

these results, we get the feeling that, for counterparts, these non-technical skills are not so much a facilitative lubricant or set of training wheels, but are more like the gasoline, or one of a pair of wheels, which are crucial for technology transfer.

Another important viewpoint lies in how closely the Japanese experts worked with their Ghanaian counterparts. The counterparts did observe the Japanese experts closely, and in the interview and workshop, their evaluations were also concrete rather than abstract. In other words, we think that this substantiates just how closely the Japanese experts worked with their counterparts. Naturally, as a result, it seems that there were some experts who were criticized for having poor communication skills, but this too can only be the result of having worked closely with the experts. To varying degrees, the Japanese experts were working within sight of the counterparts. It is because of this close relationship that we may have this view of various types of criticism emerging.

(2) The relationship between counterparts and Japanese experts

The respective features of good and poor Japanese experts and counterparts were as described in the above table, but what was the relationship between them like? We interviewed the counterparts on whether they thought their relationship with the Japanese experts was one of equal footing, and whether they thought it should be. The result was simply “it varies depending on the expert.” Certain counterparts were of the opinion that, “In no way was it equal footing. The counterparts were subordinate and the Japanese led with sole discretion.” On the other hand, some were of a differing opinion, “It was equal footing. It was a relationship of equal footing where the Japanese experts always listened to the opinions of the Ghanaian counterparts.” It seems that the counterparts who responded to the interview had completely different impressions depending on the Japanese experts with which they were involved. In actual fact, in many cases their answers were made on personal bases: “this expert was like this, and that expert was like that.” So it is difficult to reach any categorical conclusion. As mentioned previously, because the Japanese experts, who were the key player, were making decisions on the fundamental approach to be taken, and JICA has no guideline for relationship-building, it is understandable that there were huge differences between individuals.


Furthermore, opinions were also divided over the question of whether the relationship should be on equal footing in light of the characteristics of technical assistance, or whether an asymmetric relationship like a “student and teacher relationship” would be better. An opinion of counterparts that most emphasize being equal read, “The positioning of ‘counterpart,’ as originally used in English-speaking Europe and the U.S., was one of equal footing and with equal authority. In this sense, Japan’s ‘counterpart’ is ‘subordinate,’ and this is wrong.” At the same time, some counterparts are looking at the relationship positively: “As long as technical cooperation is provided, it is understandable experts and counterparts have a relationship akin to a student and teacher relationship.” A middle-of-the-road opinion stated, “Because it is technical cooperation, I recognize that, in some sense, the Japanese

experts are technically advanced, but the counterparts have a local knowledge as Ghanaians, so the relationship should be one of equal footing.” It is important to understand the fact that opinions as to “what a counterpart is” and “what their relationship with Japanese experts should be” are divided according to each counterpart, as mentioned above.

What needs to be sorted here is the question of in which fields the Japanese and counterparts should have “equal footing” or a “student and teacher” relationship. For example, even if counterparts advocate for equal footing, the counterparts and Japanese will not be the same technically. If this were to be recognized, then there would be absolutely no need to send the experts. Conversely, even if one asserts that the Japanese experts should be in a teacher-like position for the counterparts, technical cooperation would become meaningless if the experts end up doing things themselves which the counterparts are supposed to learn through OJT. The important question is who should take leadership, and where leadership should be taken. We have attempted to sort out the question in Figure 3-1.

According to Figure 3-1, because the Japanese experts feel the significance of their existence through technology, and as an advice provider, the Japanese should take lead and provide accurate advice. At the other end, for specific activities, it would be not beneficial for the counterpart if the

Figure 3-1 Balance and Gap in the Relationship between Experts and Counterparts



Source: Created by author

Japanese experts take the lead. Herein lies the problem of ownership. While the Japanese experts remain committed as advisors, they need to allow the counterparts to implement specific activities and to improve their practical skills. The goals and content of intermediate activities are the ones Japanese experts and counterparts should work together as equal partners by examining what kind of activities to be implemented, and ensuring consistency with their needs and the project purpose. However, if the Japanese experts decide everything from the setting of goals to the planning of activities, and if main activities are implemented under the “leadership” of the experts, conflict will arise with the counterparts, or the counterparts will become detached. Another issue lies in the fact that processes are unfathomed only from outcomes even when the outcomes have been produced through an ideal process, or an incorrect Japanese-led approach. Though performance-based management with the use of PDM or other similar mechanisms has been prevalent, this kind of achievement-oriented management will not be able to be used for the management of process, which is the most important part of Japan’s technical cooperation.

(3) Were there any CD effects on from individuals, to organizations and society?

In recommendations made on technical cooperation by the UNDP, the necessity is raised for the provision of comprehensive technical support for the three levels of from individuals, to organizations and society. In contrast, in JICA’s reports and articles, public organizations were defined as counterpart organizations, and the staff of those organizations as counterparts; and it is purported that, in this sense, social impacts also can be expected. How, then, does Ghana’s case stack up? Table 3-4 summarizes the opinions of the counterparts: In addition to the results in Table 3-4, the counterparts were also asked which of the phases, from the “Individual Expert Phase” to the “Technical Cooperation Follow-up Phase,” were most effective for CD. The following trends were observed:

- In terms of technological improvements for counterparts and farmers, the effects were largest during the SSIAPP Main Phase and beyond. This is because, from the Main Phase onward, even more practical technical development and OJT were implemented in the field, and there were more opportunities for counterpart training. There were direct benefits for the farmers in the model districts from this phase and beyond.
- Another view was that each of the phases had distinct objectives, and in this sense, all phases were effective for the counterparts to build CD progressively.
- Meanwhile, it was pointed out from an organizational viewpoint that, as a material impact on GIDA, a large amount of equipment and materials were provided during the Individual Expert Phase and the Mini Project Phase (development center). Furthermore, there was also the view that, as a psychological impact on GIDA, GIDA’s frame of reference was broadened through the implementation of nationwide expansion during the Follow-up Phase.

As far as looking at the results of the interviews, JICA’s efforts of more than 16 years in promoting irrigation in Ghana brought about psychological changes at the individual level in addition

Table 3-4 Impact of Technical Cooperation on Individuals, Organizations and Society

Level	Impact of JICA's Technical Cooperation (number of opinions)
Individual (Counterparts)	Able to acquire new technology (5) Able to acquire new knowledge (3) Psychological changes, such as sincerity and sense of pride toward work (2) Acquired skills such as time management and administration methods (1)
Organization (GIDA)	Virtually no effects (4) GIDA's awareness broadened. From irrigation to agriculture. To a national level (2) Provision of equipment and materials to IDC; Provision of means to transfer (1) Human resources development for staff (1) Began to recognize IDC as a technology center (1)
Society (Farming Communities)	* Increased volume of agricultural produce (4) * Social impacts, such as formation of farmer organizations (3) Improvement in attitude toward GIDA (1) Developed farmers' knowledge (1) Virtually no effects (1) (* changes limited to only model districts)

Source: Created by author

to technological changes, such as sincerity and a sense of pride toward work. The efforts also had a positive effect on non-technology capacity, such as time management and work methods. Meanwhile, at the organizational level, opinions were divided. While there was the opinion that the material impact of providing equipment and materials to the IDC, as well as GIDA's awareness as an organization, and its activities had broadened, about half of the counterparts who were interviewed stated "there was virtually no effect." It seems that the changes at the individual level were not linked to any changes visible to the organization. During the period that JICA provided continuous support, the truth is that GIDA contracted as an organization, and also became financially weaker. Finally, with regard to the impact at the social level, it has been recognized that there were tremendous impacts in the model districts particularly because substantive activities were implemented in the model districts under the SSIAPP (technical cooperation project). (This has also been confirmed by the opinions of the farmers discussed hereafter.) At the same time, if we take the term "society" to refer to the other districts and the Ghanaian society as a whole, there were no particular activities implemented other than the mostly knowledge-based intervention during the final phase, and the results of the interviews also indicated that there were no recognizable effects on society at large.

This is because JICA has essentially adopted a person-to-person approach for individual-based technical cooperation through close contact. Furthermore, with regard to the institutional development of GIDA, and the impact on the Ghanaian farming society as a whole, while they can be seen as documented in the original written plans, organizational or social involvements were not the specific intent of the activity plans. The truth is, while GIDA has been made the organizational counterpart, the reality of technical cooperation has begun and ended with individual-based cooperation. Naturally, as a

hypothesis made in the abovementioned JICA report, we may rationalize that individual-based cooperation indirectly strengthens organizations which in turn impacts on society. However, it is probably natural to conclude that this kind of social impact could not have been confirmed in a visible form as a result of the cooperation of 16 years in view of the counterparts' opinions, and the fact that GIDA was actually continuously weakened as an organization.

(4) The significance of JICA's technical cooperation

As can be seen in the preceding text, JICA's technical cooperation was preoccupied with mostly capacity strengthening at the individual level despite its long efforts of 16 years. We wonder whether there was either significance in doing so, or whether it was something that reflected GIDA's needs in the first place. Counterparts were asked the following question: "Was the long cooperation of 16 years meaningful? If you could start over again, would you do the same things again?" Looking at the results, 7 out of 9 people responded that "the duration was appropriate," 1 person responded, "too long," and the other person responded that "something that was different from the original objective was achieved."

First, the following points can be raised as reasons for why the cooperation spanning a long period was appropriate:

- Impacts that were only possible from efforts of a long duration have been generated (counterparts' capacity building, and socioeconomic changes in the model districts).
- It takes time to analyze complex situations.
- Farmer assistance is something which takes time in the first place.
- There was significance at each stage (each phase), and counterparts were able to progressively learn new technologies at each stage.

This last opinion is important. In Chapter 2, we remarked on the progressive approach of the Japanese. This gradual or progressive approach has been raised as a characteristic from the counterparts' point of view, and this fact has been evaluated highly. What was impressive were the counterpart's words: "Unlike the projects of other donors, once JICA's technical cooperation starts, it does not lapse. JICA's progressive approach is effective in advancing technology over the long-term." In the first place, CD is something which proceeds in incremental steps, and Japan's progressive approach is an example that proved effective. In this sense, it can be said that Japan's technical cooperation has implemented an approach which is in marked contrast to the simple technology gap-filling approach like that criticized in UNDP's article.

Meanwhile, the response that the cooperation was "too long" refers to there being unproductive periods in each phase, and that each individual phase could have been made shorter. It was an opinion that long-running technical cooperation in itself is significant, but even more things can be achieved in

the same amount of time by clarifying the individual objectives and proceeding in a more efficient manner. Appeals for efficiency or improvements could also be similarly seen in the group that responded that the duration was “appropriate.” The following summarizes those views:

- In the beginning, assistance was concentrated only on the IDC, so organizational changes could not be effected for GIDA. If GIDA had been sufficiently involved in the assistance from the outset, there could have been marked organizational effects.
- When a Japanese expert is around, things get done. But the very moment he has gone, things stop. This indicates that, GIDA has not learnt as an organization, and in this respect, improvements are necessary for the approach.
- Counterparts were nurtured over a long period, but there has been a drain of human resources. In this sense, sustainability has been lost.

Essentially, there are no problems as such in the assistance spanning of 16 long years. But with regard to the abovementioned “method of assistance,” we think the overall opinion of the counterparts is that there is still room for improvement. Here we would like to pose the question: To what extent were the needs of the counterparts originally reflected in JICA’s technical cooperation? Institutionally, Japan acts under a principle of “request-based” support. In principle, under the framework, cooperation can only be provided once there is a need from the Ghanaian side. However, in reality, there is a broad range of case examples. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are also instances where the direction of technical cooperation is decided with the strong leadership of the Japanese experts. If seen through the eyes of the Japanese experts, there is probably an awareness of developing plans that incorporate the opinions of the Ghanaians, but this is merely an observation of the Japanese experts themselves. Therefore, we need to find out the extent to which the needs of the counterparts were reflected from the viewpoint of the counterparts. The following summarizes the interview results from the question: “Do you think that the needs and opinions of the counterparts were respected and realized by the technical cooperation?”

- It could be argued that they have been satisfactorily respected and realized. (3)
- To some extent. Some parts have not been realized. (4)
- The needs have not been reflected. (2)

The group that responded, “They have been satisfactorily reflected,” said that the Japanese experts promoted projects in daily consultation with the counterparts, and that the SSIAPP (technical cooperation project) was what had been sought after by GIDA.

The group that responded, “To some extent,” included the view that they were unachievable due to certain constraints on the part of Japan, as well as the view that they were unachievable due to certain constraints on the part of Ghana. Constraints on the part of Japan were mainly caused by namely the fact that financial incentives were not paid to the counterparts. As part of JICA’s policies, financial

incentives, such as salary top-ups, are not paid, and there is much discontent toward this point. (Financial incentives will be discussed in detail later.) Furthermore, with regard to the provision of equipment and materials, there were views expressed that the details of such provision were decided by the Japanese experts, and that the views of the Ghanaians were not reflected. Constraints on the part of Ghana refers to the fact that GIDA was unable to sufficiently fund inputs as it should have done (including payment of wages to staff), and do the things as it should have done.

The view that, “The needs have not been reflected,” stems from the criticism that the Japanese experts made decisions on purchases and selections of equipment and materials, and the actual equipment and materials that were chosen during the initial stage were not fully utilized. This view is also based on the communication problems between the Japanese side and the Ghanaian side, or between the IDC and the senior levels of management at GIDA. Moreover, it was also pointed out that the problems were caused because GIDA itself did not properly inform the Japanese side its needs, or what it wanted to do in the first place.

Like the previous evaluation of the Japanese experts, reasons for this diverse range of responses related to needs rest on “with which expert,” “under what kind of relationship,” and “how long the involvement was.” Counterparts who had been involved with thoroughly supportive Japanese experts with good communication skills had experienced having their own opinions taken fully into account. For this reason, they might have replied that their needs have been substantially reflected. In the cases where the experts had undertaken the opposite approach, and counterparts had considered their relationship as “one of equal footing,” they might have evaluated that their needs were not reflected in the slightest. Suppose the Japanese had undertaken strong leadership, and a counterpart was a type of person who affirmed a student and teacher relation, and thought it only natural, we can probably hypothesize that, similarly, their view will be that their needs have been reflected well.


(5) Modeling of the counterpart point of view

Up until this point, we have commented on the views of the counterparts. If we were to outline the interviews individually, there is a tendency for counterparts who gave good reports on the experts to similarly view the project and JICA’s overall technical cooperation in a favorable light. Counterparts who evaluated an expert’s collective strengths (such as communication skills in technical cooperation) as high determined that their own opinions had been sufficiently reflected in the projects, and that the CD effect of JICA’s technical cooperation was high. Conversely, counterparts who were disgruntled with the experts took the view that their own personal views as well as the views of the Ghanaians had not been reflected, and that JICA’s technical cooperation had virtually no effect. If a person or object has been given favorable consideration, then it is only natural that there be the tendency for the person to also give the attached organization, country and the underlying technology similar favorable consideration. For example, it is an ordinary phenomenon in school education or training that, if a

teacher is attractive, then the content of that study will be seen as having profound significance, and interestingly it will produce a learning effect.

Of course, this is a subjective issue, and it may also be that there is some misconception on the part of the counterpart. But what is important here is the question, including any of these misconceptions, as to what kind of perception of Japan’s technical cooperation the counterparts embraced. When a close-contact type of technology transfer is to be implemented, as with Japan’s technical cooperation, the relationship between counterparts and Japanese experts will become extremely important, and the question of how the counterparts view the Japanese experts will be linked to the success or otherwise of the motivation. We can see from the interviews that, when the evaluation of the Japanese experts is good, then this means there will be recognition that their needs have been

Figure 3-2 Counterparts’ Recognition Structure



Source: Created by author

Box 3-1 “Critical” Counterparts

In the interviews, there was a broad range of counterparts, but 1 counterpart in particular was negative toward Japan’s technical cooperation from beginning to end. He was negative toward the Japanese experts, and the stance of JICA’s technical cooperation. In his view, the Japanese experts looked down at the Ghanaian counterparts, and would not listen to their views on project strategies or the selection of equipment and materials. Furthermore, on the topic of the technical cooperation project implemented by JICA, he commented that this was originally a GIDA project, and it was as if JICA had “taken it over” without reflecting the needs of GIDA. The counterpart himself had carried some weight in GIDA, and he had been a key counterpart in projects, participating for a period of time on the management of JICA’s technical cooperation project. However, he had been in conflict with the ideologies of the Japanese experts at the time, and it came to pass that he was removed from the project management. Possibly influenced by this, he negatively assessed everything to do with JICA’s cooperation during this interview. Furthermore, it was not just with JICA. He held extremely negative views on the development actions of other donors as well. He has his own opinions, and there is no way of objectively knowing whether these are correct or not, or whether there was really an issue with the attitude of the Japanese experts. One thing for sure is that his recognition was built for one reason (for the conflict with the Japanese experts), and he had become categorically negative toward all other matters.

reflected, and the view toward Japan's technical cooperation will be given favorable consideration. Then again, when the relationship-building with the Japanese expert is not successful, then there is a tendency that any effects of Japan's technical cooperation will also be seen negatively. It would be fair to say that the importance of the Japanese experts in Japan's technical cooperation has also been recognized here.

3-2-2 The Reality as Seen by the Farmers

How was JICA's technical cooperation perceived by the farmers? During the Individual Expert Phase from 1988, IDC was built in Ashaiman, a suburb of Accra. Then since 1997, technical cooperation project activities targeted at the same district has been continuously done. The history of this district began with the completion in 1968 of the gravity-type irrigation system funded by the Government of Ghana. This led to farmers migrating, and the formation of the district. Following this, in 1969, the planting of rice began through the technical cooperation of Taiwan. Then in 1972, this was superseded by China's technical cooperation, and its technical cooperation for rice cultivation continued until 1976. Then, in 1977, the management was transferred to GIDA. Finally, about 10 years later, with the construction of JICA's IDC, once again, the area became a target district for technical cooperation.

In this study, we had farmers from the Ashaiman district gather, in order for the results of JICA's technical cooperation to be evaluated through the eyes of the farmers. (Gender: 3 males, and 3 females; Ages: 1 in his or her 60s, 4 in their 50s, and 1 in his or her 30s) The workshop-format was the method adopted.


(1) The pattern of improvements to agricultural production and farmers' lifestyles as seen by the farmers

First, we asked the farmers to show the trend of how volumes of agricultural production had changed from 1965 to the present date. While the trend line is nothing more than the farmers' own subjectivity, it is connected to the farmers' own day-to-day feelings, so it is informative. According to the trends, up until the 1980s prior to aid being introduced from Japan, production volumes were severely influenced each time there was a drought or similar event. With irrigation facilities being aged, and irrigated land areas being decreased, the farmers were only just managing to get by. During the course of this period, technical assistance had been provided by China and other donors. However, the effects were limited to the short-term, and agriculture continued precariously in the medium and long term. Following this, as shown by the line, the farmers' impression was that there were sudden improvements, in particular after the start of the SSIAPP. However, this was not so much affected by the technical cooperation, but was greatly affected by the improvement of irrigation facilities through grant aid at the same time as the SSIAPP. Japan's technical cooperation, including the individually dispatched expert and mini projects, had begun prior to the SSIAPP, but the farmers' impression was

that the effects were actually realized through SSIAPP, which started in 1997. An interesting phenomenon was that the farmers were of the impression that market mummies (brokers) helped the farmers during the 1990s. Usually, brokers tend to have an image of exploiting farmers, but it was recognized that they also performed a role as a supporter.


From just looking at this trend, though IDC was established in the Ashaiman district under the leadership of the individually dispatched expert from 1988, and activities linked to research projects had continued, it would be fair to say that there was virtually no impact on the farmers prior to the SSIAPP (namely, the technical cooperation project). During the SSIAPP, direct intervention in the farmers began, and the growth in agricultural production from this time is spectacular. The evaluation data from the time of the conclusion of SSIAPP also substantiates the fact that agricultural production increased exponentially. And it was not merely increases in production. As stated by the farmers

Figure 3-3 The Trend of Changes in Agricultural Production



Source: Created by author

Figure 3-4 The Trend of Changes in Farmer Incomes



Source: Created by author

themselves, there has been the huge social impact of stabilizing agricultural production, which used to be subject to the amount of rainfall, and stabilizing the lives of the farmers.

(2) Effects of technical cooperation as seen by the farmers

It could, however, also be argued that the direct and material intervention, including the improvement of facilities and other hardware aspects, was instrumental in this dramatic improvement. Let us examine the question: What exactly was the extent of the impact from the technical cooperation? During the workshop, we had each of the farmers select 5 reasons why agricultural production was improved, and we had them evaluate each effect using the “public assessment” technique. (Rather than a “1-person 1-vote” system, the “public assessment” technique is a method where each voter is given multiple votes to allocate at their discretion, and the votes for each candidate are tallied. For example, supposing a voter has 10 votes and 3 options (A, B, C), and the voter wants to select both A and B, 5 votes will be cast for A and B respectively. In this study, each farmer had ten votes, and to avoid any group bias, the farmers were called to vote 1 by 1.)

Table 3-5 shows the results. As can be seen in Table 3-5, the most significant result was that the honest impression of the farmers was that the improvement of the irrigation facilities (47 %) had been most effective. Next was inputs, such as fertilizer, that had become available with the establishment of the Farmers’ Bank (28 %). In contrast, technical training (8 %) was not evaluated particularly high. It is evident that the farmers believed that the most significant effect generated was from the improvements to agricultural facilities, and other facilities and equipment. Even during the research project phase prior to the SSIAPP, technical training for rice cultivation was conducted sporadically. However, according to the testimonies of the farmers, and related documents, there was no mentioning that agricultural production had actually improved by technical training. In other words, one could argue that the exponential growth in agricultural production could not have been possible without the cooperation provided for facilities and equipment.

On the other hand, this is not to say that the effects of software aspects were weak. It is believed that cooperation in terms of the software aspects for facilities and equipment, such as the operation, maintenance and water management of irrigation facilities, and the system for the collection of irrigation service charges, was instrumental in augmenting the effects from the improvement of facilities. Furthermore, in order to establish the Farmers’ Bank as an institution, technical cooperation for securing its sustainability was a crucial factor, in addition to the mere provision of source materials. The truth is, irrigation facilities already existed in this district, but they had deteriorated. It was not simply a case of their being no money to fund the improvement costs, but part of the reason was because the farmer-led maintenance was not sufficient. If only facilities and equipment had been needed, surely the state of the irrigation facilities in Ghana would not have fallen into such a state of neglect. It may sound like a cliché, but the fact is that an even greater impact was able to be produced

Table 3-5 Reasons for Improved Agricultural Production, and their Respective Levels of Effects

Reasons for improved agricultural production	Score	%	F1	F2	F3	M1	M2	M3
Fertilizer and other inputs courtesy of the Farmers' Bank	17	28 %	2	3	2	3	3	4
Technical training	5	8 %			2	2	1	
Improvement of irrigation facilities	28	47 %	5	5	5	5	4	4
Provision of farming equipment	7	12 %	3	1	1		1	1
Provision of seeds (high-quality seeds)	3	5 %		1			1	1
Total	60	100 %	10	10	10	10	10	10

F: female farmer; M: male farmer

Source: Created by author

through cooperation for both hardware and software aspects combined.

The farmers were optimistic about whether they could continue their activities by themselves following the SSIAPP. The opinion of the farmers was that repayments to the Farmers' Bank were on target, the farmers' organizations were solid, and the farmers were basically able to maintain the facilities themselves. They said that if they had sought something from Japan, what they would want was further technical guidance on cultivating vegetables, and the feeling was that regular, short-term guidance would be sufficient. The fact that the farmers have this kind of confidence toward sustainability is probably the result of JICA's long and practical technical cooperation. In terms of social impacts, in particular women's position in society, female farmers are aware of the substantial improvements as a result of the organization of women for which the Japanese experts had strived, especially during the SSIAPP phase. They said that, as it turned out, they gained confidence because they became able to make rice themselves, and they no longer depended on males financially. In this district, since there are more than a few farming households which are supported by women, it appears that the impact was particularly great for these types of farming households.

(3) Impressions of the experts

In order to ascertain the extent to which Japanese experts came in contact with the farmers, and to ascertain the way in which the contact was made, we interviewed the farmers on their impressions of the experts. I had the farmers give names as best they could recall, and asked them to speak freely on their impressions of each of them. Box 3-2 contains a fragment of what they said.

As depicted in Box 3-2, farmers seem to have strong impressions of experts, and in particular of experts who were played an active part close to the farmers. Furthermore, their evaluations were extremely specific and good. 1 expert in particular (Mr. Z in Box 3-2) was a person who, in the words of the farmers, was like a "god." He worked together with the farmers, and provided equipment, materials and other objects according to the needs of the farmers. However, this same expert drew

Box 3-2 Farmers' Impression of Experts

"Mr. X is 'hardworking,' and does not seem to like 'non-hardworking' Ghanaians. He also created a forest around here by planting lots of trees."

"Mr. B likes interacting with people. He promoted 'cleaning day' when all the people would clean up around the place. Apparently, this was well received by the farmers too."

"I do not remember so much Mr. Y. On the other hand, I remember well ' ' who was one of JOCV staying here at around the same time."

"I do not remember much about Mr. A."

"Mr. Z is a good person. He has the heart of a farmer. He also built us this meeting hall. He formed a women's group, and taught us how to make rice. He also planned a bread-baking project and purchased us equipment and materials, but we have not been able to build a facility (shed) to house the equipment and materials, so they are not being used."

"Mr. M is a good person." [We were unable to ask specifically in what way he was good.]

"Mr. N is a good person, and interacted well with us." [However, there were also farmers who did not know him.]

"Mr. H is a straight person. He did not interact much with others."

criticism from the counterparts as being poor at communicating and for not listening to the needs of the counterparts. Judging comprehensively the views of the farmers, the counterparts, and the other relevant people who had knowledge of the circumstances, this particular expert appears to have worked more through direct contact with the farmers than with the counterparts. In this way, evaluations emerge which are a complete about-face from other evaluations, and we believe that this day-to-day communication and relationship-building are the keys to determining just how much of an impression is made. This is the same as the relationship between counterparts and experts, as mentioned previously, and it made us realize the importance of personal communication.

3-2-3 Survey Results by Theme

As part of the field study, we interviewed relevant people on the theme of the "pros and cons of financial incentives," which was raised in Chapter 2 as an issue of Japan's technical cooperation. We also interviewed them on the theme of "their thoughts on the technical cooperation of other donors" for a comparison with Japan. In this section, we will discuss an overview and analysis of the results of those interviews.

(1) The pros and cons of financial incentives

In Chapter 2, we gave an overview of Japan's long history of technical assistance in Ghana. The one thing that has left all the experts puzzled has been the issue of "financial incentives." In a case like Japan's transfer of technology from individuals to individuals, the attitude of the counterpart, who is the recipient of the technical cooperation, is a crucial factor. Various types of incentives can be thought of that motivate the counterparts, but the very first thing that the Ghanaian counterparts express is "financial incentives." The following types of financial incentives are possible.

Extra compensation on top of wages and salaries (Top-up)

Project charges (Honorarium/Remuneration/Overtime Allowance)

Daily allowances when participating in training, etc. (Sitting Allowance)

Accommodation costs and daily allowances which are necessary for field trips, etc. (Travel Allowance)

Due to the problem of allowances being provided to personnel of public institutions in partner countries, as a matter of policy, JICA does not approve of the above financial incentives, or . To begin with, such provision is outside their jurisdiction, and there are also fears that financial incentives will harm the long-term sustainability of the partner and lower their morals. (However, there have been cases where such payments have been made at the individual discretion of the expert on a piecemeal basis.) Furthermore, with regard to financial incentive, any payment is kept to a level equivalent to the domestic level. On the other hand, there are some cases where the payment of counterparts' wages is in arrears, or the wage levels are too low to begin with, such that the counterparts cannot even pay for the gasoline to get to the field, and they request some kind of financial incentive from the donors. Still further confusion is added to matters by the fact that some donors (a very small portion) do pay incentives, and others make payment through those in charge of the field, or those of similar responsibility despite their policy prohibiting such payment. These kinds of examples may be small in number and they may be being conducted on an exception basis, but for the counterparts, they lead to discontent, claiming, "Other donors pay incentives, so why won't Japan do?"

As part of this study, we gathered GIDA staff together for discussion in a workshop format regarding the pros and cons of financial incentives. The purpose was to first sort out the question of why financial incentives are necessary according to the logic of counterparts, then come to an understanding of the necessity and effects, and finally to explore alternatives for other incentives. At the beginning of the workshop, we divided the counterparts into 2 groups, and had them perform a role play, with one group being GIDA (Ghana team), and the other group being JICA (Japan team). The idea was for the Ghana team to list "why financial incentives are necessary," for the Japan team to list "what is wrong with financial incentives," so the 2 teams could debate with each other. The trial went amiss from the start because initially none of the counterparts wanted to join the Japan side. More than not wanting to join, it was more a case that they "had no idea why financial incentives were wrong," even if they did join. Consequently, we had a former Japanese expert who was traveling with us act as an assistant on the "Japan team." On this basis, the counterparts agreed to participate in discussions, and the workshop proceeded. Table 3-6 shows the results of the discussion.

As can be seen in Table 3-6, with respect to the affirmative opinion on financial incentives, although there are a number of overlapping areas, the counterparts were able to reel off reasons with hardly any effort. We can broadly divide these opinions into 2 categories. One of them is financial incentives as motivation. The logic is that incentives are linked to the resulting outcomes of the project.

Table 3-6 Arguments For and Against Financial Incentives

Why are financial incentives necessary?	What is wrong with financial incentives?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They raise motivation. • They allow people to concentrate on work. • Counterparts become more innovative. • There is more time for work. • Fairness at work (differentiates between those counterparts who work hard and those who do not). • They raise the quality of outputs. • They achieve the results of the project. • They contribute to achieving the project purpose. • We do not have any financial incentives at all. • The real income of the counterparts is low. • For the happiness of the counterparts' families. • To prevent counterparts transferring to other employment. • The counterparts become more involved with the farmers. • For better relationships between counterparts and experts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For sustainability once the project is complete. • Aid recipient countries have roles and responsibilities. • Tax-payers frown upon "spoon-fed" type aid to aid recipient countries. • Aid recipient countries will stop having serious discussion on fiscal policies. • Technical cooperation is not for assisting individuals, but for supporting development.

Source: Created by author

The second category is incentives as a form of income for social security. The notion of becoming reliant on aid from Japan also “for the happiness of the counterparts’ families” is beyond the comprehension of the Japanese way of thinking, which demands the so-called “attitude of self-sacrifice.” As far as the counterparts are concerned, they are probably seeking fair compensation for their work, so we can sense a cultural gap between the ways the Ghana team and the Japan team respectively perceive financial incentives. On the other hand, there are not so many negative opinions toward financial incentives. More than just being few in number, through our observation on the discussion, it seems that it was only after considerable assistance from the Japanese expert that the participants at last came forward with opinions. As can be seen here, the counterparts did not fully understand the reasons why JICA did not provide financial incentives. According to the Japanese expert, who accompanied us, apparently explanations were sometimes given to the counterparts as to why JICA did not provide financial incentives, but it was evident from looking at these results, that the counterparts had not understood the reasons. To a certain extent, this may be due to the explanation on the part of the Japanese being inadequate, but another part of the reason is most likely the counterparts not accepting the explanation, and because there exists an underlying cultural gap.

During the workshop, discussion was also held on whether there should be any incentives other than financial incentives. Table 3-7 shows the opinions of the counterparts. As can be seen in Table 3-7, the one incentive that is recognized as being highly feasibly and highly effective is training in Japan or a third nation. However, attention needs to be drawn to the fact that the counterparts have real expectations that, by participating in training, they will be provided daily allowances related to the training, and that they will receive a range of other benefits. If we look at the other proposals, despite

Table 3-7 Counterpart Thoughts on Incentive Alternatives

Non-Financial Incentives	Responsible entity (payment)	Feasibility/Motivational Effect
Increase of participation in training in Japan	Donor	High / High
Training in third countries	Donor	High / High
Health funds (mutual aid funds)	Project	Low / High
Advances on wages	Project	Medium / High
Performance-based income distribution	Project	Low / High
Awarding of outcomes-based certificates of merit	Project	High / Low
Support directly linked to income	Project	Low / High
Income through consultant service	Project	High / High

Source: Created by author

the fact that they were asked to give ideas for non-financial incentives, almost all of the ideas end up having some kind of indirect monetary relationship. The only incentive that is truly “non-financial” is “outcomes-based certificates of merit.” Even so, its motivational effect was ranked as low. Since the theme of the workshop was “arguments for and against financial incentives,” it was inevitable that their opinions would be drawn toward such a topic, but the fact that the views given by the counterparts focused mostly on finance-related ideas was a consequence of just how much financial incentives were of great concern. It is not entirely the responsibility of the counterparts that this kind of mindset has taken root. The Government of Ghana, which cannot properly pay their wages, also has responsibility, and the donors are also partly responsible. What made a lasting impression during this workshop were the words uttered, as if venting their frustration, by a Ghanaian counterpart who had always appeared cheerful and witty: “You say that if counterparts are provided financial incentives, then after the project, sustainability will disappear. But... to begin with, it’s difficult enough just carrying on with our everyday lives, so much so that we cannot give our 100 % to the projects. Before sustainability, isn’t the problem to do with the actual running of the project!!”

At the same time though, there is also hope in sight. At the beginning of the workshop, we asked the counterparts at what times they felt “happy” or “unhappy.” The results are shown in Table 3-8. As shown in Table 3-8, the lack of financial incentives was the most common reason given for unhappiness. Meanwhile, as reasons for happiness, they gave being able to participate in activities as part of the project, and the associated sense of achievement; and gaining a variety of experiences during the training in Japan. Herzberg’s theory of motivation in business management cites “hygiene factors and motivation factors.” Based on a range of experimental testing, it has been demonstrated that there is a wide range of factors that motivate people, and that, although financial factors are a source of discontent, they are not a source of motivation.

- Factors that produce satisfaction
“Achievement,” “Approval,” “Work itself,” “Responsibility”
- Factors that produce dissatisfaction
“Corporate policies and management,” “Supervision,” “Relationship with supervisors,” “Work conditions,” “Salary”
- Factors that produce both satisfaction and dissatisfaction
“Advancement,” “Growth”

According to this theory, rather than motivation factors being monetary, they include being recognized for one’s performance and work, and the work in itself. In contrast, it is purported that no matter how much wages and other allowances are improved, they will not lead to motivation though a person’s level of discontent may fall. If we look at the results of the counterparts in Table 3-8, financial problems appear to be sources of discontent, but it is unlikely that money is one of their motivations. While a basic income should be assured, it appears that such factors given by the counterparts for their happiness, as “participation in activities,” “a sense of achievement,” and “a wide range of experiences gained through training,” trigger true motivation. Even during the workshop with the counterparts, an opinion was voiced that “Other donors give financial incentives, whereas JICA doesn’t give us any.” Let us look at what the reality is. During this study we had the good fortune to interview representative donors in Ghana on their philosophies. Table 3-9 shows the views of people at the field manager level from each of the donors. Table 3-9 shows that, with the exception of the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and Care, other donors were not providing large amounts of financial incentives. As illustrated, the majority of donors in Ghana are opposed to financial incentives. This

Table 3-8 Counterpart Happiness and Unhappiness

Counterpart	Happiest time as a counterpart	Unhappy/difficult time as a counterpart
A	Participatory-approach training, and resulting development of workshop methods.	When a certain proposal was rejected by the expert.
B	When the SSIAPP (technical cooperation project) began.	The incentives during training are low.
C	When I could contribute to the development of the guidelines and strategies.	There are no outcomes-based financial incentives.
D	When I undertook training at Tsukuba (I was able to interact with people from various countries.).	When the results of my work were not recognized.
E	Training at the TBIC (JICA Tsukuba International Centre).	When financial incentives were not approved at the end of the project.
F	When I was able to present the results of the SSIAPP in Kenya.	When I was grilled by the expert for something that was no fault of my own.
G	When the full-scale SSIAPP training began in 2000.	When I found out that there were no financial incentives.

Source: Created by author

Table 3-9 Donor Thoughts on Financial Incentives

Donor/Person Questioned	On the subject of financial incentives
FAO (Representative from Ghana Office)	The project coordinator is an employee of the Government of Ghana, however, no associated compensation or top-up is paid. The policy is to not pay out any direct top-ups. However, staff travel expenses, fuel for vehicles, and daily allowances are paid. Examples of daily allowances include US\$ 80 per night for field trips to Kumasi, and around US\$ 59 per night for field trips to other rural areas.
World Bank (Expert on natural environmental management)	Their policy is to not pay out top-ups. The principle of not covering salaries had already been adopted 10 years ago. An example of daily allowances is 350,000 cedi (per night) for middle-echelon employees. Even for ministerial ranks, the allowance is not set terribly high, at 500,000 cedi.
DFID (Expert on village development)	The DFID policy is not to pay out top-ups. Sitting allowances (the payment of money for merely participating in workshops or meetings) are also not authorized. Since 1990, such payments have not been made, and even in project documents, it is clearly stated that top-ups will not be provided.
EU (Agricultural Policy Advisor)	Financial incentives are not paid in Ghana. There are instances of payments being made at other EU Offices in Central and South America, but not in Ghana. However, payments of 32 to 35 euros are made for daily allowances for business trips. These payments are kept low, and excessive payments are avoided.
CIDA (Policy Advisor)	CIDA does not pay out top-ups. Up until now, in Ghana, these payments have never been made. With regard to daily allowances for accommodation expenses, payment is made on a basis of amounts required for actual hotel and meal charges. At present, a consultant has been engaged to examine this, and CIDA is considering setting charges to minimum amounts based on the findings in the future.
GTZ (Head of Ghana Office)	GTZ does not pay out any top-ups whatsoever. Naturally, they provide hotels when conducting seminars, but they provide very hotel rooms and meals, rather than paying out money.
IWMI (Representative of West Africa Office)	IWMI does pay financial incentives. In order to maintain equity, they also provide disbursements for each outcome (deliverable) instead of mere top-ups.
Care International (Representative from Ghana Office)	Care does provide financial incentives. Care has an established level, but when a local NGO has its own rate, Care matches that. For example, when participating in a project, and increasing staff numbers, payment of about 8 % is made for their salaries and expenses, or top-ups of 5 % are paid. Compensation for salaries is made, but daily allowances are not paid. This is totally different from government-run organizations.

Source: Created by author

point shows that, amongst the donors, JICA’s policy is not necessarily unorthodox, but instead is mainstream. Prior to this survey, the hypothesis was that “almost all other donors besides JICA are providing financial incentives,” however, this proved to be a misconception.

However, what we sensed through the interviews was the fact that there is conflicting information even among the donors. When one donor said that a certain donor “seemed to be giving out incentives,” we went to hear what the donor in question had to say. On the contrary, it turned out that they did not provide incentives. We repeatedly heard that the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) did provide incentives, however, we have been unable to confirm this due to the time constraints of the study. While they cannot provide incentives at the policy level, there may be some organizations that manage somehow to “squeeze” financial incentives out by juggling the funds at the project base level. Consequently, the actual reality

is still unclear. Currently, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is leading a comprehensive study into financial incentives in Ghana. The results of this study should clear up the question of how much is actually being paid by which organizations.

On the question of why the organizations do not provide financial incentives, they are in accord with JICA's argument. They asserted that their substantial reasons are that "from the perspective of sustainability, financial incentives are ineffective, and have many adverse impacts." As institutional reasons, they also asserted, "This is not a question of motivation, but rather a policy question on Ghana's public servants salary system." In this respect, the assertion was the same as JICA. On the other hand, we also heard the claim from donors who provide general budget support to national treasuries, such as DFID and CIDA, that, "We have been already providing support for financial incentives through general financial support, and it is Ghana's responsibility as to how these funds are used. So as donors, we have already played our part."

One thing we heard repeatedly in each interview was that Ghana was too concerned with "matters which were unrelated to development," such as financial incentives and other benefits (provision of vehicles), and that there was a sense of crisis that Ghana was not able to conduct any actually meaningful discussion on development. The fact of the matter is that this has gone too far, and Ghana is not nurturing any ownership of development. It has caused morals to degenerate such that Ghana will not cooperate in projects run by donors that do not provide financial incentives. Those donors who have provided financial incentives for short-term objectives and those who continue to provide such incentives under this kind of situation must bear a heavy responsibility.

(2) Is technical cooperation out-dated?

At present, donor circles in Ghana are rushing toward a shift from technical cooperation to budget support for the Government of Ghana. We were also able to fully sense this trend from the interviews. In addition to this, in the case of GTZ, although they do not provide financial support, their affiliate organization, the German KfW, participates in multi-donor program-type funds. The World Bank also has a system to have Ghanaian communities write up project proposals, distribute appropriations through local governments, and entrust the management, including the associated budget control, up to the local governments. (Refer to Box 3-3.)

In this way, donor circles are in the process of shifting from bilateral aid to multilateral aid, and from field-based technical cooperation to policy-level budget support. Furthermore, while it may not go as far as financial support, adopting the approach of permitting the involvement of the Government of Ghana to the greatest extent possible, similar to an approach taken by the World Bank, is becoming mainstream. As for a background for this shift, it appears as a result of the interviews that certain reflection on the approach adapted to date, and certain circumstances of the donors had helped trigger

Table 3-10 The Trend of Donors Providing Budget Support

Donor/Person Questioned	Trend of budget support
<p>DFID (Expert on village development)</p>	<p>Over a span of 4 years, DFID has been providing general budget support (Multilateral Development Budget Supports (MDBS)). In terms of scale, half of its £ 70 million budget is being disbursed from this scheme. Currently, DFID is taking this kind of multilateral approach in the fields of health, education and land management. Its only remaining bilateral aid projects are its forest management project and its bridge and feeder road development project. According to its representative, this trend of pulling back from bilateral aid is set to continue further.</p>
<p>EU (Agricultural Policy Advisor)</p>	<p>The EU provides 2 concurrent lines of assistance: technical cooperation and budget support. For example, for the development of social infrastructure, the EU takes the initiative through experts on technical cooperation, including project administration. For mining development in the field of social infrastructure, it has handed leadership over to Ghana, and provides a budget according to the proposals put forward by Ghana. In farmer development, technical support is essentially provided for farming. The reason behind this is that Ghana does not yet possess adequate technical capabilities to take the initiative in the farming sector, so it needs assistance from EU experts. In contrast, in livestock farming, Ghana possesses advanced technologies, such as technology for identifying diseases in animals, so the EU plays only a financial role with Ghana taking the initiative. In economic assistance, the EU provides budgetary aid, but it does not just supply funds, but also conducts audits. This year, a massive audit was conducted, and the EU plans to adjust the amount of aid depending on the results of the audit.</p>
<p>CIDA (Policy Advisor)</p>	<p>Implementing a major shift toward budget support is not just CIDA's policy for Ghana, but it is its global policy. CIDA provides budget support to the MOFA (Ministry of Food and Agriculture). Management was initiated in 2003, however, it was not simply entrusted to the partner country in the first year when a program for research and extension was implemented. Full-scale support has been implemented since 2004. Management is positioned within the Government of Ghana, and audits too are processed using Ghana's audit system. Management performance is monitored using process indicators, called "triggers." (There are 13 indicators - for example, the timing of budget provision, the recipients of budgets, and the appropriateness of written requests for approval.) CIDA examines these triggers once a year, and may make adjustments to the amount provided when there are any problems. Furthermore, the amount of their budget support is decided once the national budget has been handed down so that CIDA's financial support will not be treated as a replacement.</p>

Source: Created by author

Box 3-3 The World Bank's Community Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP)

This is a project for rural development, and there are instances where small-scale irrigation is included as a component in the project. A typical example is farmers paying irrigation service charges, providing maintenance, and establishing a management committee for the promotion of autonomous management.

CBRDPs adopt a demand-driven approach, and are a system whereby communities independently devise development plans, submit these to a District Assembly (DA), and with its approval, a fund is appropriated from the World Bank. With regard to funds, farmers assume 5 % of the total cost, and the DA bears approximately 10 %. The DA has responsibility for actual supervision, and the community has responsibility for day-to-day management. In doing so, this leads to CD for Ghana. Naturally, local consultants are employed for areas of management that cannot be adequately managed by themselves (human resources, procurement, finance, and M&E), but it is the DA that selects local consultants. Furthermore, the state government provides backstopping.

The philosophy is to nurture a sense of ownership by entrusting management completely to Ghana. The level of involvement by the World Bank is no more than staff from the World Bank providing occasional technical backstopping, and a supervision mission being sent for about two weeks once a year so as to gauge a general overview. Furthermore, the World Bank directly appropriates a budget (US\$ 100,000) for technical assistance, and it may use these funds, if necessary, but essentially ownership is transferred to Ghana.

the shift.

Reasons for reflection

In the technical cooperation project, the experts had worked by themselves, and this had not been at all beneficial to improving the technology of the partner country. Ownership had degenerated.

There was too much of a difference in the salaries of the consultants and the staff, so motivation degenerated.

Government agencies have become a bottleneck for development, and are not facilitating promotion. (It is better to support target groups directly.)

Donor circumstances

Due to issues such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which cannot be resolved by a single country, harmonization among the donors became necessary.

Governance became necessary in order to respond at the government policy level.

Because of budgetary cuts, it became necessary to manage funds more efficiently using the “common basket” method.

Although these circumstances have led to an acceleration toward support for general budget, it was surprising that, in the interviews, we heard a number of times from the representatives of DFID and CIDA, who were promoting budget support, that “they understood that budget support involved a substantial risk.” There is an impression that, at the policy level, their policies are written in a confident manner, demonstrating a clear direction for budget support, but at the actual management level, they do not believe that the provision of budgetary aid is the more effective “answer”; and that as part of trialing a variety of approaches following technical cooperation, they have been trialing this method as a breakthrough measure, and are now observing its effectiveness. From examining the philosophies of the respective donors toward technical cooperation, we can see that they have not actually dismissed the notion of technical cooperation.

As can be seen here, although some donors, such as the NGO Care International, have taken a negative standpoint, the philosophy of all other donors is that they do not identify technical cooperation as being something that is out-dated or unnecessary. On the contrary, those donors who are rapidly heading toward budgetary aid despite its effects remaining obscured think that technical cooperation is an important approach that complements the shortfalls of budgetary aid. At the same time, like Japan, the importance of technical cooperation in practical fields is fully understood. With other donors shifting from technical cooperation to budget assistance, and causing the void to widen in the technical component which is integral in the development of Ghana, it is conceivable that there will be an even greater need for Japan’s technical cooperation.

Table 3-11 Donor Thoughts on Technical Cooperation

Donor/Person Questioned	Thoughts on Technical Cooperation
<p>FAO (Representative from Ghana Office)</p>	<p>I regard technical cooperation at FAO as a pilot-type project prior to nationwide expansion. In one of our technical cooperation programs, we implemented water management for irrigation and provided guidance to farmers in 2 or 3 small irrigation districts over 2 years. We plan to implement the technical program on a large scale (30 to 40 districts) for expansion through an improved approach after evaluating the effects of the technical program, analyzing any problems, and clarifying what the problems were.</p>
<p>World Bank (Expert on natural environmental management)</p>	<p>I see the merit of Japan's method (namely technical cooperation) as being the fact that there will likely be direct effects of technology transfer from providing direct technical assistance, and that methods suitable for Ghana can be designed by the Japanese being directly involved with the counterparts. The downside is that the balance is difficult. For example, even if an expert teaches how to drive a car, if the expert is always driving the car, the counterpart will not learn the driving techniques. The truth is that there are numerous examples like this. (Omitted) The Government of Ghana should be made to undertake sound analysis, and then, once the needs of the Government of Ghana are known, consideration should be given as to whether to incorporate technical cooperation.</p>
<p>DFID (Expert on village development)</p>	<p>JICA is making improvements to roads and other parts of social infrastructure, and I believe that this is more beneficial for practical purposes in comparison with policy advice. It is an essential factor in generating synergistic effects from technical cooperation. The concern for contemporary technical cooperation, though, is that engineering is gradually becoming less and less in the field of cooperation. Given the impact on social infrastructure, engineering technology is essential. In this regard, I think there is a need for Japan's technical cooperation.</p>
<p>EU (Agricultural Policy Advisor)</p>	<p>We provide technical cooperation depending on the field. In the field of agriculture, we have basically adopted an approach of technical cooperation. Even if budget support were provided in this area, I do not think that the Government of Ghana would have the management skills in the first place. Even if budgetary aid were provided, it would barely reach the lower levels. In the past, financial assistance has been provided through MOFA using AgSIP, but there has been virtually no impact in the field. Additional infrastructure is needed so that the effects can be felt directly in the field. In contrast, Ghana has capabilities in fields such as education and health, so I do not think that technical cooperation would be necessary here.</p>
<p>CIDA (Policy Advisor)</p>	<p>CIDA provides both technical cooperation and budget support. Developing countries like Ghana have technological gaps and financial gaps. CIDA provides budget support for the latter, and technical assistance especially in the north for the former. Accordingly, I do not think that technical cooperation is unnecessary at all. In the future, budget support will continue and expand, but this might be only temporary. The technical assistance provided by donors like JICA and GTZ does have positive effects. We are considering what we can do as a package, rather than either technical cooperation or budget support.</p>
<p>GTZ (Head of Ghana Office)</p>	<p>GTZ promotes technical cooperation. The reason why technical cooperation is necessary is the fact that outsiders' insight and advanced technology are necessary, and there are expectations that the expert will also act the role of a facilitator. Both short-term and long-term experts are necessary. It is no good to just simply provide money alone as general financial support. However, I think that through the provision of budget support, adjustments can be made to the policies and structure of the partner government, management capacity can be developed, and improvements can be made to the situation caused by the assortment of multiple donors. Harmonization is necessary, rather than a question of either technical cooperation or budgetary aid.</p>
<p>IWMI (Representative of West Africa Office)</p>	<p>With regard to technical cooperation, the question of "where" and "how" technical cooperation should be provided is more important than the question of whether technical cooperation systems are effective. In this sense, I think that technical cooperation is effective. General budget support is not practical for Ghana.</p>
<p>Care International (Representative from Ghana Office)</p>	<p>On the flip side of technical cooperation is general budget support, but it is unthinkable that either of them are effective. In Ghana's case, individual capability and personal connections are the key determinant factors in everything. In other words, there is no system. For example, donors such as GTZ and DFID have placed experts in MOFA, and they are able to promote individual projects, however, it is not realistic that they be able to promote structural improvements. Financial support only strengthens the control of the central government, so even if the central government were to change, there are a number of barriers to overcome before the support would filter down to the lower levels.</p>

Source: Created by author