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Revisiting the Capacity Development Approach through Comparative Case Analysis

A Fresh Look at Capacity Development from Insiders' Perspectives: A Case Study of an Urban Redevelopment Project in Medellín, Colombia

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**A Fresh Look at Capacity Development from Insiders' Perspectives:
A Case Study of an Urban Redevelopment Project in Medellín, Colombia**

Mine Sato*

Abstract

In contrast to the current discussion on Capacity Development (CD), which is mostly made from the donors' aid-effectiveness point of view, this paper attempts to explore what foreign donors can learn about CD by tracing the endogenous and long-running CD process from insiders' perspectives. As a case study, an urban redevelopment project called MIB in Medellín City in Colombia is examined. After clarifying the initial context of urban poverty in Colombia, the paper traces the six phases of the MIB project: institutional preparation and awareness enhancement, conception of the inclusive-urbanism idea, planning of the MIB, construction/reconstruction of the residences, resettlement of residents, and scaling-up. Then the paper makes an in-depth analysis of the whole process, focusing on five key CD factors identified by Hosono et al. (2011): stakeholder ownership, mutual learning, specific drivers, scaling-up, and roles of external actors. From the analysis, the paper proposes four major lessons on CD research and practice in the future. First, we need to change our timeframe through which we look at the CD process. The MIB experience shows that the process can be far longer than what has been assumed by donors and researchers. Second, the current project-centered periodization of development assistance and the overwhelming focus on the project period should be reconsidered. In the MIB, the project implementation phase took only five years in a total process of 30 years. Third, the MIB case shows that documentation of previous projects and seminars, which occur in the pre-project phase under donors' auspices, can greatly help local specialists conceive of new ideas. Fourth, the post-project phase also merits greater attention in identifying constraints to sustainability and replicability of the project concerned and to explore what external actors can do to overcome the constraints. The paper concludes by pointing out the necessity of accumulating similar kinds of case studies on the CD process made from insiders' perspectives.

Keywords: Capacity Development, urban redevelopment, social urbanism, Medellín, Colombia

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The concept of Capacity Development (CD) has emerged as a central issue in recent debates on development. CD indicates a process by which people, organizations, and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain their capacity over time to manage their own affairs successfully (OECD-DAC 2006). Originated chiefly from self-reflection by the donor community on why aid has not worked as expected, the CD concept has, overall, played an important role in deepening the understanding on how development actually takes place and how donors should behave in their efforts to harness it. A broadly shared lesson from discussions on CD is that the capacity is, by definition, endogenous and consequently donors should *catalyze* but not try leading the development processes of recipient countries. The main focus of CD discussion has now shifted to the operationalization of the CD concept including measurement of the capacity.¹

In the author's view, however, the current CD literature has been only half successful in making a deep analysis of the endogenous CD process for the following reasons. First, it examines CD mainly in the context of foreign aid, which would lead to an underestimation of endogenous efforts and processes. For instance, Lopes and Theisohn (2003) sets ten default principles for CD, all from the donors' point of view.² The principles dictate how external actors should behave as good providers of CD assistance. Likewise, "The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working towards Good Practice" by OECD-DAC (2006) indicates which areas need urgent attention so that the donor community can promote CD.

Second, and related to the first point, the majority of case studies focus on individual development projects or programs, overlooking the possibility that the capacity develops over a long period of time in which several consecutive or related projects (both external and domestic) are involved. For example, JICA (2006), in its first major work on CD (JICA 2006), selected most of the cases from JICA's technical assistance projects/programs. Likewise, Baser

1. For instance, see UNDP (2010), World Bank (2011) and Len (2011).

2. Ten principles include "don't rush," "respect the value system and foster self-esteem," "establish positive incentives," "build on existing capacities rather than creating new ones," and "stay engaged under difficult circumstances." (Lopes and Theisohn 2003, 13).

and Morgan (2008) are based on case studies that are either development projects/programs or external support offered to specific organizations.

Third, the analysis of the CD process is based on interpretation by outsiders, while the views and perspectives of insiders (beneficiaries, national service providers, and recipient governments) are not adequately taken into consideration. This is the point that has long been made by sociologists and anthropologists such as Chambers (1983, 1997) and Cernea (1985). Some even go so far as to say that the CD concept has been mainstreamed simply to meet the legitimacy requirements faced by development assistance agencies to defend themselves from criticism (Kühl 2009).

In short, the CD studies have focused too narrowly on donors' inputs and activities for relatively short periods for specific projects.

Considering these limitations, the author, in cooperation with her associates, redefined the concept of CD in an article published in 2010 (Hosono et al. 2010). In this article, they regard CD as being characterized by the following four features: (1) It is a long-term, endogenous process; (2) It is a holistic process encompassing multiple, interlinked levels of society; (3) It contains both specific technical capacities as well as essential core capacities;³ and (4) External actors cannot create capacity but can only provide support to the local CD processes. They also identified five CD "factors", which are mutually reinforcing and strengthening stakeholders' capacity: (1) stakeholder ownership defined as the awareness, commitment, motivation, and self-determination of the people and groups involved, (2) specific drivers (which advance the CD process) such as leadership, management system, incentive mechanisms, organizational culture, and contextual (social, political, or economic) transformation, (3) mutual learning (among stakeholders including donors), which is central to the endogenous CD process and to the discovery of innovative solutions that address the needs of beneficiaries and other stakeholders, (4) scaling-up through institutionalization of good practices, and (5) external

3. Core capacities are defined as generic and crosscutting competencies and the abilities to commit and engage, to carry out functions or tasks, to relate to and attract resources and support, to adapt and self-renew, and finally, to balance coherence and diversity (Baser and Morgan 2008).

donors serving as a catalyst for CD processes by providing financial resources and related knowledge, and by securing the space for policy dialogue and civic engagement.

This paper, written for the purpose of applying our framework to a deeper analysis of an endogenous CD process, will attempt to explore what foreign donors can learn about CD through tracing an endogenous and long-term CD process from insiders' perspectives. As the case study, this paper examines an urban redevelopment project called *Mejoramiento Integral de los Barrios* or Integral Slum Improvement (MIB) in Medellín City in Colombia.⁴

The author judges that this project is worth studying because MIB satisfies the four CD features identified by Hosono et al. (2010). First, MIB was accomplished through a long period of preparation and implementation. It took more than 10 years before the initial idea reached a stage to be ready for scaling-up. The process stretched beyond the time horizon normally dealt with by a single development assistance project. The case is therefore appropriate to examine how the endogenous CD process proceeded beyond individual projects.

Second, MIB went through a holistic process encompassing multiple, interlinked layers of stakeholders, covering not only individual and organizational capacities, but also the improvement of enabling environments such as national and regional policies and programs.

Third, the case is interesting because many related organizations, policies, and programs were involved in the process, and consequently, the implementing body had to develop not only specific technical capacities for construction works, but also core capacities for planning, coordination, and conflict resolution.

Fourth, the MIB was mostly planned and implemented by individuals and organizations from Colombia itself. External assistance did play a role, but only in the sense that experience and records of external assistance offered in the past served as “savings” for contemporary

4. Although ‘municipality’ is a more precise description, the author uses the term “city” in this paper. Medellín is a city of 2.2 million inhabitants at the center of the Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley in the Antioquia Department, which is the second largest in the country. The city is located in the hilly countryside of the Colombian Andes and is currently a major industrial center, the nation’s leading energy producing region, as well as having leading banana, coffee and gold markets.

planners and practitioners.⁵ Since the MIB has been only *indirectly* supported by external aid providers, we can trace the endogenous process in a clear and straightforward manner. It may thus contribute to clarifying the kind of roles to be played by external actors in the future CD assistances.

Furthermore, the MIB has been featured in domestic and foreign mass media and in foregoing academic literature on urban planning as an outstandingly successful case of inclusive redevelopment of urban slums.⁶

However, it has been analyzed neither from a long-term perspective covering several decades nor in the context of CD. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the MIB as a CD-fostering endeavor stretching over a long period of time.

Open-ended interviewing with the stakeholders was the principal research method in this paper. The interviewing was conducted from August to October 2010 as well as in February, May and July 2011.⁷ Considerable effort has been made to triangulate the information collected through these interviews. However, since written material is scarce, the author must acknowledge the possibility of information bias.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 will introduce the outline of the MIB and then describe its six consecutive phases; Section 2 is dedicated to the analysis of the CD process focusing on the five factors mentioned in Hosono et al. (2010); and Finally, concluding remarks follow to share the implications for future research and practice on CD.

5. CD may happen even in an environment where foreign involvement is quite limited. There has been work done on cases with no donor involvement such as Saxby (2004), but these are exceptions.

6. The project has featured on national and international news (a typical title line is “from the city of gangs, drugs, and violence to the city of hope”), as well as in a UN document (UN-Habitat 2011), and received international awards in 2008 and 2009, the websites for which are; http://dubai-award.dm.gov.ae/web/page_479.aspx http://currystonedesignprize.com/recipients/2009/transformativ_public_works. Also refer to Alcaldia de Medellín 2011, Blanco & Kobayashi 2009, Blanco 2009, Cañón-Rubiano 2010.

7. Interviews (semi-structured or focus group) were designed by the author and conducted either by local consultants, Prof. Akio Hosono, or the author herself through direct contact or on-line. Interviewees include a variety of stakeholders involved in the MIB process such as EDU, the municipal government, NGOs, community leaders, and the beneficiary population.

1. Tracing the MIB process: facts, initial context and the process at each phase⁸

The process in which the idea of urban redevelopment in Medellín was fermented, planned and implemented can be chronologically divided into six phases. Phase 1 started in the 1980s, when relevant institutional transformations happened and the awareness of urban problems spread. Phase 2 was between 2000 and 2004, when the idea of MIB was first conceived. The actual planning of MIB started in Phase 3 (2004-2006). In the following Phase 4 (2006-2008), construction work was started and, in Phase 5 (2008-2009), people were resettled in the new or renovated residences. Phase 6 is the post-project period in which similar projects have been implemented in other places and the Juan Bobo project site is frequently visited by domestic and international observers and practitioners. To these six MIB phases, we can add a pre-MIB period (1950s-1970s) in which the initial context of urbanization and poverty was formed in Colombia in general and in Medellín in particular but awareness of the problems had not yet been externalized.


1-1. Overview of the MIB in “Juan Bobo”⁹

MIB was designed, coordinated, and implemented by Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU) between 2004 and 2008 in Comuna #2 in the Northeastern zone of Medellín. The area is called Juan Bobo (See Figure 1). The project targeted the dwellings that had been constructed along the banks of the Juan Bobo Stream, with a population of 1,353 (300 families) and a land area of 1.75 hectares. MIB is a part of the Integral Slum Improvement Program (PMIB), a city program that attempted integral slum redevelopment between 2004 and 2007. The project goals were 1) applying an efficient and flexible planning procedure based on technical criteria

8. Refer to the Appendix II for abbreviations of the case study


9. MIB is also known as Housing Consolidation and Environmental Recovery Program (HCERP) or Heartfelt Houses, and implemented as an integral slum redevelopment project under Programa Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios (PMIB). Juan Bobo means ‘Silly John’, which is a ravine in Comuna 2 (Santa Cruz) in the Northeastern Zone of Medellín. The area is now newly named “Nuevo Sol de Oriente (New Sun of the East).” The discussion in this sub-section is based on Rivas 2011 and <http://dubai-award.dm.gov.ae/web/WinnersDetails.aspx?s=36&c=49> if not designated otherwise.

Figure 2: Human Development Index of Medellín City and Comuna #2



(the numbers are multiples of 100)
Source: Rivas 2011, p.45.

Figure 3: Homicide rates* in Medellín City**




Source: Alcaldía de Medellín.
*Number of homicides per 100,000 habitants.
**The data is not exclusively for Comuna #2.

1-2. Initial Context: Urbanization and Poverty in Colombia and Medellín from the 1950s till the 1970s

Urbanization in Colombia and the formation of slum areas commenced in the 1930s, and accelerated from the 1950s because of industrialization and mass migration due to the civil conflict between 1948 and 1958 known as *La Violencia*¹⁰ (Hataya 2002). The rural-urban migration to Medellín City started in the early 1900s, but quickened after *La Violencia*. The city's population, which had been 120,044 in 1928, had almost tripled by 1951. Almost another 600,000 people migrated to the city during the 1960s, and its population reached 2.2 million during the 1980s (Alcaldia de Medellín 1996).

Figure 4



Source: Alcaldia de Medellín

The city started losing its industrial advantage from the late 1960s, which resulted in the downgrading of employment and the growth of the informal sector in and around the city. This socio-economic deterioration incubated “alternative” forces such as the Medellín drug cartel,¹¹

10. A period of civil conflict in the Colombian countryside between supporters of the Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Conservative Party. More than one-third of the rural Colombian population under the age of 40 in 1951 had left the areas by 1964; this occurred again in the 1970s. (Martine 1975, 193).

11. The Medellín Cartel was an organized network of "drug suppliers and smugglers" that originated in the city of Medellín, Colombia, and which was run internationally. By 1993, the Colombian government, helped by the US, had successfully dismantled the cartel by imprisoning or hunting and gunning down its members.

paramilitary¹² and guerrilla groups¹³ and multiple other criminal organizations during the 1970s and 1980s (Betancur 2007). In the context of the urban conflict, illegal recruitment became a covert form of human trafficking controlled by armed groups, leading recruited youths to undertake high-risk activities for exploitative purposes. The northeastern parts of the city, which are called Comuna #1 and #2, thus became the poorest and most isolated areas of the city, stigmatized for being one of the most dangerous areas full of drug trafficking and gang activities. Environmental and safety problems (such as landslides in the rainy season), contamination of the main streams, and continuous expansion of overpopulated squats were of equal concern (Blanco 2011, 47).

People started to move to Comuna #2 (which includes Juan Bobo, the MIB implementation site) in the 1970s and construct shacks with wood and abandoned materials. The population density increased rapidly in the 1980s, which forced people to construct shacks on the banks of the Juan Bobo Stream, without proper infrastructure such as electricity and safe water. 80% of the houses had structural and functional deficiencies; One-third were located in the restricted areas by the riverbed. Lack of legal tenure also affected the supply of basic services: 50% of the water supply and 35% of the power supply were obtained illegally (Rivas 2011, 43). There were very few community organizations and volunteer activities in Comuna #2 and little trust in the government due to so many unfulfilled pre-election promises (Rivas 2011, 47).

Regarding security, the homicide rate of the city reached 381 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, which was the highest in the world (Perez 2011, 92). The security and poverty problems were long recognized by the city government, especially from the late 1980s, but financial conditions did not allow any of the mayors to launch integral and continuous slum redevelopment projects (Rivas 2011).

12. Paramilitary refers to the right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia during the 20th century, considered to be the groups most responsible for human rights violations in the country.

13. Such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional: National Liberation Army (ELN).

1-3. Legal transformation, city plans and awareness enhancement in the 1980s and 1990s (Phase 1)

Urban rehabilitation with strong participatory components became a shared agenda issue among Colombian policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s, and was institutionalized in the 1990s. In the 1980s, Medellín implemented a rehabilitation project at the Moravia dumping site (details to be described later), targeting the marginalized population for the first time. Another program was Centro de Estudios sobre Hábitat Popular – Programa de Estudios de Vivienda en América Latina (CEHAP-PEVAL), a popular-habitat program planned at the National University of Colombia in Medellín¹⁴. It commenced in 1981 with the support of the Netherlands government and was technically assisted by the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), a Netherlands-based international center in the field of urban management. The program aimed at offering solutions in regard to human habitat, especially for slum communities by conducting studies, offering international seminars, and managing pilot projects (<http://www.agora.unalmed.edu.co/principal/canal1/escuela.htm>).

In the 1990s, there were a series of national legal transformations concerning urban planning. In 1991, the constitution was amended to enhance the autonomy of local governments in administration, planning and promotion of economic and social development (Gonzalez et al 2009). After this amendment, in the field of urban planning, Law #3 (Housing System) was enacted in 1991 to provide housing subsidies. In 1993, Law #99 was adopted stipulating environmental obligations. Law #152 (Development Plan) was issued in 1994 and Law #388 (Territorial Orders) was enacted in 1997, emphasizing inclusive cities, citizens' participation, ecological consideration, and equal distribution of benefits and costs (Rivas 2011).

After the issuance of these national laws, the City Development Plan (1996), Plan de Manejo y Ordenamiento de una Cuenca: Integral Micro Catchment Area Plan (POMCA)

14. Centro de Estudios sobre Hábitat Popular – Programa de Estudios de Vivienda en América Latina <http://www.agora.unalmed.edu.co/principal/canal1/escuela.htm>. The program has been renamed a couple of times since its foundation.

(1999) and Plan Ordenamiento Territorial: Territory Ordering Plan (POT) (1999, revised in 2006) and Partial Plan (PP) were drafted by the Medellín City Government, and some of its staff were trained in the methodologies and application of territorial ordering (ibid).¹⁵ After the POT was adopted in 1999, the city government started to consider constructing a public transport system that would also benefit slum communities. The city administration included a construction plan of MetroPlus (Rivas 2011), which was later constructed as MetroCable in 2002, dramatically improving slum residents' mobility.

During the same decade (the 1990s), Programa de Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios Subnormales (PRIMED) (1992-2002), a large slum infrastructure development and housing improvement program, was implemented in Medellín. The project was technically and financially supported by KFW, UNDP and the National Government. It was implemented throughout the 3 zones (15 comunas) of the city, spending US\$2,940 per household (Betancur 2007). In addition to financial and technical assistance, the donors contributed to the documentation of experiences including feasibility studies. At the community level, Corporación de Desarrollo, Educación y Vivienda (CODEVI), a well-known NGO for popular housing, worked in Comuna #1 and #2.

As for citizens' awareness in general, the issue of poverty and violence became a shared social concern in the 1990s partly because of mass-media reports. According to Rivas (2011), local films such as "No Future" (1990) and "The Rose Seller" (1998) described life and the subcultures in the comunas. Also, a television program called "Arriba mi Barrio" (currently called "Camino al Barrio") began in 1991, and has now been on the air for 20 years. Community leaders themselves felt that the situation was problematic, but could not organize

15. Including urban redevelopment and land readjustment based on Japanese experiences in the Country-Focused Group Training Course "Land Readjustment Project for Colombia" (1998-2003) and Group Training Course "Urban Planning and Land Readjustment" (2003-2007), supported and funded by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The participants stayed in Hokkaido Prefecture and learned about inclusive urban planning as well as land adjustment called Kukakuseiri.

themselves or get their voices heard and tackle the problem, since they were caught up in the daily calamities and violence happening in front of them.

Finally, in 2002, the area became a target of *Operacion Orion*, a military-based anti-drug operation organized by the national government based on an initiative of the then President Uribe, who was once mayor of Medellín City. The homicide rate nearly halved after this intervention.

1-4. Conception of the MIB idea in 2000-2004 (Phase 2)

Ideas leading to MIB were fermented at el Laboratorio de Arquitectura y Urbanismo: the Architecture and Urbanism Laboratory (LAUR) of el Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana: the Pontificia Bolivariana University (UPB), although the notions and practices of inclusive urban development had been long discussed and collated at CEHAP-PEVAL as mentioned in Sub-section 2-2.

LAUR is an investigative unit founded within UPB in the early 2000s, and has been involved in urban redevelopment projects in Medellín City and surrounding cities as well as in the Urban Legalization and Regularization of the Belén Rincón Project in the Antioquia Department (Rivas 2011). Their work on zoning, public space, urban renovation, housing, and integral improvements drew widespread attention. LAUR was founded under the influence of international discourse on urban planning. From the 1990s, there has been emerging international discourse on urban/spatial planning to create sustainable and inclusive cities, where four principles of social urbanism were emphasized: citizens' participation, consultation with experts, fair representation, and the appeal of acting as advocates for collective decision-making and for the improvement of the affected communities (UNECE 2008, ix).


In the early 2000s, there were several meetings among key persons at LAUR. They shared common concepts and experiences of inclusive city development, especially in low-income areas. These key persons later got involved in EDU and MIB. Alejandro Echeverri,

the first general director of EDU, had finished his doctoral degree in Spain and joined LAUR. He had a strong interest in redevelopment of hillside slum communities, which was the main theme of his dissertation (Interviews with Alejandro Echeberri on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012). He took the initiative to construct a workshop in the northern part of the city to conduct field studies and held the first series of workshops and discussions on the situation of urban slums and alternative solutions. Juliana Portillo, who would later become the coordinator of the MIB at EDU, had written her dissertation about the urban slum redevelopment project in Medellín (Interviews with Juliana Portillo on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012), sharing her interest with Echeverri.

The period between 2000 and 2004 overlapped with the period in which Sergio Fajardo, the mayor who decided to implement MIB, was preparing for the mayoral election. He originated from Medellín and as a journalist, had a strong awareness of the issue of poverty and violence in the slum communities. Fajardo heard about LAUR from a faculty of the Architecture Department of the UPB, and one day stopped by to talk to Echeverri and ask him to help draft a city development plan (Interviews with Alejandro Echeverri on June 24, 2011).

In 2002, a public gondola-lift transport system called MetroCable K Line was inaugurated in Comuna #1 and #2, providing a 7-minute service connecting the hillside neighborhoods of Northeastern Medellín with the Medellín metro system, benefitting approximately 170,000 residents (Cañón-Rubiano 2010). This event happened to feature Comuna #1 and 2 as the areas whose living conditions were the lowest in the city and needed public intervention for improvement (Figure 5). Thus, the blueprint of MIB came to be included in the draft of the city development plan.

Figure 5: Quality of Life and Human Development Index in Medellín, 2002



Source: Alcaldia de Medellín 2004.

1-5. Planning the MIB project in 2004-2006 (Phase 3)

Formation of the project team

After Fajardo was elected as mayor in 2004, the plan became the city's formal development plan¹⁶, and Echeverri was appointed as the first director of the city's EDU, an autonomous urban development corporation (Rivas 2011).¹⁷ It should be noted that the MIB project was

16. Plan de Desarrollo 2004-2007 "Medellín, Compromiso de Toda La Ciudadanía."

17. EDU was founded in 1993, as an industrial and commercial organization to construct the San Antonio Park under a national context to promote the contracting out of public services. After three years, EDU started dealing with real estate and urban development projects including public space development. In 2002, EDU was reorganized and now is working as a legal body of the city with administrative and financial autonomy.

started in the first year of Fajardo's term of office, indicating his strong leadership and interest in the matter.

Echeberri assigned some of his colleagues to the job of designing the MIB project. One of them was Carlos Montoya, who became the Director of Housing and Habitat of EDU and supervised the project from the planning to the end. He had been working for several major slum redevelopment projects in Medellín (ibid.). He received his education at CEHAP-PEVAL of the National University in Medellín. After graduating from the university, from 1983 to 1987, he participated in the rehabilitation project of the Moravia open garbage dump site utilizing inter-institutional coordination to relocate 173 houses constructed along the steep riverside. Through direct negotiations with the residents, Montoya, with technical support of a sociologist, introduced a certificate for mutual assistance by which people were given land ownership in exchange for their cooperation in constructing their own houses and community.¹⁸ Montoya recalled that he learnt to implement projects in flexible ways depending on actual situations instead of relying on pre-fixed plans. He also noticed that new settlers intruded upon the rehabilitated areas and informally constructed shacks again. In 1990, he participated in a KfW-financed international seminar on integrated slum redevelopment in Quito, Ecuador, and exchanged his experiences with other specialists. The discussion at the seminar was published as a manual, which became available for managers of similar projects. Subsequently, he participated in the PRIMED project (1992-2002), which also included housing improvements and relocations with community participation. PRIMED was a large project whose implementation followed a rather fixed, pre-planned schedule. Through those experiences, Montoya understood that there are two different modes for implementing urban redevelopment projects: process-oriented and plan-oriented. He also learnt how to conduct interdisciplinary and inter-institutional urban projects. His cooperation with NPOs further

18. Bonos de Ayuda Mutua, developed by the sociologist Luis Fernando Londoño Nicols (Rivas 2011). A virtual wage was calculated based on national minimum salaries.

taught him how to facilitate community participation and raise awareness of residents (Interviews with Carlos Montoya on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012).

Under Montoya's supervision, the MIB project was gradually shaped. First, international policy documents regarding inclusive cities were reviewed and four priorities were identified: local action, housing for all, risk prevention, and minority inclusion. Second, in cooperation with the city government, the team undertook a census of 6,000 houses in the Northeastern part of the city. Finally, Juan Bobo was selected for the project site.

After the selection process, project components (physical, social, inter-institutional) were determined and an interdisciplinary team was formed,¹⁹ both modeled on Montoya's Moravia and PRIMED experiences (ibid.). In selecting the team members, Montoya and Portillo identified, during the field research in Comuna #1, candidates who had the capacity to work on housing in slum communities. The size of the team was flexible and changed throughout the project, some being in-and-out, while others worked intensively on particular phases of the project. The team members' terms of references have been gradually fixed through the process of social learning, depending on each member's strength (Interviews with Juliana Portillo on February 10, 2012).

Rapport building and social learning

Under Montoya's supervision and Portillo's coordination, team members visited households daily, especially in the first two months. They started by walking in and looking around the community, then having casual conversations with the residents, measuring roads and taking soil samples, telling the residents that they would come back later (Focus Group Discussions

19. The team consisted of 19 members from 7 working backgrounds, though not all the members dealt with the whole process: Assistant Director of Housing and Habitat (Carolos Montoya), Coordinator (Claudia Juliana Portillo Rubio), Social Group (Paula Ospina Uribe, Juan Miguel Pulgarin, Cruz Mery Bahos), Lawyers (John Jairo Lopez Yepes, Sandra Escudero Yepes, Juan Carlos Alvarez), Structural Engineers (Alvaro Diaz Paucar, Francisco Trujillo Mesa, Ramon Enrique Castro Perez, Viviana Gonzalez Gonzalez), Architects (Francheszo Oscar Montoya Gonzalez, Alex Correa Guitierrez, Giovanni Marin Silva), and Civil Engineers (Wilder Sneider Salinas, William Suarez Capacho, Oscar Espinel).

with residents on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012). Montoya wanted his team to have enough time for social learning to know the community through “field work,” as well as to identify who would become active participants in the project. After getting to know the area, the MIB team members conducted interviews with the residents of each household, to understand the number of residents in each household, their background and livelihood, whether they had property rights or had paid taxes and utility fees and so on, as well as making a rough sketch of each house (ibid.). Subsequently, they started taking a formal census of each household to double-check the information acquired during the interviews to gain a more detailed understanding of the residents’ living conditions (ibid.).

The team members have thus tried to build a rapport and trusting relationships with the residents as they were aware that without them they could not realize the MIB project. It is noteworthy that the residents still remember the first names of the MIB team members. They witnessed that the team first came to look, talk, and listen before starting negotiations about relocation (Interviews with residents on June 24, 2011). Montoya stated “negotiation and rapport, not imposition, was the most fundamental ‘tool’ of the project so that people would have ownership”. (Interview with Carlos Montoya on June 24, 2011). Sociologist Javier Jaramillo, who currently runs MIB projects in several locations in the metropolitan areas of Medellín, also pointed out that micro-politics, favoritism and information manipulation were usual practices in slum communities, but now it is important to gain people’s trust through dialogues on an equal-footing (Interview with Javier Jarallimo on June 25, 2011). “It must have been an epoch-making event for people to be listened to, spoken with and visited so frequently because they had continually felt abandoned by the rest of the city for a long period,” a community leader said (Interview with Mr. Elkin Zapata on February 14, 2011).

Making agreements with the residents

Subsequently, the team invited the residents to meetings to exchange opinions and reach a consensus on the project, including the geographical limitations and timelines (Interviews with Juliana Portillo on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012). These meetings were often organized at night time on the weekends and MIB staff invited all the residents. The staff even visited households whenever they were asked for further explanations and discussions (ibid.). During the meetings, the team members suggested the best options from their analysis and asked people to show “yellow cards” when they thought they were off-track (Interview with Carlos Montoya on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012). The members also asked the residents to express, in detail, how they wanted to change the community; how the roads, houses and public spaces should look compared with what they actually had (ibid.). The team sometimes made rough sketches in front of the residents to visualize their images. The team also visualized how the new community would look and listened to residents’ views (see Figure 6). At this time, a housing committee was formed to deal with all the paperwork to get public subsidies and apply for housing titles (Rivas 2011).

Finally, an assembly meeting was held to geographically define the project area. Agreements were also made on the following points: (1) Nobody would be forced to leave and all those involved would be resettled in Juan Bobo, (2) EDU would not provide the same treatment to new squatters, and (3) There would be no more DIY house construction or improvement. The interviewed residents testified that those agreements actually worked as a guarantee that they could certainly return to the community (Rivas 2011).

Figure 6: Juan Bobo project area and variations due to topography




Fig. 15 Juan Bobo variations due to topography



Fig. 16 Juan Bobo project and stream section

Source: (Blanco 2009, 58).

Getting into details

After the assembly meeting, the MIB team further elaborated on the plan and explained to the residents that 120 houses (colored yellow, orange, and brown in Figure 7) that needed more than 60% replacement work and the houses constructed on the riverside would be completely rebuilt, while 140 houses (colored green) that needed less than 40% replacement work would be improved instead of rebuilt. The team also made agreements with the residents with regard to the construction of public spaces such as parks, gully redevelopment, public services and the bridge to connect the community (Rivas 2011). The staff used visual images so that the residents could easily imagine how the community would be transformed (ibid). After the residents accepted the project plan, the team asked the residents to organize three more

committees (risk prevention, environment, and children). The MIB team also helped the residents apply for subsidies (national, regional, and city, covering approximately 70% of the construction costs) based on Law #3 (ibid.). At this point, the MIB team and the residents also introduced publicity boards to inform residents about the progress of the project and share their concerns and suggestions. The boards are still used today (ibid).

During this phase, EDU contracted an NGO named Corporación de Desarrollo, Educación y Vivienda: Cooperation of Development, Education and Housing (CODEVI) to design each house eligible for housing improvement. As each household had various needs and preferences, designing had to be done quite differently. Temporary relocation commenced, with an average duration of approximately one year (Rivas 2011). Finally, the detailed designs of each house and new buildings as well as public spaces were completed and eight construction companies were selected for the new construction process. Apart from the contractors, around ten organizations participated in providing financial or technical support.²⁰

20. These organizations include the Secretary of Social Development, and El Fondo de Vivienda de Interés Social del Municipio de Medellín (FOVIMED), Area Metropolitana (AREA), Empresas Publicas de Medellín (EPM), Empresa de Vivienda de Antioquia (VIVA), the Ministry of Environment, Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial (MAVDT), Fondo Nacional de Vivienda (FONVIVIENDA), and others from different sectors and levels of government (Rivas 2011:139).

Figure 7: Variations of house construction materials and houses for replacement/improvement



Source: EDU.

(Left: Brown: shacks built with temporary resources; Orange: shacks built with bricks; Beige: brick houses)

(Right: Yellow, orange, and brown to be replaced, green to be improved)

1-6. Construction in 2006-2008 (Phase 4)

After construction started, the residents worked for a certain number of hours, equivalent to 10% of the subsidies, as construction workers, cleaning the site and protecting the contractors from any obstructions (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 10th of February, 2012). At this time, the MIB team mediated the process to decide which household took which apartment compound (ibid). Although the residents agreed on disabled people or the elderly taking the ground floor, the rest of the households could not easily reach a consensus, but finally agreed to use a lottery arbitrated by the team (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 24th of June, 2011, 10th of February, 2012).

The MIB team installed a construction information center so that people could stop by and make inquiries as well as organize cultural activities such as plays, workshops on the social environment and kitchen gardens, cleaning and environmental campaigns, as well as meetings to put together a manual for co-living to share values and rules in the new community after construction (Rivas 2011). According to interviews with the residents, during this period, the residents sometimes felt worried, especially when the construction work fell behind schedule. But on such occasions, they would visit the construction sites and understood that their houses were being renovated, understanding that they would get a place to live and not be gentrified (ibid.).

1-7. Resettlement in 2008-2009 (Phase 5)

After construction was finished, the residents started returning to the community. Most of their houses were not only renovated but dramatically improved, with more floors, yards and balconies, as well as public spaces (Focus Group Discussions with residents on June 24, 2011). In February 2008, the newly elected mayor, Alonso Salazar, hosted an inauguration ceremony for the new apartments²¹ and there was a series of follow-up activities after the ceremony to support relocation. The EDU, especially the group composed of sociologists and social workers, worked as a facilitator, supporting the people being resettled, especially those who moved into the apartments. The team mediated the process of rule setting and explaining the manual, which was distributed to each household (Rivas 2011). Simultaneously, the team facilitated the process of formalization of property rights of each apartment compound (ibid). The residents renamed the renewed community “Nuevo Sol de Oriente (New Sun of the East)” and gave a specific name to each new building (interviews with social workers Marco Gamboa and Mary Bao on June 24, 2011). They also decided to recognize the people who showed strong leadership during the project process as community leaders (ibid.).

21. There was a pre-inauguration ceremony by Mayor Fajardo before his term of office finished.

As for the outcome of the project, apart from the macro-level index improvement mentioned in Subsection 1-1, there were a lot of impacts felt or experienced by the residents. For instance, an Impact Assessment Survey on Socio-Spatial influences applied to more than 150 beneficiary families demonstrated a remarkable transformation in the community's behavioral trends in relation to the environment and their notion of security. The interviewed residents felt greater security in the area as the risks of floods, contamination and violence in general had radically diminished. They ranked pedestrian pathways, the bridge across the Juan Bobo Stream and public stairs as the top three public infrastructures built by the project (Blanco 2009). Many residents now feel that the community has become much safer and cleaner and their housing conditions have physically improved (Focus Group Discussions with the residents on June 24, 2011; Interview with Mr. Jonás Mena on June 25, 2011).

1-8. Post-Project from 2009 till the present (Phase 6)

MIB can be counted as an epoch-making project for Medellín City. The notions and concepts of MIB have also been shared by many visitors to the project site. From 2010 on, a training course on urban planning and land readjustment has been offered in Medellín to Latin American trainees.²² The Juan Bobo project site is frequently visited by the training course's participants as a good example of urban slum redevelopment with community participation and inter-institutional coordination. The course has been presented by former Colombian participants in the JICA training program on urban development held in Obihiro, Japan. They have developed their networks and skills and are now running their own training sessions in Colombia

However, in spite of the positive prospect of scaling-up beyond national borders, there remain several concerns about the sustainability of the project.

22. "Urban Planning System and Land Management Instruments" (2010-2012) organized by the National Planning Department.

Regarding the Juan Bobo MIB, the following problems emerged in the focus group discussions conducted on June 24, 2011. First, there were people whose houses were excluded from the MIB and whose neighbors became beneficiaries. This generated tension among residents²³. Second, many residents feel that social ties with families and neighbors have been weakened. Third, there is the issue of property rights. Some families have received unofficial documents, not the title deeds, due to the long duration involved and complex paperwork. Fourth, as their houses are now registered, the residents need to pay tax and utility fees even though their income has not changed or, in some cases, has even declined. Fifth, there is still the problem of bad smells coming from the stream running through the project area because upper-hill communities still do not have a sewage system and people are still dumping trash into the stream.

It is to be seen how far the beneficiary population was empowered or has developed its capacity to maintain the renovated communities and buildings as well as to deal with remaining or emerging issues.

Beyond Juan Bobo, geographic scaling-up of the project has been observed around Medellín. Five MIB projects have been either planned or implemented in Juan Bobo #2, La Herrera, Santo Domingo, La Cruz, and La Onda (Rivas 2011. See Figure 8). In the broader Medellín metropolitan area, there have been seven MIB projects, as indicated on the map below (ibid.). However, methodologies used in the new sites were quite different from the ones used in Juan Bobo. Institutionally, the PMIB has been transferred from EDU to Instituto de Vivienda y Hábitat (ISVIMED). The latter has a strong focus on construction of new houses

23. The author could not find any possible micro-political reasons (e.g., self-exclusion or social exclusion among people) behind the decision of the project area, which is something that should be further examined.


and utilities.²⁴ Social components and public space creation, major innovations in the Juan Bobo project, are now less emphasized.

Figure 8: MIBs in other communities in Medellín and its metropolitan area



MIB in Juan Bobo #2

MIB in La Herrera



Source: EDU/ISVIMED

24.

<http://www.Medellín.gov.co/irj/portal/ciudadanos?NavigationTarget=navurl://885fc1028a0b78782186f5b7d68ecc34>

2. Analysis of the MIB process: What findings can be drawn from the tracing of the MIB process?

In this section, the MIB process described in the preceding section will be analyzed in accordance with the five CD factors identified by Hosono et al. (2010): (1) stakeholder ownership, (2) specific drivers, (3) mutual learning, (4) pathways to scaling-up, and (5) the role of external actors.

2-1 Stakeholder Ownership

Various organizations have been involved directly or indirectly as stakeholders during the whole MIB process: PEVAL-CEHAP, LAUR-UPB, EDU (including the MIB team), the municipal government, CODEVI, JICA, KfW, UNDP, IHS, National Government, FOVIMED, AREA, EPM, VIVA, the Ministry of Environment, MAVDT, FONVIVIENDA, the beneficiary residents, and many others. Obviously, the MIB team and Mayor Sergio Fajardo demonstrated strong leadership, but it is doubtful whether EDU (the organization to which the MIB team belongs), the municipal government as a whole, and the beneficiary population shared the same degree of ownership. The discrepancy in ownership probably affected the project process and its sustainability.

However, the success of the Juan Bobo Project is due to a common interest in the creation of an inclusive city as a solution to urban poverty. All stakeholders, regardless of their different degrees of ownership, shared the belief in social urbanism, which helped the difficult and complex coordination during the planning and implementation phases of the project.

2-2. Specific Drivers

There were three major drivers observed that helped advance the MIB process in Medellín: (1) initiatives and skills of specialists and political leaders, (2) enabling policies and plans, and (3) other environmental or coincidental factors.

As a specialist, Montoya's role as the supervisor of the project was extraordinary. Equally important was Mayor Fajardo's political leadership. It is the mayor who decided to implement MIB in the city and assigned LAUR staff to EDU, the MIB implementation body. In the EDU, Echeverri had helped draft a city plan, from which the MIB was born. Montoya supervised the MIB and Portillo coordinated the highly complicated MIB planning and implementation process in which various organizations and several budgetary sources were involved. At the community level, CODEVI, a well-known NGO for popular housing, played an important role as a contractor that designed each house in harmony with the general improvement of the community. CODEVI took advantage of the close relations it had established with residents through its prior activities in the area. In short, vibrant political leaders and specialists, with prior networks among themselves and with the residents, played a crucial role as drivers of the MIB process.

The second specific driver is the enabling policy environment. Following the amendment of the Constitution in 1991, four major laws related to housing and urban development – Law #3 (housing systems), Law #99 (environmental considerations in land development), Law #152 (development planning), and Law #388 (territorial orders) – were promulgated at the national level between 1991 and 1997. In Medellín, City Development Plan (1996), POMCA (1999) and POT (1999, revised in 2006) and PPs were drafted. The City Development Plan helped justify the MIB while a part of its budget was covered by national, departmental and city subsidies granted under Law #3. New institutions also influence public awareness. The POT was followed by the construction of MetroCable, which in turn highlighted the dilapidated conditions of Comuna #1 and #2 and called for further public intervention.

Third, there were several contingent drivers that served as additional enabling environments. For instance, the financial condition of Medellín City happened to be sound and enabled the city government to make a substantial financial contribution to the MIB program.

This is important because the national and departmental subsidies for house construction, though substantial, were not enough to cover the expenses necessary for construction, the hiring of specialists at EDU, and related administrative work at the city government. The city has been known for its outstanding public finance performance from 2000 (Gonzalez 2009). Another contingent factor was the media coverage of urban poverty. It greatly contributed to raising public awareness on the issue. Additionally, the military intervention, *Operacion Orion*, helped draw attention to the urban issues of the city. It also helped improve the security situation in the area, helping facilitate the project implementation.

2-3. Mutual Learning and Innovative Solutions

Various outputs resulting from mutual learning among stakeholders can be observed from Phase 2 (Conception Phase) to Phase 5 (Resettlement). It is noteworthy to point out that the MIB team played different roles in mutual learning at each stage. Their learning counterparts also shifted, but innovative solutions were found out at each stage to help the process move forward.

At Phase 2 (Conception Phase), learning occurred among LAUR researchers and between the researchers and politicians/staff of the city government. Especially at LAUR, from which MIB staff would be recruited, there were a couple of innovative field experiments that contributed to crystalizing the idea of inclusive urban development. At this phase, the MIB staff-to-be served mainly as engineering specialists.

At the planning stage, communications between MIB staff and residents started. The MIB staff now functioned as social workers working in the community to get basic information and building a rapport with the residents. Subsequently, actual town designs were sketched and put into real plans through conversations between the staff and residents. At this point, a consensus was reached with regard to the basic rules of project implementation.

When actual construction commenced, the MIB team mainly played the role of coordinator. The members facilitated the residents to discuss how to administer the new town-to-be and offered training courses and workshops on environment-friendly living and skill development for income generation. The project staff also coordinated the activities of ten or so organizations (public agencies, private firms, NGOs).

At the resettlement phase, the MIB team members became facilitators, helping the residents to set rules to manage apartments and live in harmony.

2-4. Pathway to Scaling-Up

Although attempts have been made to scale-up the Juan Bobo Project domestically and internationally, there are two constraints affecting the sustainability of the project at the last phase (Phase 6). One is the sustainability of the Juan Bobo Project itself, and the other is the replicability of the PMIB model developed at Juan Bobo.

Before anything else, the sustainability of the MIB in Juan Bobo requires that beneficiary residents demonstrate ownership and initiative to solve any remaining problems. Among such issues are how to remedy the social tension created between benefitted residents and those outside of the project area; how to collectively manage apartment buildings, pay taxes and utility fees; and how to reduce water contamination and bad odors from the stream. The solution to these problems requires a common effort by the residents. However, they seem to lack enough capacity for such work and still need external facilitators to help them tackle the problems.

Regarding replicability of the MIB, contradictions or lack of coordination among institutions are observed as the main constraints. First, it is unclear how the three city plans (development plan, micro-catchment plan, territory ordering plan) elaborated under the different laws are combined with one another. In the case of MIB, it was strongly connected with the city development plan, but was not necessarily in alignment with the other two plans,

especially with the territory ordering plan. As the city development plan can radically change, depending on the policy of elected mayors, it would be desirable that the PMIB be closely integrated with the other two plans, as the latter is less politically driven.

The second issue is friction between the two distinct approaches to urban redevelopment taken by different organizations: the process-oriented or plan-oriented approaches. At Juan Bobo, EDU took the process-oriented and labor-intensive approach. This approach, however, was not taken on by ISVIMED when the PMIB was transferred from EDU to this organization. ISVIMED's work style is to construct new buildings on the basis of nationally determined goals and blueprints. As a result, social components, public space creation and residents' participation are less emphasized in the new MIBs. In the final analysis, the success of the social-urbanism approach at Juan Bobo largely depended on Montoya's expertise and leadership and the team members' dedicated and pragmatic work styles. Continuous political will and pragmatic dedication will be the keys to insure replicability of the original MIB without diluting its social urbanism components such as paperwork assistance for subsidy application, beneficiaries' participation and organization, public space creation, capacity building workshops, and resettlement support.

2-5. Roles of External Actors

As mentioned in the introductory section and reconfirmed in this paper, no international donors were directly involved in the Juan Bobo MIB Project. However, donors' assistance to similar projects implemented before the MIB functioned as catalysts for the project. For instance, the IHS helped a university program called CEHAP-PEVAL in which Arq. Montoya (the MIB team supervisor) obtained basic ideas on inclusive urban planning. At PEVAL-CEHAP, Montoya had opportunities to participate in urban redevelopment projects such as Moravia and PRIMED, sponsored by KfW and UNDP. He further developed his networks and broadened his knowledge base through an international workshop in Quito sponsored by KfW. KfW

further prepared written documents on the workshop that later served to inspire Colombian specialists on inclusive urban planning. JICA, for its part, offered a series of training courses on inclusive urban planning and territory ordering. All this assistance, whether intentional or not, inspired and nurtured the basic ideas of MIB.

As mentioned in the previous Subsection, efficient replication of the Juan Bobo MIB needs institutional and planning coordination as well as harmonization between process-oriented and plan-oriented approaches. Here, external actors may be able to serve again as catalysts for scaling-up by organizing seminars or training courses and by financing new projects.

3. Concluding Remarks: Implications for further research and discussion on CD

The five CD factors (stakeholder ownership, mutual learning, specific drivers, scaling-up, and roles of external actors) presented by Hosono et al. (2010) can indeed be identified in the MID case. Stakeholder ownership was strongly observed especially in Phase 1. In various phases, mutual learning occurred between the residents and the MIB team members as well as among MIB team members themselves, and among various organizations involved in the project, resulting in project implementation with strong social components. Several specific drivers were also identified, while external actors indirectly supported the MIB elaboration process. As a result, the MIB at Juan Bobo became one of the world's most successful urban redevelopment projects based on social urbanism. The project has also been scaled-up to a certain extent although many challenges remain for the expansion of the inclusive approach.

From the analysis above, we can draw four main lessons on CD. First, we need to change our timeframe by which we look at the CD process. The MIB experience shows that the process can be far longer than what was assumed by donors and researchers. Twenty-five years passed between Phase 1, in which institutional preparation was made and public

awareness was enhanced, and Phase 3 in which the actual project planning started. In addition to these preparatory years, five more years were necessary to implement construction work and resettle the residents. Although it is not necessary for donors/external actors to accompany the recipient country throughout the whole process, such historical timeframe and depth of historical context should be taken into account when they design development cooperation projects/programs with CD components.

Second, related to the first point, the current periodization of development assistance into three phases – *before* (where awareness is raised and shared), *during* (project period), and *after* (where scaling-up hopefully occurs) – and the overwhelming focus on the project period should be reconsidered. In the MIB, the project implementation (construction and resettlement) phase took only five years among the total process of 30 years. And, especially greater attention needs to be directed to the pre-project phases of awareness building and project conception as the direction and deepness of endogenous CD is largely formed during these phases. By focusing on the pre-project phases, we will be able to look into the factors that have scarcely been dealt with in CD literature. For instance, the initial concept was greatly precipitated by the course of events in which institutional reforms and the rising of awareness on urban poverty synchronically happened.

Third, documentation of previous projects and seminars by donors greatly helped specialists conceive new ideas in the pre-project phases. In the MIB case, the donors' role was crucial in this respect. By bringing in external ideas and experiences, external actors can play important and sometimes unintended roles in helping incubate innovative ideas partially based on external ideas but adjusted to the local conditions.

Fourth, the post-project phase also merits greater attention. Major constraints are observed in the issue of sustainability and replicability. The experiences at Juan Bobo demonstrated that the project did not end at the completion of construction work. On the one hand, to connect the new housing opportunities with the improvement of individual and

community life – the real aim of the project – the beneficiary population needed to be more “empowered” to deal with the remaining problems. On the other hand, to enhance the chance of replicability, close coordination among relevant institutions and policies as well as among distinct development approaches is crucial. Here again, external actors may be able to contribute by serving as coordinators and by providing information on new international trends throughout the world.

This paper focused on a single CD case and extracted several lessons on future researches and practices of CD as well as the roles of external actors. Tracing the whole process of conception, planning, implementation, and scaling-up, it clarified that CD is indeed a long-term endogenous process that proceeds through interactions among local stakeholders. External actors played an indirect but important role as the catalyst for change. However, since the CD process is still little known, similar in-depth studies need to be made on many other cases. In such studies, not only the project phase but also pre-project and post-project phases should be closely examined. Furthermore, CD processes with various degrees of donor participation should be compared to look into the roles of external actors. Such research will be time-consuming but it will reward everybody involved in development assistance by helping enhance our understanding of CD in practice.

Appendix I: MIB fact sheet

Implementation area and its population	The area (micro-territory) along the banks of the Juan Bobo Stream, which runs between the Andalucia and Villa Niza sections in Comuna 2 (1.75 ha, 1,353 people (300 families))
General coordinator	Empresa Dessaroolo Urbano (EDU)
Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Application of efficient and flexible planning with appropriate technology for each micro-territory ● Promoting community participation for co-living and better security ● Improvement of environment, hygiene, and zoning for resettlement ● Housing resettlement, improvement and legalization ● Total improvement of the project area and surrounding communities
Components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Physical ● Social ● Inter-institutional
Budget	Approx. US\$4 million
Construction of infrastructure (selected)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Sewage pipes (2.7km) ● Cleaning of the stream basin (200m) ● Stream edge improvement for pedestrians (1,500 m²) ● Public space and pedestrian mobility improvement and construction (4,500 m²) ● Restoring environmental (2,000 m²) ● Construction of a bridge to connect the community ● Construction of a library and two community salons
Construction of new houses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 8 apartment blocks constructed for 118 families ● Registration of property rights for the 118 families
Improvement of houses and living conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 115 houses improved ● Organizing housing committees ● Capacity building in self-construction ● Community gatherings ● NGOs as facilitators
Major project outputs (based on assessment conducted by EDU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Physical sustainability: New constructions with appropriate work procedures matched to the legal standards ● Social sustainability: Making agreements among residents, Manual of co-living, Feeling of citizenship enhanced, Inter-institutional programs implemented ● Economic sustainability: Job training, Community work, Agro-industrial program, Basic education ● Environmental sustainability: Disaster management, Effective usage of public services, Environmental education, Ecological balconies installed

Elaborated by the author based on Alcaldia de Medellín 2011, Rivas 2011, and Blanco 2009.

Appendix II: List of Abbreviations for the Case Study

- CEHAP-PEVAL: Centro de Estudios Sobre Hábitat Popular – Programa de Estudios de Vivienda en América Latina (Centre of Popular Housing Study – Program of Housing Studies in Latin American)
- CODEVI: Corporación de Desarrollo, Educación y Vivienda (Cooperation of Development, Education and Housing)
- EDU: Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (Urban Development Enterprise)
- ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional(National Liberation Army)
- EPM: Empresas Publicas de Medellín (Medellín Public Enterprises)
- FARC:Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
- FOVIMED: El Fondo de Vivienda de Interés Social del Municipio de Medellín (Housing Fund of Social Interest of the Municipality of Medellín)
- IHS: Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies
- ISVIMED: Instituto de Vivienda y Hábitat (Institute of Housing and Habitat)
- LAUR: Laboratorio de Arquitectura y Urbanismo (Architecture and Urbanism Laboratory)
- MAVDT: Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial (Ministry of Housing, Development and Territory Development)
- MIB: Mejoramiento Integral de los Barrios (Integral Slum Improvement Project)
- FONVIVIENDA: Fondo Nacional de Vivienda (National Fund for Housing)
- PMIB: Programa de Mejoramiento Integral de los Barrios (Integral Slum Improvement Program)
- POMCA: Plan de Manejo y Ordenamiento de una Cuenca (Integral Micro Catchment Area Plan)
- POT: Plan Ordenamiento Territorial (Territory Ordering Plan)
- PP: Plan Partial (Partial Plan)
- PRIMED: Programa de Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios Subnormales (Program of Integral Improvement of Underdeveloped Areas)
- UPB: Universidad de Pontificia Bolivariana (University of Pontificia Bolivariana)
- VIVA: Empresa de Vivienda de Antioquia (Housing Enterprise of Antioquia)

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Interviews

- w./ Alejandro Echeverri on June 24, 2011.
- w./ Javier Jarallimo on June 25, 2011.
- w./ Mr. Jonás Mena on June 25, 2011.
- w./ Carlos Montoya on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012.
- w./ Juliana Portillo on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012.
- w./ Mr. Elkin Zapata on February 14, 2011.
- w./ residents in Focus Group discussions on June 24, 2011 and February 10, 2012.

Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

本稿では、もっぱら援助者 (donors) のアジェンダとして議論されがちな CD(キャパシティ・ディベロップメント)を、援助者が直接関与しない事例をとりあげることで、「内部者の視座」によって分析し、そこから援助者が何を学び得るかについて論考する。具体的にはコロンビア国メデジン市の貧困層居住地区を対象になされた MIB と呼ばれる再開発プロジェクトを取り上げる。

本稿では、当該地域の都市貧困の歴史を俯瞰した後、MIB プロセスの足跡を「制度整備と意識の醸成期」「インクルーシブな都市づくりの着想期」、「プロジェクト計画期」、「家屋やインフラの改築・建設期」、「住民の再定住期」、「スケールアップ期」の 6 フェーズに分けて辿ってみる。その上で、CD の 5 要素 (利害関係者のオーナーシップ、相互学習、CD の牽引要素、スケールアップ、外部支援者の役割) について、MIB プロセスを詳細分析する。

事例より導き出された CD 研究と CD 実践への含意は、第一に CD プロセスとして認識されるべき期間は援助者が通常考えるよりはるかに長期であること、第二に現在援助者が持つ「プロジェクト本体を中心に据えたプロセス認識」は改められるべきこと、第三に援助者によるプロジェクトやセミナーの記録は内部者が革新的な着想に至る上で役立つことがあること、第四にプロジェクト終了後のフェーズにおける持続発展性やスケールアップにおいても、外部者による支援の可能性があるのである。援助効果の向上のためにも、今後、本稿のような内部者の視点からする詳細な事例研究が蓄積される必要がある。



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