

Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Project

RESETTLEMENT IN JMBP

ASSESSING PROCESS AND OUTCOMES

QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF RRAP (REVISED RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN)
AND PROJECT ON EFAP (EROSION AND FLOOD AFFECTED PERSONS)

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Preface

Power and Participation Research Centre was commissioned to carry out a qualitative impact survey on the RRAP and EFAP Programmes of the Jamuna Bridge Project during March-June, 2000. The Report on the survey was submitted in June, 2000 and a revised version in October, 2000. Subsequent to receiving some additional comments from JBIC, the Report was further revised, once in December, 2000 and now in March, 2001. This is the final revision of the Report. For easy reference, the Report has been given the title RESETTLEMENT IN JMBP: ASSESSING PROCESS AND OUTCOMES.

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Hossain Zillur Rahman
Executive Chairman

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GLOSSARY

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AD	Alluvion-Diluvian
ASAUS	Artho Samajik Unnayan Sangstha (NGO)
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (NGO)
BWDB	Bangladesh Water Development Board
CERP	Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project
CMIS	Computerised Management Information System
CCL	Cash Compensation under Law
DC	Deputy Commissioner
EC	Entitlement Card
DORP	Development Organization of the Rural Poor (NGO)
EP	Entitled Person
EFAP	Erosion and Flood Affected Person
GC	Guidelines for Compensating EFAPs
GRC	Grievance Redressal Committee
HRD	Human Resource Development
JMBA	Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority
JMBA (RU)	Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (Resettlement Unit)
JMBP	Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project
LARP	Land Acquisition and Resettlement Plan
MARV	Maximum Allowable Replacement Value
OTCG	One time Cash Grant
PAP	Project Affected Person
PPRC	Power and Participation Research Centre
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RRAP	Revised Resettlement Action Plan
RRC	Resident Registered Card
RADOL	Rehabilitation and Development Organization for Landless (NGO)
RDM	Rural Development Movement (NGO)
RS	Resettlement Site
SOBASS	Sonar Bangla Somaj Songsker Songstha (NGO)
SES	Socio-Economic Survey
UP	Union Parishad

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

- i. The physical implementation of the Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge (Bridge) was completed and the Bridge opened on June 23, 1998. Although no land acquisition was necessary for construction of the Bridge itself, east and west guide bunds, approach roads and flood embankments, east hard point and east resettlement site together required about 2860 ha. of land for which a Resettlement Action Plan was prepared (revised subsequently in 1993 as the REVISED RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN (RRAP) for providing resettlement and compensation to Project Affected Persons (PAPs). Besides this, resettlement and compensation was also required for project-induced Erosion and Flood Affected Persons (EFAP), for which a compensation guideline was prepared in 1997.
- ii. Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA) has been implementing the said RRAP and EFAP since 1992-93. The activities under the two Plans are expected to continue till 2001. Given that both RRAP and EFAP programmes are still on-going, initial plan for an impact study was subsequently revised to allow for a qualitative study at this stage (March-June, 2000). By its very nature, the qualitative study is not expected to provide a full quantitative accounting of resettlement impact but focus rather on assessment of process and outcomes within the limits of available documents and a rapid field survey. Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) was contracted to carry out this qualitative study.
- iii. Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (JMBP) is a project of national significance linking up the eastern and western part of the country. It is expected to bring about long-term economic benefits for the northern districts in particular and the country as a whole. The introduction of a resettlement policy in the form of the RRAP and EFAP also marked a major innovation in the traditional process of land acquisition and development projects as a whole. Subsequent large-scale projects have built on the experience of resettlement in JMBP and the changes in the land acquisition policy of the country stands to benefit significantly from the experience ushered in by RRAP and EFAP policies of JMBP.
- iv. Traditionally, land acquisition in Bangladesh has been guided by a relatively narrow policy focus on official rates of compensation for asset-losing households. JMBP provided the first major instance in the country where a larger policy focus was initiated involving both a market-based rate of compensation as well as rehabilitation of affected population groups who were not recognised under the traditional legal principle of compensation. The shift to this larger focus entailed both the promulgation of new policy tools i.e. the RRAP and EFAP Policies, and, the opening of a project-based additional channel for compensation/rehabilitation over and beyond the traditional channel implemented through the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC). The main conceptual source for the new policy tools was the World Bank's

Operational Directives OD 4.30 with appropriate modification to suit the project location and its context.

v. JMBP adopted a four-pronged institutional strategy for implementing RRAP and EFAP policies:

- ◆ Appointment of Special Land Acquisition Officers (LAO) in the respective DC offices to deal exclusively with land acquisition needs of JMBP as against the normal practice of LAOs handling a variety of administrative tasks.
- ◆ Creation of a Resettlement Unit within the Project office to deal with overall monitoring and payment of entitlements.
- ◆ Contracting of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to assist in the processing of formalities including surveys for PAPs to be able to receive their entitlements as well as in post-project support programmes on health, training, afforestation and fisheries.
- ◆ A Management Consultancy for advisory and management support.

2. RESETTLEMENT TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS

vi. Resettlement targets in JMBP fell into two basic categories: unconditional and conditional targets.

Unconditional targets include:

- Cash Compensation under the law (CCL) payment to all PAPs losing land and/or structures
- 50% premium on CCL value for land-losing PAPs
- One Time Cash Grant (OTCG) for various entitled persons such as cultivators, labourers, homestead-losing PAPs
- House transfer grant and house construction grant for PAPs losing structures

Conditional targets include:

- Maximum Allowable Replacement Value (MARV) payments for those PAPs who purchase replacement land
- Stamp duty refund for those PAPs who purchase replacement land
- Community facilities for those PAPs who self-relocate to host villages
- Allotment in Resettlement Site for those homestead losing PAPs who apply
- EFAP allowances for those who submit claims of being affected by erosion and flooding.

vii. Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary overview of target achievements under the RRAP and EFAP programmes. While the exact magnitudes of resettlement outcomes will have to await the completion of the resettlement process in 2001 and its in-depth investigation, the present qualitative survey already indicates some fairly impressive

achievements: three-quarters of PAPs entitled to CCL have been paid so and 100% of these have received the premium to make up for the difference between official and market land rates. 100% of EFAP claims for the 1996 and 1997 seasons have been paid and on-going payments for the 1998 and 1999 seasons have already crossed the 64% mark. However, within these broad parameters, there have also been less than positive outcomes for specific sub-groups of PAPs. In part, such negative outcomes have to do not with JMBP as such but with the pre-existing weaknesses of the land acquisition process in Bangladesh.

TABLE 1
RRAP TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS

Category	Achievement (as from Progress Report)
<p><u>UNCONDITIONAL TARGETS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CCL Payments ▪ Grant to cover 50% premium ▪ OTCG ▪ House construction grant ▪ House Transfer grant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not less than 74% ▪ 100% of all those who have received CCL ▪ 100% ▪ 92% ▪ 100%
<p><u>CONDITIONAL TARGETS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MARV payments ▪ Stamp duty refund ▪ Host village relocation ▪ Resettlement Site relocation ▪ Training on Human Resource Development (HRD) ▪ Skill training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 48%; not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 48% ▪ 93%, not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 85%, not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 50%, planned total determined through survey ▪ 48%, planned total determined through survey

TABLE 2
EFAP TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS

Period	Expected claims	Received and finalised	Payment achievement
1996 & 1997 seasons	10499	9337	100%
1998 & 1999 seasons	4536	2790	63.5%

3. AREA-LEVEL TRENDS

viii Two broad-brush trends are indicated by the rapid field survey:

- PAP-level outcomes for the project area as a whole has seen a slight increase in household income levels, but

- The outcomes are clearly divergent on the two sides of the Jamuna river with east bank PAPs coping much better with the effects of displacement than their west bank counterparts.
- ix. Indicators of local economy show sharp rise in land prices and wage rates within the reference period but a divergent tendency of increased land transfer in the west bank and static trends in the east bank. Accessibility too has shown marked improvement with average travel time from any of the union headquarters to the respective district headquarters dropping significantly, by nearly two-thirds on the eastern side and nearly half in the western side.
 - x. Indicators of social trends reinforce the notion of a divergent outcome on the east and west banks. Perception survey results point towards an increase in social conflicts and consequent insecurity in the west bank relative to the east bank though there are also some variation within each of these broad area categories. Dowry appears to be on the increase on both sides but for differing reasons.
 - xi. Preliminary explanations for a relatively better outcome in the east bank compared to the west bank points towards the importance of better initial conditions, earlier start of the construction work and the compensation process, a more positive and effective role by local leadership and the markedly excess land acquisition on the west approach road.

4. PROCESS INSIGHTS

Land acquisition

JMBP has marked a threefold innovation in the area of land acquisition and associated compensation process:

- the introduction of the idea of a category of benefits for PAPs which are over and beyond the traditional cash compensation under the law (CCL);
- the introduction of the principle of compensation in a context where no land acquisition is occurring i.e. the EFAP policy for eroded char lands;
- Posing the issue of compensation in a larger policy framework of a resettlement action plan.

As against these positive developments, however, the traditional problem of excess land acquisition associated with development projects in Bangladesh could not be overcome, though the braiding character of the Jamuna river made planning a rather difficult exercise and hence some excess acquisition was anticipated in any case.

Resettlement Site

With regard to resettlement sites, the overall PAP preference appears to be for self-relocation in part because there are very few real-life examples of successful

resettlement planning. However, a fortuitous combination of circumstances have made the resettlement site on the eastern bank something of a success. Bulk of the settlers moved from a single village and they found it convenient to relocate in the face of continuing erosion. The disruption to their economic life too was minimal. In contrast, on the western bank, the resettlement site appears to combine negative features both of patronage politics and of narrowly bureaucratic planning. Most of the settlers were selected not from the JMBP PAPs but from squatters on the Sirajganj Town Protection Embankment. The location of the site has meant a major disruption in the economic lives of the settlers and they have responded by voting with their feet with retention rate down to 60%.

Fraudulent claims

The land acquisition process in Bangladesh has traditionally been associated with some degree of fraud. The JMBP case showed both the brazen heights to which such fraud process could reach but also how firm application of corrective measures could eventually put a stop to the fraud process. Till the time the fraud process prevailed, the field survey revealed that the process was facilitated by two factors: the piecemeal approach to acquisition and the opportunity this afforded to the development of some nexus between elements within the land acquisition offices and a category of local middlemen who organized the setting up of fake structures on advance receipt of knowledge on the land acquisition plans. The process was countered by the promulgation of a project-specific legal provision (special regulatory ordinance SRO number 218 of December 18, 1995) which sought to provide stricter cut-off dates for eligible claims and delegated powers to the district authority to exercise their discretion for preventing fraudulent claims.

Local leadership

An important actor in determining the outcome of major development initiatives in Bangladesh is the informal roles played by local leaders at various stages of the project. Some of these roles are of a “middlemen” nature, some more as “friends” of PAPs while some are simply as unwritten partners of authorities. The case of the JMBP has been no exception. Without going into the details of this informal process, one striking feature which emerges from the field reports is the relatively successful role of the informal leadership of the east bank in managing the conflicting demands and opportunities of the implementation process. In contrast, the informal leadership on the west bank proved far less capable of producing mutually beneficial outcomes.

The Role of NGOs

NGOs were an important element in the implementation of the RRAP and EFAP programmes. There have, however, been no systematic evaluation of NGO performance in the JMBP in their various roles. NGOs have played a clear and

positive role in EFAP and MARV compensation. Their performance in various post-project support programmes remain to be adequately evaluated.

A general impression which emerges from the qualitative survey is that the role of the NGOs have been more of a “technical partner” nature than a social mobilizational one. While some of the PAPs voiced the issue of accessibility of the NGOs to common PAPs, NGOs like BRAC on their part explained that their “distance” from the PAPs was necessary to avoid getting embroiled in local politics particularly in the sensitive issue of listing of PAPs for EFAP payments.

PART A

The Context

I INTRODUCTION

I.1 Introductory Background

1. The physical implementation of the Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge (Bridge) was completed and the Bridge opened on June 23, 1998. Although no land acquisition was necessary for construction of the Bridge itself, following four components required about 2860 ha. of land for which a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared (revised subsequently in 1993 as Revised Resettlement Action Plan (RRAP)) for providing resettlement and compensation to PAPs :

- East and West Guide Bunds and East Hard Point	2282 ha.
- East and West Approach Roads	370 ha.
- East and West Flood Embankments	152 ha.
- East Resettlement Site	56 ha.

Besides this, resettlement and compensation was also required for project-induced Erosion and Flood Affected Persons (EFAP), for which a Guidelines for Compensating (GC) them was prepared in 1997.

2. Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA) has been implementing the said RRAP and EFAP since 1992-93. The activities under the two Plans are expected to continue till 2001. An agreement has been reached between the Government of Bangladesh and the Co-Financiers that an Impact Evaluation of Implementation of these two Plans will be undertaken. However, given that both RRAP and EFAP programmes are still on-going, the initial plan for an impact study was subsequently revised to allow for a qualitative study at this stage (March-June, 2000) with the option for a fuller study at a later date. By its very nature, this qualitative study is not expected to provide quantitative estimates on impact of resettlement programmes but provide insights on issues of process. However, wherever possible, indicative assessment of likely longer-term impacts was also conceived as a goal. It was also anticipated that the qualitative study may point towards the areas where a fuller study can later be considered. Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) was contracted to carry out this qualitative study.

I.2 Scope of Consultancy

Objectives

- Assess the socio-economic effects of project-induced losses of land and livelihood and the corresponding mitigation measures of RRAP and EFAP.
- Assess project success in compensating, resettling and rehabilitating project affected persons.

- Assess the efficacy and relevance of the mitigation measures against the larger goals of participatory planning, involuntary resettlement and national development.

General Scope

- ◆ How well have social issues and impacts on vulnerable groups been identified and addressed through the RRAP and EFAP programmes.
- ◆ How well was a participatory process in-built into the project plan and to what extent has this been followed.
- ◆ The adequacy and functioning of organizational and institutional mechanisms established including that of Non-Government Organisations (*NGOs*)
- ◆ Adequacy of *monitoring mechanisms*
- ◆ How have Project Affected Persons (PAPs) and the local society at large fared in the post-project phase.

Specific Scope

- Perceptions on the adequacy and efficacy of the compensation process
- Nature and efficacy of the implementation tools for the RRAP and EFAP programmes at both project authority and NGO levels
- Changes, if any, in the nature of vulnerabilities in the project area
- Perceptions on the nature of post-project adjustments, both economic and social, at the level of PAPs and non-PAPs
- An overview of negative features, if any, associated with the processes of project planning, project implementation and social response and lessons to be learnt for the future.

Where they are not covered in the above, the following will also be considered:

- Likely longer term impact of displacement and land loss
- Gender issues
- Self-relocation versus relocation to a resettlement site

- Livelihood opportunities for displaced persons
- Relationship between entitled persons and others in the project area
- Exaggerated or fraudulent claims
- Project-induced dependency
- Minimising land acquisition
- Piecemeal acquisition and cumulative impact on people
- EFAP policy

I.3 JMBP: A Calendar

I.3.1 Activities

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Time Period</u>
◆ Land Acquisition	1988-89 to 1996-97
◆ Compensation Payment	1990 – Continuing
◆ EFAP Policy	1995 - Continuing
◆ Structural Work (East Bank)	1993-98
◆ Structural Work (West Bank)	1994-98
◆ Resettlement Site (East Bank)	1995, 1998, 2000 (three phases)
◆ Resettlement Site (West Bank)	1998

I.3.2 Survey Events

3. The Resettlement Action Plan for JMBP entailed a number of survey activities. These were executed by contracted NGOs. The calendar of these survey activities are described below:

<u>Survey</u>	<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Executing NGO</u>
▪ Base-Line Socio-Economic Survey (SES)	1992	BRAC
▪ Supplementary SES on West Bank	1996-97	RADOL

II RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR A QUALITATIVE EVALUATION

II.1 Research Components

4. After intense and threadbare discussions on suitable methodologies for the qualitative evaluation, the following components were identified as making up the most relevant methodological approach given the specific scope and objectives of the consultancy:
 - Documents Analysis
 - Perception survey on selected area variables
 - Qualitative field reports on selected topics
 - Quantitative information on a few PAP-related variables through small survey of PAPs.
5. The research was completed in two rounds of field and desk research:

ROUND 1: - Qualitative field reports on selected topics
 - Quantitative information on selected area variables
 - Documents Analysis

ROUND 2: - Quantitative information on PAP-related variables
6. The selected topics for field reports fell into three analytical groups:
 - Policy-related
 - Process-related
 - Impact-related
7. The perception survey on area variables covered two broad groups:
 - Indicators of local economy
 - Indicators of social change.
8. The limited PAP survey covered the following variables:
 - Process support
 - Leakage in compensation
 - Use of compensation money
 - Post-project status changes

II.2 Field Research Spots

9. Though the field research had to be in the nature of rapid appraisals, the idea was to ensure that findings drew on as wide a range of observations as was practically feasible. A two-track strategy was followed. The core research component was the field reports. So the idea here was to maximise observations points for the field teams for their interaction with key informants and local population. Observation points included market-places, tea-stalls, schools, Resettlement Sites and such other identifiable public places. Selection of key informants was made through a process of open discussion with responsible and knowledgeable local persons and they included school-teachers, businessmen, village leaders. Information was collected from a total of 53 observation points (spots) spread over 11 unions in 5 thanas on two sides of the Jamuna river. The perception survey on area variables was also combined with this part of the field research strategy.
10. For the small supplementary survey of PAPs, a different strategy was adopted. Clusters of PAP concentrations were identified and a small random sample from each cluster interviewed. In total 3 clusters each on the west and east bank of the river were identified a random sample of 314 PAPs were interviewed.
11. The details of observation points and PAP clusters are described in Annex 1 (Tables A1 and A2).

II.3 Organizations/Persons Met

12. An important component of the research strategy entailed discussions with the various organizations/officials involved with implementation of the RAP as well as various segments of the local leadership. It also included an analysis of key documents. The list of organizations/persons met on the west and east bank as well as in Dhaka is described in Annex 2. List of documents consulted is described in Annex 3.

II.4 Limits of the Survey

13. It was not within the terms of reference of this qualitative survey to establish the exact quantitative estimates of achievements of the objectives of the resettlement plan. Indeed, insofar as work on both RRAP and EFAP are still continuing, the time for undertaking a full accounting of outcomes is yet to come. Even with regard to achievements so far, the focus of this Report is very much on process issues. This Report, on the basis of its own field research, cannot therefore make any conclusive statements on the quantitative magnitudes of the proportion of PAPs who have received their due compensation or the proportion who have acquired replacement land or the amount of acquired land which has been found to be excessive. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the Report provides an assessment of outcomes based on available official information.

III RRAP AND EFAP: AN OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

III.1 Implementation Tools

14. JMBA utilised three types of tools to implement the RRAP and EFAP:

- ◆ Policy
- ◆ Institutional
- ◆ Operational.

Policy Tools

15. Traditionally, land acquisition in Bangladesh has been guided by a relatively narrow policy focus on official rates of compensation for asset-losing households. JMBP provided the first major instance in the country where a larger policy focus was initiated involving both a market-based rate of compensation as well as rehabilitation of affected population groups who were not recognised under the traditional legal principle of compensation. The shift to this larger focus entailed both the promulgation of new policy tools i.e. the RRAP and EFAP Policies, and, the opening of a project-based additional channel for compensation/rehabilitation over and beyond the traditional channel implemented through the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC). Land acquisition continued to be within the legal framework of the country with the DC office being responsible for compensating legal owners at official rates. But this official framework was now located within a larger policy framework specific to JMBP which called for ensuring additional compensation to legal owners if official rates were lower than market rates and also policy recognition of entitlements and PAPs not covered in the existing land-focussed legal provisions.
16. The main conceptual source for the new policy tools has been the World Bank's Operational Directives OD 4.30 with appropriate modification to suit the project location and its context. RRAP for PAPs originally listed 14 categories of entitlements but subsequently policy modifications were made with respect to some of the entitlements i.e. loss of homestead land, loss of living quarters, loss of physical structures. The changes were made to make the policy more realistic to the context.
17. Promulgation of the EFAP policy constituted the sharpest advance on the traditional principle of compensation. This policy was meant to compensate for losses due to project-induced erosion and floods upstream or downstream of the Bridge. The inclusion of a provision for compensating unforeseen losses in the original entitlement matrix provided the basis for this major policy innovation. For reasons of practical difficulties in differentiating induced erosion from natural erosion, no distinction between the two was drawn. There was no principle of land acquisition involved in the EFAP policy and as such its implementation did not involve the office of the DC but was wholly project-based.

18. Compensation payments under the EFAP policy began in May, 1996 with an initial time-frame up to 1998. The time-frame has now been extended to 2001. The physical boundary for considering entitlements under this policy was determined on the basis of the recommendations of two national institutions engaged for the purpose, namely River Research Institute and the Surface Water Modelling Centre. The boundary was finally set at a total of eighteen kilometres upstream and downstream from the bridge point. Actual listing of entitled persons is done on the basis of survey by BRAC, a national NGO. The list has been updated on an annual basis within the agreed time-frame. Formal concurrence on the policy between donors and JMBA took place on 17th November, 1996 (RRAP and EFAP Update, February 12, 1997).

Institutional Strategy

19. There has been four components to the institutional strategy for implementing RRAP and EFAP policies:
- ◆ Appointment of Special Land Acquisition Officers (LAO) in the respective DC offices to deal exclusively with land acquisition needs of JMBP as against the normal practice of LAOs handling a variety of administrative tasks.
 - ◆ Creation of a Resettlement Unit (RU) within the Project office to deal with overall monitoring and payment of entitlements.
 - ◆ Contracting of NGOs to assist in the processing of formalities including surveys for PAPs to be able to receive their entitlements.
 - ◆ A Management Consultancy for advisory and management support.

Operational Tools

20. The operational tools for implementing the RRAP and EFAP policies can be grouped into three categories:
- Primary Tools
 - Entitlement Matrix
 - EFAP Manual
 - Socio-Economic Survey
 - Land Market Survey
 - Relocation Survey
 - Cut-Off Survey

- Delivery tools
 - Information Booklet
 - ID Cards and Resident Registration Cards (RRC)
 - Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC)
- Management Tools
 - Data Management System
 - Entitled Person (EP) Files
 - Monitoring Formats for weekly, monthly and overall reporting on performance.

III.2 Mid-Course Innovations

21. The implementation of the resettlement plan in JMBP has shown a number of mid-course innovations:

- Innovations in operational tools:
 - change in the reporting formats for NGOs for monitoring progress of RRAP and EFAP implementation
 - new MARV was introduced and subsequently revised
 - other payments and entitlements were revised accordingly
 - Government had to promulgate new law to avoid paying compensation to hundreds of ghost/phony structures
 - RU had to make a Naming convention for computerisation to avoid difficulties in identification of EPs.
- A policy for compensating those affected by project-induced erosion and flooding i.e. the EFAP policy
- Programme initiatives in the fields of fisheries and forestry to address environmental concerns and also to provide community-level support to PAPs.

III.3 NGO Participation

22. JMBA facilitated an active role for NGOs in the implementation of RRAP and EFAP policies. Specifically, NGOs participated in the following fields:

- planning and socio-economic survey (BRAC and RADOL)
- implementation of RRAP and EFAP (RDM and BRAC)
- running of health sector programmes (Grameen Bank and GonoShasthay Kendra)
- training and income generation (DORP and ASAUS)
- plantation and afforestation (Grameen Bank and Kissan)
- fisheries programme (Grameen Matsya Foundation, Grameen Bank and SOBAS)

In general, the NGO role has been more pronounced in technical support roles than in social mobilisational roles.

III.4 Community Participation

23. Participation generally refers to the adequacy of community involvement in the project. This may occur ideally at two levels:

- participation induced by the project through consultation with affected families at the implementation stages
- participation by the community at every stage of the project cycle including planning formulation stages.

While the above presents the ideal case, it has to be kept in mind JMBP represented the first time that resettlement issues in the language and spirit of OD 4.30 of the World Bank was being introduced in Bangladesh and that too in the context of such a large and challenging project.

24. In general, community participation was not a factor at the planning stages in particular in land acquisition planning. A negative consequence of this has been the excessive acquisition of land which by all accounts has been very substantial. Consultation with the stakeholders (including PAPs) on resettlement issues really began from the time of SES activities. The main objectives of this consultation were to ensure effective implementation of RRAP and to build awareness on the RAP process. Information campaign and the recording of PAP preferences on compensation mode and relocation options were conceived as steps which could further the goals of participation. A few steps were also taken to ensure PAP participation as an in-built mechanism of the implementation process, namely:

- Around 60% of the staff of the implementing NGOs were recruited from the PAPs

- Representatives of PAPs i.e. Union Chairmen, were made members of the Grievance Redressal Committees.
25. Participation is not only a matter of being induced by project authorities. PAPs and the community at large can also take initiatives to project their interests and views into the resettlement process though the caveat here is that the scope for such initiatives was ruled out from the critical first step of land acquisition planning. Be that as it may, PAP initiatives at participation produced results in two important areas, firstly, in the mid-course policy initiative to address unforeseen losses arising from erosion and flooding, an initiative which got formal shape in the EFAP policy, and on a smaller scale, in the location finalization of the Resettlement Site on the west bank, the planned site having to be shifted several times and eventually being located on land which did not require new acquisition.

III.5 Monitoring

26. Computerised Management Information System (CMIS) was developed to ensure uninterrupted flow of accurate and timely information. The main objective was to enable the Resettlement Unit (RU) to perform effectively and monitor target achievements. The system entailed calculation of entitlements, implementation of payment modalities, reconciliation of various data from DC and SES to cope with existing computer-generated EP files.

PART B

ASSESSING OUTCOMES

IV ADEQUACY OF POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS

IV.1 Entitlement Policy Matrix

27. The Matrix has been broad-based. Relevant types of losses have been identified, listed and sub-classified so that various categories of Entitled Persons (EPs), eg. households living together, squatters, uthulies, relatives, indirectly affected persons etc. could be addressed according to their eligibility. Entitlement packages were also designed to meet the “replacement cost” principles. Loss of land, homesteads of different categories and scale, residential and commercial structures, rented in/share-cropped farm, wage-labour, employment etc. have been the major items covered in the packages. Inclusion of a provision for compensating unforeseen losses was instrumental in providing the basis for the mid-course innovation of the EFAP policy. In general, the entitlement matrix has been comprehensive and adequate in its identification of loss and EP categories.

IV.2 Instruments for Preparation of LARP (Land Acquisition and Resettlement Plan)

28. *SES (Socio-Economic Surveys)*

This was the basic source of PAP data. The SES was conducted before the project design and location was accomplished. This of course meant that once the design and location questions had been settled, there were some PAPs who had not been covered in the SES. To cover this anomaly, Project authorities subsequently created two channels for correction: grievance redressal committees, and, up-date survey by another implementing NGO.

29. *Video-filming*

This was done in order to check speculation, manipulation and fraudulent claims for compensation on structures. But these videos could have limited application because of other social and circumstantial reasons. Special law had to be enacted to deal with the issue.

30. *Land Market Survey*

It was carried out to determine market value to reflect fair price of land for those PAPs who actually purchased replacement land. Survey data was used to establish the maximum allowable replacement value (MARV). This survey was undertaken twice, once in 1994 and later in 1997. The first time a single rate was established for the entire project area but in the second survey, rates were established separately for the east and the west bank. Because mouza-wise variation in land price was not accommodated, PAPs with high value land incurred a loss while those with a lower-value land gained.

Initially the procedures for claiming MARV allowed a loophole to PAPs to make claims on the basis of sale and purchase deeds even though actual transfer of land was not occurring.

From 1998 onwards, this loophole was tightened and PAPs had to produce more definitive proofs of transfer such as mutation certificates.

The MARV principle was in many ways a major step towards the guiding OD 4.30 principle which requires compensating affected persons at market value for their lost assets. This was a first for Bangladesh and subsequent development projects were able to build on this experience to bring further maturity to this policy principle.

IV.3 Instruments for Implementation of RRAP

31. *EP File*

This was a good instrument but its efficacy was limited to project-level payments. Though project documents indicate that it was the agreed idea that DC office records and EP files being two data sources on entitlements, it is not clear to what extent DC office actually referred to the EP files in making Cash Compensation under the Law (CCL) payments. However, EP files were instrumental in guiding the payments that were made from the project after the CCL process had been completed

32. *Identity (ID) Card*

This was a good instrument to facilitate the EPs to identify themselves and draw preferential treatment in banks and other public offices. This also boosted their self-esteem and social standing.

33. *EC (Entitlement Card)*

This was a complement to the ID card which spelt out the entitlements for the individual PAP. This too proved to be an effective instrument for facilitating project-level payments.

34. *Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC)*

A total of 9004 cases of grievance have been recorded (see ADD RETA-5781, July, 1999). Role of GRC has been meaningful in the context of inadequate provisions for redress in Acquisition Act of 1982 of Bangladesh. The GRC was also authorised to recommend any inclusion and changes in the data-base. In-depth study has to be made, however, to evaluate the contribution of GRC towards the achievement of RRAP and EFAP goals.

IV.4 Instruments for Monitoring RRAP and EFAP Implementation

35. *CMIS Data* (Computerised Management Information System)

DC's Award list and SES-data were compiled to form this data-base. With implementation of RRAP, each EP File was updated and monitored. However, it is difficult to assess just from a perusal of available documents to what extent this has been successful as a monitoring mechanism.

36. *Progress Reporting*

Implementing NGOs were required to produce weekly, monthly and quarterly progress reports which were sent to the Resettlement Unit of the Project (JMBP-RU). The progress report issued from the RU simply repeats the format submitted by the implementing NGOs without any further consolidation to make the reports more user-friendly. For the most recent information on progress, repeated enquiries at the RU simply produced the progress reports sent in by the implementing NGOs. In general, the EFAP progress report appears to be more well-organised and easier to interpret. The progress reports on RRAP on the other hand has more information but is less user-friendly. For example, if we refer to the report dated 23rd May, 2000, items 6.10 and 7.1, the first on "grant to purchase homestead plot" and the second on "purchase of homestead" give planned total figures which are difficult to relate though there is an obvious logical link between the two. Item 6.10 gives a planned total figure of 1082 while item 7.1 gives a planned total figure of 336. How are these figures to be interpreted? "Grant to purchase homestead land" would prima facie appear to imply that there are 1082 PAPs who are eligible for this grant. What does it then mean when the same report cites the planned total for "purchase of homestead" as only 336?

Aside from these difficulties to interpret the given information, a critical gap is difficulty in assessing progress on the completion of CCL payments by the DC office. As we know, CCL payments is the crucial first part of the compensation process after which comes the various categories of extra-CCL i.e. payments directly paid from the project as per the entitlement policy matrix. The available reporting format makes it difficult to make any clear assessment of progress on this variable.

37. *Milestone Meetings*

These meetings of the co-financiers were very useful in monitoring the progress of RRAP implementation. There were a total of nine such meetings.

38. *Independent Review Panel*

It reviewed all the aspects of RRAP and EFAP implementation. Its suggestions regarding policy and implementation matters played a useful role particularly because it also integrated PAP reactions into their suggestions.

39. *Inspection Panel of the World Bank*

Social aspects of the project and, in particular of the EFAP, were reviewed by this panel. This was carried out in response to a particular complaint lodged by an NGO. There was no formal inspection, but the Panel kept EFAP under surveillance for almost three years, and the policy was eventually adjudged to be performing satisfactorily.

40. *Reporting formats for implementing NGO*

Weekly, monthly and overall progress reporting formats were made mandatory for the implementing NGOs. The formats were designed to show key activities, targets objectives and inputs against each output, costs and problems. Notwithstanding these self-reporting activities, a Management Consultant (Ms. Halcrow International) was placed to oversee the progress of RRAP and EFAP.

IV.5 Additional Instruments for EFAP Implementation

Following instruments were used during planning and implementation:

41. *SES*

Since the erosion PAPs were to get a standard rate of compensation, the critical instrument in the case of EFAP was the listing of PAPs through a SES. BRAC is responsible for this listing. They have already completed the listing for the erosion and flood-affected PAPs for the 1996 and 1997 seasons and are completing the list for the 1998 season. The 1995 loss to erosion (i.e. before the cut-off-date for EFAP policy) which was due to opening of the Dhaleswari spill channel was also subsequently paid for under EFAP provisions though some grievances remain. By and large, this listing exercise has been an effective one

42. *EFAP Entitlement Policy Matrix*

This was an innovative instrument being first of its kind in Bangladesh and likely to be the precedent for subsequent likely project situations. Some grievances remain particularly on the issue of AD (Alluvion-Diluvian) line demarcation.

43. *Aerial Photography, Satellite Imagery and Surface Water Modelling*

Though stemming from a social concern, innovating an EFAP policy also represented a complex technical challenge of demarcating the boundary within which erosion and flooding effects should be looked into as well as the likely physical trends in erosion and flooding. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and Finnish Geographical Information System (GIS) experts as well as two national institutions, River Research Institute and the Surface Water Modelling Centre, were able to provide the necessary technical support and establish the boundary within which the EFAP policy would apply. PPRC field teams did not come across any serious questioning on these boundaries; only source of grievance from some people were that while induced erosion and flooding had already occurred in 1995, EFAP policy implementation began from 1996.

IV.6 Cooperation of NGOs

44. NGOs played an important role in the implementation of RRAP and EFAP. However, available documents do not allow any comprehensive assessment of NGO performance. There were four areas in which NGOs played a role:

- SES
- RRAP implementation
- EFAP implementation
- Post-Project support to PAPs.

45. Conclusions, based on both field impressions and available documents, are relatively clear on the strong and positive performance of NGOs in the areas of SES and EFAP implementation. Assessments appear to be more mixed in the areas of RRAP implementation and post-project support. One simultaneous source of strength and weakness in the area of RRAP implementation arose from the specificity of the NGO TOR itself. As we know, the compensation process for PAPs in the JMBP context had two stages: CCL or cash compensation under the law, to be paid out by the DC office, and various categories of additional payments as defined under the entitlement policy matrix, to be paid out by the project authorities. The second stage has been traditionally absent in the land acquisition context and in fact was the major innovation. Not surprisingly, the NGO involvement focussed on this second stage in which they played a valuable role. However, resettlement experiences in projects subsequent to JMBP has brought out the fact that PAPs confront a variety of difficulties in securing due compensation in the traditional first i.e. CCL, stage of the process. Clearly, the larger goals of the resettlement action plan stand to be strengthened if NGO support to PAPs in this first stage of the compensation process is also made possible. In other words, what is ideally required is a unified NGO role covering both stages of the compensation process. However, this is more an insight gained from hindsight rather than a critique of the JMBP resettlement experience.

46. In the area of post-project support in training and income generation, health programme, plantation and afforestation, fisheries programme, firm assessments are of necessity difficult since many of the activities are on-going or are yet to take off. The limited evidence available on these activities present a mixed picture. For example, in the area of training in the west bank, the target of 2000 PAPs to receive training during 1999 could not be achieved even up to the halfway mark. There were also serious complaints on the content and mismanagement on the payment of training allowance. The implementing NGO here is ASAUS. Both JMBA authorities as well as the micro-credit funding agency PALLI KARMA -SAHAYAK FOUNDATION (PKSF) expressed their unhappiness with the performance of this NGO. On the other hand, PPRC field teams found a clear instance of a positive impact of training on the east bank (see Box below).

BOX 1

KULSUM: A SUCCESS STORY ON TRAINING

Among the many subjects for which training activities had been organized by Development Organization of the Rural Poor (DORP) a NGO engaged under JMBA, tailoring was the long time program. The period was three months and each trainee used to get taka 500/- monthly as an allowance. Besides, light food used to be served everyday during midday. Among the successful trainees two names have come up. One is Anwara Begum of Ruhuli village of Gobindashi Union and the other is Kulsum Begum, presently residing in the Resettlement Site. The success story of Kulsum as narrated by her in her own language is as follows:

“The success from training is dependent on the trainee himself. The trainer makes trainees understand everything but if the trainee do not remain attentive and do not try to learn, then success will not come. Eight of us joined the training programme. As I had old experience about sewing and tailoring, I used the lecture to develop my skills. Now I can do everything and I have started the sewing of ladies cloth. By loan money I have bought clothes and I get offer to sew ladies cloth. A sewing machine also has been purchased by me. If I would have more cloth, I could get more offers for sewing”.

Kulsum has advanced further. She now teaches 5 to 6 girls in sewing in addition to tailoring works. Her trainees are the daughters of her neighbours. Kulsum does not take any fee against training imparted, but trainees help Kulsum in her sewing works. This helps these trainees to get practical training. Thus, Kulsum do not require to employ extra manpower to assist her. Presently, Kulsum is a successful tailor. Her shop is in her own house in the Resettlement Site.

47. Support to fisheries development is another major area of post-project support. This programme came up to make good use of land found to have been acquired in excess of JMBA requirements. Grameen Mathshya Foundation is implementing this programme. As with the case of other such programmes, it is as yet too early to make proper assessment of outcomes. However, a possible area of concern identified by PPRC field studies had to do with the challenge of integrating PAP families in such programmes given that the pre-determined Grameen Mathshya Foundation procedures requires using only female-only groups whose members are not necessarily from PAP families.

V RESETTLEMENT TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS

V.1 Problems of Assessment

48. Insofar as a full-scale socio-economic survey of PAPs was not part of the Terms of Reference (TOR) of this qualitative survey, an independent assessment of quantitative target achievements of the resettlement programme is not possible. However, what is possible is an analysis of the progress reports available from the implementing agencies and thereby try to arrive at some reasonable conclusions on the matter.
49. Progress reports are available separately for the RRAP and the EFAP programmes. The last progress report made available to PPRC was dated May 23rd, 2000. The first step in undertaking an interpretation of these reports is to clarify the targets.
50. Resettlement targets in JMBP fell into two basic categories: unconditional and conditional targets. Unconditional targets include:
- CCL payment to all PAPs losing land and/or structures
 - 50% premium on CCL value for land-losing PAPs
 - One Time Cash Grant (OTCG) for various entitled persons such as cultivators, labourers, homestead-losing PAPs
 - House Transfer Grant and House Construction Grant for PAPs losing structures
51. Conditional targets include:
- MARV payments for those PAPs who purchase replacement land
 - Stamp duty refund for those PAPs who purchase replacement land
 - Community facilities for those PAPs who self-relocate to host villages
 - Allotment in Resettlement Site for those homestead losing PAPs who apply
 - EFAP allowances for those who submit claims of being affected by erosion and flooding.
52. A more complicated target category was that on post-project support in the area of training and income generation. Here, separate surveys were conducted to categorize PAPs into economic classes and target mainly female members of poorer PAPs.
53. In the case of unconditional targets, a factor complicating the interpretation of available progress reports relates to the fact that figures do not list separately direct and indirect PAPs, i.e. “direct” meaning those losing physical assets and “indirect” meaning those affected by loss of opportunities. In the absence of this distinction, the principal difficulty is in establishing the target for CCL payments, i.e. payments which are due only to “direct” PAPs.
54. In the case of conditional targets, by their very nature these are somewhat in the nature of “moving” targets so that the idea of what constitutes “total” is difficult to establish. The

only reasonable way to go about here is to establish cut-off dates and assess achievements within the identified limit of the targets.

55. With these prior considerations in hand, we can now try to interpret available progress reports and explore what reasonable conclusions can be drawn on resettlement target achievements.

V.2 RRAP Target Achievements

56. The proper place in the progress report from where to initiate an assessment is the section titled “EP Files”. There are two entries here, the first “preparation of EP file” and the second “closing of EP files”. The planned total for the former is given as 16343 and for the latter as 15728. These totals can reasonably be read as the total number of PAPs for JMBP, the former as the figure given by the SES and the latter as the final total after due process of scrutiny. In this interpretation, the total number of PAP in the Project can reasonably be taken as 15728 covering all categories of PAPs and entitlements. If closing of EP file is taken to mean that all entitlements have been met, the cumulative achievement as of May 2000 is then shown as 62.65%.
57. It is difficult to distinguish, however, the achievements on the unconditional and conditional targets from the above summary figure. The critical difficulty is in establishing the target for the direct PAPs i.e. those who are to receive CCL payments. If the category “One Time Cash Grant (OTCG)” had referred only to indirect PAPs, then one could have simply subtracted this figure from the total number of PAPs given in the section on EP files to arrive at the figure for direct PAPs. Unfortunately, direct PAPs are also eligible for OTCG in their role as cultivators. The nearest one comes to getting a figure for the direct PAPs is that given for the category “grant to cover 50% premium”. This category is applicable only for direct PAPs losing land. The planned total here is listed as 10,000 though achievement is shown at 11,677. The figure for those eligible for CCL payments thus logically lie somewhere between this figure and the total figure for EPs shown as 15728. Achievement on the target of CCL payments, which it should be recalled is done by the DC office, therefore has to be interpreted as not less than 74.2 % (i.e. 11677 as a percentage of 15728).
58. Following table summarizes RRAP target achievements:

TABLE 1**RRAP TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS**

Category	Achievement (as from Progress Report)
<u>UNCONDITIONAL TARGETS</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CCL Payments ▪ Grant to cover 50% premium ▪ OTCG ▪ House Construction Grant ▪ House Transfer Grant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not less than 74% ▪ 100% of all those who have received CCL ▪ 100% ▪ 92% ▪ 100%
<u>CONDITIONAL TARGETS</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MARV payments ▪ Stamp duty refund ▪ Host village relocation ▪ Resettlement Site relocation ▪ Training on Human Resource Development (HRD) ▪ Skill training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 48%; not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 48% ▪ 93%, not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 85%, not clear how planned total arrived at ▪ 50%, planned total determined through survey ▪ 48%, planned total determined through survey

Source: RDM progress Report, May 23rd, 2000 and JMBP-RU Report, December, 1999

V.3 EFAP Target Achievements

59. In comparison to assessing RRAP target achievements, the EFAP target achievements are relatively easier to establish from available progress reports.

TABLE 2**EFAP TARGET ACHIEVEMENTS**

Period	Expected claims	Received and finalised	Payment achievement
1996 & 1997 seasons	10499	9337	100%
1998 & 1999 seasons	4536	2790	63.5%

Source: BRAC Progress Report, 23rd May, 2000

60. In general, EFAP target achievements appear satisfactory both from the progress reports as well as from field impressions. As already referred to earlier, the few sources of grievances here relate to the PAP feeling that the EFAP policy should have come into existence a year earlier, i.e. from the 1995 erosion season. However, it should be emphasised that EFAP was not only a mid-course innovation for JMBP but also very much of a new precedent for Bangladesh as a whole.

VI PAP-LEVEL OUTCOMES

61. Resettlement target achievements by themselves may not explain the totality of social and economic outcomes at the level of individual PAPs. To broaden the basis for assessing outcomes, the qualitative survey directed its field attention at three additional levels:
- firstly, a small quantitative survey on a few PAP-related variables not covered in project-level progress reports (sample details in chapter II)
 - secondly, a closer enquiry of specific sub-groups of PAPs who may be facing adverse outcomes,
 - thirdly, a perception survey on area-level changes to assess longer-term impacts. The last will be subject-matter for the next chapter.

VI.1 PAP Experience of the RAP Process

62. Tables 3 and 4 describe the responses of the sampled PAPs on their experience of the RAP process. Table 3 describes the level of support as perceived by PAPs at various stages of the RAP process. In terms of the five indicators of process support described in Table 3, it appears that the level of process support has been generally stronger on the east bank compared to the west bank.

TABLE 3

PROCESS SUPPORT

Indicators of Process Support	Tangail	Sirajganj
	% of PAPs	
PAPs who received information booklet	72	59
PAPs who had booklet explained to them	67	64
PAPs who had booklet explained through house-to-house visit	60	34
PAPs who received project grants of one sort or another	100	82
PAPs who received post-project support of one sort or another	80	24

Sample: Tangail: 155, Sirajganj: 159

TABLE 4

HARASSMENT/DIFFICULTIES IN RECEIVING COMPENSATION

Nature of Difficulty/Harrassment	Tangail	Sirajganj	Total
	% of Respondents (multiple responses)		
Excess expenses on travel/lodging for frequent visit to DC office	89	91	90
Speed money	95	84	90
Harassment during receiving of cheque from treasury	51	62	57
Middlemen	15	16	15
Improper Joint Verification	8	16	12
Faulty land documents	4	9	7
Lack of awareness on procedures	2	7	5
Harassment during encashment of cheque at bank	6	3	4
Actual owner not listed	1	5	3

Sample: Tangail: 155, Sirajganj: 159

63. There are three major, two relatively significant and several minor categories of difficulties PAPs faced in the process of securing their compensation. The major categories are: speed money (90% of respondents), unnecessary excess expenditure incurred on account of having to make repeated visit to DC office, brokerage etc. and harassment (e.g. repeated and unnecessary invoking of procedural formalities during receipt of cheque from the treasury). Two somewhat lesser though still significant factors cited were: “middlemen” (16%) and “improper joint verification” (12%). On a separate question on the magnitude of speed money involved, the responses cited an average magnitude of 10.7% of the compensation having to be foregone as speed money.

VI.2 Use of Compensation Money

64. What use do PAPs make of their compensation money? PAPs were asked to provide indicative use-pattern of their compensation money. The specific answer sought was in terms of broad percentages interpreted both as a self-assessed ranking order and an indicative quantitative estimate. Table 5 summarizes the results. The pattern varied across the river. At the aggregate, the most important use-categories were “land purchase (36.4%), daily expenses (14.8%), house building/shifting/repair (22.3%), social ceremonies (5%), business investment (5%) and land mortgage-in (4.7%).

TABLE 5: USE OF COMPENSATION MONEY

Use Category	Tangail	Sirajganj	Total
	%		
Land Purchase	42.9	29.9	36.4
Daily Expenditure	11	18.6	14.8
House-building	6.5	14.3	10.4
House Shifting	12.1	5.4	8.7
Social Ceremonies	3.4	6.6	5
Business Investment	5	5	5
Land Mortgage-in	7.5	2	4.7
House Repair	2.6	3.8	3.2
Debt Repayment	2.1	2.1	2.1
Non-Land asset/shop	0.6	2.5	1.5
Medical Treatment	1	1.2	1.1
Children Education	0.3	1.3	0.8
Cultivation	-	1.2	0.6
Bank deposit	-	0.8	0.4
Miscellaneous	5.2	5	5.1
ALL CATEGORIES	100	100	100

Sample: Tangail: 155, Sirajganj: 159

VI.3 Post-Project Status Changes

65. Over and beyond resettlement programme targets as such, it is important also to look at post-project outcomes at the level of individual PAPs. The PAP survey considered two variables: reported monthly income, and, occupation.

TABLE 6: CHANGES IN INCOME SITUATION

Reported Monthly Income Categories	Tangail		Sirajganj	
	Pre-Project	Post-Project	Pre-Project	Post-Project
	% of PAPs			
Up to 3000 Taka	27.7	16.8	39.6	51.3
3001 – 5000 Taka	39.4	32.9	37.7	31.6
5001 – 9000 Taka	18.7	33.5	13.8	12.7
9001 + Taka	14.2	16.8	8.8	4.4

Sample: Tangail: 155, Sirajganj: 159

66. For the project as a whole, average reported monthly income of the sampled PAPs rose slightly, i.e. from Taka 5165 to Taka 5957. However, there is a clear divergence among the PAPs on the two sides of the Jamuna. Reported income levels rose from Taka 5710 to Taka 7810 for the east bank (Tangail) PAPs but it declined from Taka 4633 to Taka 4139 for the west bank (Sirajganj) PAPs. Table 6 drives home these trends in terms of the relative proportion of PAPs in each income group. The proportion of PAPs in the poorest income category (monthly income less than taka 3000) has increased from 39.6% to 51.3% in the Sirajganj side while it declined from 27.7% to 16.8% in the Tangail side. PPRC field survey indicate as initial explanations for such divergent trends the much more severe economic displacements effects of land acquisition on the west bank PAPs than on the east bank PAPs. A detailed analysis of this divergent outcomes is provided later in Table 17.
67. The other variable examined by the survey to assess longer-term impact on PAPs was “principal occupation”. Table 7 describes the occupational profile of the sampled PAPs in the pre-project and post-project periods. The most important change is in the relative position of agriculture as occupation. For the project area as a whole, the proportion of PAPs engaged in agriculture declined from 65.3% to 48.1%. The decline is true for both sides of the river. However, on the west bank, there was an increase in the proportion of share-croppers.
68. Other noteworthy changes is in the proportion engaged in rickshaw-pulling but this trend is mainly confined to the east bank area. While agriculture has declined, the growth area has been in small to medium business and petty trade, all together rising from 12.1% to 20.3%. The trend is true for both sides. However, an expression of rising occupational uncertainty on the west bank is the sharp increase in the miscellaneous category from 3.6% in the pre-project period to 11.5% in the post-project period.

TABLE 7OCCUPATIONAL CHANGES

Principal Occupation	Tangail		Sirajganj		Total	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
	% of PAPs					
Agriculture	72.3	56.8	58.5	39.6	65.3	48.1
Share-cropping	1.3	0.6	3.8	5.7	2.5	3.2
Labourer	4.5	3.2	6.3	8.1	5.4	5.7
Rickshaw-pulling	1.9	7.1	1.3	1.9	1.6	4.5
Artisans	2.5	3.2	7.6	6.2	5.1	4.8
Hawker	0.6	4.5	-	0.6	0.3	2.5
Shopkeeper	3.9	6.5	3.1	8.8	3.5	7.6
Small/ Medium business	8.4	9	8.2	11.3	8.3	10.2
Service	3.2	3.2	5.7	5	4.5	4.1
Fishing	-	1.9	1.9	1.3	1	1.6
Miscellaneous	1.4	4	3.6	11.5	2.5	7.7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sample: Tangail: 155, Sirajganj: 159

69. While the limited nature of the field survey must circumscribe the quantitative depth of the outcomes noted above, two broad-brush conclusions on PAP-level outcomes may nevertheless be drawn:
- PAP-level outcomes for the project area as a whole has seen a slight increase in household income levels, but
 - The outcomes are clearly divergent on the two sides of the Jamuna river with east bank PAPs coping much better with the effects of displacement than their west bank counterparts.
70. The dynamics involved in which west bank PAPs appeared to have fared poorly in the broader socio-economic outcomes merits more thorough enquiry. Table 17 attempts to provide some answers which could be gathered through the qualitative survey. It is quite possible that on the longer time horizon, positive economic outcomes may become more universal. However, the adjustment dynamics which produces some losers in the shorter run need also to be understood so that the maxim “no one shall be worse off” can be made ever more real.

VII AREA-LEVEL CHANGES: 1990-2000

VII.1 Indicators of Local Economy

71. Land Prices

Land prices in the project area on both sides of the Jamuna river have gone up within the reference period up to a maximum of 400 per cent as revealed through the perception survey (Table 8). The rates of increase have varied as per land type as well as location. On the Sirajganj side (west bank), the sharpest increase has been in the case of land for residential purposes while in the Tangail side it has been for commercial and productive land. An immediate reason for the price increase is that there are many more buyers in the market than there are sellers. PAPs are eager to buy land to be eligible for MARV payments while business people and remittance workers are purchasing land for future uses.

TABLE 8

CHANGES IN LAND PRICES

Land Category	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)				TANGAIL (East Bank)			
	Pre-1990	Mid-90s	2000	% change '90-'00	Pre-1990	Mid 90s	2000	% change '90-'00
	takas per decimal							
Homestead land	2300	4892	8964	390	5423	7231	11539	213
Single crop land	840	1560	2870	342	1067	2333	3000	281
Multi-crop land	2979	3307	5450	183	1131	3100	4608	407
Commercial Land	8600	10370	16000	186	6222	11727	22509	362

72. Land Purchase/Sale

In terms of perceived tendency on rates of land transfer, there is a clearly divergent tendency at work. On the Tangail side, key informants' perceptions indicate no major change, indeed, a net decrease with only two pockets showing a tendency towards increased rates of land transfer. However, on the western, i.e. Sirajganj side, the perceived tendency is unmistakably one of increased rates of land transfer (Table 9).

TABLE 9

<i>Area</i>	<i>Perceived Tendency on land Transfer</i>
East Bank (Tangail)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall net decrease ▪ Increase only in Salla and Alenga Unions
West Bank (Sirajganj)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall net increase ▪ No decrease any where ▪ Sharpest increase in Sayedabad and Jhaul unions

73. *Wages and Prices*

Agricultural and non-agricultural wage rates have increased on both sides of the river over the project period. However, while the rates were initially higher on the west side, it is the east side (Tangail) which has registered the larger increase. Thus, agri wage increased by 70% on the Tangail side compared to 34% on the Sirajganj side; similarly with non-agri wage i.e. 65% compared to 40%. In contrast the price of the staple food i.e. coarse rice, increased faster on the west side: 42% compared to 18% on the east side. An overall trend which is thus evident is that in terms of wages and prices, Tangail side has fared much better compared to Sirajganj side. There are however variation within each of the two broad project areas.

TABLE 10

Category	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)			TANGAIL (East Bank)		
	1990	mid 90s	2000	1990	Mid 90s	2000
Agri daily wage rate (taka)	43	53	58	40	51	68
Non-agri daily wage rate (taka)	59	75	83	43	61	71
Daily net earning from Rickshaw-pulling (taka)	88	102	90	110	108	110
Price of Coarse rice (taka per kg)	9.2	11.3	13.1	10.3	11.4	12.2

74. In the case of earning from rickshaw/van pulling, there has been little change. Indeed, on the west bank, there has been a decline from the mid 90 earning levels. Field inquiries have revealed that the expansion of the road network and the availability of cheaper motorized transportation has dampened demand and by extension earning levels.

75. *Housing*

In the perceptions of key informants, the cost of average housing has gone up on both sides of the river over the project period (Table 11). Interestingly, however, the more noticeable difference in terms of rates of increase is between classes rather than locations. Thus the poor has fared worse, 67% and 94% respectively in Sirajganj and Tangail. This stands in contrast to the rate of increase for rural middle class housing, 41% in Sirajganj and 35% in Tangail respectively.

TABLE 11

Category	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)			TANGAIL (East Bank)		
	<i>Average Specifications</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Average Specifications</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>
		Taka			Taka	
Poor Class	Size: 210 sq.ft Roof: Tin/Thatch	5398	9052	Size: 235 sq.ft Roof: Tin	8617	16733
Middle Class	Size: 277 sq.ft Roof: Tin	31681	44542	Size: 414 sq.ft Roof: Tin	37733	50800

76. *Accessibility*

In general, accessibility has improved in the post-project period on both sides of the river. The improvements have been more pronounced on the eastern bank i.e. the Tangail side. Average time required for a trip from any of the union headquarters to the district headquarters has dropped more than two-thirds on the Tangail side compared to a drop of slightly over half on the Sirajganj side. However, while the average cost for such a trip has remained virtually same on the Tangail side, it has increased by 42% on the Sirajganj side. Notwithstanding these general changes, certain pockets on both sides of the river face problems arising from the restrictions imposed on movements of local transports over the highway and the absence of bus stops within the local area.

TABLE 12

Category	SIRAJGANJ		TANGAIL	
	<i>Pre-project</i>	<i>Now (2000)</i>	<i>Pre-Project</i>	<i>Now (2000)</i>
Accessibility	Many areas inaccessible	Few areas inaccessible	All areas accessible	All areas accessible
Average travel time from union to district town (hours)	1.16	0.43.	1.51	0.38
Average cost per trip (taka)	7.9	11.2	7.54	7.85

VII.2 Indicators of Social Change

77. *Social Conflict Trends*

There is a clearly divergent trend at work in the post-project period with regard to intensity of social conflicts. Perceptions on trends point towards a sharp increase in social conflict situations on the Sirajganj side except for the two pockets of Kalia haripur and Nalka unions. In comparison, there is no noticeable change in the Tangail side except for one pocket i.e. Salla union.

TABLE 13

<i>Area</i>	<i>Intensity of Social Conflicts in Post-Project Period</i>
East Bank (Tangail)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No overall change ▪ Increased tendency only in Salla union
West Bank (Sirajganj)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant increase ▪ Only two pockets i.e. Kalia Haripur and Nalka unions unaffected

78. *Access to Facilities*

Key informants were asked about their perceptions on the trend in the project area as a whole in terms of access to five categories of facilities in the post-project period: primary school, secondary school, health-care facility, banking facility and market/shopping facility. Unequivocal perceptions on wholesale improvement were noted only in the case of access to market/shopping facility in the Tangail side. However, there was no perception on worsening in access to any of the cited facilities on the Tangail side. In comparison, in the case of Sirajganj side, some of the perceptions cited worsening in the cases of access to banking and market/shopping facilities. However, improvements were clearly cited in the case of access to the other three facilities. It should be noted that the variation in perceptions arises from area differences within each of the two broad zones on the east and west of the river.

TABLE 14

FACILITY	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)			TANGAIL (East Bank)		
	% of Key Informants who cited			% of Key Informants who cited		
	Positive Change	No Change	Negative Change	Positive Change	No Change	Negative Change
Primary School	50	50	0	46	54	0
Secondary School	50	50	0	38	62	0
Health-care	36	64	0	61	39	0
Banking	14	72	14	31	69	0
Market/Shopping	36	43	21	100	0	0

79. Gender Concerns

Perceptions of key informants on trends in the post-project period on six issues related to women's social situation were collated: Dowry Tendency, Early Marriage Trend, Female Schooling, Violence against Women, Divorce Rate and Attitude to Female Earning. The results present a mixed picture.

TABLE 15

ISSUE	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)	TANGAIL (East Bank)
	PERCEIVED TRENDS	
Dowry Tendency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a clear worsening in the tendency for dowry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a clear worsening in the tendency for dowry
Early Marriage Trend	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tendency for early marriage has declined 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tendency for early marriage has intensified
Female Schooling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major positive change in social attitudes towards female schooling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major positive change in social attitudes towards female schooling
Violence against women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mixed picture; situation has worsened in some pockets, improved in some and unchanged in half of the spots visited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unchanged in three-fifths of the spots visited and positive changes in the other pockets
Divorce Rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Divorce rate has gone down 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Divorce rate has gone down
Attitude to female earning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mixed picture Positive changes in half of the spots visited but also negative changes in a significant number of pockets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pronounced positive changes in all the spots

80. For example, the incidence of dowry is on the increase but for contrasting reasons on the west and east bank. In the west bank, there is a crisis of employment opportunities. With few other openings available to them, males look on dowry as one possible avenue to secure some capital to get a rickshaw/van or invest in petty business, poultry farming or similar

income generating activities. They think dowry will change their social position and improve their situation. On the other hand, the reason on the east bank appears to be a different one. The flow of money received as cash compensation has enhanced the liquidity position of many households and parents are anxious to secure good marriages for their eligible daughters as quickly as possible. The same rationale also explains the contrasting trends in early marriage. Lack of money and the consequent inability to bear the dowry burden has meant that many poor families cannot afford to marry off their young daughters. However, the better economic situation on the east bank have encouraged parents to marry off their daughters even if young in the hope of securing good marriages.

81. *Insecurity*

Perceptions on the issue of insecurity was probed in terms of four indicators: general state of security, crime rate, police oppression and minority security. The results show a clear divergence on the issues between the East and West bank. Perceptions on these security indicators do not indicate any worsening on the Tangail side whereas on the western Sirajganj side, perceptions indicate a clearly mixed picture with 50% of perceptions indicating a worsening on the indicators of general security and crime rate. As in the case of earlier topics, these overall trends contain significant area-level differences within each of the two broad zones. It may be worthwhile to stress here that these perception results do not necessarily reflect a project outcome but they are nevertheless significant as indicative of the social context in which project outcomes come into play.

TABLE 16

INDICATOR	SIRAJGANJ (West Bank)			TANGAIL (East Bank)		
	% of key informants who cited			% of key informants who cited		
	<i>Positive Change</i>	<i>No Change</i>	<i>Negative Change</i>	<i>Positive Change</i>	<i>No Change</i>	<i>Negative Change</i>
General Security	43	7	50	31	69	0
Crime Rate	21	29	50	31	69	0
Police Oppression	14	72	14	23	77	0
Minority Security	0	71	29	9	91	0

82. A different type of insecurity is being faced by the people around the approach road to Sirajganj as explained in the Box below.

BOX 2

THE ACCIDENT SPOT

This story is about the link road on the western side of the bridge in Sirajganj district. The length of the link road is about 16 km touching six Unions of three thanas: Saidabad, Kalia Haripur and Sialkol under Sirajganj Sadar Thana, Jhaul and Bhadrachhat under Kamarkhond Thana and Nalka Union under Raigonj Thana. As the approach road has gone through these unions, many villages have been divided into two parts. But to maintain livelihood and many household necessities people cross the approach road daily and regularly but they now face serious danger of frequent accidents because the long-distance transports plying on this road engage in reckless driving. No separate safety measures are in place. Particularly accident-prone spots include Baitara, Per Jhaul, Baniagati, Middle Bhadrachhat, Konabari, Salpa Mahmudpur, Kadda and Nalka. People have complained that there are no

- Safe passages across the road
- No speed breakers in the heavily populated sections
- Absence of highway patrol
- Absence of local bus service.

The absence of a local bus service compels people to use less safe modes of transportation such as rickshaws risking their lives on the highway. Because the link road straddles three thanas, none of the thana administration take any initiative on the matter.

VII.3 Differential Outcomes across Jamuna: Preliminary Explanations

83. The sharply differential outcomes on the east and west bank is perhaps the most immediate “impact” finding thrown up by the qualitative survey. A second round of field visits sought to identify what the plausible explanations for the distinctly positive outcomes on the Tangail side compared to those on the Sirajganj side were. Table 17 presents what it was possible to extract by way of plausible explanations. Some of the key issues regarding differential outcomes, namely, role and quality of local leadership, resettlement site and excessive land acquisition have been examined further in Part C.

TABLE 17

PRELIMINARY EXPLNATIONS FOR DIFFERENTIAL AREA-LEVEL OUTCOMES

ISSUE	FIELD EXPLANATION
Initial Condition	Initial economic conditions were better on the Tangail side compared to Sirajganj side.
Collection of CCL and Project Grants	PAPs on the Tangail side collected CCL and Project Grants much before their counterparts on the Sirajganj side. In the early stages of the project period, land price was much lower in Tangail side so affected people could manage to purchase lands and received Project Grants early. Also the procedures for collecting MARV grants were less stringent in the early stage which benefitted the Tangail PAPs more. PAPs on the Sirajganj side faced the double disadvantage of facing a much stricter implementation process and at the same time the value of the official compensation they were receiving proved much smaller in the wake of the rapid price hike in the project area as a whole.
Role and Quality of Local Leadership	Local leaders on the Tangail side played a positive role for the affected people in collecting CCL and Project Grants. This appears not to have been the case on the Sirajganj side; local leaders were in severe conflict situation and were unable to project with any vigour the collective interests of the PAPs.
Physical impact of Project	The construction work on the guide bund and the piling works had started in the Tangail side before Sirajganj side. This has caused the turning of flow of water and Sirajganj side was subjected to erosion and flood much more severely. Aside from this, Sirajganj was routinely more ecologically vulnerable compared to the Tangail side.
Economic Displacement	The economic displacement effects were much more severe on the Sirajganj side which has been traditionally dependent on handloom operators and petty business. These occupations have been unable to recover from the consequences of physical displacement upon acquisition. The occupational profile on the Tangail side was able to cope much better with the effects of displacement. There were also specific losses in riverine professions including fishing. Some indication of the nature of occupational changes is described in Table 7.
Alternative Income Sources	Affected people of Tangail developed an alternative employment opportunity like cloth hawking but no such thing was visible in Sirajganj side.
Land Fertility	Land fertility is higher in the Tangail side compared to Sirajganj side.

Resettlement Site	Tangail side RS is better located, better placed with water facilities, road etc. Maximum settlers are from the same village, so, they have maintained the same social environment in the RS. Whereas Sirajganj side RS is poorly located with poor facilities and the majority of settlers are squatters and coming from dispersed locations. They have been unable to create a conducive social environment and the consequences are evident in the lower retention rate.
Training Facilities	Tangail side affected people enjoyed the training and credit facilities provided by JMBP through NGOs. But these facilities were poorly enjoyed by Sirajganj side PAPs as the concerned NGOs suffered from paucity of fund
Excessive land acquisition	A glaring example of excessive land acquisition has been in the case of the 16 km long approach road from the Sirajganj side. While the approach road has been successfully built and is in operation, much of the acquired area on the two sides remain unutilized. PAPs have demanded de-requisition of these land but no such action is being considered. The issue here is not the fact of excess acquisition as such which may happen on legitimate planning grounds but that no corrective action is undertaken when the acquisition clearly proves to have been excessive.

PART C

SELECTED ISSUES

VIII SELECTED ISSUES

VIII.1 Land Acquisition

84. Two key concerns pertain to the issue of land acquisition in JMBP. Firstly, whether excessive land was acquired, and secondly, how efficient was land acquisition planning, in particular, what were the consequences of a piecemeal approach to acquisition.
85. Though precise quantitative magnitudes are not possible from such a rapid qualitative survey, the impression was fairly unanimous that excess land had been acquired. Excess land acquisition is a general problem associated with government projects in Bangladesh and the JMBP does not appear to have been very different in this regard. Indirect indication of excess acquisition was evident in the strong visual images of large tracts of unused land within the project area as well as in the post-project leasing of a substantial amount of land, nearly 80 ha, to the Grameen Mathshay Foundation for digging ponds and pisciculture. However, it should be stressed again that precise magnitude of the excess acquisition was not feasible from the qualitative survey.
86. A specific area of concern on the issue of excess acquisition in the west bank pertained to the bureaucratic imposition of the so-called AD-Line (Alluvian and Deluvian) which forced many PAPs to part with more land than was required. In Sayedabad Mouza in the west bank, some owners of plots notified under sections 6 and 3 of the Land Acquisition Act were subsequently rendered ineligible for compensation when the affected areas were arbitrarily declared reclaimed river beds in 1995* . In the east bank, excess acquisition was made for the Resettlement Site, but at a later stage JMBA returned about 72 ha of land to the owners out of the total acquired land of about 128 ha.
- * JBIC's Comment: Although the land was notified to be acquired under the project, the land became government owned before the actual process of acquisition took place due to declaration of A-D line. Therefore the issue is beyond control of JBMA.
87. Besides the issue of excess acquisition, the other area of concern was piecemeal acquisition. While there may have been legitimate planning grounds for piecemeal acquisition, in practice it appeared in some cases to have contributed to fraudulent claims (see also next section). This process is described in the box below.

Box 3

THE DOWNSIDES OF PIECEMEAL ACQUISITION

On the Eastern side of Jamuna Bridge the authority has acquired land five times as follows:

- First time acquired in the year 1988-89
- Second time acquired in the year 1989-90
- Third time acquired in the year 1993-94
- Fourth time acquired in the year 1994-95
- Fifth time acquired in the year 1996-97.

Piecemeal acquisition paved the way for many kinds of anomalies and fraudulent claims. There are concerns that the piecemeal approach allowed for a corrupt nexus between land acquisition office personnel and local middlemen. Many PAPs also sought to turn the situation to their advantage. The legal process was misused by touts or local middlemen who used to collect information from DC's office where acquisition would take place next. There they built new houses to get compensation and in many cases they were successful.

Land has been acquired three times in Pathaikandi village. The people of the area used to get information through touts that acquisition in the area is in the offing. So they built about 2200 illegal houses and this later caused a hue and cry. Though all did not receive compensation for illegally built houses but many have managed. One Abdul Hye son of Late Kashem Talukder of Pathaikandi village overnight built a business house in the name of Talukder Stores and managed compensation of nearly Taka 12 lakhs from DC's office. Similarly, Jainal Hazi son of Late Noor Muhammad Sarkar of Ballavbari area managed three and half lakh takas as compensation for a newly built house. A member of the implementing NGO reckoned that JMBA has lost a great deal of money for compensation of illegally built houses.

VIII.2 Fraudulent Claims

88. The issue of fraudulent claims attracted a lot publicity mid-way through the project when a variety of actors took advantage of the novelty of the resettlement policy to make and secure false claims. While it was a major problem in the early part of the project, new laws were subsequently enacted to close down legal loopholes and prevent such fraud. Though the issue remains, the scale has been significantly brought down.
89. To the extent that it prevailed, fraudulent claims in the JMBP resettlement programme was very much a process in which some officials, local middlemen and some of the PAPs themselves were perceived to have played a role. Both the process and some its ironical results are described in the two Boxes below:

Box 4

THE FRAUDULENT CLAIMS PROCESS

The fraudulent claims process involves three actors: interested PAPs, local touts or middlemen, and personnel in the land acquisition office. Piecemeal implement was instrumental to this process. On the eastern side, land acquired 2 times in Nalchia Mouza and 3 times in Pathaikandi Mouza. This has brought fortunes to many fraudulent claimants who have managed to get compensation by shifting newly built houses in a new place every time a new acquisition process begins. Fraudulent claimants with the help of local touts have developed an understanding with the Kanungo/surveyor of DC's Office in such a manner that on the payment of 50% compensation value their houses/structures would be recorded during joint verification although these were non-existent. For each non-existent structure, the inhabitant's name used was a fraudulent one. Out of above mentioned 50% speed money 25% was required to be paid during listing of the structures through joint verification and remaining 25% was required to be paid before collection of compensation cheque. Several people from Pathaikandi Mouza played a leading role in fraudulent claims.

Box 5

FRAUDULENT CLAIMS ARE NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFUL

In the year 1994, when the alignment for approach to the Jamuna Bridge was being determined, it became known that many villages of Saidabad Union district Sirajganj would be affected. Smelling an opportunity, few touts became active to place fraudulent claims by building new houses/infrastructures. One of these was Arif locally known as Arif Biriwala. From locals, it is known that Arif is from Kandarpara and he has a house in Sirajganj town. As he was an influential man in the area, he was thinking to collect huge amount of compensation for newly built dairy and poultry farm, Pisciculture projects, Hatchery, godown and few residential houses etc. He spent about 35 to 40 lakhs taka to construct above mentioned new structures in connivance with few locals of Saidabad and Dhukhiabari Mouzas. He then tried to cut a deal with the LAO staff of DC's office to get compensation fraudulently. He was trying to increase the amount of compensation (CCL) by bargaining with DC's staff and managed to get about 50% of his investment. Several others tried to follow his example but this led to a lot of publicity which put the administration on guard and they stopped further payments to Arif Biriwala and other fraudulent claimants. People estimated that he has not been benefited from fraudulent claims, rather he has suffered a big loss. Such loss has also been suffered by Mozaffar Hossain of Beltia Jamuna bali village, Osman Molla of Saidabad, A Samad of Sarulia, Humayun Islam khan of Sirajganj Sadar and Khademul Islam khan of same Thana. They were all influential people. But their ultimate motive has suffered heavily due to negative publicity and subsequent vigilance by the authorities.

VIII.3 Resettlement Sites

90. West Bank (Sirajganj)

- The Resettlement Site (RS) is located in Panchasona mouza with around 22 ha. of char land. The site was finally selected here after 2 initial attempts at site selections in Panchasarutia and Baoitara mouzas were abandoned after local resistance. Interestingly, it was not JMBP PAPs as such but rather squatters on the Sirajganj Town Protection Embankment who were mainly relocated as settlers here. As may be mentioned, squatters are amenable to eviction and these families may have initially seen the move to the Resettlement Site as an opportunity.
- Settlers received the following facilities at the Site: plot, cash and sanitary latrine for each settler family; tube-well, school, health centre, mosque, internal roads and tree cover as community facilities. The target distribution of tube-wells was 57; actual distribution till the time of survey was 25.
- The main problem for settlers has been livelihood opportunities. Area, productivity of land, accessibility from outside, physical and social environment, opportunities etc. of the site have been reported to be unfavorable for the settlers. The retention rate of settlers here have been around 60% who have a number of problems in residing at the site particularly relating to their opportunities for casual employment. Self-relocation has been reported to be preferable. Out of 200 Households (HH) interviewed, about 65% responded that the relocation to the Resettlement Sites (RS) from their squatter position on the Town Protection Embankment has seen a worsening of their access to employment and income opportunities.

East bank (Tangail)

- The Resettlement Site (RS) is located in Nikrail Union with around 57 ha. of land. The site was selected in one try.
- Area, accessibility from outside, physical and social environment, opportunities etc. of the site have been reported to be favorable for the settlers. There are 405 plots. Size of the plots was initially larger (15 decimals) because PAPs were not willing to settle there. Now it is roughly 5 decimals per plot. Water and other sanitary facilities were created but they are now in a very bad shape for want of operation and maintenance. Playground, burial ground, mosques, schools, ponds, barbed wire fences, power connection, market-places, a community centre etc. have been put in place for PAPs. The retention rate of settling here have been reported to be almost 100%, perhaps because 90% of settlers have come from the same village, Nalchia. With only a few problems eg. want of fuel for cooking, mastanism, settlers by and large expressed their satisfaction with the RS.

- Priorities for resettlement in the plots are reported to have been given to those who have lost land to the project.

VIII.4 PAP Relationship with Host Population

91. There are three levels at which this relationship can be examined:
 - Relationship between self-relocating PAPs and host population
 - Relationship between Uthulies (long-term squatter) with host household
 - Relationship between Resettlement Site residents and neighbouring village population.

92. On the first, the relationship has been found to be positive primarily because host population gained from the community facilities which JMBP provided on account of the self-relocating PAPs. So there is a built-in incentive for good relationship and indeed field inquiries have confirmed it so.

93. On the question of uthulies, there appears to have been a transition in the quality of the relationship with the host household. Earlier, this relationship was couched in the accomodating language of kinship but as a consequence to the large-scale land acquisition by the project, the opportunities for the squatting household to rotate among other host households has considerably lessened. The uthuly household is now being seen more as a tenant. Kinship is giving way to a more straightforward commercial relationship.

94. On the question of Resettlement Site population with neighboring villagers, the issue does not apply on the west side where the Site is far away from any settled village. The conflict here was around the location of the Site which after vigorous objection from local population had to be relocated twice before being finally located on isolated and previously acquired land near the river. The eastern Site, however, has been associated with several incidents. These have essentially have had to do with setting the boundary. Four settlers were fined when they beat a local women in one such petty conflict. Because, the Site population have a feeling of being protected by the project, they have been somewhat assertive with the neighboring villagers. In one instance, settlers wanted to prevail in their choice of an Imam (prayer leader) during the Eid prayer on the ground that the prayer ground was now physically within the Site boundary. The local population split and now offer their prayers elsewhere. All these, however, are not really serious problems. It, of course, has to be kept in mind the settlers are very much part of the local population having come from only a short distance in the district.

VIII.5 Project-induced Dependency

95. It is difficult to assess any long-term project induced dependency at this stage of the project cycle. In the short-term, the Resettlement Site is the prime unit of project-induced dependency:

West Bank (Sirajganj)

- Settlers on 2.5 decimal plots in the RS have formed dependency on “would be” project facilities which are still a far cry. These destitute squatters do not have employment which they had before the project within the vicinity . They require quick communication for finding jobs afar .
- The project provided a good number of people in project related activities like project labour, suppliers of various services to the project officers, middlemanship in land acquisition process, local transportation media, tea-shop keepers etc., but on completion of the project construction they have been dependent on further such project . In absence of such project now they are indulging in anti-social activities.
- The project opened up opportunities for a better living on the temporary rise in cash income . On termination of the project those people have developed a dependency on such project induced income for maintaining their standard.

East Bank (Tangail)

- The project promised employment opportunity for the resettlers. In absence of such opportunities now they have developed a sense of dependency that the project should provide them employment .
- The project opened up opportunities for a better living on the temporary rise in cash income . On termination of the project those people have developed a dependency on such project induced income for maintaining their standard .
- The settlers in the RS are found dependent on the project for matters of maintaining the overhead facilities created by the project in the area . As a result, the facilities are steadily deteriorating in their efficiency to serve the PAPs because of little or poor maintenance .

VIII.6 PAP Migration

96. West Bank (Sirajganj)

- Out-migration has been predominant among the direct PAPs. Acquisition being bulk in nature, some villages have fallen wholly within acquisition pushing its people out

of Saidabad and Kaliharipur Unions of Sirajganj thana and Jhaul, Bhadraghat and Nolka Unions of Kamarkhand and Raigonj thanas .The replacement value offered under RAP was insufficient to buy land nearby and, therefore, middle and lower class PAPs had to migrate elsewhere for a living on rented or leased in land;

- Out-migration has also been reported for those who have been indirectly affected by the project. For example, a number of fishermen families migrated to far off thanas in search of fishing profession and a number of potters also migrated to Tarash thana and even India for their livelihood;
- In-migration has been reported to have occurred only in the resettlement site . The immigrants are mostly the squatters and extreme poor people (rickshaw pullers, labourers, petty shopkeepers, destitute women etc.) from the town protection embankment at Sirajganj and from other affected areas of Bhuapur and local villages.

East Bank (Tangail)

- Out-migration has been a more pronounced feature than in-migration on the east bank Two reasons for this has been firstly, the bulk nature of the acquisition in some spots which pushed residents out, secondly, PAPs found it economically worthwhile to sell their land in the project area where land prices appreciated considerably and settle down in low-cost areas;
- However, the rate of out-migration as a whole has not been very large, between 5 to 7 per cent of PAPs;
- Even where out-migration has taken place, it has been in the vicinity rather than to distant areas;
- In-migration so far has been confined to the resettlement site. However with land values going up, it is foreseen that a later process may set in in terms of in-migration of affluent guests to build up economic and productive infrastructures in the years to come.

VIII.7 Informal Institutions

97. Though JMBA had an elaborate implementing machinery for implementing its resettlement programmes including contracted NGOs, various types of informal institutions and leaders also played an important role in the process. PPRC field teams looked at three aspects on the issue: emergence, composition of leadership, and, performance. Findings for the two sides of the river are described below:

West Bank (Sirajganj)

- *Emergence*

Informal institutions of PAPs in the western area of JMBP grew mainly upon a complex of factors comprising of grievances pertaining to the compensation process. In the pursuit of these grievances, the PAPs organized themselves in groups under the leadership of local important persons. Five such groups emerged with 30 to 40 members in each group.

- *Composition of Leadership*

These informal institutions had been so strong that these involved people from the top national leaders down to the local elites, representatives and important persons. Local government institutions were not effectively involved in the process of LA and implementation of RRAP and EFAP.

- *Performance*

Though generally unsatisfactory, PAP organisations proved to be meaningful when they could resist the authority's selection of RS at Saratia and Mulibari mouzas . But due to the vested interest of the leaders of the groups, performance was bad .

East Bank (Tangail)

- *Emergence*

Informal institutions of PAPs in the eastern area of JMB grew both as responses to real or perceived harassment and deception in the compensation process and also to exploit loopholes in the administrative process. In general, informal institutions of PAPs came into existence around the following four objectives:

- ⇒ Group to move against perceived bribery and harassment in DC's office
- ⇒ Group to pursue fraudulent claims
- ⇒ Group to protect interest of building cross dam over the new Dhaleswari channel
- ⇒ Group for preparation of EFAP list and fixation of entitlements

These groups were all composed of local leaders from respective villages .

- *Performance*

Informal groups had very limited success but they played an important role in resisting mistakes, biases or motivated actions on the part of the authorities.

VIII.8 New Opportunities

98. West Bank (Sirajganj)

- Number of rickshaw vans has increased twice or even thrice to employ more people;
- A local market is proposed which will create opportunities for many to earn;
- Digging of ponds by Grameen Fisheries Foundation has a potential for creating new avenues of work for the local people at a limited scale;
- the proposed industrial park at the RS is expected to open new employment opportunities;
- Possibility of bringing more areas under cultivation in certain mouzas under Kaliaharipur Union has come up due to non-occurrence of erosion any more and quick siltation.

East Bank (Tangail)

- Appreciation of the value of all kinds of land has been the major opportunity accruing from the project;
- Better communication facility and tying up of the area with the global society through the highway is obviously a new opportunity;
- New employment opportunities in various socio-economic sectors are expected to surface due to rapid urbanization all around the project;
- Protection from the persisting threats of erosion of the left bank of Jamuna has been a new opportunity for the area;
- Schooling and other community assets created by the project will improve the quality of life of the local people including PAPs;
- Recognition as the contributors to the construction of the bridge offers a new identity of the PAPs;
- Pond fisheries culture and production has a new prospects under the ongoing efforts of Grameen Fisheries Foundation which has taken land on lease from JMBA for such activities.

VIII.9 New Vulnerabilities

99. New vulnerabilities have also appeared along with the new opportunities. Some of these have to do with problems faced by some traditional occupations such as handloom, river transports and open-area fishing. There have also been some reported adverse consequences on aus and aman paddy productivity due to redistributive impact of water upstream and downstream and due to increased siltation downstream. Another area of concern for the time being is the lack of facilities for local transportation on both sides of the river.

PART D

CONCLUSIONS

IX CONCLUSIONS

IX.1 An Overview

100. JMBP is a project of national significance linking up the eastern and western part of the country. It is expected to bring about long-term economic benefits for the northern districts in particular and the country as a whole. The introduction of a resettlement policy in the form of the RRAP and EFAP also marked a major innovation in the traditional process of land acquisition and development projects as a whole. Subsequent large-scale projects have built on the experience of resettlement in JMBP and the changes in the land acquisition policy of the country stands to benefit significantly from the experience ushered in by RRAP and EFAP policies of JMBP.
101. The introduction of a major policy innovation naturally entails a learning process. The qualitative survey focussed on a number of issues to develop a closer insight into the relevant dimensions of resettlement and its associated social outcomes. While the exact magnitudes of resettlement outcomes will have to await the completion of the resettlement process in 2001 and its in-depth investigation, the present qualitative survey already indicates some fairly impressive achievements:
 - nearly 12000 out of a total of nearly 16000 i.e. three-quarters of entitled persons have received their due compensation under law and 100% of them were paid the premium to make up for the difference between official and market land rates.
 - A wholly new category of “losers” not traditionally recognised in law i.e. erosion and flood affected persons, got official recognition under the EFAP policy and 12127 out of 15035 recognised claims have so far been settled.
102. However, within these broad parameters, there have also been less than positive outcomes for specific sub-groups of PAPs as also area-specific differential outcomes. In part, such negative outcomes have to do not with JMBP as such but with the pre-existing weaknesses of the land acquisition process in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, a better understanding of these weaknesses offer the possibility of corrective action as the life-time of the resettlement programme within JMBP is yet to run its course.
103. With its pioneer status within the field of involuntary resettlement in Bangladesh, the experience of JMBP is also significant for highlighting a number of “lessons” which carry implications for wider attention from policy-makers. In the sections which follow, six such “lessons” are highlighted.

IX.2 LESSONS

IX.2.1 How innovative has been the RRAP?

104. Land acquisition and associated compensation process in Bangladesh is traditionally associated with a number of well-known shortcomings. These arise from a combination of:

- Faulty land records
- Administrative mis-governance
- Harassment of PAPs in the official (CCL) compensation process
- Inefficient land acquisition planning
- Lack of attention to entitlements beyond that due to land-owners.

105 The major innovations in JMBP have been threefold:

- The introduction of the idea of a category of benefits for PAPs which are over and beyond the traditional cash compensation under law (CCL);
- the introduction of the principle of compensation in a context where no land acquisition is occurring i.e. the EFAP policy for eroded char lands;
- Posing the issue of compensation in a larger policy framework of a resettlement action plan.

106. Where JMBP exhibited weaknesses were in:

- As with most development projects in Bangladesh, JMBP too was characterized by excess land acquisition though the braiding character of the Jamuna river made location planning a rather difficult exercise and hence some excess acquisition was anticipated in any case. In retrospect, however, it is clear that land acquired for the project was quite in excess of what was required;
- JMBP also did not, and perhaps could not, come to grips with the well-known weaknesses with the “official” part of the compensation process i.e. CCL payments made by the offices of the DC. It is unlikely that such weaknesses can be addressed effectively within a project context but an important insight relevant for future policy is that the assistance of NGOs to PAPs can be brought to bear on both the CCL and the post-CCL phases of compensation so as to minimise negative outcomes for the PAPs.

IX.2.2 Differential Impact

107. Even if overall results are positive, it is important to be alert to the possibility of differential outcomes for specific sub-groups within the affected population. The experience of JMBP is striking in the divergence of outcomes on the east and west banks of the Jamuna river.

IX.2.3 Resettlement versus Self-Relocation

108. The overall PAP preference appears to be for self-relocation in part because there are very few real-life examples of successful resettlement planning. However, a fortuitous combination of circumstances have made the resettlement site on the east bank something of a success. A critical reason for this appears to be that most of the settlers moved from a single village and they found it convenient to relocate in the face of continuing erosion. The disruption to their economic life has been rather muted. In contrast, the experience of the resettlement site on the west bank has been quite the opposite. In the face of opposition from host populations, site selection eventually settled on an unfavorable (infertile, sandy land) remote location. Most of the settlers were selected not from the JMBP PAPs (who in any case may have been unwilling) but from squatters on the Sirajganj Town Protection Embankment who were under threat of eviction. The location of the site has meant a major disruption in the economic lives of the settlers and they have responded by voting with their feet. The retention rate has been less than 60% and a majority of those interviewed saw their post-relocation condition as worse in terms of access to earning opportunities than before.

IX.2.4 Vigilance against Fraudulent Claims

109. The land acquisition process in Bangladesh has traditionally been associated with some degree of fraudulent claims. The appearance of a new and generous compensation policy combined with loopholes afforded by piecemeal acquisition fuelled an initial momentum to the process of fraudulent claims. The key policy lesson here is the need to anticipate such possibilities and undertake effective corrective action. The role of the media in exposing the severity of the problem was critical to mobilise policy attention on the issue. The process was countered by the promulgation of a project-specific legal provision (special regulatory ordinance SRO number 218 of December 18, 1995) which sought to provide stricter cut-off dates for eligible claims and delegated powers to the district authority to exercise their discretion for preventing fraudulent claims.

IX.2.5 Role of Local Society

110. An important actor in determining the outcome of major development initiatives in Bangladesh is the informal roles played by local leaders at various stages of the project. Some of these roles are of a “middlemen” nature, some more as “friends” of PAPs while

some simply as unwritten partners of authorities. The case of the JMBP has been no exception. Without going into the details of this informal process, one striking feature which emerges from the field reports is the relatively successful role of the informal leadership of the east bank in managing the conflicting demands and opportunities of the implementation process. In contrast, the informal leadership on the west bank proved far less capable of producing mutually beneficial outcomes.

IX.2.6 Role of NGOs

111. Within the resettlement and acquisition context of JMBP, there are three distinct areas where NGOs have a relevant role to play:
 - Assisting PAPs in the land acquisition process
 - Assisting PAPs in securing benefits not provided for in the existing law
 - Assisting PAPs in their economic and social recovery in the post-project phase.

112. The role of NGOs in JMBP has pertained primarily to the latter two of the above list. An initial reading of available project documents does not point towards any systematic evaluation of NGO performance. A general impression which emerges from the qualitative survey is that the role of the NGOs have been more of a “technical” nature whether in terms of providing information support or training and development support. A recurrent view which surfaced in interviews of PAPs was the issue of accessibility of the NGOs to common PAPs. NGOs like BRAC on their part explained that their “distance” from the PAPs was necessary to avoid getting embroiled in local politics. The NGO role has been rather clear and positive in the areas of EFAP and MARV payments. The element of NGO performance which will require a more thorough evaluation in the future is their role in various community development initiatives such as training for income-generation activities, fisheries and forestry.

TABLE A1

PROFILE OF SPOTS VISITED FOR FIELD REPORTS AND PERCEPTION SURVEY

District	Thana	Union	Spot
Sirajganj	Sirajganj Sadar	Sayedabad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sayedabad ▪ Gasabari ▪ Panchsona ▪ Sarutia ▪ Dhukhibari ▪ East Mohanpur ▪ Degrechar ▪ Barosarotia ▪ Mulibari
		Sialkot	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dukuria
		Kalia haripur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Purbo Bonbaria ▪ Paikpara ▪ Satiantoli ▪ Moregram ▪ Belutia ▪ Ramgotighonapara ▪ Biara
	Kamar Khond	Bhadraghat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chowrgati ▪ Baniagati ▪ Kalibari ▪ Bhadanghat ▪ Madhya Bhadanghat
		Jhaul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Naya Jhaul ▪ Khaul Bazar ▪ Habazpur ▪ Konabari ▪ Sholpo Mahmudpur
	Raiganj	Nalka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Nalka ▪ Sengati ▪ Jhakri

Tangail	Kalihati	Salla	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Salla ▪ Hatiya ▪ Mirhamjani ▪ Chanpara
		Alenga	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Moheshpur ▪ Pathaikandi ▪ Char babla ▪ Rajabari
		Durgapur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Goalbari ▪ Binod lohori ▪ Beltia ▪ Ballav bari
	Bhuapur	Nikrail	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Patalkandi ▪ Polshia ▪ Resettlement site ▪ Serajkandi
		Gobindashi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gobindashi ▪ Balkutia ▪ Costapara ▪ Chitalipara ▪ Sthalkashi ▪ Malkutia ▪ Ruhuli
Total	5	11	53

TABLE A2
PAP Survey: Sample Area Details

<i>District</i>	<i>Cluster</i>	<i>No. of Questionnaires</i>	<i>Cluster Characteristics</i>
Sirajganj	Nalka, Jhaul, Bhadrghat, Sialkot	62	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approach road/Overbridge ▪ Sirajganj connecting road ▪ Excess acquisition area
	Kalia Haripur	48	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Guide bund ▪ Town protection embankment ▪ Erosion affected area ▪ New consolidated char area
	Sayedabad	49	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strong migration ▪ Fraudulent claims ▪ Resettlement Site ▪ EFAP area ▪ Weaver community area
Tangail	Durgapur and south Nikrail	48	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bridge end ▪ Approx. 4 villages eroded away ▪ Resettlement Site
	North Nikrail and Gobindashi	50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bhuapur approach road ▪ Guide bund
	Salla, Alenga	57	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approach road ▪ Big commercial area
Total		314	

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS/LEADERS/KEY INFORMANTS MET

A: Persons/Organizations met on the East Bank

JMBA (RU)

Amjad Hossain (DD(R))

Mohammad Abdur Rahman (AD (R))

Aminuzzaman Mridha (Accountant)

JMBA (EU)

Abdul Mazid (AD)

BRAC (NGO)

Shahajan Chowdhury (MF)

Shahidul Islam (FO)

RDM (NGO)

Alamgir Hossain Badsha , Akbar Ali, Abdul Latif, Sarwar Hossain (all Village Resettlement Workers)

DORP (NGO)

Abdus Sakur Sarker (Manager)

Programme incharge (Loan)

Programme incharge (Training)

Two Trainers

SOBASS (NGO)

Chairman

Md. Rafiqul Islam (Project Engineer)

Grameen Motshya Foundation

Engineering Consultant

Supervisor

Field Organizer

LOCAL LEADERS/KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS

Abdul Motaleb Sarker (Ex Chairman)

Mohiuddin (Chairman Ballob Bari Union)

Hazrat Master

Hazi Joynal Sarker

Mozaffor Hossain Khan

Habibur Rahman

Abdus Salam Joyardar

Md. Abdul Hye Akand
Younnus Ali Mollah
Abdul Hye Talukder
Aslam Talukder
Azizur Rahman
Al-Haz Hasan Ali Sarker.
Hazi Mohammad Maha
Md. Abul Kasem
Dr. Samsul Haque
Nowsher Ali
Soheb Ali
Fazlul Rahman
Lutfur Rahman
Md. Yasin
Hossain Ahmed
Md. Hatem Ali
Zinnat Talukder
Md. Abdul Mannan
Abdus Sattar
Saiful Islam
Anowara Begum
Kulsum
Rokeya Begum
Nazrul Islam
Mozaffor Akand

B: Organizations/Persons met on the West Bank

JMBA

Shahidul Islam (DD(R))
Amanullah (AD (R))

NGOs

BRAC (Area Manager, Community Organizer)
ASAUS (Office Manager)
Gonobiddalaya (Headmaster, Assistant Headmaster)
GonoShashthay (Sirajganj Area Office)
RDM (Area Office)
Grameen Motshaya Foundation (Western Side office)

Local Administration

Tahsildar (Land officer), Sayedabad Tahsil Office
Local Amin (land surveyor), Madda Bhadrghat

Local Governments

Gazi Belaluddin, Chairman, Sayedabad union
Mozammel Hossain, Bhadrghat Union
Ali Akbar, Rahisuddin, Abdul Quader, Up Members

Others

Head master Sayedabad High School

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Khademul Islam (Local elite)

Arif Bidi Factory, Abdul Sattar, Monir Hossain (local business, businessmen)

Aminul Islam (Journalist)

Abdul Hye Talukder, Abu Yusuf Surjo (political leaders)

C: Persons consulted in Dhaka

Mr. Benu Gopal Dey

Director, Resettlement, JMBA

Mr. Shahidul Alam

Ex-Director, Resettlement, JMBA

Mr. K. M. Maqsoodul Mannan

Task Manager

Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project

World Bank Office, Dhaka

Mr. Mohammad Mohsin

Program Officer

Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Dhaka

Dr. T.K. Barua

Resettlement Officer

World Bank Office, Dhaka

Mr. Reider Kevam

Social Development Division

World Bank

Washington D.C.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Sl. no.	Documents
1	Staff Appraisal Report, January 24, 1994
2	EMAP Update, February, 1997
3	Final Supervision/Initiation of ILI Mission, January 16-24, 2000 (Photo copy)
4	Report of the Base line Survey of Potential Erosion and Flood Affected Areas of JMBP, January 1997 (Draft copy)
5	EFAP (Flood Preparedness and Relief plan) Draft copy, March 1997
6	EFAP Manual (Draft copy) March 1997
7	RRAP & EFAP update, February 12, 1997
8	RRAP update, March 1998
9	An Overview of the Resettlement, Environmental Management and Related Activities in the JMB Project, 15 th October, 1997
10	Guidelines for Compensating Erosion PAPs, July 1999
11	8 th Milestone Meeting and Co-Financiers Review Mission Project Site : 7-9 October 1997
12	Inspection Panel's Report on Progress on Implementation of the Erosion and Flood Action Plan, August 17, 1998
13	Management Response to Inspection Panel, September, 1996
14	Progress Report of RRAP and EFAP, May 2000
15	Implementation Completion Report for the JMBP, March 2000
16	Bangladesh Resettlement Policy and Practice Review and Recommendation, March 1999



サイト地図



ジャムナ多目的橋



整備移転地に設置されたコミュニティーセンター



整備移転地へ移転した住民