

JICA-Development Studies Program
School of International and Public Policy (IPP)

A Profile of Japan's International Cooperation



HITOTSUBASHI
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Foreword by JICA

A great many international students come to Japan to acquire masters and doctoral degrees. They then return to their home countries where many ultimately become significant leaders in their political, public administration and business communities. They also play a pivotal role in establishing good diplomatic and business relationships between their own countries and Japan – as accomplished actors who are very familiar with Japan.

Every year, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) receives hundreds of students from abroad. The number of these foreign students has continuously increased. However, one fundamental challenge has remained unsolved for a long time. Namely, what kinds of significant programs we should offer to those students who are eager to learn about Japan.

Historically, Japan was the first non-Western nation to become a developed country in the late nineteenth century. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has accumulated various political, economic and social experiences and, while some might be considered a success, others were not. As a result of these changes, Japan has become a country that is free, peaceful, prosperous and democratic, while still preserving its traditions. At present, Japan is struggling against emergent challenges that few other countries have experienced, such as a declining birthrate and an aging population. Based on these past and current experiences, Japan can serve as one of the best models for our partner countries to follow in their own development.

In addition, Japan has been contributing to the socio-economic growth of developing countries by sharing our knowledge and experiences through Official Development Assistance (ODA). Therefore, I firmly believe that Japan can act as a leading country in development studies throughout the world.

Based on these perspectives, in 2018, JICA launched the “JICA Development Studies Program” (JICA-DSP) in collaboration with Japanese universities. Under the JICA-DSP, JICA invites future leaders from partner countries to Japan and offers them the opportunity to learn in English about Japan’s modernization and development experiences, as these differ from those of Western countries.

From September to November 2018, a lecture series, titled “Japan’s Foreign Policy Making,” was organized by Professor Misako Kaji in the School of International and Public Policy (IPP), Hitotsubashi University under JICA-DSP. The series of lectures was conducted by a number of academics and practitioners with rich experience of working for Japanese government organizations, JICA, international organizations and international NGOs. This booklet was developed based on the materials used in their lectures.

The importance of delivering lectures on Japan’s development and development cooperation in English for postgraduate programs in Japan has been acknowledged for a long time. However, textbooks and learning materials written in English on such topics have hitherto been insufficient to meet the increasing demand on the ground within the universities.

This booklet enriches the contents of English textbooks and learning materials, making it possible for international students to study those topics easily. I would like to express my high appreciation for the initiative taken by the IPP of Hitotsubashi University as well the efforts made by the other lecturers.

I hope that this booklet will be used not only at Hitotsubashi University but also shared widely among other Japanese postgraduate programs, so that many international students can learn from our valuable past and on-going experiences.

February 2019
Shinichi Kitaoka
President
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Introduction

Misako Kaji

In the process of raising its income level and enhancing sophistication in its society, a developing country should at the same time nourish its ability and willingness to play its part in sustaining the international order. In a globalizing world, and particularly today when the liberal order is challenged, all countries are expected to support one another and provide resources to form and manage international systems for international peace and prosperity. Playing its part, in turn, works as a driving force for the country to develop further.

This booklet is a compilation of the summary outcomes of a course of lectures entitled Japan's Foreign Policy Making, complemented by a couple of lectures in a course entitled Seisaku Kettei Katei Ron (Theories of Policy Decision-Making Process), at the Graduate School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University in the 2018 autumn/winter term. Experts with frontline experiences from JICA and its Research Institute, major UN and humanitarian Organizations, the Japanese Government, Japanese think-tanks, as well as academia each address the following three questions:

In the sphere of his/her subject,

1. why is international cooperation needed?
2. how has Japan been engaged in international cooperation?
3. what are the challenges for Asia and the world today?

The subjects are: Disaster Risk Reduction, Global Health, Sustainable Development, Humanitarian Law, Peace Cooperation, Cyber Security, Climate and the Environment, Good Governance, Refugee Protection, and Gender Equality.

Japan's international cooperation is analyzed in practical perspectives by experts in charge from objective standpoints of multilateral international organizations, or through scientific observations by academic researchers. Japan has a long tradition of international cooperation, and its policies often reflect its own history.¹ The authors hope that students from developing countries would draw useful lessons from Japan's experiences in global contexts when they return home and engage themselves in the process of nation building.

Some background behind the choice of subjects in this booklet is given below.

1. Disaster Risk Reduction

Japan is among the countries most prone to large scale natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and typhoons. As countries are unable to move away from where they are situated, geography, and therefore climate as well, have a lot to do with its history and tradition. Natural disasters normally could have been very location-oriented, country-specific, or at most region-specific, challenges. Thus, why is there a need for international cooperation in a universal framework more than emergency aid based on humanitarian concerns?

Supply chain and international tourism in a globalizing world partly speak to this issue. When the Great North East Earthquake hit Japan in 2011, there was not only a shortage of milk in local shops in the municipality of Tokyo, but machinery production in remote parts of the world including the inland United States was also affected. When the tsunami hit Indochina on Boxing Day 2004, more than a thousand Europeans on holiday were among the victims. Japan, together with Morocco, in 1987 proposed a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly to designate the 1990s the international decade for disaster reduction, aiming to diffuse the recognition that reducing the risks of natural disasters is very much about preparedness, as well as an essential component of economic and social development. The message gradually gained understanding through the world conferences held in Kyoto in 1994, Hyogo in 2005, and in Sendai in 2015.

Takeya explains how Disaster Risk Reduction investment has been a key survival issue for Japan for centuries. He shares his experience as a Japanese delegate in the negotiation of the 2015 Sendai Framework for DRR adopted by 185 states, successfully channeling preventive investment into the priority agenda for the affected communities and states.

2. Global Health

It is not difficult to identify the need for international cooperation in combating infectious diseases. Japan was the first to take up infectious disease control at the G7 Summit in Okinawa in 2000, which led to the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, in 2002.

The need for such a global approach, however, is not limited to combating transnational infection. Healthcare can and should mean prevention and cover non-communicable diseases. The system of social health insurance was first legislated in 1922 in Japan and took 40 years to attain universal coverage in 1961. An ample healthy workforce is analyzed to have been a major driving force for Japan's labour-intensive economic growth (9% between 1956~73), often called a miracle, from post war devastation to the second largest economy in the world (1968~2010). Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is "to provide all people with access to needed health services of sufficient quality to be effective and ensure that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship." Japan was instrumental in placing the UHC as one of the targets among the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, see 3. below), adopted at the UN in 2015. UHC is not only pursued by Japan through ODA in countries as in the case of Kenya but is also promoted as a central agenda by the World Health Organization (WHO) today.

Makimoto reviews the global trend of health initiatives, focuses on Japan's initiatives that have been active since the turn of the century, and combines conceptual analysis of the UHC with actual cooperation projects by JICA. She also touches on challenges faced by the world community, particularly those with lower incomes, such as drug resistant infections.

3. Sustainable Development in Africa and the World

The development of all nations has long been a global objective requiring international cooperation. The ILO (International Labour Organization) was established in 1919 as the sister organization of the League of Nations after WWI to focus on the wellbeing of workers in all countries. After WWII under the United Nations, particularly since the avalanche of decolonization in the 1960s, economic and social development became the highest priority agenda for the newly independent UN member states. The World Bank and IMF prescribed market-oriented economic growth in the 1980s, while the UNDP stressed human development in the 1990s. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set following the Millennium Declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in 2000, to institutionalize the broad consensus on ending poverty as the overarching objective of development². The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted at the General Assembly in 2015 call upon not only the donor countries and the UN and its related agencies, but all governments, NGOs, and the private sector to be engaged in attaining much broader goals for developmental and environmental sustainability for generations to come.

Three priorities placed in Japan's development cooperation policy today, according to its 2018 Diplomatic Bluebook, are: (1) improving connectivity between Asia and Africa based on the concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," (2) supporting achievement of the SDGs, and (3) promoting Japanese enterprises and local governments' advancement abroad. Japan has hosted, together with the UN and the World Bank, the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) every five years since 1993 to invite African leaders, and every three years since 2016 alternating the venue between Africa and in the Tokyo vicinity.

Kondo, the UNDP Representative in Japan, depicts how the Japanese business circle is involved in achieving the SDGs drawing from his current mission to promote them. He also visits the origin and spirit of development goals based on his vivid experiences in having supported Chad, a least developing but prominent country in Africa, emphasizing the importance of goal number five (See 10. below).

Komatsubara, the UNDP officer in charge of the TICAD process, takes a close look at the origin and evolution of the Conference. He describes the way Japan has collaborated with the UN organization by co-hosting the TICAD and promoting the concept of “human security.” He describes how TICAD and the SDGs would play complementary roles to be of practical use for governments, aid agencies, and the private sector.

4. International Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Aid

Humankind invented devices for international cooperation even when at war; the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was adopted in 1864, the founding text of contemporary International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Japan acceded in 1886 to this Convention as the first Asian country. The Hakuai-sha, Philanthropic Society was founded by Count Tsunetami Sano in 1877 during the Seinan no Eki, the battles of rebellion in Kyushu. This Society, renamed the Japanese Red Cross Society, was recognized in 1887 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the guardian of the IHL. After the devastating WWII, Japan, as it declared at the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1953. Accession to the Additional Protocols of 1977 took place in 2004 in the context of its emergency legislation through the belated enactment of domestic laws required for the implementation of the 1949 Conventions as well as for the accession to their Protocols. Japan engages with the ICRC today not only through funding of its activities but also by supporting the promotion of the IHL in Asia and the world.

Japan’s humanitarian aid is said to date back to 1953 by funding the UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees.³ Japan has provided a substantial amount of funding, emergency supplies, and personnel to people affected by natural disasters under the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams of 1987. Japan has extended assistance to those affected by conflict-related emergencies under the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 (see 5. below).

Schroeder clarifies that the International Humanitarian Law tells you what you can and cannot do during conflict to alleviate human suffering. All 196 states in the world are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As the nature of war changes in the world, the ICRC’s mission to disseminate the IHL, to assist people affected by conflict and other situations of violence, has been faced with many challenges.

5. International Peace Cooperation

The UN was established in 1945 to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” through collective security. The primary mechanisms for collective security are the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI), peace enforcement (Chapter VII), and respect for regional arrangements (Chapter VIII).⁴ Military action to redress aggression under Chapter VII, however, has taken place only twice to date: against North Korea in 1950, and against Iraq in 1991. In the meantime, the idea of using soldiers to keep the peace was invented while there was no specific reference to it in the UN Charter.

The “Chapter six and a half” peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have evolved over the years, from monitoring ceasefires into a wide-ranging activity “to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace.” Since 1948, more than 70 peacekeeping operations have deployed hundreds of thousands of military personnel and tens of thousands of UN police and civilians from 128 countries.⁵ Moreover, multilateral peace operations have been carried out by regional organizations including the EU, OSCE, AU, NATO, and ECOWAS in different parts of the world.

Japan, with its unique Constitution whose Article 9 renounces “war and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” has long refrained from taking part in operations that involved the “use of force.” Its Self Defense Forces (SDF) are in place strictly for “defending the country.” The above-mentioned 1991 UN-authorized US-led operation against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait triggered the enactment of the PKO Cooperation Law in 1992. Since then, the SDF (to engage in limited but later expanded tasks), as well as civilian personnel, have been dispatched to 13 UN missions and 14 humanitarian or electoral support operations. The Peace and Security

Legislations of 2015 also enabled SDF participation in non-UN led peace operations. How Japan has struggled to engage in peace operations is related to how Japan has come to terms with its past, namely, the aggression and its defeat in WWII.

Tsuzuki presents the basics of the UN PKO, such as its mechanism and how member states, including Japan, have shared the costs and responsibility to run the evolving tools of peace operations to deal with conflicts in different parts of the world. He reveals how international politics play out in every stage of the process.

Nakamura clarifies the difference between the two categories of operations: PKOs and collective military operations by coalition forces. He then introduces the two schools in Japan as to the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution, and hence as to whether and how the SDFs should contribute in each of the two categories of operations.

6. Cyber Security

In 2013, the Japanese Cabinet adopted for the first time a National Security Strategy,⁶ which not only served as a basis for the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation (see 5. above), but also set guidelines for policies in sea, outer space, cyberspace, ODA, and energy.

Though cyberspace spreads beyond national borders, an agreed system of international cooperation has not yet been established as to who regulates it and through which organization. The issue in the background is how to reconcile three often conflicting requirements of (1) ensuring national security, (2) maintaining the free flow of information, and (3) protecting individual privacy (which often means freedom of thought). Some states use cyber security as an excuse to protect themselves from inconvenient information.

The related issue is whether the private sector, the technical community, or civil society should be equally involved in decision making as state actors in governing the system, or if they should be consulted only at the domestic level. The Domain Name System, managed by ICANN, an American non-governmental entity established in 1998, “worked consistently through exponential growth across borders, languages, and political cultures, with no roadmap or precedent; a feat of multi-stakeholder approach.”⁷ Though the ICANN officially left US oversight in 2016, China, Russia, and many developing states argue that internet governance should come under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, a UN specialized agency originally established in 1865 to manage global telegraph standards), in an intergovernmental setting. Western states oppose this proposal.

Ogawa presents Japan’s cyber diplomacy, which prioritizes the free flow of information and the multi-stakeholder approach, while reconfirming existing international laws to be applicable to cyberspace. He adds his analysis on the nature of cyberspace and depicts a near future of mankind where cyberspace is seamlessly fused with the real world.

Osawa describes the actuality of cyber-attacks across the globe, their evolvement, and the new trend. He presents his analysis on the nature of cyber-attacks and their counter measures. He shares his prescription for effective international cooperation to secure the national interest.

7. Environment Management and Climate Change

Pollution does not stop at borders, and thus environmental movements in the 1960s led to international norm creation towards the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. An attempt was made to bridge the divide between economic growth and environmental protection with the concept of “sustainable development,” defined in 1987 by the UN-assigned Brundtland Commission as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own need.” The Commission Report served as the basis of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, known as the Earth Summit, with the participation a of record number of representatives from governments and NGOs. The North-South tensions arose (and prevail still today) as many developing countries perceive that ozone depletion, hazardous waste pollution, and global climate change were products of industrialization and overconsumption in the developed world, but suddenly the new priority to protect the environment was to come at their expense.⁸ The Summit adopted the Rio Declaration with 27 principles, an Agenda 21 to implement them, as well as the Statement

of Forest Principles. The Convention on Bio-diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change were also signed at the Summit. The latter led to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and eventually to the Paris Agreement of 2015 where states from the North and South agreed to take verifiable steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Rio plus 20 Conference twenty years hence was held again in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 and led to the adoption of the SDGs (see 3. above.)

Adachi explains what an environmental problem is, how Japan has coped with various environment problems, and how it extends support to other countries. The high economic growth model of Japan between the 1950s and the mid-1970s was not without cost. Japan had learnt a painful lesson in overcoming environmental degradation and human suffering caused by industrialization until it regained clean air and water; thus, prevention is better than cure. The Green Growth and Future City initiatives are among the ways that Japan excels in international cooperation to meet current and future challenges.

8. Good Governance

In the early days when Japan was still at the stage of recovering from the devastation of WWII, Japan's bilateral ODA was essentially aimed at its own economic development through promoting production and export by its private sector. Procurement for Japanese aid was "tied" almost entirely to Japanese companies. As Japan became the second largest economy in 1968 (until it was superseded by China in 2010) and expanded its ODA tenfold (USD 115 million in 1964 to USD 1.15 billion in 1976), new objectives were added to the aim of ODA, along with the currents of international aid philosophy.

The major trend of world aid philosophy in the Regan-Thatcher era of the 1980s was less government intervention and the liberalization of economic activities in the private sector, until it shifted in the 1990s to focus on poverty reduction and human development as epitomized by the MDGs (see 3. above). The World Bank and the IMF prescribed structural adjustments to recipient countries as conditions for their loans. Moreover, against the backdrop of international politics, for instance, aid to the Saddam regime was challenged in relation to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (see 5. above), and donor countries were expected to demonstrate its standpoint with respect to values such as good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.⁹ Japan, a country that shares those values, has acted accordingly, while keeping an approach not identical to other Western countries.

The Japanese Cabinet thus adopted in 1992 a Charter to announce the multifaceted objectives of its ODA, namely, the ODA as a tool for attaining peace, prosperity, and sustainability in the world, which is indispensable for Japan's own objectives.¹⁰ The Charter, revised in 2015, stipulates the implementation principles as "to pay adequate attention to the process of democratization, the rule of law and the protection of basic human rights," followed by those pertaining to avoiding military purposes, weapons of mass destruction and the trade of arms, the impact on the environment and climate change, ensuring equity and consideration of the socially vulnerable, promoting women's participation, preventing fraud and corruption, and the security and safety of development cooperation personnel.¹¹ Under such guidelines, the Japanese ODA is extended first and foremost based on requests from the recipient countries.

Shiga, while admitting the absence of established definitions, explains why notions such as good governance, democracy, and the rule of law are needed in international cooperation. He reveals from a practitioner standpoint some salient features of Japan's approach in international cooperation, differing from those of the US and the World Bank, leaving you to ponder which approach might prove more effective in the long run.

9. Protection and Solutions for Refugees

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states in its preamble that "the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and a satisfactory solution of a refugee problem cannot be achieved without international co-operation." The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), created by the UN General Assembly in 1950 with the mission to provide international protection to refugees and seek permanent

solutions for the problem of refugees, today supports people fleeing from conflict and generalized violence, as well as people fleeing from persecution as defined in the 1951 Convention.

Today, an unprecedented 68.5 million people have been forced from their homes (end 2017), including 40 million IDPs, Internally Displaced Persons, and 25.4 refugees (19.9 million under UNHCR mandate and 5.4 Palestinian refugees under UNRWA mandate). The UN General Assembly adopted in late 2018 a Global Compact on Refugees to strengthen the international response to refugees by easing the pressure on host countries and enhancing refugee self-reliance.¹² As for the IDPs, the international community entrusts UNHCR and several UN and other development and humanitarian organizations to take part in operations for their support.

Japan's refugee acceptance was triggered by Indo-China boat people first arriving in 1975; 1232 out of 13,768 who arrived until 1994 were settled in Japan. To accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1981, Japan amended its Immigration Control Order accordingly and in 2003 extended support comparable to those given to the Indo-China refugees to refugees as defined by the Convention to promote their integration into Japanese society.¹³

Japan is oftentimes seen as a country unkind to refugees. "Japan made fewer than 100 positive decisions out of 12,900, resulting in a particularly low protection rate of under 1 per cent."¹⁴ Hebecker explains why this can be misleading and elaborates how Japan engages in response to the refugee situation around the world through each of the three durable solutions to the refugee problem: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.

10. Gender Equality

The UN was established in 1945 not only to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" (see 5. above) but also to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women," as stated in the preamble of its Charter. At that stage, only 30 out of the 51 original Member States allowed women equal voting rights with men.¹⁵ Confirmed in the Universal Declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1948, the protection of human rights was then legislated into separate Instruments for civil and political rights and for economic social rights, both Conventions enacted in 1976. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which focuses on gender, covering both civil/political rights and economic/social rights, was adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1981. Today, 189 states are parties to the Convention to submit periodic reports to be reviewed by the Committee under the Convention. What had essentially been a domestic issue found a place in UN deliberations, rooted in the Charter, and grew into a dominant agenda in the international community where civil society organizations play a big role, and where state sovereignty became no longer sacrosanct.

Consecutive Global Women's Conferences in Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995 built up momentum for creating a norm on gender equality. Through such dialogue, the world gradually came to terms with the fact that the protection and empowerment of women, their perspective, and participation in every stage of the processes are indispensable for attaining peace and security, as depicted in the Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000; this is also true for sustainable development, as prominent in the MDGs and SDGs. All UN agencies have come to enshrine the gender perspective in their agendas. UNWOMEN was established in 2010, consolidating four UN entities with gender-focused mandates.

Ishikawa stresses that gender equality is a universal issue, which no country can achieve alone, and thus there is the need for international cooperation. She introduces the priority areas and initiatives undertaken by UNWOMEN and other agencies. Japan, ranking 110 out of 149 countries in the 2018 Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum, is by no means exemplary. She explains why and how Japan is engaged in pushing the norm within its society, while reaching out to support other countries in their diverse situations to achieve the goal common to humankind.

Finally, before continuing to the Chapters of their interest, a brief outline of the origin and the scale of Japanese ODA might be useful for interested readers.

Japan joined the World Bank as a recipient in 1952 and received loan aid until 1966; the symbolic bullet

train was built on loans from the World Bank in 1961. While being a recipient of international aid, Japan started early as a donor. Japan in 1954 joined the Colombo plan (then a Commonwealth-based regional organization to promote economic development in Asia), and in 1955 started accepting trainees and dispatching experts for technical cooperation. Japan's grant aid was extended in tandem with its WWII reparation to Asian countries between 1954 and 1976, and in the following years often as its follow-up projects. Japan started its loan aid in 1958 by extending Yen loans in concessional terms to India. Japan joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964, whose Development Assistance Committee, DAC, defines ODA as the financial and technical assistance that governments/government agencies provide in concessional terms (grant element of at least 25%). Japan became the world's top ODA donor in 1989, maintaining its rank for ten years from 1991 to 2000. Today (2016), Japanese ODA ranks fourth among the DAC countries by the approximate amount of USD 10 billion net disbursements: USD 7 billion bilaterally and USD 3 billion through international organizations. JICA, established in 1974, became the world largest development institution in 2008 to extend loan aid, technical cooperation, and grant aid in a comprehensive manner.¹⁶

2018 marked 150 years since the start of the Meiji Restoration (1868), the process of modernizing Japan to become the first non-Western developed country. To commemorate, JICA jointly launched the Development Studies Program this year with more than 50 graduate schools of Japanese Universities for future leaders of developing countries. Hitotsubashi University appreciates the opportunity to be part of this worthy endeavor.

Notes

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Chapter 1 Disaster Risk Reduction

Kimio Takeya

1. Need for International Cooperation

Natural disasters repeatedly occur in hazardous countries, especially in the Asian monsoon region. Moreover, residents of these high-risk areas are mostly people in the low-income strata and will easily lose their livelihoods and assets because of the disasters.

According to the UN, between 2005 and 2015, disasters have continued to exact a heavy toll and, as a result, the wellbeing and safety of persons, communities, and countries as a whole have been affected. Over 700 thousand people have lost their lives, over 1.4 million have been injured, and approximately 23 million have been rendered homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, more than 1.5 billion people have been affected by disasters in various ways, with women, children, and people in vulnerable situations disproportionately affected. The total economic loss was more than USD 1.3 trillion. In addition, between 2008 and 2012, 144 million people were displaced by disasters. Disasters, many of which are exacerbated by climate change and which are increasing in frequency and intensity, significantly impede progress towards sustainable development.¹

Natural disasters hit a country's economy and obstruct its development plans. In the 2011 Thailand flood, estimated damages and losses totaled approximately THB 1.429 trillion (USD 46.5 billion). The damages to physical assets amounted to THB 630 billion, where associated losses in economic activities totaled about THB 799 billion. These estimates assumed the losses that would occur over the three-year period of 2011–2013.² We can still observe the magnitude of the loss in comparison to the Thai GDP in 2011, namely, THB 11.307 trillion. Such disasters have also revealed how many countries' industries were connected beyond national borders since many other countries have also been affected. To attain sustainable growth for the people of all countries, natural disasters are one of the most important factors to be taken into account. Disasters can be prevented and mitigated. Countries that face natural disasters are mostly developing countries still in need of support from their developed partners, particularly from those that have faced, and still do face, natural disasters, such as Japan.

2. Japan's Engagement

Due to its geography, topography, and climate, Japan is a disaster-prone country that has seen events ranging from earthquakes and volcanic eruptions to typhoons, rain-induced flooding, and landslides. The first Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) project in Japan goes back to the eighth century. A high priest named Gyoki and his fellow monks built flood control and multi-purpose irrigation reservoir systems. Ever since, DRR has always been a priority for the governance of the country. In the unfortunate event of a disaster, Japan has made efforts to recover not to the pre-disaster situation, but to a stronger country by continuously strengthening its DRR systems.³ This "Build Back Better" policy enabled sustainable development by avoiding recurring vulnerability. Japan also made DRR investments to reduce damages from future disasters. This long history has built abundant knowledge and experience in minimizing damage from disasters.

Based on the proposal by Japan and Morocco, the 1990s were designated at the UN as the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction" (IDNDR). During the decade, Japan actively promoted DRR. The Japanese government hosted the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in 1994, where the "Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World" and its plan of action was endorsed. Japan also hosted the Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Hyogo in January 2005, where the "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015" was adopted.

The Hyogo Conference was held less than one month after the Sumatra Tsunami on December 26, 2004. This was the first Mega disaster in the Internet age; the images of the serious strike of the Tsunami spread across the

Internet through cellphone footage. Many European youth taking a vacation and enjoying surfing in Sri Lanka and the surrounding areas had been victimized, leading to the biggest mortality records for their countries of origin. Affected by this impact, discussions in Hyogo tended to have overemphasized the importance of “early warning” and how to escape, rather than how to prevent disaster by investment. Early warning is the minimum requirement for reducing mortality, but it cannot prevent economic losses. During the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011, while more than 95% of the people in the tsunami-affected area successfully evacuated, the local economy was completely destroyed. On account of Japanese DRR experiences, this became one of the revising points from Hyogo to the next phase.

According to “Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: A 20 year story of international aid,”⁴ a survey report by ODI (Overseas Development Institute, a think tank) and GFDRR (Global Facility For Disaster Reduction and Recovery, a grant funding mechanism managed by the World Bank), Japan was the world’s top donor for DRR, the second being the World Bank. Among the bilateral donors, Japan supported more than 64% of the total, followed by the European Commission with 8%.

After the 2011 Earthquake, Japan once again hosted the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015. Japan, making full use of its experience and knowledge, took a leading role in the formulation and consensus building for the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. DRR provides important elements of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, the consensus reached in March paved the way for the adoption of the SDGs at the UN General Assembly in September and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in December that year.

At the Sendai Conference, the Japanese government also announced the Sendai Cooperation Initiative for Disaster Risk Reduction, which committed DRR cooperation and human resource development totaling USD 4 billion and training of 40,000 DRR officials from 2015 to 2018.

3. Challenges Ahead

The Japanese government and JICA are now concentrating on achieving the seven targets given in the Sendai Framework.⁵ These targets are divided into two phases. The first phase is Target (e), “Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.” The logical sequence here is to first develop DRR strategies by 2020 along with Target (e), and then the other six global targets will be achieved by 2030 through the implementation of the plans under those strategies.

While national DRR plans have been developed in many disaster-prone countries after the Hyogo Framework for Action, local DRR plans have not been developed as much. In this circumstance, the highest priority should be given to developing local DRR plans. While the topics in general were discussed at international conferences, it is still necessary to clarify common gaps and bottlenecks such as legal, budgetary, and technical constraints for the development of local DRR plans.

In this situation, JICA has posed eight practical steps to formulate Local DRR Plans.

- Step 1 Confirmation of hazard
- Step 2 Understanding of local disaster risks
- Step 3 Confirmation of DRR measures by national and upper authorities
- Step 4 Identification of residual risks considering time span
- Step 5 Consideration of DRR measures to reduce residual risks
- Step 6 Development of local DRR plan with prioritized DRR measures
- Step 7 Allocation of budget from both local and national governments
- Step 8 Implementation of DRR measures and periodic review of plans

In order to implement these practical steps and formulate a local DRR plan, JICA enhances the dialogue between each country’s DRR Ministers and high-level financial officials, allowing them to formulate DRR plans using these processes. JICA also continuously takes leadership in international conferences, such as the Asian Ministerial

Conference and the Global Platform for DRR, sending each country's DRR Minister or serving as the moderator of important sessions.

The Sendai Initiative has mainly been implemented by JICA, and for the first two fiscal years, 2015 and 2016, a total of USD 3.1 billion of financial support and training for 39,776 officials were achieved. JICA will continuously play a major role for DRR in the international arena.

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Chapter 2 Global Health

Saeda Makimoto

1. Need for International Cooperation

Health not only constitutes a foundation for the lives of people around the world, but also alleviates socioeconomic disparities. The international community traditionally has a kind of shared idea that has matured over time, namely, that industrial countries and their citizens must support other nations to improve health disparities, which represent a preventable and solvable global injustice to ensure stability, security, peace, and prosperity. International health cooperation has been implemented with various diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian objectives from the colonial period; one of them has been the moral or social justice of the international community.

In spite of remarkable progress during the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) era, we still have many preventable deaths and unacceptable health inequities between/within countries. These are not only the result of the inadequate availability of health service resources but are also often due to differences in social conditions between population groups, such as where people are born, grow up, live, work, and age. Looking at the financing of healthcare, the world's average proportion of government health expenditure to total government expenditure has been increasing year by year; however, in developing countries, a large proportion of health expenditure is still paid by individuals. As a result, about 100 million people fall into poverty every year because of their medical expenses,¹ and such unjust and unfair systematic differences negatively affect a nation's prosperity. International communities provide technical and financial support to nations to eliminate health disparities to ensure stability, security, peace, and prosperity.

Recently enhanced joint efforts of the international community are related to health security. As has been seen in the outbreaks of the Ebola virus, globalization comes with the growing threat of cross-border infectious diseases. With the rapid increase in population movement and trade, outbreaks of infectious diseases, foodborne illnesses, antimicrobial resistance, or contaminated pharmaceuticals can quickly spread from country to country and directly or indirectly impact the health of all citizens. No one nation can achieve health security on its own. It requires thinking about health in a global context and an adequate global response from the health sector, such as a comprehensive and real-time infectious disease surveillance system, and global and country capacity for responding to those threats, including an emergency fund mechanism. Such development in turn will help ensure the peace and stability of the world and be the basis for the private sector to conduct its activities, thereby helping to promote trade and investment.

2. Japan's Engagement

Japan has been placing importance on efforts in the health field that are directly linked to "human security." Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated in the *Lancet* in 2015 that Japan's global health priorities are "to construct a global health architecture that can respond to public health crises and to build resilient and sustainable health systems." He also remarked on Japan's comparative advantages as a pioneer country in achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) through firm political will in a resource limited situation, and in maintaining UHC in a super ageing society.²

With the strong commitment of top leaders, Japan has led global health and governance architecture discussions through such opportunities as the G7/G8 Summits. Japan introduced health as a G8 agenda for the first time in 2000 and paved the way toward the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund). At the G7 summit in 2008, Japan stressed the importance of an integrated approach of infectious disease control by strengthening health systems. In 2013, Japan announced the Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy³ and called for mainstream UHC as the post-2015 agenda. In 2015, Japan approved the Basic Design for Peace and Health (Global Health Cooperation)⁴ to establish resilient global health governance able to respond to public health

crises and natural disasters, promote UHC throughout the lifecycle, and contribute to solving health challenges using Japan's knowledge and technologies including universal health insurance. At the G7 summit and TICAD VI in 2016 and the UHC Forum in 2017, Japan further accelerated the movement to establish an emergency fund mechanism for public health emergencies and coordination to attain UHC and better preparedness.

Japan's contribution in global health is striking in mainstreaming the agenda and collaboration at the global level, but a further important contribution is cooperation at the country level. Country-level operations by JICA align to Japan's ODA policy by using policy/strategy documents and close communication among stakeholders in the ODA management mechanism. Attaining UHC through Health System Strengthening is set as the key concept of JICA cooperation in JICA's SDGs position paper⁵ and health cooperation operation strategy.⁶ A country cooperation program is developed in close dialogue to align both partner countries' policies and JICA's cooperation strategy. To produce synergetic effects, JICA combines modalities from technical cooperation, grant aid, concessional loans, volunteers, and partnership programs with the private sector. Japanese experience and knowledge are utilized as applicable.

3. Challenges Ahead

Many challenges are observed in global health, such as service quality, demographic transition, disease pattern change, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), innovation and rapidly advancing technology, healthcare costs, how to achieve the goal of "leave no one behind," and many more.

Ensuring adequate service quality is a critical issue in any health program including UHC and health security. Unless the quality of services is secured, not only will it be ineffective and inefficient, but it will also be harmful. Measuring the quality of healthcare is a necessary step in the process of improving healthcare quality.

LMICs (Low- and Middle-Income Countries) are facing various unexperienced changes at the same time, such as disease pattern changes, growing populations, ageing, rapid urbanization, and the rapid advancement of technology. Costly chronic care needs are growing but LMICs have little experience in long-term care. With an increase in the proportion of middle-class citizens, people's expectations regarding the quality of medical services have increased. With a shortage of skilled health workers, task-shifting and the utilization of innovation and technology will be essential. Legal frameworks on new technologies and data utilization would be urgently required, and effective training mechanisms for health workers need to be reconsidered. Each country needs to strengthen its own capacity to prioritize different health interventions with the available resources in their UHC agendas to address local values, needs, and constraints.

AMR is one of the world's most pressing and urgent global health threats. Patients with drug-resistant infections typically require more difficult and expensive treatment options. AMR is found in people, animals, food, and the environment. The misuse and overuse of antimicrobials is accelerating this process. Immediate, crosscutting, and multidisciplinary action is required. The problem is more worrisome in LMICs, where resources, capacity, and political will are frequently insufficient to adequately address the issue.

UHC will leave no one behind in the concept, but its actual attainment needs to be monitored with a functioning civil registration system. However, most countries do not have enough mechanisms in place. Service access and utilization by marginalized key populations, such as poor people, children, women, persons with disabilities, migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous people, is also a significant challenge. Costless and sustainable monitoring systems are expected.

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Chapter 3 Sustainable Development in Africa and the World

3-I. SDGs in Practice

Tetsuo Kondo

1. Need for International Cooperation

The reason the current global development goals were named “Sustainable Development Goals” is obvious: our way of living and its impact on the environment would be unsustainable if we keep on living without changing our current lifestyles. Some species on this planet come into existence and others become extinct due to changing climates. The United Nations (UN) must raise alarm whenever human lives face the threat and risks of unsustainability, just as it does when conflicts cause the abuse of human rights.

The UNDP was established in 1966 when the newly independent nations in the developing world became UN Member States and made démarches at the General Assembly, calling for international support in offering solutions for the inclusive development of their people. Over time, the UNDP has become the largest development arm in the UN system with support from major donor countries, including Japan.

2. Japan’s Engagement

In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report was published, introducing the new concept of “Human Security.” Human Security was conceived when the end of the Cold War gave rise to a peace dividend as a result of the savings generated through the abolishment of mass destructive weapons by major military powers. Human Security has been promoted by the Government of Japan as a key principle of its official development assistance (ODA), and formed the bedrock of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2001–2015).

The lessons learned during the period of implementation of the MDGs were broadly examined not only by governments but also by political leaders, civil society, academia, and business leaders, as well as by the general public through web-based surveys. Extensive negotiations resulted in the setting of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) with 169 targets. To achieve the SDGs, we should focus on their characteristic of universality, the role of the private sector, innovation, women, and youth.

First, one of the major characteristics of the SDGs is embodied in their principle of leaving no one behind. The SDGs are not only for poor countries but for developed countries as well (if they have people in need of assistance to escape extreme poverty). We should know that any issues that threaten human security, such as climate change, the marine environment, global health, migration, and refugee problems, cannot be solely solved by a single government but require intervention from the entire world.

Second, to achieve the SDGs by 2030, governments’ responses in the form of ODA are not at all sufficient. The private sector is a key stakeholder in SDGs, since it includes people who work in companies, consumers who buy products and services, and investors who provide funds. To this effect, the Japanese business concept of “win-win-win among providers, buyers, and communities” (“Sanpo Yoshi,” which means “good for all three parties” in Japanese) represents the approach of Japanese companies in their business conduct and matches the principle behind the implementation of the SDGs.

The UNDP administrator, Achim Steiner, visited Japan in November 2018 and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Japan Business Federation (KEIDANREN). The MOU aims at fostering mutual cooperation between the UNDP and the Japanese business association to identify business products and practices that clearly generate impacts to help developing countries obtain solutions for achieving the SDGs.

Third, in this era of a fast and changing society that is mainly the result of advancements in technology, such as

artificial intelligence, we should continue our efforts to innovate businesses in all instances. Science and technology should define their added value to peoples' lives in line with the progress of the SDGs. Financial Technology (FinTech), research and development in healthcare, bio-chemical technology, alternative and renewable energy, recycling, and the protection of the environment are key areas of innovation, among others.

These technologies should be used to dispose of barriers to and exclusion from opportunities to access education, healthcare, and the betterment of life through the development of market economies. As such, social cohesion and inclusiveness should be ensured by means of new technologies. For instance, the virtual currency "MPESA" is widely used in Kenya to allow broader coverage in money transactions for those who cannot access banking services due to long distances to bank branches or the lack of social identification.

3. Challenges Ahead

The most essential factor in achieving the SDGs in many countries, including Japan, is SDG5: gender equality (see Chapter 10). My past experience as a UNDP development practitioner for almost 20 years has clearly shown me that when the empowerment of women is centered on development programs, target communities are mostly successful in achieving planned outcomes. Women in Africa are often deprived of opportunities in education, access to healthcare, and success in business due to the custom of early marriage. In Chad, the government introduced a law that banned forced marriage for individuals under the age of 18, after strenuous efforts by the country's political leaders, associations for helping women, and the UN.

In 2016, the UNDP issued an Africa Human Development Report titled, "Accelerating Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Africa." Gender inequality is costing sub-Saharan Africa an average of USD 95 billion a year, peaking at USD 105 billion in 2014, which is equivalent to six percent of the region's GDP. According to the 2016 Africa Human Development Report, this jeopardizes the continent's efforts toward inclusive human development and economic growth. The report analyses the political, economic, and social factors that hamper African women's advancement, and proposes policies and precise actions to close the gender gap. These include addressing the contradiction between legal provisions and practice in gender laws, debunking harmful social norms, transforming discriminatory institutional settings, and ensuring women's economic, social, and political participation.

Deeply-rooted structural obstacles such as the unequal distribution of resources, power, and wealth, as well as social institutions and norms that encourage gender inequality are holding African women and the rest of the continent back. The report estimates that a one percent increase in gender inequality reduces a country's human development index by 0.75 percent.

The same principle applies to Japan in its SDG implementation and the growth strategy of its government. Unfair practices that were recently uncovered in business and the academic community, such as the discriminatory treatment of female candidates in medical schools' entrance examinations, are unacceptable. Unfair perceptions such as attributing the responsibility of childcare to women only should be changed. Such changes would enable the Japanese community to reduce the risk of its dwindling birth rate and the consequent loss of its demographic dividend.

In conclusion, to improve the sustainability and quality of human lives through the achievement of the SDGs by 2030, the world should pay close attention to transformational leadership based on the extensive development experience acquired by UN development agencies such as the UNDP. The key message is, "leave no one behind, and reach the ones that are furthest behind first."

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Chapter 3 Sustainable Development in Africa and the World

3-II. TICAD in Action

Shigeki Komatsubara

1. Need for International Cooperation

The Charter of the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, the United States of America, outlines the fundamental aspirations and commitments of the international community for the realization of a world of peace, dignity, and prosperity. “To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” is one of the four goals set forth in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, along with aspirations for peace, respect for justice and law, and human rights.

Article 55 in the Chapter IX on International Economic and Social Cooperation further elaborates on the above aspiration as follows. “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
- c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

These statements explain why we need international cooperation in today’s world in its most fundamental form. Our lives are increasingly connected, and there is no lasting peace and prosperity without development for all.

2. Japan’s Engagement

Against this backdrop, the United Nations Development has been working with global stakeholders to advance sustainable and inclusive development, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at the core of the system, which supports the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) as the convener and the coordinator. With presence in about 170 countries and 7000 staff members, the UNDP is the largest UN development agency, providing a global network for partnership, knowledge sharing, and innovation, working to support host countries in eradicating poverty, strengthening resilience, and accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development.

Japan has been one of the key partners of the United Nations development system including the UNDP, not only in terms of funding but also in terms of her contributions to the development of key concepts and approaches to development. The UNDP’s advocacy for the empowerment of individuals through a Human Development approach has been echoed by Japan’s focus on a human-centered approach to development. In its flagship Human Development Report of 1994, the UNDP for the first time coined the word “Human Security” in proposing a new, integrated approach to development. Japan owned and refined the concept and the approach of human security, actively promoted discussions within the United Nations, established and funded the UN Trust Fund for Human Security to translate the concept and approaches into concrete programs on the ground, fostered a group of like-minded countries on Human Security at the United Nations, and played a key role in the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Human Security in 2012.

In the area of Africa’s development, the UNDP and Japan have been partnering as co-organizers of the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) since its inception in 1993. Building on the unique set-up of TICAD as an open and inclusive forum for Africa’s development, and under the principle of “African Ownership

and International Partnership,” TICAD has been supporting (1) the formulation of global consensus on Africa’s development priorities, and (2) the promotion of partnerships and innovation among global stakeholders for Africa’s development.

As such, unlike many common misunderstandings, TICAD has not been a “Japan-Africa” forum, nor a “pledging conference.” Unique characteristics of TICAD, unlike other “bilateral” forums that were created after TICAD, helped TICAD to grow into a major global forum on Africa’s development, gathering increasingly large numbers of stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. Being able to flexibly accommodate new and emerging stakeholders including Asian and Latin American countries, civil society, and the private sector, TICAD participants increased from 1,000 at TICAD I in 1993 to 14,000 at TICAD VI, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2016.

In addition to Japan’s steadfast commitment to accelerating Africa’s development by supporting Africa’s own priorities, the true value and growth potential of TICAD lie in its flexibility and capacity to advocate for Africa, and to leverage increasing numbers of stakeholders, most notably the private sector, to mobilize global partnerships and promote innovation in support of Africa’s development aspirations.

3. Challenges Ahead

For the first time in the history of TICAD, the TICAD VI summit was held in Africa, in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 2016. Until then, TICAD had been holding Ministerial meetings in Africa and the Summit in Japan. TICAD VI gathered 14,000 participants from Africa, Japan, Asia, Latin America, and OECD countries. The most prominent feature of TICAD VI was the mainstreaming of the private sector perspectives and participants in the program. Japanese and African private sector representatives participated in large numbers in plenary sessions of the summit meeting. In addition, a dedicated dialogue session between African heads of state and Japanese/African private sector representatives was held at the summit for the first time.

TICAD VI adopted the Nairobi Declaration, identifying the following priority areas for Africa’s development: (1) promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialization, (2) promoting resilient health systems for quality of life, and (3) promoting social prosperity for shared prosperity. It also confirmed the importance of cross-cutting aspects such as (1) youth, women, and persons with disabilities; (2) promoting science, technology, and innovation; (3) human resource development; (4) advancing public-private partnerships; (5) engaging private sector and civil society; and (6) strengthening institutions and good governance.

While these priorities are of particular relevance for Africa, it is also noteworthy that the discussions were held against the large backdrop of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), which were only recently adopted at the United Nations. SDGs provide the common language, perspectives, and framework to promote dialogue, agenda setting, and collaboration to address common challenges facing people across the globe. It also provides the flexibility to identify the most important development priorities for each stakeholder, be it at the individual, communal, local government, or national level, or be it in the public or private sector. SDGs share the same characteristics with TICAD, such as flexibility, adaptability, openness, inclusiveness, as well as the active facilitation of partnerships and innovation.

TICAD has been contributing to reflecting African voices to the formulation and implementation of global development goals such as MDGs and SDGs. To address development challenges for Africa and the global community, TICAD and SDGs are expected to play mutually complementary roles, engaging diverse stakeholders for dialogue, partnerships, and innovations.

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Chapter 4 International Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Aid

Linh Schroeder

1. Need for International Cooperation

At a time when we focus on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a 2030 Agenda, and despite undeniable general progress over the past centuries, there is also no question that today's world and the conflict environment are much more complex and less predictable. There is a multiplication of actors, confrontations are often asymmetric, and national borders are increasingly irrelevant. Armed conflicts tend to last two, three, or even four decades without end in sight for many of them. Furthermore, everyone should be alarmed by the regularity and brutality of attacks on civilian populations and infrastructures, whether by state armed forces or by non-state armed groups. Indeed, contemporary wars are so violent that some countries are essentially reduced to rubble after just a few months of fighting, especially when battles rage in populated urban centers, leading to the disintegration of whole systems and infrastructures, with government, medical, and basic public services—education and even electricity and water systems—wiped out. It defies the notion of humanitarian relief being a short-term solution and only for emergencies.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a legal mandate from the international community, through the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, which task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, re-uniting separated families, and conducting similar humanitarian activities during armed conflicts. Unfortunately, we witness the dire consequences of such conflict and behavior in too many places where we work to bring protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and violence. We see the heavy, longer-term toll of today's wars on civilians, detainees, the wounded, medical staff, and essential infrastructures.

We also know that conflicts are the main impediment for the development of the affected countries, and that global sustainable development will not be achieved if it does not reach those left furthest behind, who are often those affected by conflict and violence. Here are some current numbers that justify our concern:

- Two billion people are affected by fragility, conflict, or violence, and the annual economic impact is USD 14 trillion, or 14% of the global GDP. The number of people living in fragile and unstable situations is projected to increase by 46% of the global population by 2030, according to the World Bank.
- Over 152 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance globally; 115 million people lack basic health services; 94 million lack water and sanitation services; 34 million lack access to education.
- Almost 70 million people have been forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict or violence. The 36 most fragile countries in the world account for just 2.6% of the global GDP but host 71% of the world's population of internally displaced persons.

When fighting breaks out, people caught up in the violence need help quickly. Humanitarian funding is only a tiny fraction of government budgets, and a relatively modest portion of ODA when compared to bilateral aid. Yet, it is absolutely essential to keeping millions of people alive in conflict hotspots. In particular, principled humanitarian action serves to protect against development reversals caused by the effects of war by serving as a safety net.

International cooperation not only contributes to ensuring a principled and appropriate humanitarian response to conflict-related needs in an increasingly complex world. Cooperation among states is at the origin and heart of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)¹, which has as its purpose maintaining humanity in times of conflict by forbidding unnecessary suffering or destruction. The cornerstone of IHL is composed of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which all 196 states have ratified and agreed to be bound by, making them universal and the most signed international treaty.

The ICRC is convinced that, short of being able to prevent war itself, the single most effective way to prevent terrible human suffering and unnecessary destruction is, without a doubt, by improving compliance with IHL and respect for the basic principle of humanity. Furthermore, respect for humanitarian law and principles has positive and

multiplying impacts on the daily lives of people and countries affected by armed conflict and violence. For example, when the principles of distinction and proportionality² at the basis of IHL are applied, lives are saved, hospitals and schools remain open, and markets can function. These are factors that all contribute to stability and pave the way for development and future peace. Conversely, the direct consequences of failures to respect IHL are often a spiral of increased violence and the five Ds: disease, death, destruction, destitution, and displacement.

2. Japan's Engagement

According to Watanabe³, Japan's humanitarian assistance dates back to 1953 and primarily included responses to natural disasters. "Japan became actively involved in conflict-related emergencies in 1992" and, in 2004, "over 50% of Japan's total ODA Humanitarian assistance has been extended to conflict-affected countries around the world." Japan provides emergency assistance notably in line with its human security policy, one of the pillars of its foreign policy. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁴ Japan provides humanitarian assistance while respecting the basic principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.⁵ "In delivering humanitarian assistance, the Government of Japan also complies with relevant international guidelines, including refugee-related treaties, the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship that define the basic policy for donor countries to respect, and the Oslo Guidelines, which set out basic principles on the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief."⁶

Obviously, states are meeting some of their international obligations by channeling a part of their ODA and official humanitarian aid—we would argue that this part could be more substantial than the current levels given the gap with increasing needs—through multilateral platforms and international humanitarian organizations like the ICRC. Indeed, voluntary contributions to ICRC by the states party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions allow the latter to fulfill the above-mentioned mandate they have assigned to the organization. Japan has been part of the ICRC Donors Support Group⁷, which in 2017 comprised 20 states providing annual contributions of more than CHF 10 million in cash.⁸ Furthermore, several Japanese nationals are among the ICRC's 2,500 odd international staff and 13,000 resident employees, and are constantly seeking to increase their number by reaching out to young Japanese professionals and students in Japan and abroad.

According to the Geneva Conventions, states have the primary responsibility to assist and protect victims of armed conflict. Japan and other states are also primarily responsible to ensure that IHL is respected, that violators are prosecuted, and that knowledge of IHL is spread as widely as possible in times of peace as in war. Japan has been an increasingly active contributor, in line with its other foreign policy pillar, the strengthening of the rule of law. In addition to being party to most of the main IHL treaties and ensuring their national implementation,⁹ "Japan participated actively in discussions held in Geneva on strengthening the International Humanitarian Law, which seek to strengthen the implementation of the International Humanitarian Law and to protect those who have been deprived of their liberty. At the diplomatic meeting of States Parties of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) held in Switzerland in December 2016, Shuichi Furuya (Professor, Waseda University), was re-elected as a member of the IHFFC. Moreover, as part of its efforts to promote awareness and understanding of International Humanitarian Law, MOFA dispatched a lecturer to the International Humanitarian Law Moot Court Competition hosted by the ICRC."¹⁰ Further, Japan regularly participates in or hosts discussions at various international forums focusing on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and is engaged in efforts to support victims of sexual violence in conflicts.¹¹ It was also among the key states initiating the unanimous adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2286 (2016), "Strongly Condemning Attacks against Medical Facilities, Personnel in Conflict Situations."¹²

3. Challenges Ahead

Faced with long-running conflicts and growing fragility in our world today, it would be easy to be pessimistic. What keeps us hopeful is that we have tools and approaches at our disposal to address some of the intrinsic problems. However, in order to sustain hope, we need countries to proactively deal with some of the key challenges of the humanitarian sector, brought forward by today's frontline of war. As described above, Japan is making important

contributions. Japan as a country, the Japanese economy, and the society at large have an even bigger potential for the future and are uniquely positioned to further engage on the challenges of our time. The same would apply to several other Asian countries as their economies and societies develop and their roles on the international scene grow.

Notes

1. <https://casebook.icrc.org/law/fundamentals-ihl>
2. <https://casebook.icrc.org/law/principle-distinction> and <https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/proportionality>
3. Mamiko Watanabe, "Japan's official humanitarian assistance," *Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), Humanitarian Exchange* No.26 (March 2004): pp. 41-43.
4. *Japan's Humanitarian Assistance*, edited and published by Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
5. "The general principles and values of humanitarian assistance derived from international humanitarian and human rights law, including the right of humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to non-combatants in situations of conflict, informed a set of guiding principles for humanitarian action developed by the Red Cross Movement, including the impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian assistance, and these remain a central foundation of today's international humanitarian system." Joanna Macrae, Sarah Collinson, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Nicola Reindorp, Anna Schmidt, Tasneem Mowjee and Adele Harmer, "Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action," *HPG Report 12* (December 2002): p. 52.
6. Humanitarian Aid Policy of Japan (provisional translation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2011.
7. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-donor-support-group>
8. Japan's contribution in 2016 amounted to CHF 41.2 million (ICRC Annual Report 2017, Vol. I, p. 69).
9. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=JP (Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries – Japan) & https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/vwLawsByCategorySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=JP (national implementation of IHL – Japan)
10. Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter3/c030106.html>
11. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr_ha/page23e_000466.html
12. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2286\(2016\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2286(2016)) & <https://www.un-emb-japan.go.jp/jp/statements/okamura092816.html>

Ms. Linh SCHROEDER was the head of the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Japan from 2015 to 2019. She joined the ICRC in 1997, starting in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Colombia. She then worked at ICRC headquarters from 2005 to 2008 as the Deputy Head of Operations for the Eastern Europe Region, before returning to the field, where she coordinated the evacuation, by the ICRC, of wounded and sick persons from the LTTE to government-held areas throughout the last year of the conflict in Sri Lanka. Ms. Schroeder was promoted to Head of Delegation in 2010, representing the ICRC for 11 countries in the South Pacific, then directing the ICRC in Chad in 2012–14. She holds a BA in international relations and an LLM in international law.

Chapter 5 International Peace Cooperation

5- I. Politics and Dynamics of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Masayasu Tsuzuki

1. Need for International Cooperation

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are mandated by the Security Council to provide a country in a post-conflict situation with support for laying the foundation for sustainable peace. Although the idea of deploying some interim UN force for monitoring a ceasefire upon the request from the parties to the conflict was originally invented at the General Assembly (the deployment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956)¹, the deployment of PKOs has come to be recognized as one of the most frequently used policy tools of the Security Council. The Security Council intends to encourage the parties to the conflict to commit to the peace process. The UN PKO is a kind of “stick and carrot” approach taken by the Security Council through two basic functions as below.

The first is preventing the recurrence of armed conflicts with the presence of UN military and police personnel. In recent years, such military and police presence, although not comfortable for the host state authority, has increasingly been expected to protect the local populations as well as all deployed UN personnel. The second is supporting the efforts of the state authority to strengthen its governance capabilities. The role is taken by the UN civilian presence, and also by the UN military presence. The process is sometimes called peacebuilding.

There is an inevitable aspect of a political nature in the UN PKOs: each UN member state seeks to gain maximum benefit with minimum costs through the PKOs. At the same time, the need for international cooperation for sustaining peace in all corners of the world has come to be shared universally.

How is the UN peacekeeping operation managed? Pursuant to the UN Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the member states agree to accept and carry out the decision (UN Charter Article 24–25). However, the reality is different: the UN Secretariat needs to mobilize the finances and personnel from the member states for the deployment of each UN PKO based on the decisions of the Security Council.

The UN PKO thus rests on “a global partnership.” Currently, fourteen UN peacekeeping missions are deployed on four continents: seven missions in Africa, six in Eurasia, and one in Latin America. The whole budget for 2018–2019 amounts to approximately USD 6.69 billion. The uniformed (military and police) personnel is deployed from 128 UN member states.² It means that 66.32% of the UN member states provide uniformed personnel to the UN PKOs on a voluntary basis. In terms of financing the operations, pursuant to the UN Charter (Article 17), all UN member states are legally obligated to pay their respective share to the UN PKO based on a special scale of assessment, taking into account the relative economic wealth of each member state, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The unique strength of the UN PKO is worth noting. Regional/sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have come to conduct peacekeeping operations. The UN missions are different from such regional efforts on account of its ultimate legitimacy (based on the mandate by the UN Security Council) and burden sharing mechanism among the 193 member states as explained above. Some African states prefer “re-hatting” of their regional missions to UN Peacekeeping missions.

2. Japan's Engagement

Japan has not deployed infantry units of its Self Defense Forces (SDFs) to UN Peacekeeping thus far. However, Japan has accumulated plenty of experience of deploying engineering units of the SDF to UN PKOs in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and South Sudan, and helped them rebuild social infrastructures.

While Japan falls 113th among the 124 troop contributing countries in terms of the number of troop deployments³, it has been the second largest financial contributor to PKOs for two decades (1995 to 2015), even under the expanding budget⁴.

Such contributions have been highly appreciated by the UN member states, including the host countries. They also helped Japan consolidate its political basis in the UN system. Japan is the most elected UN member state to the non-permanent membership of the Security Council to date.

3. Challenges Ahead

In recent years, top uniformed personnel contributors have come from Africa and South Asia, namely, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan. Troop/police contributing countries receive a monthly reimbursement of USD 1,410 for contingent personnel. Such reimbursements are not the only reason for the contribution of uniformed personnel. According to Jean-Marie Guehenno, former Under Secretary-General of the UN in charge of the PKOs, in recent years, neighboring countries to a given conflict have increasingly volunteered to provide their uniformed personnel, because of their strong interest in the situation. For example, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya have deployed in the UN-supported African Union mission in Somalia (UNISOM). The UN Interim Force in Abyei (UNISFA), whose uniformed personnel contributing country is Ethiopia only, is another case in point. In such situations, the peacekeepers from these neighboring countries have incentive to take greater military risk in accordance with their political objectives. The situation is different from the classical assumption that “traditionally, peacekeepers have been provided by countries that did not have a national stake in the conflict, and thus had little incentive to join any fighting.”⁵

Despite their strong political incentive, regional UN peacekeepers have often not been sufficiently trained and equipped. That is one of the reasons why UN peacekeepers have frequently been challenged by some local armed groups in recent years. The “Cruz Report,” published in December 2017, effectively depicts the new reality of UN peacekeeping. The year 2017 is deemed the most dangerous year for UN Peacekeepers, after a steady trend of increasing attacks on the peacekeepers over the last five years. In March of the same year, Japan decided on the withdrawal of its engineering units from the peacekeeping mission deployed in South Sudan (UNMISS). In response to the situation, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres commissioned former UN Force Commander Dos Santos Cruz of Brazil to examine what measures could be taken to limit the risks to UN Peacekeepers. The resulting “Cruz Report” stresses a fundamental shift from classical assumptions of UN peacekeeping toward a more “proactive posture” requiring that UN peacekeepers use “overwhelming force” in the face of hostile actions. The Report states that “the blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer ‘natural’ protection.”⁶

What implication does such a new reality have for Japan's international cooperation policies? The new reality does not indicate the end of Japan's contribution to the UN PKOs, but it rather expands new frontiers. Japan has already started capacity-building programs for the African and Asian peacekeepers in the field of engineering, medicine, and signals.⁷ Japan has also studied the possibility of providing mobility assets to the UN PKOs.⁸ Japan's proactive contributions to the UN PKOs can evolve further.

Notes

1 UNEF I was deployed mainly in the Sinai Peninsula to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed

forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.

- 2 UN Department of Public Information, "Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet" (31 August 2018).
- 3 UN Department of Public Information, "Summary of Troop Contributing Countries by Ranking Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Troop" (31 December 2018).
- 4 Global Policy Forum, "Debt of 15 Largest Payers to the Peacekeeping Budget 1995-," UN Document (A/RES/49/19 B, 23 December 1994) and UN Document (A/RES/70/245, 23 December 2015).
- 5 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Peacekeepers Shouldn't Always be Peaceful," *Foreign Policy*, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/19/peacekeepers-shouldnt-always-be-peaceful/>> (April 19, 2018).
- 6 "Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business," <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf> (December 2017).
- 7 Statement by Mr. Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the High-Level Event on Action for Peacekeeping, September 25, 2018.
- 8 Statement by His Excellency, Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Second Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping at the Second Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping, September 29, 2015.

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Chapter 5 International Peace Cooperation

5-II. Unresolved and Unexplored Questions of Dispatching the Japan Self Defense Forces

Nagafumi Nakamura

1. Need for International Cooperation

After World War II, the United Nations (UN) was established mainly to maintain international peace and security. Under the UN system, there were two exceptions to the principle of the non-use of force: collective security and self-defense. Collective security was expected to function as the main UN instrument for promoting and underwriting international security.

There turned out to be many inconsistencies between the theory of collective security as written in the Charter of the UN and its practice in the real world of international politics.¹ From the beginning, the Cold War prevented the UN Security Council (UNSC) from achieving collective security. Faced with the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the UNSC failed to react to the threat of international peace and security in a coordinated manner. Against this backdrop, Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) emerged as a new form of international activity. In the Cold War era, the UN dispatched nearly 20 PKOs and met with certain success. PKOs have gradually been regarded as the second-best substitute for a non-obtainable collective security system.

The end of the Cold War revitalized the UNSC. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UNSC authorized the dispatch of coalition forces (Gulf War). Coalition forces are different from the UN Forces envisaged by the UN Charter in that each troop contributing country, not the UN, has the right of command over their troops. This form of maintaining international peace and security has gradually become mainstream. We can say that today, the UN system has two important alternatives for the UN Forces: Coalition Forces and PKOs.

2. Japan's Engagement

The Gulf War ignited debates regarding the overseas deployment of the Self Defense Forces (SDFs) in Japan. The United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill tabled in 1990 to enable the SDF's participation in certain Coalition Forces and PKOs, induced by the Gulf War, did not pass the Japanese Diet. In the interim, the Japanese public's attitudes gradually started to shift to support the SDF's deployment abroad. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Bill to enable the SDF's participation in PKOs passed the Diet in 1992. In 2013, the government commissioned an Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security² and based on its report (2014) the Security-related Legislation (2015)³ was enacted as a perpetual law. It permitted the use of weapons in executing missions and providing emergency protection, suggesting a modest shift in the Japanese government's attitude towards more active involvement of SDFs in certain operations.

2.1. Coalition Forces

Regarding whether the SDF can be sent to join coalition forces, one school maintains that it is permissible. This school is divided into two positions: one states that the SDF can participate in coalition forces, and the other that the SDF can only cooperate with coalition forces through such activities as provision of logistical support, without engaging in combat. The other school argues that neither participation nor cooperation is permissible, as they would contravene Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The current Japanese government's view is that only cooperation with coalition forces is permissible. The 2014 Advisory Panel report argued that participation was permissible, but the Cabinet refrained from making any decision on this point, and this issue was not referred to in the debate on the

Security-related Legislation (2015) at the Diet either.

2.2. PKOs

Regarding whether the SDF can be sent to join PKOs, one school maintains that it is permissible. The other school argues that it is not, as it would contravene Article 9, and still questions the legality of the 1992 PKO Act. The former school is divided into two positions: one states that the SDF can be deployed to all PKOs including robust PKOs (whose mandate includes the use of force to protect its mandate), and the other maintains that the SDF can only participate in conventional PKOs (whose mandate is limited to monitoring). The current Japanese government's view is that the SDF can only participate in conventional PKOs under the "five principles."⁴ The 2014 Advisory Panel report proposed to revise the "five principles" so that the "consent of major parties involved in conflict" rather than "consent of all parties" would be required for the deployment of troops, as in the case of the current UN PKOs. However, as in the case of the coalition forces, the Cabinet did not make any decision on this point, and this issue was not referred to in the debate on the 2015 Security-related Legislation.

3. Challenges Ahead

Let us give names to the two schools above: "the willing" to those who believe the SDF should do more abroad, and "the reluctant" for those who believe it is enough or more than enough. While the debates between the two are still ongoing, I would like to discuss unsolved and unexplored questions by focusing on what appears to be most important in each category.⁵

3.1. An Unresolved Question

"The willing" and "the reluctant" are divided based on their interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. It appears there are different traumas behind each position.

For the willing, "the trauma of the Gulf War" is to have had provided USD 13 billion by raising taxes to support the coalition forces, but not to have been mentioned in the advertisement by the Kuwaiti government to thank the world after the war, lacking in a visible contribution such as the SDF dispatch.

For the reluctant, "the trauma of war of invasion" is to revoke invasive actions by the pre-WWII Japanese military forces if Japanese troops are deployed, alarming neighboring countries, and is based on concerns partly against some revivalist remarks appearing to deny the responsibility for the military actions mentioned above.

While the idea that "something needs to be done" for international co-operation is shared between the two schools, the conclusion regarding "what is to be done" differs. This point, left somewhat unresolved for a quarter of a century, could be resolved through a more substantial dialogue between the two schools, aiming to wipe out the traumas of each other.

3.2. An Unexplored Question

The discussion of policy effects seems to have been absent in the views of both schools. If one is to support the active deployment of the SDF to missions abroad, an assessment to expect enough policy effects should be presented as its basis. As policy effects of coalition forces and PKOs are in general not self-evident, and this assessment is not easy. Experts are concerned about to what degree policy effects can be expected, and the reality is that the assessment is a product of trial and error.⁶

Discussions on policy effects seem to have hardly taken place in Japan for the past quarter of a century and it appears that policy effects have been dealt with as if they were obvious. Furthermore, "the willing" have not fully engaged with the possibility of not deploying the SDF, nor have they presented an assessment of the policy effects of SDF deployment. As for "the reluctant," once the SDF is deployed, they rarely try to engage with "the willing" by questioning policy effects, giving the impression that they have given up on their stance. It is about time we engaged with discussions on this unexplored point.

Notes

- 1 Ramesh Thakur, "Reconfiguring the UN System of Collective Security," In Marc Weller (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law*, Oxford University Press, 2015: pp. 182-185.
- 2 The Panel (Chairperson: Shunji Yanai; Deputy Chairperson: Shinichi Kitaoka) was convened under the Prime Minister in 2013.
- 3 The Legislation consists of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security (Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community) and the newly enacted International Peace Support Act.
- 4 The "Five Principles" set out the legal conditions for Japan's participation in PKOs ((1) Agreement to a cease-fire shall have been reached; (2) consent shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to the armed conflict; (3) the operations shall maintain impartiality; (4) should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned principles cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw; and (5) the use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel etc.).
- 5 Nagafumi Nakamura, "*Heiwa-iji, Heiwa-kochiku wo meguru Ronso no Kozu*" (Debate on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Japan). In Sato Shiro, Kawana Shinji, Kamino Tomoya and Saitou Kousuke (eds.), *Nihon Gaiko no Ronten (Japan's Contemporary Diplomacy: Issues and Debates)*, Horitsu bunka sha, 2018: pp. 120-124.
- 6 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, 2006; Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*, Princeton University Press, 2008; Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, *Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions: A Typology of Success and Failure in International Interventions*, Routledge, 2017.

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Chapter 6 Cyber Security

6-I. Approaches, Structures, and Risks in Cyberspace

Hidetoshi Ogawa

1. Need for International Cooperation

The invention of the Internet half a century ago has created an invisible world around us: cyberspace. Unlike physical space, cyberspace is born as borderless, which may blur or make more difficult a sovereign state's jurisdiction. Japan and like-minded states believe that the existing international laws, the UN Charter, conventions, and treaties, as well as customary laws are also applicable to cyberspace. To put this into practice, it is necessary to clarify these international laws for use in the cyber-age, and to agree upon concrete interpretations or some kind of a voluntary code of conduct. In the United Nations or in other fora, these are called "norms." Establishing norms is not an easy job. Cyberspace is in a sense reflecting, or influenced by, the difference in the political ideology, or in the national system of each state, especially when it comes to laws and rules. What all can agree on is that there should be an appropriate minimum consensus not to make cyberspace a lawless wasteland. Furthermore, the fundamentals of Internet technology are unchanged since its naissance, which seem to be based on people's goodwill. They tend to be vulnerable to malicious attacks if we do not have common international understanding and technological self-defense measures.

Besides the seamlessness of cyberspace and the need for cyber-adapted rules, we should also focus on the gaps of cyber security capacity, maturity, and preparedness among states due to technological or financial constraints or those in human resources. Such gaps often cause what is called a "digital divide" on an individual basis, as well as in the international context. We need to bridge the gaps. As we are interconnected in one cyberspace much more than before, we should cooperate to raise the world's baseline for better security, not only for the beneficiary states but also for ourselves and all of cyberspace.

2. Japan's Engagement

Against the above background, Japan sets its cyber diplomacy with the following three main pillars, utilizing various channels and international frameworks, both bilateral and multilateral.

(1) Promotion of the Rule of Law in Cyberspace

Promoting discussions on the application of international law to cyberspace and the development of non-binding norms in peacetime.

(2) Development of Confidence-Building Measures

Build confidence among all parties in peacetime to prevent cyber conflicts.

(3) Cooperation on Capacity Building

Conducting capacity building and providing assistance for human resource development to countries in need, since security holes in any connected party are risk factors for the entire world, including Japan.

Below are the main government-to-government structures with which Japan has been engaged.

(a) Bilateral: Partnerships and dialogues with other countries

- As of 2018, Japan has conducted bilateral dialogues on cyberspace with 11 countries (the US, Australia, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, India, ROK, Israel, Estonia, and the Ukraine).

- Japan also holds dialogues on cyberspace with the EU and ASEAN, as well as within the Japan-China-ROK and Japan-US-ROK trilateral frameworks.

(b) Multilateral: Major global/regional frameworks

-United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE): Governmental cyber experts from different countries discuss issues such as the rule of law and confidence building in cyberspace within the framework of the UN. Since 2004, five sessions have been held.

- G7 (Summit Meeting and Foreign Ministers' Meeting): The G7 leaders decided to establish a new working group on cyberspace at the Ise-Shima Summit, hosted by Japan in 2016.

- G20: Cyberspace has been discussed at several G20 meetings mainly in the context of the digital economy. In November 2015, cyber security aspects were for the first time mentioned in the G20 Leaders' Communiqué of the Antalya Summit.

- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): The forum has held workshops on cyberspace and in 2017 established a new Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information Communications Technologies (ARF-ISM on ICTs Security).

- Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS) (also called the London Process): Held since 2011 where governments at Ministerial levels and a wider cyber community comprehensively discuss various issues on cyberspace.

There are many other international/regional initiatives in those settings, including the OECD and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation).

From the viewpoint of substantial day-to-day cooperation on concrete information exchanges among experts (not necessarily government officials but including them), national or major CERTs' (Computer Emergency Response Teams) or CSIRTs' (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) cooperation is noteworthy, such as IWWN (Internet Watch and Warning Network) and FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).

It should be noted that the Japanese government strongly upholds the value and the need for a multi-stakeholder approach, involving the private sector, business communities, NGOs, and academia. Such an approach is not limited to discussions in a framework such as the WEF (World Economic Forum), but has been employed in many of the structures mentioned above. The so-called track 1.5 dialogues, where retired diplomats and uniformed officers are often involved, have also proved as useful tools to promote undertakings under the above-mentioned three pillars.

3. Challenges Ahead

The challenges in cyber security is the reverse side of the same coin of the rapid advancement of ICT (Information and Communication Technology), which changes our daily lives and all of society. With the revolutionary high speed and broad coverage of the Internet, we are now entering a new era where everything (human beings, things, services) is always connected, interacting and generating innovative values, higher productivity, as well as more practical and effective lives. The last factor should speak to a pressing human need in the extreme aging society that we will soon face. Let us take an example from the "autonomous car (driverless car)." According to specialists, we would have a "level 5 (ultimate) literally driverless car" within a decade, widely deployed and incorporated in society in the following decade. If all the autonomous car systems are run as normal, this is safer than a skilled human driver, who is still not 100% immunized from any kind of human error or sudden illness. On the other hand, what happens if the unmanned car runs out of control in the midst of a crowd because of an unintended bug or malicious hacking?

In such a future society where the real world and cyberspace are seamlessly fused, its blessing is celestial but the possible risks and damages are also colossal (cf. the theft or leakage of tons of paper-equivalent sensitive information within a second becomes realistic in a highly connected society. AI dominance could undermine privacy or influence the democratic system. Quantum computing may break widely used cryptography in current financial transactions, etc.). We should also be aware that the cadence of technological development becomes even faster, and this is not monopolized only by good people: adversaries, criminals, and enemy entities can also use them for their own malicious objectives.

Further ICT developments and a changing society are inevitable postulates, or more positively, indispensable for our brighter future. However, to secure its safety and security for the benefit of all, we should internally double our efforts, cooperation, and coordination among various stakeholders, nationally and internationally. This is the cause and the background of 1 and 2 above.

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Chapter 6 Cyber Security

6-II. Cyber-attacks and National Security

Jun Osawa

1. Need for International Cooperation

Information technology and digital infrastructure play an important role both in national security and economic activities and in our daily lives. It is not only military operations, but also our daily economic and social lives that depend on the cyber domain, from smart phones in our hands to billions of dollars of financial transactions. Thus, cyberspace has become a necessary domain for national security, and cyber security has become a top priority in national and international security.

Over the last ten years, some states have been using cyberspace as a place to achieve strategic goals and express their intentions. That began in 2007 with the cyber-attacks against the Baltic States in pursuit of national interests. In cyberspace, state-to-state conflicts in a realist world reemerge with intensity. The risks of state-sponsored cyber-attacks with the intent to steal classified information, disrupt critical infrastructure, obstruct military systems, and intervene in democratic processes are becoming more serious.

It is difficult for an individual state to defend itself against sophisticated state-sponsored cyber-attacks with its own defensive measures alone. Therefore, NATO has introduced a “collective cyber defense” strategy to protect its member states from large-scale cyber-attacks, declaring that a cyber-attack can trigger NATO’s Article 5.

Another model of international cooperation in the cyber arena is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a non-government entity, operating several databases to solve the problem of Internet routing and coordinating Internet procedures. ICANN embraces a multi-stakeholder approach to operate the organization because of the severe struggle between developed and developing countries fighting over the style of Internet governance.

2. Japan’s Engagement

In Japan, a large-scale targeted attack (advanced persistent threat: APT) aimed at stealing information from the House of Representatives, government institutions, and the defense industry came to light in 2011. Similar attacks with the objective of stealing information are believed to have taken place since around 2005. In May 2015, a targeted cyber-attack took place, aimed at the personal information possessed by the Japan Pension Service (JPS).

In addition to targeted attacks with the objective of stealing classified information, signs of attacks designed to paralyze the control systems of vital social infrastructure have begun to appear in recent years. They have been based on the realization that successful attacks on electrical grids, transportation facilities, and industrial sites would have an adverse impact on people’s lives.

Moreover, as a new phenomenon in the recent trend of cyber-attacks, manipulative cyber-attacks (information warfare) aimed at information manipulation within other states are taking place. This cyber manipulation attack, such as distributing “fake news,” sowing confusion through cyber-attacks with proxies, and releasing stolen confidential information, have a significant impact on our democratic processes.

Thus, detecting and preventing state-sponsored cyber-attacks has become the top cyber defense priority in the center of the government. Up until now, the national response to cyber-attacks has focused on passive cyber-defense, such as securing cyber-security and the protection of critical infrastructure. These measures of passive defense are now insufficient.

In the new cyber strategy of 2018, the Government of Japan decided to promote the policy of “Proactive Cyber Defense” that ensures that the government implements active preventive measures against threats in advance.

Adding to a single national effort, Japan and the United States are reported to be considering various measures, including the application of Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty for cyber-attacks. Japan will take a strategic approach of strengthening cyber security by means of promoting comprehensive measures to defend cyberspace, strengthen its response capability against cyber-attacks, and enhance public-private partnerships and international coordination.

3. Challenges Ahead

It is apparent that there have recently been three changes in the nature of cyber-attacks: a transition from non-targeted to targeted attacks designed to steal classified information, the commencement of concerted cyber-attacks targeting control systems of infrastructure providers, and a new phenomenon of undermining or manipulating public opinion in democratic countries by means of propaganda in cyber media, fake news on social network services, or by betraying secrets on the Web.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned in a speech to business executives in October 2012 that a “cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states and violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11,” and that “the collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor.”

There are symptoms of the new serious crisis that threatens the democratic institution. New phenomena of undermining or manipulating public opinion in democratic countries have become serious. Attackers use propaganda in cyber media, fake news, or by betraying secrets.

In order to stop potential state adversaries from conducting cyber-attacks on our national interests, like-minded countries have to employ new international cooperation as below.

- 1) To make good use of diplomatic pressure, like-minded countries have to promote norms of state behavior in cyberspace, such as to refrain from cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain, not to attack critical infrastructure, and not to interfere in internal affairs by means of cyber manipulation.
- 2) In order to protect cyberspace, early detection of cyber-attacks is essential and warnings must be shared without delay among like-minded countries. Like-minded countries should make effective use of classified meetings to exchange views on cyber threat situation awareness and potential cyber adversaries.
- 3) Immediate introduction of a joint database of cyber-attacks or an automated cyber indicator sharing system is desirable.

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Chapter 7 Environmental Management and Climate Change

Ichiro Adachi

1. Need for International Cooperation

During the rapid industrial economic development period of the 1960s and 1970s, many environmental problems occurred in the industrial countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. In this situation, some important reports were published. "Silent Spring" by Rachel Carson in 1962 alerted a large audience to the environmental and human dangers of the indiscriminate use of pesticides, spurring revolutionary changes in the laws affecting our air, land, and water. "Tragedy of Commons" by Garrett Hardin in 1968 argued strongly that: "The most important aspect of necessity that we must now recognize, is the necessity of abandoning the commons in breeding. No technical solution can rescue us from the misery of over population. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all."

Through these alerts increasing citizens' concerns, the environmental problem became strongly highlighted in the global community. In 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment met and issued the Stockholm Declaration, which was the first stock-taking of the global human impact on the environment, and an attempt at forging a basic common outlook on how to address the challenge of preserving and enhancing the human environment. The term "sustainable development" became popularly accepted through the report "Our Common Future" issued in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED),¹ supported by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The report defined the concept of "sustainable development" as "development which is carried out to satisfy the needs of the present generation in such ways that it does not undermine the capability to fulfill the needs of the future generations." It includes the qualitative improvement of living conditions as well as quantitative economic expansion and stressed the need for close considerations for a variety of factors, including the distribution of income, education, health, clean air and water, and the protection of nature's beauty. The world community has gradually confirmed the concept and the essence of the report. However, despite these efforts, the global environmental situation has still faced difficulties, such as the destruction of the ozone layer, climate change, illegal dumping of waste, and so forth.

In 1992, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 178 states adopted the "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development" and Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action to build a global partnership for sustainable development to improve human lives and protect the environment.² In 2000, member states unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration at the Millennium Summit, which led to the elaboration of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). One of the goals was to ensure environmental sustainability.

Twenty years later in 2012, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), member states adopted "The Future We Want" to launch a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals to build upon the MDGs and to establish the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. In 2013, the General Assembly established a 30-member Open Working Group³ to develop a proposal on the SDGs. In 2015, the UN Sustainable Development Summit was held and set the SDGs; the year 2015 is said to have been a landmark year for multilateralism and international policy shaping.

The environmental discourse has thus been reframed in more constructive or reformist language. At the same time, the most difficult subject in each meeting has been how developed and developing countries would work together. From the first Rio Summit, a concept of "common but differentiated responsibility" was developed and confirmed as an important principle for tackling the environmental problem. The developing countries strongly argued that the developed countries had caused actual environmental problems such as climate change. Through the above conferences, principles have emerged to engage the developed countries in international cooperation activities.

2. Japan's Engagement

In the period of rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and 1960s, the highest priority was placed on expanding the economy; it was a societal goal that united the Japanese people. The government as well as business enterprises pursued economic efficiency. There was not much of an awareness about the environmental pollution created through productive activities, and hardly any consciousness existed about devising and implementing preventive measures unless some mandatory controls were put in place. The notorious four diseases, Minamata disease, Niigata Minamata Disease, Yokkaichi Asthma, and Itai-itai Disease, are all cases of industrial pollution.

The "Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control" was enacted in 1967 to define the scope of environmental pollution that must be addressed by the government, and to clarify the responsibilities of the national government, local governments, and business enterprises. With the development of such legal and administrative frameworks, various types of measures against environmental pollution were drawn up, strengthened, and improved in a systematic manner. While Japan's postwar economic recovery is referred to as a "miracle," overcoming severe pollution problems in a short period of time without negatively impacting business operations and the entire national economy is evaluated as "another miracle of Japan." Enterprises' investment and technological development derived energy conservation and structural change and supported environmental protection. Pollution prevention has been promoted not merely as part of the natural course of economic activities, but also by governmental policies based on long-term strategic planning and the enforcement of regulations, such as financial incentive support and the establishment of markets that accept low-pollution products. Thus, a positive attitude by businesses towards pollution prevention has stimulated the power of the market economy, and growth has been attained while the social economic mechanism was moving towards environmental preservation.

The increase and concentration of population, especially in urban areas, affected the living environments in developing countries. Developed countries were called to extend support to countries where environmental measures had been neglected in the past. Japan's first policy on environmental development assistance was announced at the Arche Summit meeting of the G7 in 1989, and was accomplished over a short period of two years before 1990. Japan has since extended environmental ODA.

At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, Japan declared that it would increase its environmental ODA from FY 1992 to an amount between JPY 900 billion and JPY 1 trillion (USD8.3-9.2 billion). As a result, in the five years from FY 1992 to FY 1996, Japan's environmental ODA has grown to JPY 1.44 trillion (USD13.3 billion), which exceeded the target by more than 40 percent. Since then, Japan continued to strengthen its efforts in environmental cooperation, mainly through its ODA programs. From 2012 to 2016, an average amount of around USD 7.9 million a year was spent as ODA.⁴

3. Challenges Ahead

It is said that the most urgent task today is to persuade all countries of the need to return to multilateralism. The challenge of achieving SDGs should renew the search for multilateral solutions, and consideration should be given to restructuring the international economic system of cooperation. These challenges cut across the divides of national sovereignty, of limited strategies for economic gain, and of separated disciplines of science.

In the 1960s and 1970s, pollution was the most important issue between the polluter and civil society, meaning that there was some conflict between the industrial society and the lives of each human being. After that, ecological modernization theory was developed, and integrated the industry into an environmentally friendly society, even though some problems still remain. Today, our society faces more complicated and challenging difficulties in this field. The essence of environmental problems comes from the relationship between each human activity. Climate change is a case in point that should be tackled by all of human society.

The spirit and essence of WCED thirty years ago has been inherited in the SDGs. Going forward, we should learn from the history of environmental policy development. In this context, regional cooperation among each country is all the more important. The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has since 1977 cooperated closely

in promoting environmental causes among its Member States. Through these kinds of platforms, more practical and enforceable cooperation and activities are required in Asian countries.

Notes

- 1 In 1983, WCED was established by the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The report is refer to following HP. (<http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm>)
- 2 In 1983, WCED was established by the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The report is refer to following HP. (<http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm>)
- 3 The Open Working Group was established in 2013 by the decision of the General Assembly. The Member States have decided to use an innovative, constituency-based system of representation that is new to limited membership bodies of the General Assembly.
- 4 <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000409536.pdf>

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Chapter 8 Good Governance

Hiroaki Shiga

1. Need for International Cooperation

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the world witnessed an unprecedented wave of regime changes. Almost all socialist regimes in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe collapsed. In Africa and Latin America, many authoritarian regimes crumbled. These countries faced the multiple challenge of building a democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy, all of which came to be regarded as universal values in the post-Cold War world. It was a daunting challenge, since they had to build these institutions simultaneously in a short period of time. Even worse, the task had to be implemented in an inherently hostile environment of ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity, and economic, political, and social instability. Faced with this situation, the international community embarked on the project of aiding those countries tackling historic challenges.

It was against this background that the concept of “good governance” emerged as a new orthodoxy that dominated Western aid policy and development discourse. The notion of good governance is notoriously difficult to define. It has been said to encompass a transparent, accountable, efficient, and effective public sector, respect for human rights, the rule of law, effective participation and the political empowerment of people, and democracy. International organizations such as the World Bank places emphasis on the apolitical elements of good governance, such as effective and efficient bureaucracy, while Western states such as the United States adopt political definitions of good governance that are identical to liberal democracy. Whatever the case, the core argument shared in the international community is that good governance is an essential condition for development in all societies. It is argued that whether a state can effectively provide people with healthcare, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice, and personal security hinges upon the establishment of good governance in the country.

2. Japan’s Engagement

Japan has been said to be as an “outlier” among Western donors because of its unique aid norms and practices of emphasizing economic development through infrastructure building and the capacity development of people. It sought to assist the “self-help” efforts of developing countries, and to avoid being entangled in the domestic political affairs of recipients.

However, after the end of the Cold War, Japan was expected to demonstrate its commitment to universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy. In response, the Japanese government showed its commitment to these values in the ODA Charter newly adopted in 1992, and pledged to provide ODA to help ensure good governance in developing countries. Japan’s commitment towards a good governance agenda is reiterated in the revised Charters of 2003 and of 2015.

In providing ODA to enhance the good governance of developing countries, Japan adopts an apolitical definition of the concept similar to that of the World Bank. In terms of the promotion of democracy, Japan cautiously eschews being involved in the domestic politics of recipient countries. Instead, Japan provides technical assistance for the capacity building of government officials in charge of the implementation of democratic practices, such as regular, fair, and uncorrupted elections. Japan’s apolitical approach to the good governance agenda is also illustrated in its ODA to promote the rule of law, one of the core elements of good governance. Japan concentrates its efforts to promote the rule of law in the private law domain, mainly by assisting in the drafting of private laws (such as civil codes or civil procedural laws). Its aim is to provide a level playing field for private actors by introducing unequivocal and fair “rule of games” of economic activities, and thus to facilitate the smooth functioning of the market mechanism. Reflecting its own experience of adopting foreign laws, Japan’s ODA in this field is characterized by its due respect

for the ownership of recipients. It seeks to establish legal institutions based on the historical and cultural uniqueness of recipients, and to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach to impose Western legal institutions. Moreover, Japan is active in the capacity development of legal professionals, such as judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.

3. Challenges Ahead

Despite the concerted effort of Western donors to facilitate good governance in developing countries, the overall picture of its achievement turns out to be rather discouraging. Many reforms failed, and some countries experienced the resurgence of undemocratic, unaccountable, ineffective, and corrupt regimes. Human rights violations, violent conflicts, and civil wars are still rampant in many countries.

Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community found itself faced with new challenges. It was to deal with the “fragile states” that frequently became the epicenters of regional and global instability by harboring terrorists and by sending out massive waves of emigrants. It was also to push back the worldwide trend of the resurgence of authoritarian regimes. In order to cope with these challenges, it is required that we renew our commitment and reinvigorate efforts to enhance good governance in developing countries. The challenge for Japan is to bear the responsibility of joining concerted international efforts to promote good governance, with its unique approach to pay due respect to the ownership of the people of developing countries to pursue their *own* version of good governance.

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Chapter 9 Protection and Solutions for Refugees

Dirk Hebecker

1. Need for International Cooperation

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is mandated by the UN General Assembly to assist governments in the reception and protection of refugees and to find durable solutions for refugee situations worldwide. When the agency was created 68 years ago, it was only meant to help post-war Europe solve its refugee problems. Soon enough, conflicts erupted in Europe and beyond that caused new refugee flows. In 1967, UNHCR's mandate was amended to cover refugee situations all over the world. Since then, UNHCR has been leading the international response to massive humanitarian crises in Africa, the Middle East and Central/South Asia, South-East Asia, Central America, and Eastern Europe. Hundreds of millions of refugees and other displaced people were assisted during their exile and then helped to return home, integrated in asylum countries, or resettled in third countries.

In today's global world, global issues need concerted international responses. The wealth gap between the global North and South necessitates the redistribution of resources. Economically healthy countries must show solidarity even when humanitarian crises unfold at a distance. It has also become clear that the response to refugee problems must include refugees themselves not as victims or mere recipients of international aid hand-outs, but as a resource, skilled human beings with the potential to contribute to local economies. This requires initial investments and inclusive policies, which, in turn, will pay off politically and socio-economically in the medium and long term, be it for the host communities or for the future of the refugees themselves when they are able to return to their own countries.

Countries that are geographically distant from the world's hot spots and refugee crises, as much as those directly and massively affected, cannot and must not shy away from taking part in responding to this global issue. Apart from sending much needed financial resources, technology, expertise, and in-kind aid, they can open up to receive at least modest numbers of refugees for resettlement or even for a limited period of time under humanitarian labor migration schemes or for education. Politically, they can also play a role in conflict prevention and resolution.

International cooperation takes different forms. Bilateral aid for humanitarian interventions or for development projects will benefit host communities and the refugees they welcome as much as the assistance provided to international aid organizations like the UNHCR. Such aid is provided by taxpayers, businesses, religious foundations, and charity organizations. It is thus essential for the recipients of such support to demonstrate that it is used properly and efficiently, benefiting refugees and their host communities in tangible, life-changing ways. Accountability by aid agencies and recipient countries to their donors increases the confidence that financial resources are managed with the highest level of integrity and will justify sustainable contributions in the future. New principles of humanitarian accountability were adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016. Much of the "Grand Bargain" has been done and more changes are being introduced to the functioning of the international refugee response to improve aid efficiency.¹

2. Japan's Engagement

Japan's engagement with global issues has, for many years, been formidable and manifold. In the area of global displacement, Japan has been and remains one of the most active and pro-active players, both politically and financially. Steady and predictable financial support from Japan is appreciated as non-political and purely humanitarian. For over a decade, Japan was UNHCR's second largest donor; after reductions in recent years, it now ranks fifth with over USD 115 million in voluntary financial contributions to the agency in 2018. The share of non-earmarked funding has been growing steadily. Every year, Japan sends a fair number of Japanese nationals to

UNHCR as junior professional officers; in addition, a few experts at mid-management or senior levels have also been deployed to various UNHCR operations in recent years. The longstanding collaboration between UNHCR and JICA has benefited refugees and their host communities in over a dozen countries where there are Japanese development projects focused on improving basic services and infrastructure.

Support of UNHCR's operations worldwide is not limited to government sources only. Some USD 30 million are mobilized from the private sector, public and religious foundations, and charities, as well as from the general public. UNHCR's national partner association, "Japan for UNHCR," counted over 100,000 committed monthly donors. The Japanese textile giant Fast Retailing known for its UNIQLO brand generously donates billions of Japanese Yen to UNHCR for education and livelihood support, and sends new and used clothes to refugees and other displaced people around the world.

The Japanese government also contributes to international refugee protection by accepting a small number of refugees, originating mainly from Myanmar, for resettlement. Since 2010, almost 200 refugees have been invited to settle and integrate in the country. This resettlement scheme is on track to expand in numbers and scope in the near future. In addition, as part of Japan's response to the refugee crisis in the Middle East, 300 young Syrian scholars, half of them refugees, have been invited to complete their graduate studies at Japanese universities under an exemplary scheme that has received international attention and appreciation.

3. Challenges Ahead

Asia is still one of the major regions plagued by refugee crises and displacement. The Afghanistan situation, now entering its fortieth year, has seen returns as well as fresh displacement, both external and internal, and remains the largest refugee crisis in the region to date. The protractedness of the situation paired with continuing political instability in Myanmar with its ethnic conflicts in the East and again more recently in Rakhine State has produced massive outflows of refugees to neighboring countries. The escape within weeks of over 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017 was dubbed one of the fastest growing refugee crises in recent history. With limited progress on stability and community reconciliation in Rakhine State, prospects for the speedy return of the Rohingya are slim. Internal displacement also continues in Myanmar, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Asia is also home to a considerable number of refugees from Africa and the Middle East.

An important challenge in Asia is that only a few countries acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention, though some of these non-signatory states have permitted refugees to enter and seek protection. Another challenge on the continent is the prevalence of statelessness.

In other parts of the world, nationalist and populist political movements have intensified their anti-refugee rhetoric; some countries have even restricted refugee admission despite their international obligations.

Resourcing the international refugee protection response remains challenging. As the agency depends almost entirely on voluntary contributions, predictable funding is essential to the agency's operations and thus to the functioning of the international protection regime for refugees and other people of concern to UNHCR. Limited resources impact the lives of refugees very directly: when even basic standards of humanitarian assistance cannot be met because of funding shortages, children go hungry and miss out on education, and women are pushed into sexual exploitation. In 2018, only slightly over half of the USD 8.2 billion required by UNHCR to provide basic relief assistance was made available by the donor community. Some prominent refugee situations are relatively well funded, while others, especially protracted or "forgotten" ones, struggle to mobilize even a fraction of the needed funds.

The main burden of hosting refugees is, to a large degree, shouldered by countries who themselves struggle with poverty, underdevelopment, sub-standard basic services, and political instability. Over 90% of the world's refugees today are hosted in the developing world. Yet funding to support these countries' responses to their refugee problems is often insufficient. In 2016, an unprecedented summit of world leaders in New York addressed this, and, in a Declaration unanimously adopted by Member States, called for fairer responsibility sharing. UNHCR was tasked to formulate a Global Compact for Refugees to consolidate and strengthen international refugee protection and to

address resourcing, a stronger linkage between humanitarian and development interventions, new policy approaches, and practical measures to allow refugees to strive rather than just survive. This Compact, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2018, will have a lasting impact on the way the international community deals with refugees.²

Notes

- 1 (Grand Bargain)
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf
<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-0>
<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc>
- 2 (Global Compact on Refugees)
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028791>
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https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2018/181027_01.html
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<http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/>
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<https://www.icvanetwork.org/resources/global-compact-refugees-explained-icva-briefing-paper>
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https://www.jica.go.jp/english/low/news/field/2018/181027_01.html
<https://www.uniqlo.com/en/sustainability/refugees/unhcr/>

Mr. Dirk HEBECKER is the Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, in Japan, since May 2016. He started his UNHCR career in Vietnam, then worked in different capacities in Georgia, Albania, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and at Headquarters in Geneva. He became the UNHCR Representative in 2013 in the Republic of Korea. His academic majors are International Relations and South-East Asia Studies, including languages: English, Russian, French, and Vietnamese. His recent short-term deployment was to Bangladesh to deal with the Rohingya crisis.

Chapter 10 Gender Equality

Kae Ishikawa

1. Need for International Cooperation

Despite significant normative advances, progress for women and girls remains uneven and slow. No country has fully achieved gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2018 published by the World Economic Forum, it takes 108 years to close the global gender gap. The most challenging gender gaps to close are the economic and political empowerment dimensions, which will take 202 and 107 years to close respectively.¹ The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by world leaders in September 2015 describe the universal goals of the entire international community that both developed and developing countries should achieve together. Women's equality and empowerment is one of the 17 SDGs, but is also integral to all dimensions of inclusive and sustainable development. Realizing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls will make a crucial contribution to progress across all the Goals and targets. In short, all the SDGs depend on the achievement of Goal 5 and it can only be achieved through international cooperation (see Chapter 3-I).

2. Japan's Engagement

Japan is a vital partner in UN Women's mission to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women. UN Women and Japan work together in the areas of humanitarian action, "women, peace, and security", and preventing violent extremism in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, and the Arab States. Japan is also a Champion of UN Women's LEAP (Leadership, Access, Empowerment, and Protection in Crisis Response) Flagship Programme as part of its support of humanitarian action. Japan focuses on three priorities through its development cooperation: promoting of women's and girls' rights, improving an enabling environment for women and girls to reach their full potential, and advancing women's leadership in politics, the economy, and other public fields. Japan aims to expand the outcomes and maximize the effectiveness of development cooperation by incorporating gender perspectives into every area.²

3. Challenges Ahead

While Asia and the Pacific have made progress in some areas of gender equality, there remains significant inequality for women and girls. For instance, as many as one in two women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner in the last 12 months. Women and girls also spend as much as 11 times more of their day than men and boys on unpaid care and domestic work. Meanwhile, some countries in the region have the highest incidence of "missing women" in the world due to discriminatory practices that favor sons, while progress on reducing the maternal mortality rate has also been uneven. In terms of professional and economic opportunities, women in Asia and the Pacific have less access to financial services and productive assets, while girls are less likely than boys to be in organized learning before primary school. Asia and the Pacific are the only regions globally where the gender gap in labor force participation is increasing. Women also remain underrepresented in decision making and leadership roles, with fewer than one in five parliamentarians in Asia and the Pacific being women.³

Each country faces challenges in different ways. All the more, there is room for effective international cooperation. A seemingly paradoxical phenomenon is that in Asia, those countries with lower GDP such as the Philippines (8), Thailand (73), and Vietnam (77) tend to score higher in the Gender Gap Score than those with higher GDPs, such as China (103), Japan (110), and the ROK (115).⁴ This reveals that when it comes to gender equality, international cooperation needs to be mutual, and all countries need to learn from one another.

Notes

- 1 The Global Gender Gap Report 2018
- 2 <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/11/partner-profile-interview-with-taro-kono-japan>
- 3 Gender Equality and the Sustainable Development Goals in Asia and the Pacific Asia-Pacific, SDG Report Baseline and Pathways for Transformative Change by 2030
- 4 The Global Gender Gap Report, op.cit.

Ms. Kae ISHIKAWA brings approximately 20 years of experience in resource mobilization and partnership building at the headquarters, regional and country level in the United Nations system. Before joining UN Women, she was a resource mobilization specialist in UNFPA with one-year secondment to the Human Security Unit, Department of Management at the UN Secretariat. In her capacity as resource mobilization specialist in UNFPA, she was the donor focal point for Japan, as well as for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea. She also took detailed assignments in the UNFPA Sierra Leone Country Office as Assistant Representative a.i., as well as the UNFPA Asia and Pacific Regional Office as Resource Mobilization and Partnership Adviser. Prior to UNFPA, she worked for UNICEF as an Assistant Programme Officer to address the sexual exploitation of children and for the Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, as the gender and human rights advisor. Ms. Ishikawa holds a Master of International Human Rights Law from Kobe University in Japan.

Afterward by IPP

Hitotsubashi University was founded in 1875, seven years after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. The university's mission statement reads: "to create intellectual and cultural property which will contribute to the building of free and peaceful political and economic societies in Japan and the world and to nurture those who will assume positions of leadership." Since its establishment, it has produced many highly talented graduates who have been active not only in Japan but also internationally. In the 21st century, demand for specialized and practical skills has increased to ensure better formulation and implementation of international and public policies in national and local governments. The School of International and Public Policy (IPP) was established in 2005 to foster future leaders who can identify relevant public policy problems and find solutions to tackle them. IPP therefore finds itself well placed to take part in the JICA Development Studies Program (DSP).

This booklet is a compilation of a series of lectures primarily from the course *Japan Foreign Policy Making* placed under the Law and Political area of JICA DSP. It is intended to be of use to students of this course in the coming academic years and to be of reference to lecturers and students in a wider academic sphere in Japan under the DSP. The IPP hopes that this first issue will be well received and cause deliberation to serve the good cause of nourishing future leaders around the world, and provide a foundation, on which expertise and knowledge on training and learning at the JICA DSP will be accumulated and further developed.

February 2019

Nobumasa Akiyama

Dean

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February 2019
Misako Kaji

Ms. Misako KAJI is professor at School of International and Public Policy of Hitotsubashi University since 2017. Her previous responsibilities mostly in the Japanese foreign service include: Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Geneva; Senior Research Fellow at Institute for International Policy Studies (now Nakasone Peace Institute); Professor at Graduate School on Human Security of the University of Tokyo; Deputy Director General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Principal Deputy Chief of Protocol, Director for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Press Secretary to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi; Special Advisor to Ms. Sadako Ogata, UNHCR. Her other foreign postings were Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, and to the EU, Embassies of Japan in Vietnam and in the UK. She served as a member of the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) 2007-10, and of the Advisory Group on UN Peace Building Fund 2012-2017. She holds BA in Economics at the University of Tokyo and MA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford University.

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