ANNEX A: SUMMARIES OF COUNTRY STUDIES

Country Case Study – Burundi and Rwanda – By Peter Uvin
Structural Causes, Development Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda

This paper analyzes the relation between development aid and the structural causes of violent conflict. It does so through a case study of two countries, Burundi and Rwanda.

Many of the usually recognized structural causes are present in Burundi and Rwanda. These countries fit comfortably within most structure-based explanations: they are very poor, they had economic crises before the mass violence; they suffered from severe natural resource constraints; they were military dictatorships; and their populations comprised an enormous proportion of youth. But it became equally clear that structural factors alone explain little: what really matters is their interaction, and their specific content and context. Structure is a weak predictor of anything, and an even weaker tool for understanding a particular place. Structural analyses such as those dominant in much popular scholarship – reflected in many peace and conflict impact assessment tools – are at best superficial hints of reality, and at worst beside the point; actions solely based on these insights or tools are bound to be a waste of money. What is needed, then, is far more than an understanding of the mere structural factors – substantive and in-depth local knowledge is required.

In addition, structural causes do not change easily – that is why they are structural! For understanding, and especially for acting on violent conflict, 'conjunctural' and 'intermediary' political and social factors matter much more than structural ones do. Development aid then, to have an impact on violent conflict, will need to be based on an in-depth analysis of the context within which it works.

We observe that the international community does now deal, much more than before the 1990s, with root causes of violent conflict in Burundi and Rwanda. Many issues that are at the heart of the conflict nexus – ill governance, impunity, social polarization, unaccountable and inefficient security sectors – are now on the development agenda in Burundi and Rwanda, and tens of millions of dollars are spent each year in both countries on affecting these dynamics. In both countries, the post-conflict aims of the donors have been smart and broad; successes, both at the national and the local level have occurred, especially in those rare circumstances where visionary individuals met flexible donors; and lots of good thinking and writing has taken place. There is real progress here, and real learning has taken place in many of these sectors.

Still, there are enormous constraints on the capacity of the development system to achieve its aims. The aid community remains largely unimaginative, inflexible, politically impotent, crushed under bureaucratic and short-term pressures, and largely irrelevant to the crucial dynamics of socio-political change, of violence and peace, in both countries. It does not possess the knowledge and flexibility and political spine to achieve its aims. And, let's face it, these aims are tough and hard to achieve in any case.

Country Case Study – Democratic Republic of the Congo – By Seth Kaplan
The Wrong Prescription for the Congo

In October 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which experienced possibly the world's deadliest humanitarian catastrophe, held the second of two rounds of the first free presidential elections in 46 years. The culmination of a transitional process funded, designed and overseen by the West, the elections were supposed to bring stability, accountability and democracy to a land long devastated by war, poor administration and authoritarianism. Sadly, this brighter future is unlikely to be reached any time soon, for the transitional process is fatally flawed. A bold approach is needed to reform the DRC's governmental apparatus, the collapse of which not only affects its citizens, but also destabilizes states throughout the continent and provides a haven for terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks.

The country is roughly the same size as Western Europe, but its state has almost entirely withered away, leaving an increasingly despairing population to fend for themselves within a Hobbesian nightmare of chaos and violence. In the last decade alone, violence, disease and malnutrition have killed nearly four million, while armies, warlords and assorted gangs have pilfered hundreds of millions of dollars in gold, diamonds and coltan.

The scale of these problems has been magnified by DRC's tempting natural resources, vast size, disadvantageous political geography and meager infrastructure. There is a wealth of mineral deposits, including uranium, diamonds, copper, cobalt and coltan. But instead of acting as the country's economic engine, this natural resource base is fueling today's conflict. Another factor contributing to conflict is the deep geographical and political divisions that have led to outbreaks of violence between competing factions.

The DRC's collapse not only affects its citizens; it also destabilizes states throughout the continent, at least half a dozen of which have been drawn into its civil war in recent years, spawning Africa's first 'world war.'

The West has pumped billions of dollars into humanitarian programs and a large UN peacekeeping deployment, but it has not fully examined whether its strategy for the country will deal with the root causes of its dysfunction.

The current international effort to fix the DRC prescribes conventional remedies for failed states – elections, economic liberalization and security reforms – that are desirable, but none of which will make a significant difference unless coupled with an ambitious plan to counteract the systemic roots of the country's profound dysfunctionalities. If the DRC is to develop homegrown capacities that can eventually overcome the state's problems, the country's institutions must be redesigned so that they better reflect its political geography, limited governance capacities, dearth of infrastructure and abundant mineral wealth. Above all, this means giving local leaders a genuine chance to effectively serve the population.

Country Case Study – Mozambique – By Joseph Hanlon
"The war ended 15 years ago, but we are still poor."

One million people died in Mozambique's 1981-92 war, and one-third of the population had to flee their homes. After that war, there was an intense feeling of 'never again – everything must be done to avoid violence.' But 15 years later, there has been a subtle mood change. Those who fought gained nothing, while their leaders have become comfortable and prosperous. And there is now a new generation of young people who do not remember the war – with a basic primary education they are moving into towns and cities to try to earn a living in the 'informal sector,' on the margins of the law. Violent crime is increasingly an issue, in the media and in public meetings with President Armando Guebuza. So far, political violence has been very limited, but where it has occurred has been in areas of economic stress.

Mozambique is a 'donor darling,' with relatively high levels of aid. We argue that Mozambique is not the post-conflict success story that has been painted, and that the donors seem willfully blind to growing problems of increasing poverty and jobless youth.

This paper makes four assertions about how divisions impacted war. First, that the 1981-92 war was externally driven and that divisions and conflicts within the country would not have become violent without that outside intervention. Second, that ethnic, language and religious differences have not been and are unlikely to be factors in violence. Third, that the main differences are between rich and poor and between urban and rural, and that differences within groups and provinces are larger than differences between them. Fourth, that there is an important economic division between the south and the rest of the country that is becoming increasingly important.

Using social contract and greed/grievance models of the roots of civil war, it could be argued that the failure of economic modernization strategies of the early 1980s and the deterioration of the rural economy developed into a felt grievance, for which the government was blamed, and thus to a breakdown in the social contract. The breakdown was not serious enough to cause or trigger a war, but it definitely led poor rural people in some areas not to oppose invading forces.

It is difficult to predict organized violence. But we may already be seeing the inchoate violence of a group who are young, poor, only partly educated, and marginalized – illegality, criminality with gratuitous violence, sexual violence, and attacks on outsiders and the more powerful – blamed for the increasing economic problems. This sort of violence is much more common in neighboring South Africa, but it seems to be increasing in Mozambique, particularly with a growing willingness to use weapons and indications of the formation of gangs. The disenchanted young do not seem to identify with language groups nor with parties, and are not voting in elections. Preventing violent conflict requires Mozambique to become an activist, developmental state that intervenes in the economy and gives the young and poor a future and a stake in society.

Country Case Study – Sierra Leone – By Victor A. B. Davies

This paper analyzes the root causes of the 1991-2001 civil war in Sierra Leone, highlighting the role of development cooperation and external factors. The war ended in January 2002 with the signing of a peace accord. The British military intervention was the decisive factor, making military victory for the rebel movement an unlikely proposition. The intervention demonstrated that in a small country like Sierra Leone, a small clinical operation could be effective in helping to end civil conflict in certain circumstances.

Other factors that also contributed to ending the conflict included the decimation of the rebel movement's military capability in 2000 by Guinean troops repulsing an RUF-assisted rebellion in Guinea on the northern border. Second, UN sanctions forced Liberia to reduce its arms-for-diamonds support for the rebels. An existing arms embargo was extended to a ban on diamond exports and on international travel for members of the government and their families. Third, the intransigent rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, was incarcerated and replaced.

The roots of the Sierra Leone civil war can be traced to Siaka Stevens' patrimonial system of governance from 1968 to 1985, the emergence of which was aided by ethno-regional rivalries and diamonds. The key subsequent elements of this system of governance that fostered state failure and civil war were political repression, economic mismanagement and corruption, rural isolation, diamonds, youth alienation and ethno-regional rivalries.

Youth alienation and its subsequent radicalization culminated in the formation of the rebel movement in Sierra Leone. Thus, youths played a major role in the onset of the conflict. The available evidence suggests that the country also had a youthful population. The Sierra Leone case is therefore consistent with the youth bulge hypothesis.

Political factors were equally if not more important for conflict than economic ones. Economic and political factors interacted closely, so that any attempt to view them as independent factors, as in the Collier and Hoeffler 2004 categorization, could lead to misleading inferences.

The Sierra Leone case highlights several issues for foreign aid and development cooperation. The first is the absence of a distinct policy for weak states by the international financial institutions. The second issue relates to dealing with external instigation, from Libya and Liberia in Sierra Leone's case. The implications are that when the international community takes strong positions against external aggressors it can help end violent conflicts in Africa. Third, the Sierra Leone civil war highlights the need to make it difficult for rebels to sell natural resources used to finance violent conflict. Fourth is the domestic management of Sierra Leone's alluvial diamond resources; donors, and indeed, policy makers, do not appear to have a clear understanding of the complexity of this problem. The fifth issue is the need for donors to reduce the transaction costs of aid, as well as aid unpredictability, by harmonizing procedures and making timely disbursements of committed aid. The Sierra Leone experience shows that delays and shortfalls in aid commitments can be costly.

Country Case Study – Sudan – By Eltigani Seisi M. Ateem
The Root Causes of Conflicts in Sudan and the Making of the Darfur Tragedy

Sudan has been at war with itself since its independence in 1956. The most recent of these conflicts is the current one in Darfur, which instantly brought the region to the forefront of regional and international attention because of the severity of the human rights violations committed. The war that broke out in early 2003 has seen wide-scale mobilization of tribal militias that committed colossal atrocities against the civilian population. Despite the signing of a peace agreement and the strong involvement of the regional and international community, the intensity of the conflict escalated, resulting in a worsening of the humanitarian situation.

Numerous explanations have been given for the causes of the conflict in the Darfur region. It is not principally rebel economic opportunity as argued by the Collier and Hoeffler framework, nor environmental degradation or ethnicity as argued by some other researchers that are the root causes. The seeds of the conflict have been sown by decades of deliberate marginalization and neglect of the region; disproportionate power sharing to the favor of the riverine elites; manipulation of and persistent inequity in resource allocation; and incitement of tribal and ethnic conflicts, all of which are inherently political and economic. This prolonged marginalization has resulted in huge disparities between the center and the Darfur region, where life has become untenable. It contributed to the creation of imbalanced development where socio-economic indicators are much worse compared to those at the center. This was compounded by low levels of public expenditure resulting in poor state capacity for social service delivery at all levels.

While the country's oil revenues, if properly used, could have partially alleviated poverty across the country, they have instead been dedicated to military spending. The government's military expenditure is incomparable to its expenditures on social services.

Bad governance in the Sudan in general and in Darfur in particular has been at the heart of the causes of the conflict. Among the characteristics of the country's bad governance are monopoly of power, rampant corruption, lack of transparency, dishonoring of peace agreements, the disbanding of political parties and the lack of rights to assembly and freedom of expression.

Interventions by some neighboring countries contributed to escalating ethnic tensions in the region, in particular with regard to the Chadian-Libyan war.

The development role of the international community in the Sudan has been weak since 1989 when a military coup toppled a democratically elected government. Development aid was initially scaled down but was subsequently suspended and replaced with humanitarian aid. Development aid was only resumed after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war in Southern Sudan.

ANNEX B: WILTON PARK CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

PROGRAMME

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA: A POLICY WORKSHOP

Thursday, 8 – Sunday, 11 November, 2007

889th WILTON PARK CONFERENCE

in co-operation with the

United Nations Development Programme, New York

Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo

The statistical association between low incomes, low growth and violent conflict is robust and reflects reciprocal causal links. First, the damage caused by war amounts to development in reverse. Second, poverty exacerbates vulnerability to conflict. Both insecurity and poverty are associated with weak state capacity to protect citizens, manage the economy, deliver services and defuse social tensions. But last decade's research on development-conflict nexus reveals that not all development contributes to security; some patterns of development can exacerbate risks of conflict. These include development that reduces state capacity and increases state fragility, development that exacerbates group exclusion and horizontal inequalities or that continues dependence on natural resources.
How can external engagement reduce risks of violent conflict and improve the stability of fragile states and contribute to conflict prevention? How can aid and non-aid policies be made more risk sensitive? What should constitute the security content of poverty reduction programs in Africa? What aid allocation criteria would best contribute to peace and stability? Should the mitigation of horizontal inequalities figure on the agenda of poverty reduction strategies? How should aid effectiveness be analyzed if donors wish to prevent conflict? What aid vehicles are best adapted to peace building?
These policy questions are especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa, the only region of the world where the share of people living in absolute poverty is rising; where nearly 40% of world conflicts are taking place; where the deadliest confrontations of the last decade and a half have been experienced; and where the incidence of violent conflict is rising.

The workshop will tap policy research findings at the intersection of security and development. By connecting knowledge domains and epistemic communities that have remained isolated from one another (development economics, international law, security studies, humanitarian affairs etc.) it will help identify the behaviors of states and non-state agents that encourage the spread of violence, the structural factors that make countries conflict prone and the conflict sensitivity characteristics of development cooperation. This should help to design external engagement strategies best suited to the enhancement of human security in Africa.

THURSDAY, 8 NOVEMBER

1500-1515 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Donald LAMONT
Chief Executive, Wilton Park

Masafumi KUROKI
Vice President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo

Gilbert HOUNGBO
Assistant United Nations Secretary-General; Assistant Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Director of UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa, New York

1515-1645 1 KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AND HUMAN SECURITY
Sadako OGATA
President, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo

1645 Tea, coffee and conference photograph

1730-1900 2 CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Chair: Gilbert HOUNGBO
Assistant United Nations Secretary-General; Assistant Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Director of UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa, New York

Conflict and development: what do we know?
Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Conflict trends and international engagement in Africa: where do we stand?
Andrew MACK
Director, Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver

Discussants:

Herbert M'CLEOD
Special Coordinator, Office of the Vice President, Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown

Torgny HOLMGREN

Deputy Director-General, Head of Department for Development Policy, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm

1915 Drinks Reception

1945 Dinner with after dinner speaker

IS CONFLICT PREVENTION THE MISSING LINK?

Sir Lawrence FREEDMAN
Vice Principal, King's College London

FRIDAY, 9 NOVEMBER

0900-1030 3 THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Chair: Ashraf GHANI
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Aid policy and fragile states: the way forward
Richard MANNING
Chairman, Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

The role of the civil society
Mary KALDOR
Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

Discussants:

Clare LOCKHART
Director, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Stephen BROWNE
Deputy Executive Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva

1030 Tea and Coffee

1100-1230 4 ADDRESSING DEVOLUTION AND EXCLUSION

Chair: Asbjørn EIDHAMMER
Director of Evaluation, Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), Oslo

Decentralization
Yuichi SASAOKA
Senior Advisor, Development Policy, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo

Human rights, state capacity and economic policy
Juan Alberto FUENTES
Director, Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEF), Guatamala City

International engagement prior to conflict: lessons from Rwanda
Peter UVIN
Director, Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford

Discussants:

Karin CHRISTIANSEN
Research Fellow, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

Jibrin IBRAHIM
Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja

1300 Lunch

1500-1630 5 ADDRESSING EMPLOYMENT, YOUTH AND GENDER DIMENSIONS

Chair: Andrew STEER
Director, Policy and Research Division, Department for International Development, London

Employment
Anthony ADDISON
Executive Director, Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester

The youth bulge and its implications
Richard CINCOTTA
Consulting Demographer, Long Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council, Washington DC

The gender dimension
Judy EL BUSHRA
Programme Manager, African Great Lakes Region, International Alert, London

Discussant:

Funmi OLONISAKIN
Director, Conflict, Security & Development Group (CSDG), International Policy Institute, King's College London

1630 Tea and coffee

1700-1830 6 MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES

Chair: Jibrin IBRAHIM
Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos

Natural resources and conflict: curse or blessing?
Anke HOEFFLER
Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University

Managing land and water resources for conflict prevention
James PUTZEL
Director, Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science

The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
Peter EIGEN
Chairman, Transparency International, Berlin

Discussants:

Alan R. ROE
Former Principal Economist, World Bank; Director, Oxford Policy Management (OPM)

Antonio PEDRO
Chief, Infrastructure and Natural Resources Development, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

1900 Drinks Reception

1930 Dinner
hosted by Donald LAMONT, Chief Executive, Wilton Park

Dinner Speaker
The Rt. Hon. the Lord MALLOCH-BROWN
Minister for Africa, Asia and United Nations, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

SATURDAY, 10 NOVEMBER

0900-1030 7 THE GOVERNANCE AND EQUITY REQUIREMENTS OF PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT

Chair: Ashraf GHANI
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

Horizontal inequality and policy implications
Frances STEWART
Director, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford University

Democracy and ethnicity
Yusuf BANGURA
Research Coordinator, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva

Reforming the security sector
Nicole BALL
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, (CIDCM), Washington DC

Discussant:

Adedeji A. EBO
Senior Fellow and Head of the Africa Programme, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

1030 Tea and Coffee

1100-1215 8 COUNTRY CASE STUDIES - PARALLEL DISCUSSION GROUPS

Burundi and Rwanda
Peter UVIN
Director, Institute for Human Security, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford

Discussant: Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Mozambique
Alcinda HONWANA
Director, International Development Centre, The Open University, Milton Keynes

Joseph HANLON
Senior Lecturer, Development & Conflict Resolution, The Open University, Milton Keynes

Discussant: Yoichi MINE
Associate Professor, Global Collaboration Centre, Osaka University

Sierra Leone
Victor DAVIES
Senior Research Economist, African Development Bank, Tunis Belvedere

Discussant: Kamil KAMALUDDEEN
Economics Advisor and Head of Strategy and Policy Unit, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Monrovia

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Seth KAPLAN
Chairman, Alpha International Consulting, New York

Discussant: Tukumbi LUMUMBA-KASONGO
Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Wells College; Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Ithaca

Sudan (Darfur)
Eltigani S. M. ATEEM
Senior Regional Advisor, NEPAD and Regional Integration Division, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa

Discussant: Sara PANTULIANO
Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

1215-1300 REPORT BACK FROM DISCUSSION GROUPS TO PLENARY

Chair: Hiroshi KATO
Director General, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo

1300 Lunch

1500-1630 9 ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Chair: Tukumbi LUMUMBA-KASONGO
Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Wells College and Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, New York

Macroeconomic policy
Valpy FITZGERALD
Director, Department of International Development, University of Oxford

Economic recovery
John OHIORHENUAN
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York

Discussant:

Pedro COUTO
Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo

1630 Tea and Coffee

1700-1830 10 POLICY COHERENCE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Chair: Robert PICCIOTTO
Visiting Professor, King's College London

Humanitarian policy dilemmas
James DARCY
Director, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London

Regulating the small arms trade
Robert MUGGAH
Research Director, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

The private sector and violent conflict
Kathryn McPHAIL
Principal, International Council on Mining and Metals, London

Discussant:

Alexandra TRZECIAK-DUVAL
Head, Policy Coordination Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris

1830-1930 11 PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER

Co-Chairs: Sakiko FUKUDA-PARR
Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York

Robert PICCIOTTO
Visiting Professor, King's College London

Panel:

Pedro COUTO
Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo

Ukoha O. UKIWO
Research Fellow, Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt and Visiting Scholar, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Dan SMITH
Secretary General, International Alert, London

2000 Drinks reception

2030 Conference Dinner with after dinner speaker

THE INTERNATIONAL CAPACITY FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF PEACE
Ashraf GHANI
Chairman, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC

SUNDAY, 11 NOVEMBER

0730-0915 Breakfast and payment of bills

0915 Participants depart

ANNEX C: WILTON PARK CONFERENCE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

WP889 WILTON PARK CONFERENCE 889 Final List

Thu 08/11/2007 to Sun 11/11/2007

Conflict Prevention And Development Cooperation In Africa: A Policy Workshop

ADDISON, Anthony (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Executive Director, Brooks World Poverty Institute; Associate Director, Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC); Professor of Development Studies, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, Manchester
ASHWILL, Maximillian	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Research Assistant, The New School, New York
ATEEM, Eltigani (Speaker)	UNITED NATIONS Senior Regional Advisor, NEPAD and Regional Integration Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa
BALL, Nicole (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Visiting Senior Research Fellow, CIDCM/University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, Centre for International Policy, Washington DC
BANGURA, Yusuf (Speaker)	UNITED NATIONS Research Coordinator, UN Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva
BARNES, Cedric (Session Participant)	UNITED KINGDOM Research Analyst, Africa Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
BROWNE, Stephen	UNITED KINGDOM Deputy Executive Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva
CARRILLO, Roxanna	UNITED NATIONS Chief, Policy Analysis Section, Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), United Nations, New York
CHERINDA, Lúcia	MOZAMBIQUE Second Secretary, High Commission of Mozambique, London
CHIAPPA, Elizabeth	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Research Assistant, The New School, New York
CHRISTIANSEN, Karin	UNITED KINGDOM Research Fellow, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London
CINCOTTA, Richard (Speaker)	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Consulting Demographer, National Intelligence Council, Washington DC

CISSÉ, Babacar	UNDP Country Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Kinshasa
COUTO, Pedro	MOZAMBIQUE Vice-Minister, Ministry of Finance, Maputo
DARCY, James (Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Director, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London
DAVIES, Victor (Speaker)	SIERRA LEONE Senior Research Economist, African Development Bank, Tunis
DEROUIN, Robert	CANADA Director General, Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
EBO, Adedeji	NIGERIA Senior Fellow, Head of Africa Programme, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva
EIDHAMMER, Asbjørn (Co-Chair)	NORWAY Director of Evaluation, Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), Oslo
EIGEN, Peter (Speaker)	GERMANY Chairman, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives, Berlin
EL-BUSHRA, Judy (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Regional Programme Manager, Great Lakes, International Alert, London
FITZGERALD, Edmund (Valpy) (Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Director, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, Oxford
FREEDMAN, Lawrence (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Professor of War Studies; Vice Principal, Research, King's College, London
FUENTES, Juan Alberto (Speaker)	GUATEMALA Director, Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEF), Guatemala City
FUKUDA-PARR, Sakiko (Speaker)	JAPAN Visiting Professor, International Affairs, The New School, New York
FULTON, Craig (Session Participant)	UNITED KINGDOM Private Secretary to Lord Malloch Brown, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
FURUKAWA, Mitsuaki	JAPAN Resident Representative, Representative Office London, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), London

GAULME, François	FRANCE Desk Officer, Fragile States and Societies, Agence Française de Developpement, Paris
GHANI, Ashraf (Speaker)	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Chairman, Institute for State Effectiveness, Washington DC
GROENEWALD, Hesta	SOUTH AFRICA Conflict Advisor, Saferworld, London
HANLON, Joe (Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Senior Lecturer, Development and Conflict Resolution, Open University, Milton Keynes
HASHIMOTO, Kei-ichi	JAPAN Senior Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo
HOEFFLER, Anke (Visiting Speaker)	GERMANY Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, Oxford
HOLMGREN, Torgny	SWEDEN Deputy Director-General, Department for Development Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm
HOSHINO, Toshiya	JAPAN Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, New York
HOUDET, Chantal	CANADA Deputy Director (Francophonie), Department of International Affairs, Quebec City
HOUNGBO, Gilbert (Speaker)	UNDP Assistant UN Secretary-General and Director of UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York
IBRAHIM, Jibrin	NIGERIA Director, Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja
JAQUES, Isobelle	UNITED KINGDOM Programme Director, Wilton Park, Steyning
KALDOR, Mary (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London
KAMALUDDEEN, Kamil	UNDP Economic Advisor, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Monrovia
KAPLAN, Seth (Speaker)	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Chairman, Alpha Consulting International, Riverdale
KATO, Hiroshi (Co-Chair)	JAPAN Director General, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo

KOMUKAI, Eri	JAPAN Senior Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo
KUROKI, Masafumi (Speaker)	JAPAN Vice-President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo
LAMONT, Donald	UNITED KINGDOM Chief Executive, Wilton Park, Steyning
LOCKHART, Clare	UNITED KINGDOM Director, Institute of State Effectiveness, Washington DC
LUMUMBA-KASONGO, Tukumbi	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Wells College and Visiting Scholar, Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Ithaca
M'CLEOD, Herbert	SIERRA LEONE Special Coordinator, Office of the Vice President, Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown
MACK, Andrew (Speaker)	AUSTRALIA Director, Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver
MÄENPÄÄ, Sirpa	FINLAND Deputy Director General, Department for Africa and Middle East, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki
MALLOCH BROWN, Mark (Visiting Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Minister for Africa, Asia and the United Nations, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
MANNING, Richard (Speaker)	OECD Chair, Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris
MCCANDLESS, Erin	UNITED KINGDOM Adjunct Professor, The New School, Graduate Program In International Affairs; Executive Editor, *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, New York
MCPHAIL, Kathryn (Speaker)	UNITED KINGDOM Principal, International Council on Mining and Metals, London
MESSINEO, Carol	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Research Assistant, The New School, New York
MINE, Yoichi	JAPAN Associate Professor, Global Collaboration Centre (GLOCOL), Osaka University, Osaka
MONCRIEFF, Richard (Session Participant)	UNITED KINGDOM West Africa Research Analyst; Head, Africa Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

MUGGAH, Robert (Speaker)	CANADA Research Director/Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey, SSRC Fellow, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
NOUWEN, Sarah (Session Participant)	NETHERLANDS Consultant, Human European Consultancy; Ph.D. Candidate, International Law, Cambridge University, Cambridge
OGATA, Sadako (Speaker)	JAPAN President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo
OHIORHENUAN, John (Visiting Speaker)	UNDP Deputy Assistant Administrator and Senior Deputy Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York
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ANNEX D: THE CONFLICT-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: A SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1980-2005)

By Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Maximillian Ashwill, Elizabeth Chiappa and Carol Messineo

Abstract

This paper surveys the nexus between development and armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 2005. It focuses on war trends, impact of war on development, socio-economic structures as war risks, and policy responses. Several findings emerge that challenge widely held state-centric assumptions that underpin contemporary analyses, data collection and policy priorities. The wars in question defy conventional analytical frameworks as they commingle state and non-state actors with political, economic and private motives. As the findings illustrate, the state is not a sufficient unit of analysis: more research, data collection and policy attention should be directed to non-state actors and wars and sub-national and cross-border impacts. War is development in reverse, yet in many of these wars, the national economy continued to grow and social indicators improved. At the same time, the destructive impacts were localized, implying that development gaps and horizontal inequalities worsened. Structural risk factors – horizontal inequalities, youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and natural resource dependence – have played a causal or perpetuating role in the wars surveyed. Economic, social and governance reform policies can play a role in conflict prevention by addressing these risk factors, yet at present national and international policy priorities do not systematically address these risks.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is at the core of today's global challenge of armed conflict, a challenge that is inextricably related to development. Most of the world's armed conflicts of recent decades have occurred in the region (Human Security Report Project 2006). Continued violence in several countries, the tenuousness of the peace in others and the legacy of violence pose significant peace, security, and development challenges both within states and for the continent as a whole.

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the nexus of poverty/development and armed conflict in Africa. After reviewing trends, the paper explores two sets of links between conflict and poverty: the consequences of war on development and poverty, and socio-economic structures as risk factors for war. The final section considers how these links have been addressed in development policy by examining recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Trends

Since 1980, more than half of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have experienced armed conflict, sometimes multiple conflicts taking place simultaneously in different parts of the country and sometimes lasting for decades. Appendices 1 and 2 chart 126 wars in 32 countries recorded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.[i] Table 1

lists these wars and their key features. It includes only wars in which the state is a party to conflict, and where at least 25 battle deaths have occurred. These criteria, used in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, are common elements of the conventional definition of war used in many other datasets. While governments do not collect data on war, over 60 datasets have been created by academics and NGOs to monitor regional and global trends. The armed conflict dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is increasingly used in research and policy work because it is comprehensive, updated annually, and its methodology is considered rigorous. (See Appendix 3 on datasets.)

There was a general rise in the number of wars in this period, but a decline in the last four years (2002-2005) from 14 to six (Human Security Report Project 2006) with a corresponding decline in the number of battle deaths from 8,200 to 2,400 (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005; Human Security Report Project 2006). This trend should be treated with caution because it covers only four years, and many of the political, social, economic, and structural factors of war are still unresolved.

All but six of these 126 armed conflicts were intrastate or civil wars. Many continued for decades, interspersed with repeated attempts at settlement, and often involved multiple parties pursuing different goals. Others, less intense 'minor wars,' lasted two years or less (Gleditsch *et al* 2002; Harbom *et al* 2006; Harbom and Wallenstein 2007). The majority have been driven by attempts to control the state and only a few involved secessionist groups (Gelditsch *et al* 2002). Many wars have spilled across national boundaries and developed into sub-regional conflicts, including those in the Great Lakes, Southern Africa, the Mano River Basin and Central East Africa.

Table 1: Major Periods of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Country, 1980-2005

Major Conflict (>1,000 Battle Deaths)	Dates	Battle Deaths	Date of Peace Accord
Angola	**1975*-2004**	**126466**	**2002/04/04**
Burundi	**1991-2005**	**8555**	**2003/11/16**
Chad	**1965*-2005**	**43085**	**2005/08/18**
Congo (Brazzaville)	**1993-2002**	**9791**	**1999/12/29**
Democratic Rep. of Congo	**1996-2001**	**149000**	**2003/04/02**
Eritrea	**1998-2000**	**50391**	**2000/12/12**
Ethiopia	**1976*-1991 and 1996-2005**	**157440**	**2000/12/12 (with Eritrea)**
Guinea-Bissau	**1998-1999**	**1850**	**1998/11/01**
Liberia	**1989-2003**	**12684**	**2003/08/18**
Mozambique	**1977*-1992**	**109000**	**1992/10/04**
Rwanda	**1990-2002**	**9759**	**1993/08/04**
Sierra Leone	**1991-2000**	**12997**	**2000/11/10**
Somalia	**1981-2005**	**67014**	**1997/12/22**
South Africa	**1966*-1988**	**26777**	**n.d.**
Sudan	**1983-2005**	**61528**	**2005/01/09**
Uganda	**1977*-2005**	**118275**	**2002/12/24**
Minor Armed Conflict >25 and < 999 Battle Deaths			
Burkina Faso	**1985 and 1987**	**200**	**n.d.**
Cameroon	**1984 and 1996**	**600**	**n.d.**
Central African Republic	**2001-2002**	**219**	**n.d.**
Comoros	**1989 and 1997**	**83**	**2003/12/20**
Côte d'Ivoire	**2002-2004**	**1200**	**2005/04/06**

Djibouti	**1991-1994**	**540**	**2001/05/12**
Gambia	**1981**	**650**	**n.d.**
Ghana	**1981 and 1983**	**76**	**n.d.**
Guinea	**2000-2001**	**1100**	**n.d.**
Kenya	**1982**	**318**	**n.d.**
Lesotho	**1998**	**114**	**n.d.**
Mali	**1990-1994**	**300**	**1992/04/11**
Niger	**1992-1997**	**489**	**1995/04/15**
Nigeria	**2004**	**552**	**n.d.**
Senegal	**1990-2003**	**1644**	**2004/12/30**
Togo	**1986 and 1991**	**55**	**n.d.**

*** Onset of the armed conflict was before 1980.**
Armed Conflict: A contested incompatibility that concerns the government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.
Sources:, Harbom and Hőgbladh 2006; Gleditsch *et al* 2002; Harbom *et al* 2006; Harbom and Wallenstein 2007.
n.d.: no data

Today's armed conflicts in Africa defy the analytical frameworks used in the study of war and security. These conflicts correspond more closely to the concept of 'new wars' as they are motivated by both political and private economic objectives, commingle state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and involve violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians by state armies, non-state militias and organized criminal networks (Kaldor 2007; Reno 2005). Kaldor notes that …

> "… although most of these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain (2007:2)."

Non-state wars

Most definitions of war, including the UCDP/PRIO dataset used in this paper, include formally organized contested combat against the state. This excludes armed conflicts between non-state actors such as communal violence, conflict between rival guerrilla groups and warlords, state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians and acts of terrorism. Data on non-state conflicts have begun to be collected only in recent years. From 2002 to 2005, there were 77 non-state conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 17 state-based conflicts (Table 2). The number of fatalities was smaller – 12,834 compared with 20,655 (UCDP Non-state Dataset 4.1) These non-state wars differ in character from state wars; they may be 'low intensity,' employing unconventional weapons and tactics without regard for traditional political or military codes of conduct (WHO 2002).

Table 2: Comparison of State-Based and Non-State Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 2002-2005 (> 25 battle deaths per year)

Countries with Non-State Based Armed Conflict	Number of Conflicts Between Non-state Warring Parties	Fatalities: Non-State Conflicts	Number of State-Based Conflicts	Fatalities: State-based Conflicts
Burundi	1	97	2	2440
Côte d'Ivoire	4	583	2	1200
Democratic Rep. of Congo	6	5298	0	0
Ethiopia	8	517	3	2210
Ghana	1	36	0	0
Kenya	1	68	0	0
Madagascar	1	79	0	0
Nigeria	17	3050	2	552
Somalia	25	1944	1	--
Sudan	7	688	4	8028
Sudan, Uganda	1	142	--	--
Uganda	5	332	3	6225
Total Sub-Saharan Africa	77	12834	17	20,655
Total Global Non-State Conflict	101	17832	--	--

Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 4.1

Casualties and human costs

Conventional definitions of casualties only count deaths on the battlefield. While the 126 wars described earlier resulted in approximately one million such deaths, the toll would be multiples of this number if all 'war deaths' were counted (Lacina & Gelditsch 2005). Battle death estimates do not include victims of state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, such as the Rwandan genocide in which 800,000 people perished, and communal violence between non-state groups, such as the 1994-1995 ethnic violence of northern Ghana that saw 15,000 fatalities (Jönsson 2007). They also exclude the depredations of militias on unarmed men, women and children that have characterized much of the violence in Sierra Leone and Angola. Many other non-combatants have died of malnutrition and disease. For example, between 1998 and 2004 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality (Coghlan *et al* 2006). Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) found that battle death estimates as a proportion of total war death estimates – which include civilian battle deaths, fatalities from disease and famine provoked by war, and deaths due to criminal and unorganized violence – range from less than 2% in Ethiopia to 29% in Mozambique (Table 3).

Table 3: Battle deaths are a small part of total war deaths: Deaths in Selected Conflicts in Africa

Country	Years	Estimates of total war deaths	Battle deaths	Percentage battle dead
Angola	1975-2002	1.5 million	160,475	11%
Ethiopia (not inc. Eritrean insurgency)	1976-1991	1-2 million	16,000	< 2%
Mozambique	1976-1992	500,000 to 1 million	145,400	15-29%
Somalia	1981-1996	250,000-350,000 (to mid-1990s)	66,750	19-27%
Sudan	1983-2002	2 million	55,500	3%
Liberia	1989-1996	150,000-200,000	23,500	12-16%
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1998-2001	2.5 million	145,000	6%

Source: This table is reproduced from Lacina and Gelditsch, 2005: 159

Rape, deliberate mutilation, forced conscription of children and the use of landmines – in addition to death and injury – exact long-term costs and inhibit recovery from war. The overall legacy of violence constrains post-conflict reconciliation and political accommodation. Violent armed conflict ignites humanitarian crisis and disrupts human security in all its personal, economic and political dimensions (Collier *et al* 2003; Stewart *et al* 2001).

Massive dislocation of people from their homes, livelihoods and communities is another human cost; over the survey period (1980-2005), more than four million Africans fled their countries (UNHCR 2007). In some dramatic cases, as much as 40% of the population of Rwanda fled their homes in 1994, and 14% of Burundi's people did likewise in 1993. In 2005, there were an estimated 12.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 20 African countries – more than twice the total for the rest of the world (Eschenbächer, 2006). Unlike refugees, IDPs do not cross international borders. Estimates of IDPs have ranged from 300,000 in the 1993-2002 Congo (Brazzaville) conflict to 1.6 million in Uganda in 2005 and to 7.4 million in Sudan in 2005 (IISS 2007). As of 2005 in sub-Saharan Africa, there were 1.9 million people in 17 protracted refugee situations, defined as situations where 25,000 or more people are in exile and reliant upon external assistance for at least five years (UNHCR 2006). (Appendix 4)

Large-scale forced migration increases mortality and morbidity (WHO 2002; Van Damme 1995). Protracted refugee encampments create security problems and conflict between burdened host countries and their neighbors. Refugee populations may include those sympathetic to the irredentist challenges of ethnic minorities in the host

country. Camps often harbor insurgent militias and facilitate small arms trafficking, drug smuggling and other illicit trade (Jacobsen 2002; UNHCR 2006). In host countries, concentrations of refugees may exacerbate environmental problems, including deforestation and pollution and overuse of land and water (Jacobsen 2002, 1997; Black & Sessay 1997; Black 1994).

Consequences of Armed Conflict on Poverty and Development

Civil wars have been called 'development in reverse' (Collier *et al* 2003:13). They divert resources from productive economic activities and from public expenditures for social goods that advance development. They incur direct human costs as described above, and longer-term developmental costs through loss of household assets, destruction of infrastructure essential for both human well-being and for successful agriculture and commerce, as well as loss of confidence in institutions, leading to lawlessness and capital flight (Stewart *et al* 2001).

However, evidence from the 126 wars in this survey shows that the consequences of armed conflict on development are far from simple; the costs not only vary from one country to another, but are also uneven within countries. Within a given country different segments of the population do not always suffer the cost of war equally, and in the aggregate, the economy does not always falter. Figures 1 - 4 show the evolution of economic output (GDP) and human survival (under-five mortality rate – U5MR) during war years. They show a precipitous economic decline in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Burundi, Djibouti and Mozambique among other countries. Only nine of the 22 countries for which data are available show GDP that was lower at the end of the war than at its onset. For some, such as Angola and Rwanda, there were dramatic declines at the height of the fighting, followed by recovery. But several countries sustained GDP growth while fighting continued, such as Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger.

Some examples illustrate why war does not always lead to a decline in national development. Oil in both Sudan and Chad has fuelled economic growth even though armed conflicts have left thousands dead and millions displaced. In Guinea and Uganda, the fighting has been geographically isolated – in the south and southeast in Guinea and in the north in Uganda – without compromising overall growth at the national level. These positive macro-indicators are pernicious in that they mask both widening inequality and human suffering.

Figure 1: GDP decreases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars)
excluding conflicts of one year
Source: World Development Indicators



*defined by GDP lower last year of conflict compared with first year
^data from Mozambique begins 1980

Burundi (1991-2005) | Central African Republic (2001-2002) | Congo, Dem. Rep. (1996-2001)
Cote d'Ivoire (2002-2004) | Djibouti (1991-1994) | Eritrea (1998-2000)
Liberia (1989-2003) | Mozambique (1977-1992) | Sierra Leone (1991-2000)

Figure 2: GDP increases* during conflicts 1970-2005 (in constant 2000 US dollars)^
(excluding conflicts of one year)**
Source: World Development Indicators



*defined by GDP higher last year of conflict compared with first year
^data from Angola begins 1980, Chad 1970, Ethiopia1 1981, Uganda 1982
**excluding South Africa

Angola (1974-2004) | Chad (1965-2005) | Congo, Rep. (1993-2002)
Ethiopia1 (1976-1991) | Ethiopia2 (1996-2005) | Guinea (2000-2001)
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) | Mali (1990-1994) | Niger (1992-1997)
Rwanda (1990-2002) | Senegal (1990-2003) | Sudan (1983-2005)
Uganda (1981-2005)

Figure 3: Under-five mortality rate decreases* during conflict 1970-2005
(excluding conflicts with one or less data point recorded during conflict)
Source: World Development Indicators



Figure 4: Under-five mortality rate increases* during conflict 1970-2005
Source: World Development Indicators



Civil war is development in reverse, but the country is not the best unit of analysis. By disaggregating development indicators along regional or group lines, it is possible to track the deleterious consequences that conflict may have on some segments of a country's population despite positive aggregated indicators for the country as a whole. From 1990 to 2004, while armed conflict raged in northern Uganda, the country's human development index (HDI) improved from 0.411 to 0.502, childhood immunization rose from 45% to 87%, and access to clean water improved from 44% to 60% (UNDP 2007). Yet these national numbers severely misrepresent the stark and widening regional inequalities. In 2005-06, Uganda's national poverty rate was 31.1%, while northern Uganda's poverty level was 60.7% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2006). In addition, the under-five mortality rate remains three to four times higher in the northern conflict areas than in the non-conflict areas (WHO 2005) and the adult literacy rate, which stands at 77% in central Uganda, is a mere 47% in northern Uganda (Nawaguna 2007).

Structural Conditions and War Risks

Traditionally, studies of armed conflicts relied on historical and political factors to explain why wars emerge, persist, recur and end. However, in response to the increasing concentration of civil wars in poor countries, new research in the 1990s began to focus on socio-economic conditions that are associated with the frequent occurrence of war. Thus a rich and diverse literature of cross-country statistical and qualitative studies emerged. This research identified a series of social and economic conditions that may exist in a country and that appear to favor the emergence of armed conflict. It identifies several socio-economic factors that raise risks of conflict. It is important to point out that these factors are not mutually exclusive and may coexist and be mutually reinforcing (Fukuda-Parr 2007; Murshed 2007). Moreover, while political and historical factors may be the proximate factors that drive war, structural risks are root causes. Were these factors relevant for the 32 countries surveyed in this paper?

Chronic poverty

Studies found strong correlation between per capita income and incidence of conflict, implying that GDP growth would help reduce war risks (Collier *et al* 2002). All of the 32 countries are among the world's poorest countries with large proportions of their population surviving in extreme poverty. For these countries, 2005 per capita GDP ranged from $91 to $997 and HDI in 2004 ranged from 0.311 to 0.532. The proportion of people surviving in extreme poverty measured by the international threshold of $1 a day ranges from 15% to 78% for the 21 countries for which estimates are available from 1996-2005. In this respect, these 32 countries are no different from the other 12 countries of the region that remained conflict-free but which are also poor.

A more interesting question is whether economic decline and a general worsening of poverty precede the onset of war. Often, historical accounts of civil war attribute serious economic mismanagement and misrule as among the causes of an insurgency, such as in DRC, Liberia or Sierra Leone. Economic decline prior to the onset of war was registered in 13 of the 32 countries where per capita income was lower at the onset of war than five years previously, and for nine others , GDP growth averaged

less than -1% annually over that period. But this was not a generalized pattern; in 13 countries, per capita GDP was higher at the onset of the war than five years previously (Figure 5), and average annual growth rate was over 1%. Under-five mortality rates were also improving during the years preceding the war for most countries. (Appendix 5)

Figure 6: Per Capita GDP increases during 5th years before onset of armed conflict



Over-dependence on natural resources

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that over-dependence on natural resources increases war risks, with greatest risk reached when primary commodities comprise a 32% share of GDP. Several of the 32 countries are highly dependent on natural resource exports, including Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia, where primary commodity exports exceed 15% as a share of GDP. If oil is included, Angola, Nigeria and the Congo are also highly resource dependent. However, the majority of the 32 countries are not so highly dependent on primary commodity exports. In 2000, Côte d'Ivoire's share of primary commodities to GDP was 31.6% (UNCTAD 2003); two years later war broke out.

Over-dependence on minerals can be a risk factor in two ways. The first is that groups take up arms to seek control of a country's natural resources. The second is that once war starts, control of mineral resources becomes a lifeline for the warring parties. In Sierra Leone, during the civil war (1991-2000) RUF rebels financed their insurgency through profits from the diamond trade (Keen 2006). In Angola's civil war (1975-2002), both the government and rebels sustained themselves by exploiting natural resource wealth (Gamba and Cornwell 2000). The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebel group did so with diamonds and the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola did so with oil (Le Billon 2001; ICG 2003; Sherman 2000). In the civil war of Côte d'Ivoire, where primary commodity exports reached almost 32% of GDP in 2000, the role of natural resources (i.e. cocoa) in sustaining violence is more ambiguous. In addition to the examples listed above, it is clear that competition for control of the oil wealth has been a factor in the conflicts in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta.

Horizontal inequalities

While the idea that stark inequality would lead to resentment and uprising is intuitively appealing, research has not found empirical evidence of armed war occurring more frequently where vertical inequalities are high. On the other hand, there is more evidence associating horizontal inequality – inequality between groups with ethnic, religious or linguistic ties – with conflict (Stewart 2002). Grievances over historical exclusion from economic, social and political opportunities and power provide incentives for insurgency, and the appeal to group loyalty and identity can be a powerful means to mobilization. These disparities provide explanations for ethnic wars that go beyond historic enmity between groups (Stewart 2002).

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by a multiplicity of identity groups with legacies of unequal political and economic power (UNDP 2004). It is widely held that horizontal inequalities are widespread in African countries where ethnicity became politically and economically salient in colonial and post-colonial times. Available data consistently show sharp inequalities when data disaggregated by ethnicity are available for economic and social indicators such as income, educational attainment and access to high-level jobs, as well as in political indicators such as representation in the executive, legislative, military and other institutions of the state. For example, in Namibia the HDI was estimated for six linguistic groups and ranged from a high of 0.960 for German speakers to a low of 0.326 for San speakers (UNDP 2004). Disparities are sharp not only between racial groups but also among Namibia's

African populations: HDI for Oshiwambo speakers is 0.641, twice the index for the San speakers (UNDP 2004).

However, such data are not consistently available. This survey reviewed two databases that assess the extent of horizontal inequalities that are politically salient in the context of their potential for armed conflict. First, the Minorities at Risk Project's Aggregate Differential Index (ADI) is a composite of 18 cultural, political and economic indicators that rate differential treatment based on group identity (Minorities at Risk, 2005a: 5). Scores are available for 26 of the 32 countries; Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Liberia, Mali, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda score particularly high – above 10 – on a scale where the maximum possible score is 18 (Minorities at Risk Project 2007).

Second, the Failed State Index uses a composite of 12 sub-indicators. One is a measure of horizontal inequality – 'Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines.' Two others indicate the level of political mobilization based on group disparity: 'Uneven Legacy of Vengeance-seeking Group Grievance, or Group Paranoia;' and 'Rise of Factionalized Elites.' Most of the 32 countries score high on uneven economic development; 22 of them are at the 'warning' level while nine others – Comoros, Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Senegal – fall just below the cut-off. Ghana, Mali and Senegal show low scores in political mobilization (rise of factionalized elites), but the political salience of group inequalities is evident in all the countries according to this index (Fund for Peace 2007). Appendix 6 summarizes relevant data from these two databases.

While these databases confirm the presence of group exclusion and political activation, they do not show whether this was a factor that drove past wars. Academic and policy literature that examines the causes of wars in 32 countries identifies horizontal inequality or group exclusion as a factor in several of them.

The war in the southern Casamance region of Senegal is an example of horizontal inequalities as a factor in mobilizing violence. Home to the Diola ethnic group, a distinct cultural entity, the Casamance region also has the highest poverty and infant mortality rates in the country (Senegal PRSP 2002). Other examples include conflicts in Burundi, Central African Republic, among southern Christians in Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, the Afar and Somali liberation movements of Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo, and Uganda. However, it is important to note that group exclusion does not appear to have been a major factor in many other countries such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Somalia, Cameroon and Guinea Bissau.

Neighborhood spillovers

Wars have taken on sub-regional dimensions as neighboring countries become embroiled in supporting various warring parties. Neighboring countries serve as safe havens for rebel groups, receive influxes of refugees, incite support among ethnic groups that inhabit more than one state, and provide opportunities for profiteers to engage in smuggling of weapons or natural resources. Warring parties receive direct material and political support from states and other groups. For example, Chad provided refuge for thousands of people displaced by violence in the Central African

Republic and Sudan; the governments of Eritrea and Somalia supported opposing sides in the war in Ethiopia; the governments of Senegal and Guinea sent troops to Guinea-Bissau; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and Sudan have sent arms to various warring groups in Somalia (ICG 2007; Webersik 2004); and finally, the wars in Sudan and Uganda have fed on each other.

Environmental pressure related to migration

Although the African continent is sparsely populated when compared with other regions of the world, environmental stress and demographic pressures are present in a number of countries that have experienced violent conflict. Mounting demographic pressure is one of the indicators of the Failed State Index; all the 32 countries score above six, and several above nine (Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, Somalia, Sudan).

Several conflicts have been triggered by rival claims to scarce land or natural resources. Although the conflict in Sudan has been commonly attributed to historical enmity on religious or racial grounds, in fact resource scarcity lies at the root of the conflict. Drought and desertification have increased pressure on water and land resources, forcing group migration into areas historically settled by others. This encroachment has created stress and led to violence (Youngs 2004:8). The Azawad conflict in Mali (1990-1996) was driven by socio-economic exclusion of the Tuaregs, but environmental stress also played a role (Minorities at Risk 2007). The desertification of the Sahel from the late 1960s to early 1970s, as well as frequent droughts in the 1980s, caused a mass migration of Tuaregs from northern Mali to neighboring countries.

Demographic youth bulge

Cincotta (2003) demonstrates strong statistical relationship between demographic patterns and the incidence of armed conflict. His study identifies countries in which young adults comprise more than 40% of the adult population as more than twice as likely as countries with lower proportions to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. In the absence of employment, opportunity or constructive activities, young men especially are known to congregate in gangs that may evolve into politically mobilized insurgencies (Cincotta 2003). This risk factor is present in almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including those that have experienced major wars, minor wars and no wars. Review of data (UNPD 2006) shows that each of the 32 conflict countries surveyed here has a youth bulge with a population aged 15-29 years comprising over 44% of the total.

History of war

Statistical analysis has shown high risk that conflict will re-emerge after an end to violence (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). This has indeed been the history of sub-Saharan Africa where formal peace agreements have failed to achieve long-lasting peace. Of the 126 conflicts being surveyed here, there were 154 cessations in fighting, but only nine of these lasted for 10 years. Peace has lasted for an additional 10 conflicts that ended fewer than 10 years ago. Of the 32 conflict-affected countries only eight have experienced peace of at least 10 years duration. In several countries violent state

repression or conflict between identity groups has continued unabated (Gleditsch *et al* 2002; Harbom *et al* 2006; Harbom and Wallenstein 2007).

Policy Responses to Address Risk Factors

The preceding sections illustrate ways in which armed conflict has affected the trajectory of development and *vice versa*. The destructive impact of wars is a source of current poverty and development challenge. Development patterns such as a history of ethnic exclusion and environmental pressure have been among the drivers of past conflicts and continue to raise political tensions. These linkages have important policy implications for development strategy as economic, social and governance reform policies have important bearing on these structural factors. For example, budgetary allocations can deepen horizontal inequalities and group grievance; health and education policies such as measures to increase schooling of girls are central aspects of demographic change; inappropriate agricultural and rural policies can aggravate environmental pressures and competition for land. In these and many other ways, development policy can either alleviate or worsen group grievance, the youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and poor governance of natural resources; it can then help reduce or exacerbate the risks of armed conflict recurring.

To assess how development policies and priorities address these links between armed conflict and development, PRSPs were reviewed where they were available. PRSPs reflect both national priorities and a degree of endorsement by the official donor community. Several of the PRSPs, notably for countries that are emerging from war following a peace settlement – such as Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola and Djibouti – or following a decisive victory as in Rwanda, identify conflict as a major source of their development and poverty challenges. All of the PRSPs emphasize the importance of governance, but mostly not in relation to preventing recurrence of violent conflict.

Overall, there is scant treatment of armed conflict and its links to development challenges in the 18 PRSPs reviewed; four made no mention of armed conflict that had taken place or was continuing at the time, and while others mentioned the issue, only Liberia's interim PRSP of 2007 had a section devoted to an analysis of the root causes of conflict. The lack of attention to armed conflict is particularly surprising where wars were being actively fought at the time that the document was prepared and adopted: the Ethiopia PRSP of 2002 refers only to the border war with Eritrea, and in historical context, the pre-1991 wars, not to the ongoing conflicts within the country; the Senegal PRSP of 2002 makes no mention of the persistent fighting in the south at the time; the Chad PRSP of 2003 cites conflict only twice in its 142 pages, referring only to a 'climate of insecurity and impunity' in a 'conflict-ridden environment' and to 'decades of armed conflict' and its impact on armed forces. These findings are consistent with a recent study (Scharf *et al* 2008) that analyzed 20 PRSP and similar documents and more than 80 UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and found that less than half referred to armed violence.

Structural risk factors – horizontal inequality, youth employment, demographic pressures, migration, neighborhood spillover effects and the governance of natural resources, for instance – were not given priority attention in PRSPs. Issues of unequal development along group lines and ethnic exclusion are rarely addressed. Inclusive development approaches such as equitable growth and greater sharing of power and

opportunities are not explicit goals, even in countries where ethnic grievances and exclusion are politically live issues. The term 'equity' most often appears in relation to gender equality. Even the interim PRSP of Liberia, which fully recognizes the pattern of elite rule as a source of the war that lasted over a decade, is weak when it comes to reflecting inclusion as a policy priority. The document says little about setting priorities across regions and activities to ensure distributional balance. While social and physical infrastructure development has been concentrated in Monrovia and along the coast, and the interior has been neglected, this strategy makes no provisions to reverse these historic imbalances; while poverty is concentrated in rural areas, the economic growth strategy does not give priority to agriculture other than the export-oriented plantation sector (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2007).

Thus PRSPs do not systematically include an analysis of the impact of conflict on development or of the root causes of conflict and grievances over issues of political, economic and social exclusion. Ongoing armed conflict in a country is systematically ignored as a source of poverty. Indeed, that both a country's governments and the donors that endorse them turn a blind eye to recent or ongoing fighting in the country inevitably has repercussions for development and poverty.

Conclusions

In surveying the nexus of development and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa since 1980, several findings emerge that challenge widely held assumptions and suggest directions for reconsidering policy priorities, launching new research directions and designing more effective policies for human security.

First, the state as a unit of analysis and focus of policy action does not match the reality of contemporary wars in Africa where the actors are both state and non-state, involve local and external allies and are motivated by political and private economic ends. Yet data collection, analytical frameworks and policy interventions remain state-centric. New research directions are needed that focus on non-state actors and transnational conflict networks, destructive impacts of conflicts at sub-national levels, and on cross-border alliances and impacts. There is a singular lack of data and analysis of non-state conflicts and the distributional consequences of conflicts. Current policy research and policy agendas for conflict prevention, peace building and economic recovery continue to focus on major armed conflicts that involved the state.

Second, the survey found, surprisingly, that economic decline did not uniformly result from war; some economies grew and human outcomes improved even during conflict as impacts were confined to specific locations or as the economy was buoyed by such exogenous factors as commodity exports. More research is needed to understand how the expected consequences of conflict are contained, and the nature of their political implications. More policy attention is needed on the distributional impact of armed conflicts.

Third, the survey shows the prevalence of long-term 'low-intensity' conflicts that constitute a human security priority because their violence imposes huge human and developmental costs and has the potential to escalate and spread. They are also a priority for conflict prevention policy. Yet low-intensity conflicts receive little policy attention, especially as a development challenge. As the conflict in northern Uganda illustrates, development disparities are both a cause and a consequence of such conflicts, yet they are considered to be a domestic political/security issue and kept out

of development policy priority setting. In the context of positive development trends for the country overall, the international community can be tempted to 'turn a blind eye' to these sources of human insecurity and worsening war risks. New policy approaches need to be developed in the international community to address these cases.

Fourth, structural conditions identified by recent research as risk factors are present to varying extents in most African countries and particularly in the 32 that have experienced war. Horizontal inequality and the youth bulge are relevant more consistently than other factors. While all countries are 'poor,' in many cases economic decline did not precede conflict. Environmental pressure and natural resource dependence have been factors in few of the 32 countries. The relationship between underlying risk factors and emergence of armed conflict is neither automatic nor uniform, and their presence should not be considered predictive but rather as relevant risk factors requiring attention. Since they relate to development structures, they are highly relevant to development policy, including governance reforms to promote political inclusion and economic and social policies to reduce horizontal inequality, generate employment-creating growth, promote youth employment and manage the demographic transition. Economic growth alone will not remove these structural risks.

Fifth, neither national governments nor the international community have developed and applied systematic approaches to integrating conflict consequences and risks into development policy priorities. Major development policy instruments, starting with the PRSP, need to be more consistent in addressing conflict impacts and risks.

Finally, this survey documents and confirms the high risks of armed conflict in sub-Saharan African countries as political tensions remain unresolved and structural risk factors prevail. Perhaps most importantly, one of the most striking characteristics of armed conflict in Africa has been the fragility of peace; even where there has been an end to violence almost invariably it has resumed. These patterns point to a need for a more proactive approach to preventing conflict by addressing the structural risk factors.

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*Papers and speeches presented during the Wilton Park Conference (see Appendix B: Wilton Park Conference Programme for titles and authors) are available on the conference website: http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP889/participants/participants.aspx

Endnote

While governments do not collect data on war, over 60 datasets have been created by academics and NGOs to monitor regional and global trends. The armed conflict dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is increasingly used in research and policy work because it is comprehensive, updated annually, and its methodology is considered rigorous.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Minor and Major Armed Conflicts 1980-2005 and Peace Accords 1989-2005



Minor War: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. **War**: at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year. **P**: Years during which peace agreements were signed.
Note: Somalia was not by definition in armed conflict in 1997-2000 and 2003-2005 since no government could be identified.
Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2006 1946-2005; UCPD Peace Agreement Dataset Version 1.0 1989-2005

Appendix 2: Battle Deaths in Armed Conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

Battle Deaths: Major Armed Conflict (>1,000/year)	**1980-1984**	**1985-1989**	**1990-1994**	**1995-1999**	**2000-2004**	**2005**	**Total by Country**
Angola	27665	27668	54143	11850	5140		**126466**
Burundi			1215	2800	4240	300	**8555**
Chad	13970	20180	7449	275	1101	110	**43085**
Congo (Brazzaville)			175	9500	116		**9791**
Democratic Republic of Congo				100066	48934		**149000**
Eritrea				40334	10057		**50391**
Ethiopia	64692	61493	26476	2029	1977	773	**157440**
Guinea-Bissau				1850			**1850**
Liberia	27	100	7999	500	4058		**12684**
Mozambique	23250	82500	3250				**109000**
Rwanda			5500	2700	1559		**9759**
Sierra Leone			1998	10599	400		**12997**
Somalia	600	25424	39526	1200	264	Note 3	**67014**
South Africa	18478	8299					**26777**
Sudan	8000	20000	10000	12500	10528	500	**61528**
Uganda	68532	38268	1950	2300	6556	669	**118275**
Battle Deaths: Minor Armed Conflict (25-999/year)							
Burkina Faso		200					**200**
Cameroon	500			100			**600**
Central African Rep.					219		**219**
Comoros		27		56			**83**
Côte d'Ivoire					1200		**1200**
Djibouti			515	25			**540**
Gambia	650						**650**
Ghana	76						**76**
Guinea					1100		**1100**
Kenya	318						**318**
Lesotho				114			**114**
Mali			300				**300**
Niger			400	89			**489**
Nigeria					552		**552**
Senegal			600	910	134		**1644**
Togo			25				**55**
Total per Period	**226758**	**284159**	**161521**	**199797**	**98135**	**2352**	**972752**

Sources: UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2006. Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard; Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005 Version 2.0. Lacina, Bethany and Niles Petter Gleditsch. 2005 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: a New Dataset of Battle Deaths;' *European Journal of Population* 21(2-3): 145-165.

Definitions

Battle Deaths: Both armed combatant and civilian deaths resulting from violence inflicted during the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat. This definition of battle deaths includes deaths during combat and deaths from wounds received in combat. It excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or

civilians outside the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of prisoners of war). It also excludes non-combat deaths resulting from famine, disease and other results of war.

Armed Conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths between armed combatants during a contested incompatibility.

Appendix 3: Datasets on Armed Conflict

There are no official datasets on armed conflict from official governmental or intergovernmental bodies. Over 60 datasets created by academic researchers and NGOs track global armed conflict. Their usefulness for research and policy applications varies along key dimensions. What years do they cover and are they updated annually? What criteria define armed conflict? What factors access conflict severity? What data are included and excluded? These datasets with their systematic application of definitions and thresholds allow trends to be identified and cross-country comparisons to be made. This lists the datasets that have been most widely used by researchers and policy analysts internationally.

Dataset	Source	Coverage
Correlates of War (COW) **Datasets on interstate, intrastate, and extra-systemic wars** **Covers 1816-1997**	**J. David Singer and Melvin Small**	**Includes conflicts in which battle deaths between armed combatants total 1,000 or more.** **Excludes:** • **conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans);** • **low intensity conflicts;** • **one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war);** • **civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.**
UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2006 **Covers 1946-2005 and is updated annually**	**Gleditsch *et al* of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)**	**Includes small conflicts in which battle deaths of armed combatants during a contested incompatibility total 25 or more.** **Excludes:** • **conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans);** • **one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war);** • **civilian fatalities from the cross-fire of war and from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.**
UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset **Covers 1946-2005**	**Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gledtisch of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**	**Applies definitions of conflict consistent with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and tracks conflicts recorded in that dataset. Battle death totals include armed combatants plus civilians killed in cross-fire or as "collateral damage" during combat.** **Excludes:** • **conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans);** • **one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (e.g. genocide and massacres of prisoners of war);** • **civilian fatalities factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.**
Ethnic Conflict Research project (ECOR) **Covers 1985-2000**	**Christian P. Scherrer 2002 in *Structural Prevention of Ethnic Violence*, NY: Palgrave**	**Studies 'mass violence,' which encompasses wars of high and low intensity following COW and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset threshold levels.** **Uses a seven-part typology that includes non-military acts of mass violence involving non-state actors (e.g. gang wars, genocide).**
Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004 **Covers 1946-2004**	**Center for Systemic Peace, Monty G. Marshall**	**Does not provide annual data.** **Tracks armed conflict, political instability in the absence of armed conflict, adverse regime changes, and communal rebellion and inter-communal violence.** **Armed conflict dataset includes conflicts in which battle deaths reach 500 at a rate of 100/yr.** **Provides estimates of civilian fatalities from factors (e.g. disease, famine) caused by war.**

Fearon and Laitin 2003 **Covers 1945-1999**	**James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin** **Published in *American Political Science Review***	**Includes civil wars that meet the 1000-death thresholds with at least 100 annually.** **Excludes:** • **conflicts in which the state is not a party (e.g. conflicts between non-state militias and clans);** • **state-led massacres when there is no organized opposition.**
IISS Armed Conflict Database **Covers 1997 to present**	**Hanna Ucko, International Institute for Strategic Studies**	**Updated sub-annually, but does not disaggregate data by year.** **Tracks international armed border and territorial conflicts, internal conflicts, and terrorism.** **Includes information on political status, fatalities, refugees, economic costs and weapons.**
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.1.1, Covers 2002 - 2005	**Joakim Kreutz and Kristine Eck, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**	**A conflict-year dataset with information of communal and organized armed conflict where none of the parties is the government of a state.**

Source: Eck, K. 2003 'A Beginner's Guide To Conflict Data: Finding And Using The Right Dataset,' UCDP Paper No. 1, Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Appendix 4: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2005

Major Conflict >1,000 Battle Deaths	Conflict Period	Population 1995 (millions)	Cross-Border Refugees in Year of Greatest Displacement: Number of Refugees (a)	Year	Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Year of Greatest Displacement**: Number of IDPs	Year	Source
Angola	**1975*-2004**	**12.3**	**470,267**	**2001**	**4,000,000**	**2001**	**IISS (b)**
Burundi	**1991-2005**	**6.2**	**871,319**	**1993**	**500,000**	**2002**	**IISS**
Chad	**1965*-2005**	**7.2**	**234,260**	**1981**	**n.d.**		
Congo (Brazzaville)	**1993-2002**	**2.8**	**28,958**	**2003**	**300,000**	**2001**	**IISS**
Dem Rep. of Congo	**1996-2001**	**45.3**	**461,037**	**2004**	**4,000,000**	**2003**	**IISS**
Eritrea	**1998-2000**	**3.2**	**503,200**	**1992**	**> 500,000**	**2001**	**IISS**
Ethiopia	**1976*-1991 and 1996-2005**	**60.3**	**2,567,998**	**1980**	**n.d.**		
Guinea-Bissau	**1998-1999**	**1.2**	**8,887**	**1998**	**531,616**	**2003**	**UNHCR (a)**
Liberia	**1989-2003**	**2.1**	**797,835**	**1994**	**>310,000**	**2004**	**IISS**
Mozambique	**1977*-1992**	**15.9**	**1,445,474**	**1992**	**n.d**		
Rwanda	**1990-2002**	**5.6**	**2,257,514**	**1994**	**625,000**	**1998**	**UNHCR**
Sierra Leone	**1991-2000**	**4.1**	**488,869**	**1999**	**> 250,000**	**2001**	**IISS**
Somalia	**1981-2005**	**6.2**	**812,195**	**1992**	**>400,000**	**2002**	**IISS**
South Africa	**1966*-1988**	**44.0**	**29,560**	**1984**	**n.d.**		
Sudan	**1983-2005**	**29.5**	**730,647**	**2004**	**7,355,00**	**2005**	**IISS**
Uganda	**1977*-2005**	**21.3**	**306,060**	**1995**	**1,600,000**	**2005**	**IISS**
Minor Conflict 25-999 Battle Deaths							
Burkina Faso	**1985 and 1987**	**10.3**	**978**	**2002**	**n.d.**		
Cameroon	**1984 and 1996**	**14.1**	**9101**	**2005**	**n.d.**		
Central African Rep.	**2001-2002**	**3.4**	**42,890**	**2005**	**212,000**	**2007**	**IDMC (c)**
Comoros	**1989 and 1997**	**.61**	**2**	**1997**	**n.d.**		
Côte d'Ivoire	**2002-2004**	**15.0**	**33,637**	**2003**	**< 1,000,000**	**2003**	**IISS**
Djibouti	**1991-1994**	**.62**	**18,101**	**1996**	**n.d.**		
Gambia	**1981**	**1.2**	**1,683**	**2005**	**n.d.**		
Ghana	**1981 and 1983**	**17.9**	**18,433**	**2005**	**n.d.**		
Guinea	**2000-2001**	**7.3**	**5,820**	**2005**	**n.d.**		
Kenya	**1982**	**27.4**	**9,570**	**1997**	**431,000**	**2002**	**IDCM**
Lesotho	**1998**	**1.7**	**7**	**2004**	**n.d.**		
Mali	**1990-1994**	**8.7**	**172,905**	**1994**	**3,000**	**1994**	**UNHCR**
Niger	**1992-1997**	**10.3**	**22,307**	**1993**	**n.d.**		
Nigeria	**2004**	**109.0**	**24,568**	**2002**	**~ 810,000**	**2003**	**IISS**
Senegal	**1990-2003**	**9.1**	**60,006**	**1990**	**64,000**	**2005**	**IISS**
Togo	**1986 and 1991**	**4.6**	**291,060**	**1993**	**1,500**	**2006**	**IDMC**

*** Onset of the armed conflict was before 1980. ** Year of 'greatest displacement' for which data is available. Data is not available for all years. n.d.: no data**

Sources: (a) UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR definition: Refugees represent total refugees originating from the country, both assisted and unassisted by the UNHCR. IDPs: UNHCR's IDP statistics

are not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country but are exclusively limited to the ones who are protected and/or assisted by the Office.
(b) IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database
(c) IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Appendix 5: Change in Under 5 Mortality Rates (per 1000 persons) in Years prior to Outbreak of War

Country	2 most recent years prior to war with available data	Conflict Period	Change in Under 5 Mortality Rate before War
Central Africa Republic	1995-2000	2001-2002	13
Côte D'Ivoire	1995 and 2000	2002-2004	13
Uganda	1970 and 1975	1977-2005	9
Burundi	1985 and 1990	1991-2005	0
Democratic Republic of Congo	1990 and 1995	1996-2001	0
Niger	1985 and 1990	1992-1997	0
Lesotho	1990 and 1995	1998	-11
Sudan	1978-1982	1983-2005	-11
Sierra Leone	1985 and 1990	1991-2000	-13
Togo	1980 and 1985	1986 and 1991	-13
Ghana	1975 and 1980	1981 and 1983	-14
Rwanda	1985 and 1990	1990-2002	-14
Congo (Brazzaville)	1980 and 1990	1993-2002	-15
Guinea-Bissau	1990 and 1995	1998-1999	-18
Comoros (b)	1990 and 1995	1997	-19
Angola	1970 and 1975	1975-2004	-20
Mozambique	1970 and 1975	1977-1992	-20
Senegal	1985 and 1990	1990-2003	-22
Nigeria	1995 and 2000	2004	-23
Cameroon	1975 and 1980	1984-1996	-24
Kenya	1975 and 1980	1982	-24
Eritrea	1990 and 1995	1998-2000	-25
Mali	1985 and 1990	1990-1994	-25
Guinea	1995 and 2000	2000-2001	-25
Ethiopia	1990 and 1995	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	-26
Burkina Faso	1980 and 1985	1985 and 1987	-26
Liberia	1970 and 1980	1989-2003	-28
Djibouti	1980 and 1990	1991-1994	-30
Gambia	1975 and 1980	1981	-47
Comoros (a)	1970 and 1980	1989	-50
Chad	1960-1964	1965-2005	N/A
Somalia	1980	1981-2005	N/A
South Africa	1961-1965	1966-1988	N/A

Average Change in Under-5 Mortality Rate for all of sub-Saharan Africa from 1980-2005 was -7 (per 1000).
Definition: Under-5 mortality rate is the probability that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. The probability is expressed as a rate per 1,000.
Source: Harmonized estimates of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and vital registration, supplemented by World Bank estimates based on household surveys and vital registration.

Appendix 6: Indicators on Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk

		Failed State Index 2007			MAR
Country	Conflict Period	Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia*	Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines*	Rise of Factionalized Elites*	Aggregate Differential Index - Mean Index of Cultural, Economic, and Political Differentials among Groups within Countries (1980-2000)**
Angola	1975-2004	5.9	8.7	7.5	6.0
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	6.4	8.9	7.7	..
Burundi	1991-2005	6.7	8.8	7.5	10.5
Cameroon	1984-1996	7.0	8.7	8.0	7.0
Central Africa Republic	2001-2002	8.8	8.6	9.3	..
Chad	1965-2005	9.5	9.0	9.7	9.0
Comoros	1989 and 1997	5.3	6.1	6.5	..
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993-2002	6.8	8.1	7.2	0.5
Côte D'Ivoire	2002-2004	9.8	8.0	9.3	14.0
Democratic Republic of Congo	1996-2001	8.8	9.1	8.6	7.6
Djibouti	1991-1994	5.5	6.1	6.9	10.0
Eritrea	1998-2000	5.4	5.9	7.2	9.0
Ethiopia	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	7.8	8.6	8.9	10.4
Gambia	1981	4.2	7.0	5.9	..
Ghana	1981 and 1983	5.1	6.8	3.5	6.7
Guinea	2000-2001	8.1	8.5	9.0	8.0
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	5.4	8.6	6.8	..
Kenya	1982	6.9	8.1	8.2	8.0
Lesotho	1998	5.5	5.5	6.7	..
Liberia	1989-2003	6.5	8.3	8.1	12.0
Mali	1990-1994	6.1	6.6	3.7	11.0
Mozambique	1977-1992	4.7	7.2	5.6	..
Niger	1992-1997	8.9	7.2	6.0	9.7
Nigeria	2004	9.5	9.1	9.6	8.8
Rwanda	1990-2002	8.7	7.1	8.2	6.0
Senegal	1990-2003	5.2	6.9	3.8	8.0
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	7.1	8.7	7.7	5.8
Somalia	1981-2005	8.5	7.5	10.0	2.5
Sudan	1983-2005	10.0	9.1	9.7	12.0
Togo	1986 and 1991	6.0	7.5	7.6	8.0
Uganda	1977-2005	8.5	8.5	7.8	10.1

Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia:* History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries; Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups; Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression; Institutionalized political exclusion; Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of 'hate' radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines:* Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs and economic status; Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels; Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

Rise of Factionalized Elites:* Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines; Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a 'Greater Serbia') or of communal solidarity (e.g. 'ethnic cleansing' or 'defending the faith').

Aggregate Intergroup Differentials Index:** ADI is based upon the total differences checked and rated for 18 cultural, economic and political differences including income, land/property, higher education, presence in commerce, access to power, access to civil service, legal protection, etc. Accessed from Minorities At Risk (MAR) website on October 19, 2007 <>.

***Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).**

****Range of ADI:** The ADI ranges from -2 (lowest) to 18 (highest).

Appendix 6.2: Structural Conditions and Conflict Risk

		Failed State Index 2007				
Country	Conflict Period	Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors*	Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitar-ian Emergencies*	Mounting Demographic Pressures*	Youth Bulge: Percentage of 15-24 year olds in total adult population (15-64 yrs. old) in 2005	Share of Primary Commod-ity Exports in GDP (2000) as a percent-age (excluding petroleum)
Angola	1975-2004	7.6	7.5	8.5	37.4	0.5
Burkina Faso	1985 and 1987	7.0	5.6	8.6	37.6	6.0
Burundi	1991-2005	9.0	8.9	9.1	39.8	5.7
Cameroon	1984-1996	7.0	6.8	7.0	36.1	10.7
Central Africa Republic	2001-2002	9.0	8.4	8.9	35.6	9.4
Chad	1965-2005	9.0	8.9	9.1	51.3	7.0
Comoros	1989 and 1997	6.9	3.6	6.2	44.9	3.2
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993-2002	7.4	7.3	8.7	44.6	4.4
Côte d'Ivoire	2002-2004	9.8	8.3	8.6	45.5	23.8
Democratic Republic of Congo	1996-2001	9.6	8.9	9.4	52.5	5.1
Djibouti	1991-1994	7.6	6.5	7.9	34.3	3.9
Eritrea	1998-2000	6.5	7.1	8.1	37.8	0.9
Ethiopia	1976-1991 and 1996-2005	6.7	7.9	9.0	35.8	6.4
Gambia	1981	6.2	5.2	6.4	31.3	9.2
Ghana	1981 and 1983	4.7	4.5	6.0		20.8
Guinea	2000-2001	8.5	7.4	7.8	34.7	14.6
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	7.2	6.5	7.6	35.6	35.3
Kenya	1982	7.2	8.0	8.4	38.8	10.8
Lesotho	1998	6.2	4.5	9.0	39.5	0.8
Liberia	1989-2003	9.0	8.5	8.1	37.9	16.5
Mali	1990-1994	6.9	4.4	8.5	39.0	11.1
Mozambique	1977-1992	5.9	2.2	7.5	35.3	4.7
Niger	1992-1997	8.0	5.9	9.2	33.6	12.9
Nigeria	2004	5.7	5.6	8.2	36.5	1.3
Rwanda	1990-2002	6.6	7.0	9.1	43.9	2.4
Senegal	1990-2003	5.5	4.5	7.0	35.6	10.1
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	7.0	7.4	8.6	33.1	5.3
Somalia	1981-2005	10.0	9.0	9.2	33.9	3.3
Sudan	1983-2005	9.8	9.8	9.2	33.8	3.2
Togo	1986 and 1991	6.6	5.4	7.5	36.0	14.2
Uganda	1977-2005	7.4	9.4	8.1	40.1	7.8

The Failed State Index: The FSI uses software to index and scan tens of thousands of open-source articles and reports. The data is electronically gathered using a data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies and corporate financial filings. The software calculates the number of positive and negative 'hits' for the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the articles themselves, when necessary, to confirm the scores and ensure accuracy. For more information regarding the methodology used to calculate the Failed State Index visit <www.fundforpeace.org.>.

Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors:* Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict; Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies:* Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).

Mounting Demographic Pressures:* Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship; Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards; Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a 'youth or age bulge,' or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups.

Youth Bulge, Percentage of 15-24 year olds in total adult population (15-64 yrs old) in 2005 - Sources: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat

Share of Primary Commodity Exports in GDP (2000) as a percentage (excluding petroleum) - Sources: United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 2003, accessed online October 20, 2007, http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/comm_docs/cybframes.htm>.

****Range of Index is 10 (worst rating) to 0 (best).**