JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development
December 2023

A NEW WAY OF WORKING TO SUPPORT REFUGEES

PUTTING THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS INTO ACTION IN AFRICA

Atsushi HANATANI, Ph.D.

JICA Project History Series No.5

A New Way of Working to Support Refugees

Putting the Humanitarian-Development Nexus into Action in Africa

An Omnibus of Histories

Atsushi Hanatani, Ph.D.

December 2023

JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute
for Peace and Development

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Preface

The effects of conflict, political instability, and violent extremism have deprived people of the lives they had previously led, forcing them to move away from their homelands and live in unfamiliar communities. Some refugees are not just temporarily displaced but compelled to restart their lives from scratch in order to survive. In recent years, there has been a marked increase in news reports on the number of refugees, particularly those from Afghanistan and from Ukraine.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a government organization tasked with implementing Japanese bilateral aid, has been given the mission of contributing to the long-term social and economic development of the countries with which it works. In contrast, refugee assistance is a response to emergency situations where people are forcibly displaced, and the activities to provide support have mainly fallen under the responsibility of international organizations, NGOs, and other emergency humanitarian aid agencies. For this reason, the scope of JICA's engagements in the field of refugee assistance has been limited for many years. However, as the periods of displacement are protracted and situations become more intractable, the human security of many refugees is increasingly endangered.

This book is a historical account of JICA's engagement in the support of refugees in Uganda, a country that has accepted many refugees from neighboring countries. It summarizes the history of cooperation by the Japanese government and JICA to work for the refugees. The author, who was directly involved in the process in his capacity as a JICA official, provides a detailed picture of the situation at the time. The story starts with the author's own experiences of being evacuated from South Sudan and shows how his own circumstances led him to start providing support for refugees. The story further describes the process of drafting JICA's cooperation policy for refugees amid the international humanitarian crises during the 2010s. It covers the circumstances in which this new approach was put in place in Uganda and the impact of JICA's cooperation to support the refugees and host communities, as well as the significance of Japan's involvement in addressing protracted refugee situations in Africa. This book is the result of our desire to share thoughts with readers concerning how the international community and Japan should be involved in the

large-scale outflows of refugees, which is a growing international concern.

This is the story of Japan and JICA's support for protracted refugee situations in Uganda—a story that might usually be overlooked in the mundane, day-to-day running of a government agency. This publication, however, is expected to provide readers with an opportunity to learn more about the fascinating world of development cooperation.

The Project History series of the JICA Ogata Research Institute is published with the aim of reconstructing the history of JICA projects from a broad perspective, while tracing specific and individual facts carefully. In this series, we have so far published thirty-five books in Japanese, six in English including this volume. This book is the fourth on peacebuilding in English, valuable addition to previous volumes on Bosnia and Herzegovina (Volume 1), the Philippines (Volume 2), and South Sudan (Volume 3). I hope readers are interested in this ever-expanding series and look at some of the other volumes as well.

Yoichi Mine
Executive Director
JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute
for Peace and Development

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
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

Printing date: 30 May 2018 **Sources:** UNCS, UNHCR **Author:** UNHCR - HQ Geneva **Feedback:** mapping@unhcr.org **Filename:** uga_reference_gr17

Source: UNHCR

Refugee settlement (Adjumani District)
Photograph: Courtesy of author

South Sudanese refugees arriving in Uganda
Photograph: Courtesy of author

A primary school classroom in a refugee hosting community
Photograph: JICA

A health clinic in the refugee hosting community
Photograph: JICA

1. Evacuation from South Sudan and "Refugee-zation"

December 23, 2013. On that unforgettable day, I was alone in a hotel restaurant in Nairobi, Kenya. There were no other customers, probably because everyone had gone home for the Christmas holidays. I was relieved and thankful to have evacuated safely from the chaos and gunfire of South Sudan, but at the same time, I was worried about the future of myself and the South Sudanese.

A little more than a week earlier, late at night on December 15, armed clashes broke out in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, between the president's supporters and the former vice president's faction. As the unrest spread across the country, it became increasingly difficult to secure food and fuel. In addition, reports that rebel forces were approaching Juba prompted all 44 members of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to evacuate the country. Thanks to the desperate efforts of JICA office staff and headquarters personnel, we were able to use commercial flights and government evacuation flights to complete our departure after the airport reopened, completing the evacuation by December 22. As the head of JICA's South Sudan office, I was the last one to evacuate to Nairobi on the following day, returning safely to Japan on December 25.

To trace the story's origins, we have to go back ten years. JICA, under the direction of then President Sadako Ogata, began its work in North and South Sudan immediately after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. I was in charge of North-South Sudan cooperation and continued to be involved until May 2007. Later, in July

Aboard the emergency evacuation flight from Juba
Photograph: Courtesy of Hiroaki Nakatsubo

2011, I participated in a ceremony held in Juba commemorating South Sudan's Independence, and in August of the same year, I was assigned as the Director of the JICA South Sudan Office, which had been upgraded from the previous sub-office. While living in prefabricated buildings and small rooms made from a converted container with temperatures exceeding 40°C during the dry season, the staff and I were doing our utmost to help build the new country. However, due to the aforementioned armed conflict, everyone had to leave the country temporarily. We worried about what would become of all our efforts to date because of the chaos and what would happen to the people of South Sudan and to us.

After returning to Japan, I had little time to catch my breath as the end of the year approached. I was busy providing reports on what had occurred to the JICA management and other colleagues of JICA, explaining to external parties the policies and procedures for conducting business for the time being and responding to requests for media interviews. The JICA headquarters had allocated a small meeting room for our sudden return, but I am sorry to say that it was much too cramped. If one of us caught a cold in the unaccustomed chilly weather, we all got sick in no time. When I saw that my colleagues in the headquarters building were having trouble securing meeting rooms because of our presence, I felt uncomfortable, and after a month, we moved to the JICA Research Institute in Ichigaya, Tokyo. There was no place to settle for "evacuees" like us.

By the end of January 2014, it had become clear that the security situation in South Sudan was unlikely to improve in the short term, and we were forced to temporarily suspend or review our project contracts in South Sudan. Around this time, some of our staff members asked about leaving Tokyo and returning to the region, working from countries neighboring South Sudan and continuing our projects by providing remote support. In the face of an uncertain future, rather than continuing to do paperwork, terminating and reviewing contracts in Japan, they wanted to move as close as possible to South Sudan and continue to help the country. I fully understood this desire, and I felt it was important for morale to act on this recommendation. I contacted the head of our office in the neighboring country of Uganda, who was fortunately not opposed to accepting us. After coordinating with the relevant offices, it was decided that we would be reassigned to Uganda from the end of March. It was our third relocation in just four months.

In Uganda, we received workspace in the JICA office and resumed operations in April. Kampala, the capital of Uganda, has developed in such a way that it is difficult to believe it is right next door to South Sudan. There were very few problems with shopping or eating out. Above all, we always had a warm shower at the hotel. Once life settled down, we invited the South Sudanese government officials involved in our projects—those that had been spared from suspension—to Uganda and resumed our support. We were happy to find that our counterparts from Juba, with whom we worked closely until just a short while ago, were safe and we would be able to engage them again.

On the other hand, the local media was reporting on the hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese refugees fleeing to Uganda. Some of our project counterparts evacuated their families and relatives to Uganda. The normal activity of government in a peaceful country—in which the state provides protection and services to its citizens—had been paralyzed. The premise of promoting development through government-to-government cooperation, which is the most basic form of development assistance, had collapsed by this point. The fruits of any aid provided to the government would certainly take a long time to reach the people. We did not know how long our stay in Kampala would be, but in addition to working with South Sudanese officials invited to Uganda, we were inclined to consider the possibility of providing aid directly to South Sudanese refugees in Uganda. But was this—providing direct support to refugees—the role of humanitarian aid and not of development assistance?

I was pondering this vaguely when I heard that a donor group in Uganda

South Sudanese refugees arriving in Uganda
Photograph: Courtesy of Hiroaki Nakatsubo

that supports northern Uganda was planning to organize a joint visit to the refugee-hosting area in the north. Originally, this was an event meant for aid-related personnel and diplomats based in Uganda working for northern Uganda reconstruction. I was particularly interested in what the people of South Sudan, who were now experiencing the same situation I had found myself in just a short while ago, were faring. With this in mind, I immediately applied to participate. In early May 2014, I joined other participating donors and a JICA expert working in northern Uganda to visit Arua, Koboko, and Adjumani districts in the West Nile sub-region, as well as the town of Eleg, on the border between Uganda and South Sudan.

During this visit, we observed South Sudanese refugee settlements that have existed in Adjumani District since the 1990s. In the border town, we saw a group of refugee mothers and their children who had fled from South Sudan on a truck. The anxious gazes of those waiting to be registered at the temporary registration office set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had something in common with those of us living in Uganda with no clear future.

As we continued our tour, we visited a rice mill in a warehouse that had been built with support from Denmark. The bags of rice piled up there were produced and sold not only by Ugandans but also by South Sudanese refugees who had been there for a long time, or so I was told. In Uganda, refugees are given small plots of land and are allowed to grow crops. We heard that some refugees produce rice for subsistence, but it can also be sold as a cash crop to earn an income. The rice milling machine used in the warehouse was said to have been provided by Japanese aid. It was nice to see our aid being used in such places.

Incidentally, before I departed on the trip, UNHCR officials visited the JICA Uganda office in Kampala to ask if we could provide training on rice cultivation techniques to the refugees. JICA had been providing such technical support to Ugandan farmers for many years. According to the discussion between JICA Uganda office and the UNHCR at the time, the technical training for refugees would be targeting those in the southwestern part of the country, where JICA was already cooperating with the rice project. I wondered during the drive back to Kampala if we could somehow expand these efforts to the north as well.

After returning to Kampala, I talked with the South Sudan office staff and Uganda office staff about the situation of the north and the South Sudanese refugees there and asked them if we could also target South Sudanese refugees in the north through this rice project. Since this project and its budget are under the jurisdiction of the JICA Uganda Office, it was necessary to ask for its support. Fortunately, the director of the Uganda office at the time and the person in charge were understanding and replied that they would consider it. I was very grateful and thought that we could go ahead and begin the project when I received a letter from headquarters ordering me home. Nearly three years had elapsed since I was appointed as the head of the South Sudan Office, so perhaps JICA Headquarters thought it was time to send me home.

My time in Uganda ended after only two months. I left for Japan at the end of May 2014, leaving the affairs in the hands of the South Sudan and Uganda offices. I later learned that the above idea was realized thanks to the efforts of Tomoki Kobayashi, Deputy Director of the South Sudan Office, and his team as well as the staff of the Uganda Office. This support continues today.

2. How International Society Responded to the Massive Outflow of Refugees and Migrants

JICA's support for South Sudanese refugees in Uganda began in this way, gaining entry into this area through the good offices of others. And now, today, JICA's cooperation projects in Uganda for refugees from South Sudan are officially recognized.

However, originally, refugee[1] assistance was not the domain of a so-called development assistance organization such as JICA. Refugee outflows are emergencies, and the movement of refugees and the humanitarian problems they face in their countries of asylum should be handled by the United Nations, NGOs, and other emergency humanitarian aid agencies. Development assistance agencies have the primary mission of supporting the longer-term social and economic development of our partner countries. In addition, refugees are not citizens of the host country, and the government of the host country has no lawful reason or need to allocate its own development assistance or budgetary resources to them.

[1] See Column 1 for the definition of refugees.

The common wisdom is that refugee problems[2] are not a matter for the host country but instead an international one, and that it is best left to the international community to deal with it. This understanding was largely the same within JICA.

However, reality always intrudes into existing frameworks and demands new responses. Conflicts that lead to the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons have been prolonged in recent years and can take a long time to resolve. As a result, refugees and internally displaced persons are living in asylum longer. The emergency humanitarian response to this has been overwhelmed by the succession of new conflicts and refugees that have emerged around the world, while the international community's interest in the "old" refugee crisis slowly wanes and funding tapers off. New sources of funding are then needed to support the livelihoods of the old refugees. But where would this funding come from?

UNHCR has been aware of this problem since the 1980s and has launched various initiatives to promote the linkage of humanitarian aid and development assistance to refugees. One of the alternatives is to use development assistance funds. However, none of these initiatives has attracted much international attention, and development donors have not allocated their limited resources to refugee issues. This is because many of the refugee problems are in Africa and Afghanistan, for example, far away from the Western countries that lead international public opinion and are therefore of little concern to them. The same is true for Japan. Since 2010, however, something has occurred that has drastically changed this situation. The so-called "Arab Spring" in the Middle East prompted active anti-government movement for democracy in the region. Amid this, the Syrian civil war brought a massive outflow of refugees and immigrants.

By 2014, the Syrian civil war had displaced more than ten million people. About four million of them fled to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan as refugees, some of them to the European Union (EU) countries. Many people from Afghanistan and Africa also became refugees at this time, with 630,000 applying for asylum in the EU. The media coverage of

[2] In this chapter, "refugee problem" refers to the whole host of issues that arise from the displacement, receiving, stay in the host country, and repatriation of refugees. It should be noted that not all refugee-related events are "problems" and that there are positive aspects, such as the revitalization of local economies, that result from the acceptance of refugees.

refugees attempting to reach European shores via sea routes also brought the issue of refugees and migration to the attention of the world. In 2015, several European countries accepted more than 160,000 refugees who flooded into Italy, Greece, and Hungary.

These events brought refugee and immigrant issues to the forefront of international attention. In May 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey, and in September 2016, the United Nations adopted the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants.[3] These actions led to the signing in December 2018 of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration. These conferences and declarations focused on how the international community can share the burden of refugees in protracted situations rather than leaving it up to the host nations.

After returning to Japan in May 2014, I worked for one year at the JICA Research Institute before being assigned to the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Office in April 2015. In the course of my daily work, I was confronted with the problems of refugees in the Middle East and Europe mentioned above, as well as with the growing international debate over refugee assistance. I had to work out how JICA could contribute to these international discussions, to which the Japanese government was also committed. After much debate, JICA decided to become fully involved in providing assistance to refugees in protracted situations. One of the main target countries was Uganda, where I was later assigned and became involved in refugee assistance.

This book describes a small effort of JICA in Uganda that began with my personal experience of "becoming a refugee," and eventually involved the Japanese government and JICA in developing an organizational response to refugee problems that has attracted increasing international attention. It also looks at the impact this support had on the refugees and host communities. Together with the readers of this book, I would like to consider ways that international society—and Japan in particular—can be involved in addressing refugee issues in Africa and other parts of the world today.

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[3] The New York Declaration was adopted by 193 member nations and was the first time for the UN General Assembly to discuss issues related to migration and refugees at the global level. Annex II of the Declaration set in motion discussions leading to two global compacts on refugees and migration respectively.

Column 1
Who are Refugees?

According to UNHCR's *Global Trends Report 2020*, an annual statistical report, the number of people, including refugees, "forcibly displaced…by persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order" totaled about 82.4 million by the end of 2020 (UNHCR 2021).[4] This is equivalent to approximately 1% of the world's current population of 7.8 billion people. Compared to the previous year, 2019 (79.5 million), this is a four percent increase—the ninth consecutive year of annual increase. It also means a doubling of the number of refugees compared to 2010, when it was 41 million.[5]

Of the total number of these "displaced" persons (82.4 million), 32% are refugees (20.7 million under UNHCR mandate assisted persons and 5.7 million Palestinians under UNHCR mandate[6]), 58% (or 48 million) are internally displaced persons, 5% (4.1 million) are asylum seekers, and others make up the remaining percentages (see graph on page 22).[7]

Those whom UNHCR refers to as "displaced" include refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers, but these terms require a bit of explanation.

According to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter,

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4 UNHCR, *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2020*, p. 2 (https://www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2020).

5 As of May 2022, another eight million people are said to have been forced to flee their homes (including six million who crossed the border) due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 (UNHCR: Ukraine, Other Conflicts Push Forcibly Displaced Total over 100 million for First Time, Press Release, May 23, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/5/628a389e4/unhcr-ukraine-other-conflicts-push-forcibly-displaced-total-100-million.html).

6 For Palestinian refugees, another UN organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), is responsible for providing assistance.

7 Other refugees include those from Venezuela, where the economic situation is unstable.



Source: UNHCR Global forced displacement

Global Trend of Forced Displacement

collectively referred to as the Refugee Convention)[8] refugees are defined as persons who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (including stateless persons who have left their country of residence).

According to this definition, a refugee is a person who meets the two requirements of "having suffered or being likely to suffer persecution" and "being outside his or her country of nationality," and is called a Convention refugee, in the narrow sense of the term. Later, in the 1960s, this definition was expanded to include people who sought asylum in other countries to escape political persecution, armed conflict, or human rights violations. These people are referred to as Conflict refugees, defining refugees in the broader sense of the term.

A key element of the Refugee Convention is the non-refoulement principle, which recognizes the right not to be expelled from the

[8] The 1967 Protocol removed the Convention's time limitation of "as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951," and the optional clause on the territories to which signatories are obligated (signatories could choose whether or not they were obligated to accept only those refugees originating in the European area).

country where refugees have fled to. However, a person is not considered a refugee simply because he or she has fled to another country. Those who have sought refuge in the host countries are called asylum seekers, which refers to the requirement to undergo a thorough assessment of their cases by the government of the host country before they can be given the status of refugees.

On the other hand, those displaced from their homes due to conflict or other reasons but remain within their country without crossing borders are referred to as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Globally, the number of IDPs is much larger than the number of refugees. Originally, IDPs were not included in the above-mentioned refugee conventions and were not protected under international law, but since the early 1990s, they have also been subject to UNHCR protection and assistance.[9]

Today, the term "forcibly displaced persons" is used to refer to refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, and others, and the phenomenon is referred to as "forced displacement." This term is also used in this book when no distinction is made between refugees and IDPs.

[9] The first internally displaced persons to receive UNHCR protection and assistance were the displaced Kurds in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. It is well known that Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner of UNHCR, made the decision to provide protection in this instance, contrary to conventional practice.

Chapter 1
The Start of Refugee Assistance in Uganda

As discussed in the Prologue, JICA's support for refugees in Uganda began in 2014, when I was displaced from South Sudan and began my temporary stay in Uganda. After returning from Uganda, my initial idea was further developed by the Uganda office staff and the South Sudan office staff who remained in Uganda and implemented through the support of various stakeholders.

All of these assistance efforts were focused on northern Uganda. JICA's involvement in refugee issues in northern Uganda was based on JICA's own long history of providing assistance in northern Uganda. I will begin by describing this history here.

1.1 Underdevelopment in Northern Uganda due to Civil War and Conflict

The Republic of Uganda (Uganda) is a landlocked country in Eastern Africa, bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Tanzania. It has a land area of approximately 200,000 square kilometers and a population of about 4,100,000 as of 2020, with an estimated annual population growth rate of 3%. Uganda's annual GDP per capita was US$918 in 2020, meaning that it is categorized as a low-income and least-developed country. The country's human development index was 0.544, ranking it 159th in the world (UNDP 2020).

After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1962, Uganda underwent several changes of government until 1986, when the current president, Yoweri Museveni, took power. During that time, a number of armed clashes took place between the old and new regimes, along with the repression of the former members of government by the new regime. The area most recently affected by this conflict has been northern Uganda.

President Museveni, from the southwest, overthrew President Okello, who was from the Acholi region in the north. Since 1986, an anti-Museveni movement has been active in northern Uganda, driven by fears of government repression. At the center of this movement is the

"Lord's Resistance Army," an armed insurgent group formed in 1987 and led by Joseph Kony. The LRA, as it is known locally, has been attacking settlements, looting, killing, and abducting people, including children, mainly in the Acholi and Lango regions of northern Uganda. The LRA has been involved in a number of crimes against humanity, one of them being the recruiting of as many as 20,000 child soldiers. Since 1991, the conflict has escalated as government forces have begun a full-scale campaign to eradicate the LRA. In addition, the government forcibly relocated entire villages to prevent the LRA from abducting people, resulting in the creation of an estimated 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Beginning in the 2000s, the government of Sudan, which had supported the LRA, began to decrease its support to them, and as a result of the Ugandan government having stepped up its mop-up operations against the insurgents, the LRA was weakened and forced to move to the DRC. In 2004, the Ugandan government brought Kony and other militants before the International Criminal Court. This was followed by a ceasefire agreement in 2006, thanks to the efforts of the government



Source: Wikimedia Commons

Northern Uganda and the LRA's area of influence (shown as yellow-shaded area)

of Southern Sudan, which facilitated peace negotiations.[10] As a result, the security situation in northern Uganda began to improve, and IDPs gradually returned to their villages. Unfortunately, the conflict has not been officially resolved to date due to Kony's refusal to recognize the final peace agreement just prior to its signing.

As a result of the armed clashes and repression associated with the LRA conflict, the northern region of Uganda was socially and economically left behind compared to the southern area. The resettlement of returnees and the rehabilitation of their livelihoods were also major challenges. The Government of Uganda formulated the first Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) in 2007 and, with the help of international donors, began to support the reconstruction of the northern part of the country. The PRDP was followed by PRDP2 from 2012 to 2015 and PRDP3 from 2016 to 2020, and reconstruction and development were carried out under each plan.

To support this initiative, the Japanese government and JICA launched the Reconstruction Assistance Programme (REAP) in northern Uganda in 2009 and set the Japanese fiscal year 2015 as its target year for the realization of its program objectives of helping IDPs. The Japanese government as a whole emphasized the following three aims in the REAP program: (1) basic infrastructure development and community revitalization, (2) local government capacity building, and (3) livelihood improvement.

REAP was set to end in March 2016, but in light of the high evaluation of the program by the government of Uganda and the international community and the extension of the PRDP itself, the Japanese government decided to extend the REAP for an additional five years from April 2016 to 2021. REAP2 was designed to support the transition from reconstruction to development in the Acholi sub-region while expanding the scope of support to the West Nile sub-region. The West Nile sub-region has historically been a frontier region of Uganda and has been neglected in terms of its development—even more than the Acholi—due in part to the conflict that began in the late 1970s.

[10] Between the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and independence in July 2011, the region that corresponds to today's South Sudan was called Southern Sudan under the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan.

This is the background against which the refugee assistance in northern Uganda, including the West Nile sub-region, was initiated.

1.2 Rice and Job Training that Commenced as a Support Program for Refugees

Two projects were initiated after I, along with others in the South Sudan office, had fled from Uganda. One was the Promotion of Rice Development (PRiDe) Project, which was implemented in Uganda to teach rice cultivation techniques to refugees. The other was the Project for Improvement of Basic Skills and Vocational Training in Southern Sudan (SAVOT) Project.

1.2.1 Teaching Rice Cultivation Techniques through the PRiDe Project

The following section introduces the PRiDe Project, which was developed to teach rice cultivation techniques.

In the first place, readers may wonder whether refugees in Uganda needed to learn rice cultivation techniques and whether they had access to the land to make use of them. In fact, some of the refugees in Uganda are not only cultivating the land given to them in their settlements (see Column 5) but also using land they rented from Ugandans in the surrounding areas for their own consumption and for cash. Rice is one of the most popular cash crops, and JICA has been promoting a type of upland rice called NERICA rice for use in Uganda.[11] It can be cultivated with rainwater even without irrigation facilities. This makes it possible and suitable for refugees who temporarily rent land for cultivation to grow rice.

Cooperation on research and dissemination of NERICA rice in Uganda began in the 2000s. The PRiDe project aims to increase rice production in Uganda by developing cultivation technologies in cooperation with agricultural research institutions, disseminating technologies to agricultural extension workers and farmers, and improving post-harvest processing technologies, especially rice milling. The first phase of the project was implemented from 2011 to 2019, and the second phase is currently being implemented from 2019 onward.

[11] The rice name "NERICA" means "New Rice for Africa."

(1) Background to Support

As mentioned in the Prologue, the first discussions about providing assistance to refugees with the help of the PRiDe Project began in April–May of 2014.

It began with a visit to the JICA Uganda office by representatives of the Uganda Office of UNHCR at the end of April. According to the records, the visit took place on April 28. Deputy Director Tomoki Kobayashi and I attended the meeting together with our JICA Uganda office colleagues.

The meeting began with a statement by UNHCR on their recognition of "the successful results of the upland rice cultivation training previously conducted by JICA in 2010 for refugees from DRC in the Nakivale refugee settlement. [UNHCR] viewed the possibility of promoting rice cultivation in the refugee settlements as a means of improving their livelihoods."[12] As such, UNHCR asked JICA if the organization could repeat this program in light of the increase in the number of refugees since the beginning of 2014. In addition to Nakivale, the potential sites proposed by UNHCR included Kiryandongo, Kyangwari, Chaka II, and Rwamanja; those settlements located in the southwestern part of the country (see map on p. 11).

In response, the JICA Uganda Office held discussions with experts from

Warehouse and rice milling machine in northern Uganda
Photograph: Courtesy of author

[12] The PRiDe Project's predecessor, the NERICA Rice Promotion Project, provided rice cultivation training to approximately 150 refugees from the DRC in the Nakivale refugee settlement from 2010 to 2011. Unfortunately, according to internal JICA documents, the target area was not necessarily suitable for rice cultivation, and the rice yield was not especially high after the training.

the PRiDe Project. At the time, the JICA Uganda Office was reasonably open to including refugees in the training program, given their past experience. However, the project experts were somewhat concerned about whether the UNHCR, a humanitarian aid organization, would understand what JICA, a development assistance organization that emphasized the capacity building of beneficiaries, was trying to achieve.[13] The project was not intended simply to increase the number of training beneficiaries or to distribute seeds to the participants but rather to improve the capacity of farmers through technical training. In addition, since Ugandan farmers are the intended beneficiaries of the training, their understanding would be a necessary precondition for including refugees in the project. These were perfectly reasonable requests, and so JICA decided to raise these points in its next meeting with UNHCR and to confirm their acceptance of these preconditions.

The next meeting between the JICA Uganda Office and UNHCR was held on May 8. There, we explained the Japanese side's position and received UNHCR's understanding. It was agreed that not only refugees but also Ugandan farmers in the area receiving refugees would be targeted for support. However, at that time, it was decided that the project would focus on settlements in southwestern Uganda, including Hoima and Masindi districts, where the project had worked with farmers in the past.

Parallel to this meeting, a joint field trip was held in the West Nile sub-region by donors in Uganda's northern region, as mentioned in the Prologue. Along with Yoshiyuki Takahashi, Director of JICA's Gulu Field Office,[14] I visited each of the districts of the West Nile sub-region and exchanged opinions with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the district government and the speaker of each district assembly. We also visited refugee reception facilities and support projects by other donors, such as Denmark.

I also had the opportunity to hear from local governments and UNHCR

[13] One indication of JICA's emphasis on technical training is the amount of seed given to trainee farmers after the NERICA rice training. JICA's usual practice was to give 1 kg of seeds to the trainee farmers, but in the past, UNHCR had expressed the opinion that this was too small a quantity to incentivize the trainees. In contrast, JICA argued that this amount was appropriate because it would be more encouraging for the trainees "to harvest 50 kgs of rice by planting 1 kg of seed."

[14] This was a former sub-office established by JICA in Gulu, the main city of the northern Acholi region, to support the implementation of REAP.

about the support needs of refugees and host communities. As I was still a member of the South Sudan Office at the time, I was looking for ways to provide support to South Sudanese people, namely the South Sudanese refugees.

As a result, I realized the potential of training in rice cultivation techniques for refugees through the PRiDe project. My own impressions of the trip, according to my notes and internal documents from the time, were as follows:

- Considering the local situation (food shortages in the host communities) and UNHCR's explanation of its support needs (training on agricultural production and post-harvest handling), the expansion of beneficiaries of the rice promotion project to include "host communities and refugees," which is being studied by JICA Uganda Office, is well worth considering.

- In addition to cassava and sorghum, rice is part of the staple diet of the Congolese people, especially in Arua and Koboko, who have similar dietary preferences and share borders with the DRC and South Sudan. As such, the marketability of rice is also expected to be sufficient.

- When we visited the project site supported by Danish funds, we saw a large amount of rice brought in by local farmers piled up in a warehouse. Two rice milling machines (one of which was originally used for a JICA project and was donated by the Sasakawa Foundation[15]) were being used to polish rice.

- In light of the above, from the viewpoint of the South Sudan Office, if the training through the above-mentioned rice promotion project was extended to the West Nile sub-region (especially Arua, Koboko), which was involved in receiving refugees following the crisis in South Sudan, it would be beneficial not only for the refugees hosted there but also for JICA in that it would give positive publicity of JICA's activities showcasing continued engagement for South Sudan from a neighboring country. I will submit this idea to the JICA Uganda Office for serious consideration.

[15] The Sasakawa Africa Association provided the rice milling machine.

After my return to Kampala, I explained to the staff of JICA South Sudan and Uganda offices the importance of providing technical support for rice cultivation to refugees and farmers in the West Nile sub-region through the PRiDe project. The Uganda office showed an interest in this idea, as it was perceived to provide a good entry point for JICA to extend assistance to the West Nile. By then, JICA had wanted to expand the target area of REAP2 to the West Nile sub-region, in addition to Acholi; but the identification and formation of support projects had not yet been done.

The Uganda Office and the project team's intentions thus overlapped with those of the South Sudan Office, including myself, and we were able to reach a basic agreement within JICA to include refugees in the northern region as beneficiaries of the training program. Based on this agreement, the project experts made another site visit to confirm the refugees' needs and the natural conditions in the area. Actual training began in the rainy season of late 2014. This support has continued to the present, with the project now in its second phase.

(2) Outline of Support

Given the limited number of agricultural extension agents in Uganda, the PRiDe project emphasizes a methodology of technology dissemination from farmers to farmers as well as from extension agents to farmers. There are three patterns of training.

The first is training for agricultural extension workers and farmers who are enthusiastic about farming and are willing to promote the technology to other farmers (farmer-instructors). It is known as Training of Trainers (TOT) and takes place over three days, including classroom and practical training.

The second is called TOF (Training of Farmers). This is a simple half-day training course for individual farmers, conducted by extension agents who have received training in TOT, and consists mainly of classroom lectures using poster materials. After attending the training, farmers receive 1 kg of seeds and a rice farming manual.

The third type of extension activity, the Musomesa Field Training Program (MFS), is provided by farmer instructors who have received

TOT.[16] Farmer-instructors trained in TOT and extension workers jointly set up an exhibition plot (mother demonstration site). This is then used as a training site for local farmers for a total of seven training sessions over a three-month period during one cropping season. Farmers who have received training at the mother demo site will then set up a demonstration plot in their own village (baby demo site) and serve as instructors to teach rice cultivation techniques to neighboring farmers.

This training is conducted by UNHCR, NGOs that operate in the settlements under contract with UNHCR (Implementing Partners (IPs)), relevant agencies of the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture (Regional Agricultural Development Offices, Uganda Agricultural Research Organization and its affiliated National Grain Resources Institute), and experts from JICA. The first step is for the UNHCR and IPs to prepare a list of training candidates, including refugees, which will be reviewed and finalized by all parties involved. The Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand, takes the lead in preparing training materials and seeds. The training is conducted by IPs under the supervision and support of JICA and the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture. After the training, monitoring is conducted by the IPs who are close to the field, and the achievement is reported to the relevant parties.

In the eight years from 2014 through 2021, 1,742 refugees received TOF training and 229 received MFS training. The number of Ugandan participants in the host communities during the same period was 800

Rice promotion training for refugees

Photographs: PRiDe Project

[16] *Musomesa* comes from the Ganda language, one of the main local languages of Uganda, and means "teacher."

in the TOF and 58 in the MFS.[17] Although the project team stated that "refugees are only additional" in terms of the target community for the training, the number of refugees trained by the project exceeded the number of Ugandan farmers.

The agricultural support for both refugees and local farmers has been provided through the combined efforts of UNHCR, JICA Uganda office, project staff, and South Sudan office staff, including myself, who happened to see the potential of rice cultivation on a field trip to the north.

1.2.2 Support for Vocational Training through the SAVOT Project

Another type of cooperation that took place during this period was the support of vocational training in construction, woodworking, and other fields.

As will be discussed later, refugees in Uganda are not dependent solely on humanitarian aid. They are allowed freedom of movement and can be employed or self-employed in Uganda. However, in order to increase their employment possibilities, they need to develop better vocational skills.

This component was initiated by Tomoki Kobayashi, Acting Director of the South Sudan Office at the time, and Shimpei Taguchi, who succeeded me in overseeing the overall initiative after my return to Japan in May 2014. The project was implemented through JICA's cooperation partner in South Sudan.

The history of the SAVOT project dates back to 2006, before the independence of South Sudan. In January 2005, a North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, and the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan was established within Sudan. The SAVOT project, which came into being at this point, was one of the first projects supported by JICA then.[18] It was a technical cooperation project aimed at strengthening vocational training capacity at the Juba Multiple Training Center (MTC),

[17] These figures come from records provided by the PRiDe Project.

[18] At the time, the author was the head of the regional section responsible for the East Africa sub-region, including North and then Southern Sudan within JICA and participated in the first government mission after the peace agreement. I was also involved in the formation of the SAVOT project.

which had been established in the 1970s during the brief period of peace that the region experienced between the first civil war (1955–1972) and the second civil war (1983–2005). Parallel to JICA's support, the rehabilitation of training facilities and the updating of equipment were also carried out using the Japanese government's emergency grant aid.

(1) Utilizing the Framework for Follow-Up Cooperation

The SAVOT project had already completed its work by the time we were evacuated from Juba. In addition, in 2014, MTC itself had ceased its activities due to the armed conflict that broke out in December of the previous year. Under such circumstances, the members of the South Sudan Office in Uganda were concerned about finding ways to ensure that the results of the previous efforts would not be lost during the war and that any support offered would directly benefit the people of South Sudan. When I asked Kobayashi how he was feeling at the time, he replied, "After seeing the report of your (Hanatani's) trip to the north, I was also wondering if it might be possible to provide assistance that directly benefits South Sudanese people in areas other than rice, i.e., refugee assistance." Unbeknownst to me, the staff members at the time had already adopted my ideas.

After much thought and effort, Kobayashi and Taguchi came up with the idea of providing assistance to refugees by utilizing the outcomes of the SAVOT project. Specifically, they decided to utilize JICA's follow-up cooperation mechanism. Follow-up cooperation is one of the forms of cooperation employed by JICA. JICA provides support for equipment renewal and retraining of counterparts to ensure that the results of cooperation are maintained after the program has already ended. Kobayashi and his colleagues considered inviting MTC instructors from South Sudan to the Nakawa Vocational Training Institute in Uganda for retraining and then having the instructors provide training directly to the refugees. The training and guidance to the refugees were positioned as a place for practical training by the instructors and included in the scope of follow-up cooperation.

Incidentally, Uganda's Nakawa Vocational Training Institute is the premier vocational training institution in Uganda and has received support from Japan since the 1970s. After a long period of war during which MTC had ceased functioning properly, MTC in South Sudan sought cooperation from Nakawa to revive itself after the North-South

Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached. According to internal records, the relationship began with Nakawa's support for Juba MTC's curriculum review and instructor training in 2006–2007. The cooperation between the two schools continued, and during my stay in Juba from 2011 to 2013, we received ongoing support from Nakawa.

With this "sister-school" relationship as a backdrop, MTC will again send instructors to Nakawa for retraining. By itself, this is a difficult task to implement as it comprises a type of follow-up cooperation implemented remotely from a neighboring country. This time, however, an additional element was added: MTC instructors would provide direct training and guidance to South Sudanese refugees for a period of three months. Once the idea was developed, Kobayashi and Taguchi contacted the South Sudanese Ministry of Labor and MTC by e-mail and telephone to explain the project and obtain their approval. They also went directly to the refugee bureau in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) of Uganda, which was to host the project, to explain the situation and obtain their consent. At that time, the Ugandan government requested that Ugandans should also benefit from this training program and that Ugandan NGOs be utilized. After carefully coordinating with local officials and partners, Kobayashi and Taguchi applied for funding from our headquarters and finally received approval to implement the project.

(2) Outline of Vocational Training

The target of the assistance was the Kiryandongo refugee settlement, located about 220 km north of Kampala. The settlement, which had about 25,000 refugees at the time[19], had a private school called the Panyadri Vocational Training School, which was run by a Ugandan NGO called Real Medicine Foundation (RMF). However, as is often the case with local NGOs, activities are dependent on the availability of donors. At the time, donor support had ceased, and training tended to be intermittent. When Taguchi, the staff member in charge of the project, traveled to the area and spoke with the organization, he was told that they would definitely like to expand their vocational training for refugees with the cooperation of JICA. As a result of discussions on implementation modalities, a division of roles was established, whereby MTC instructors would provide technical guidance while RMF would manage the overall

[19] The settlement had more than 70,000 refugees as of April 2021 (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/86505).

Refugees undergoing training

Photographs: JICA report

training and provide training facilities. The training was divided into four fields: hairdressing and beauty, sewing—each of which RMF was able to teach—and construction and woodworking, which was taught by MTC instructors.

The program was held twice, from December 2014 to March 2015 and from May 2015 to August 2015, and approximately 160 refugees and 70 Ugandans received training. In each session, about two-thirds of the participants were women. In order to ensure the involvement of the South Sudanese government in the training process, a representative from the Ministry of Labor of the Government of South Sudan was invited to evaluate the content of the training and the satisfaction level of the participants. In addition, officials from the JICA South Sudan office attended each completion ceremony, congratulated the graduates, and provided them with start-up kits.

After the two training sessions, the focus of JICA's cooperative efforts shifted to South Sudan due to the temporary stabilization of the situation in South Sudan at the time, and the program was temporarily terminated in 2015. However, as will be described later, at the time of the Uganda Refugee Solidarity Summit in June 2017, Vice President Hiroshi Katō, who attended the meeting on behalf of JICA, had the opportunity to visit Kiryandongo, which led to a third follow-up training session beginning in October of 2017.[20]

[20] During his visit to the site, Vice President Katō observed RMF's activities as a former cooperative partner in the region and met with RMF staff and others. As a result of the

Although limited to rice cultivation technology and vocational training support and, in part, delivered intermittently, JICA has been providing support to refugees in protracted situations in northern Uganda since 2014, using development assistance funds. This was a groundbreaking initiative in that it directly targeted refugees who would not normally be included as beneficiaries in development assistance.

visit, he noted (according to internal JICA documents) that "RMF was still active, and it seems that even a small-scale input can be expected to have some effect if such support is provided. As with the assistance provided in response to the large influx of refugees in the Northwest, activities in other areas were also considered worthwhile." This may have provided the impetus for the third round of support.

Column 2
What Happens When the Refugee Situation Becomes Protracted?

Along with its mandate to protect and assist refugees, UNHCR has another significant role to play: seeking durable solutions to the refugee problem.

This is usually accomplished in three ways: voluntary repatriation, local integration in the host country, and third-country resettlement. Voluntary repatriation is the return of refugees to their home country of their own free will following the stabilization of the situation in their home country. Local integration in the host country means naturalization in the host country or settlement with permanent residency, while third-country resettlement refers to naturalization and resettlement in a third country. All of these options are carried out within the framework of the states concerned and with respect for the intentions of the sovereign state. The UNHCR's role is primarily limited to support, advice, and coordination.

However, since the beginning of this century, progress toward finding durable solutions has been slow. In the 1990s, about 1.5 million refugees were able to find a solution to their situation, one way or another. By the 2000s, this number had dropped to about 1 million, and then to about 400,000 in the 2010s (Takizawa and Yamada 2017). The number of refugees who were able to return to their home countries in 2020 was 250,000, while those resettled in third countries accounted for 34,000, or 1.4% of the total number of refugees.

There are many reasons for this, but the most significant is prolonged conflict. According to a World Bank report, the average duration of violent conflicts that ended in 1970 was 9.6 years, while those that ended in 2014 and 2015 lasted 26.7 years and 14.5 years, respectively (World Bank 2018). With prolonged conflict comes prolonged refugee situations.

Therefore, the issue of protracted refugee situations has received

particular attention this century. UNHCR considers it protracted when more than 25,000 refugees of the same nationality are displaced for more than five years (UNHCR 2021). Among refugee-creating situations, Syria (since 2011), Afghanistan (since 1978), and South Sudan (since 1983), not to mention Palestine, are all considered protracted.

There are three main problems that arise as a result of the protracted refugee situation. The first is the increased and prolonged burden on the host country. Even though UNHCR provides assistance, the host country is expected to provide the land for the camps and settlements, as well as the water and forest resources associated with the land. Some countries allow the sharing of their own educational and health facilities, which creates additional burdens and congestion in the provision of social services when refugees use the same social services as the locals. In addition, there are conflicts and tensions that arise between the refugees and the host society. There are social costs associated with mitigating these conflicts and tensions and maintaining security. Prolonged refugee admission directly leads to an increase and prolongation of these burdens.

Second, the international community's ability to assist refugees will become progressively weaker. Since UNHCR is essentially a humanitarian agency with a mandate to protect and assist refugees, priority will be placed on responding to new crises that require an immediate response. The international community and the international media, which support UNHCR's work, also expect UNHCR to respond to new and pressing humanitarian issues. However, UNHCR's annual budget continues to be about half of what it requests ($9.1 billion requested in 2020, with $4.8 billion actually provided) (UNHCR 2021), and not all needs are being met. In this context, refugee response to protracted situations, which has not received the attention of the international community or the media, has been given lower priority, and funding has tapered off. As a result, refugees receive less food and services.

Third and most important is the negative impact on the refugees themselves. Given the conditions that refugees have experienced,

it is inevitable that they will depend on the assistance of the host country and the international community to survive in asylum. However, if this situation becomes prolonged and people continue to live only to wait for aid, they are left in an unstable psychological state with no clear future, and their sense of dignity and independence as human beings is gradually eroded. Limited opportunities for education, work, and other productive activities in camps and settlements lead to dependence on alcohol and drugs, as well as increased crime. The lack of educational and training opportunities causes refugees to become less self-reliant, which is an obstacle to future return or resettlement, depriving the home country of the human resources it needs to rebuild itself.

Column 3
The Increasing Number of African Refugees: Now at 6.5 Million

There are approximately 29 million forcibly displaced people in Africa today. The displaced are found mainly in the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Central Africa, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Eritrea, with these ten countries accounting for 90% of the total. IDPs account for 72% of the total. The number of refugees is approximately 6.5 million, or 22% of the total. The main host countries for refugees are Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Chad, and South Sudan, which are either neighbors of the country of origin or are themselves countries of origin.

The graph below shows the number of refugees in Africa from 1960 to 2020 by country of origin.[21] The African countries that gained independence around 1960, known as the "Year of Africa," had high



Source: Prepared by author based on UNHCR data

Number of Refugees in Africa by Region

[21] In the chart, Burundi and Rwanda in the Great Lakes region are included in Eastern Africa, while the DRC and the Republic of Congo are in Southern Africa. Chad, Central Africa, and Cameroon are classified as West-Central Africa.

expectations for economic development and prosperity under a new national system, free from the fetters of colonial rule. However, political upheaval, secessionist movements, and anti-colonial struggles soon followed, and by 1970, nearly 1 million refugees had been created. In the 1970s and 1980s, political instability, including coups d'état, and economic crises, such as the oil crisis and the debt crisis, increased the number of refugees to 4 million by 1980. After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, "democratization" began to take place, but it also sparked domestic conflicts, and by the mid-1990s, the number of refugees reached a record high of about 6 million, the highest number to date. The African countries then experienced an economic boom as commodity prices rose in tandem with the economic growth of emerging economies, and conflicts subsided due to the intervention of the African Union (AU), other African countries, and the international community. Refugees returned voluntarily, and the number of refugees dropped to about 2.6 million in 2008–09, the lowest number in decades. However, the number of refugees in Africa began to rise again in the 2010s, and the armed conflict in South Sudan at the end of 2013 triggered a significant increase in the number of refugees, reaching approximately 6.5 million by 2020.

The number of refugees in Africa is a complex result of a variety of factors, but in the early years of independence, African countries were relatively open to accepting refugees from a position of support for the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) enacted the OAU Refugee Convention in 1969, which defined refugees as including "every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality."[22] This definition went beyond the scope of the then existing refugee

[22] Article 1, Definition of the Term "Refugee," OAU Convention (https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-36400-treaty-oau_convention_1963.pdf).

protocols. The acceptance of refugees was based on "refugee status through the Prima Facie recognition process." This means that people who have fled their homes are accepted into the territory without the individual screening of refugee applicants that is normally required under the Refugee Convention.

However, the end of the Cold War, prolonged economic stagnation and the push for democratization have also changed refugee admission policies. With the loss of economic space due to the recession and increased competition in multi-party elections, governments and politicians have often tried to win support by appealing to xenophobia. In addition, in recent years, many African countries have gradually become "weary" of accepting refugees. In addition to the increasing burden on host societies and the tapering off of international humanitarian assistance, refugees have come to be perceived as a direct threat to the security of host countries in the wake of increased global terrorist activity. As a result, since the 1990s, refugee reception policies in African countries have gradually become less tolerant.

Chapter 2

Uganda's Refugee Acceptance Policy and the Living Circumstances of Refugees

The previous chapter described the initial forms of JICA's assistance to refugees in Uganda. This chapter provides an overview of Uganda's policy toward accepting refugees, followed by a discussion of the living situation of refugees in Uganda and their relationship with the host community.

2.1 Uganda's Refugee Acceptance Policy

2.1.1 Uganda's Internationally Acclaimed Refugee Law

Historically, the Ugandan government has adopted a policy of settlement, housing refugees in government-designated refugee settlements. The legal system itself is also known for its generosity toward refugees.

Uganda is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the OAU Refugee Convention adopted in 1969.[23] Domestically, the country initially handled refugees under the Refugee Control Act of 1960. As the name suggests, the law focused on controlling and policing refugees, including restrictions on freedom of movement, prohibitions on property ownership, and prohibitions on contact between refugees and Ugandans. In practice, the law is said to have been less strictly applied, but the international community pointed out that the lack of a national law that conforms to international norms was a problem for guaranteeing the legal rights of refugees (JICA 2016a).

Therefore, with the encouragement of the international community, the current Refugee Law and its regulations of implementation were enacted in 2006 and 2010, respectively. As a result, the rules regarding refugee status recognition procedures, which had been unclear in the past, were established in accordance with international human rights law and international refugee law, providing refugees with certain rights. These rights included the following:

[23] See Column 1.

(i) Right to work[24]
(ii) Freedom of movement with some conditions[25]
(iii) Access to land
(iv) Property ownership
(v) Access to public services that Ugandan citizens enjoy (health, primary education, etc.)
(vi) Issuance of personal ID
(vii) Issuance of a refugee travel document (equivalent to a passport)

Regarding the third (iii) right, refugees are provided with housing and land for farming in proportion to the number of people in their households as long as they reside in the refugee settlement.[26] However, refugees living in urban areas or other areas outside of their place of registration are not eligible for land grants.

The 2006 Refugee Act is internationally recognized for its generous recognition of a variety of rights, including the right to work, freedom of movement, land and property ownership, access to public services for its citizens, freedom of association (limited to non-political), and equality before the law.

2.1.2 Refugee Affairs under the Jurisdiction of the Central Government

The 1995 Constitution of Uganda stipulates that the administration of refugee affairs in Uganda falls under the jurisdiction of the central government. The central government ministries responsible for this task have, in turn, passed from the Ministry of Culture and Community Development to the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Youth Culture and Sports, and eventually, the Ministry of Local Government. However, the government was reorganized in 1998 to create the Department of Refugees under the OPM, a structure that continues to this day. The minister in charge within the OPM is the Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees. This positioning suggests that the

[24] If the refugee is engaged in work that earns cash income, they are obligated to pay taxes.
[25] Permission must be obtained from the officer in charge of the OPM.
[26] Refugee settlements in the Southwest and Midwest are owned by the government, while land in the north is owned by the local communities and leased by the government with the consent of the local landowners (e.g., clan leaders in the case of communal ownership). The landowners provide these lands essentially free of charge.

management of refugee affairs is considered a part of emergency response measures.

At the central government level, the OPM is responsible for: (1) formulating and implementing refugee policy; (2) receiving asylum seekers and recognizing their refugee status; (3) ensuring compliance with international law, (4) ensuring order in refugee settlements; (5) ensuring the safety of refugees; (6) providing land to refugees; (7) providing public services to both refugees and host communities; and (8) monitoring refugee assistance programs and refugee issues.

In the districts, Regional Desk Officers are assigned to four major refugee reception sites nationwide (Mbarara, Hoima, Arua, and Adjumani) (see map on page 11) to oversee refugee administration in their areas. Refugee Settlement Commandants, Deputy Refugee Settlement Commandants, and Assistant Refugee Settlement Commandants are assigned to each refugee settlement.

Refugee settlements have their own self-governing body, the Refugee



Source: Prepared by author based on JICA reports

Refugee settlement administration structure and local government system in Uganda

Welfare Council (RWC). The RWC is responsible for mediating problems that arise within the refugee community and with the Ugandan host community, as well as acting as an interface between the Ugandan government and the refugee community. The Council's officers are elected, and there are three levels of bodies, RWC1, RWC2, and RWC3, starting from the bottom. Each is said to be equivalent to a village, parish, or sub-county in Uganda's local government system. However, it should be noted that RWCs are self-governing systems established within refugee settlements under the jurisdiction of the OPM and are situated outside of Uganda's local government system, which provides public services such as education and health.

2.1.3 Previous Discussions on Reducing the Burden on Host Countries

Since the late 1970s, there has been widespread debate in Africa concerning ways to reduce the burden of refugees on host countries. A series of discussions, including the International Conference on African Refugee Assistance (the first, or ICARA I, being held in 1981 and the second, ICARA II, in 1984), highlighted the crucial role of development aid in assisting refugees (Refugee Aid and Development, or RAD). In response to these discussions, the Principles for Action in Developing Countries adopted by UNHCR in 1984 aimed to reduce the burden on host countries by ensuring that RAD: (1) is development-oriented from the outset; (2) aims to move refugees from self-sufficiency to self-reliance; (3) benefits both refugees and local populations; and (4) is consistent with the host country's national development plan (Koizumi 2004).

Since the late 1990s, when the Museveni administration in Uganda enacted a new constitution and introduced decentralization policies, discussions on reducing the burdens associated with prolonged refugee stays have increased. In 1998, the Ugandan government, in collaboration with the UNHCR, launched the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS), which focused on the self-reliance of refugees and their economic and social contribution to local communities. The SRS had two goals: 1) to empower refugees and local people so that both refugees and Ugandans can be self-sufficient, and 2) to establish a mechanism to ensure integrated public service delivery for refugees and local people. Despite budget shortfalls and the lack of understanding on the part of local governments, the strategy was continued until 2003 and achieved some results, such as enabling refugees

to receive health services in Uganda.

Based on the experience of the SRS, a regional development strategy for refugee-hosting communities known as Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) was planned to commence in 2005, with host communities also being directly supported. The first phase (DAR I) was implemented from 2005 to 2008, and the second phase (DAR II) from 2009 to 2013. The DAR aimed at: (1) burden sharing with refugee host countries; (2) developing host communities; (3) promoting gender equality, dignity and livelihoods of refugees and host communities, and (4) empowering refugees and improving their productive capacities and self-reliance. The DAR aimed to include the provision of public services to refugee settlements in local government development plans to further ensure service integration efforts in the SRS.

The SRS and DAR efforts have had an impact not only as a program during a specific period but also on Uganda's national development plan. Refugee affairs were already addressed as early as the 2000s, beginning with the Third Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP 2004/05-2007/08) and as part of the disaster management plan in the first National Development Plan (NDP 2010/11–2014/15) and came to be more centrally placed in the development agenda of the Second National Development Plan (NDP II 2015/2016-2019/2020).

The NDPII includes the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA), a reform effort that aims to promote the inclusive development of refugees and host communities, specifying the promotion of refugee self-reliance, host society support, and integrated public service delivery.



Settlement Transformative Agenda
Source: Government of Uganda

In response to the STA, UN agencies and the World Bank developed a support strategy called Refugee and Host Community Empowerment (ReHoPE). This move would later influence the Comprehensive Refugee Relief Framework (CRRF) and the Global Compact on Refugees.

In Uganda, the implementation of the Refugee Act and its associated regulations has extended beyond offering humanitarian assistance. Support for both refugees and host communities, the provision of integrated public services to refugees, and efforts to help refugees become self-sufficient in their livelihoods are not limited to the level of individual initiatives such as SRS and DAR. They have also been included (at least in the official documents) in national development plans and are considered development issues in the country. This is a distinctive feature of Uganda's refugee acceptance policy.

2.2 The Lives of Refugees in Uganda

2.2.1 Citizens of Neighboring Countries and Urban Refugees Included

What kind of people are considered refugees in Uganda under the legal framework described in the previous section? In Uganda, the following three types of people are commonly referred to as "refugees" (JICA 2016a). Legally, only some, specifically (1) and (3), are considered refugees. However, in Uganda, the term "refugee" often refers to all three categories.

(1) Nationals of neighboring countries residing in refugee settlements (registered refugees)
People who are registered as refugees with the government and are eligible for humanitarian assistance.

(2) Nationals of neighboring countries residing in rural areas outside of refugee settlements (voluntarily settled refugees)
Generally, they are not registered as refugees and are not eligible for humanitarian assistance. However, they have settled in Ugandan society by renting land from their relatives and acquaintances living in Uganda. Their number is unknown.

(3) Nationals of neighboring countries who live in rented accommoda-

tion mainly in urban areas (urban refugees)
Some have registered as refugees and lived in refugee settlements before moving to urban areas, while others have moved directly to urban areas without registering as refugees. The latter, of course, cannot receive humanitarian aid, but some of the former are said to return to their places of residence to receive rations when they are available. The exact number of people is unknown.

Others are nationals of neighboring countries (voluntary border crossers) who move between the two countries on a daily basis for trade, shopping, business, weddings, funerals, etc. Their residency is based in the neighboring country. Although they might stay in Uganda only for a short period of time, they use Ugandan public services such as education and health facilities (which often seems to be their purpose in crossing the border). For many African countries, borders are artificial, inherited from colonial times. The reality is that people cross borders on a daily basis in search of opportunities for trade, employment, or education.

The situation of these people was examined in a JICA research report published in 2016 (JICA 2016a, hereafter referred to as the "JICA Report") and a report based on a household survey of refugees and host community residents conducted by the World Bank in 2018 (World Bank 2019, hereafter the "World Bank Report"[27]). The following is a case study of the West Nile sub-region based on these reports.

2.2.2 Living Conditions for Refugees and their Reliance on Aid

The average household size of refugees in the West Nile sub-region is 5.8 persons. In contrast, the average size of households in communities hosting refugees is 5.3 persons. The number of dependent age-people (under 15 and over 65) is 1.9 for refugee households and 1.4 for host community households, indicating that refugee households have slightly larger household sizes and dependent-age people. In West Nile, 62% of refugee households are headed by women, compared to 35% of host community households. In terms of the education level of the head of household, 72% of refugee households have not completed primary

[27] The survey was conducted in all 13 districts where refugees reside. The number of respondents was 2,209. The report covers the Maaji III Refugee Settlement in Adjumani District, the Ochea Refugee Settlement in Arua District, the Wanyange Refugee Settlement, and the Kuku Refugee Settlement in Koboko District.

education. This is higher than the 65% of the host community households in the region.

In West Nile, refugee households are given plots of land depending on the time of influx and where they live. Most plots range in size from 20m × 20m to 30m × 30m, with the largest being 50m × 50m. In addition to land, refugees are entitled to food assistance for the first five years after resettlement. They receive full food assistance for the first three years, half for three to five years, and after five years, the aid is cut off. In addition to food, tarpaulin sheets essential for building houses, water containers, farming tools, etc., are distributed. Those who are identified as socially vulnerable may continue to receive food assistance after five years.

In the West Nile sub-region, 66.1% of refugees' income comes from humanitarian aid, 7.2% from agriculture, 9.1% from wages, 6.5% from



Source: Prepared by author based on World Bank Report (2019)

Demographic Composition of Refugees and Host Communities

self-employment, and 8.2% from remittances (see figure on page 30). This differs significantly from the income structure of host community households (see figure on page 29), where 60.9% of the income comes from agriculture, 21.2% from wages, 10.4% from self-employment, and 5.7% from remittances. This shows that refugee households are highly dependent on humanitarian aid.

The poverty rate for the West Nile host community households is 29%, while the rate for refugee households is 57%, almost twice as high as the local. This rate varies depending on the length of stay as a refugee. It is 64% for those who stay for two years or less, 32% for those who stay for two to five years, and 15% for those who stay for more than five years. On the other hand, the household poverty rate for Uganda as a whole was 21% in the 2016/17 National Household Survey.

In terms of access to public services, refugees have better access to



Source: World Bank Report (2019)

Income structures of host community households



Source: World Bank Report (2019)

Income structures of refugee households

safe water, health and improved sanitation, and electricity than host communities. For example, access to safe water is 95% for refugees and 76% for host communities. In the area of education, the national averages show that the gross enrollment rates for primary education are similar for refugees and host communities, 131% and 124%, respectively, and the net enrollment rates are similar, 65% and 68%, respectively. However, the completion rates are 14% for refugees compared to 34% for the host communities. With refugee completion rates less than half those for local communities, this highlights the inherent problems and ineffectiveness of providing education for refugees.[28] In secondary education, there is a large gap in both enrollment and completion rates between refugees and

[28] Investment in education is an indicator of the effectiveness of a child's education leading to graduation and is influenced by retention and dropout rates. There are a number of related factors, including the economic situation of the family, the presence of siblings under school age and other family circumstances, as well as basic academic skills, and the quality of the education provided.



Source: World Bank Report (2019)

Poverty rates for host community households and refugee households



Source: World Bank Report (2019)

Rate of access to public services

local residents.

2.2.3 Refugees Living in Cities in Rental Housing

While some refugees live in settlements and conduct business outside the refugee settlements only during the daytime, many of them rent houses in urban areas outside their settlements and live in urban areas. Many do not apply for refugee status and live in Ugandan society without receiving formal refugee status.

Although comprehensive data on the actual situation is lacking, the results of interviews included in the JICA report show that there are diverse reasons for living outside of refugee settlements. For example, there is the account of a student who "attends junior high school with the support of their aunt who is married to a Ugandan and lives in Uganda." Another account is of a woman who "rents a house in Uganda with her mother and eight children with remittances from her brother who remains in South Sudan," while another woman "fled to Uganda with her parents to escape the conflict and later married a Ugandan, so she has remained in Uganda."

The World Bank report, which introduces the results of a survey of refugees living in Kampala, shows that refugees residing there have a lower household size (4.7 persons) and a lower number of dependent-age household members (0.8 persons) than refugees living in other regions.[29] Above all, among the refugees residing in Kampala, the level of education of the head of the household is high. While only 40% of the heads of host community households have completed secondary education, 64% of refugee household heads have done so. Despite this, the refugee average for high school completion is just 9%.

Regarding income structure, 74.1% of refugee income comes from remittances, followed by self-employment (12.1%) and wages (9.6%). The poverty rate for refugee households is 0% (compared to 2% for local households). In terms of access to public services, access to health services is slightly lower than that of the locals, but other than that, access to safe

[29] The breakdown by country of origin of refugees residing in Kampala in the World Bank survey is: Somalis 47%, South Sudanese 6%, Congolese 13%, Burundians 8%, and others 27%.

water, improved sanitation facilities, and electricity is higher than that of the locals. Refugees living in Kampala appear to be better educated, have higher-income jobs, and enjoy relatively stable livelihoods due to remittances from relatives and other sources.

2.3 Social Acceptance of Refugees

In general, relations between refugees and locals in Uganda are not as fraught as outsiders may fear. The World Bank report also asked about refugees' perceptions of safety and their perceptions of Ugandan society. Some 83% of refugees in the refugee settlements in West Nile felt "safe" (91% including "fairly safe"), and 72% said they were "accepted" by Ugandan society. Refugees in Kampala also responded that 85% felt safe (99% including "fairly safe"), and 98% had a positive view of their reception in the country. The JICA report lists the following merits and demerits of accepting refugees, as perceived by the host society.

Merits

- Refugees can serve as a catalyst for aid. Some 30% of the aid provided to refugees is also designated to benefit the host community.
- Social infrastructure may be improved (roads, education, health facilities, etc.).
- New markets and other facilities may be established in refugee settlements, which can become centers of development.
- Increased employment opportunities (e.g., more jobs for aid partners, more hotels/restaurants, day labor for infrastructure development, etc.)
- Increase in the number of banks in the county due to an increase in wage workers, support agencies, etc.
- Likely increase in local revenue from NGOs and South Sudanese[30]

Demerits

- Increased burden on social services. The increased number of patients and students increases the burden on the already fragile social infrastructure and public services.
- In some cases, refugees may have a better life than the host

[30] Although there is no specific description in the JICA report, this expectation may refer to income tax revenue through employment of local people by NGOs, collection of market rent from refugees, etc.

community, and in such cases, host community sentiment towards refugees may deteriorate.
- Low youth employment in settlements increases crime.
- In some cases, landless Ugandans feel upset about Ugandan landowners sharing their land with refugees.

On the other hand, refugees have reported problems such as being evicted from the host community because the only water supply facilities in the area were those used by the local community. Others were evicted for cutting down trees to build a dwelling. There are also reports of problems among the refugees, such as concerns about fairness between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities regarding the membership of various committees and the selection of beneficiaries of assistance, which could lead to violence.

The general impression is that the host community's feelings toward refugees are not particularly bad. However, the local population may become dissatisfied when that assistance is directed only toward refugees. In light of this situation, the JICA report points out the need to pay attention to the following points when providing support to refugee-receiving areas:

- Supporting refugees can lead to backlash from the host community.
- When assisting host communities, it is important to be aware of the burden placed on the areas where refugee settlements are established. This is also true for other regions that are believed to have a large number of unregistered refugees and citizens of neighboring countries who move around on a daily basis. They are also experiencing an increased burden on social infrastructure (although we do not know on what scale, as the situation is not known or reflected in population figures, it is possible that the situation is worse than in regions hosting refugee settlements).
- Even in areas with refugee settlements of similar size, newly established settlements may experience a temporary rapid deterioration of social service provisions.

At first glance, the relationship between refugees and locals may not appear to be a major problem. However, it is important to understand that the concentration of international assistance toward refugees and the increased burden on host societies have led to a situation where the

relationship between the two is somewhat fragile. This is likely to increase as refugees stay in the country longer.

2.4 The Twin Challenges of Promoting Self-reliance and Reducing the Burden

The World Bank report also noted that Uganda has a tolerant policy towards refugees, and that, in general, while refugees generally feel safe and accepted by the local community, the poverty rate is overwhelmingly high among refugee households, and the number of dependent-age households is also high, making the environment extremely fragile economically. Therefore, the report concludes that it is important for refugees to diversify their income and become self-reliant in order to break away from aid dependency. In particular, it is essential to note that the income from agricultural production plays only a limited role in the overall livelihood of refugees; and that the granting of land for subsistence use, the basis of the resettlement policy, does not necessarily contribute to ensuring the livelihoods of refugees above the poverty line.

If Uganda's refugee reception policy is to continue in the future, it will be necessary to improve the livelihood conditions of refugees and reduce the burden on the host society. As seen in the previous section, the poverty rate of refugees tends to be higher when the length of stay is shorter, resulting in a greater dependence on humanitarian assistance; on the other hand, the poverty rate tends to become lower with a longer duration of stay. One possible solution, therefore, is to stimulate income-generating activities, including agricultural production and others. Furthermore, the relationship between refugees and host communities is generally fragile. The major challenge is finding ways to reduce the burden on the host society in terms of providing social services, improved environments, etc.[31]

The above discussions demonstrate that two important issues for refugees in protracted situations in Uganda are the need to promote refugees'

[31] In Uganda, both the refugee and host communities have been severely affected by the current COVID pandemic, and more attention is needed to maintain good relations between them in the future. A 2021 report by the International Labor Organization found that in Arua District, 64% of host community respondents and 73% of refugee respondents stated that tensions have increased within their communities (ILO 2021), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ILO-Prospects%2Bcovid-Uganda.pdf).

self-reliance and to reduce their burdens on the host society. These are issues that cannot be adequately addressed by humanitarian aid provided as a means of averting short-term humanitarian crises. This is where development assistance has a role to play.

Column 4
The History of Uganda and Its Refugee Acceptance Policy

Despite its poverty, Uganda is the world's fifth-largest host country for refugees and the largest in Africa. According to UNHCR, by the end of 2020, there were approximately 1.45 million registered refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda, representing about 3.5% of the national population.[32]

By country of origin, approximately 890,000 (61%) and 420,000 (29%) are from South Sudan and the DRC, respectively, accounting for about 90% of the total. In addition, refugees have been accepted from 31 countries, including Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Ninety-four percent of these refugees live within the 30 refugee settlements established in the country's 13 districts,[33] and about 6% reside outside the refugee settlements, such as in Kampala.[34]

Uganda has a long history of hosting many refugees, dating back to the 1940s when it accepted about 7,000 Polish refugees during British colonial rule. In September 1939, at the beginning of World War II, after the partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union, many people who had been forced to flee their homes fled to Uganda, a British colony with which the Ugandan government had an alliance.[35]

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32 See the Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal for up-to-date information on the number of refugees in Uganda (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga). Note that these figures are for registered refugees only and do not include unregistered voluntary border crossers/resettlers, also known as "self-settlers."

33 The thirteen districts hosting refugees are comprised of the five Midwestern districts of Kiryandongo, Hoima, Chegegwa, Kamwenge, and Isinjiro, the six Northern and West Nile districts of Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Moyo, Yumbe, and Lamwo, and the capital Kampala and its suburban district of Wakiso. Note that the number of recipient districts has increased due to the subdivision of Arua district from 2019 onward.

34 The number of "residents" is based on registration. In reality, there are many refugees and voluntary border crossers/residents who have left their place of residence without changing their place of registration and are residing in other cities, especially Kampala, but the exact numbers are not known (JICA 2016a).

35 After the partition of Poland, the Polish government-in-exile fled to London. There was also a consulate of the government-in-exile in Kampala (Lwanga-Lunyiigo 1993).

In the period after World War II, Sudanese and Congolese refugees fled to Uganda in the 1950s. Rwandan Tutsi refugees fleeing oppression began arriving in Uganda in 1959 as a result of Rwanda's social revolution prior to independence (1959–1961), and they continued to be admitted after Rwanda achieved independence in 1962. Since the 1980s, the Ugandan government has also accepted refugees from Somalia, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and other countries.

Sudanese refugees were admitted throughout the first (1955–1972) and second (1983–2005) Sudanese civil wars. After the end of the first Sudanese civil war in 1972 following the Addis Ababa Accords, refugees returned home from Uganda, but since 1989, Sudanese refugees have again flowed into northern Uganda. In recent years, the country has been host to more than one million South Sudanese refugees following armed conflicts in December 2013 and July 2016.[36]

Congolese refugees have also been hosted by Uganda following the Congo Uprising (1960–1965), the First Congo War (1996–1997), and the Second Congo War (1998–2003). However, the number has increased—especially since 2012—when the situation in Eastern Congo became unstable.

Another unique feature of Uganda's refugee intake is that Uganda has itself been a refugee-generating country. Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1962, Uganda experienced numerous changes of government until 1986, when current President Museveni took power. In 1971, the Obote regime, based in the Acholi and Lango regions in the north, was overthrown in a coup d'état by military commander Idi Amin, a native of the West Nile sub-region, and the Amin regime was established. President Amin was known for his use of the politics

[36] In this publication, the name "South Sudan" will be used when referring to events after the independence of the "Republic of South Sudan" on July 9, 2011. The term "Southern Sudan" will be used for the period of the "Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan" that existed between 2005 and 2011. The name "Sudan" will be used for the period before then.

of terror, especially his repression of the Acholi and Lango region, Obote's stronghold. As a result, as many as 300,000 Ugandans were massacred, and many fled to neighboring countries. Incidentally, due to the Amin-era politics of terror, the current president, Museveni, also fled to Tanzania as a refugee.

After Amin's government lost support due to its defeat in the Uganda-Tanzania War in 1979, Obote returned to power (the second Obote administration) and launched a crackdown against ordinary citizens in the West Nile sub-region, Amin's stronghold. As a result, more than 250,000 Ugandans fled to the DRC and Sudan as refugees. The second Obote regime collapsed in 1986, and the current president, Museveni, who hails from the southwestern part of the country, came to power.

Between 1986 and 2006, attacks (including abductions of children and other residents) by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which also conducted anti-Museveni activities in northern Uganda, caused many Ugandans to flee to Sudan and the DRC. The conflict, which lasted more than 25 years from 1980 to 2006, centered on the Acholi region in northern Uganda, destroyed the region's social and economic infrastructure and resulted in the relocation of up to 2 million IDPs and more than 400,000 refugees.

As seen from this brief overview, Uganda has a history of receiving and sending large numbers of refugees due to political instability internally and in neighboring countries.

Column 5
Lifeworld of Refugees in the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement

By Assistant Prof. Isao Murahashi, University of Shizuoka

The influx of refugees in 2016–2017 was unprecedented in Uganda's long history of accepting refugees. Humanitarian workers began to turn their attention to the West Nile sub-region in the northwest, where many refugee settlements are concentrated. Here, I focus on the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement in midwest Uganda, where I have been conducting research since 2014, and compare it to other refugee settlements.

Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement is located 225 km north of Kampala and 110 km south of Gulu. It is located close to the main road connecting Kampala, the capital of Uganda, and Juba, the capital of South Sudan. If you drive from Kampala to Gulu, you will pass through the town of Bweyale, from where you can see the settlement a few kilometers to the east.

Kiryandongo's history as a refugee settlement goes back to 1990 when it was first established. The length of stay for the refugees varies. Some of the refugees are long-term, having lived there since



Map of Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement (2019)

Source: Prepared by author based on Google Earth

the 1990s. Others returned to South Sudan after the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005 but came back to the refugee settlement after they were displaced again in 2013. Still others are relatively new arrivals who were displaced after 2013. Some refugees have been living in Uganda for more than 25 years, and some are "South Sudanese" who were born, raised and educated in the refugee settlements.

I began my fieldwork in the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement in July 2014. According to UNHCR, as of the end of July 2017, there were approximately 14,000 households and 56,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers in Kiryandongo. Nearly 99% of the registered refugees in Kiryandongo are South Sudanese. The remainder include refugees from DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan. The ethnic origin of South Sudanese refugees is diverse, including Dinka and Nuer, as well as those from the Equatoria region, composed of various ethnic groups such as Acholi, Madi, Moru, and Kuku. By age and gender, children under 18 and women combined account for 85% of the population.

In Uganda, refugees are given land by the government and are encouraged to make a self-reliant living. Compared to the 1990s, the land area allocated to each refugee household has been reduced. In the 1990s, the land provided to refugees ranged from 1.2 ha to 4 ha per family. The size of the land area depended on the number of family members in the household. In early 2014, the area allocated per household was reduced from 50 x 100 m (0.5 ha) to 50 x 50 m (0.25 ha). After 2016, the allocation was further reduced to 30 x 30 m (0.09 ha).

In terms of land use by refugees, the general trend is that land is often used as farmland by those from the Equatoria region, where there are many farmers, while it is not used as farmland by the Dinka and the Nuer pastoralists. This may be attributable to their livelihoods in their homeland of South Sudan.

Refugees are most concerned about how to secure food for their daily needs. They are divided into three categories: new arrivals,

long-term refugees, and those with special needs, each receiving different amounts of food aid. Food rations include cereals,[37] beans,[38] CSB (Corn Soya Blend),[39] salt, and cooking oil. However, since the influx of refugees in 2016, some refugees have been subject to a 50% reduction in aid, while none of the refugees are receiving all of the aid they are entitled to. In addition, due to delays in transportation and procurement, some of the food is being delivered late, well after the scheduled time each month. Therefore, there are frequent complaints from the refugee community members that they have not received any food rations this month.

In 2018, in addition to in-kind food aid, a cash transfer system was introduced, giving refugees the option of receiving either food or cash. The cash benefit is 35,000 Ugandan shillings (about $9.45) per person, and as with food, the amount increases or decreases depending on the number of family members in the household.

The food situation in Kiryandongo is not good. For example, in a 2015 NGO survey of refugees in Kiryandongo, 65% of respondents reported that food was in short supply. The reduction in the land area available to refugees has made it difficult for them to achieve self-sufficiency solely on the food they produce themselves. While remittances from family members and relatives who remain in South Sudan or live abroad can be received now that remittance systems have developed, only those in close contact with their family and relatives can access remittances. In addition, when the value of the South Sudanese pound plummeted after the start of the conflict in 2013, remittances from the homeland declined dramatically. As a result, the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement, despite its relatively abundant rainfall and fertile land, is unable to sustain its daily food needs without food aid, even though the environment in terms of food production is more favorable than in refugee settlements in the West Nile sub-region.

[37] Sorghum is common, but corn, or maize, is sometimes provided as well.
[38] Kidney beans are most commonly used.
[39] CSB is a fortified food made from a mixture of corn and soybean flour. It is dissolved in hot water and eaten as a soft porridge.

For long-term refugees, it is crucial not only to secure food in refugee settlements but also to invest in their own and their children's futures. Among key concerns, education for their children is a major concern, with many parents struggling to pay school fees.

According to the Uganda Investment Authority and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), nearly 70% of refugees in Kiryandongo are engaged in some form of informal economic activity. Of these, about half are engaged in the production and sale of agricultural products, while the other half are self-employed or engage in day labor. While selling crops, some refugees also run retail stores or work as day laborers.

There are three trading centers in the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement, along with a number of informal markets that have been established by refugees on their own initiative. Many of those selling food and other goods at these markets are women. They sell vegetables and beans grown in their vegetable gardens, as well as clothes, shoes, notebooks, and other household items purchased in bulk from Ugandan wholesale merchants.

One way for women to earn cash at home is to make and sell homemade alcohol. Many households in the refugee settlements are comprised solely of women and children. For women who have to earn money for living expenses and school fees while doing farm work, housework, and childcare, distilled alcohol can provide an important means of livelihood.

Photograph of Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement

Primary school class in Kiryandongo refugee settlement

Photographs: Courtesy of author

Many men, on the other hand, depend on peakwork (piece-rate wage labor), such as contracted digging of fields and making sun-dried bricks to build houses, as a means of earning a livelihood. With few opportunities for waged work available within the refugee settlements, men seek opportunities to earn money outside the refugee settlements. This is especially true of the youth, who often have to earn money to pay for their own schooling.

Young people rent motorcycles and operate motorcycle cabs called "boda-bodas," or are employed by Chinese companies as short-term laborers for road construction work. In addition, large farms in the vicinity of refugee settlements need many laborers to help with the harvesting of maize and other crops. Some people are quick to obtain information on such employment opportunities and undertake harvesting work for short periods to earn cash. Other examples of informal economic activities of refugees include operating kiosks,[40] running cafeterias, pharmacies, and dance halls in refugee settlements, providing cell phone recharging services, operating mobile photo stores, and repairing bicycles.

Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement is one of the settlements in Uganda where diverse livelihoods can be pursued by refugees, with both men and women trying to create as many opportunities as possible to earn a cash income. Nevertheless, the majority of refugees live in economic poverty. One of the goals of Uganda's refugee policy is to help refugees become self-reliant, but in the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement, the narrow plots of land available for cultivation, inadequate food aid, and limited opportunities to earn cash mean that even today, refugees are not achieving the livelihoods they desire.

[40] Refers to a box-shaped concession stand. Snacks, bread, and other food items, as well as a variety of daily necessities such as scratch cards for cell phone calls, are sold at these stands.

Chapter 3
International Attention to Refugee Issues and Japan's Response

The problem of protracted refugee situations in Uganda is not only a Ugandan problem but also a global problem. JICA's efforts to support refugees in protracted situations, which began in Uganda, eventually became synchronized with international trends in refugee assistance. This was largely due to the global increase in the number of refugees in the 2010s. In this chapter, I will discuss the refugee issue as an international problem and its influence on global and Japanese aid strategies, as well as my own involvement in this process.

3.1 The Syrian Crisis and Refugee Issues

The period from 2014 to 2016, when I returned from Uganda after an emergency evacuation from South Sudan, was marked by the deepening of humanitarian crises due to the escalation of the Syrian civil war and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and other Islamic extremist organizations.[41]

In Iraq, which had been in a state of civil war since 2003, major cities such as Fallujah and Mosul fell into IS hands. This momentum spread to Syria in 2013 which was in a state of civil war since 2011. The chaotic situation in Syria continued as various armed forces joined the Assad regime or the rebel side. In June 2014, IS declared the "founding" of the Islamic State in the region straddling Iraq and Syria. IS has been terrorizing and conducting public executions of captured fighters, residents of the areas it controls, and non-Muslims. These civil wars and violence resulted in the displacement of people on an unprecedented scale, and by the end of 2015, the situation in Syria had resulted in some ten million refugees and IDPs.

Many of those displaced sought asylum in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, but Germany's proactive stance toward

[41] The so-called Islamic State is referred to as ISIL, ISIS, the Arabic abbreviation "Daesh," etc., but will be referred to here as IS for simplicity's sake.

accepting refugees and migrants, as well as Turkey's request that Europe share responsibility, led many to seek asylum by crossing the Aegean Sea and/or going through Greece and the Balkans. The number of asylum seekers in the EU doubled to 630,000 in 2014 and doubled again to 1.32 million in 2015. As a result, the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East, including Syria, and the resulting refugee crisis quickly became a focus of international attention.[42] In addition, disputes over how to respond to the refugee crisis have divided the international community, leading to political and security debates over whether or not countries should accept foreign nationals in large numbers. This has led to a rise in nativist policies in developed countries, best illustrated by the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (otherwise known as "Brexit").

3.2 Humanitarian and Development Support Should Advance Simultaneously

Amidst the above chaotic international situation, about a year after my return from Uganda, I was assigned in April 2015 to become the Director of the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Office of the then Social Infrastructure and Peacebuilding Department of JICA. My office oversaw peacebuilding support activities within JICA. Specifically, our duties included:

(1) Formulating JICA's assistance policy and strategy for peacebuilding support;
(2) Implementing projects with a strong peacebuilding orientation in conflict-affected countries/areas;
(3) Providing advice on other projects (education, health, etc.) in conflict-affected countries/areas from the viewpoint of conflict impact considerations;
(4) Conducting research on peacebuilding support; and
(5) Handling national and international conferences related to peacebuilding.

In regard to the fourth of these responsibilities, when I arrived in my new position, a study had already begun on "The Role of Development

[42] This was also a year of rampant terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists in Europe: the "Charlie Hebdo" shootings in Paris, France, in January 2015 and attacks in November 2015, also in Paris. Following this, the airport bombings in Brussels and Istanbul, the Nice terrorist attacks, and other terrorist attacks occurred in 2016.

Agencies in Protracted Refugee Situations." The purpose of this study was to clarify the situation for refugees in developing countries and assess the responses of major donors and agencies, as well as consider what kind of support JICA could provide to refugees in protracted situations. Yutaka Tatewaki, who was seconded from UNHCR to JICA and served as an advisor in the field of peacebuilding, and Takashi Hibino, a JICA staff member, were in charge of the project.[43] Fumiko Izeki of Global Link Management, Inc., participated as a member of the study group.

As part of this research project, the team visited the UNHCR and other international organizations, as well as major donor country missions in Geneva in February and March 2015 to learn about the international assistance framework and the status of efforts by each country. In April 2015, when I assumed my position, the team had already studied Uganda's policies on accepting refugees, the issues faced by refugees and host societies, and the trends in donor countries, as well as examined how JICA could be involved in this field in the future.

As a result of this research, the report (JICA 2016b) made the following recommendations (comments in brackets were added by the author):

> In the past, the main task of development agencies in assisting refugees was the rapid and stable delivery of refugee assistance in post-conflict situations. To this end, JICA has aided returnees' resettlement after they have [been] repatriated to their countries of origin as part of its reconstruction assistance. [However] as the number of displaced persons increases and the period of displacement becomes longer, JICA, as a development agency, can provide development assistance, not necessarily humanitarian, to refugees, from the perspective of "no one is left behind" [as stated in the SDGs] or from the perspective of human security [which emphasizes "the realization of a dignified life for the most vulnerable"]. Specifically, JICA should aid [refugee] host governments and [host] communities, as well as provide targeted assistance to improve the livelihoods of refugees who have been living in the country for a long time.

[43] Since the late 1990s, JICA and UNHCR have been conducting a staff exchange program. Personnel seconded from UNHCR would advise JICA on refugee issues and serve as a liaison between UNHCR and JICA. At the time of the project in question, Tatewaki was responsible for planning and proposing it, and was also involved in the research.

> New forms of cooperation between humanitarian and development assistance have the potential to help displaced persons move away from dependency and [host community's] instability, and to strengthen their [both the refugees themselves as well as the host communities] self-reliance and resilience. This will require development agencies to be flexible in providing development assistance in areas that were once considered humanitarian only […]. The relationship between humanitarian and development assistance should no longer be viewed as a sequential one, but rather as a concurrent and integrated one.

This proposal was something that I, who had seen the hosting of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, could understand without difficulty, and it seemed to me that it was a new issue for the Peacebuilding Office and JICA to tackle in the future. However, for JICA as an organization, it was something new that necessitated institutional debates and the development of consensus. Until quite recently, as a development assistance organization, JICA's refugee assistance has focused on reintegration—or helping refugees to settle after their return to their home countries. This was the model used in the 1990s when the repatriation process was relatively successful. Refugee assistance is the purview of humanitarian agencies, while development agencies are involved only in assisting the countries of origin and their own citizens after return. This was considered to be the dividing line between humanitarian and development assistance, and it was also the way things tended to work. In contrast to this conventional wisdom, the report pointed out that "the two should be implemented simultaneously and in an integrated manner."

We discussed this recommendation in our Peacebuilding Office. Importantly, JICA always values the ideas of the field offices, which are directly responsible for implementing projects. In addition, launching a new project is an act that involves the reallocation of limited budgets, so a significant amount of coordination is necessary. Of course, it is also vital to confirm the intentions and priorities of the recipient government. As a result of the discussions, it was decided to specifically explore the possibility of assistance to Uganda and Zambia, two countries that were studied in the report. The most crucial reason for selecting these two countries was their tolerant policies toward refugees.

In JICA's experience, one of the biggest problems for development

agencies in assisting refugees is that recipient countries often resist directing aid funds to refugees when they should be directed toward their own economic and social development. This is not surprising since refugees are not citizens of the recipient country. In my own experience, I was told the same thing by the Tanzanian government when I investigated the possibility of supporting refugee camps in western Tanzania in 1999. Therefore, I was aware that this remains an issue that development agencies need to resolve when they seek to engage with refugee issues. In this regard, Uganda had positioned refugee self-reliance and host-community assistance as development issues for its own country by including these concerns in its national development plan. By doing so, it was able to overcome this specific hurdle for us. In addition, Zambia's policy of integrating former refugees from Angola and Rwanda—those who had been living in the country for a long period of time—was expected to meet with little resistance from the recipient government, even if we offered to provide assistance to these "former refugees."[44]

In order to develop concrete cooperation programs in those two countries, it was necessary to understand the detailed needs of Uganda and Zambia and to gain the agreement and understanding of our local offices there. As a first step, the Peacebuilding Office decided to invite government officials involved in refugee administration in Uganda and Zambia as trainees to Japan and discuss future cooperation needs and expectations for JICA.

3.3 Discussions within the Solution Alliance

In addition to examining the possibility of aiding specific countries, I also considered it essential to participate in the international community's discussions on the issue of protracted refugee situations to understand the efforts being undertaken by other countries and organizations and to explore the possibility of collaborating with them. At this time, the international framework for protracted refugee problems included the work of the Solution Alliance, or SA.[45] Our involvement with the SA was largely based on Tatewaki's advice.

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[44] The Zambian government's local integration policy is intended to grant citizenship to refugees. When this policy is applied, the person in question is considered a "former refugee."

[45] While SA is called an "alliance," it is a non-binding voluntary initiative of donor countries and agencies with the purpose of encouraging solidarity among donors for the durable resolutions of protracted refugee problems.

SA is the successor to the Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), which was launched in 2011 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, and the World Bank to address problems related to protracted refugee situations that require the involvement of development agencies as well as humanitarian aid organizations. At that time, the initiative was limited to international organizations and financial institutions. However, in April 2014, a review of the TSI was conducted, with Denmark joining the former three, resulting in the launch of SA as a new initiative to take over from the TSI.

The second roundtable meeting of the SA was held in Brussels from February 9 to 10, 2016, and I participated in the meeting together with Arefu Araki, who was on secondment from JICA to UNHCR headquarters at the time. The overall purpose of the meeting was to share the progress made over the previous two years since the inception of SA in 2014 and consider future efforts. It also provided an opportunity to discuss what message to send to the various international conferences and meetings scheduled for 2016 (UN World Humanitarian Summit, UN General Assembly, etc.).

More than 130 people attended the meeting in Brussels, with key participants including UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Kelly Clements, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UNDP Crisis Response Bureau Chief Izumi Nakamitsu, and European Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva (in charge of international cooperation, humanitarian aid, and crisis response).[46] In addition to Somalia and Zambia, which were designated as target countries for SA, the African countries of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda participated as refugee-hosting countries.

The following points were emphasized in the output document of the meeting:

- SA should aim to develop specific solutions in individual target countries, not general policy discussions.
- Humanitarian and development agencies should work together to overcome any inter-agency divisions to better support each country's efforts.
- In order to address refugee-related problems, promoting self-reliance

[46] The job titles described are those from that time.

through the empowerment of refugees and others, reducing the burden on host countries and communities, and avoiding dependence on aid by refugees and others are important.
- To this end, it is essential to strengthen the ownership of the host country, including prioritization of refugee issues in the development plans of the host country.
- In supporting each specific country's efforts, support for local integration in Tanzania and Zambia, for the self-reliance policy in Uganda, and for facilitating overseas remittances for refugees in Somalia are important.
- In promoting SA, it is necessary to overcome systemic issues such as multi-year support commitments on the part of humanitarian agencies, support collaboration between humanitarian and development agencies, and include refugee issues in the development plans of host countries.
- The international community needs to overcome the barriers between humanitarian and development assistance because the acceptance of refugees is an international public good.

During the Q&A session of the plenary session that preceded the release of the outcome document, I took the floor to speak from the perspective of a development agency. Based on my own experience and the results of JICA's research, I pointed out that there are challenges for development agencies in assisting refugees and host communities, as refugee issues are not always clearly positioned in the development plans and budgets of host governments. I argued that these obstacles must be overcome in order to facilitate the involvement of development agencies in the protracted refugee crisis. Moreover, during the "Solutions Fair" session, in which donors and NGOs introduced their own initiatives, Araki and I presented the results of JICA's research to an audience of more than 100 people. Perhaps because of these contributions, the issue of "the positioning of refugee issues in the national development plans of the host country government" was included in the outcome document of the meeting (the fourth and sixth item above). After the meeting, as I was leaving the venue, a participant walked up to me, offered his hand to shake my hand, and said, "That was a very good statement (pointing out the need for refugees to be included in the development plans of host countries). It is written in many places, but not many people recognize its importance."

3.4 United Nations World Humanitarian Summit

One of the most significant of the series of international conferences during this period was the United Nations World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2016.

The need for a humanitarian summit was originally one of the issues raised in the UN Five-Year Plan announced by then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2012. Preparatory meetings were held in eight regions around the world in 2014–15, culminating in the main meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, from May 23 to 24, 2016. The agenda for this session was summarized in the declaration entitled "Agenda for Humanity," which was developed based on discussions at the preparatory meetings. The declaration called for increased efforts by the international community in the five "core responsibilities," including: (1) political leadership to prevent and end conflict, (2) adherence to humanitarian norms, (3) no one left behind, (4) shifting from delivering assistance to addressing needs, and (5) investing in humanity.

As an initiative related to (4), during the main summit, the Japanese foreign ministry co-hosted a side event with SA. The title of this event was "Strengthening the Humanitarian-Development Nexus: Collaborative Approaches to Find Solutions for Forcibly Displaced Persons." Its purpose was to discuss the challenges and possibilities of how various actors in the humanitarian and development fields could strengthen their collaboration toward a solution to forced migration. JICA President Shinichi Kitaoka

World Humanitarian Summit venue

President Kitaoka at the side event

Photographs: JICA

participated in the meeting as one of the speakers along with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi, UNDP Administrator Helen Clark, and others. I was responsible for drafting the content of President Kitaoka's remarks.

In his remarks, President Kitaoka explained three contributions that JICA could make, particularly in light of the protracted situation of forced displacement: (1) support for refugee-hosting countries and communities, (2) support for refugees to become self-reliant, and (3) support for peacebuilding to resolve the root causes of refugee outflows, with specific examples of these contributions. He stressed three points to keep in mind when providing such assistance: (1) host countries should position refugee issues as their own problems; (2) host countries should guarantee refugees the right to education, freedom of movement, and the right to work; and (3) care should be taken not to allow refugees to become dependent on aid. In the process of preparing his remarks, Kitaoka emphasized the last point, in particular, that the provision of assistance should not encourage refugees to become dependent on aid.

Through presentations on JICA's efforts to address the issue of protracted refugee problems based on the results of our research at the SA and the Humanitarian Summit, as well as through exposure to the currents of international debate, my own understanding of the issue and that of my organization gradually deepened.

3.5 New York Declaration for Migrants and Refugees

In 2016, when international attention was focused on the issue of migrants and refugees, another major international conference was held alongside the World Humanitarian Summit. This was the UN Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, held in New York in September of the same year on the occasion of the 71st session of the UN General Assembly.

The trigger for the summit was the aforementioned large-scale movement of people from Syria and the Middle East. The movement of people was so large that it exceeded the capacity of recipient countries, including neighboring countries and European countries, with the key question of how the international community could share the heavy burden of accepting refugees. In addition, there was a growing recognition of the

need to address the issue of so-called "mixed migration" issue, whereby it is difficult to distinguish between refugees, whose movement may be considered involuntary and a humanitarian issue, and migrants, whose movement is voluntary and an economic issue.[47]

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants ("New York Declaration") was agreed upon by the participating countries at the beginning of the conference. The Declaration emphasized: (1) protecting the human rights of refugees and migrants without distinction, (2) supporting refugee host countries, (3) expanding the possibility of a permanent solution for refugees, (4) recognizing the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a UN agency and strengthens the protection system for migrants[48] and (5) calling for the preparation of two global compacts, one on refugees and the other on migrants, over the course of two years by 2018. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan attended the UN Summit, where he announced Japan would provide a total of $2.8 billion in assistance to refugees and others, support for refugee self-reliance, and assistance to host countries and communities over three years starting in 2016.

In response to the New York Declaration, UNHCR established the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) as a basic policy for the formulation of the Global Compact. The CRRF was later positioned as an implementation framework for the Global Compact, but in 2016, it was presented as a follow-up to its predecessor SA, making it a more comprehensive and encompassing one.

The CRRF seeks to find ways to not only respond to the humanitarian crisis at hand but also integrate refugees into host societies and pave the way for permanent solutions, given the current protracted refugee crisis.

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47 Mixed migration is defined as "the movement [across borders] made by refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking in persons, stowaways, economic migrants and other migrants, often in an irregular manner, for different purposes through concurrent and combined similar modes of movement" (Ishii 2018). Most irregular migrants apply for refugee status, but since the definition of refugee in developed countries is based on "refugee in the narrow sense of the term," that is, the fact or fear of personal persecution, the number of migrants who are recognized as refugees is limited, and those who are not are either deported or remain in the destination country as illegal immigrants.

48 IOM began as the European Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICEM), a non-UN international organization established in 1952, and later as the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration, or ICM, established in 1980, before its name was changed to IOM in 1989.



Source: Prepared by author based on UNHCR documents

Priority Strategies of CRRF

It is comprehensive in the sense that it covers the various stages of the refugee crisis, including immediate post-refugee crisis situations, support for host communities in protracted situations, and the expansion of possibilities for durable solutions and creation of conducive environment for return, as well as in the sense that it covers various actors, including partnerships between humanitarian agencies and development agencies, political and diplomatic actors, and the private sector.

Particularly in the context of protracted refugee problems, the CRRF expects refugees to be active contributors to the development of host countries and societies rather than passive recipients of humanitarian assistance. To this end, refugees should be allowed to access social services such as education and health care in the host country and participate in the labor market. In order to achieve this, the CRRF calls on the international community, including humanitarian agencies, development agencies, and the governments of the countries where refugees originate and are hosted, to provide the following support:

(1) Assistance to reduce the burden on the host country and host society;
(2) Assistance to help refugees become self-reliant;
(3) Expansion of durable solutions, including resettlement in third countries; and
(4) Creation of an environment for safe and dignified return

As for the specific development of the CRRF, more than a dozen countries that have pioneered the acceptance of refugees since 2016 were selected as pilot countries. They and their donors were asked to work in line with the CRRF's basic policies. In Africa, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda were selected to review their legal systems related to the freedom of movement and employment of refugees, integrate the provision of social services, including those for refugees, clarify the position of refugee issues in national development plans, and strengthen donor support for host communities.

Based on the achievements of the CRRF after 2016 and discussions based on them over the following two years, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was agreed to by the UN General Assembly in December 2018.[49] The CRRF itself has been incorporated into Part II of the document as the GCR's implementation framework, giving it a clear status as part of a UN resolution (departing from the status of a UNHCR document). The GCR also agreed to convene a Global Refugee Forum every four years beginning in 2019 as a venue for reviewing the progress of regional and national efforts and for soliciting renewed commitments.

The efforts to address the protracted refugee crisis that began with the TSI in 2011 have culminated in the SA and CRRF—and finally in the GCR, which is now positioned as the official support framework of the United Nations.

3.6 Developing an Assistance Policy to Aid Refugees

After the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2016, JICA began to work on the concrete implementation of refugee assistance based on the New York Declaration. Specifically, the work involved the question of how to implement, on the part of JICA, the Japanese government's pledge of "a total of US$2.8 billion over three years starting in 2016." I became involved in this process as the head of the department in charge of peacebuilding assistance.

In JICA, regional and country-specific cooperation policies for Africa and the Middle East are handled by the respective Regional Departments.

[49] The author had the opportunity to be involved in the process of drafting the GCR, which will be discussed more in Chapter 5.

Therefore, it was necessary for the Peacebuilding Office to work with the Africa Department and the Middle East and Europe Department (regions that have large numbers of refugees) to develop assistance policies. The overall coordination was carried out by the Operations Strategy Department, which is in charge of cross-departmental operations.

The challenge here was whether the Board of Directors, the decision-making body of JICA, could position refugee assistance as a new area of assistance for JICA. Again, JICA is a development agency, not a humanitarian agency like UNHCR. While refugee issues have been recognized as humanitarian assistance issues in principle, it took a great deal of preparation and discussion to gain the understanding of the organization's upper echelons. Of course, in June of the same year, President Kitaoka attended the World Humanitarian Summit, where he spoke about assistance for refugees in protracted situations. The UNHCR, a refugee assistance agency, is the organization in which Sadako Ogata, a former President of JICA, served as High Commissioner for ten years, and the two organizations have benefited from a long mutual relationship. Nevertheless, JICA's Board of Directors, the decision-making body of the organization as a whole, had never before addressed the subject of refugee assistance head-on.

At the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA had to obtain Board approval for its cooperation policy in early November, and the work was done in a great hurry. Based on discussions and coordination between the Africa Department and the Middle East and Europe Department, the Peacebuilding Office took the lead in developing the cooperation policy. The main contents of the policy were: (1) to provide assistance to reduce the burden on refugee host countries, and (2) to provide assistance to promote the self-reliance of refugees.

The draft was presented to the Board members individually starting in mid-October. There are many stakeholders involved in decision-making within JICA, including the heads of the operational departments, the heads of the regional departments, the head of the Operations Strategy Department, the Senior Vice Presidents, and the President who oversees the board of directors. We briefed these people, sometimes individually and sometimes in small groups, over and over. In these explanations and discussions, we were asked more than once to clarify why development agencies should provide assistance to refugees. The first pillar of

cooperation we wished to establish was the provision of support for host countries and communities. It was not difficult to justify providing this support since it aligns with regional development and social services, which JICA was already supporting. However, no matter how much we tried to explain the second pillar—support for refugees to become self-reliant—we were unable to get the executives and staff in other departments to see the light. It seemed that there was an understanding that refugees are the responsibility of UNHCR as a humanitarian aid agency—and not within JICA's purview.

The turning point in gaining the understanding of those involved was the fact that three-fourths of the world's refugees are currently living in non-camp settings, where they are being integrated into the host society. Refugees are generally thought of as living in refugee camps, in tents covered with UNHCR-logoed blue tarps. In reality, however, many refugees live outside the camps, receiving not only humanitarian aid but also income (though limited) to support themselves and integrate into the host society and economy. Improving their livelihoods, encouraging their self-reliance, and guiding them toward peaceful coexistence with the host society would contribute to the stabilization of the host society, which is significant from a peacebuilding perspective. In addition, improving the self-reliance of refugees will also contribute to nation-building after their (possible) return to their countries of origin. Capacity building is a field that JICA has long been engaged in, and it is an area in which JICA could make use of its experience and demonstrate its unique capabilities compared to humanitarian aid agencies. It took some time to convey, but through these explanations and discussions, the understanding of the stakeholders within the organization finally became clear about the importance of aiding refugees to help them become self-reliant.

The final cooperation policy was outlined as follows.[50]

Current Situation and Necessity

-- The trend toward large-scale and protracted situations of refugees has led to the emergence of problems, such as overburdened host countries, friction between refugees and host communities, environmental destruction around refugee settlements, and

[50] This list comes from documents introduced at the JICA Board of Directors meeting on November 8, 2016.

refugees' dependence on humanitarian assistance.[51] In recent years, refugees have been mixed with host communities, and new issues have emerged, including the need for refugees to become self-reliant, coexist with host communities, and seek out durable solutions (including local integration, etc.).

-- The Japanese government announced in a speech by the Prime Minister at the UN Summit in September that same year that it would promote the "humanitarian and development nexus" and that it would emphasize "coexistence with refugees, migrants and host communities."

-- In light of the Japanese government's policy, JICA must take this opportunity to reevaluate refugee issues from a medium- to long-term perspective and utilize the experience of development agencies to deal with issues surrounding refugees that cannot be addressed through humanitarian assistance alone.

Basic Approach

-- JICA will contribute to the government's pledge to provide a total of US$2.8 billion in assistance over three years from 2016 by quantitatively and qualitatively expanding assistance in line with the following basic approaches:

1. Provide assistance based on our strengths and experience as a development institution.
2. Promote collaboration between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.
3. Enhance Japan's presence by strengthening visible support and international communication.

Three Pillars of Support

1. Comprehensive support for countries hosting refugees
   Position refugee issues as a development challenge for refugee-hosting countries and strengthen administrative capacity building, improve social services, develop infrastructure, etc.

[51] Typical examples include the depletion of forest resources due to the logging of timber for housing and firewood by refugees and the depletion of groundwater resources due to the drilling of wells for refugees.

under the ownership of the host countries.

2. Capacity building for refugees
   Provide refugees with opportunities for vocational training and higher education to help them become self-reliant and improve their livelihoods, and help them to become key players in national development after their return.
3. Strengthen collaboration with international organizations
   Strengthen collaboration with international organizations and other key partners in order to consistently promote collaboration between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation from the policy level to the project level.

A Board of Directors meeting was held on November 8, where the above approach was approved. On November 15, the same explanation was provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it was once again approved. This was the first time that JICA's provision of assistance to refugees had been officially approved by the Board of Directors. It was a major step toward the realization of the coordinated and integrated implementation of humanitarian and development assistance—also known as the "humanitarian-development nexus"—as pointed out in the research report.

Column 6
"Internalization" as the Main Focus of Research

By Yutaka Tatewaki, UNHCR

My secondment to JICA (February 2013–November 2016) coincidentally took place amidst the European refugee crisis, SDG agreement, World Humanitarian Summit, and New York Declaration. I was fortunate to be able to complete my assignment with JICA while observing the momentum of these events at every turn.

However, it was also true that at the beginning of my secondment, I sometimes felt like I was being alienated. In my impatience to get things moving, I strongly recognized the need for "internalization." Internalization means that JICA positions its involvement in refugee assistance as a part of its development agenda, and it seemed to me that JICA's previous involvement with refugees was not always spontaneous or well-planned. On the other hand, I also learned that the various technical barriers between development aid and humanitarian assistance—such as differences in the time horizon of planning and data precision—could be largely overcome by making full use of JICA's various development assistance tools. In short, I believed that organizational will was the key.

For me, this internalization was the main purpose of becoming engaged in the research project, "The Role of Development Agencies in Protracted Refugee Situations." I would like to point out that this research was made possible due to the initiative and motivation of many young JICA staff members, including Takashi Hibino, who was a member of the research team from the beginning, as well as the understanding of the executive staff. Without such encouragement, the degree of my involvement in the research, which lasted more than a year and often ran into dead ends, would have ended up quite differently.

The research itself consisted of interviews with other development agencies and UN agencies on the one hand and combined with field research in Uganda on the other. The field research was conducted

in the hope that it would contribute to policy recommendations as well as to the actual work implemented on the ground. Returning from the trips, I fondly recalled the times when the members of the research team stayed up late at night discussing our findings and offering different interpretations.

Before I was transferred to JICA, I was engaged in emergency and short-term work protecting refugees in conflict-affected areas such as Darfur, Iraq, and Afghanistan. I discovered a number of things through conducting the research. First, it was helpful to be able to look at humanitarian agencies objectively from the outside. I recall a staff member of a bilateral development agency once remarking, "The bottom line is that humanitarian agencies should not create parallel worlds." In a sense, I realized that humanitarian assistance is a different world, and in a sense, haughty.

I was also able to experience different perspectives on refugee-hosting countries and communities. In my experience of providing humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas, the governments and populations of host countries do not always welcome refugee aid, which is often perceived as a substantive hurdle in providing support. When I was assigned to Darfur, I remember that I focused only on the needs of the displaced Africans, who were farmers and neglected the plight of the local nomads who were fighting with the farmers over water. I even remember denouncing them as the perpetrators. I may have also unconsciously avoided the view of refugees as contributors to their host communities. The image of the "strong, self-reliant refugee" is not always helpful when asking for humanitarian support.

I also have to call into question the traditional chronological thinking of humanitarian aid first, then development assistance next. In the past, I rarely saw development agencies in the field when I was involved in protection, but through my research, I learned that JICA can prepare concrete plans on the locations of schools, their building specifications, and education curricula, taking into account, for example, local conditions of geography, population composition, capacity of local government and community, as well as the history

and culture of the area. I wondered if we could somehow share these capabilities with humanitarian agencies, working at the same time and in the same place, before a "parallel world" was created. Development agencies seem to be better at having an overhead view and painting the big picture. Humanitarian agencies, on the other hand, focus more on the individual. Even if we have a well-run school with hundreds of students, humanitarians cannot overlook the fact that, for example, a single girl may not be able to go to school because she feels unsafe.

The SDGs were the first development agenda approach to include the vision of "leaving no one behind." This concept should also be embraced by each individual in the field. Human security and "no one left behind" were the key concepts that connected JICA, UNHCR, and refugees in terms of both policy and practice and became the basis for our research.

The formal report of the research was issued in early 2016, just in time for the international conference that followed. Personally, I think the most significant achievement of the project was that JICA's involvement in refugee assistance was finally internalized as a basic policy by the Board of Directors in November of the same year, after presentations at subsequent international conferences. This was only a week before I left JICA and returned to UNHCR.

Nearly six years have passed since then. One of the biggest changes during that time has been the emergence of the World Bank as a partner in assisting refugees. In October 2017, Dr. Hanatani was invited to co-chair the GCR thematic meeting in Geneva on "How Can We Support the Inclusion of Refugees in National Systems and Services." We invited him as co-chair to share his practical experiences in Uganda. Needless to say, he was praised by the other participants, who had been slightly bored by all the talk about money and who knew the difficulties of doing business in the field.

Before leaving JICA, I went to see Madame Ogata (as she was called at UNHCR), then JICA's Special Advisor, to report on my departure. When I told her that JICA's involvement in refugee

While undertaking the survey on protracted refugees

Photographs: JICA report

assistance had been brought up at the board meeting, she quietly said, “I know that JICA can do more.” I am still searching myself for answers on what I can do as well.

Chapter 4

Responding to the Uganda Solidarity Summit on Refugees

In response to the international focus on refugee issues and the changing circumstances surrounding refugees in the 2010s, JICA finally began full-fledged efforts to support refugees. The refugee problem in northern Uganda attracted particular attention. This section looks back at the evolution of Japan's cooperation with refugees in the protracted situation occurring in northern Uganda following JICA's decision to support refugees, as described in Chapter 3.

4.1 Second Armed Conflict and Refugee Outflow from South Sudan

Refugees became a significant policy issue in Uganda after the second armed conflict in South Sudan in July 2016, which resulted in another large refugee outflow. The first armed conflict occurred in December 2013 while I was working in South Sudan. It was triggered by clashes between presidential guards (Dinka soldiers of President Kiir and Nuer soldiers of former Vice President Machar) in the capital, Juba. Machar fled to the north, where he was born, and the conflict and armed clashes spread from Juba to the northern part of the country, where the Dinka and Nuer peoples live. Many refugees fled to Sudan and Ethiopia, with only a small influx into Uganda.

In August 2015, through mediation by the Intergovernmental Development Organization (IGAD) and concerned countries and others, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed by the parties concerned. Following the signing of the agreement, a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee was set up, and former Vice President Machar returned to Juba in April 2016 to assume the office of First Vice President. A Transitional Government of National Unity was established.

However, in July of the same year, factions of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar clashed again in Juba City—the second armed clash. Machar fled Juba, this time to the DRC side in the south, and government



Source: World Development Indicators

Number of refugees accepted by Uganda since 1990

forces began pursuing him along his route in the southern region known as the Equatoria. The government forces persecuted and suppressed the residents of this area because the government suspected that they had harbored Machar and allowed him to escape. In the second conflict, the southern region became the center of the conflict, and this time, many refugees flowed into the geographically closer Uganda and the DRC.

Before the outbreak of the conflict, at the end of December 2015, the number of newly arrived refugees from South Sudan in Uganda was approximately 150,000; by February 1, 2017, about six months after the outbreak, the number had more than tripled to 555,000 in just over a year. Most refugees arriving in Uganda were sent to refugee settlements established in the West Nile sub-region. Although several new settlements were established, the growing refugee population quickly exceeded the capacity to receive them. As of February 1, 2017, the refugee intake status in each of the districts with refugee settlements in the West Nile sub-region was as shown in the table below. In particular, the number of refugees in Adjumani District was equal to the population of the district itself.[52]

This situation increased the burden and feelings of frustration among the

[52] The number of South Sudanese refugees continued to grow, and by mid-2017, the number exceeded one million. At the time of writing (September 2021), the refugee population has reached just over 925,000, a number that has not changed significantly.

Situation of acceptance of refugees in West Nile (as of February 2017)

	Yumbe	Moyo	Adjumani	Arua
Refugee numbers	269,561	77,864	215,312	93,879 (only for Rhino Camp)
Ugandan local population	485,582	137,489	232,813	785,189
Refugees as a percentage of the local population	56%	57%	92%	12%

Source: JICA

host communities in West Nile, as well as among the Ugandan population as a whole, about the lack of support from the international community (compared to Syrian refugees, for example). Then, at the end of 2016, the Ugandan government, with the cooperation of the United Nations, decided to hold a Uganda Solidarity Summit on Refugees the following year, 2017, to seek support from the international community and ease the burden associated with Uganda's reception of refugees. The UN positioned the summit as Uganda's version of the refugee summit held in New York the previous year and saw it as an excellent opportunity to put into practice the solidarity of the international community expressed in the New York Declaration.

4.2 Visiting the Ugandan Communities Hosting Refugees

As part of the Japan's support program for northern Uganda known as REAP, or Reconstruction Assistance Programme in Northern Agenda, JICA had been implementing the "Project for Capacity Development in Planning and Implementation of Community Development in Acholi Sub-Region (ACAP)" since 2011. The goal of this project was to strengthen the administrative capacity of the local government in the Acholi sub-region. Under REAP2, the ACAP project was expanded in 2016 into a capacity development project called WACAP, or "Project for Capacity Development of Local Government for Strengthening Community Resilience in Acholi and West Nile Sub-Regions." In January 2017, six months after starting the new project, I had the opportunity to visit the WACAP site. I was accompanied by Eri Komukai, a JICA senior advisor, and Misaki Kimura, who was assigned to the Peacebuilding Office as an associate expert at the time. The project covered the West Nile and Acholi sub-regions, and the main project office was located in Arua City, Arua District, the central city of the West Nile. This was my first visit to Arua in

about three years, since May 2014.

WACAP was designed to improve the capacity of local governments in the West Nile sub-region to formulate district development plans and to strengthen their capacity to implement community development projects. Although the project did not directly target refugee assistance, UNHCR had requested that development assistance implemented in Uganda be extended to refugees as well, the pilot country for the CRRF, and the main target of this request was the West Nile sub-region, which received a large number of refugees from South Sudan. Therefore, I wanted to use this opportunity to visit the Ugandan OPM and UNHCR, which are in charge of refugee issues, to hear about the situation following the refugee influx and support from the government and the international community. I also hoped to observe the actual situation of hosting refugees in the West Nile to see what kind of cooperation JICA could provide to refugees and refugee-hosting communities.[53]

As a result of the two-week survey, the team proposed the following ideas for future cooperation with refugee-hosting communities. At that time, refugee settlements were already living close to and intermingling with Ugandan communities, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, Ugandan public facilities were open to refugees. Therefore, local Ugandans sometimes use facilities established by humanitarian agencies in the settlements (schools, health centers, etc.), while refugees sometimes use facilities established by the Ugandan government. In response to the large influx of refugees starting in July of the previous year, humanitarian agencies provided additional emergency assistance and allocated 30% of their humanitarian assistance to support host communities. However, public service capacity in Uganda has not been able to expand sufficiently to keep pace. In addition, competition between refugees and local residents over forestry and water resources had begun, and there were reports of conflicts between residents and refugees. At present, both the Ugandan government and aid donors are overwhelmed with providing emergency humanitarian assistance for the growing refugee population and cannot afford to strengthen public services in Uganda.

In light of this situation, our survey team thought it would be effective

[53] We visited the Bidi Bidi Refugee Settlement in Yumbe District, which had already become the largest "refugee camp" in the world with over 250,000 people.

to utilize the unique characteristics of JICA's development assistance organization to formulate a plan for the development of small-scale local social and economic infrastructure (water and sanitation, education, health, small bridges, and roads, etc.) that comprehensively addresses the needs of the refugee population and surrounding communities. Of course, Japan could provide finance to implement some of the projects after the plan had been formulated. Such support can be viewed as a practical training opportunity for strengthening the development planning capacity of local governments, which is the objective of the WACAP project and could be positioned as a collaborative effort with JICA's technical cooperation.

When we reported this idea to the Japanese Embassy, they responded positively, saying that the Embassy had plans to strengthen its support for refugee-hosting communities in preparation for the forthcoming Solidarity Summit and that they would like to collaborate with JICA on this. Japanese support for implementation based on the survey was also met with a positive response, with the Embassy official saying, "It would be good if we can realize even a little of it before the upcoming Solidarity Summit."

The two-week survey provided us with a meaningful opportunity to consider the direction of JICA's cooperation with Uganda's refugee problem. After returning from the survey, I discussed with Mikako Kudo, Deputy Director of the Peacebuilding Office, and Komukai, who visited Uganda with me, and we decided to pursue the following possibilities for JICA's future efforts to address the Ugandan refugee problem.

(1) To provide a forum for discussion, including a side event, at the Solidarity Summit in order to clarify Japan's focus around protracted refugee situations in Uganda and its support policy.
(2) To undertake a needs assessment survey on social and economic infrastructure development for both refugee settlements and host communities in order to provide concrete support to refugee-hosting areas.

Based on the decisions made at the Board of Directors meeting in November of the previous year, and with the Solidarity Summit looming as one of the milestones, we felt that momentum was building for full-fledged cooperation with refugees in Uganda.

4.3 Responding to the Solidarity Summit

As a result of the subsequent gathering of information through the JICA Uganda office, it became clear that the Uganda Solidarity Summit would be held around June 2017, and we would spend about five months preparing for the event.

First of all, regarding the idea in (1) above, even if we were to hold a side event, the issue was what theme to discuss. What could Japan do to appeal to other stakeholders in terms of its contribution to the refugee problem in Uganda? During my previous stay in Uganda in 2014, I initiated a project to help refugees improve their livelihoods within the framework of an ongoing technical cooperation project. Unfortunately, the scale of the project was not very large. There was no review of the project, and the challenges and lessons to be shared were unclear. For our part, we wanted to build on JICA's experience to create a forum for discussion with regard to assistance for refugees in protracted situations.

As mentioned in the section related to the SA discussion in the previous chapter, in order for development agencies to become involved in refugee issues, host countries are required to position refugee assistance and host community assistance as development issues for their own countries. In the case of Uganda, this had already been achieved, so there was essentially no problem. However, one of the issues that became clear during the January survey was the excessive burden placed on the host communities by the refugees' use of social services.

For example, in elementary schools, the number of students per class far exceeds the standard number of students, resulting in problems such as shortages of desks for students and teachers. Health centers are accepting refugee patients, resulting in long waiting times for consultations and medicine shortages. Roads are also damaged faster due to the frequent use of trucks delivering aid and water. While UNHCR and other international donors have been providing support for the expansion of facilities in refugee settlements, few additional funds have been allocated for facilities in host communities, as they are beyond the scope of humanitarian assistance. From the perspective of the local governments responsible for providing services, the lack of a corresponding budgetary allowance for the additional population of refugees is exacerbating their already constrained ability to provide services to their own citizens.

JICA, which has a strong relationship with local governments as a result of its efforts to strengthen administrative capacity through WACAP and the ACAP project that preceded it, thought it would be a good idea to approach the current situation of hosting refugees from the perspective of local governments and the challenges they are facing. One of the characteristic stances of Japan's international cooperation is that it is attentive to the standpoint of the recipient party. In this Solidarity Summit, therefore, the key question became how to refocus on issues facing local governments, which currently receive very little attention internationally. We also needed to develop ways to appeal to both Uganda and the international community. As a result of repeated discussions, the Peacebuilding Office reached a consensus that this theme would make good use of the experience gained through the ACAP and WACAP.

Next, we turn to (2), the needs assessment in the areas of social and economic infrastructure, capturing the refugee and host community needs. While UNHCR is taking the lead in formulating annual sectoral activity plans for refugee settlements, local governments in the districts surrounding the settlements have formulated five-year development plans and are implementing projects in accordance with these plans. Since these are planned and implemented in parallel, there is no integrated plan that encompasses both refugees and host communities, and there is no complementarity between the two. Therefore, it may be necessary to formulate a consolidated development plan for refugee settlements and host communities based on the current situation (population distribution of refugees and host communities combined, current allocation and use of public service facilities, etc.). The problem was how to do this quickly. At JICA's usual pace of project implementation, it would take at least one year to start the survey. However, given the urgency of the situation, we could not afford to take that long. It would be necessary to start the survey before the Solidarity Summit and appeal to Uganda and the international community.

After consulting with Komukai, Kudo, and others involved, an idea was put forward to use JICA's mechanism for basic information gathering and verification surveys, which would not require a request from the partner government or an approval process for projects. The idea was to use a form of the survey intended to gather the information required to develop a concrete project. If we prepared it quickly, we felt we might be able to start the project before the Solidarity Summit.

Thus, after the field survey in January and subsequent discussions in Japan, we decided on a policy for the Solidarity Summit. It was good that the policy was decided, but a problem arose for me. My term as Director of the Peacebuilding Office ended on March 31, 2017. This was because I had reached the age of retirement for management positions at JICA, which meant that I would have to leave that position whether I wanted to or not. I was disappointed to have had to leave partway through, but there was nothing I could do about it. Fortunately, I was able to remain with the Peacebuilding Office for the time being and continue to help with the preparations for the Solidarity Summit.

4.4 Including Refugee Support in the South Sudan Programs

Another important event I need to describe is the board meeting that was held on April 11, 2017, immediately after my retirement, which focused on the assistance strategy for South Sudan. In April 2017, JICA officials decided to reassign the South Sudan office staff to Uganda and resume cooperation from Uganda, given that the situation had stabilized somewhat. The armed conflict in July 2016 had once again led to the emergency evacuation of JICA staff from the area and suspended cooperation. The objective of the meeting was to send a green light on the resumption of assistance remotely from Uganda. Preparatory discussions began in March 2017, just prior to my retirement.

Initially, the only "South Sudan programs" to be considered by the Board were those implemented in South Sudan before the evacuation. However, I would have liked to see refugee assistance in northern Uganda included as part of the South Sudan programs. This is because most of the refugees currently flowing into Uganda are South Sudanese, and Ugandan refugee assistance is therefore meant to assist South Sudanese who have been forced to flee their homes. As in 2014, the government's ability to protect its citizens had been undermined, and it was the vulnerable refugees and IDPs who were most in need of assistance in this time of crisis. Due to security concerns, we could not provide direct assistance to the IDPs who remained in South Sudan, but we could provide direct assistance to the refugees in Uganda. This support is not humanitarian aid. It is assistance to help them become self-reliant and live in harmony with the host society so that they do not become overly dependent on humanitarian aid and lose their dignity as human beings, given that they are likely to remain refugees for a long time. This would surely help them when they

return to their own countries one day to rebuild, thereby supporting the stabilization of the region. From this perspective, I even thought that part of the budget for South Sudan operations could be allocated to supporting refugees in Uganda.

When I made the above proposal to the Africa Department, which was in charge of developing assistance policy, I was able to obtain their understanding. It was accepted that we would include support for refugees in northern Uganda as part of South Sudan programs to be discussed at the board meeting. After the deliberations, the basic policy for the resumption of South Sudan programs was decided as follows.

> In light of the current critical humanitarian situation, JICA will work to expand assistance that contributes to improving the humanitarian situation from a medium- to long-term perspective, with two pillars: (1) development cooperation focusing on basic human resource development that contributes to nation building through remote management, and (2) assistance for refugees in northern Uganda.
>
> [...] Specifically, with regard to (2), in addition to the rice cultivation training for refugees and host community population under the "Rice Promotion Project," which has already been implemented, a new project will be launched to conduct a data collection survey to formulate new support measures to meet the needs of refugees and host communities in Northern Uganda (e.g., health centers, hospitals, and schools)."

After discussion at the April 11 Board meeting, the policy was approved as originally proposed. Reviewing the minutes of the Board meeting again, it is clear that each Board member supported the inclusion of refugee assistance in Uganda as part of the South Sudan assistance. Then-President Kitaoka, speaking at the end of the deliberations, said, "We should focus on supporting refugees in northern Uganda. This is an urgent issue as Uganda's capacity to receive refugees is limited."

4.5 Preparation Process for the Solidarity Summit Side Event (Part 1)

Although it was good that the organizational policy on refugee-related assistance in Uganda had been decided, it was necessary to accelerate the

preparations for the Solidarity Summit side events. There were still many twists and turns leading up to the event. It was already April, but the specific dates for the side events had not yet been officially announced.

Because of this, I decided to go to Uganda myself from May 1 to 6 to check on the overall preparations for the summit and the intentions of those involved in organizing the side events. The stakeholders referred to here included the OPM and the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) of Uganda, donors such as UNHCR and UNDP, and other bilateral donors, as well as the Japanese Embassy, JICA office, and WACAP experts. Although the trip was short, the following points were confirmed. The following is an excerpt from my trip report, which gives a sense of what was going on at the time.

On Holding the Solidarity Summit

-- It was decided to hold the summit on June 22 and 23. The hosts are the Ugandan government and the United Nations. The secretariat within the Ugandan government is the OPM, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of handling the diplomatic corps and donors. The UN side will be represented by the Resident Coordinator, but UNHCR will be in charge of the actual preparations.

-- The objectives of the summit are threefold: (1) secure international support for Uganda's reception of refugees; (2) secure international recognition for Uganda's progressive refugee policy; and 3) provide a forum (but only on the margins of the meeting) for discussions on peace in South Sudan, the root cause of the refugee influx.

-- The UN side has confirmed that UN Secretary-General Guterres and UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi will attend the summit. It is highly likely that leaders from African countries surrounding Uganda will attend the summit. The donor side is considering having their respective Ministers of State for Refugee Affairs attend the summit.

-- The first day of the summit program will be used for site visits and side events, and the main meeting will be held on the second day. However, due to transportation limitations, the number of participants in the site visit (on Day 1) will be limited to 50–60, and

many are expected to remain in Kampala.

Side Event to be Held

-- The Ugandan government (including the Minister and the State Minister for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees from the OPM) agreed that the side event focusing on local government, which was proposed by JICA, would eventually be jointly organized by JICA and UNDP. The OPM and the MoLG are in charge within the Ugandan government.

-- The tentative theme of the side event will be the "Roles and Capacities of Local Governments for Sustainable Hosting of Refugees" (the actual name is subject to change). The date and time will be the afternoon of June 22 (Day 1).

The results of my mission turned out as shown above, but there were two issues that emerged during my stay. First, there was the issue of turf war among government ministries in dealing with refugees. It was well known that local governments and host communities were experiencing a heavy burden as a result of accepting refugees. Supporting host communities was also a priority policy of the CRRF. Therefore, the MoLG, as well as many donors, were generally supportive of holding events that focused on the role of local governments and strengthening their capacity.

However, when we met with the Undersecretary of the OPM, the Director of the Department of Refugees, who was also in attendance, told us that the OPM is solely responsible for dealing with refugees and that the role of local governments in accepting refugees is limited. When there is a need for coordination with the local community, such as the leasing of land for settlement establishment, the OPM consults with the local government and the local community, so there is no particular problem with the local government. In other words, the OPM was not particularly supportive of the proposed event. After much discussion, the Permanent Secretary of the OPM eventually suggested that a side event might be acceptable. However, she still expressed concern, reminding us that we should not allow such situations to occur where placards might be erected by local government officials (i.e., public protests) at the event site.

Prior to this, discussions were held with the head of the UNHCR Uganda office, but its response was mixed from the outset. The UNHCR side said,

"We fully understand the importance of the issue, but this is currently a very sensitive issue within the government, and we would like to see the government's reaction." In talking to local officials, I learned that a meeting of government officials on accepting refugees had been held the week before my visit. In the meeting, the participating local government representatives had expressed great dissatisfaction with the central government's response, including the lack of consultation and budget allocation. In Uganda, refugee affairs are the responsibility of the OPM, and it was feared that the involvement of local governments could lead to a weakening of the authority of the OPM and its associated resources for assistance. Therefore, the OPM was cautious about holding meetings focused on the role of local governments. After talking with various stakeholders, I finally understood what the UNHCR Director's advice really meant. I was beginning to feel that the possibility of holding a side event was becoming uncertain.

I continued to meet with the Minister of the OPM and the Minister of State and repeatedly explained our intentions, but no clear answers were forthcoming from them. The day of my departure was gradually approaching, and just when I thought I had no choice but to return home without any clear sign of green light after running out of time, a major turn of events occurred on the last day of the trip. I received a call from Steven Goldfinch, a UNDP official with whom I had met at a dinner hosted by the Japanese Embassy on the evening of the first day, saying that the UN Resident Coordinator, Rosa Malango, wanted to meet with me immediately. The UN Resident Coordinator is the representative of the United Nations that coordinates all UN humanitarian and development assistance in countries facing conflict, refugees, and other challenges. What could such a person want to see me about?

I met with Malango, who, without even really greeting me, proposed that we jointly hold a side event by JICA and UNDP—as UNDP was also very interested in JICA's proposal to focus on local governments in refugee response. Since the UNDP also provides support to local governments, the official thought JICA's proposal had something in common with what they were doing and could create synergy after hearing about it from Goldfinch.

When I said, "I appreciate your interest, but the Ugandan government has not yet given its full approval and we need to further coordinate,"

Malango interrupted me and said, "I have already spoken to the minister in charge of the OPM and the Prime Minister and have their approval on the issue, so there is nothing to worry about." Malango also told me that she had spoken to the UN headquarters in New York and had obtained their approval, so it would be possible for UNDP to bear some of the costs.

I was very surprised at the sudden offer and was a little concerned about whether the Ugandan side had really agreed to it or not. However, I was unable to refuse such a request from a representative of the United Nations, which was the co-host of the Solidarity Summit itself.

It was good that the possibility of holding the event had been opened up, but there was another problem: the capacity of the JICA Uganda Office. When we reported the results of my visit to the Uganda Office just before I left for the airport, their response was mixed. While the Uganda Office understood the significance of the side event and the fact that the experience gained through past support to the northern part of the country would be utilized at the event, they feared that they could not manage the coordination with the UNDP and UNHCR—in addition to the OPM and the MoLG—to hold the side event due to staffing shortages in the office and the lack of staff with experience in holding international conferences. I explained to them that there was nothing to worry about as the planning of the event and publicity materials would be prepared at the headquarters, but they did not agree, citing staff shortages. The details of meetings of this kind are decided onsite, so there was a limit to what could be done remotely from headquarters. We needed to get the office to be willing to take an active role in preparing for the meeting. I told them that I would consider dispatching support personnel from headquarters to assist in the preparations (unfortunately, I did not have the authority to make such a decision at that time), and left Uganda for the time being.

4.6 Preparation Process for the Solidarity Summit Side Event (Part 2)

After returning to Japan, I shared my insights about the local situation with colleagues of the Peacebuilding Office, who agreed to co-sponsor the project with UNDP and discussed the possibility of dispatching office support staff. As a result, from May 28 to June 3, Komukai and Kimura, both of whom had been directly involved in ACAP and WACAP, traveled to Uganda to provide support to the office. In addition, I went to Uganda

again from June 10, just before the summit, to help with preparations. Since it was decided that the headquarters would also provide support, the Uganda Office agreed to get involved in earnest. In addition, Tomomi Uchikawa, Deputy Director of the South Sudan Office, also agreed to assist.

Before Komukai and Kimura arrived in Uganda, we had prepared a concept paper for the event and shared it with our Uganda office staff, but preparations in the field did not go very far. In retrospect, it seems that part of the reason for this was the lack of support from the OPM in Uganda. At the end of May, Komukai and Kimura, leading the second preparatory support mission, arrived at the site, only to be met with further setbacks. The following is an excerpt from their trip report at the time.

-- At a meeting held on Monday, May 29, chaired by Mr. Onek, Minister for Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees in the OPM, a representative of the Director of the Department of Refugees in the OPM attempted to overturn the holding of this side event, and it was clear that the Director and others did not want this side event to be held. In response, the Embassy of Japan, UNDP, and the MoLG explained that an agreement had already been reached with State Minister Ecweru in the OPM and that preparations were underway to hold the event. Minister Onek did not seem to have been fully briefed on the situation surrounding such a side event. However, after reading the draft concept paper shared at the meeting, he appreciated the purpose of the side event and agreed to hold it, and then explained that (1) a support package would be prepared in advance as an outcome of the side event, and (2) a preparatory meeting would be held in order to gather the opinions of the twelve CAOs of refugee-hosting districts (5 in West Nile, 1 in Acholi, and 6 in the Southwest) and present them at the side event.

-- In a meeting with State Minister for Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees Ecweru on Tuesday, May 30, the minister instructed his secretary on the spot to coordinate with the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make this side event an official part of the program. UNHCR, who was also present at the meeting, explained they would be grateful for official approval as soon as possible in order to proceed with various procedures (e.g., securing a venue,

securing accommodation and transportation for participants, etc.).

-- In response to Minister Onek's instructions, a preparatory meeting was held on June 1 with CAOs from the eight districts that have refugee settlements (the invitation was sent to all twelve districts, but due to the short notice, representatives from only eight were able to attend). The meeting was moderated by a staff member of the Department of Refugees of the OPM, and all eight CAOs presented the challenges they face due to the influx of refugees, as well as concrete examples of their efforts to address these challenges.

-- This side event had not yet been officially registered as of June 1 and was not included in the program. However, the following day, June 2, the OPM issued a statement and instructions regarding this matter at a meeting of concerned parties in preparation for the summit, and the event was officially registered.

As described above, there were many twists and turns in the process of holding the side event itself. One of the reasons for this was that the theme touched on a very sensitive issue that lies at the heart of Uganda's refugee response: a turf war within the government. However, JICA recognized that this was an issue that could not be avoided in order to realize the "refugee integration in and coexistence with the host community." Thanks to the efforts of Komukai and Kimura, the Japanese Embassy, the JICA offices in Uganda and South Sudan, UNDP, and others who shared this recognition, we managed to get our side event officially included in the Solidarity Summit program.

Uganda solidarity summit on refugees
Photograph: Local Development Partners' Group in Uganda

(From left to right) JICA Vice President Hiroshi Katō, UNDP Country Director Almaz Gebru, and State Minister Ecweru speaking at Solidarity Summit on Refugees Photograph: JICA

4.7 Hosting the Solidarity Summit Side Event

After this process, the Solidarity Summit and side events were finally held. JICA asked Hiroshi Katō, Vice President for Africa at the time, to deliver an address at the side event, and had Komukai speak at the panel discussion. I was assigned to manage the entire event together with UNDP. Kōji Sakane, who succeeded me as the new head of the Peacebuilding Office, participated along with Kimura and Miki Ichikawa in a supporting role. The following is what came out of our preparations for the Solidarity Summit, which began in February. Excerpts are attached, once again, from the trip report.

Overview of Summit

-- The Uganda Refugee Solidarity Summit was co-hosted by the Government of Uganda and the United Nations on June 22 and 23 in Munyunyo, outside Kampala. Attendees included Ugandan President Museveni, UN Secretary-General Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Grandi, AU President Condé, African heads of state, WFP Executive Director Beasley, Vice President James Wani Igga of South Sudan— altogether about 500 people. From Japan, Nobuo Kishi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, attended the meeting.

-- Uganda has accepted 1.3 million refugees, including 950,000 South Sudanese refugees. This summit was held with the goal of securing pledges to the tune of US$2 billion to support the

Ugandan government's efforts to accept refugees. Major countries and organizations have pledged to contribute: 85 million euros from the EU, 50 million US dollars each from the UK and Germany, 10 million US dollars from Japan, 500,000 US dollars from China, etc. The total pledges amounted to US$350 million. Other African countries have also pledged to contribute, including Gabon (US$250,000), Somalia (US$100,000), and Equatorial Guinea (US$100,000).

Overview of Side Event

-- JICA and UNDP co-organized the side event on capacity building of Ugandan local governments hosting refugees. This side event was realized after JICA, which has been supporting the capacity building of local governments in northern Uganda since 2009, stressed the importance of the role of local governments in hosting refugees to the central government and UN agencies. The realization of this program was made possible by the generous support from the South Sudan Office, as well as from the Uganda Office.

-- Hiroshi Kato, Vice President of JICA, gave the opening remarks and Komukai, Senior Advisor, participated as a panelist. State Minister Ecuweru in the OPM, Assistant Secretary Chouda of the Ministry of Local Government, and other dignitaries took the stage. The event was quite successful, attracting about 150 participants in total (the results of this side event were published in New Vision, a major Ugandan newspaper).

-- Uganda hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world (1.3 million as of now). As a result of its generous policy of allowing refugees freedom of movement and access to land, as well as providing basic services such as water and education, the large and prolonged refugee population has placed a heavy burden on host communities and local governments. JICA has been supporting local governments, including refugee-hosting districts, to strengthen their administrative capacity, and this side event introduced the challenges faced by local governments and JICA's efforts to address them. JICA's planned "Data collection survey on social infrastructure needs of refugee-hosting communities in northern Uganda" was also mentioned, as was the importance of

the Ugandan government and donors working together to address the issues.

-- The panelists, CAOs from Yumbe and Kamwenge districts, gave detailed explanations of the current status and challenges of local administration, which were based on the discussions held with CAOs from the eight districts that had refugee settlements prior to the side event. This was an effective input to introduce specific issues on the ground.

-- Traditionally, assistance for humanitarian crises has been viewed as a transition from "humanitarian aid to development assistance" over time. However, in recent years, the burden on host countries and communities has increased due to the extended stays of refugees and displaced persons and the expansion of their size. JICA has already provided capacity-building support for local administration in the West Nile and Acholi sub-regions of Uganda, which host large numbers of refugees, as announced at this side event. These pioneering efforts by JICA embody the spirit of the CRRF, which is why this side event attracted a great deal of attention—not only from Ugandan government officials but also from aid workers and the media. It is necessary to continue to actively promote such projects and support the Ugandan government's efforts as a host country for refugees.

After more than two years of study and trial and error on JICA's refugee assistance, while I was with the Peacebuilding Office, JICA presented its emerging strategy at a side event at the Solidarity Summit in Uganda. After the summit, we learned that JICA had been the only bilateral donor allowed to hold a side event during the summit. I believe that the trust between JICA and the Ugandan government and the careful handling of the preparatory process by all parties involved had borne fruit.

On the way back from Uganda, I explained the results of this project to Daniel Endress, the then Director of the CRRF at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, who was very pleased with the project as an attempt to advance the CRRF in a concrete way.

In retrospect, the events leading up to the side event at the Solidarity Summit in Uganda were a compelling example of how difficult these

issues are to manage in practice, even though they are emphasized in international frameworks such as the GCR and CRRF, namely, "integration and coexistence of refugees into host societies."

On the host country side, the ministry in charge of refugees—namely OPM—is not the only institution handling refugee issues. There are also local governments, local residents, and local politicians as key stakeholders as well as the MoLG, which represents them in the central government. On the international organization side, there is the UNHCR, a humanitarian agency, as well as the UNDP, a development agency. Development agencies such as JICA are also involved as bilateral donors. With such a wide range of stakeholders, it is imperative to find a consensus on the issues of mutual concern and improve the situation of both the refugees and the host communities, who are the ultimate beneficiaries. With all this fuss over a single conference, it was not surprising that international efforts prior to the CRRF faced such enormous challenges.

This side event marked the end of my work at the Peacebuilding Office. However, I still had a strong desire to develop this effort in the field. The results so far were only one international conference, and the actual implementation of such effort on the ground was still in its infancy.

Column 7
JICA's Support for Northern Uganda and the Solidarity Summit on Refugees

By Eri Komukai, Senior Advisor, JICA

My first visit to northern Uganda was back in 1995. I still cannot believe that it was more than a quarter century ago. When North and South Sudan were still one country, I was working as an NGO worker in a camp for Sudanese refugees who had fled to the West Nile sub-region of northern Uganda due to the Sudanese civil war (at that time, the refugees were called "Sudanese" and not "South Sudanese," and the settlements were then still "camps"). At that time, I was involved in humanitarian relief projects in the West Nile sub-region of Uganda, where armed groups were sporadically active, so we had to be careful about security. The UN had already designated this area as a non-family duty station (i.e., no family could join the aid worker) due to the risks involved. In December 2004, before the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, I participated in a mission to Sudan led by Dr. Hanatani, the author of this book. I also clearly remember traveling to Nairobi, where we met with officials of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

JICA first became involved in northern Uganda in 2009 when it dispatched a survey team to study support for the return and resettlement of IDPs in the Acholi sub-region, where the conflict with the LRA had been settled. Afterward, I was involved in promoting cooperation in the Acholi sub-region, and in 2014, five years later, I had the chance to visit Adjumani District in West Nile, next to Acholi. Although some 20 years had passed since I began working for the NGO, I was both nostalgic and saddened to see Sudanese refugees still living there, even though they had changed their names to "South Sudanese" refugees.

In July 2016, an even larger number of South Sudanese refugees arrived in Uganda, and JICA decided to seriously consider cooperation in the West Nile sub-region. I took three trips to the region in January, May–June, and the end of June 2017. The trip

starting in May was one of the most exciting. Despite the fact that the side event at the Solidarity Summit on Refugees was only a few weeks away, on May 29, the first day of the trip, at a meeting with ministers and other officials in the OPM, the Department of Refugees of the OPM expressed its opposition to holding the side event. Undaunted, I informed the minister that the State Minister in the OPM had already agreed to hold the side event. I also explained to the minister what the side event would aim to achieve and what we wanted to discuss. As a result, the minister finally agreed to hold the side event, but he instructed us to hold a preparatory meeting with the CAOs (chief administrators of local governments) of the twelve districts hosting refugees.

It is not easy to invite the top administrators from the twelve districts to meet in the capital city of Kampala, especially on such short notice. However, without this meeting, we would not be able to hold the side event. And if we did not have a preparatory meeting during our trip to Uganda, the trip from Tokyo by my colleague, Ms. Kimura and I would have been meaningless. We asked the MoLG, a ministry with which JICA has had a long cooperative relationship, for help, and three days after the minister's instruction, we were able to hold a preparatory meeting. The meeting was attended by the Department of Refugees of the OPM, which had made a direct appeal to JICA in advance, and eight (of the twelve) CAOs. We gathered in the conference room in JICA's office in Kampala to discuss the needs of the refugee influx in each district and what measures were being taken to address them. Real opinions were expressed.

In my view, the meeting with CAOs of refugee-hosting districts held on June 1 was the highlight of the Solidarity Summit preparations. Hearing the CAOs confidently and constructively express their opinions about the situation on the ground in each district, I felt confident that the side event would be meaningful.

We arrived in Uganda again in time for the Solidarity Summit side event and finished confirming arrangements and checking the venue the day before the actual event began on June 22. I

participated in a panel discussion with Mr. Asman, CAO of Kamwenge District, Mr. Jacob, CAO of Yumbe District, and Mr. Innocent of UNDP, all of whom were involved in hosting refugees. I explained how JICA, a development agency, was supporting refugees and host communities, the significance of support to local governments hosting refugees, and plans for JICA's future cooperation. Most impressive were the presentations by the two CAOs and their responses to the panel discussion. Because the issue of refugees tends to be discussed only among the people based in Kampala, the side event was meant to show how local governments that are hosting refugees are doing a lot of work on the ground. The two CAOs spoke with confidence during the session and I remember thinking that hosting the side event had made a valuable contribution.

In the session, we introduced the "Data collection survey on social infrastructure needs of refugee-hosting communities in northern Uganda" as the centerpiece of JICA's future cooperation with refugee and host communities in Uganda. In July 2017, the month following the Solidarity Summit, consultants in the roads, health, education, and water supply sectors began working on the ground in Kampala and West Nile. This was the first survey to assess the needs of the above four sectors, encompassing both refugee settlements and the host areas outside of them. About six months after the survey began, a seminar was held to share the results

Author presenting at the Solidarity Summit on Refugees
Photograph: JICA

with the Ugandan government and donors, which was highly praised by the Ugandan national press with the headline "Emulate Japan on Refugee Support." In retrospect, I feel that this survey and the side event held at the Solidarity Summit were important efforts to support JICA's subsequent support for refugees and host communities in Uganda.

Chapter 5
To Uganda, Again

After leaving my position in the Peacebuilding Office to help organize the side event at the Uganda Refugee Solidarity Summit, I wanted to continue my efforts on the ground in Uganda. At that time, the Peacebuilding Office was looking for a replacement for the project leader of WACAP, which had started the previous year. I decided to apply for the post, seeing it as a good opportunity to get involved in the field on the issue of assistance for refugees in protracted situations, as it was the area I had been working on. After a selection process, I was assigned back to Uganda in July 2017, where I spent the next two years working in the field supporting refugees and host communities. Here I will describe the various collaborations that took place during this period and my activities within them.

5.1 Joining the Northern Uganda Assistance Project

In late July 2017, a month after the Solidarity Summit ended, I was back in the land of West Nile in Northern Uganda.

My assignment at WACAP was to lead a technical cooperation project to improve development planning capacity and support the implementation of community development projects in the (then) 13 districts of West Nile and Acholi. However, through the arrangement of the Peacebuilding Office and the JICA Uganda Office, I was also asked to serve as "Refugee Assistance Coordinator in Northern Uganda" as an extension of my previous work. Although my main duty was to lead WACAP, I was also expected to provide lateral support to JICA's refugee-related work in northern Uganda by making use of my hands-on knowledge of local government in Uganda and the people involved through this work.[54]

In September of the same year, Miki Ichikawa from the Peacebuilding Office was assigned as a project formulation advisor to coordinate assistance for refugees in the capital city of Kampala. Her mission was to collect and analyze information on refugee assistance provided by the

[54] Although my main work during my stay in Uganda was as a leader of WACAP, I will focus here on my activities as an advisor for refugee assistance.

international community in Uganda—as it was the CRRF pilot country—and to plan Japan-JICA cooperation projects in line with CRRF principles. She was to liaise with and gather information from representatives of various countries and organizations in the capital city of Kampala, while I was to support her activities in the field in the north.

5.1.1 President Kitaoka's Visit

While I was still living in a hotel in Arua City, looking for a place to settle, my first refugee-related assignment was to support then-JICA President Shinichi Kitaoka's visit to Northern Uganda. During his trip to Tanzania and Uganda from August 20 to 26, 2017, Kitaoka was scheduled to visit the Adjumani District in northern Uganda on August 24. His destination was a refugee settlement in the district and an activity site of JICA's PRiDe project, which had been providing training on rice cultivation to both Ugandans and South Sudanese refugees since 2014. Before the site visit, a briefing at the Adjumani District Office was also planned.

In preparation for his visit, I met with the Refugee Settlement Commander of the OPM, the Chairperson of the Refugee Welfare Council, and the UNHCR Adjumani Office representative several times, explaining the purpose of President Kitaoka's visit and consulting with them about any matters related to the program. As the visit was about to get underway, I visited Adjumani the day before the visit to finalize arrangements with the people concerned.

On the day of the visit, when Kitaoka and his delegation arrived at a small

President Kitaoka and his delegation planting seeds at a Northern Uganda refugee settlement

Photograph: JICA

President Kitaoka giving a speech during his visit to Uganda

Photograph: PRiDe Project

airfield in Adjumani, I immediately got in the car with him and briefed him on the situation in northern Uganda and the program for the day. Kitaoka understood well that I was there as an extension of the series of policy-level discussions that had taken place since the previous year, including the World Humanitarian Summit, the Board of Directors meeting on refugee assistance, the Board of Directors meeting on assistance to South Sudan, and the recent Solidarity Summit. I explained to him that I wanted him and the delegation to see how the organizational decision-making and international discussions on aid policy were actually unfolding on the ground.

The tour proceeded as planned, with a visit to the district government, a briefing from the CAO on the status of refugee reception, a visit to a refugee settlement, and a rice planting ceremony at an exhibition plot for rice cultivation. At a little past 2:00 p.m., the chartered plane with the president's group took off for Entebbe. The visit took about four hours. Although I did not ask Kitaoka directly for his impressions of the trip, I felt that the purpose of the visit had been accomplished, as the following report was included in the internal documents of the organization at that time.

> JICA's support in Uganda for the return and resettlement of IDPs in Northern Uganda (since 2009) and refugee-related support mainly for South Sudanese (since 2014) are concrete examples showcasing the Japanese Government policy of "proactive contributions to peace," and this is something that JICA should make every effort to address. In a side event at the Solidarity Summit on Refugees held in Uganda in June this year, we shared the results of JICA's efforts to support host communities by strengthening local administrative capacity. While keeping a close eye on the situation in South Sudan, it is highly significant for JICA to be actively involved in the formulation and implementation of policy processes related to the reception of refugees in Uganda, not only through financial contributions but also through technical cooperation. It is also important to strengthen the support for refugees to promote their self-reliance and deepen relationships with local communities, as can be seen in the support for rice cultivation training.

5.1.2 Attending the CRRF Meeting in Geneva

Another task awaited me following President Kitaoka's visit to Uganda. The UNHCR was at the critical juncture of its process to develop a Global Compact on Refugees based on the New York Declaration adopted in December 2016.

The UNHCR was holding a series of thematic meetings in Geneva to develop specific support policies based on the CRRF and to summarize the views of stakeholders. The third meeting of the series was scheduled to be held in Geneva in early October 2017 under the theme of "Responding to Refugee Needs and Supporting Host Communities." The UNHCR asked me to deliver a keynote speech at a session on "How to Promote Integration of Refugees into Host Countries' Development Systems and Social Services."

In response to this request, JICA decided to send Ichikawa and Yui Takayama of JICA Uganda Office along with me. The three of us left Entebbe on October 14 for Geneva, where the weather was already showing signs of late autumn.

When we arrived, UNHCR told me that they wanted me to serve as co-chair as well as keynote speaker. The event was held on October 18, and following the keynote speech, I moderated a panel discussion that was attended by about 150 people, together with the Director of UNHCR's Organizational Reform Division. Since the chairperson of the Adjumani District Council of Uganda was invited as a panelist as well, I arranged

Meeting on CRRF-related themes

Giving the final report

Photographs: Courtesy of author

a meeting with him in advance (he arrived at the venue just before the event) and discussed how we should approach the meeting.

In my keynote speech, I spoke about the discussions at the Solidarity Summit and the situation on the ground in northern Uganda. Based on the Ugandan case, I discussed the situation on the ground, saying that, under the decentralized system of governance in Africa, the integration of refugees in the national development plan does not automatically translate into the integration of refugees in social services. I asked the participants to discuss how this problem could be overcome. More than 40 people from the floor spoke on this theme, including reports from countries in the Middle East and Latin America. After my session, I took no time to rest and prepared a document summarizing the discussions, which I presented at the plenary session at the end of the meeting.

My days in northern Uganda thus began in a hectic manner.

5.2 Conducting a Basic Information Collection and Verification Survey in the West Nile Sub-region

5.2.1 Identifying Demand for Social Services, Including Users Among Refugees

The "Data Collection Survey on Social Infrastructure Needs of Refugee-Hosting Communities in Northern Uganda" (hereafter the "West Nile Survey"), which had been prepared prior to my departure from Japan, was conducted at this time. The survey, which was conceived during my

Road near refugee settlement

Water collection point in the refugee settlement
Photographs: JICA

visit to Uganda in January of this year, began in July. The survey was undertaken by a group of consultants selected from a joint venture of Katahira Engineering International, PADECO, and Kokusai Kogyo.

This study targeted five districts (Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Moyo, and Yumbe) in the West Nile sub-region of Uganda, where the large influx of South Sudanese refugees continues, to identify the current status and issues of social infrastructure, especially water supply facilities, health facilities, primary and secondary schools, roads and small bridges in the refugee settlements and the host communities and to formulate projects to be supported by donors including Japan for priority projects. The survey was conducted over a nine-month period from July 2017 to March 2018.[55]

The survey was groundbreaking in terms of the speed with which the Japanese government's commitment at the Solidarity Summit was implemented as early as the following month. However, it was also unprecedented in several significant ways.

First, although the project was limited to social infrastructure, it was the first to attempt an estimation of the demand for facilities such as school classrooms and health centers of users, including refugee users. It then compared this demand with the current situation to identify current and future development gaps. Since social services in Uganda are open to refugees, the number of social services provided should be determined by taking into account the burden brought on by both national and refugee users, but this approach had not previously been employed in the planning process. In this study, therefore, demand was estimated by integrating the Ugandan user population and the refugee user population.

Second, the survey obtained geographic information on social service delivery points in Uganda, such as schools and health centers, and maps were created to show their exact geographic locations and the gap between supply and demand at those locations. Although the district government already knew the approximate location of service delivery points in Uganda, there was no objective data that provided specific geographical information, distance from refugee settlements, and the population residing within a certain radius of access. In this study, this data was

[55] The contract period was in fact extended by one month, and the survey continued until April.

obtained and used to develop a map that can be visually confirmed by anyone.

Eventually, this data was uploaded onto a portal site for Ugandan refugee assistance created by the CRRF Secretariat in Uganda and made available to anyone who wanted to view and use the findings.

5.2.2 When Even Basic Information on Refugees is Unavailable

The West Nile Survey was a milestone in terms of creating integrated data for refugee and national users, which had never existed before. Releasing this data was done as a public good to those concerned, in line with one of the CRRF's objectives of supporting refugee-hosting communities. However, the implementation of the project was fraught with difficulties.

For example, the report of the survey team stated that "The (sub)counties in which the settlements are located were known in advance (through information gathering in Japan). However, there was no mention of the corresponding parish (an administrative unit below sub-county), which had to be confirmed through the field survey. As for the settlements on the east side of the Nile River (in Adjumani District), we were unable to obtain specific information on their locations through surveys in Japan, despite repeated searches on the Internet and inquiries to NGOs active in the area." As such, it was not easy to determine the exact location and boundaries of the refugee settlements.



A sketch showing the location of refugee settlements in Adjumani District

Source: JICA report

After the start of the field survey, it also became clear that "there is not always a consensus between the OPM, UNHCR, and local government regarding the definition of settlements and host communities." For example, the area designated as "settlement" on UNHCR's maps was delineated according to their understanding of "the maximum extent of land to be set aside for refugee settlements in the future," and thus "settlement" referred to a considerably larger area than it actually was. In contrast, the Department of Refugees of the OPM indicated that the same area should be considered a "host community," while district officials argued that the entire district should be considered a host community. The survey team was confronted with the problem of differing perceptions of the basic question of what constitutes a refugee settlement and a host community.

The parties involved also differed on the definition of "refugee." The survey team considered refugees as those who were living in refugee settlements, with the number of refugees roughly equal to the total number of registered refugees in the country. However, the Ugandan side argued that voluntary migrants (self-settlers) and refugees living in urban areas—as mentioned in Chapter 2 of this book—should also be included. Although we could understand this argument given the reality of the refugee problem in Uganda, when we asked them to give the exact number of such "refugees" (for the sake of planning), no one was able to answer. Therefore, these non-registered refugees and migrants could not be included in our estimates, although the impact of such additional service users was well noted.

Finally, another problem was the difficulty of gathering information on social service delivery points in refugee settlements and host communities. The Japanese side assumed that the regional offices of the OPM would have information on such facilities, but the team found that they did not. In the end, it was actually the local NGOs, known as implementing partners (IPs)—those who had contracted with UNHCR to provide services in the settlements—that were able to answer the locations and conditions of the schools, health centers, and water supply facilities in the settlements. The survey team therefore visited NGOs working in the field in each area of settlement and asked them one by one questions about what kind of facilities existed and where and whether they were functioning or not, and so on. Although the local government (district, sub-county, etc.) had some data on the facilities that existed on the side of host communities, it

was necessary to record their geographical locations by GPS at each site. In addition, the existence of boreholes and other facilities created as part of the refugee assistance program but situated outside the settlements due to various reasons was not known to local government officials.

5.2.3 Government of Uganda Seminar for Donors

Although the collection of information that formed the basis of the survey was extremely difficult, the efforts of the survey team and the support of stakeholders resulted in the development of a list of priority projects in the areas of education, health, water supply, and roads and small bridges, taking into account the impact of the refugee influx.[56] In addition, the report included a geographic information system (GIS) map of the Ugandan population, refugee numbers, administrative boundaries, refugee settlements, and existing facilities in each sector, which was overlaid on the maps prepared during the survey.

In February 2018, after the draft report was completed, two seminars



Example of a GIS map in West Nile Survey
Source: JICA report

[56] Regarding roads and small bridges, we assessed the current situation of the roads and road network in terms of the need for improvements and the level of contribution to enhancing road transport capacity throughout the West Nile sub-region.

were held to share the findings with the government of Uganda and with donors involved in refugee assistance. The seminar for the Ugandan government was held at the invitation of the Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees of the OPM, based on the initiative of then-Japanese Ambassador Mr. Kazuaki Kameda. Thirty-seven people attended the meeting on February 28, including the Minister of State, Musa Ecweru himself, the Director of the Department of Refugees, and technical officials from the line ministries and technical agencies (such as the Ministry of Public Works and National Highway Administration). The meeting was chaired by State Minister Ecweru. Expressing his gratitude for the Japanese support through this study, he stated that "Japan is a reliable partner to support Uganda (which has an open-door policy toward refugees). Because of this trust, JICA had been granted special approval to co-host a side event with UNDP at the previous year's Solidarity Summit on Refugees. Within weeks of the side event, JICA dispatched the mission. Instead of working in front of a computer in an office in Kampala like many other organizations, the team went to the West Nile site as soon as its members arrived."[57] The following day, March 1, New Vision, a local daily newspaper, carried an article authored by the State Minister titled "Emulate Japan on Refugee Support" (see newspaper article below).

The seminar for donors was held on March 1 with a total of 28 participants from UNDP, UNHCR, EU, embassies of other bilateral donor countries, NGOs and humanitarian and development agencies, and the CRRF

16 NEW VISION, Friday, March 2, 2018

COMMENT

Musa Ecweru, Minister/politician

Emulate Japan on refugees support

Uganda is currently hosting over 1.4 million refugees from mainly South Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, among others.

The huge number of refugees imposes a big burden to Uganda and the host districts as pressure is exerted to the existing infrastructure and social services in those areas. This, therefore, calls for increased international responsibility sharing.

It is on this basis that the President of the Republic of Uganda and the Secretary General of the United Nations co-hosted a Solidarity Summit on Refugees in June 2017 to appeal to the International Community to demonstrate their international responsibility sharing and stand with Uganda in solidarity to respond to the refugee influx.

Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was among the partners that was invited to the Solidarity Summit on refugees and they hosted a side event together with UNDP on local governments.

As a quick response to the situation, a field assessment was conducted to establish investment gaps and areas of intervention that could be supported to lessen the burden of refugee hosting districts.

JICA was among the first partners to respond after the Solidarity Summit on Refugees since by July, it had already commissioned a team to conduct an assessment study on infrastructural needs within refugee hosting communities of West Nile region.

I am happy that the JICA study team has shared the findings of the study and the methodology used to prioritise projects for investment.

In addition, the Japanese Government pledged $10m for refugee humanitarian response through the UN Agencies. The identified project profiles target refugee hosting communities in five districts of West Nile including Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Moyo and Yumbe districts.

JICA is a credible partner with Government of Uganda and has over the years been supporting the Government in a number of projects including Economic Infrastructural Development, Agriculture, Health, Water and in the reconstruction of Northern Uganda and many others.

The Government of Uganda pledges transparency and accountability in all ways of collaborating with JICA, the Japanese Government and other partners.

We call upon other Agencies to emulate JICA by honouring their commitments towards the refugee response.

The Government of Uganda recognises the researched findings from the JICA study and appeals to other partners to support more projects from the developed profiles that JICA may not fund through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.

The writer is the Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees

Paul Busharizi, journalist

Susan Magara's death

Dr Norman Mugarura

Reform anti-money laundering regulation

It has become apparent that some aspects of the current anti-money laundering regulatory framework such as "the reporting requirements" on minimum threshold and suspicious transaction report filings (SARs) are not facilitating the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism.

In a study carried out by two accounting firms in 2016 found that more than half of the transactions that were flagged as "suspicious" did not necessarily need investigations and should never have been undertaken. It costs banks business and huge sums of money to carry out SARs investigations and to store the generated data that may in the end not be necessarily utilised.

In order to make anti-money laundering regulation and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) more robust, the priority should be put on instituting measures on beneficial ownership, terrorist financing and proactive detection of money laundering to dispense with unnecessary requirements.

Two significant issues have been identified: (1) reporting requirements for transactions over $10,000 and (2) the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports. Banks and law enforcement agree that many of the filings above the $10,000 threshold and its SARs are not helpful to law enforcement. In response to money laundering and terrorist financing threats, the number of filings required by banks has steadily increased with no firm finding that such filings have directly resulted in increased enforcement.

The current AML/CFT regulatory framework is so complex and poorly coordinated that it hampers rather than advancing the ability of banks utilise their resources efficiently to safeguard against criminal exploitation. For instance, the $10,000 threshold

New Vision newspaper commentary Source: *New Vision*

[57] This refers to the fact that JICA is the only bilateral donor organization that was allowed to hold a side event at the Solidarity Summit.

Secretariat, etc. Komukai, an expert from JICA Headquarters, traveled to the seminar as a speaker, and I chaired the meeting. While many of the participants agreed that the information compiled in the survey was very comprehensive and substantial and that it would be useful for future activities, they also expressed the need for a mechanism to ensure that the information is easily accessible to all concerned and that it is regularly updated. Donors considering assistance in related fields expressed interest in exchanging detailed information on survey methods and demand estimation methods.

The CRRF Secretariat commented that it would like to further share the survey results at CRRF meetings, as the contents of the survey are consistent with and embody the CRRF's policies. In response, on April 29, I and the Chief Representative of the JICA Uganda Office had an opportunity to present the results of the study at the CRRF Coordination Meeting, the highest decision-making body of the Uganda CRRF.

5.2.4 Toward Appropriate Services for Refugees and Nationals of the Host Country

The first step in the integration of refugees into the host society—which is the objective of the CRRF—is the provision of integrated social services to nationals and refugees. While they need to be appropriate for refugees (in terms of access, quantity, and quality), they must first and foremost be appropriate for the citizens of the host society. Otherwise, integrated service delivery will not be sustainable. The West Nile survey attempted to identify and synthesize data as a prerequisite for providing appropriate services to refugees and citizens of the host society, and to identify support needs based on this data. The survey also enabled us to organize this data as geographic information that could be visually grasped and provided to the public as a public good.

This was an extremely valuable asset for the governments that provide services and donors that provide support. However, for the general public and refugees who receive services, it is meaningless unless these projects are implemented. After the survey team returned to Japan, it was JICA's job to implement their recommendations. This required collaboration between JICA and Japanese Embassy officials in Uganda, as well as those at JICA headquarters.

5.3 Support for Promotion of Implementation of Priority West Nile Study Projects

5.3.1 Projects Categorized Based on Project Size and Implementation Timeline

Assistance toward the implementation of high-priority projects identified through the West Nile Survey began at the end of 2017, even before the survey was completed. In Japan's aid administration system, it usually takes a long time for a project to be requested, appraised, adopted, and implemented. However, the beneficiaries often cannot wait for such a long time. As a result, initial expectations turn into disappointment. While the expectations of the Ugandan side were rising with the unveiling of the survey results, this time, it was necessary to ensure that those expectations would not turn into disappointment.

As a result of discussions among JICA officials, it was decided to initiate procedures by categorizing the projects by type, taking into consideration the scale of the project and the time required for adoption and implementation. Accordingly, the projects were divided into these three categories: (1) projects that are large in scale and require a lot of time for adoption and implementation, (2) projects that are small in scale and require a relatively short time for adoption and implementation, and (3) projects that fall in between the two categories.

First, we assumed that (1) is for grant aid (a form of assistance that does not require the recipient country to make repayments). This type of project is mainly aimed at building infrastructure and facilities that contribute to poverty alleviation in low-income countries and is usually in the range of several hundred million yen to several billion yen (equivalent to one to several tens of million USD). The decision to implement such projects is made by the Cabinet of the Japanese government, which requires a detailed engineering study called the "Preparatory Survey." It usually takes one to two years from the time the study is conducted to the time the decision is made by the Cabinet. Therefore, we considered a road improvement project that requires a detailed engineering study would fit this format.

Roads in refugee settlements are essential to the daily lives of local residents and are also important infrastructure used for the distribution of

humanitarian aid supplies and drinking water. Most roads in the West Nile sub-region are laterite pavements, which are made of red clay containing gravel. The roads that access residential areas are severely damaged due to the frequent passage of heavy vehicles carrying water and food in the course of humanitarian assistance. This makes it difficult to pass through during the rainy season, and the surface needs to be leveled and improved every year after the rainy season. If these roads could be paved with asphalt, logistics and human movement could be facilitated throughout the year, and the need for frequent repairs would also be reduced.[58] The revitalization of traffic would also stimulate economic activity among refugees. However, road construction requires significant funding and donors interested in this sector in Africa are limited to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Union—not including other bilateral donors. If Japan could support the construction of asphalted roads, it would not only be very effective for the social and economic revitalization of the West Nile sub-region, including refugee settlements but it would also give Japan an enhanced presence over other bilateral donors. From these perspectives, it was decided that the grant aid would support the construction of a trunk road to access refugee settlements in the study area.

With regard to the second type of project—projects that are small in scale and require a relatively short time for adoption and implementation—we perceived two ways to realize them. The first was to utilize the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (GGP), which is under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Embassy, to build small facilities such as classrooms, sanitation facilities, health centers, water supply facilities, etc. Individual projects funded through GGP usually cost less than 10 million yen (equivalent to 0.1 million USD) and are implemented by local governments and NGOs. The budget for GGP is therefore smaller than that of the above-mentioned grant aid, but such projects can be implemented in a relatively short period of time. The second way was to construct a small-scale facility as a pilot project for technical cooperation within the WACAP framework, with which I was involved. The latter

[58] Reduced frequency does not mean reduced cost. Even asphalt pavements naturally require maintenance and repair. However, quite often this is handled simply by "filling in the potholes" as a temporary measure rather than fundamental repairs, depending on the volume of traffic and the degree of heavy vehicle use. Repairing the entire dirt road every six months after the rainy season is seen as particularly laborious by those involved in humanitarian assistance in the field.

option was immediately discussed with the relevant officials at JICA headquarters, but unfortunately, this was abandoned because the budget situation at that time made it difficult to allocate additional funds. Thus, it was decided that it would be better to use the GGP for small-scale facility improvements that require immediate attention.

The third type of project concerned those that fell in between (1) and (2) in size and had to be implemented more quickly than (1). One type of project that meets those conditions is called "Grants in Association with an International Organization." The Japanese government provides funds to an international organization, which in turn designs, procures contractors, and manages the construction of the facilities. This type of aid has often been implemented in partnership with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as the main contracting partner. However, as a basic policy of the Japanese government, grants in association with an international organization have been implemented in areas where project-type grant aid (as in the aforementioned (1)) cannot be implemented for a variety of reasons, such as security concerns, for example. This time, in order to pursue the possibility of (1), it was highly uncertain whether the grant aid in collaboration with international organizations would be approved for northern Uganda at the same time. Yet, we could not make the Ugandan officials, who were burdened with accepting refugees, wait for at least two years until the grant aid in (1) was realized. We wanted to somehow persuade the parties concerned to go with this option and collaborate with international organizations as the speediest way to realize projects. Fortunately, the JICA Uganda office and the Japanese Embassy there agreed with this approach.

5.3.2 Road Improvement through Grant Aid

Using the above approach, the JICA Uganda Office, the Embassy, and the Africa Division of JICA Headquarters worked together to explain (1) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, a trunk road improvement project targeting part of the road connecting Yumbe-Arua towns was selected. It was approved under the name of the "Project for Improvement of National Road in Refugee-hosting Areas of West Nile Sub-region" and a preparatory survey for cooperation was conducted. The survey started in early 2019 and continued through the COVID pandemic, resulting in plans for a project that included the paving of approximately 23 km of the national trunk road, the improvement of approximately 4 km of feeder


The road between Arua and Yumbe (both left and right) Photograph: JICA

roads, and the construction of a 34-meter bridge. After a Cabinet decision, a diplomatic agreement was signed in February 2021 for 3.82 billion yen in grant aid.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs website introduces the project as follows;

> The grant aims to develop the socioeconomic infrastructure and realize smooth transport through improving the national road, feeder roads and a bridge in refugee-hosting areas of West Nile sub-region, thereby contributing to stabilization of the society and promotion of sustainable economic growth in West Nile sub-region and northern part of the Republic of Uganda. The project will, in part, utilize the Labour Based Technology concept in improving the feeder roads which is intended to build skills and create employment for the refugees as well as people in the refugee host community.[59]

5.3.3 Improvement of Social Services through GGP

Regarding (2), since January 2018, during the implementation of the survey, Ichikawa, project formulation advisor at JICA Uganda Office, had been playing a central role in providing explanations to the district governments in the West Nile and assisting in the preparation of the request forms. Whenever I met with district officials involved in WACAP, I asked them about the status of the application and informed the embassy

[59] Translation from the original text in Japanese: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/press/shiryo/page23_001285.html.

of their preparation status, and conversely, I asked the embassy about the status of their deliberations and informed the local officials. As a result, projects such as the "Educational Environment Improvement Plan for Two Elementary Schools in Itura Sub-county, Moyo District" (adopted in March 2019) were implemented. These schools are adjacent to the Palorinya Refugee Settlement, then located in Moyo District (now part of Obongi District). They were identified as a priority project in the West Nile survey because of the obvious shortage of classrooms and teacher housing due to the acceptance of refugees. This continues to be a very important project from the perspective of the humanitarian-development nexus, as it provides a way to resolve and alleviate the problems of a humanitarian nature caused by the acceptance of refugees through development assistance. Furthermore, this is an excellent example of a project formulation study (West Nile Survey), whose recommendations were quickly translated into real-world implementation as a GGP.

5.3.4 Bridge Improvement through Collaboration with International Organizations

The greatest need identified through our discussions with the UNHCR Arua Sub-office was a bridge construction project at the crossing point of the Nyala River on the road connecting the two refugee settlements of Rhino Camp and Rhino Camp Extension in Omgo sub-county, Arua District.[60] This was, of course, a priority project included in the West Nile survey. This crossing point was accessible through the riverbed during the dry season but became impassable during the rainy season due to rising water levels. In such cases, traffic between the two settlements was forced to make a major detour, taking two hours instead of the usual 20 minutes each way. It was believed that the bridge would not only greatly streamline the movement of humanitarian agencies and government officials and the transfer of goods but would also significantly improve market access for refugees.

In implementing this project, I took advantage of my role as "Refugee Assistance Coordinator in Northern Uganda" to make numerous trips to the area and to provide information to the UNHCR Arua Sub-office and to the UNHCR Kampala office and UNOPS officials who visited Arua. When

[60] Due to the division of Arua District between 2019 and 2020, the Rhino Camp refugee settlement is now located in Madi-Okoro and Terego districts.

the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of Japan visited the area, I also gave him a tour of the area and helped deepen his understanding of the importance of the bridge. In Kampala, Ichikawa worked hard to explain the project to the people concerned in the capital.

Thanks to these efforts, on February 19, 2019, the Japanese Embassy and the UNOPS Regional Office in Kenya were able to sign an official agreement for the construction of a 48-meter bridge with a total grant amount of 180 million yen. Regarding the parallel implementation of the project with the road project, which had been a challenge, it is our understanding that the urgency of the project was recognized by the Japanese government from a humanitarian point of view because it is located in a refugee settlement. This point was emphasized on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of signing, which stated that "This cooperation is expected to reduce the time required to travel by vehicle between refugee settlements from two hours to about 20 minutes. The cooperation is also expected to improve the efficiency of humanitarian assistance activities by reducing the distance traveled for the delivery of relief supplies and aid workers, thereby benefiting the approximately 160,000 people living in refugee settlements and humanitarian aid workers." The construction of the project was continued during the COVID pandemic and was successfully completed in July 2022.

In this way, the Japanese government and JICA were able to follow up on the West Nile survey and promote part of the priority projects, if not all of them.

Crossing point of the Nyala River
Photograph: Courtesy of author

Aerial view of the completed Nyala Bridge
Photograph: UNOPS

5.4 Assistance to Local Governments

5.4.1 Refugees Not Being Included in Local Government Budgets

While providing tangible support through infrastructure and facility development projects, I also wanted to promote the integration of refugees into host country development systems and social services at the local government level, which was the theme of the CRRF thematic meeting in Geneva. This would also mean that the planning integration that we had initiated in the West Nile survey could take root in the Ugandan administrative system. As I described previously, decentralization has been promoted in Uganda since the 1990s and basic social services are provided by local governments. Furthermore, in terms of the development system, district development plans are formulated every five years, budget requests are made, and projects are implemented based on these plans. Therefore, the integration of refugees into the host country cannot be considered without embedding refugee impact into the development plans and budgets of local governments. To promote this, it was thought that cooperation through WACAP, with local governments in the West Nile and Acholi sub-regions as the main partners, would be effective. However, when we learned about the actual process of local governments' five-year planning and budgeting, it became clear that integrating refugees would not be as easy as expected.

Meeting to formulate budget through the participation of local governments
Photograph: Courtesy of author

First of all, the Ugandan local government budgets are mostly financed by grants from the central government (conditional, general, and equalization grants), with only 1–2% of the budget being self-financed, leaving very little room for discretion on the part of local governments. The allocation of these grants was based on the population and area of the district, but the population was calculated based on the most recent census figures plus a certain population growth rate, which in principle did not include the refugee population. If refugees are not included in the population estimates, it means that they are not included in the budget. In terms of planning, the 5-year plan for the districts hosting refugees does not mention refugees except for a brief mention in the overview of the districts. Moreover, refugee representatives were not invited to the participatory budgeting meetings held annually in each sub-county and district. In speaking with district officials on this issue, they were of the opinion that it made no sense to include refugees only in the planning process when additional funding was not available. Although the WACAP aimed to make the budgeting and planning of each district based on data and evidence (rather than on the vested interests of politicians and influential people), "integrating refugees" only into the planning aspects where there were no allocated funds seemed to be a rather difficult problem. The reality was that the refugee-related budget was under the direct control of the OPM and was managed separately from the budget of the local governments themselves.

5.4.2 Changing Perceptions of Refugee Integration

While still considering what could be done to promote refugee integration into the local government planning and budgeting system, the National Planning Authority (NPA)—one of WACAP's counterparts—asked for assistance in reviewing the guidelines for the formulation of the next district development plans. At the time, Uganda was operating under five-year national and district development plans covering the period 2016/17–2020/21, and as the next cycle was supposed to begin in 2021/22, each district was expected to formulate its next development plan by the end of FY2020. In preparation for this, the NPA needed to revise the planning guidelines for each district government.

This was important not only for refugee integration but also for WACAP, which was seeking to strengthen district planning capacities since the guidelines can reflect key improvements in the current planning and

budgeting processes identified through WACAP. For example, in Uganda, although bottom-up participatory planning starting from the village level is the norm, the priorities of local governments below the district level are not always reflected in the district plans (lack of vertical integration). Even at the district level, there was a problem that sectoral plan proposals were compiled into an overall plan without mutual coordination (lack of horizontal integration). The guideline revision process was an opportunity to apply the WACAP experience to improving the district development planning process.

In light of the above, I considered it worthwhile to support this revision process. Therefore, I applied to JICA headquarters for additional funds to support the above process, which were approved after various discussions. The revision process was conducted by hiring a consultant in Uganda, and I accompanied the consultant on a three-week field survey, visiting district governments and sub-counties in the eastern, central, southwestern, and northern regions of Uganda, along with NPA staff who oversaw the overall process. This process identified the problem of lack of vertical and horizontal integration mentioned above, and we were able to incorporate measures to overcome this problem into the guidelines.

Regarding the integration of refugees into the plan, all parties initially believed that it would be difficult to include additional projects associated

Meeting preparing the Local Government Development Plan
Photograph: Courtesy of author



Local Government Development Planning Guidelines
Source: Government of Uganda

with the reception of refugees where no additional budget allowance was expected. However, around this time, a plan called the Refugee Response Plan, which covered the areas of basic social services such as education, health, and water ("Sectoral Refugee Response Plan"), was being developed by the CRRF in Kampala. Sectoral Refugee Response Plans are intended to strengthen social services (including additional infrastructure, staffing, capacity building, etc.) in these sectors, taking into account the burden of hosting refugees, based on which additional donor support was expected to be provided.

As the review process revealed this trend, the consultants and NPAs gradually came to the realization that, if budget allocations were to be made in future, it would be necessary to include the refugee population in the population to be served and that this would require planning. As a result, we were able to include a section in the guidelines that mandates that the district plan needs to incorporate the impacts of hosting refugees. Chapter 3 of the revised guidelines for local government development planning states that "Local governments in refugee-hosting provinces and near refugee settlements (within a 150 km radius) are obliged to include the impacts of hosting refugees in their development plans."[61]

5.4.3 Identification of Refugee Assistance Needs by Local Governments

There was another type of impact realized through WACAP. This can be seen in the improved facilitation of project implementation in refugee-hosting areas by improving the planning capacity of local governments, which is the objective of the project itself. As I learned from my project counterparts, local governments have gradually become more efficient at providing information on priority needs to donors when development needs assessments for supporting refugee-hosting areas are conducted. One of the results of WACAP's support is that district planning officers are now better able to identify the development needs of their areas, including refugee-hosting areas.

Since the importance of the role of local government in refugee assistance was strongly recognized in Kampala, donor development needs

[61] "Local Government Development Planning Guidelines (Second Edition)," National Planning Authority, the Government of the Republic of Uganda, February 2020.

assessments in refugee-hosting districts have been referred directly to local government planning officers.[62] When such inquiries are received, district planners are now able to select and present to donors high-priority projects that have been identified through their own planning processes (which WACAP supported) but which have not yet been implemented due to budget constraints and are being held in reserve. Donors had previously placed less importance on projects submitted by local governments, fearing that influential local figures had a hand in them. But when they learned that there were projects in the North that had been selected transparently based on evidence and with public participation, encouraged through WACAP, they gradually agreed to budget for them. This was considered one of the crucial and embedded outcomes of WACAP's support for host communities.

By this point, it had been more than 18 months since I arrived in Uganda, and I was beginning to see various new developments in the area of support for refugee-hosting areas. However, around the time of my visits to various districts to revise the district development plan guidelines, I began to feel some physical discomfort. I saw a local doctor and temporarily returned to Japan to seek medical consultations, but the situation did not improve. The doctor recommended that I seek treatment in Japan.

I decided to leave Uganda at the end of May 2019, although I was saddened to have to do so. Personally, I had also reached the point in my professional life where it was appropriate to end my career and retire. Therefore, upon my return to Japan, I decided to put an end to the work I had been involved in up until that point. During that time, as a WACAP leader and Refugee Assistance Coordinator in Northern Uganda, I had done everything I could for refugees in protracted situations and Ugandans in the host society. At times, I may have strayed a little outside the bounds of my duties. However, it has been personally and professionally rewarding for me to be able to put the discussions at the Refugee Solidarity Summit into practice in the field.

[62] One example is the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP), a three-year World Bank program targeting refugees and host communities beginning in 2017/18. Whereas in the past, surveys on projects for assistance were usually conducted with the OPM, the DRDIP conducted such surveys directly with the districts.

Column 8
NGO Support for the Self-reliance of Refugees from South Sudan

By Tatsujiro Suzuka, Terra Renaissance

Since 2005, Terra Renaissance has been supporting the reintegration of former child soldiers in northern Uganda back into society, while in other parts of Africa, Terra Renaissance has also provided assistance mainly to those affected by conflict in the DRC and Burundi.

The political situation in South Sudan, Uganda's neighbor, has remained unstable, even after independence in 2011, and the resurgence of conflict in 2016, in particular, has led to an influx of several hundred thousand South Sudanese refugees into Uganda. As a result, new refugee settlements were established one after another in northern Uganda—especially in the West Nile sub-region.

In 2017, our NPO began providing emergency assistance to refugees, particularly those "in need of special support," by providing daily necessities such as mosquito nets, soap, sanitary products, and polythene tanks for collecting water, according to the needs of the households.

While providing this emergency assistance, in 2018, the project also began providing self-reliance support to refugees and vulnerable members of the Ugandan host community hosting refugees in the Pagrinya Refugee Settlement in Adjumani District.

The emergency food assistance provided by aid agencies since the establishment of the refugee settlement has been a source of livelihood for the refugees, but from the beginning, it was expected to decrease or cease after about three years. It was decided that it would be essential to support the host communities in and around the refugee settlements, which have few means of earning an income, to become self-reliant in order to earn a living, and aid agencies have shifted their emphasis from emergency assistance to

support for self-reliance.

With the help of an NGO grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan and funds from Japanese donors, a vocational training facility was established in the refugee settlement, and over the past three years, a total of 197 students from the first, second, and third cohorts have received vocational training and support for opening their own businesses.

There are six areas of training: sewing, knitting, woodworking, bricklaying, welding, and pig farming, with each beneficiary selecting one area in which to acquire skills and knowledge. Since the vulnerable beneficiaries were not good at reading, writing, and calculating, the program emphasized practical skills rather than theoretical ones, such as making product samples.

After gaining skills and knowledge, the beneficiaries started their own businesses using the equipment and materials provided, such as a dressmaker's store and a woodworking shop, which were set up to support their business start-up.

They sell clothes, sweaters for school uniforms, furniture, piglets, and other items in response to orders from individuals and organizations in the refugee settlement and host communities.

Although there have been no major conflicts between refugees and

Training to make sweaters with a knitting machine

Welding training beneficiary making a metallic shelf

Photographs: Courtesy of author

host communities in the refugee settlement, the influx of refugees has increased the use of local resources, such as firewood for cooking, placing a heavy burden on local resources. In our self-reliance support program, the percentage of refugees accepted is slightly more than a majority of the beneficiaries at 56%, but we also accept 44% from the host community, which promotes peaceful coexistence between the two groups.

There are some challenges in providing assistance for self-reliance. Many beneficiaries have experienced a decrease in income due to the COVID outbreak, which caused Uganda to go into lockdown, along with the attendant significant changes this brought about in the socioeconomic situation in the country. There has also been a fluid movement of people, particularly refugees, who have moved to South Sudan (where economic activities are less constrained) to work to generate an income.

Follow-up on this program is conducted from Uganda, but it is sometimes difficult to contact people in South Sudan by phone, and individual interviews are conducted when people return to Uganda. In addition to asking about the state of their financial independence, we also ask about the family circumstances of each beneficiary. For example, some women have suffered domestic violence (DV). Each situation is different, and some have chosen to continue to live with their husbands while others have chosen to get a divorce. There is no one right answer. However, while respecting the wishes of the individual, we provide advice and other support to help them lead more secure and independent lives.

Although there are many challenges, we are encouraged by the many voices we hear. One male beneficiary of the training stated, “Before I received support, I had no financial income and depended on my family and neighbors, but now that I have an income, I can pay for food and medical expenses for my family and support my grieving neighbors at funerals.”

In the local culture where men pay for their spouses’ families, this same man said, “Because I became independent, I was recognized

by my respective families, and I was able to get married. If I was not economically independent, I don't think I could have gotten married."

Another beneficiary said, "I have been able to teach raising pigs to people in the area, and thanks to this, I have come to be relied on by my neighbors, and my relationships with them have improved."

The third class just started their businesses in 2021, and along with the first and second cohorts, were affected by the lockdown. With the reopening of schools in January 2022, which had been closed for a long time, socioeconomic activities are returning to normal.

Our NPO will continue to follow up with them to help them improve and stabilize their business incomes. While there are various challenges, we will continue to promote the self-reliance of each individual, watching proudly the change of the beneficiaries from being a recipient of aid to being a provider of support.

Chapter 6
Achievements and Remaining Issues

I have described the historical background and overview of the assistance to refugees in protracted situations in Uganda provided by the Japanese government and JICA since 2014. Various efforts have been made to improve the livelihoods of refugees and to support refugee-hosting communities, but what impact have these efforts had on the beneficiaries and the refugee support system in Uganda? I would like to review past efforts and identify significant achievements, as well as the issues that remain to be addressed.

6.1 Japanese Government and JICA Support within the International Policy Framework

The Japanese government and JICA have been working on two areas of refugee-related assistance in Uganda, as described in the previous chapters: (1) support for refugee-hosting areas and (2) support for refugees to become self-reliant.

With regard to the first of these areas—support for refugee-hosting areas—the Japanese government and JICA have been working to strengthen the planning capacity of local governments under Uganda's decentralized system since before the massive influx of refugees from South Sudan. Once Uganda became a model country for the CRRF, a side event focusing on the role of local governments was held during the Solidarity Summit on Refugees to encourage the MoLG and local governments to become key actors in the CRRF.

In addition, in order to advance direct support to the host communities, a social infrastructure needs survey was conducted in the West Nile sub-region to reduce the burden of accepting refugees, and based on the survey results, the Japanese government supported the construction of roads, bridges, educational facilities, and other infrastructure. The emphasis was on institutionalizing refugee inclusion in Uganda's social services delivery system and improving the social services that refugees and local people should receive. The West Nile study estimated the scale of demand for each sector, including both Ugandans and refugees, and compared it

to the current situation to identify the existing gaps and priority projects. In addition, to institutionalize these efforts, JICA supported the Ugandan government in revising local government development planning guidelines to reflect the impact of hosting refugees.

In terms of supporting refugees' self-reliance—as mentioned in the second of the two key areas above—since 2014, JICA has provided vocational training opportunities in the Kiryandongo refugee settlement and supported refugees' efforts to improve their livelihoods through the dissemination of rice cultivation techniques. The former program has trained more than 160 refugees over a total of three training sessions, and the latter has trained nearly 2,000 refugees over the past eight years.

These are in line with the four objectives of the global refugee assistance frameworks, GCR and CRRF: (i) to reduce the burden on refugee host countries; (ii) to promote self-reliance among refugees; (iii) to expand access to solutions in third countries; and (iv) to help refugees develop conditions in their countries of origin for their safe and dignified return. Of these, Japan's efforts in Uganda contribute directly to (i) and (ii).[63] Furthermore, among the five priority areas of the Uganda CRRF: (a) reception of refugees and granting of rights in line with international conventions, (b) emergency response and response to ongoing needs, (c) strengthening refugee-hosting systems and promoting refugee self-reliance, (d) expanding permanent solutions, and (e) promoting voluntary return, our efforts contribute to a part of (b) (response to ongoing needs) and (c). In this sense, the policy relevance of the cooperation between the Japanese government and JICA can be considered quite high.

6.2 Impact on the Host Society

Assistance to refugee-hosting communities in Uganda began with the implementation of the West Nile Survey and then led to the implementation of priority projects selected from the survey. It was decided that the road improvement project would be implemented as a grant aid project, although it will take some time before completion. By contrast, a bridge construction project via UNOPS was realized as a project that could be implemented more quickly.

[63] Of the four objectives, (iv) is supported through peacebuilding assistance projects in refugee-generating countries (e.g., South Sudan).

In addition, the district development planning guidelines were revised to institutionalize the promotion of refugee integration that was carried out during the West Nile survey, and local government officials who have been supported through WACAP are now able to identify their own development needs in refugee-hosting communities and present them to donors. The most significant achievement, however, is that the role of local governments in hosting refugees—a crucial goal that JICA has been advocating since the Solidarity Summit—is now being officially recognized as one of major importance in the refugee response framework in Uganda.

6.2.1 Changes in the Refugee Assistance Framework

While the efforts by the Japanese government and JICA since the Solidarity Summit on Refugees in June 2017 have been described above, there have also been significant developments among the Ugandan government and donors. The MoLG has become more involved in addressing refugee issues, and donor support has been targeted directly toward local governments in line with this involvement.

The former change can be seen in the implementation structure of the



Source: Prepared by author based on UNHCR materials

CRRF coordination mechanism in Uganda

CRRF, which is headed by the OPM, with a Coordinating Committee of 20 government ministries and 15 nongovernmental members, including donors, NGOs, and private sector representatives, chaired by the MoLG, along with the Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Management, and Refugees in the OPM. The CRRF was initially to be managed mainly by the OPM, which is in charge of refugee issues, but since the Solidarity Summit, the role of local governments has been widely recognized in terms of providing services to refugees and supporting host communities. This change in recognition has led to the addition of the MoLG as a co-chair of the Coordinating Committee.

This move also affected the nature of donor support. Until the Solidarity Summit, the OPM was the primary point of contact for needs assessments in the host communities, and the OPM transmitted instructions to UNHCR regional offices and local governments via the regional office of the OPM to submit assistance needs. In addition, donors who support the capacity building of local governments did not provide sufficient assistance to facilitate the integration of refugees (into development plans and services). This has changed significantly since the Solidarity Summit, with the MoLG acting as the point of contact to direct the relevant local governments to conduct needs assessments in host areas.

The World Bank launched a project called "Developmental Response to the Impact of Forced Displacement," or DRDIP, to support host communities, and since 2017, it has provided a special $2 billion line of credit to low-income countries that receive large numbers of refugees. This fund was named the "Regional Sub-Window to Support Refugees and Host Communities," and Uganda has been a recipient of these funds. In addition, donors such as Germany's GIZ have emerged to provide support to local governments to facilitate the integration of refugees into development planning and service delivery.[64] JICA is currently implementing a technical cooperation project with the same objective from November 2021, following in the footsteps of WACAP.

In addition, there is the formulation of sectoral refugee response plans

[64] GIZ has been implementing a project called "Response to Increased Demand on Government Services and Creation of Economic Opportunities in Uganda (RISE)," which was scheduled to be implemented over four years starting in 2018. It aims to support planning capacity building by local government agencies in the districts hosting refugee settlements in the West Nile sub-region.

targeting major social sectors. This is an integrated plan that considers refugees and the local population as beneficiaries and sets out the scale of needs and budget to be met in relation to the combined demand of the two. The Refugee Response Plan for the Education Sector, for example, aims to improve access and quality of education for 676,000 pre-primary, primary, and secondary school students (both refugees and Ugandans) per year in twelve refugee-hosting districts and 34 sub-counties across the country over a 3.5-year period, from January 2018 to June 2021.

Currently, these plans cover six sectors: education, health, water supply and environment, employment and livelihoods, infrastructure, and sustainable energy. The pioneering work in developing these sectoral integrated plans began with the JICA West Nile survey. While the West Nile survey focused on local government, and the Refugee Response Plan takes a sectoral approach, it is now officially recognized by the central government in Uganda (not only the OPM and the MoLG but also sectoral ministries) as key to the creation of development plans that take into account the impacts of hosting refugees.

The Solidarity Summit, in which JICA participated, and the JICA cooperation with local governments that preceded it, had major impacts on Uganda's institutional framework for dealing with refugee issues. This



Source: Prepared by author based on UNHCR materials

Uganda's integrated planning process

indicates that the refugee problem in Uganda is not a transitory event similar to a disaster but has become a long-term and endemic phenomenon and that the perception of the Ugandan people toward refugees has changed. JICA's cooperation activities may have had a catalytic effect in bringing these changes to the fore in the actions and decision-making of the people involved.

6.2.2 Promoting a Whole-of-Government Approach

According to a progress assessment report on the Uganda CRRF by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a British think tank, "The CRRF reflects a comprehensive acceptance that refugees are part of the development landscape of Uganda for the foreseeable future and that, for the first time, a relevant and broad-based stakeholder group has formulated a comprehensive picture of the challenges and needs" (Crawford et al. 2019, 12) This approach had essentially been enshrined in policies such as the National Development Plan II (NDPII), launched in 2015/16, and the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) as a policy for refugee settlements. In practice, however, no significant progress had been made before the introduction of CRRF. ReHoPE was formed as a donor strategy to support the STA, but it was shared between the UN and the World Bank and not widely embraced by all donors.

The inclusion of Ugandan ministries, agencies, and development donors in the CRRF framework has helped to bring together humanitarian and development actors around refugee assistance. Moreover, the inclusion of Ugandan ministries and development donors in the CRRF framework has created a point of contact where humanitarian and development entities can exchange information and opinions on refugee assistance. In addition, local government representatives and the MoLG, which oversees local governments, have been added. The ODI report describes these developments in the CRRF "as providing clear governance structures and accountability lines and mentioned how previously fragmented processes (e.g., humanitarian response plans, sectoral and district plans for refugee and host community response) had been consolidated into a coherent framework" (Crawford et al. 2019). Among the most important achievements are: 1) the formulation of sectoral refugee response plans; 2) the inclusion of the refugee population in the third national development

plan, NDPIII, and the corresponding local development plans;[65] and 3) the shift from the monopoly of the OPM in the coordination mechanism of government ministries responsible for refugee assistance to the participation of other technical ministries and local governments.

Once again, cooperation between the Japanese government and JICA played a significant role in these areas. Regarding (1), although JICA was not directly involved in the formulation of sectoral refugee response plans, it was the first donor to consolidate the development needs of social infrastructure for refugees and host communities in the five counties of the West Nile sub-region, providing a concrete picture of the integrated social services that the refugee response plan aims to provide. Regarding (2), through the revision of Local Government Development Planning Guidelines, we supported the inclusion of refugee impacts in NDPIII's local development plans. For (3), JICA provided an opportunity to involve the MoLG and local governments in the coordination mechanism of refugee assistance through advocacy at the side event held during the Solidarity Summit and its preparatory process. As a result, JICA has played an important role in developing a whole-of-government approach to the CRRF, or a whole-of-society approach if refugees and host communities are to be included.

6.2.3 Strengthening the Humanitarian-Development Nexus

The issue of strengthening the nexus between humanitarian aid and development assistance has long been a challenge in the field of peace-related international cooperation—not only for refugee issues. In practice, it has not been easy to involve development donors in refugee assistance, which has traditionally been treated as a humanitarian issue. This is because there are many differences in the principles underlying assistance (neutrality vs. through governments), time frames for planning and budget implementation (short-term vs. medium to long-term), and perceptions of outcomes (protection vs. capacity building).

[65] The NDP III, developed in June 2020, sees refugees as a threat to economic development and natural resource management but also recognizes the importance of contributing to regional stability to limit refugee flows; capacity building to integrate refugee assistance planning into national, sectoral, and local government planning; and support to refugee host communities to improve labor productivity, etc. (National Planning Authority 2020).

However, according to the aforementioned ODI report (Crawford et al. 2019), the introduction of the CRRF has increased the momentum to support refugee-hosting communities, making it a reality that humanitarian needs can be addressed through development assistance. It has thereby opened up possibilities for strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus. The report cites as achievements of the CRRF in this area, in particular: (1) the World Bank's DRDIP and other support for the development needs of the host community that have been initiated; and (2) sectoral refugee response plans have strengthened the capacity to provide social services to refugees and the host community (Crawford et al. 2019).

The Government of Japan and JICA, as mentioned, have supported (in addition to DRDIP) the development of social infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, and health centers in refugee-hosting communities based on the implementation of the West Nile survey, etc., and (2) contributed to the identification of development needs in recipient communities through support for strengthening the planning capacity of local governments as part of WACAP, which are implemented through DRDIP and other financial assistance programs. Above all, the fact that JICA, a development assistance organization, has supported capacity building of local governments in the West Nile sub-region, a refugee-hosting area, is itself an initiative aimed at strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus.

The reason why the humanitarian-development nexus has become possible in Uganda is that, as the refugee crisis has become more protracted, the stakeholders involved have come to include not only refugees but also (1) host communities and host governments (including local governments), and (2) the livelihood needs of the refugees themselves have shifted from the one being solely dependent on humanitarian assistance to the one that requires self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and (3) the government and society of the host country, Uganda, as well as the international community, are addressing this change head-on. In other words, changes on the part of the refugees and the host government made it possible to overcome differences on the part of donors.

6.3 Impact on Refugee Livelihoods

Finally, I would like to summarize the impact of the livelihood and self-reliance assistance provided to refugees since 2014, based on available

data, albeit fragmentary and anecdotal.

6.3.1 Rice Promotion Project (PRiDe Project)

The training for refugees in rice cultivation techniques was not subject to formal monitoring and evaluation during the first phase of the PRiDe project (2011–2019), as it was conducted outside the official framework of the cooperation. However, this training program has been repeatedly mentioned by UNHCR as a good example of cooperation between JICA and UNHCR and has been publicized around the world. For example, UNHCR's August 27, 2019, article, "South Sudanese Grow Rice, and Community Ties, in Uganda," describes a training participant as follows.

> Queen fled conflict in South Sudan and found refuge in Uganda as a young child in the early 1990s. She has spent most of her life growing maize, sorghum, and peanuts on land borrowed from her Ugandan neighbor, but with maize and sorghum prices falling, she was struggling to make ends meet. Then, in 2014, everything changed. Queen was selected to take part in a Promotion of Rice Development (PRiDe) project, an initiative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency. JICA has long supported the promotion of rice production techniques and has expanded the program to refugees. Queen learned how to grow rice. Training with a group of fellow refugees and Ugandans, she learned how to prepare the land and sow in straight lines, making harvesting and weeding much easier. At the end of the training, the group was given a bag of rice seed to sow. However, Queen did not have space on her plot. She approached another trainee, Samuel, a farmer. He agreed to donate a third of his land to her and two other refugees to grow rice. For him, the gesture was natural. As a refugee in South Sudan, Samuel had also received help in the 1980s. He said, "We are not going to refuse them. They are our brothers. I give land to refugees because they have no land here in Uganda." Queen is a mother to 22 children. As waves of violence hit her country over the years, she took in refugee children at her farm—orphans and unaccompanied minors who had nowhere else to go. They joined her own three children and became part of her family. She pays their medical and school fees and sees to it that they are properly fed, clothed, and looked after. Since the training, she has seen her overall yields double. The extra income from rice has also allowed Queen to build a house for the children and keep all

of them in school. In return, they help out on the farm at weekends and during holidays. "When I see my rice, as good as it is, I become somehow happy," says Queen, adding that she hopes her children will pass on all they have learned from her about farming. She is planning to buy a cow with the proceeds from her next crop.[66]

The PRiDe Project Phase II, which started in 2019, conducted a mid-term review in 2021 to determine the impact of the training on the recipients to date.[67] In all, 488 people were surveyed, 58 of whom were refugees and host community residents living in Madi Okoro and Terego districts in Western Nile (Rhino Camp refugee settlement) and Kamwenge district in the Midwest (Rwamanja refugee settlement).

The survey revealed that, in and around the refugee settlements, yields had increased from an average of 1.3 tons/ha before the training to an average of 2.1 tons/ha at the time of the survey, an increase of about 70%, and income had increased by 78%. The additional income from rice production was used by 91% of households for children's education,



Source: PRiDe Project

[66] See UNHCR - South Sudanese grow rice, and community ties, in Uganda. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/south-sudanese-grow-rice-and-community-ties-uganda

[67] Based on documents provided to author on the PRiDe Phase 2 Project.



Source: PRiDe Project

Outcome of PRiDe Project in refugee settlement areas

82% for agricultural investments such as land expansion and livestock production, and 13% for house repairs and additions. When asked about changes in their lives, 59% of refugee respondents said that they had "made more acquaintances" or "developed trust with Ugandans," 18% said that they had "gained self-confidence," and 14% said that they had "developed leadership skills."

The overall evaluation of the PRiDe project found that "the level of technology acquisition and productivity improvements in agricultural technology dissemination activities in the refugee settlements were comparable to those in the other (non-refugee settlement) areas, and the speed of farmer-to-farmer dissemination was faster than in the other areas." The reasons for this were: 1) refugees have limited means to improve their livelihoods and are therefore highly motivated in growing cash crops, 2) many refugees (about 20%) have business experience and are willing to accept new technology, 3) investment of inputs in rice cultivation is relatively easy due to the prevalence and development of savings groups among refugees, and 4) the existence of a market in the settlement area, which is a sales channel for the products produced in the area. On the other hand, there seemed to be some limiting factors, such as

PRiDe trainees

Photographs: PRiDe Project

limited access to land and distance to medium and large-scale markets.

6.3.2 Vocational Training Project (SAVOT Project)

Information on the vocational training project can be found in a report prepared by a local NGO that cooperated in the implementation of the training after the completion of the two training sessions in 2014–2015.

According to this report, 56% of the 161 refugee trainees (out of a total of 227) returned to their home countries and are engaged in income-generating activities that make use of the results of their training. The reasons for returning include: (1) the potential for success based on the large market and lack of competition in South Sudan, (2) the possibility of employment and enterprise with the support of the UN and other donors, and (3) the unbreakable desire to return home ("East or West, home is best"). The difficulties of living in Uganda (language problems, etc.) are also a reason some gave for not wanting to stay there.

The majority of the 31% of the trainees who have not yet returned are woodworking trainees. They are given start-up kits—so they have tools—but they face the problem of lack of capital to rent a workshop and money to buy production materials. The situation of Samuel (pseudonym), one of the trainees in the sewing program who returned to South Sudan, is introduced in the report as follows:

> Samuel is one of the very successful tailors who trained at Panyadoli Vocational Training Institute and graduated as a tailor in the first

Results of tracing of ex-trainees (as of December 2015)

Category of Ex-Trainees	No. of beneficiaries	% of beneficiaries	Current activities
Refugees	91	40%	Returned to South Sudan and is employed or self-employed
Refugees	70	31%	Remain within the settlement and is seeking opportunities to start own business. Facing language barriers, and limited capital to rent working space and buy materials.
Ugandans	66	29%	Has been employed while others have created their own businesses and is currently able to meet personal needs and those of their families.
	227	100%	

Source: JICA report

> batch. After acquiring his start-up kits given by JICA/Government of South Sudan, he chose to go back to South Sudan and started his business. He says that [as] very few people in his location in South Sudan know how to sew, he is almost the only person sewing in the whole sub-county and he gets a lot of customers, and he gets overwhelmed by work. Customers bring torn clothes for repair, their secondhand clothes to adjust to fitting; some bring their new materials to make free ware, and so forth. He feels he is making a lot of money and will soon start his iron sheet house construction. He encouraged those that graduated to go back to South Sudan as there is more demand than staying in Uganda, where competition is very high. He says he dreams of starting a farm with the profits he earns and he will soon be an employer. He encouraged his friends, especially South Sudanese, to go back to South Sudan.[68]

Another case study of a trainee in the sewing program, Juliet (pseudonym), who remained in Uganda, is described as follows:

> Juliet graduated in Tailoring and Garment Cutting with the August intake 2015, and with her start-up kits, she works from home. According to Juliet, this has enabled her to earn and save about

[68] RMF Uganda - Start-up Kits - Success Stories (https://realmedicinefoundation.org), p. 4.

UGX 5,000/week.[69] Her continued practice helps her to stay in touch with the skills she acquired during the training. While at home, the community or her clients bring her clothes for repair, and whenever she gets materials, she designs simple children's clothes, which she sells. This has enabled her to contribute towards the basic needs of her family, comprised of her mother, sisters, and brothers. Juliet looks forward to an opportunity to attain capital to be able to rent a shop space and buy materials for her anticipated shop. Juliet's dream is a big shop for designing clothes that can compete favourably in the market. Like any other person who starts a business, Juliet has experienced ups and downs where she says that, during rainy season, people are in the garden, and the rain disturbs her since she works at home in a compound under a tree shade. When the rain comes, she cannot work.[70]

During my stay in Uganda in 2017, I happened to meet a South Sudanese who had received JICA-supported RMF training. He was still in Uganda working as a carpenter at the time, but he happened to see me and, guessing I was Japanese, spoke to me, thanking me for the training. It was a nice experience to know that what we have done may have been a small cooperation project, but it surely had an effect on at least one person.

SAVOT graduation ceremony

Shop operated by training graduate

Photographs: JICA

[69] In March 2022, the time of this translation, 1 U.S. dollar equals 3,699 Uganda Shillings. The poverty line set in 2016–2017 in Uganda was 46,000 Uganda Shillings per month. See Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019. Poverty Maps of Uganda. 02 2020Poverty_Map_report__Oct_2019.pdf (ubos.org).

[70] RMF Uganda Start-up Kits Success Stories, pp. 7–8.

6.4 Remaining Challenges

6.4.1 Limitations of the Refugee Self-Sufficiency Strategy

The basis of Uganda's refugee-hosting policy is the refugee settlement system. Settlements were established with the intention of providing refugees with land of a certain size and enabling them to become self-sufficient and self-reliant through agriculture.

However, due to the increase in the number of refugees in recent years, the size of land granted to each refugee family has been shrinking. A recent study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) showed that even long-term refugees are not achieving food self-sufficiency (FAO and OPM 2018), and that in 2017, food rations would once again be distributed to all registered refugees (Crawford et al. 2019, 13).

This has forced the Uganda CRRF to rethink its strategy for supporting refugee self-reliance, one of its main objectives. In other words, the goal of achieving livelihood self-sufficiency through food production alone on arable land provided in their settlements has become extremely difficult to achieve, and there is now a need to increase productivity and diversify livelihood options on the land provided.

In response to this challenge, JICA has promoted the extension of rice cultivation technology as a cash crop and provided vocational training. While these efforts have produced some results, the number of beneficiaries is still limited. In the case of rice cultivation, access to land may become increasingly difficult in the future, and farmers may be faced with the new challenge of learning the technology but not having the land to cultivate. The same is true for vocational training, as we have seen above, where it is not easy to start a business or enter the workforce after training, especially in Uganda.

6.4.2 Feasibility of Sectoral Refugee Response Plans

Starting with education, sectoral refugee response plans have been developed in key areas such as health, employment and livelihoods, and water and environment, but assistance through these plans has not yet been fully implemented. The ODI report indicates that some local donors

have criticized these plans for being too general and not sufficiently prioritized (Crawford et al. 2019, 14).

However, in my experience, under Uganda's decentralized system, the implementation of projects and services is frequently left to local governments, and the sectoral response plans do not need to specify all priorities. While the response plans indicate broad policies, priority areas, and the overall volume and budget size of projects, the actual planning and implementation of projects are usually the responsibility of local governments. In this sense, the success or failure of sectoral refugee response plans will depend not only on the budgetary allocation but also on the local government's ability to formulate plans and implement projects.

Furthermore, according to JICA's "Social Survey on the Current Situation and Needs for Strengthening Resilience of West Nile Refugee Host Communities" conducted in 2020, there was still insufficient awareness of sectoral refugee response plans at the local government level at the time of the survey (JICA 2021). This means that local governments have not yet recognized the sectoral refugee response plans as their own. In order to implement local projects based on sectoral refugee response plans in the future, both the Ugandan government and donors will need to make further efforts in institutionalizing the plans and budgeting for them.

6.4.3 Further Improve Government Transparency and Administrative Capacity

The Uganda CRRF has been a joint government-donor effort that has developed a stakeholder coordination mechanism, generated policy documents, and significantly influenced the treatment of refugees in the NDPIII and local development plans. However, future implementation of projects based on these plans will require assistance on a much larger scale than before. Without this additional support, the expectations of the Ugandan government and people to share the burden of hosting refugees will be dashed, and the momentum for promoting the CRRF will be frustrated.

So what are the key factors influencing donor support for Uganda's refugee sector? In addition to the size and priority of the needs of the target sectors, accountability, transparency, and budget implementation

capacity on the part of the recipient country are also important. In other words, donors' trust in the Ugandan government is critical.

In this sense, the November 2018 incident, in which the Ugandan government padded the number of refugee registrations, had a significant negative impact.[71] This incident prompted the EU and other donors to suspend humanitarian assistance for refugees. Although assistance was resumed after the incident was uncovered—with punishment of those involved and the introduction of biometric identification for refugee registration—the incident undermined donors' confidence in the transparency of the Ugandan government and affected donor funding for the CRRF. Ugandan CRRF officials need to learn from this incident and continue their efforts to maintain accountability and transparency.

Another challenge is the need to further strengthen the administrative capacity of local governments. As discussed in the next chapter, Uganda's local governments have a commendable level of administrative capacity. The ODI report recognizes that the cooperation between GIZ and JICA has played an essential role in strengthening the capacity of local governments to formulate plans and implement projects, but it will also be necessary for Uganda to further strengthen its capacity in the future.

[71] This refers to a corruption case stemming from a tip-off within the Ugandan government regarding the abuse of funds collected at the Solidarity Summit and the padding of the refugee count. It is commonly known as the "refugee scandal." Four officials in the OPM were suspended and questioned, and the UNHCR representative in Uganda was replaced. In April 2018, UNHCR committed US$11 million to implement a new biometric identification system and, together with the OPM, verifications were implemented in all refugee settlements (Murahashi 2019).

Column 9

Cooperating with Local Governments and Development Organizations in a UNHCR local office in Uganda

By Yui Suzuki, JICA (former UN Volunteer attached to UNHCR Moyo-Obongi Sub-Office)

From November 2019 to October 2021, I was deployed to the UNHCR's Moyo-Obongi Sub-Office as a UNHCR volunteer drawn from the former Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV). During these two years, I worked as an Associate Development Officer, coordinating with the district governments and development agencies.

The refugee settlement under the jurisdiction of my office was Palorinya Refugee Settlement, the closest settlement in Uganda to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The refugee settlement was created by the influx of South Sudanese refugees in January 2017. The refugee population was approximately 125,600 as of May 2021. This is about 2.5 times the population of Obongi District, where the Palorinya refugee settlement is located —it was just 49,100 at the time of the 2020 District Population Census. Some 99.9% of the refugees were from South Sudan.

I worked in the UNHCR Moyo-Obongi Sub-office as a counterpart to the local governments of Moyo District, which borders South Sudan, and Obongi District, which has the Palorinya refugee settlement. Originally, Moyo and Obongi were one district. In July 2019, Obongi District officially became separate from Moyo District. There were many reasons for this separation, but one of the main reasons was the existence of refugee settlements. To ease the burden of hosting refugees, host communities receive a lot of aid from development agencies such as the World Bank. The large budgets available to refugee-hosting districts were a good reason for politicians to fight for the division (e.g., about 59% of the district's planned budget for 2020–2025 is to be funded by the Development Response to Displacement Impact Project (DRDIP), one of the World Bank's projects).

UNHCR provided financial support to local governments to enable them to carry out activities related to refugees through annual partnership agreements. In Obongi District, where the refugee settlement is located, UNHCR supported the district government's activities in the areas of education, child protection, health, and environment, in addition to assisting with various coordination meetings for aid harmonization and monitoring of donor activities. In Moyo district, a route for South Sudanese refugees and adjacent to the Palorinya refugee settlement, UNHCR provided support in the areas of environment, education, and health, in addition to the same coordination meetings and monitoring activities as in Obongi District. The reason for the focus on these areas is that the refugees are affected by environmental degradation due to the cutting down of trees in neighboring Moyo for fuel. In addition, because there is no major hospital in Obongi, patients from health centers in Obongi are sometimes sent to a referral hospital in Moyo, with the district and donors covering the costs.

Preparation of the District Governments' Five-Year Development Plans

In late 2019, the preparation of the District Governments' Five-Year Development Plans (DDPs) for 2020–2025 began in earnest nationwide. Obongi District was established in July of the same year, initially with less than 30% of its full staff. However, the Obongi District Planner, who was primarily in charge of preparing the DDP, was highly motivated and worked tirelessly on the DDP, even on his days off, with the involvement of his staff. He was a former planner in Moyo District who had received JICA training and was a person with whom I, as a Japanese national, could easily communicate, as he had a high regard for JICA's previous support. The German international cooperation organization GIZ, with its office in the district, provided hands-on support in the preparation of the DDP draft. UNHCR also reviewed the draft and provided information, including adding parts to the draft. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) also provided funding for a workshop to review the final draft. The DDP-drafting project was made possible on the initiative of the Ugandan government and local governments, with the support of many donors. In July 2020, the first final draft

validation meeting was held in Obongi District, and the National Planning Agency (NPA) described it as a model for DDPs. By contrast, I heard that other districts did not do as well in submitting their DDPs. Successfully preparing the large number of documents to be submitted depends greatly, it seems, on the motivation and ability of the planners in charge and the cooperation of donors and other parties.

Development Assistance Funds and Local Governments

Development assistance funds, led by the World Bank's DRDIP (which commenced in June 2017), were by this time entering the refugee-hosting district. It was clear that the Palorinya Refugee Settlement was in the process of transitioning from the humanitarian assistance phase to the humanitarian-development-peace partnership (nexus) phase. Humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR and WFP were not going away anytime soon, but in terms of the size of their budgets, humanitarian agencies were becoming more aware of the budgets of development agencies and were looking to strengthen their partnerships. On the other hand, there is a long lag between when the World Bank's support is outlined and approved and when the funds actually arrive. In Obongi District, the DRDIP launch meeting for refugee settlements finally started in July 2020. On the ground, there were concerns that budgets for humanitarian agencies were dwindling before development assistance funds had arrived.

A further challenge was the fact that Obongi District had to forfeit a major funding opportunity because it did not meet the funding requirements due to its failure to submit necessary documents within the deadlines set by the World Bank and other agencies. I have seen situations where a project cannot be implemented without necessary human and technical capacity, even when there is sufficient budget and/or trainings and tools. It was frustrating to see the opportunities that were available but not being utilized to their fullest potential. For me, this experience has reinforced the importance of agencies like JICA, which has advantages in technical assistance and capacity building, strengthening cooperation with the World Bank and other organizations to help local governments

improve their capacities to take advantage of each funding opportunity.

Importance of Peacebuilding Perspective

Finally, I would like to mention a conflict I experienced when I worked in the Moyo-Obongi office between refugees from different ethnic groups. The Palorinya Refugee Settlement consists mainly of South Sudanese refugees, of which the Kuku, a Balinese ethnic group, made up about 74% (as of May 2021).

In July 2020, ethnic violence broke out after maize was stolen from a field, and within a day, the majority ethnic group attacked the minority Nuer ethnic group, burning dozens of homes to the ground. There were casualties, and eventually, all Nueri refugees were relocated to other refugee settlements. This was the first time such an incident had occurred since the establishment of the Palorinya Refugee Settlement.

Until this incident happened, perspectives on ethnic differences and peacebuilding had not been taken into account in the field by either humanitarian or development agencies, such as UNHCR. While it is likely that the root of the incident lies in the conflict in South Sudan, it must be recalled that for several years, coordination with the refugee community through the ethnic majority was the norm. Despite calls for more inclusive consideration of ethnic minorities at partner meetings after the incident, many organizations had already established their own criteria for selecting beneficiaries, and many organizations continued to provide assistance in the same manner as in the past. However, it is too late to change it once victims have already been harmed or killed. Even in refugee settlements where security appears to be maintained, it is essential to formulate and implement aid plans from the perspective of peacebuilding, and the role of donor countries in facilitating this is important.

DDP Final Validation Workshop at the District Office in Obongi
Photograph: Courtesy of author

Interagency Coordination Meeting at Palorinya Refugee Settlement in Obongi District
Photograph: Courtesy of author

Chapter 7
Reflections on Refugee Assistance in Uganda

In this final chapter, I would like to discuss the background factors that have made these efforts possible and rethink the significance of Japan's use of development assistance to support refugees, as well as the things that Japan, as a member of the international community, should learn from the Ugandan case.

7.1 Factors That Made it Possible to Provide Refugee Assistance in Uganda

This section focuses on two questions. Firstly, what factors facilitated the involvement of the Japanese government and JICA—despite their limited experience in this field—in Uganda's efforts to advance refugee response in line with the CRRF? And secondly, why were the Japanese government and JICA able to play their specific roles? This section will examine these factors from two perspectives, firstly from the Ugandan side and then from the Japanese side.

7.1.1 Ugandan Factors

(1) Refugee Issues Included in National Development Plan

The primary factor that allowed development agencies such as JICA to become involved in Uganda's refugee crisis was, quite clearly, the Ugandan government's refugee policy. Historically, Uganda has had a permissive policy towards refugees, with land provided for "subsistence" and freedom of movement within the country, as well as freedom of employment. Furthermore, in its NDPII for 2015/2016–2019/2020, the Ugandan government identified supporting refugee self-reliance and reducing the burden on host societies as one of its priority areas of development, and within that, it developed a strategy called STA specifically for refugee integration.

The inclusion of refugee issues in the National Development Plan means that a certain amount of resources—whether domestic budgets or donor funds—are allocated to refugee matters. This sits in contrast to other African countries, where, as mentioned earlier, "refugees are not

a domestic problem for the host country, but an international problem that should be addressed by the international community." In contrast, Uganda's generous policy was expressed internationally through the Refugee Summit and has not wavered during the NDPIII period. These preconditions made it possible for the Japanese government and JICA to include refugee-related projects in the scope of development cooperation through the policy dialogue with the Ugandan government.

(2) Relatively High Local Government Administrative Capacity

The second factor is related to the functioning of Uganda's local governments. Decentralization in Uganda is often criticized in terms of its nature of devolution. Financially, local governments are almost entirely funded by grants from the central government and donor funds, with local governments collecting only a few percent of their own revenues. Accordingly, most of the projects undertaken by local governments are in line with instructions from the central government. In terms of personnel, the hiring of local government officials is left to them, but the number is capped by the central government. In addition, the head of the administrative arm of each district, the CAO, is dispatched from the central government and rotates throughout the country for a term of two to three years per location. In light of these circumstances, it is sometimes said that Uganda's decentralization is in fact "centralization" by another name. Also, as noted in the ODI report, there is a general skepticism among donors about the administrative capacity of local governments.

Despite these criticisms, I have a somewhat different view based on my experience of working with local governments on technical cooperation projects in northern Uganda for nearly two years. In my experience, the administrative capacity of Ugandan local governments deserves greater credit.

For example, almost all local governments prepare five-year local development plans, which form part of the NDP, and these plans are reviewed by the NPA. Annual budgeting meetings are held not only at the district level but also at the sub-county level, and budget requests are made based on the discussions at these meetings (even though there is a problem of vertical and horizontal integration). Although there are various problems, such as delays in execution and omissions in financial reporting, annual audits of budget execution are conducted. Moreover, the OPM has recently begun to evaluate the performance of districts

using outcome indicators, and the central Ministry of Local Government provides guidance to each county based on the results.

The fact that local governments and the MoLG were allowed to participate in the Steering Committee of the Uganda CRRF and that the latter was allowed to play the role of co-chair seems to be due to the achievements of a decentralized system of local governance and development over the past quarter of a century.

7.1.2 Japanese Factors

JICA's support for Uganda's protracted refugee crisis has been made possible by many years of steady cooperation with the government of Uganda.

(1) Trust Based on Many Years of Cooperation

The first factor is JICA's longstanding relationship of trust with the Ugandan government, especially with the MoLG and local governments, which was gained through its provision of support to northern Uganda. Since 2009, JICA has been supporting the restoration of local government administrative functions and the reconstruction of local infrastructure in the Acholi sub-region after the return of IDPs. JICA supported the local government in strengthening its planning and project implementation capacity in the Acholi sub-region from 2011 to 2016, and from 2016, the scope was expanded to include the West Nile sub-region. Through this process, JICA's Peacebuilding Office and the Uganda Office gained a better understanding of the functioning of local government institutions and the challenges they faced in the region. At the same time, they were able to make many acquaintances with local government officials and build a relationship of mutual trust.[72]

It is precisely because of these intangible assets that JICA was able to immediately recognize the significant role of local government when

[72] On December 15, 2021, the Parliament of Uganda unanimously adopted a resolution commending JICA's cooperation with Uganda. The resolution, which commended JICA's cooperation for the overall development of Uganda, was originally proposed by a northern member of parliament as a resolution to commend JICA's cooperation in supporting the reconstruction of the northern region. This is the first time in the history of the parliament that a resolution has been adopted to honor cooperation by a specific aid organization, and it can be seen that JICA's cooperation over the years has contributed to building trust between the two countries.

it was called upon to respond to Uganda's massive influx of refugees, as well as understanding the importance of appealing to the people of Uganda and to the international society.

This point is also extremely important when considering development assistance for refugees in protracted situations. In fact, it is not sufficient for refugee issues to be included in the national development plans of the central government to ensure support for host communities and the integrated provision of social services required for refugee assistance. While the integration of refugee issues in central policies is a prerequisite, the integration of refugee issues in local governments, where services are provided, is also necessary for effective assistance. This is especially true in a country like Uganda, which has a decentralized system of governance.

(2) Sharing the Ideals of Human Security

The second factor is that the Japanese government and JICA embraced the concept of human security and was able to flexibly determine policy based on this concept. Human security is a concept that complements national security by focusing on ensuring the safety and dignity of every human being. It emphasizes how to protect and empower people in order to reduce threats to their survival, livelihood, and dignity. The Japanese government introduced this concept in its revised Official Development Assistance Charter in 2003, and it is now one of the basic policies in the current Development Cooperation Charter. The concept was adopted by JICA in 2003 at the time when the late Sadako Ogata became JICA's president and working on "human security and quality growth" is JICA's organizational mission today.

In retrospect, I believe that it was because this concept was organizationally embraced that there was the favorable November 2016 Board of Directors' decision on refugee assistance. This was followed up by the successful April 2017 discussion on the review of the South Sudan assistance strategy—also at the Board of Directors meeting. This was possible because the entire organization has made it a common practice to think about what it could do as a development agency not only for the medium- to long-term economic and social development and infrastructure of the country but also to support people in vulnerable situations where the protective function of the state is inadequate.

This understanding was shared by each member of the organization, as

well as by the experts and consultants working on the project. This led to the implementation of rice cultivation training for refugees—something that was not originally part of the project plan—and vocational training for refugees by flexibly utilizing the JICA project mechanism.

The same is true for the case of a grant aid project (bridge construction project) that was adopted in collaboration with an international organization in an area where a project-type grant aid (road construction project) was to be implemented. This was nearly unprecedented. The flexible combination of multiple development assistance instruments for refugee assistance can probably be attributed to the fact that the Japanese government as a whole shared the philosophy of human security to protect vulnerable populations.

7.2 Reconsidering the Significance of Development Assistance for Refugees in Protracted Situations

Next, I would like to consider why development agencies need to provide assistance for refugees in protracted situations. In other words, what should development agencies aim to accomplish through their involvement in supporting refugee host communities and helping refugees become self-reliant?

7.2.1 Refugee Assistance as Human Security

To reiterate, human security is a concept that emphasizes securing the lives, livelihoods, and dignity of vulnerable populations, and JICA has been working to put this concept into practice since the late Sadako Ogata was President of JICA. It has already been noted that this concept is widely shared within and outside the organization.

There is no doubt that refugees are vulnerable, having been excluded from the protection (or fleeing persecution) of their state, and are therefore the object of humanitarian assistance. But why have they come to be recognized as the target for development assistance? There are both passive and positive reasons.

The passive reason is the chronic lack of funding for humanitarian assistance. Funding for humanitarian aid to support refugees is always in short supply. Prioritizing humanitarian aid within a limited budget,

it is unavoidable to allocate resources to places where emergencies are occurring, as the supreme priority of humanitarian assistance is the protection of humanity. Therefore, for long-term refugees in relatively stable situations, other sources of aid will need to be sought, including development assistance. However, as long as development assistance funds are used to provide support, it is not possible to provide direct food and medical support, as humanitarians are used to doing. Instead, capacity-building assistance aimed at making the refugees self-reliant must be provided.

The positive reason for this is that protracted refugee status has become a new normal. The international community aims for three types of durable solutions to the refugee problem: voluntary return, acceptance into a third country, and local integration. However, under conditions in which refugees are allowed freedom of movement and employment in the host country, they can be considered economic agents of the host country. Recent studies on refugees have pointed out the positive economic effects of refugees on host countries and societies, recognizing refugees as a kind of economic agent of the host country. Therefore, supporting them through development assistance to the host country should be meaningful for the host country itself.[73] Refugees will not remain recipients of humanitarian aid forever but can be educated, trained and able to earn their own livelihoods, thereby becoming development actors themselves, self-reliant, and able to live with more dignity.

Another target is the host community. Refugees are not the only ones vulnerable to refugee outflows. The inhabitants of the host country are also affected. In Africa, it is physically and culturally difficult to refuse to accept a refugee from a neighboring country—unlike Japan, which is surrounded by oceans and can be selective in its decision to accept refugees. As a result, the host country assumes an excessive burden. Of course, there will be positive spillover effects from the influx of aid and the creation of a market for refugees, but in the short term, the adverse spillover effects will be greater, starting with the provision of land, water, and fuelwood, and continuing with the congestion of social services and the deterioration of roads. Refugee-hosting communities are often remote from the capital and tend to be excluded from social and economic development—even before the refugees arrive. Reducing

[73] See, for example, Betts et al. (2017).

the additional burden of hosting refugees and improving the livelihoods of the people living there is a meaningful practice of human security, in which humanitarian aid and development assistance work together to create a society in which people can live in harmony.

7.2.2 Refugee Assistance as Peacebuilding Support

Today, the importance of resilience—the ability to resist and mitigate the impact of a great shock—is often highlighted in relation to assistance to conflict-affected countries, but resilience in refugee assistance needs to be understood not only in relation to the lives of the refugees themselves but also to the entire refugee reception and support system of the host country and international community. In the GCR and CRRF, the term resilience is always used to refer to both refugees and host communities.[74] Generally speaking, the risk of social discontent in fragile countries being directed at outsiders (refugees) is high, and avoiding conflict between refugees and host societies is essential for attaining regional stability.

Even in a country like Uganda, which has a tolerant policy toward refugees, public understanding and support for refugee reception has not been stable. In 2017, Uganda's readiness to accept refugees was reaching its limits as it faced a massive and prolonged influx of refugees due to the political instability in neighboring South Sudan and the DRC. Public dissatisfaction and anxiety surfaced when local governments and legislators in refugee-hosting areas expressed their dissatisfaction during the lead-up to the Solidarity Summit on Refugees. While this event was partly a political struggle over the allocation of resources for refugee assistance, at a deeper level, it was also a challenge to the central government by local communities in Uganda, especially in the remote areas of West Nile that had been left out of development for many years. If left unchecked, the growing discontent could have led to the exclusion of refugees from the host country and social instability.[75] This would not only threaten the human security of the refugees and host communities but would also have created social divisions in Uganda and posed a risk to national security. President Museveni's decision to approach the United Nations to organize the Solidarity Summit in order to attract the attention

[74] For example, Uganda CRRF's objective is to "promote the resilience and self-reliance of the entire population of the refugee-hosting areas in Uganda" (OPM 2019).

[75] There were concerns that the conflict would further intensify amid the COVID pandemic.

and support of the international community may have been prompted by his perception of a crisis in domestic governance due to growing public discontent.

In the face of such a situation, as a means of stabilizing the refugee-producing countries and their surrounding areas, the refugee-hosting systems in countries accepting refugees must be made stronger and more stable. To this end, it is important to (1) ensure the capacity of the host country to accept refugees and (2) expand the potential for refugees to become self-reliant. The first will contribute to maintaining the tolerance of the host society, while the second will reduce the burden on the host country and strengthen the resilience of the refugees themselves. Together, they will reduce dependence on humanitarian assistance and contribute to the strengthening of the refugee support system by the international community. If economic activities by refugees lead to the economic revitalization of the host communities, it will lead to further revitalization and resilience of the host country.

The support for host countries and self-reliance that is emphasized in the GCR and CRRF is intended to contribute to regional stabilization through a combined contribution to the resilience of refugees and refugee support systems. Stabilization of areas surrounding conflict-affected countries through assistance to refugees with protracted problems will contribute to national security and even regional security and is thus significant enough to be considered as a form of peacebuilding assistance.[76]

7.3 Learning from Uganda's Policy of Accepting Refugees

Finally, I would like to consider the question of what, if anything, members of the international community, especially those in Japan, can learn from my experience of supporting refugees in Uganda. I will begin by discussing what Japan can do to support refugees.

Generally, there are three types of international cooperation for refugee issues: (1) protection of asylum seekers and granting refugee status to asylum seekers, (2) acceptance of refugees through resettlement schemes,

[76] As of 2021, the Horn of Africa region from the Great Lake region to the eastern part of the DRC, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia is becoming unstable, and if Uganda, the nexus between the Horn of Africa and the Great Lake region, does not receive refugees from neighboring countries, the situation will become increasingly unstable.

and (3) financial cooperation with UNHCR and other organizations. In the case of Japan, contributions through measures (1) and (2) are limited due to institutional and social reasons, and Japan's refugee recognition status in 2020 is about 0.5%, with 44 people certified out of approximately 4,000 applicants,[77] which is often criticized as too a low contribution to refugee issues compared to other developed countries.[78]

However, accepting refugees into one's own country is not the only way to contribute to addressing the refugee problem. As mentioned above, the provision of protection for refugees places a heavy burden on countries adjacent to the country of origin. On the other hand, countries far from the refugee country do not have to bear this burden, but they can enjoy the common benefit of stability in international society that accrues from providing protection to refugees. In other words, the benefits of stabilization of the international community generated by the reception of refugees are available to all countries, not just neighboring countries (non-excludability). However, the size of the benefit of stabilization enjoyed by one country does not affect the size of the benefit received by other countries (non-competitiveness). This is why the provision of refugee protection is said to be an international public good.[79] However, its nature as a public good inevitably leads to problems of free-riding and inequity, resulting in the underprovision of a public good (such as refugee protection).

Because refugee protection inherently involves such problems, the Refugee Convention calls for international cooperation in the spirit of international solidarity. Therefore, in order to establish a refugee protection system that is an international public good, it is also meaningful to contribute funds to international organizations through the means described in (3) above.

In this regard, Japan's contribution to UNHCR and other international organizations is by no means small. In 2020, Japan's contribution to UNHCR was approximately US$126 million (about 13 billion yen), or 2.6%

[77] Data for the year 2020 according to the Immigration Services Agency of Japan.

[78] For example, see the website by the NPO, the Japan Association of Refugees, which discusses why there are so few refugees in Japan (https://www.refugee.or.jp/en/refugee/#section01).

[79] See, for example, Takizawa (2017).

of the total, and Japan ranks fifth in the world in terms of contributions.[80] However, as we have repeatedly noted in this book, international organizations tend to prioritize responding to newly emerging refugee crises, leaving responses to protracted refugee crises on the back burner.

Given the nature of the refugee problem, in which the cost burden of hosting refugees tends to be unfair to neighboring countries, direct assistance to host countries through bilateral assistance (including that provided by NGOs) to specific host countries and countries with protracted refugee crises, such as Uganda, discussed in this report, is an effective way to reduce the burden on the host country. This will be effective in supporting the most fragile parts of the international refugee protection system by reducing the burden on the host country. In this context, the utilization of the development cooperation experience that Japan and JICA have gained in African countries to date should make a meaningful contribution—both for the host country government and for humanitarian agencies. At the same time, this has led to a tangible enhancement of Japan's international reputation, which we believe is diplomatically significant for Japan as well.

Another advantage is that it will provide an opportunity to think about Japan's system for accepting refugees. As we have seen, Uganda's refugee reception policy is characterized by a tolerant attitude toward refugees. This is widely recognized in international refugee assistance frameworks such as the GCR and CRRF, and the Ugandan case is considered a global model. Needless to say, it is this attitude that has made possible the refugee assistance by JICA described in this report.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Japan should adopt a tolerant refugee policy like Uganda. Uganda is tolerant of refugees not only because of its history of mutual acceptance of refugees from neighboring countries, the presence of a common ethnic group that straddles borders arbitrarily established during the colonial period, the high mobility of African people and active economic relations across borders, and the existence of relatively vast unused land but also for political reasons. The current governments in Uganda and South Sudan have a history of mutual

[80] The following countries contribute more: United States (41.3%), EU (10.9%), Germany (9.4%), and the United Kingdom (2.8%).
See https://www.unhcr.org/jp/japanese-government-unhcr.

dependence on each other through the latter's struggle for independence and the former's struggle with the LRA.

In contrast, Japan's geographical characteristics as an island nation, the absence of historical experience of mutual reception of refugees, a comparatively culturally homogeneous social structure, and a densely populated country make Japan's environment for receiving refugees quite different from Uganda's. Although Japanese society is becoming more diverse with the increase in the number of foreign workers, there are reports of foreigners using the refugee status system to work in Japan, and public opinion in Japan is not necessarily favorable toward the acceptance of refugees.

The situation regarding the acceptance of refugees in Japan and Uganda is very different, and it cannot be easily stated that Japan should follow Uganda's example and adopt a more tolerant policy toward the acceptance of refugees. Some may argue that Japan lacks humanitarian considerations, but Japan has its own circumstances and national interests. Altruism that is not backed by self-interest will not last.

What those in Japan and other countries can do is learn about the existence of countries like Uganda, which, for whatever reason, bear the excessive burden of maintaining a system for supporting refugees, which is an international public good. They should also think about how Japan and other nations should support refugees and the problems of accepting them from a broader perspective. There are many experiences and lessons to be learned, such as the existence of conflict refugees, who are rarely considered for refugee status in Japan, the protracted refugee crises and the need for self-reliance, and the friction with the host society and how to overcome it. I believe that the case of Uganda's hosting of refugees introduced in this book provides us—both in Japan and around the world—with important material for considering new approaches to the refugee problem.

Epilogue

1. Participation in TICAD 7

At the end of May 2019, I left my mission in Uganda for medical treatment and returned to Japan. I took an extended break and started going to the hospital as soon as I returned to Japan. However, during this time, I was asked by JICA to attend the 7th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in August of the same year. There, a side event on forced migration in Africa, co-hosted with UNHCR and other organizations, was being organized and I was invited to participate as a panelist. Although physically weak, I decided to accept the invitation in the hope that I could contribute to the discussion based on my experience in Uganda over the past several years.

The side event, under the title "Towards Enhanced Partnership and Solidarity to Support Forcibly Displaced Persons in Africa," was held on August 29 with the participation of UNHCR High Commissioner E. Filippo Grandi, the African Union Commission (AUC), the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for Africa (UNOSAA), and others. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how the international community should work to solve the problems of refugees and IDPs in Africa. The event was also an opportunity to publicize the realities of forced displacement in Africa, including protracted displacement, and to emphasize the need to involve a variety of actors in addition to traditional humanitarian assistance approaches. As TICAD was held in Japan, it was important for the private sector and aid-related organizations in Japan to listen to this discussion.

Opening the event, then JICA President Kitaoka gave a keynote speech, drawing on JICA's experience in supporting the self-reliance of refugees and the importance of the process of reconciliation. He gave the following statement:

> no single country or organization can solve refugee and conflict issues alone. Members of the international community must come together in support of those willing to create peaceful and harmonious societies. We must also enhance local 'ownership' of peace and reconciliation processes through our solidarity efforts. To guarantee

> not only a bright and peaceful future for Africa but also a sustainable future for humanity, we must act now, as responsible members of the community, to turn the tide of forced displacement in Africa and beyond.

In response, High Commissioner Grandi emphasized the importance of linking humanitarian aid and development assistance and involving new partners when he stated: "humanitarian assistance, development agencies, and new partners such as the private sector and civil society should collaborate to develop innovative approaches and go one step further." Another keynote speaker, Bience Gawanas of UNOSAA, based on her own experience as a refugee, stressed that "we must share the responsibility to support the individuals behind the statistics on their 'journey of dignity' so that they can one day return home."

In the panel discussion that followed—in addition to High Commissioner Grandi and Special Advisor Gawanas—those present included the Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Management, and Refugees in the OPM of Uganda Ecweru, a representative of Equity Bank of Kenya, which has opened bank branches in refugee settlements, a representative of refugees in South Sudan; and myself, to discuss what kind of efforts are needed to address the issue of forced migration in Africa.

I was particularly impressed by the remarks of Susan Grace Duku, who represented South Sudanese refugees living in Uganda. She fled Southern Sudan (before independence) to Uganda at the age of 7, returned home once, and was forced to leave the country again as a refugee. Getting right to the point about the problems refugees face, she said, "It has taken a lot

Panelists at TICAD7 side event

Gawanas, Grandi, and Author (from left to right)
Photographs: Courtesy of author

of trial and error to make my way to an independent life, but education and support for independence are very important for refugees. I hope you understand that refugees are not a burden to the host country or community but can be an asset." As a representative of a development agency, I also shared my own experiences in Uganda and talked about the various things that can be done by development agencies like JICA to reduce the burden on host countries and help refugees become self-reliant.

During the Q&A session, a high school student who served as a volunteer Japanese teacher to refugees living in Japan asked, "What can be done to spread the humanitarian spirit in Japan?" In response, High Commissioner Grandi stated, "People who have the idea that 'refugees are a threat and a burden' will change their minds once they actually meet refugees. I hope that you will share your own experiences gained through your interactions with them." The event ended with an appeal to the host countries to further raise awareness about accepting refugees and to form broader partnerships.

2. New Initiatives by JICA

As readers have experienced, in 2020, the world was hit by the COVID pandemic, and many of JICA's cooperation projects had to be suspended or temporarily halted as a result. However, with the gradual resumption of cooperation projects, Uganda's refugee assistance efforts have entered a new phase.

The "Project for the Improvement of National Road in Refugee-hosting Areas of West Nile Sub-region," for which an engineering survey was being conducted during my stay in Uganda, was completed, and the grant of approximately 3.8 billion yen in grant aid was officially decided in February 2021. The Nyala Bridge construction project via UNOPS was completed at the end of July 2022, just as I completed the final stage of editing the Japanese language version of this book. Phase 2 of the rice promotion project through 2023 continues to train farmers, including refugees, in rice cultivation.

In addition to the continuation of these projects, a Refugee Assistance Advisor was dispatched to the Department of Refugees of the OPM in February 2020 to coordinate Japan's assistance to Uganda's CRRF as a whole. In November 2021, the "Project for Strengthening Resilience in

Refugee Hosting Districts of West Nile Sub-Region" was launched to further develop WACAP efforts and strengthen integrated planning capacity, which will provide the basis for the realization of integrated services. In particular, the guidelines for local government-integrated planning clearly stipulate the need to include refugee impacts in local development planning. However, the implementation of such plans is still in a state of limbo and will require trial and error in the field. Other studies are being conducted to consider support for sustainable forest and natural resource management, as well as to attract social investment to refugee-related businesses in Uganda. In the future, once the COVID situation calms down, it is likely that overseas volunteers will be dispatched to Northern Uganda and the West Nile.

Despite the delays caused by the pandemic, JICA continues to cooperate in reducing the burden on refugee-hosting areas, particularly in northern Uganda and the West Nile region, as well as in promoting the self-reliance of the refugees.

3. A Tribute to the Late Sadako Ogata

My first experience working with refugees in Africa was in 1999. I traveled to Kigoma on the shores of Lake Tanganyika in western Tanzania to visit refugee camps for refugees from the DRC and Burundi and their host communities (I was accompanied by Komukai, who has often appeared in this book). At the time, the late Dr. Ogata was serving as High Commissioner of the UNHCR, and the Brookings Process and other initiatives were being actively discussed (which may have been a factor behind the decision to conduct a survey in Tanzania). As a result of the survey, support (i.e., drilling of boreholes and other local water supply improvements) was provided to refugee-hosting communities through NGOs working in the area, albeit on a small scale. This was the beginning for me of a long relationship with African refugees that continued for about 20 years.

Thereafter, I was both directly and indirectly involved in refugee assistance through Ogata's appointment as President of JICA. I was involved in initiating assistance to Sudan and South Sudan as the person in charge of assistance to Eastern Africa, work in the South Sudan Office, evacuation to Uganda, supervision of peacebuilding assistance projects, and again assignment to northern Uganda. Although I had no experience

in humanitarian assistance and was unfamiliar with refugee issues, a work-related coincidence led me to become involved in refugee issues from the perspective of development assistance during the latter half of my career at JICA. From the standpoint of those engaged in humanitarian assistance, I became involved in the refugee issue for the most innocent of reasons. However, through my work, I have experienced firsthand the linkage between humanitarian and development assistance—the so-called "humanitarian-development nexus"—to refugees in Africa, and I believe that I have opened up new avenues of cooperation in my own way.

During this period, with the exception of the JICA colleagues mentioned in this book, my efforts were guided in part by UNHCR officials. When JICA first began its assistance in South Sudan, they allowed Japanese counterparts to stay at their lodgings for extended periods of time. I myself conducted a joint survey with them in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The project for the development of a teacher training school in Juba, which was formed at that time, was later realized with the support of the Japanese government.

After that, whenever I had a chance, I visited UNHCR in Geneva on my way back from my business trips to Africa and exchanged opinions with them about the possibility of JICA support, including those seconded from JICA. Each time, they listened attentively to JICA's interest in cooperation,

Visit by UNHCR Public Relations Team
Photograph: Courtesy of author



Pamphlet introducing JICA's activities
Source: UNHCR

even though JICA does not directly provide funds to UNHCR. I am especially indebted to Daniel Endres, who was in charge of promoting the CRRF after it was launched, for inviting me to co-chair the sectoral meeting held in Geneva to develop the GCR and for sending a team to cover my activities and publicize them to other donors during my time in Arua.

If I had to name another person who guided my efforts, I would have to mention the late Sadako Ogata. Although I was a marginal member of the organization and only had a few rare opportunities to meet her, professionally, it was an incredible experience to have had the opportunity to be involved in South Sudan assistance through my work. Without her, my colleagues and I would not have been able to realize the refugee support in protracted situations in JICA that I have described in this book. I have only been trying to realize, by trial and error, what Dr. Ogata said on many occasions, that "Humanitarian assistance alone cannot solve humanitarian problems." In retrospect, however, I realize that this statement was not only about the spirit of extending assistance but out of the necessity that emerges from the nature of things. In writing this book, I was again surprised by the depth of her insights. I hope I have been able to convey to readers some of what Japan is doing to help the refugees in Africa, an issue that is still not directly felt or understood in Japan or many other countries. I feel that doing so would be the best type of tribute to Dr. Ogata.

Afterword

More than two years have passed since I started writing the Japanese version of this book. Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka, the then-President of JICA, suggested that I write this book back in 2021, something that I was happy to do.

During this time, Japan and the world finally overcame the COVID pandemic and we were moving toward a new normal, only to experience a renewed period of upheaval with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Millions of new Ukrainian refugees have been created, bringing the global forced migration population to over 100 million. We now live in a world where more than one in a hundred people are displaced from their homes.

Looking back, what did I want to say in this book?

First, based on my personal experience, I wanted to introduce readers to the existence and experiences of refugees in Africa, especially those who are termed "refugees in protracted situations." I also sought to describe some of the activities that Japan is undertaking to assist these long-term refugees. By doing so, I hoped to present a way of supporting refugees other than refugee hosting. This is important for countries like Japan, which—for various reasons—are limited to accepting only a certain number of refugees. This volume shows how a country like Japan can still actively contribute to the construction and maintenance of a global refugee support system, which is an international public good, and that it is, in fact, contributing to it.

Second, I wanted to highlight that the concept of "human security" is a major factor behind Japan's efforts to provide long-term refugee assistance. Since the early 2000s, this concept has been positioned as a basic policy for Japan's international cooperation, and it has served as the basis for Japan's efforts to explain and gain an understanding of its new activities to the outside world. In fact, Japan's involvement in peacebuilding activities in Africa has been guided by the concept of human security. The Japanese government has based its agenda for international cooperation, made decisions, and implemented these decisions based on human security concerns.

In 2022, the UNDP released a special report, "New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene," and the JICA Ogata Research Institute also published its "Human Security Today" report. It is precisely in these times of diverse and multiple crises that we must once again base our international cooperation on the concept of human security.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Kitaoka for giving me the opportunity to write this book about my professional experiences. He has helped me on various occasions, including my visit to Uganda, and I still remember his suggestion at the Humanitarian Summit that we should ask ourselves "whether we are not undermining the self-esteem and dignity of refugees by providing assistance." I would also like to thank the authors of each of the separate columns in this book, JICA's Governance and Peacebuilding Department, JICA's Uganda Office, JICA's Ogata Research Institute, and others who helped me with this book. Finally, I wish to thank my wife and three children who have supported my time in Africa over the years and shared my professional life.

December 2022
Atsushi Hanatani

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Abbreviations

ACAP	Project for Capacity Development in Planning and Implementation of Community Development in Acholi Sub-Region
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DAR	Development Assistance to Refugee-Hosting Areas
DDP	District Development Plan
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impact Project
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCR	Global Compact for Refugees
GGP	Grant Assistance for Grassroots and Human Security Projects
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MFS	Musomesa Field School
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MTC	Juba Multi-Service Training Center
NDP	National Development Plan
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
PRiDe	Promotion of Rice Development Project
RAD	Refugee Aid and Development
REAP	Reconstruction Assistance Programme in Northern Uganda

ReHoPE	Refugee and Host Population Empowerment
RWC	Refugee Welfare Council
SA	Solutions Alliance
SAVOT	Project on Improvement of Basic Skills and Vocational Training
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SRS	Self-Reliance Strategy
STA	Settlement Transformation Agenda
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TOF	Training of Farmers
TOT	Training of Trainer
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNOSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WACAP	The Project for Capacity Improvement of Local Government for Strengthening Community Resilience in Acholi and West Nile sub-regions
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

[About the Author]

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Atsushi Hanatani was born in Shimane Prefecture, Japan, in 1959. While studying at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, he worked in an administrative capacity at the Japanese Embassy in Liberia. After working in a private consultancy and completing a master's degree, he joined JICA in 1989. He served in Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Uganda before retiring in 2020. He earned his Ph.D. in International Development from Nagoya University in 2016. He currently is a Senior Research Fellow at the JICA Ogata Research Institute.

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