Photo 3.1.4 Container Terminal at Dar es Salaam Port

Figure 3.1.11 Trend of Cargo Handling Volume by Category of Cargo: Mombasa Port and Dar es Salaam Port
(2) Improvement Projects by Development Partners

Mombasa Port: At present, a container terminal expansion project is ongoing with the assistance of JICA, which completion scheduled for 2012. At the same time, the World Bank EATTFP is assisting port security strengthening and a cargo electronic tracking system targeting cargo transiting the Northern Transport Corridor.

The JICA-assisted Mombasa Port container terminal expansion will construct four new container berths with a water depth of 11–15 m, sufficient to accommodate fourth generation container ships with a capacity of 4,600 TEU and 60,000 DWT. These four additional berths will add annual cargo handling capacity of 1.1 million TEUs. The project’s container terminal strengthening includes new berths additions, construction of new container yards and expansion of existing yards, new loading/unloading facilities, and construction of access roads. The project will also assist KPA in privatizing new container terminal operation including assistance with selection of the operator. The project is attracting attention from the neighboring inland countries since it will reduce traffic congestion at Mombasa Port.

In addition, the security strengthening component of the World Bank project includes capacity building and integration of monitoring and communications system. Although efforts have been made to establish a Port Community Based Cargo Tracking System (PCBS), there has been some difficulty in sharing data and information on process and forms among KPA, KRA, logistics operators, and other agencies. Accordingly, additional efforts are required to establish an integrated information control and management to facilitate transport along the Northern Corridor; a cargo tracking system developed by KRA will be a step in this direction.

Dar es Salaam Port and other Tanzanian Ports: In addition to assisting Mombasa Port through the EATTFP, the World Bank is assisting Dar es Salaam Port via the project as well as other Tanzanian ports, e.g., through the Tanzania Port Master Plan, which has set out future directions for the country’s port sector. EATTFP program components include security training targeting officers at Dar es Salaam and Tanga Ports, introduction of CCTV at Dar es Salaam
Port, and purchase of patrol boats and vehicles for TPA. In addition, the Japan External Trade Organization has been undertaking an Urgent Needs Survey of the Mtwara Port Expansion since December 2008; the study is assessing the need for further study assisted by JICA as well as for infrastructural improvements through grant aid or a yen loan.

(3) Country/Regional Community Development Strategy

Kenya: KPA has been carrying out container terminal improvements at Mombasa, and KPA is also aggressively seeking to enhance the link between the port and Northern Corridor land transport routes. In addition, the Government of Kenya aims to privatize the operation of Mombasa Port, pursuing a “landlord” port model (see Chapter 4). Also, KPA envisages developing a second international trade port, with Lamu located along Kenya’s northeastern coast considered a candidate site, although a corridor would need to be developed to provide an inland connection. Also envisioned is a railway line connecting a port at Lamu with the Sudan and Ethiopia, although as yet no external funding for these projects has been identified. There also is a plan to establish a pipeline connecting an oil terminal at Lamu with inland points.

Tanzania: TPA is making efforts to expand container handling capacity through various measures to address the prevailing congestion at Dar es Salaam Port’s container terminal. Though a traditional approach, TPA has secured additional space for container operations capable of handling 8,000 TEUs, by moving automotive vehicle cargo outside of the port area. Also, TPA reached an agreement with TICTS, in the short term, to handle container cargos unloaded from smaller vessels at the general cargo terminal. In addition, TPA is with its own funds conducting a feasibility study for a new container terminal with two berths with an annual container handling capacity of 650,000 TEUs; TPA has already requested the Chinese Government for financing for the new container terminal. There is also a plan to establish a dry port for the handling of transit cargo at Kisarawe southwest of Dar es Salaam. The two ICDs at Dar es Salaam Port do not operate efficiently together as they are managed by independent operators. Establishing a new ICD at Kisarawe, to be managed by an existing or new private operator, is believed to provide an efficient connection with TRL, TAZARA, and the road corridors. Further, the potential connection of the port and an ICD via a single track railway is under consideration, with assistance potentially either from JICA or the World Bank. The option of operating the port on a 24-hour basis has been considered, but it has not yet been undertaken since at present the port (e.g., institutions, equipment) is not designed for nighttime operation.

On the other hand, it is argued that there is a necessity of eventually developing a large-scale alternative to Dar es Salaam Port, which suffers from chronic traffic congestion and insufficient space. Candidate ports are being selected by the World Bank assisted master plan study of Tanzanian ports. The study’s interim report identified Bagamayo and Tanga Ports as priorities. However, developing either one of these two is seen to entail large-scale dredging; large investment would also required to establish infrastructure to connect these ports with railway and road connections. Of the two, Bagamayo has been favored by the Government; an official request for development assistance has been made of China, although details of financing (from China or others) are not yet known.

---

21 An estimated US$100–200 million is required to develop an ICD at Kisarawe for which the GoT is looking for a private operator under a PPP scheme. The World Bank sees the possibility for assistance for a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract with a private operator after the completion of a feasibility study. However, necessary costs not to be covered by the private operator’s investment could possibly be covered by international development partners. (Source: Interview with the World Bank, Tanzania.)
In addition, economic development zones in the periphery of major port areas are envisaged, using land secured by GoT, at Mtwara, Bagamayo, and Tanga. As noted with respect to Mtwara port, a JETRO study is underway to formulate a development project for possible Japanese financial assistance.

### 3.1.4 Facilities for Transit Cargo

#### (1) Current Systems

**Overview:** Representative of the facilities for transit cargo are border posts, which serve the exit/entry of passengers and cargo between neighboring countries. At most borders in the subregion at present, the respective countries’ Customs authorities on each side inspect cargo and process cargo entry and exit procedures. Generally, trucks take considerable time to cross borders - there are instances of long queues by trucks waiting for the border crossing process due to insufficient Customs staff and/or insufficient facilities. Relative to elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, border posts in East Africa are relatively well furnished, with border crossing times typically “only” 1–2 days, and as has been noted, One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) projects are being undertaken at many border crossings in the Subregion; however, transport operators still face the risk of possible border crossing delays of 3–7 days due to the cumbersome handling of documents and forms to be submitted to the Customs authorities and problems related to the requirement for bond guarantees.

Following international practice, in East Africa customs duties are not imposed on transit freight; rather, the duties are paid at the destination country where customs clearance is conducted, usually at an ICD. However, cargo bound for Zambia, for example, transits East Africa, and it is mandatory to have customs clearance at the border crossing point between Tanzania and Zambia, which takes an average of three days inclusive of queuing and clearance.

Other border-crossing facilities include weighbridges and police checkpoints. Normally weighbridges are used to control overloaded vehicles by measuring loaded weight. However, in East Africa weighbridges are installed at many points along the major international corridors to, among other things, prevent illegal sales of goods and/or the loading additional freight in the transit countries. However, facilities and equipment installed at weighbridge stations are insufficient, leading to long queues of trucks with waiting times of 5 hours or more. However, a problem is that different weights are sometimes recorded for the same truck with the same cargo due to inaccurate measurements by manually operated weigh scales.

**Northern Corridor:** Implementation of an OSBP at Malaba (see Photo 3.1.5), one of the important border crossing points along the Northern Corridor, has progressed the farthest in East Africa. While it previously required more than two days for border crossing at Malaba, this has been reduced to 0.5–1.0 hours for rail freight since the establishment of the first railway-dedicated OSBP in the subregion. Regarding road freight transport, border clearance takes only 6–8 hours due to recent developments (e.g., some provision of customs facilities,

---

22 Trucks are mandated to prepare the necessary documents and forms in advance of customs clearance at the border. Since any failures in the forms result in the applicant being denied permission to cross the border, it is necessary for the applicant have the forms corrected (usually in the home office) and then return to the border.

23 These bonds are to guarantee of duties that would be owed if transit cargo “leaks” into the national economy of the transit country. Such guarantees are often undertaken through bank deposit or cash payments, although modality of deposit varies by country.

24 The Tunduma (Tanzania)/Nakonde (Zambia) border crossing has the longest delays in East Africa, due in part to the slow clearance of freight on the Zambian side.
round-the-clock operation, joint customs clearance for designated goods); further, the road freight border checkpoint at Malaba is progressing towards full functional OSBP implementation. At the Katuna border, a gateway to Rwanda, border crossing takes only two hours, although this is due in part to the relatively low traffic volumes at this border.

Since the Northern Corridor has many weighbridges and police checkpoints, they contribute significantly to delay in transport. While the weighbridge clearance time in general is going to be reduced, it still takes more than five hours for some stations like the Mariakani one.

Central Corridor: Major (Tanzanian) border crossing points along the Central Corridor include Kobelo with Burundi, Rusumo with Rwanda, and Mutukula with Uganda. Time required to cross at these points is generally within one day. The World Bank has included Mutukula as an OSBP site with the EATTFP. While bilateral talks between Uganda and Tanzania are underway regarding this border crossing, detailed design for the site has not yet been completed due to a delay in EATTFP implementation. Moreover, OSBP development at Mutukula is accorded the lowest priority and despite its inclusion in the EATTFP there is some uncertainty as to its construction (according to the Tanzania and Uganda offices of the World Bank). Issues related to weighbridge and police checkpoints along the Central Corridor are not considered as serious as along the Northern Corridor (due to lower traffic volumes and fewer weighbridges per unit length), although the problem along the Central Corridor also requires a solution, especially along the Dar es Salaam–Morogoro section, which has relatively heavy traffic as it is also part of the Tazara Corridor (e.g., waiting times at the Kibaha weighbridge station have been observed as more than three hours).

(2) Projects Assisted by Development Partners

Cross-border transport infrastructure should be developed from a more comprehensive regional viewpoint rather than focusing on corridor development per se. The World Bank has assisted the cross-border transport infrastructure through the EATTFP, through which it is to implement OSBPs at seven major international border crossings in East Africa (see Table 3.1.7). However,
implementation of the project is behind schedule since consensus building (part of the World Bank’s “Coordinated Parallel Approach”) among participating countries has taken some time; completion by November 2009 is not considered likely. Also, because of rapid increased in construction costs over the two years since project initiation, the World Bank considers that implementation of all planned OSBPs may be difficult to materialize. The EATTFP also includes: (i) introduction of a Vehicle Overload Management System (VOMS), (ii) development and rehabilitation of weighbridges and other cross-border transport facilities and systems improvements.

Related initiatives supported by development partners include (i) USAID assistance for a feasibility study of OSBP implementation at major national borders in the East Africa in 2004, construction of the Malaba border crossing facility (Kenyan side), and implementation of a common bond guarantee system to be deployed by COMESA member states; (ii) EU assistance for border-crossing facilities at many international borders as early as 1990–96, including the Malaba border facility (Kenyan side), and the Isebaya/Sirali border facility; and (iii) JICA assistance for OSBP implementation, including a commitment to implementing OSBPs at the Namanga border between Kenya and Tanzania, and capacity strengthening of the Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania Revenue Authorities. In particular, an interface system developed with JICA assistance, which is currently being introduced at Namanga (Kenya/Tanzania) will eventually serve as a model for interoperability among OSBP systems throughout the region (e.g., JICA plans to provide necessary equipment to facilitate Malaba OSBP operation).

Table 3.1.7 OSBP Development Priorities under the EATTFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Priority of WB Kenya</th>
<th>Priority of WB Uganda</th>
<th>Priority of WB Tanzania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaba</td>
<td>Kenya/Uganda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia</td>
<td>Kenya/Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunga Lunga/Horo Horo</td>
<td>Kenya/Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isebania/ Sirari</td>
<td>Kenya/Tanzania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taveta/ Holili</td>
<td>Kenya/Tanzania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatuna/ Katuna</td>
<td>Uganda/Rwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutukula</td>
<td>Tanzania/Uganda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Prioritized in accordance with the views expressed at respective country offices of the World Bank.
Source: Interviews with the World Bank (WB) offices at Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda

(3) Country/Regional Community Development Strategy

As indicated by the EATTFP initiative, the East African countries have agreed to cooperate to implement OSBPs. The EAC is also supporting the implementation of OSBPs. Indeed, there has been some dissatisfaction with the delay in implementing OSBPs under the EATTFP. The EAC as well as COMESA plan to provide cross-border transport hardware and related measures, along with associated information technology (IT) systems; specific aspects of this assistance include harmonization and standardization of maximum allowable axle loads, adoption of a common bond guarantee and common vehicle insurance system, and efforts to enhance interoperability among computer subsystems.

---

25 Targeted OSBPs to be constructed at international boundaries under the EATTFP will be finalized based on prioritization (as shown in the Table 3.1.7) after completion of the detailed design and construction cost estimates of the respective candidate OSBPs. The World Bank’s Kenya Office commented that it may be difficult to implement OSBPs at the Isebaya/Sirari border between Kenya and Tanzania and the Mutukula border between Tanzania and Uganda.
3.2 Analysis of Transport Time and Cost

As elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, in East Africa relatively long freight transport times and high transport costs pose bottlenecks to economic growth, trade, and private capital investment promotion. With a view to identifying causes for these longer transport times and high transport costs, the study analyzed transport time and costs in the Subregion in some depth. Addressed for analysis were imported freight containers (40 ft, i.e., about 12 meters), the use of which has grown rapidly in East Africa. Both road and railway freight transported along the Northern and Central Corridors have been assessed, with the results presented in this section.

3.2.1 Estimation of Transport Time and Cost

Initially, freight traffic routes with designated origins and destinations were assessed. Transport times along designated routes were reviewed by section from available study reports and field interviews with relevant authorities and institutions. In instances where multiple data points were available for particular sections, study results were carefully assessed and the data deemed most reliable was used. When no information was available from previous studies, the Study Team relied on data obtained from interviews. Time spent at port, on railways, and on roads was assessed. It was assumed that customs clearance was undertaken at an inland container/clearance depot (ICD) near the destination point considering that customs clearance of East African transit freight is generally undertaken at ICDs rather than at the border post of the destination country. Further, truck operating time was assumed to be 12 hours a day, which reflects standard practice observed in East Africa, considering that trucks are generally not operated at night for security reasons. The cost estimation methodology is detailed by respective transport mode below.

(1) The Northern Corridor Road Routes

Freight traffic routes along the Northern Corridor are assumed to originate from Mombasa port with a destination of either Kampala (Uganda) or Kigali (Rwanda). Freight transport time survey results are presented in Table 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freight Destination (Originating from Mombasa Port)</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Kigali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Borders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>14^26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving Time (hours)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Crossing Time (hours)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighbridge Crossing Time (hours)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Here total transport time is defined as the time spent from cargo entry into the port up to completion of customs clearance at the ICD. This definition also applies to other routes.
27 Port dwell time includes time elapsed due to delay(s) in receipt by freight forwarding and logistics agents, in addition to time spent for port clearance procedures.
28 The average dwell time of transit freight at Mombasa Port, bound for Kampala, is 21.6 days, according to KPA, 2008, Report of the Container Census 2008. Dwell time for road traffic freight is estimated at 14 days, by assuming the modal share of Uganda-bound freight and 51 days of port dwell time for railway traffic, which is calculated as the sum of 2 days of berth waiting time, 9 days for port administration procedures, and 40 days for railway waiting time, inferred from EATTFP, 2008, Report on Inspection Tour on Northern Corridor and other reports.
29 The total land transport time is defined as the sum of driving time, border crossing time, and the time spent at weighbridge stations. An hour-to-day conversion was undertaken, assuming truck operations of 12 hours a day.
### Freight Destination (Originating from Mombasa Port)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Kigali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Time at ICD (days)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Figure 3.2.1 Total Road Transport Time for the Mombasa–Kigali Section (for a 40-ft Container)

Based on the transport time survey results, the transport cost and economic costs were estimated, with transport cost defined to include the fixed and variable costs of trucks deployed for freight transport and costs incurred at the port and ICD, as well as backhaul truck operating costs incurred by carrying empty loads (from inland origins to the port), as backhaul freight volume is disproportionately smaller than forward haul volume (from the port to inland destinations). Economic cost is defined to include transport cost and the imputed time value of freight. A local yard occupancy cost of US$80 per day for a 40-ft container was used to estimate the unit value of time of freight. The methodology for quantifying transport and economic costs are shown below.

**Fixed cost of forward truck operation (Tfcl):** A recent World Bank publication\(^{30}\) found the fixed operating costs for a truck operating in East Africa to be 0.35 US$/km.\(^{31}\) The fixed operating cost of a truck over a day, Tfcl, may be calculated by the equation below.

\[^{30}\text{The World Bank, 2008, Transport Price and Cost in Africa}\]
\[^{31}\text{Defined as the fixed cost for operating a truck traveling a distance of 1,145 km from Mombasa to Kampala. It includes vehicle capital cost, driver wages, insurance, licensing fee, and other operating costs.}\]
\( T_{fc1} = 0.35 \text{US$} / \text{km} \times 1145 \text{km} \div 5 \text{days} \approx 80 \text{US$} / \text{Day} \)  
(Equation 1)

**Fixed transport cost for a backhaul truck (Tfc2):** As a truck’s fixed cost is the same both for forward or back hauls, \( T_{fc2} \) was defined as;
\[
T_{fc2} = T_{fc1} \approx 80 \text{US$} / \text{Day} \]  
(Equation 2)

**Forward haul truck’s variable transport cost (Tvl):** The World Bank (2008) defines the variable cost of a loaded truck to be 0.98 US$\text{/km}, which was used as variable transport cost of a forward truck operation\(^{32}\):
\[
T_{vcl} = 0.98 \text{US$} / \text{km} \]  
(Equation 3)

**Backhaul truck variable cost (Tvc2):** In estimating the variable cost per km for an empty backhaul truck operation, the following equation was used.
\[
T_{vc2} = T_{vcm} + T_{vcm} \]  
(Equation 4)

Where,
\[
\begin{align*}
T_{vcw} & : \text{per km fuel cost} \\
T_{vcm} & : \text{per km variable cost independent of payload (per km variable cost except fuel cost)} \\
T_{vcw_{\text{min}}} & : \text{per km fuel cost for empty load} \\
T_{vcw_{\text{max}}} & : \text{per km fuel cost for a full load (100%)} \\
ful & : \text{fuel cost per liter}
\end{align*}
\]

Whence, the field collected data gives,
\[
ful = 1.4 \text{US$} / l
\]

As was adopted by the World Bank (2008), \(0.60\text{l/km}\) was assumed as unit fuel consumption for forward truck operation:
\[
T_{vcw_{\text{max}}} = 1.4 \text{US$} / l \times 0.60 \text{l} / \text{km}
= 0.84 \text{US$} / \text{km}
]  
(Equation 5)

Therefore,
\[
T_{vcm} = T_{vcl} - T_{vcw_{\text{max}}}
= 0.98 \text{US$} / \text{km} - 0.84 \text{US$} / \text{km} = 0.14 \text{US$} / \text{km}
]  
(Equation 6)

And, since unit fuel consumption per km for an empty truck operation was assumed to be \(0.20/\text{km}\)\(^{33}\),
\[
T_{vcw_{\text{min}}} = 1.4 \text{US$} / l \times 0.20 \text{l} / \text{km}
= 0.28 \text{US$} / \text{km}
]  
(Equation 7)

---

\(^{32}\) Defined as the variable cost of operating a truck over the distance of 1,145 km from Mombasa to Kampala. It includes maintenance cost as well as fuel cost, the latter based on a unit fuel consumption of 0.60 liters per km/truck.

\(^{33}\) Adopted as the fuel consumption rate for a commercial vehicle with more than 2,000 kg of maximum payload capacity, as indicated by the Notice #66 (2006), Ministry of Economy and Industry, Japan.
Using the values obtained by Equations 6 and Equation 7, Equation 1 gives:

\[ Tvc_2 = Tvc_m + Tvc_w \]
\[ = 0.14 \text{US$/km} + 0.28 \text{US$/km} \]
\[ = 0.42 \text{US$/km} \]  

(Equation 8)

**The total transport cost:** Total transport cost was defined as the sum of truck operation cost, shipping line costs at the port, port-related costs, and the customs clearance cost. The truck operation cost was calculated as below, using the above-mentioned Tfc1, Tfc2, Tvc1, and Tvc2.

\[ \text{Truck Transport Cost} = Tfc_1 \times \text{forward land transport time} + Tvc_1 \times \text{haul distance} \]
\[ + (1 - \text{backhaul load factor}) \]
\[ \times (Tfc_2 \times \text{backhaul land transport time} + Tvc_1 \times \text{haul distance}) \]
\[ = 80 \text{US$/haul distance} + 0.98 \text{US$/haul distance} \]
\[ + (1 - \text{backhaul load factor}) \]
\[ \times (80 \text{US$/haul distance} + 0.42 \text{US$/km} \times \text{haul distance}) \]  

(Equation 9)

Through field interviews the Study Team found that the same time is required for forward as for backhaul operations.

**Economic Cost:** Economic cost was defined as the transportation cost added by the value of time for truck freight. The time value of truck freight was taken to be US$80/day, estimated based on the warehouse cost for a 40-ft container. The economic cost was calculated by the following equation:

\[ \text{Economic Cost} = \text{Transport Cost} + \text{US$80} \times \text{Total Transport Time (days)} \]  

(Equation 10)

In the above equation, the total transport time was defined as the time spent from cargo entry into the port up to completion of customs clearance at the ICD, i.e., port dwelling time, land transport time, and the clearance time at the ICD.

Table 3.2.2 shows the resultant estimated transport costs and economic costs. The economic cost with a breakdown by transit section is shown in Figure 3.2.2.
Table 3.2.2 Road Transport Costs along the Northern Corridor (Mombasa Port-Kampala/Kigali) for a 40-ft Container

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freight Destination (originating from Mombasa Port)</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Kigali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Time at ICD (day)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul Load Factor</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truck Transport Cost (US$)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Cost</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Cost</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>1,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Cost</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Cost</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shipping Line Costs (US$)</strong></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Port Related Costs (US$)</strong></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customs Clearance Related Costs (US$)</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Transport Cost (US$)</strong></td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>4,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Transport Price (US$)</strong></td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>7,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Economic Cost (US$)</strong></td>
<td>4,856</td>
<td>6,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures for transport cost, shipping line cost, port-related cost, and customs clearance costs were adapted from KPA, 2008, A Study of the Central Corridor. Other figures are estimates by the Study Team.

Figure 3.2.2 Road Transport Costs along the Northern Corridor (Mombasa Port–Kampala/Kigali) for a 40-ft Container

Source: Compiled from various sources

34 The total transport cost includes all costs incurred from the vessel’s arrival at the port to receipt of freight by the recipient. Shipping line cost, port-related costs, and the customs clearance costs are in addition to the truck transport costs.
(2) The Central Corridor Road Routes

To analyze the transport cost along the Central Corridor Road routes, transport operations were assumed to originate from Dar es Salaam port with Kampala as the destination. The estimated transportation time is shown in Table 3.2.3 and Figure 3.2.3.

Table 3.2.3 Freight Transport Time for a 40-ft Container through the Central Corridor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Kigali</th>
<th>Bujumbura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Borders to Be Crossed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Time at ICD (days)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from data from World Bank, 2008, Tanzania Port Master Plan Inception Report; TPA, 2008, Brief on Dar es Salaam Port; and KPA, 2008, A Study of the Central Corridor

This includes extra time spent, e.g., the time elapsed due to freight left over due to delayed pickup by clearance and forwarding agents (CFAs), in addition to actual port-related clearance time, such as the port dwell time observed at Mombasa. While the latest statistics on port dwell time by destination countries are for 2007, as reported in “TPA, 2008, Brief on Dar es Salaam”, an adjusted figure was used instead by updating TPA’s 2007 statistics since field interviews identified a 6-day increase over that reported in the statistics of 2007. Similar to the method applied in the analysis of Northern Corridor transport data, road dwell time was estimated by considering the modal share of container freight by rail and road, and the time required for trains to come to pickup freight.
Transport cost and economic cost were estimated based on the above-described survey of freight transport time. The same methodology and equations used for the Northern Corridor analysis were applied to obtain transport time and economic cost along the Central Corridor. The results are presented in Table 3.2.4 and Figure 3.2.4

Table 3.2.4 Freight Travel Costs for a 40-ft Container along the Central Corridor (Originating from the Dar es Salaam Port, and Destined for Kampala, Kigali, and Bujumbura)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freight Destination (Originating in the Dar es Salaam Port)</th>
<th>Kampala</th>
<th>Kigali</th>
<th>Bujumbura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Time at an ICD (days)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul Load Ratio</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Transport Cost (US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Fixed Cost</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul Variable Cost</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Variable Cost</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul Variable Cost</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping Line Costs (US$)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-Related Costs (US$)</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Related Costs (US$)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Cost (US$)</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>3,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Price (US$)</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>5,390</td>
<td>5,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic Cost (US$)</td>
<td>8,231</td>
<td>7,509</td>
<td>10,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures for transport cost, shipping line cost, port-related cost, and customs clearance costs were adapted from KPA, 2008, A Study of the Central Corridor. Other figures are estimates by the Study Team.

Figure 3.2.4 Freight Road Transport Costs for a 40-ft Container along the Central Corridor (Originating from Dar es Salaam Port, and Destined for Kigali or Kampala)
For analyses of time and costs along the Northern and Central railway routes, freight traffic was assumed to originate either at Mombasa port or Dar es Salaam port for the Northern Corridor and Central Corridor, respectively, and with (both) routes bound for Kampala. Results for the respective corridors are shown in Table 3.2.5, Figure 3.2.5, and Figure 3.2.6.

### Table 3.2.5 Railway Freight Transport Time for a 40-ft Container (Originating from Mombasa Port or Dar es Salaam Port, and Destined for Kampala)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corridor</th>
<th>Northern Corridor</th>
<th>Central Corridor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Borders to Be Crossed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Water (Lake Ferry) Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Time at ICD (days)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above-described survey of railway freight transport time, the transport cost and the economic costs are estimated. The methodology used to estimate these costs is detailed below.

**Fixed railway freight transport cost** *(Rfc)*: Total annual fixed costs for Kenya Railways, annual railway freight transport volume, and average daily transport distance were employed to estimate a unit fixed transport cost, which then was applied to Kenya Railways, Uganda Railways, and Tanzania Railways. The formula used is shown below:

\[
Rfc = \frac{(Total \ annual \ fixed \ cost)}{(Annual \ maximum \ transport \ capacity)} \times \frac{(Northern \ Corridor \ length)}{(Northern \ Corridor \ transport \ days)}
\]  
*(Equation 11)*

Maximum annual transport capacity \(C_{\text{max}}\) is defined as;

\[
C_{\text{max}} = \frac{(Annual \ Transport \ Volume: \ t \cdot km) \times 2}{(1 + \text{backhaul load factor})}
\]  
*(Equation 12)*

---

40 It is assumed to be an aggregate of capital investment in track and rolling stock, personnel cost, and annual depreciation cost.

41 Data on annual fixed cost and total annual transport volumes are from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
Where,

- Total annual fixed cost: US$23,320,000\(^{42}\)
- Annual transport volume: 1,313,000,000 t \cdot km
- Backhaul load factor of the Northern Corridor: 20%
- Service length of the Northern Corridor: 1300km
- Service days along the Northern Corridor: 5 days

Inputting these figures into equations 14 and 15,

\[
R_{fc} = 2.77 \text{ US$/t \cdot day} \quad \text{(Equation 13)}
\]

**Variable Railway Cost (Rvc):** It was assumed that variable railways costs consist of fuel cost only. The following formula was employed:

\[
R_{vc} = \frac{\text{Fuel requirement per unit freight ton and distance}}{(\text{diesel oil energy conversion factor}) \times (\text{diesel oil price})} \quad \text{(Equation 14)}
\]

Where,

- Fuel thermal energy requirement per ton-km: 0.491 MJ/t \cdot km\(^{43}\)
- Diesel oil energy conversion factor: 38.2 MJ/ℓ\(^{44}\)
- Diesel Oil Price: 80 Ksh/ℓ = 1.11 US$/ℓ\(^{45}\)

Inputting these figures into Equation 11,

\[
R_{vc} = 0.491 \text{MJ/t \cdot km} \div 38.2 \text{MJ/ℓ} \times 1.11 \text{US$/ℓ} \\
= 0.0143 \text{US$/t \cdot km} \quad \text{(Equation 15)}
\]

In the above calculation, variable transport cost for an empty load is assumed to be 0, by using the definition in Equation 11.

**Lake Transport Cost:** In the absence of recent data on lake transport cost, a US$20/ton transport cost (effective up to 2003) for Mwanza–Kampala was employed, which is the sum of ferry transport freight rate for Mwanza–Kampala and the railway transport rate for Port Bell–Kampala. A huge reduction in ferry transport capacity and monopoly operation since 2003 has decreased the rate to US$33.75/t as of October 2008. The Study Team applied the 2003 ferry fare in its analysis. In this exercise, it was assumed that a 40-ft container weighs 20 tons.

Total transport cost and economic cost are presented in Table 3.2.6 and Figures 3.2.7–3.2.8.

---

\(^{42}\) An exchange rate of 1US$=72Ksh was employed.  
\(^{43}\) In accordance with the 66\(^{th}\) notice of the Ministry of Economy and Industry, Japan.  
\(^{44}\) Data taken from the Annual Energy Report, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Japan.  
\(^{45}\) Data obtained from field survey in Kenya.
Table 3.2.6 Total Railway Transport Costs along the Northern/Central Corridors (Originating from Mombasa Port/Dar es Salaam Port and Bound for Kampala) for a 40-ft Container

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ports of Freight Origin</th>
<th>Mombasa Port</th>
<th>Dar es Salaam Port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total transport time (days)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dwell Time (days)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Clearance at an ICD (days)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Time (days)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul Load Factor</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Transport Cost (US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Fixed Cost</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Variable Cost</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back Fixed Cost</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back Variable Cost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Transport Cost (US$)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Line Cost (US$)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-Related Cost (US$)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Clearance Cost (US$)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Cost (US$)</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>1,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Price (US$)</td>
<td>3288</td>
<td>3859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic Cost (US$)</td>
<td>6,406</td>
<td>4,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data on transport cost, ship line cost, port-related costs, and customs clearance cost were adapted from KPA, 2008, A Study of the Central Corridor. Other costs are estimates made by the Study Team.

Figure 3.2.7 Railway Transport Cost along the Northern Corridor (Mombasa Port–Kampala) for a 40-ft Container

46 Total transport cost represents all costs incurred from vessel’s arrival at the port up to receipt of the freight by the recipient. It was derived from the truck haul cost, plus the ship line cost, port-related cost, and customs clearance cost.
3.2.2 Findings

(1) Transport Time

**Long Port Dwell Times:** Port dwell time was found to be 61% and 85% respectively of total road transport time and railway transport time (inclusive of the time waiting for a freight train). In particular, about 40 days are spent for railway freight waiting for transshipment due to (i) rolling stock capacity constraints; (ii) insufficient port infrastructure capacity, in particular, of berths and yards, (iii) slow customs clearance due to processing by multiple agents, (iv) time required for document review of consignees (via CFAs), and (v) delayed pickups by cargo recipients. In some instances, agents keep freight at port yards to take advantage of storage rates that are lower than at warehouses.

**Time Spent at Border Crossings and ICDs:** The time spent at the Malaba border crossing has been reduced to 6–8 hours by road and 1 hour by rail, in particular by introduction of a one-stop border post for rail traffic (introduction of an OSBP for road traffic is ongoing). Consequently, the portion of time required for border crossing represents 2.9% and 0.1% of overall transport time for road traffic freight and rail traffic freight, respectively, implying that time lost due to other factors (e.g., port dwell time) is more significant. Even considering only the total transport time for domestic traffic, the border crossing portion constitutes only 6%, a small (although not necessarily an insignificant portion). For Uganda-bound freight, customs clearance is undertaken at the destination ICD (at Kampala), instead of at the border; processing at the ICD usually takes a few days. Transport delays due to a lack of preparedness for border-crossing procedures are a more serious problem. In planning and developing the cross-border transport infrastructure, there is a need to achieve overall physical distribution efficiency over the entire trip length from origin to destination.

**Weighbridges, Police Checks, and Police Escort:** There are many weighbridge stations and police checkpoints along the subject corridors for the purpose of preventing illegal freight transshipment, loading/unloading, and overloading. Further, police escorts are required on occasion. There are instances in which more than five hours is required at some weighbridge stations, a consequence of traffic congestion in or near the station; such delays are generally
caused by poor equipment design or insufficient parts supply since actual process of weight measurement should take only about three minutes under normal circumstances. There also are reported incidents of bribery and corruption, which is understood to be very costly for transport operators.

**Low Freight Trip Speed:** Trucks can be operated at relatively high speeds since the riding surfaces are maintained in good condition, but truck operations stop at night for security reasons. Railway operating speeds are as low as 10 kph since the track has not been well maintained.

Figures 3.2.9 and 3.2.10 illustrate a number of the findings presented above in the case of the Mombasa-Kampala route.

![Transport Time (Road) and Railway Time](image)

(2) **Transport Cost**

**Transport Cost:** One of the factors leading to high transport costs is the cost added by backhaul transport. Backhaul operation costs tend to be allocated to forward operation costs since backhaul cargo loads (originating inland and bound for the port) are disproportionately less than that of forward cargo loads (originating from the port and bound for inland destinations). It is also noted that transport policy allows for a large markup in road freight rates to cover the backhaul transport costs. On the other hand, railway freight rates are kept at relatively lower levels since railway operating costs are lower.

**Economic Cost:** As defined in this research study, economic costs consist of transport costs incurred plus the cost of time spent by the freight. Therefore the magnitude of the economic cost affects corporate behavior in their choice of transport modes. It is evident that ports represent a big bottleneck in the overall physical distribution system since port-related costs account for a large portion of economic costs due the long port dwell times.

Figures 3.2.11–3.2.14 illustrate the above findings regarding transport and economic costs with reference to the Mombasa–Kampala route.
Transport Cost (Road)

- Shipping Line: 5.2%
- Port-related: 7.3%
- Forward Transport (Running): 26.0%
- Forward Transport (WB/PC): 11.9%
- Forward Transport (Border): 2.4%
- Backward Transport: 4.4%
- Custom Clearance: 11.8%

Total: US$3,016

Transport Cost (Railway)

- Shipping Line: 22.4%
- Port-related: 13.7%
- Forward Transport (Running): 9.7%
- Forward Transport (WB/PC): 0.1%
- Forward Transport (Border): 40.2%
- Backward Transport: 13.0%
- Custom Clearance: 0.1%

Total: US$1,606

Figure 3.2.11
Breakdown of Total Road Transport Cost from Mombasa to Kampala

Figure 3.2.12
Breakdown of Total Railway Transport Cost from Mombasa to Kampala

Economic Cost (Road)

- at Port: 2.3%
- during Running: 3.1%
- at WB/PC: 14.4%
- at Border: 31.6%
- at ICD: 32.1%

Total: US$4,729

Economic Cost (Railway)

- at Port: 0.1%
- during Running: 3.5%
- at WB/PC: 69.6%
- at Border: 18.2%
- at ICD: 10.6%

Total: US$6,404

Figure 3.2.13
Breakdown of Total Road Transport Economic Cost from Mombasa to Kampala

Figure 3.2.14
Breakdown of Total Railway Transport Economic Cost from Mombasa to Kampala
Chapter 4  Non-Physical (“Soft”) Issues in Cross-Border Transport in East Africa

The importance of soft infrastructure (e.g., institutional reforms, laws/regulations,) as well as hard infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, ports) for transport and trade efficiency is well-established. It is considered that 25% of delays on transport corridors worldwide are a result of poor infrastructure, while 75% are related to poor facilitation. While infrastructure improvements save travel time and reduce vehicle operating costs, reducing documentation and border delays can save days, thereby (i) enabling greater vehicle utilization and (ii) reducing capital tied up during shipment and increased inventory to hedge against the unpredictability of delivery time. Accordingly, this chapter examines the soft infrastructure of cross-border transport, with the focus on East Africa, since the field data collection activities were undertaken in this subregion.

Table 4.1.1 shows rankings according to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index, a benchmarking tool ranking 150 countries. Kenya and Uganda are in the middle of the global rankings and Tanzania near the bottom.

### Table 4.1.1 Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Rankings of the Focus Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LPI Ranking</th>
<th>Customs Infrastructure</th>
<th>International Shipments</th>
<th>Logistics Competence</th>
<th>Tracking and Tracing</th>
<th>Domestic Logistics Costs</th>
<th>Timeliness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The LPI ranking is a composite ranking based on a simple average of the country scores on the seven key dimensions shown in the table.

Source: Jean-François Arvis (World Bank), Monica Alina Mustra (World Bank), John Panzer (World Bank), Lauri Ojala (Turku School of Economics), and Tapio Naula (Turku School of Economics), *Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy, The Logistics Performance Index and Its Indicators*, 2007 [the most recent available as of the current writing], pp. 26–33

In order to better understand the soft infrastructure of cross-border transport in East Africa, the following subsections address: (i) the legal/regulatory/institutional framework for cross-border transport and (ii) specific soft side issues/development. Regional integration issues are considered in the first of these subsections. The Section 2.2 presents an historical review that permits broad understanding of the background to these issues.

---

4. Some insights from other subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa are presented, however.
5. Singapore was ranked first, Afghanistan was ranked last, and Japan was ranked sixth.
6. As noted, institutional and organizational factors in transport have become increasingly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, since (i) transport costs are quite sensitive to the efficient utilization of transport capacity (which depends very much on the ability to obtain return freight and vehicle turnaround time), and (ii) transport speed and reliability have become more important as a result of globalization and just-in-time production, which requires goods to be delivered in very narrow time windows, which in turn requires greater frequency of service on the various modes of transport.
4.1 Legal/Regulatory/Institutional Framework for Cross-Border Transport

At the international level, the legal/regulatory/institutional framework is based on: (i) international conventions, (ii) African-wide treaties and legal instruments, (iii) subregional instruments, and (iv) partnership-based harmonization initiatives.

4.1.1 International Conventions

International transport facilitation conventions include: (i) convention with provisions protecting the rights of landlocked states, including the Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit (Barcelona, 1921), the Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries (New York, 1965), and the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (New York, 1982); (ii) various customs conventions, including the Revised Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, the Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR [Transit International Routier, from the French acronym] Carnets (the TIR Convention, Geneva, 1975), the Customs Convention on Containers (Geneva, 1972), the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Commercial Road Vehicles (Geneva, 1956), the Convention on the Harmonization of the Frontier Control of Goods (Geneva, 1982), and the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offenses (Nairobi, 1977); (iii) various conventions on road traffic and road signs and signals, including the Convention on Road Traffic (Vienna, 1968) and the Convention on Road Signs and Signals (Vienna, 1968); (iv) various conventions on railway traffic, including the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF, Convention Relative aux transports Internationaux Ferroviaires, Bern, 1980), (v) conventions related to inland water transport, such as the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Inland Waterway (Geneva, 1978); and (vi) conventions on air transport, such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).

Generally, the East African countries have not acceded to these conventions, although there are a few exceptions, e.g., the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (New York, 1982; Part X addressed the right of access of land-locked states to and from the sea and freedom of transit), acceded to by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; the Customs Convention on the Importation of Private Road Vehicles (Geneva, 1954), acceded to by Uganda.

4.1.2 African-wide Treaties and Legal Instruments

Continent-wide instruments include: (i) the African Union Treaty (the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé, 2001), pursuant to which the African Union has made provisions in its priority program for Linking Africa for an Integrated Continental Transport Master Plan; (ii) the Treaty of Abuja (1991), which established the African Economic Community, by which the contracting states are to promote the integration of infrastructure and develop transport coordination to increase productivity and efficiency; (iii) the African Maritime Transport Charter (Tunis, 1994); and (iv) the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (Port Louis, 1993), which covers transport laws, but which to date only includes civil law countries.\(^8\)


\(^8\) If Rwanda and Burundi were to accede to this treaty, it could serve as a foundation for harmonization of transport laws between these two countries, which in turn may accelerate harmonization within the EAC, although the other EAC member states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) are common law countries.
4.1.3 Subregional Instruments

Relevant subregional instruments for East Africa are described below:

(1) East African Community (EAC) Treaty (Arusha, 1999)

The EAC Treaty signed by the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, entered into force in 2000, establishing the East African Community, which was expanded in 2007 to include Burundi and Rwanda. Article 89 of the treaty on common transport and communications policy provides that the partner states will: (a) develop harmonized standards and regulatory laws, rules, procedures, and practices; (b) construct, maintain, upgrade, rehabilitate, and integrate roads, railways, airports, pipelines, and harbors in their territories; (c) review and re-design their intermodal transport systems and develop new routes within the Community for the transport of the type of goods and services produced in the partner states; (d) maintain, expand, and upgrade communication facilities to enhance interaction between/among persons and businesses in the partner states and promote the full exploitation of the market and investment opportunities created by the Community; (e) grant special treatment to landlocked partner states; and (f) provide security and protection to transport systems to ensure the smooth movement of goods and persons within the Community. To implement the treaty provisions, the East African Community Development Strategy 2006–2010 calls for: (a) improved road connectivity across the region, through rehabilitation/ construction of prioritized regional roads and institutionalizing the maintenance of roads; continued harmonization of traffic laws, including regulations and highway codes, adoption of common definitions of classes of roads and a route numbering system, vehicle dimensions, axle load limits, and road transit charges; and implementation of the Tripartite Agreement on Road Transport (see below); (b) maximized benefits of a safe, secure, and efficient air transport system in the region, through harmonizing and implementing civil aviation programs, projects, and regulations; establishing and operationalizing an East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Organization and Upper Airspace Administrative Centre; finalizing a Common Aviation Policy; and fully liberalizing civil aviation activities; (c) maximizing benefits from an efficient railway system, through development and implementation of an EAC Railways Master Plan and carrying through the railways concession process; and (d) putting into place efficient, safe, and secure maritime operations, though implementing the Inland Waterways Transport Agreement and undertaking capacity building of the Lake Victoria Transport Commission. The document also calls for full implementation of a customs union by 2010.

(2) Treaty Establishing a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, Kampala, 1993)

COMESA superseded the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (1981), and has 19 members making it the largest regional grouping in Africa, including Kenya and Uganda as well as Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but not Tanzania, which withdrew on 2 September 2000, stating that its industries were too weak to compete in a free trade zone. As the main objectives of a common transport policy, Article 84 of the treaty calls for adequate maintenance of roads, ports, airports, and other transport facilities, as well as for the security of transport systems, the granting of special treatment to landlocked countries, and the development of intermodal systems. Regarding roads and road transport, Article 85 calls for the partner countries to accede to international conventions on road traffic and signs/signals, and to harmonize laws, standards, and formalities, and ensure equal treatment of common carriers and road operators in the common market. Regarding railways and railway transport, Article 86 cites efficiency and coordination as objectives, and prioritizes subsector development, with common safety rules, procedures, documents, regulations, non-discriminatory tariffs, and standards of equipment/facilities.
(3) Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1993)

SADC, which originated from the frontline states opposed to apartheid in South Africa, has 14 member states, including Tanzania, but not Kenya and Uganda. SADC overlaps substantially with COMESA, although historically SADC has resisted efforts to merge the two. Within SADC, Mozambique has responsibility for coordinating transport and Tanzania has responsibility for coordinating trade. A SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology (1996) has been signed by the Heads of State and calls for (a) development of complementarities between and among modes and encouragement of multimodal services; (b) establishment of infrastructure, logistical, institutional, and legal frameworks including the right of transit of landlocked countries to unimpeded access to the sea and equal treatment of nationals from different member countries; and (c) establishment of cross-border multimodal corridor planning committees with representatives from both the public and private sectors. SADC promoted transport corridors from the early stages, and now focuses on development corridors, encompassing transport and complementary measures.

(4) Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (Bujumbura, 1985)

The Northern Corridor Transit Agreement, initially concluded by Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda (and acceded to by the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1987), was revised in December 2006 and is awaiting ratification by all five signatory states. The revised Agreement includes 11 implementing Protocols, covering (a) maritime port facilities, (b) routes and facilities, (c) customs control, (d) documentation procedures, (e) transport of goods by rail, (f) transport of goods by road, (g) inland water transport, (h) transport by pipeline, (i) multimodal transport of goods, (j) handling of dangerous goods, and (k) measures of facilitation for transit agencies, traders, and employees. Like the original agreement, the revised agreement is well drafted and relatively comprehensive in scope. It will rename the existing Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority (NCTTCA) as the Northern Corridor Co-ordination Authority, which is to include a Council of Ministers, Executive Board, Specialized Committees, Public Private Partnership Committee, and Permanent Secretariat.


The Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement has been signed by Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, and has been ratified to date by Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. The agreement is to become operational after at least three countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the United Nations Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa (Uganda has already done so). The agreement is modeled upon the (original) Northern Corridor Transit Agreement, with the main objectives to (a) ensure that the corridor is efficient and cost-effective; (b) market the corridor with a view toward increasing its use; (c) supporting infrastructure planning and operations of the corridor through collection, processing, and dissemination of relevant data; (d) promote sustainable maintenance of infrastructure; (e) improve customs transit procedures, including joint customs controls and juxtaposed customs offices at land borders and seaports; and (f) cooperate with other regional bodies. It is to be governed by an interstate council of ministers, an executive board, and a stakeholders’ consultative committee, supported by a permanent secretariat to be

---

9 The original agreement was to be 10 years in duration and may not have been formally extended. Also, it referred to a number of international instruments the parties never acceded to (e.g., the 1980 Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods).

10 The stakeholders consultative committee is responsible for: (i) developing and implementing strategies designed to provide seamless transport along the corridor; (ii) developing performance targets for the corridor and monitoring its utilization and performance; (iii) developing and implementing strategies to market the corridor; (iv) undertaking research and recommending the appointment of senior staff by the executive board; (v) establishing a stakeholders representative group to oversee its affairs between meetings; and (vi) appointing technical committees or working
based in Dar es Salaam, with start-up costs of US$1.8 million to be provided for three years by AfDB. At this stage, however, the legal basis for the Central Corridor coordination has not yet been finalized, although coordinating committees have been established on a bilateral basis between Tanzania and the landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

(6) **Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, Nairobi, 1996)**

The Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development includes Kenya and Uganda among its six parties in the Horn of Africa, the others being Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Article 7 of the agreement provides that the parties are to (a) promote joint development strategies and harmonize policies regarding trade, transport, communications and customs, as well as the free movement of goods, persons, and services; (b) create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border, and domestic trade; and (c) develop and improve a coordinate transport infrastructure. Article 13 A provides that the parties are to work toward harmonization of transport policies and elimination of physical and nonphysical barriers. Kenya and Uganda have focused more on the EAC, although Kenya has been active as the current president of IGAD.

(7) **Tripartite Agreement on Road Transport between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of Uganda and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (Arusha, 2001)**

The Tripartite Agreement is to be implemented according to the *East African Community Development Strategy 2006–2010*. Article II provides that the objectives of the agreement are to (a) promote, regulate, and facilitate traffic flow through transit routes by handling regional trade through the partner states’ territories with a view to achieving a fair distribution of road transport services; and (b) minimize the incidence of customs fraud and avoidance by taking all the necessary measures to ensure expeditious and secure movement of traffic, avoidance of unnecessary delays in the movement of goods, and the simplification and harmonization of relevant documentation and procedures. Rather than adopting a free market approach, Article IV limits market access based on permits/licenses to be issued to carriers. Article V limits operation of the agreement to designated ports of entry and routes authorized for international operations. Article VI(2) identifies the following transit routes: (a) Mombasa–Nairobi–Kampala; (b) Mombasa–Horohoro–Tanga–Dar es Salaam; (c) Dar es Salaam–Arusha–Namanga–Kajiado–Nairobi; (d) Namanga–Arusha–Dodoma–Iringa–Tunduma; (e) Nairobi–Isebania–Musoma–Mwanza–Biharamulu; (f) Mombasa–Voi–Taveta–Holili–Moshi–Arusha; (g) Dar es Salaam–Dodoma–Isaka–Mutukula–Masa–Kampala; (h) Mbarara–Kikagati–Kayanga–Bukoba; (i) Nfutukula–Kigoma–Tunduma; (j) Mbale–Moroto–Lodwar–Wamurupulh-route; and (k) Nakuru–Kisumu–Busia–Kampala. Article VII(b) provides that the partner states undertake to: (a) keep documentation and procedures under continuous review in order to simplify and reduce them; (b) align their documentation and procedures to those of larger regional organizations to which the partner states are members; (c) harmonize as far as possible commodity codes and descriptions with those commonly used in international trade; and (d) look for possibilities of harmonizing, rationalizing, and merging control and license/permit issuing bodies for the purpose of minimizing difficulties and diversity. Article IX(d) provides that the partner states shall harmonize relevant technical standards on, but not limited to (a) safety and fitness of vehicles; (b) dimensions of vehicles and vehicle combinations; (c) loads on vehicles; (d) traffic groups. Yao Adzigbey, Charles Kunaka, and Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku, *Institutional Arrangements for Transport Corridor Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program, SSATP Working Paper No. 86, p. 6.

11 See source in previous footnote, pp. 6–8 and p.20.
signs including traffic signals, road signs, and markings; and (e) road and bridge design standards. Article IX provides for mutual recognition of roadworthiness certificates. Article X provides for a Joint Technical Committee to meet four times per year to manage implementation of the Agreement; it also calls for the Joint Technical Committee to establish Route Management Groups. Article XII(6) provides that the partner states will agree to implement a harmonized cross-border road charging system or road transit charges that shall be reviewed as the need arises in a framework acceptable to all partner states. Article XIII(2) provides that visas will not be required by nationals of any of the partner states for entry into the territory of the other partner states. The agreement is reasonably comprehensive, although it: (a) does not provide for a customs transit and inland clearance regime for goods, or a customs temporary importation for containers; (b) does not address mutual recognition of driving licenses or multimodal carrier licensing/liability regimes; and (c) does not provide the details of single-stop/single-window border crossing inspection.

4.1.4 Partnership-based Transport Harmonization Initiatives

Partnership-based transport harmonization initiatives include: (i) the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an integrated socioeconomic development framework for Africa adopted by a 2001 summit of the Organization for African Unity, with objectives including promoting economic activity and cross-border trade through improved land transport linkages and including an action plan to establish customs and immigration task teams to harmonize border crossing and visa procedures, establish and nurture public-private partnerships (PPPs) as well as grant concessions towards the development/maintenance of transport infrastructure, and promote harmonization of transport modal standards and regulations and the increased use of multimodal transport facilities; (ii) the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP), which includes eight regional economic communities, three African institutions (AfDB, NEPAD, and the UN Economic Commission for Africa or UNECA), national and regional organizations as well as international development partners seeking to ensure that transport plays its full part in achieving the developmental objectives of Sub-Saharan Africa; and (iii) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub, which has been involved in trade policy formulation/capacity building enterprise development, customs harmonization and simplification, and initiatives to promote transport efficiency.

4.1.5 Assessment

A number of conclusions may be reached regarding the multi-tiered international legal framework outlined above:

(i) The memberships and functions of the different legal frameworks overlap; one recent study termed the arrangements a “muddle”. The resulting “spaghetti bowl” is displayed in Figure 1.6.2 (Chapter 1), for East Africa as well as for other parts of the continent. In East Africa, for example, while Kenya and Uganda are both members of COMESA, Tanzania is no longer a COMESA member, but is a member of SADC; however, all three are members of the EAC, along with Burundi and Rwanda. While the EAC has historically represented a fast track of the COMESA integration agenda, the EAC is now

---

13 Burundi and Rwanda are also members of the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of Great Lakes States (ECGLS), both of which seek to achieve full economic union including a common transport policy and harmonization of road transport policies.
implementing a customs union, which means that Kenya and Uganda’s COMESA membership will be incompatible with their EAC membership as soon as COMESA moves to a customs union unless the common external tariffs of the two regional groupings are harmonized.14 Also, successful implementation of common transport policies is more difficult in the case of overlapping memberships because of differences in obligations and implementation timetables, as well as the added burden on the respective countries’ institutional capacity; the problem is compounded by the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between the regional groupings and the partner states.15 However, on 22 October 2008 in Kampala the heads of state of the EAC, COMESA, and SADC approved the establishment of a free trade area encompassing the 26 states that are members of the three regional groupings, with the ultimate goal of establishing a single union.16 In the longer term, accession to and implementation of the major international transport facilitation conventions (including the TIR Convention)17 should be undertaken.

(ii) It has been suggested that the legal framework can be streamlined if: (a) African-wide institutions limit their role to coordinating the policies and strategies of regional economic institutions, and facilitate regional policy harmonization, observing corridor and national implementation, disseminating best practices, and monitoring corridor committees; (b) corridor committees serve as anchors for public-private partnerships across two or more countries seeking to improve transport efficiency and monitor national implementation; and (c) national governments implement national policies and enabling frameworks, with national coordinating committees identifying enablers and constraints, investment opportunities, and potential efficiency gains at the national level and coordinate with government and the private sector.18

(iii) To pursue the interests of the EAC countries in the transport sector, the EAC countries would ideally adopt a uniform approach in various international organizations such as COMESA, SADC, and NEPAD. Comprehensive guidelines for a common transport policy should be adopted sooner rather than later.19

---

15 For example, the area of EAC responsibility/competency is often stated in broad terms with respect to transport; because EAC legislation is emerging as supranational law, the partner states are obligated to observe it [e.g., Article 8(1)(c) of the EAC Treaty states that the partner states agree “to abstain from any measures likely to jeopardize the implementation of the provisions of the treaty”]; however, if there is no specific EAC legislation on a matter (yet), partner states may consider that the matter is not covered by the EAC legal regime, thereby rendering efforts at a common transport policy more difficult. See CPCS, East African Railways Master Plan Study, Interim Report, prepared for the East African Community, January 2008, pp. C-21 to C-22.
16 The African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) announced at the EAC–SADC–COMESA Summit (also known the AFTZ Summit and Tripartite Summit) effectively is the realization of a dream of more than 100 years, a trade zone spanning the length of African continent from Cape Town to Cairo. Regarding the legal and institutional framework, the Tripartite Summit (i) directed the Council of Ministers of each of the three regional economic communities (RECs) to, within six months, consider and approve a memorandum of understanding on interregional cooperation; (ii) the approved memorandum to be signed by the chairpersons of the three RECs within one month of its approval; and (iii) have established a Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and/or Government, which shall sit once every two years.
17 In post-war Europe the TIR system, which relies on public-private partnerships, played an important role in increasing trade. See Jean-François Arvis, Gael Raballand, and Jean-François Marteau, The Cost of Being Landlocked: Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4528, June 2007, p. 59.
(iv) The Northern Corridor Transit Agreement has operated effectively with the NCTTCA implementing a number of initiatives focusing on the facilitation of trade and transport in the corridor. Although its budget is limited (only about US$1 million per annum, with funding provided by a tonnage-based levy on imports at the port of Mombasa\(^{20}\) and budget allocations from the governments), it has laid the foundation for implementation of corridor action plans. A similar approach in the Central Corridor should prove fruitful after establishment of the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency, especially if a clear role is given to stakeholder consultations in corridor management.\(^{21}\)

(v) In some cases, the EAC has implemented Community-wide laws/regulations, e.g., the East African Community Customs Management Act (2004), which standardizes and modernizes the respective customs legislation of the EAC partner countries.\(^{22}\) However, effective application of international legal instruments often requires action internalizing them in national legal/regulatory frameworks to ensure that government officials such as customs officers and police understand and apply the new regulations, documentation, and formalities.\(^{23}\) National policymaking institutions have often been slow or unable to translate their commitments under regional agreements into substantive changes in policies, laws, rules, and regulations.\(^{24}\) To some extent, there may still be a hesitancy to give up elements of sovereignty to regional institutions. Also, vested interests sometimes oppose regional transport integration. Due to its small size and limited capacity, the EAC has been unable to put in place effective monitoring and enforcement mechanism to assure adherence to agreed measures and timings.\(^{25}\)

4.2 Specific Soft Issues/Developments

4.2.1 Overview

This subsection addresses specific soft side issues/developments (listed in Box 4.1) relating to the institutional system and laws/regulations for the smooth operation and maintenance of hard infrastructure.

---


\(^{24}\) Sometimes a regional commitment is made to achieve a uniform standard (e.g., vehicle roadworthiness inspections) without specifying the standards, determining the cost of the necessary facilities, and determining how these costs would be paid). The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), *Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region*, Final Report, April 2005, Chapter 13.

Box 4.1: Soft Issues/Developments

Customs and Transit
Customs Bond Guarantees Issues
Issues Related to Additional Customs Security (e.g., customs escorts)
Border Post Issues (to move to one-stop inspection)
Other Border Post Issues
Corruption
Need to Sensitize Frontline (Border) Officials

Regional Gateway Ports
Need to Introduce “Landlord” Ports
Need for Port Facilitation Improvements

Regional Road Corridors (Roads and Road Transport)
Excessive Number of Checkpoints and Weighbridges
Need for Third-Party Motor Insurance
Need for Harmonization of Road Traffic Rules/Regulations
Need for Harmonization of Axle Load Controls
Road Transport and Health Issues

Regional Railway Corridors
Railway Services Issues
Concession Issues

Air Transport
Need for Liberalization of Air Transport Services
Need for Air Transport Regulatory Reform

Indicative Cross-Cutting Issues
Need for Revision of National Laws and Regulations in accordance with Regional Agreements
Need for Performance Measures to Monitor Transport Facilitation and other Soft Measures to Improve Transport Efficiency
Need for Training

4.2.2 Customs and Transit

While revenue collection has been the traditional focus of customs authorities in many Sub-Saharan African countries, in recent years greater attention has been devoted to the role that customs authorities must play in facilitating transport and trade. With the assistance of international development partners, customs authorities have initiated ambitious modernization programs, to meet their responsibilities in a changing international environment. Nevertheless, a number of customs and transit issues remain, as detailed below.

26 Some issues that might be included under Customs and Transit Issues (i.e., excessive number of checkpoints, third-party motor insurance) have been discussed under Regional Road Corridors.

27 A 2005 study in Tanzania found that “[a] control mentality focused on maximizing revenue collection permeates all Customs activities at the expense of meeting trade facilitation objectives. Organizational performance is assessed almost exclusively by its success in meeting revenue targets and little or no objective data is available on its performance in relation to other organizational priorities.” http://www.integratedframework.org/files/english/Tanzania_DTIS_Vol1_Nov05.pdf [Tanzania Diagnostic Trade Integration Study], p. 129.
(1) Customs Bond Guarantees

The EAC countries require customs bonds to cover the potential loss of duty revenue if the goods carried are diverted and consumed in a transit country.\(^{28}\) Within a nationally executed bond system, transporters transiting one country en route to another need to take out a customs bond at least equal to the duty that would be payable on their cargo; when they prove that the cargo has left the customs territory, the bond is released. However, the processing of releasing takes time (sometimes as long as 60 days), and the issuance of the bond comes at a cost, estimated at about 4% of the cost of an import or export commodity.\(^{29}\) An estimated US$500 million equivalent in business capital in the COMESA region is currently being used to bond goods, which ties up working capital of mainly small firms already short of cash. The problem is compounded by delays in bond cancellation, due to manual rather than electronic processing. A recommended countermeasure is the COMESA Regional Customs Transit Guarantee (RCTG), which is being developed with the support of USAID to bond goods on a regional basis instead of country by country.

The RCTG has been piloted but is still not fully functional. Benefits may ultimately include: (i) faster clearance of vehicles; (ii) a resulting increase in tons/kilometers with a positive impact on freight rates; (iii) release of a large sum of money for clearing and forwarding agents, which is tied up as a guarantee and/or collateral in commercial banks and insurance companies; (iv) providing customs authorities with reliable security and an improved system for collection of duties and taxes; (v) providing a simple and economical administrative system for carriers/transporters; and (vi) providing a simple and economical mechanism for sureties (financial institutions) to issue and manage customs bond and creating an opportunity to extend their cooperation.\(^{30}\)

In the longer run, a more comprehensive solution could involve the countries acceding to the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) (Geneva, 14 November 1975), which permits the international carriage of goods by road from one customs office of departure to a customs office of arrival, through as many countries as necessary, without any intermediate frontier check of the goods carried.\(^{31}\)

(2) Additional Customs Security Measures (e.g., Customs Escorts)

Kenya has been requiring customs escorts by its Transit Monitoring Unit for various categories of “sensitive goods”, which comprise as much as half or more of containerized transit traffic.\(^{32}\) Many of the items deemed “sensitive” are listed only to protect Kenyan industries. Another issue is that Kenya requires transit goods to clear the Kenya/Uganda border within 15 days from

\(^{28}\) While requiring such bonds is permitted under the EAC Customs Management Act (2004), the Act does not require it.

\(^{29}\) http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Uganda_DTIS_vol1.pdf [Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study., p. 88


\(^{31}\) It might even be argued that no guarantee system is required for a large percentage of cargo because most goods traveling under bonds are carried by established clearing and forwarding companies, which have substantial fixed assets that could be seized. See, e.g., http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Uganda_DTIS_vol1.pdf [Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study], p. 89

\(^{32}\) Escorts are to be provided (i) from Mombasa port to Mombasa Weighbridge, (ii) from Mombasa to Athi River, and (iii) from Athi River to Malaba. Since the convoys move in fleets of 25, they often take time to assemble. Promas Consultants Ltd. in association with Dr. C. K. Kaira Associates Ltd., Project Document for Support Services for Elimination of Non-Physical Barriers along the Northern Corridor, Final Report, Appendix 3, prepared for the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority, April 2006, p. 5.
presentation of the documents for customs clearing in Mombasa, even though such delays often arise for legitimate commercial, transport, or documentation reasons. Policy changes required include a reduction in the categories of goods deemed sensitive, allowing for longer transit times, and more generally adoption of a mindset oriented more toward transport and trade facilitation.\(^{33}\)

(3) Border Post Issues (the Move to One-Stop Inspection)

Historically, at border posts along transport corridors in the region several government agencies (e.g., customs, immigration, health/quarantine) have had responsibilities for clearing people, goods, and cargo; these procedures have been labor intensive, duplicated in each country, and not available for more than 12 hours per weekday and sometimes less on weekends. However, efforts to address these issues have been undertaken with the implementation of one-stop border posts, now planned for the following border crossings in East Africa, including: (i) Malaba (Kenya-Uganda) border (where it has already been partially implemented, with ongoing World Bank assistance), (ii) Busia (Kenya-Uganda, scheduled to be implemented with World bank support), (iii) Lunga Lunga–Horo Horo (Kenya–Tanzania, also slated for implementation with World Bank support), (iv) Namanga (Kenya–Tanzania, with JICA and AfDB assistance), (v) Isebania–Sirari, (Kenya-Tanzania, expected with World Bank support), (vi) Taveta (Kenya–Tanzania; development partner uncertain), (vii) Gatuna/Katuna (Uganda–Rwanda; development partner uncertain), (viii) Rusumo Falls (Tanzania–Rwanda, with JICA support envisaged), (ix) Mutukula (Tanzania–Uganda, possibly with JICA support), and (x) Kagitumba–Kirama Falls (Uganda–Rwanda, with likely World Bank assistance).\(^{34}\)

Implementation of one-stop border posts in East Africa is farthest along at Malaba, where it has now been implemented for all railway traffic and partially for road traffic (for 12 commodities comprising an estimated 30% of traffic).\(^{35}\) Implementation is being facilitated by the JICA-assisted Project on Capacity Development for the Customs Administrations of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, summarized in Box 4.2.

The legal basis of implementation at Malaba is the Bilateral Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Government of the Republic of Kenya on Joint Border Controls, Procedures, Facilities and Management at Malaba Border Post (April 2006, Arusha). It is considered that this bilateral agreement does not adequately deal with issues of extraterritoriality and control (administration and enforcement). For example, a question may arise as to criminal investigations when there are concurrent violations of entry and exit laws,

---


\(^{34}\) See, e.g., *OSBP Newsletter*, June 2008. World Bank support under the East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project may be insufficient to support all one-stop border posts envisaged due to unanticipated inflation in construction costs. Other one-stop border posts in East Africa may include: (i) Mpondwe (Uganda/Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC); (ii) Ishasha (Uganda/DRC); (iii) Gisenyi (Rwanda/DRC border); (iv) Cyangugu (Rwanda/DRC); and (v) Akanyaru (Rwanda-Burundi). In addition, there are 17 OSBP projects in West Africa, and 11 in Southern Africa, under the auspices of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Economic Community of West African States, and the West African Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine), among others.

\(^{35}\) However, a July 2008 inspection tour found that: (i) the road manifest released from the port arrives after the trucks arrive at the border control points, causing delays; (ii) a surcharge after six hours and uneven terrain on the Uganda side causes truck drivers to prefer parking on the Kenyan side, resulting in congestion; (iii) exports through Uganda into and through Kenya are not jointly verified; and (iv) duty payments on the Uganda are done only after verification resulting in delays. East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP), *Report on Inspection Tour of Northern Corridor from Mombasa–Malaba–Kigali by the Seamless Transport Committee*, 4th–12th July 2008, 14 July 2008, p. 4.
such as disputes over large tax evasions, smuggling, and the rights of accused criminals. In such cases, there may be questions as to who can apprehend and detain the accused persons, and who can seize and confiscate the goods. Solutions to these and other issues can be found in a draft Regional Framework Convention prepared for the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS) in the context of the Abidjan–Lagos Corridor, which traverses Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Issues to be addressed in this regional convention include: (i) institutional arrangements, (ii) configuration of the site, (iii) status of the land of the control area, (iv) status of the infrastructure and equipment, (v) modality of the inspection process, (vi) status of expatriate staff, (vii) extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (viii) miscellaneous facilitation measures.

Box 4.2 Three Pillars of the JICA-assisted Project on Capacity Development for the Customs Administrations of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda

The project is developing three “pillars”:

- **Pillar 1**: Concurrent Process (establishment of a real time monitoring system, concurrent document processing, a single counter system, document acceptance examination, and joint coordinated physical examination);
- **Pillar 2**: Immediate Release upon Arrival (establishment of an electronic cargo control system, document examination with PDF copies prior to arrival in parallel with enhancement of risk management and promotion and mutual recognition of scheme for authorized economic operators);
- **Pillar 3**: Management by Tact Time (replacement of the traditional work practices largely depending on “rules of thumb” with precise operational management practices by introducing a concept of new industrial engineering, establishment of a lean process by processing in small batches under rigid time management and eliminating processes and daily backlogs, elimination of wasted work by introducing document acceptance examination, and improvement of process traceability).

It has developed the prototypes of two custom-made ICT systems (a real time monitoring system and a cargo control system). The model systems will shorten the clearance time from 2–3 days to 2 hours.

Note: “Tact time” in this context refers to a fixed short-time period between the allocations of declarations to the individual customs officers.

Source: JICA Team for the Project on Capacity Development for the Customs Administrations of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (also see Japan International Cooperation Agency, Model Operational System for “One Stop Border Post” (OSBP), 14 May 2008)

36 See, e.g., Wambui Namu, Commissioner, Customs Service Department, Kenya Revenue Authority, OSP [One-Stop Border Post] Operational Model [Background and Outlines], 14 May 2008.
37 PADECO Co., Ltd., West Africa Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program – Joint Border Posts (PHRD P0 79749), Final Report, prepared for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), and the World Bank, Part B.
38 Regarding conflicting competence/authority in the arrest of offenders and detention of goods and vehicles, Article 32 of the draft regional framework conventions provides that: (i) the contracting party whose officers have first established the offence shall have priority to arrest the offenders and to detain the vehicles and the goods; (ii) in case of arrest and/or detention by the host contracting party, but when the guest contracting party has jurisdiction for the prosecution of the offence, the host contracting party shall extradite the offenders and transfer the vehicles and goods to the authorities of the guest contracting party; and (iii) the host contracting party is however entitled to refuse the extradition of its national subjects, provided it prosecutes them itself for the offences committed. PADECO Co., Ltd., West Africa Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program – Joint Border Posts (PHRD P0 79749), Final Report, prepared for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), and the World Bank, p. B-80.
(4) Other Border Post Issues

A number of other border post issues have been identified in the region, e.g., high levels of traffic congestion at the border checkpoints, a lack of modern verification sheds, insufficient use of information and communication technology (ICT) for freight tracking and clearance, a lack of an appropriate institutional framework for parking management, poor environmental management, lengthy documentation and cumbersome procedures for cargo clearance, a poorly coordinated framework between/among institutions involved in cargo clearance, poor social infrastructure, insecurity, and uncoordinated border activities. Most or all of these issues should be addressed when developing one-stop border posts.

(5) Corruption

A USAID-sponsored study found that 29% of shipments in the region are subject to corruption, with the incidence of bribery as high as 59% in Tanzania, compared to 15% in Kenya and 18% in Uganda; the amounts of bribes paid were found to be highest in Uganda at US$277, compared to US$123 in Kenya and US$265 in Tanzania. Customs and the police were found to be the most corrupt, with immigration, quality control, and food and health agencies less corrupt. The study found a strong link between delays and corruption since delays provide an environment that facilitates corruption; 57% of respondents reported avoiding delay as the reason for paying bribes. Measures to reduce corruption may include: (i) reducing the level of bureaucracy by streamlining and simplifying clearance procedures and making them transparent; (ii) establishing a code of conduct for both customs officers and clearing and forwarding agents (CFAs), which should include standards for customs clearance in terms of duration as well as a provision of appeals of customs decisions; (iii) capacity enhancement, including information technology (IT) solutions, which will reduce documentation requirements and increase transparency, and workshops for CFAs, so that they can more effectively handle clearance documentation procedures; and (iv) implementation of anti-corruption campaigns, similar to the Kenya Ports Authority’s integrity initiative.

(6) Need to Sensitize Frontline (Border) Officials

It has been observed that there is a “disconnect between the most senior officials, who tend to be helpful and understand the problems faced by the private sector, and frontline officials who are often officious, indecisive, susceptible to petty corruption, and suspicious of business”. While survey data has shown that this disconnect is generally greater in West Africa than in East Africa, it remains a problem that should be addressed in training of frontline officials.

4.2.3 Regional Gateway Ports

(1) Moving toward “Landlord” Ports

East Africa’s main gateway ports (Mombasa and Dar es Salaam) have been seeking to convert from a service port model to a landlord port model, by which the port authority retains the port infrastructure and regulatory functions, but the port services are provided by private operators;

40 The Steadman Group, Report on the Assessment Study on Corruption at the Northern Road Corridor Transit Points (Baseline Study July 2007), for USAID Anti-Corruption Program, 2007, pp. 41–42, 44–45, and 62–64 [in spite of the study title, study coverage included Tanzania and points in locations other than the Northern Corridor].
41 See, e.g., Creek Buyonge and Irina Kireeva, “Trade Facilitation in Africa: Challenges and Possible Solutions”, in World Customs Journal, Volume 2, Number 1, 2008, p. 44.
indeed, such is explicit government policy. Rotterdam, Antwerp, New York, and Singapore are examples of landlord ports globally, and Abidjan, Tema, Takoradi, Luanda, and Douala are examples of landlord ports in Africa. The strengths of landlord ports are that: (i) private terminal handling companies generally are better able to cope with market requirements, and (ii) the terminal operators are more likely to make needed investments as a consequence of their long-term contracts; the weaknesses are: (i) the risk of overcapacity as a result of pressure from various private operators, and (ii) the risk of misjudging the timing of capacity additions.

In the case of Mombasa, a JBIC SAPROF team urged that it introduce intra-port competition by inviting two or more private container terminal operators, and in October 2008 the port was advertising for container freight station (CFS) operators. Kenya Ports Authority cites the port of Nhava Sheva (Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Mumbai) as a model; it has a size similar to that of Mombasa, but has 16 container freight stations and a cargo dwell time of only 48 hours.

In the case of Dar es Salaam, while the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) is mandated by law to act as a landlord and award concessions, it is still buying equipment (e.g., cranes); a better approach would be for TPA to move more in the direction of public-private partnership, and for external development partners to assist any residual cost that cannot be financed by the private sector.

(2) Port Facilitation Measures

Port performance is a key factor for trade competitiveness, yet time release studies have indicated substantial delays at both Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. For example, clearance times at Mombasa port have been of the order of 10–11 days. A time release study for Dar es Salaam port found that the mean time release from arrival to movement of goods from customs control areas was 12.7 days, 12.2 days from lodgment to release, and 4.1 days from release to removal, although there has been reportedly some improvement since then. For comparison

42 See, e.g., Performance Contract between the Government of Kenya and the Kenya Ports Authority for the Year 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Section 10.1.7 [case of Mombasa].
43 Samuel O. Helu, Principal Planning Officer, Kenya Ports Authority, Trade Negotiations and Pro-Poor Services Reforms in Africa: Status of Transport Services Reforms – Bridging the Gap for Enhanced Trade and Pro-Poor Growth, Kampala, 4–8 February 2008.
44 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit, Module 3, Alternative Port Management Structures and Ownership Modules, 2007, p. 84.
46 Substantial indirect costs result from these delays. There are costs due to the goods not being available for use, estimated at 0.8% of the value of the goods per day based on a study of exporters’ willingness to pay for reducing the time of manufactured goods. See http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Uganda_DTIS_vol1.pdf [Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study], p. 86. Inventory holding costs have been found to be equal to 0.6% of the value of the goods for each 10 days of delay (based on an assumed 20% annual interest rate; this may be lower now). Also, World Bank research has found that on average each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1%. Simeon Djankov, Caroline Freund, and Cong S. Pham, Trading on Time, 26 January 2006, downloaded from http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/trading_on_time_full_report.pdf.
47 Tanzania Revenue Authority, Time Release Study, April–August 2005, September 2005, p. 29. Indications are that some degree of improvement has been achieved since 2005. Royal Haskoning, Congestion Assessment Study DSM
purposes, a time release study at Port Klang, Malaysia undertaken in the mid-1990s found an average release time of only 34.5 hours, while in Sweden in 2001 the average release time at seaports was 1.4 hours.\footnote{World Bank, \textit{Kenya: Unleashing the Potential for Trade and Growth}, February 2007, p. 35.}

The time release study for Dar es Salaam port found causes of delay in the processes of the (i) Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) (e.g., late submission and registration of data into the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), repetitive document checking, mistrust of importers, the lack of interface with cargo handlers, delay in the release of exempted goods, uncoordinated examination of goods, poor declarations resulting from misclassifications and under- or over-declarations); (ii) Tanzania Inspection Service Co. (TISCAN) (e.g., the practice of requesting detailed information from the country of supply, lack of effective communication between TISCAN and importers/agents); (iii) importers/agents (e.g., poor declarations resulting from misclassifications and under- and over-declarations, poor declarations due to a desire to evade duties, underinvoicing and misclassification); and (iv) shipping agents (e.g., late or partial submission of manifests, delay in managing rejections and queries on manifests).\footnote{Tanzania Revenue Authority, \textit{Time Release Study, April–August 2005}, September 2005, Chapter 6. The World Bank found a low level of cooperation among the players involved in the execution of port procedures. World Bank, \textit{Project Appraisal Report on Proposed Credits to the Republic of Kenya, to the Republic of Tanzania and to the Republic of Uganda for the East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project}, 27 December 2005, p. 47.}

Measures to address such delays may include: (i) introduction of an electronic declaration system to the introduction of a single window through which traders can lodge information fulfilling all import- and export-related regulatory requirements (Kenya is in the process of implementing such a system, through its “community based system”, with full implementation expected in 2009); (ii) various improvements to avoid duplication and eliminate unnecessary procedures (e.g., introduction of random quality control provision on receipt of declarations, improved coordination between customs authorities and other control agencies, introduction of enhanced risk management techniques); and (iii) increased cooperation between customs authorities and the private sector to improve procedures and introduce an authorized trader scheme that would permit frequent traders to use simplified procedures.\footnote{See, e.g., World Bank, \textit{Kenya: Unleashing the Potential for Trade and Growth}, February 2007, p. 35. Perhaps too pessimistically, the 2008 Dar es Salaam port master planning study found that many of the structural changes (particularly with respect to TRA) have been made, and that remaining measures such as training and improved communications would be difficult and slow to have impacts. Royal Haskoning, \textit{Congestion Assessment Study DSM Port, Final Report}, prepared for Tanzania Ports Authority, 30 September 2008, pp. 3–4.}
4.2.4 Regional Road Corridors (Roads and Road Transport)

(1) Excessive Number of Checkpoints and Weighbridges

There are a large number of checkpoints and weighbridges along the main transport corridors in East Africa,\(^{52}\) including several at which transit vehicles must be weighed, and at which there are problems with queuing,\(^{53}\) inconsistency in weights recorded at different checkpoints, and inconsistency in the way in which penalties are administered. The system leads to corruption, with payments to police and magistrates, so that vehicles can proceed. The police may hold vehicles until overload fees are paid and excess weight unloaded, the latter of which requires customs supervision for goods in transit. The incentive for a driver to negotiate an “informal” settlement is high. Policy measures to address this issue include: (i) weighing vehicles only at the point of loading, (ii) use of weigh-in-motion rather than static weighbridges; (iii) regular calibration of weighbridges by joint (multinational) teams to assure the accuracy and reliability of weighing equipment and create confidence in weights registered by respective countries along the corridor; (iv) providing vehicles carrying containers with a certificate of compliance at the originating weigh station, after which they should not be subject to further weight controls until exiting the country; (v) operating axle load controls on private contract management, as has been done in Tanzania, with specification of fair and enforceable contract condition; and (vi) levying user fees rather than fines for a criminal offense, thereby reducing delays by avoiding court proceedings, as also has been instituted in Tanzania.\(^{54}\)

(2) Third-Party Motor Insurance

In all East African countries, the COMESA Yellow Card, based on the COMESA Protocol on Third Party Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme, allows for pre-purchase of motor insurance in local currency at the origin with the insurance honored by all participating countries.\(^{55}\) The insurance, which covers third-party property liabilities and medical expenses of the driver and passengers, facilitates cross-border transport since transporters and motorists do not need to buy separate insurance coverage for each country they traverse. However, there have been a number

\(^{52}\) E.g., along the Northern Corridor there were found to be seven weighbridges in Kenya, at Mariakani, Athi River, Norok, Gilgil, Eldoret, Webuye, and Amogoro, and three in Uganda, at Malaba, Iganga, and Mbarara. Prom Conultants Ltd. in association with Dr. C. K. Kaira Associates Ltd., \textit{Project Document for Support Services for Elimination of Non-Physical Barriers along the Northern Corridor, Final Report, Appendix 3}, prepared for the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority, April 2006, p. 5. Also, along the Northern Corridor there were reported 38 police checkpoints in Kenya (13 between Mombasa and Nairobi, 10 between Nairobi and Nakuru, and 15 between Nakura and Malaba) and 18 in Uganda (6 between Malaba and Kampala and 12 between Kampala and Katuna). East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP), \textit{Report on Inspection Tour of Northern Corridor from Mombasa–Malaba–Kigali by the Seamless Transport Committee, 4th–12th July 2008}, 14 July 2008, p. 5. There are six current and five proposed weighbridges along the Central Corridor into Rwanda (via Rusumo) and Burundi (via Nyakahura), and five existing and six proposed weighbridges into Uganda (via Mutukula), as shown in the TANROADS Weighbridges Master Plan. It has been observed that the time spent at weighbridges is less along the Central Corridor than along the Northern Corridor. Kenya Ports Authority and the Kenya High Commission, Tanzania, \textit{A Study of the Central Corridor (Dar-Rusumo/Mutukula) as an Alternative Route to the Northern Corridor (Mombasa–Malaba/Busia)}, February 2008, p. 26. For comparison purposes, the problem is much worse in Nigeria, with 35 checkpoints along the 105 km road segment between Seme (on the border with Bénin) and Lagos. Arc Ingénierie, \textit{Setting Up Observatories to Follow-Up the Migratory Movements in the Abidjan–Lagos Corridor}, Report Term 3, Volume 1, January–March 2006, section 5.1.

\(^{53}\) Although the actual process of weighing a truck takes only about three minutes, the logistics of trucks entering and exiting some of the weighbridge stations leads to congestion. At some weighbridge stations, parking facilities are inadequate for waiting and impounded vehicles. East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP), \textit{Report on Inspection Tour of Northern Corridor from Mombasa–Malaba–Kigali by the Seamless Transport Committee, 4th–12th July 2008}, 14 July 2008, p. 4.

\(^{54}\) The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), \textit{Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report}, April 2005, Chapter 4.

\(^{55}\) A comparable Brown Card scheme is implemented in West Africa under the auspices of ECOWAS.
of problems with implementation of the scheme: (i) the insurance coverage varies between/among countries (e.g., Kenya’s coverage is broader than Uganda’s); (ii) there have been problems with counterfeit cards, especially cards forged in Uganda; (iii) some companies authorized to issue Yellow Cards have been de-registered; (iv) at some borders there are no insurance companies to issue the cards; and (v) the cost of the Yellow Card varies by country, although to some extent this reflects the different coverage. Recommended policy measures include: (i) computerization of Yellow Card operations, with the national bureaus to link their databases to monitor the use of the card along transport corridors; and (ii) harmonization of Yellow Card coverage between/among counties so that insurance coverage is uniform.56

(3) Harmonization of Road Traffic Rules/Regulations

None of the East African countries has acceded to the latest Convention on Road Traffic (Vienna, 1968), so the countries may need to work toward harmonizing their “rules of the road”. The left-hand, right-hand drive issue may arise because Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda drive on the left side (i.e., right-hand drive, meaning that the steering wheel is on the right side), while Rwanda and Burundi drive on the right side (i.e., left-hand drive). The solution in other regions, such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) of Southeast Asia, has been mutual recognition, since it is often not practical for a country or countries to switch their system, and indeed there is little or no evidence of adverse safety impacts from this approach.

(4) Harmonization of Axle Load Controls

Technical meetings involving weighbridge management officials of the EAC countries have been held, considering issues such as: (i) axle load limits, (ii) axle configuration, (iii) abnormal loads, (iv) vehicle dimensions, (v) equipment standardization, (vi) weighbridge operations and procedures, (vii) policy on the treatment of excess import cargo, (viii) reports and communications systems, (ix) treatment of offenders, and (x) penalties against overloading. Broad agreement has been reached, except for (i) disparities in maximum gross vehicle weight allowable in the SADC and EAC/COMESA groupings, due to the COMESA tandem axle limit of 16 tons versus 18 tons in SADEC; (ii) disparities in tolerance levels for axle loads allowable in Uganda and Tanzania (5% for axle loads and 0% for gross vehicle weight); and (iii) while Kenya outlawed lift axles effective 1 December 2007, Uganda and Tanzania regulations as well as those of SADC do not address the issue. These latter issues will require implementation of uniform legislation provisions, operational procedures, and rules by the EAC partner countries.60

(5) Road Transport and Health

There are a number of health impacts of cross-border road transport, including: (i) road traffic accidents, which result in medical costs as well as pain and suffering; (ii) the transmission of

56 See, e.g., http://about.comesa.int/attachments/059_yellow-card-compendium.pdf; and The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005, Chapter 5.

57 Uganda (and Rwanda) acceded to the earlier (1949) Geneva Convention on Road Traffic.

58 Although such a switch has occurred in various places at various times, e.g., in China in 1946, Sweden in 1967, and Myanmar (Burma) in 1970 (as well as the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa in 1978).

59 A proposal to adopt a uniform tolerance of 5% in both cases was agreed in consideration of the potential for an undesirable rise in gross vehicle weight.

60 [Kenya] Ministry of Roads, East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, Status Update on Components, undated, p. 5. A July 2008 USAID/COMESA/SSATP regional workshop to review harmonization of key elements and implementation of best practice in overload control proposed (i) a resolution on standardized axle/axle unit load limits, (ii) a cross-border overload system linked to customs at all border posts, and (iii) harmonized weighbridge certificates.
disease (e.g., HIV/AIDS by road transport workers, a problem that is exacerbated by long delays at borders); and (iii) the health effects of air and noise pollution. Countermeasures may include: (i) research to better understand the linkages between road transport and health to develop a framework for interventions; (ii) development of a multisectoral framework to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, focusing on long-distance truck drivers; and (iii) a move towards the use of more environmentally friendly fuels. With respect to (ii), the USAID-sponsored Safe-T-Stop program at Malaba is worth mentioning.

### 4.2.5 Regional Railway Corridors

#### (1) Railway Services

While the railway subsector has been losing market share to road, rail should be competitive for trips of more than 1,000 km, especially with enforcement of axle load limits on trucks. While implementation of concessions (see below) may eventually address some issues (e.g., the Rift Valley Railway concession involving Kenya and Uganda, which has to some extent reintegrated the two national rail systems), rail services in the region remain substandard in terms of reliability and wagon turnaround performance. Soft-side issues/problems include: (i) the need to increase financial efficiency in the railway subsector, (ii) the need to further introduce market forces in the railway subsector, (iii) the need to integrate the technical standards of national railway systems, (iv) introduction of an EAC railway licensing system, and (v) adoption of comprehensive railway guidelines, e.g., covering safety, certification of train crews, passenger rights, compliance in the case of noncompliance with contractual requirements for rail freight services.

#### (2) Concession Issues

An assessment of the concession to Tanzania Railways Limited by the JICA Project Team indicates that: (i) track conditions and wagon availability are the major constraints at present although a broad range of operational difficulties are contributing further to lack of profitability; (ii) operational costs are significantly above target due to the operational constraints noted above; (iii) efforts to resolve the constraints are in hand but seem to be slow in implementation as witnessed by disbursement levels on existing loan facilities; (iv) technical assistance does not seem to be a high priority except perhaps in the area of marketing as the concessionaires apparently already have the staff with the required expertise; and (v) while the concession has only been effective for just over one year to date, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions but clearly much remains to be done.

Rift Valley Railways (RVR) in Kenya and Uganda suffer from similar difficulties. An assessment by the JICA Project Team found that: (i) the operations of RVR are poor (a consultant found that the existing meter gauge track can serve Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but they need to modernize locomotives and wagons, and undertake track rehabilitation; the concessionaire is required to start track rehabilitation and procure new locomotives and wagons but these requirements have not been met to date); (ii) existing management is poor in relation to both the concessionaire and authority entities; (iii) the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group and the Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW, the German Development Bank) had not yet disbursed funds to RVR due

---


to covenants and due diligence shortfalls (conditions precedent); (iv) there has been some restructuring of shareholding (although the current structuring is not available in detail); (v) current freight traffic is 1.7 million tons per year as compared with theoretical network capacity of some 7 million tons; (vi) cross-border processes are a continuing constraint (with taxes generated on cross-border transactions that are purely internal to the concession, adversely affecting profitability); and (vi) the concession agreement envisaged capitalization of US$30 million but now the concessionaire estimates that actual need is about US$190 million over the first five years.

The government agencies overseeing the concessions – Kenya Railways in Kenya and Reli Assets Holding Company (RAHCO) in Tanzania – have indicated a need for training in operations (so the supervisor is not disadvantaged), infrastructure management, equipment utilization and management, financial, and legal aspects. Also KRC indicated that it could benefit from development support from JICA for new railway networks and modernization of the existing network; feasibility studies are required at this stage.

The experience with railway concessions in Tanzania and Kenya/Uganda is not different from the experience generally in sub-Saharan Africa, where the World Bank has identified four core problem areas: (i) limited capacity and/or willingness of private operators to finance track renewal; (ii) low financial returns have been low; (iii) a need for effective and efficient regulation of private rail operators; and (iv) the need for government behavior vis-à-vis railway concessionaires to be more consistent, and in line with good business practices to promote efficiency and economies of scale.63

Details of assessment of railway concessions in Tanzania and Kenya/Uganda undertaken by the JICA Project Team are further set out in Appendix.

4.2.6 Air Transport

(1) Liberalization of Air Transport Services

The EAC has been in the process of liberalization of air transport in line with the Yamoussoukro Decision (YD) on Air Transport, which came into force on 12 August 2000 and which is expected to lead to significant gains for passengers as well as to boost economic activity through increased trade, higher levels of foreign direct investment, increased tourism, and job creation. The EAC countries are also members of COMESA, which has taken steps towards implementation of the YD. Tanzania is also a member of SADC, which historically has pursued a slower approach to YD implementation than COMESA, which has slowed down both regional groupings because of the need for “harmonization”. EAC rules have been more binding than those of COMESA and SADC and or effective in promoting integration of the air transport market. While implementation of the YD has faced some problems (e.g., the reluctance of some countries to grant unrestricted fifth freedom rights), it is generally accepted. More recently, the EAC–COMESA–SADC Tripartite Summit launched a Joint Competition Authority (JCA), which is to oversee the full implementation of the YD in the three regional economic communities commencing in January 2009; the JCA includes seven members, two each from the EAC, COMESA, and SADC, and a chairperson on a rotating basis. Going forward, there is a need to (i) complete the YD legal and institutional framework, including adoption of common competitive regulations, adoption of guidelines/procedures/implementing provisions for the competitive regulations, and establishment of the executing agency: (ii) agree on a permanent framework for external relations, and (iii) agree on a YD implementation timetable and on an

awareness campaign in the regional economic communities and member states for political commitment for full implementation of the YD.\textsuperscript{64}

(2) **Air Transport Regulatory Reform**

The East African countries have been setting up a two-tier regulatory system, consisting of (i) an independent civil aviation authority in charge of regulating air transport (e.g., the issuance of licenses, enforcement of technical regulations, monitoring of competition practices), and (ii) a government structure that formulates policies through laws/regulations and the negotiation of international agreements (including bilateral air services agreements). The structure is aimed at complying with the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to make civil aviation authorities independent from political interference and separate operators from regulatory bodies. One challenge is likely to be the separation of air traffic control from civil aviation authorities as the consequent loss of revenue may weaken their capacity to regulate effectively. Another issue is that the separation of regulation and policymaking may lead to organizations in charge of policymaking having limited experience with the practical realities of air transport.\textsuperscript{65}

4.2.7 **Indicative Cross-Cutting Issues**

Indicative cross-cutting issues include: (i) the need for revision of national laws and regulations in accordance with regional agreements; (ii) the need for performance measures to monitor transport facilitation and other soft measures to improve transport efficiency; and (iii) the need for training. Each is discussed below.

(1) **Need for Revision of National Laws and Regulations in Accordance with Regional Agreements**

As noted, the countries have in some cases reached regional agreements without fully appreciating their implied implementation obligations in conforming their national laws and regulations to the regional provisions. Accordingly, national governments should review and amend their laws and regulations to meet the requirements of regional agreements (e.g., the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement, Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement, Tripartite Agreement on Road Transport between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of Uganda and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania).\textsuperscript{66}

(2) **Need for Performance Measures to Monitor Transport Facilitation and Other Soft Measures to Improve Transport Efficiency**

Performance measures can support, guide, and justify decisions in corridors. Generally, progress is best measured by time and cost savings rather than by intermediate criteria. Indicators should be measurable, efficient, “forecastable”, and comprehensible. Examples of performance indicators for corridors include: (i) traffic volumes, (ii) transport cost, (iii) turnaround time of


\textsuperscript{65} E.g., the negotiation of bilateral air services agreements is a complex exercise, as the rights exchanged may not have the same economic value to the respective parties. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAIRTRANSPORT/Resources/514573-1117230543314/050617-East_Africa_Air_Transport_Survey_Revision_2.pdf [East Africa Air Transport Survey, 2005], p. 35.

trucks and rail wagons, (iv) port dwell time, (v) border crossing times, and (vi) variation in the above times.67

(3) Need for Training

As elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, enhancement of the technical and managerial capacity in transport sector in East Africa is required. Specifically, with respect to the facilitation of cross-border transport, private sector associations (e.g., freight forwarders’ associations) require strengthening to increase their capacity to (i) communicate their members’ concerns to government agencies, (ii) hold agencies accountable for remedial actions, and (iii) pressure political leaders to take actions necessary to carry out required reforms. In particular, the private sector should better articulate the costs of logistics inefficiencies on their business and investment prospects (e.g., the impact of higher transport costs on raw material and consumer prices, the impact of logistic bottlenecks on export competitiveness).68 Also, as noted above, the government agencies overseeing the railway concessions have indicated a need for training in operations (so the supervisor is not disadvantaged), infrastructure management, equipment utilization and management, financial, and legal aspects.

68 The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005, Chapter 15.
Chapter 5 Cross-Border Transport and Economic Development in East Africa

5.1 Change in Relative Prices between Natural Resource and Industrial Products: Implications for Cross-Border Transport

The worldwide economic structure is changing. Inflation of resources and deflation of industrial products is taking place, with prices of primary products increasing compared with those of industrial products. While prices of various primary products including agricultural commodities, crude oil, nonferrous metals, and steel materials have been increasing rapidly in recent years (as an example, the surging prices of mineral resources are shown in Figure 5.1.1), the prices of industrial products have been relatively decreasing. Specialists have started to recognize a historical transition to a new pricing structure,¹ which is a trend contrary to the “North-South problem” in the 19th and 20th centuries, when income was transferred from the South to the North driven by the increasing rising prices of industrial products and the decreasing prices of primary products. A new North-South structure is emerging.²

![Figure 5.1.1 Rapid Increases in Natural Resource Prices](source: Japan Research Institute, “Research Eye”, June 2008)

![Figure 5.1.2 Financial Crisis Impacts on the Prices of Primary Products (Changes in London Metal Exchange Prices after Crisis)](source: Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting “Non-Ferrous Metal Report”, No. 41, November 2008)

For primary products including natural resources and agricultural products, income elasticity was formerly low and their relative prices vis-à-vis industrial products remained low over a long period of time with only a few exceptions such as during the “oil shock” of the 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America aimed for economic growth using its own natural resources as a driving force, but its economy stalled due to low relative prices of primary products (especially of mineral resources). On the other hand, Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES) in Asia achieved high economic growth through exporting manufactured goods in a manner that, in hindsight, took advantage of the low prices of primary products.

¹ Comment made by Mr. Kadoma, Director General of the Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, under the theme of “Messages of surging resource prices” in a NHK program titled “Shiten Ronten” (broadcast on September 5, 2008). In 2004, Mr. Kojima, Chairman of Japan Center for Economic Research at that time, also said that “for decades in the late 20th century, prices of industrial products kept rising and those of primary products kept dropping relatively. But I assume such relationship was reversed when the world rapidly became industrialized (with the trend of globalization) starting in the late ‘90s after the end of the Cold War.” (Source: http://www.nikkei.com.sg/file/seminar/2004-11/mr-kojima-melbourne.pdf).

However, as shown in Figure 5.1.3 Trade Balance of Selected Countries in 2006 (for Primary Products, Share of GDP) Figure 5.1.3, income losses are increasing in countries consuming primary products (mainly developed countries and some developing countries such as China, the Philippines, and Pakistan), remotely due to the reverse of relative prices. The income loss of the developed countries in 2008 was estimated (before the financial crisis) at 1–3% of GDP, which presents a very serious problem for Japan, which can only achieve a potential economic growth of about 2%³. Major causes of this “reverse of relative prices” seem to include growing demand worldwide (especially in the BRICs, i.e., the fast-growing developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and other emerging countries), restriction of supply for such growing demand, and decreasing natural resources. A paradigm shift or crustal change of the economic structure is taking place as the relative prices of primary products and industrial products are adjusting. (For details, see Figure 5.1.4.)

On the other hand, due to such factors as the withdrawal of investment monies and declining demand following the financial crisis in late 2008, resource prices are currently in an adjustment phase, as shown in Figure 5.1.2. It is difficult to forecast future price trends, but many specialists expect that the prices will increase again, as described in Chapter 1, considering decreasing natural resources and the brisk demand for resources in emerging countries.

³ Source: Japan Research Institute, “Research Eye”, June 2008
Relative Prices of Primary Commodities with Industrial Products

Note 1): The relative price was calculated by dividing Primary Commodities Index by IMF-IFS (at 2000 prices) per Export Unit Value Index for Advanced Economies (at 2000 prices).

Note 2): “Export Unit Value Index for Advanced Economies” was applied as an index representing the price level of industrial products. (Note that this index does not strictly represent the price level since it includes prices of agricultural export products of the U.S.A., France, and other countries.)

Note 3): The figure shows four types of primary commodities prices: (i) All Primary Commodities, (ii) Non-Fuel Commodities, (iii) Agricultural Raw Materials, and (iv) Metals.

Note 4): The figure does not incorporate the impacts of global financial crises because of the lack of data.

Source: Study Team (Prepared from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS))

Figure 5.1.4 Relative Prices of Primary Commodities with Industrial Products

Since Japan is a trading nation, this worsened trading condition, i.e., adverse changes in the relative prices of industrial products, will cause persistent deterioration of the country’s trade balance and may weaken the economy over the long term. Although there are other options including “urban mine” development, 4 methane hydrate development, 5 and Arctic Ocean development, 6 securing mineral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa is vital for the Japanese economy over the medium and long term.

---

4 Sony has started experimental recycling rare metals taken from discarded personal computers (PCs) and home electric appliances in Kitakyushu City. Other parties including the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy and university researchers are also carrying out large-scale activities concerning “urban mines.”

5 This is a “dream” technology for natural gas extraction. Bodies of waters around Japan have the world’s largest methane hydrate deposits. However, such gas extraction is technologically very challenging and further research and development (R&D) investment is required for toward practical utilization.

6 Some specialists say that new mine lots will be developed rapidly as the Arctic Ocean ice is diminishing due to global warming and other factors.
5.2 Trade/Investment Promotion, Industrial/Regional Development, and CBTI Development

5.2.1 Trade

(1) Current Industrial Structure and Intra-Regional Trade

In Sub-Saharan Africa the share of agricultural production in GDP has been 20–25% on average over the last 40 years, although the ratio of agricultural population to the total employed population is extremely high, as described in Chapter 1. This means that agricultural productivity is remarkably low in the continent. In addition, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are totally dependent on the export of colonial primary products for their foreign currency earnings. At the same time the share of exports in agricultural production is relatively low (e.g., 12.8% as a whole in 2000), and most of the agricultural products are for domestic consumption.

Regarding the manufacturing industry, there are many countries where the proportion of employment in manufacturing sectors is lower than 10 percent of total employment. Industry accounts for less than 1% of world production. As a whole, the manufacturing industry in Sub-Saharan Africa is, apart from exceptional cases, merely contributing to domestic economic activities, which has resulted in their being marginalized in international markets.

Thus, it can be concluded that the international competitiveness of both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors is weak in general, and the shares of exports in these sectors remain at a low level compared to those of developed countries and other regions, as shown in Figures 5.2.1–5.2.2. However, there have been many comments over the presence of informal sectors that are not shown in the statistics.

On the other hand, an assessment of intraregional trade within Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the trade volume within regional economic communities (RECs) has been increasing as shown in Figure 5.2.3, stemming from the (i) relative economic positions of each country’s agriculture

---

7 If the economic presence of South Africa and Nigeria is excluded, this figure will slightly increase.
8 Ethiopia and Burundi are highly dependent on coffee export revenues (65 percent in Ethiopia and 90 percent in Burundi). These revenues are significantly influenced by international market conditions.
and manufacturing sector, (ii) thee exchange of complementary products, and (iii) an increase in the trade of consumer products due to recent rapid economic growth. Particularly in the large-scale RECs such as SADC, COMESA, and ECOWAS, interregional trade among member states has been consistently growing since 2002. (Refer to Chapter 1 for the basic information for each REC.) Such a trend reflect diversification of trading partners within the regions, and it is highly possible that there are some transitions from traditional “vertical” trade relations to intraregional interdependence and/or a “South-South” trading structure.

Regarding the trade patterns within EAC member countries, trade volume between Kenya and Uganda and between Kenya and Tanzania has been relatively high, as shown in Figure 5.2.4. Kenya provides consumer products to Uganda and Tanzania while Uganda and Tanzania are exporting primary products.9

Figure 5.2.3 Intraregional Trade within RECs in Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 5.2.4 Trade Pattern among Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (2007)

(2) Kenya

Kenya was originally an agrarian country and about 60 percent10 of its labor force is employed in agriculture. The sector accounted for 25.9% of GDP in 2006, and agricultural products accounted for 60% of total exports. Coffee, tea, and soda ash have traditionally been major exports, but in recent years exports of horticultural crops have grown rapidly with such exports to Europe and the Middle East currently being expanded.

Major export products are tea, horticultural crops, coffee, fishery products, petroleum products, and industrial products. Almost half of the exports directed to Sub-Saharan Africa including EAC member states and other countries are to Uganda and Tanzania, which are geographically close to Kenya and maintain a close trading relationship with Kenya. The majority of export items to the EAC and COMESA are industrial products whereas about 30% of total exports are directed to Europe countries, the majority of which are primary agricultural products such as horticultural products and tea. The biggest import partner is currently United Arab Emirates (UAE), followed by the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, and India. Table 5.2.1 shows the major trading partners of Kenya.

9 However, regarding tea exports, the export value from Tanzania/Uganda to Kenya has incorporated the amount re-exported to developed countries, which is transported through “the Auction Center” in Mombasa, Kenya.

10 However, there are no reliable statistics in Kenya (or other Sub-Saharan African countries) regarding the number of agriculture workers.
The horticultural industry in Kenya has received a fair amount of attention as a successful example of agricultural development in Africa. Exports of fresh vegetables (peas), fruit (pineapples), cut flowers (mainly roses exported to the European Union) are rapidly expanding with a record 388% increase in fruit, 1,064% in vegetable, and 1,221% in cut flower exports from 1992 up to 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>191.6</td>
<td>231.7</td>
<td>275.7</td>
<td>263.5</td>
<td>356.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>402.8</td>
<td>479.1</td>
<td>589.8</td>
<td>400.8</td>
<td>535.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td>151.9</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>131.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>402.3</td>
<td>487.0</td>
<td>645.7</td>
<td>796.2</td>
<td>961.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>1,111.8</td>
<td>1,316.3</td>
<td>1,663.1</td>
<td>1,560.7</td>
<td>1,984.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>1,293.7</td>
<td>1,460.8</td>
<td>1,935.5</td>
<td>2,056.1</td>
<td>2,397.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,405.5</td>
<td>2,777.1</td>
<td>3,598.6</td>
<td>3,616.8</td>
<td>4,381.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>458.5</td>
<td>638.7</td>
<td>802.5</td>
<td>829.3</td>
<td>943.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>490.1</td>
<td>677.9</td>
<td>866.4</td>
<td>916.7</td>
<td>1,149.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>3,211.6</td>
<td>4,035.5</td>
<td>5,256.4</td>
<td>6,597.8</td>
<td>8,505.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,701.7</td>
<td>4,713.4</td>
<td>6,122.8</td>
<td>7,514.5</td>
<td>9,654.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Team (prepared from, e.g., Economic Survey 2008, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics)

Note 1): Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in July 2007.

(3) Tanzania

The economy of Tanzania depends heavily on agriculture, which accounts for more than 40% of its GDP, 85% of its exports, and 80% of its employment, although its topography and climatic conditions limit the cultivated area. Tanzania’s export trade of mining products of gold, copper, and other metals continue to increase in recent years, and the leading export product is gold in 2007. Table 5.2.2 shows data on the major trading partners of Tanzania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>101.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>116.7</td>
<td>171.9</td>
<td>357.0</td>
<td>371.0</td>
<td>321.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>205.3</td>
<td>267.3</td>
<td>453.4</td>
<td>488.7</td>
<td>494.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>923.9</td>
<td>1,067.6</td>
<td>1,222.9</td>
<td>1,234.3</td>
<td>1,528.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,129.2</td>
<td>1,334.9</td>
<td>1,676.3</td>
<td>1,723.0</td>
<td>2,022.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>130.1</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>169.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>346.0</td>
<td>428.0</td>
<td>447.8</td>
<td>688.8</td>
<td>716.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>470.1</td>
<td>565.7</td>
<td>608.2</td>
<td>863.2</td>
<td>823.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>1,698.1</td>
<td>1,715.1</td>
<td>2,316.8</td>
<td>3,383.1</td>
<td>4,037.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,168.2</td>
<td>2,280.8</td>
<td>2,925.0</td>
<td>4,246.3</td>
<td>4,860.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Team (prepared from, e.g., The Economic Survey 2007, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs of Tanzania)

Note 1): Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in July 2007.
Note 2): Provisional data

The cultivated area was 9.2 million ha in 2005 (Source: FAO-STAT, Food and Agricultural Organization), which accounts for 10.4% of Tanzania’s total surface area of 88.6 million ha.
Exports of primary agricultural products and imports of industrial goods have historically been the underlying trade structure of Tanzania; major export products included agricultural products such as coffee, tea, tobacco, sisal, cotton, and cashew nuts until 1990s. However, exports of mining products (e.g. gold and diamonds), copper, manufactured goods and fishery products increased considerably much after 2000. In particular, the share of gold in export value has increased, accounting for 44% of total export value in 2003. Major import items include machinery, automobile products, industrial raw materials, food, and garments. Leading export partners include the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan, while India and Kenya have become significant partners recently. Import trade partners include South Africa, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, India, and Kenya.

(4) Uganda

Agriculture is the most important sector of the Ugandan economy, employing about 82% of its workforce, and generating one-third of its GDP. Although export revenues used to depend heavily on traditional export products such as coffee and tea, the country was successful in diversifying export crops since 2000 despite its being a landlocked country. Production of freshwater fish from Lake Victoria, vanilla, and waragi (distilled liquor) has been active. Also, Uganda is endowed with abundant natural resources, including sizable deposits of copper and cobalt.

The underlying trade structure of Uganda is very similar to that of Tanzania and Kenya, all of which export primary agricultural products and import industrial goods. The item with the largest share of total exports is coffee, although exports of horticultural crops are growing rapidly. Other major export products include cotton, tea, and tobacco. The export items that have been increasingly recently include garments, leather goods, vanilla, and freshwater fishery products, except for horticultural crops. Major import items include capital goods such as machinery, automobiles, petroleum, and cereal grains. Uganda’s biggest export trade partner is currently Kenya, followed by European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Tanzania’s leading import partner is Kenya with 32.6% in total, followed by the United States, South Africa, India, China, and the United Kingdom. Table 5.2.3 shows data on the major trading partners of Uganda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2.3 Major Trading Partners of Uganda</th>
<th>Unit: Million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>193.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>340.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>534.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>357.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EAC</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>133.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Africa</td>
<td>501.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>873.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,375.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study Team (prepared from, e.g., Statistical Abstract 2008, Uganda Bureau of Statistics)

Note 1): Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in July 2007.
Note 2): Rwanda only (there were no reported imports from Burundi)
5.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment

(1) Kenya

From the 1960s to the 1970s, foreign investors considered Kenya the most developed nation in East Africa and it attracted more foreign investments than its neighboring countries. This was mainly because Kenya was perceived as a promising market with a reasonable market size and growth potential considering that physical infrastructure was well provided and the nation itself was relatively developed at that time. However, foreign investment in Kenya drastically decreased after 1980 due to increasing costs in every sector caused by economic policy incoherence, pervasive corruption, and dilapidated infrastructure.

Foreign investment did not start increasing again until 2006. The business environment has been improving with government reform of business registration and licensing regulations, although the political turmoil in late 2007 had a negative impact on foreign direct investment to the country Kenya, and the recent global financial crisis had had an effect.

(2) Tanzania

Annual foreign direct investment in Tanzania from 1999 to 2001 was 2–3 times that in 1998, a consequence of financial assistance planned by the IMF and the World Bank for the period after 2000 as well as the commencement of gold mining projects around that time. In addition, government implementation of economic reform, infrastructure development, and poverty reduction measures also helped attract private investment. Foreign direct investment in Tanzania is still steady although it decreased after 2002 since gold development projects had just completed the first stage. The major sectors for investment after 1999 have been construction, petroleum, mining, and manufacturing; the mining sector has been particularly strong, with both “majors” and “junior” firms active.

Privatization of public enterprises/corporations has been ongoing to promote economic efficiency, reduce financial burden, and increase productivity. State-owned enterprises have recently been acquired through foreign capital investment in the sectors of automobile assembly, steel manufacturing, and hotels.

(3) Uganda

Foreign direct investment in Uganda has been rapidly increasing every year since structural adjustment in 1987 and the introduction of a new investment law in 1991. This law fundamentally changed the government policy for foreign direct investment, e.g., by guaranteeing private companies’ interests and protecting them from asset expropriation as well as providing general measures to attract investments. Also, the Government of Uganda provides support and advisory services to potential investors through the Uganda Investment Authority under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. These efforts along with the recent activity by the EAC has led to considerable attention from European and South African investors in particular. Investment sectors been ranged from small-scale companies in agriculture and/or agro-processing industry to global enterprises with several thousand employees.

5.2.3 Industrial and Regional Development

(1) National Policy on Industrial Development and Trade Promotion

Kenya

Recent policies and strategies in relation to industrial development and trade promotion in
Kenya are summarized below, based on the results of interview in October 2008 with related governmental agencies/institutions:

(i) A national policy “Vision 2030” was established in 2007, aiming at 10% annual economic growth. As of this writing, several export-related sectors have significantly contributed to this rapid economic growth. The Vision also seeks to attract business process outsourcing (BPO) services to Kenya as a location of call/telemarketing centers for private European Union and American companies. It also includes the development of professional services such as accounting, to deliver in the market of EAC countries.

(ii) A National Export Strategy was formulated in 2003 as an export promotion strategy and was under review at the time of the Study Team’s field visit (October 2008). The strategy selected the following strategic export sectors: (a) horticultural industry, (b) coffee and tea, and (c) the apparel industry. The competitiveness of the textile industry has decreased due to increases in the prices of imported raw materials (e.g., cotton for spinning). The horticultural industry is at present thriving but tightening regulation (e.g., employment conditions, product certification) may adversely affect exports. Traditional primary products such as coffee and tea have been replaced by cut flowers in terms of export value.

(iii) The EAC countries are the first priority targets for exports, followed by the COMESA countries. Infrastructure improvement is an issue. For example, the government recognizes that it is necessary to improve road links between Kenya and Southern Sudan to expand exports to this area. There are other issues and challenges, including: (a) lack of capacity in Mombasa Port, (b) the need for railway improvement, (c) skyrocketing electricity tariffs, and (d) customs operation improvements.

(iv) In terms of interregional export promotion, there has been a tendency for Kenyan manufacturing companies to build factories in Uganda and Tanzania, rather than directly to export their industrial products to these countries, due to (a) higher transportation costs and (b) customs duties.

(v) Tariffs still have not been abolished in the EAC. If and when that happens, exports will increase substantially. In contrast, adverse effects stemming from the free movement of goods, services, and workers should be noted.

Tanzania

In a similar way, recent policies and strategies in relation to industrial development and trade promotion in Tanzania are summarized below, based on the results of interviews in October 2008 with related governmental agencies/institutions:

(i) The fundamental policy of industrial development and trade promotion in Tanzania is National Trade Policy; also, the Agriculture Marketing Policy Tanzania, which directs export promotion of the country’s agricultural sector, is a very important policy document.

(ii) As a comprehensive export promotion strategy for the entire industrial sector, an Export Development Strategy was to be completed by the end of 2008. It will serve as a framework for the country’s export promotion policies and strategies, focusing on agriculture (including livestock industry), mining, and the tourism sectors.

(iii) Strategic export products in the agricultural sector include: (a) cashew nuts, (b) cotton, (c) horticultural products, and (d) livestock industry products. For cashew nuts and cotton, there is a big challenge of how to add value to products that are currently exported as raw materials. Coffee and tea—which are traditional export products—will also continue to be emphasized.

(iv) For adding value to export products a key concern will be “processing”, which includes a packaging industry. Also, there are some problems with the quarantine system in exporting edible meat to markets in the Middle East.
(v) There are a lot of restrictions on infrastructure development to support industrial
development and export promotion. Major restrictions for export include: (a) the poor
quality of rural roads, (b) unpaved main roads, (c) the lack of infrastructure supporting
marketing activities (e.g., underdeveloped cold chains for the horticultural industry, a
shortage of silos for grain storage), and (d) inadequate public utility services such as
electricity, water supply, and sewerage.

(vi) The Tanzania Mineral Policy was established in 1997, with the target year set as 2007.
Implementing supplementary laws for the Policy include the Mining Act of 1998. At present,
a inter-ministerial task force has been set up to prepare a new national policy for the sector,
with a draft version completed in December 2008.

(vii) For the preparation of this new policy, a Policy Review Committee, a Physical Review
Committee, and a Final Review Committee were established in 2004, 2005, and 2007,
respectively, in order to review and evaluate the former policy. The mining sector has
greatly contributed to economic growth in Tanzania with the highest growth rate of all
sectors, and it is considered that the government should continue to be involved in the
mining and development of gold, uranium, diamonds, and coal.

(viii) One of the biggest issues and challenges for the mining sector in Tanzania is that there is no
strategic linkage between the development of mineral resources and the construction of
supporting infrastructure such as access railroads and power plants. One of the good
practices for development of such linkages is the project along the Central Corridor by a
“mining major” (NiCo Mining Limited), which received mining rights near Kabanga; NiCo
studied the feasibility study of the construction of railway linking the mining area and Isaka
(where a dry port is located) with the utilization of funds from AfDB and the EU.

(ix) While there has been no progress on infrastructure development along the Mtwara
Development Corridor, it is expected to incorporate coal development along the Corridor
into the provision of related infrastructure. One government officials stated that there
remains plenty of room for involvement for the Government of Japan.

Uganda

Recent policies and strategies in relation to industrial development and trade promotion in
Uganda are summarized below, based on the results of interviews in October 2008 with related
governmental agencies/institutions:

(i) The National Export Strategy (NES) 2008–2012 was set out in October 2007 as an export
promoting strategy for Uganda. The main directions of the Strategy are (a) infrastructure
development contributing to export promotion, (b) development and improvement of related
laws and regulations, (c) quality improvement and standard development, (d) export
competitiveness strengthening, (e) trade finance provision, and (f) market information
management and customs documentation development.

(ii) Priority sectors in the NES are (a) coffee, (b) tea, (c) horticultural products (cut flowers), (d)
freshwater fishery, (e) cotton, and (f) service sectors.

(iii) The following governmental agencies were involved in developing the NES: (a) the Private
Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU), (b) the National Planning Authority, (c) the Uganda
Export Promotion Board (UEPB), (d) the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and (e) the Commonwealth Secretariat.

(iv) The NES Implementation Plan (three-year plan) has already been developed.

The overview of the strategies of each country set out above indicates that agricultural and
mineral resources development will be priority targets in the strategic arena of industrial
development and export promotion. The following section presents issues and viewpoints on
these arenas.
(2) Agricultural Development

There are a number of outstanding issues relating to the domestic distribution system for agriculture products in the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The system is unfavorable especially for small-scale farmers, considering that they are now confronting issues and problems of price setting, quality inspection, and accessibility to market information, mainly caused by the complicated distribution routes in this region with many middlemen (intermediaries) between producers and consumers. Moreover, accessibility to bazaars/shopping places, enhancement of selling capacity, and improvement of product quality by small-scale farmers have severely been hampered by not only distribution system problems, but also a lack of physical distribution infrastructure (e.g., access roads to markets, cold chains with refrigerated containers/chilled trucks, bazaars/shopping place, market information infrastructure), which are not well developed in East Africa. Infrastructure issues have become the biggest constraint on further expansion of exports and the reduction of poverty. Taking these issues into consideration, it can be effective in the short term to redevelop both the institutional distribution system and physical distribution infrastructure, while productivity improvement of subsistence crops such as rice and maize (corn) should be stressed over the medium and long term from the viewpoint of ensuring food security of each country.

Based on this background, the Kenyan agriculture ministry is, for example, currently putting a strategic emphasis on the development and market promotion of high value-added products with a central focus on processing and packaging, sensibly recognizing the necessity to diversify export products and export markets since the majority of Kenya’s products in the marketplace are fresh foods, which are very sensitive to market conditions. Also in Tanzania, the government is aiming at the development of agriculture as one of the prioritized export promotion sectors, focusing on the processing industry of primary agricultural products as a strategic target of for adding value. In Uganda, a similar strategy has been developed in the country’s export promotion policies, considering primary agricultural products as priority commodities for export promotion.

To enhance the value added of agriculture products by developing the agro-processing industry, together with the diversification of export products and markets, thereby increasing the potential for export expansion. Furthermore it is very much expected that focusing on the agro-processing industry will contribute both to industrial development and poverty reduction, considering a World Bank research finding 12 that the development of the agro-processing industry will assist income growth and diversification of the poor, and contribute to providing more wide-ranging employment opportunities, as well as JBIC Research Institute empirical research 13 demonstrating an effective linkage between agro-processing industry development and pro-poor growth, drawing from a case study conducted in Thailand and in Kenya. (For the details of paths to pro-poor growth by the development of agro-processing industry, refer to the Figure 5.2.5; also refer to Box 5.1 on the presence of horticulture in Kenya.) It can be concluded that targeting the agro-processing industry with the aim of adding value to agricultural export products is a significant strategy not only for strengthening export competitiveness but also for reducing poverty in East Africa.

---


Figure 5.2.5 Paths to Pro-Poor Growth by Agro-Processing Industry Development

Box 5.1 Presence of Horticulture in Kenya

Kenya produces a wide variety of horticultural products including fresh/frozen vegetables and fruits, herbs, and cut flowers. Horticulture is the industry where producers in the least developed countries can become relatively competitive by utilizing comparatively low labor costs and seasonality. The poor in rural areas can improve skills and increase income by exploiting such comparative advantages. In Kenya, horticultural crops have been grown since the 1960s soon after independence. Major crops in the late 1960s were pineapples and passion fruits. Initially, the demand for pineapples was mainly for canning, but some (e.g., fresh fruit) were distributed to the domestic market. Passion fruits were mostly processed into beverages. Later the product range became more diverse, including avocados and French beans.

In the interest of employment, the country’s current development plan stresses the manufacturing sector, especially industries where agricultural goods are used. The Government of Kenya is also implementing a policy to promote horticultural products. In 1994, the government budget included import duty exemption and benefits for fertilizers and other items necessary for growing horticultural crops. As a result, the export of horticultural products steadily increased both in quantity and money amount. Against this background, the horticultural industry in Kenya is enjoying rapid growth of exports both in quantity and monetary amount and the products are rapidly becoming more diverse.

14 Extract from JBIC Development Institute/UFJ Sogo Kenkyusho (2006), “Pro-Poor Growth in Asia and its Application to Africa (Phase 2): Pro-Poor Growth through Creation of Employment Opportunities”. 
(3) Mine Development

Among the main players in mineral resources development in Sub-Saharan Africa are major mine development companies, the so-called mining giants/majors, which have been active since around 2005. These major companies have significantly reduced risks through large-scale mergers; they normally reject partial participation of so-called passive investors such as Japanese trading companies. The so-called mining juniors or mining minors have been more vigorous than the mining giants. They are quicker in implementing development strategies (e.g., in making investment decisions), and they tend to deal with small and medium projects mainly for rare metals and non-ferrous metals, rather than large projects.

As stated in Chapter 1, the international prices of oil, coal, nonferrous metals, and rare metals have been increasing in recent years, a development that has boosted the inflow of resource FDI into inland countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which formerly had been avoided due to relatively high mining costs. However, as also stated previously, mineral resources prices have been falling sharply due to withdrawal of investment funds following the financial crisis in late 2008, declining demand, and other factors (although many specialists forecast such prices to rise again over the long term).

Source: “Meeting Session with Japanese Ambassadors to Middle East and African Regions” hosted by Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations Federation of Economic Organizations Federation of Economic Organizations), January 16, 2009

Figure 5.2.6 Mineral Resource Deposits in SADC
The Government of Japan, which intends to participate in mine development in Botswana and other Southern African countries as part of public-private initiatives/cooperation for securing resources in Africa, has commenced exploration activities utilizing leading-edge remote sensing technologies. Figure 5.2.6 shows the achievements of such activities as of today. The types of rare metals targeted by Japanese companies are unevenly distributed in Southern Africa. Box 5.2 assesses the needs for CBTI development from the viewpoint of private companies.

**Box 5.2 Needs of CBTI Development from Private Companies’ Viewpoint — Results of Interviews with Private Companies in East Africa**

In this study, field surveys were carried out in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in October 2008, including interviews with 11 Japanese and local companies, to obtain suggestions on how to remove business disincentives and bottlenecks. The companies interviewed are listed in Table 5.2.4 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Company</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Business Category</th>
<th>Example Export/Import Items</th>
<th>Export to/Import from (Examples)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee</td>
<td>Tea, Coffee</td>
<td>Kenya, Uganda, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>Sugar, Rice, Cooking Oil, Sisal, Trucks</td>
<td>Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Food Processing</td>
<td>Biscuit</td>
<td>Kenya, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>Cashew nuts</td>
<td>India, China, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company E</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>Agricultural/Industrial Products</td>
<td>Kenya, Uganda, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company F</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>Steel, Water Pipes</td>
<td>EAC countries, Zambia, Malawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2.4 Interviewed Private Companies in the Field Survey**

Source: JBIC TODAY, April 2008
The opinions and suggestions of these companies as stated in the interviews are as follows.

**Disincentives to and bottlenecks in promotion of intraregional trades from the viewpoint of local private companies**

1) High transport cost
   - Extremely poor quality of port operation (Ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam)
   - Increase in port charges as a result of freight congestion
   - Various problems regarding customs duties (e.g., informal costs, with amounts varying depending on the customs officer, especially at Namanga)
   - Physical inspections/checks frequently conducted by the police (especially along the Northern Corridor) and long hours at weighbridges (same as above)
   - For some companies, transport cost accounts for as much as about 50% of the total cost. (There are some cases where they have no choice but to use air freight because land transport is unreliable.)

2) Poor infrastructure
   - Unreliable railway operation (along the Northern and Central Corridors)
     - Such operation is so unreliable that in some cases there is no choice but to depend on roads.
   - Bad road conditions (especially conditions of secondary routes used for transport of products to consuming areas)
   - Electricity shortages and steep increases in electricity price (especially in Kenya)

3) Trade barriers (segmented markets)
   - In 2005, the EAC introduced common customs tariffs and declared a policy to eliminate tariffs in 2010. However, there are too many exceptional items (about 600 items for Tanzania and about 300 for Kenya).

**Suggestions from local private companies to remove bottlenecks**

1) Improvement of infrastructure
   - More efficient port operation (“Port of Dar es Salaam is the height of chaos,” one company stated.)
   - More reliable railway operation (it is totally unreliable at present).
   - Improvement of roads (especially along the Northern Corridor)

2) Customs
   - Duties should be consistent at least (this is especially a problem at the Namanga border, where currently amounts vary depending on the customs officer).
   - There are a lot of “red-tape” routines for various procedures and even bribes. These practices should be eliminated.
   - Trade barriers should be removed. (Markets should be unified.)
   - The number of tariff exception articles should be decreased.
Other comments

- Vehicle passage in Kenya has been restricted since 2008. (The number of trailer axles has to be three or below. Trailers with four or more axles are not allowed to be used, which imposes a heavy burden on private companies. These views were stated by more than one Kenyan companies.)
- Politicians are involved in most Kenyan transport companies, which is the biggest contributor to the existence of cartels and chronically high transport costs. (Opinions of Kenyan and Ugandan companies)
- About 40 years ago, rail transport between Kampala and Mombasa took about one week. Since efficient operations were once achieved in the past, they can also be achieved now. Improvement in railway operations is definitely necessary for cost reduction. (Opinion of a Ugandan company)
- The Government of Japan should focus on strengthening administrative capacities within the EAC. (The EAC personnel are honest and highly qualified. The problem lies in the system to implement policies. Improvement of EAC’s implementation system is vital to the promotion of free trade. (Opinion of a Ugandan company)

5.3 Harmonization of Cross-Border Transport Requirements with Industrial Development and Trade Promotion Priorities

5.3.1 Basic Concept

While, as mentioned earlier, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 with the fundamental theme of poverty reduction, the idea of focusing on areas with growing economies has also received attention especially in Southern African countries as South Africa increases its economic presence. As the host country for the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Japan has become actively involved in the development of Africa, and in 2005 announced it would double ODA to Africa over the coming three years (and has started cooperation with the African Development Bank for a yen loans scheme Enhanced Private Sector Assistance, EPSA, for Africa). TICAD-IV (the fourth TICAD conference) announced a policy to support development of the private sector in Africa. When supporting CBTI development, taking the earlier mentioned actions as a set condition, “higher-level” CBTI strategies and regional/industrial development must be organically combined, based on the utilization of the private sector, which will be considered in more detail below.

Maputo Corridor development provides an example of good practice for effective linkages between transport corridor and industrial development in Africa. This corridor project became successful because the Government of South Africa provided information to domestic and foreign investors through Bankable Packages as well investing in the initial infrastructure.

15 The new Japan Bank for International Cooperation (the new JBIC, formerly the Export-Import Bank of Japan) has announced that, as part of its activities for Africa, it will establish Fund to Facilitate Doubling Investment in Africa (Facility for African Investment) in April 2010 (within JBIC) to support Japanese companies’ business expansion in Africa, and that it will provide support for African infrastructure for manufacturing, resource development, electricity, ports, and others through investment, guarantees, and local currency financing from Facility for African Investment. Moreover, JBIC will provide financial support totaling US$ 2.5 billion to Africa over the next five years in the form of loans, equity investments, and guarantees.

16 Bankable Packages include various pieces of information: information on economically superior projects such as development of transport infrastructure or industrial parks, and information on potential resources in the region and other geographical characteristics. Projects that are not individually profitable may turn profitable by synergistic effects when combined with other projects. For example, a road project that is not profitable by itself can secure toll revenue with another industry located on the periphery. Conversely, such industries could not come to the area if there
Moreover, according to a review of Maputo Corridor development from the standpoint of regional development, this corridor development is unique in that multiple investment opportunities were put together into a package and investment was widely called for, and that in such cases it is vital for investors to understand packaged investments are more bankable, i.e., more profitable. This review also found that the Maputo Corridor represents the emergence of a new type of micro-regionalism under which joint development of the border area between two nations (South Africa and Mozambique) is carried out, in contrast with wide-area regionalism between nations as seen in SADC and COMESA, there is likely to be more cross-national regional development using such corridors.

The above discussion is highly suggestive and a similar discussion is also seen in the JICA-sponsored Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure Feasibility Project Study, Phase 2, a study prior to the current one in the same series. Thus, when developing a strategy harmonious with transport corridor development and local development projects in the region (such as development of a SEZ or a mine), it is necessary to have broad perspectives such as (i) how to bring about the synergistic effects of the common use of corridor infrastructure through multiple private investment businesses to the local countries’ higher-level strategies, and (ii) how such local countries can internalize the benefits of CBTI development in their economy through regional development projects including resource, agricultural, and industrial development. In addition, in case corridor infrastructure is developed through public-private initiatives/cooperation, it is also critical to consider the amount of government subsidy and how to allocate risk between the government and the private sectors.

Another example of a Bankable Package is the Corridor Sands project in Mozambique, described in Table 5.3.1. This project is unique in that the funds for building infrastructure were drawn from a financing group formed by multiple financial institutes as well as from investment companies, through a project finance scheme.

Table 5.3.1 Corridor Sands Project (Mozambique)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>The deposit is near town of Chibuto, Gaza Province, located 190 km North of Maputo, and 50 km inland from Indian Ocean.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Resource</td>
<td>Deposit of titanium dioxide (TiO²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors</td>
<td>BHP Billiton (the former Australian mining company Western Mining Corporation, WMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure to be Developed</td>
<td>The road, jetty, and related infrastructure to be built to the coast cost US$80 million, and power infrastructure will cost US$80 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investment Cost</td>
<td>US$800 million with US$500 million as an initial investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility Study</td>
<td>The bankable feasibility study completed in 2002, with US$10 million.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


was no road. Therefore, the term Bankable Package implies profitability through synergistic effects.” (Source: JBIC Research Institute for Development and Finance, Report No. 2 (April 2000).


19 E.g., this study found that in order to maximize the effect of cross-border transport, regional development focusing on such effects is important. Previously, development priorities tended to be set based on the industry composition and resource allocation of a country but, as interchanges and trading with neighboring countries increase and the cross-border transfer of labor resource becomes easier, development strategies need to be more adaptable to the industry composition of the whole region and the comparative advantage over neighboring countries.

5-17
### 5.3.2 Strategy Development Issues

One approach to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa is the MDGs, the underpinning theme of which is poverty reduction. At the same time, with the increasing economic presence of South Africa and the steady economic growth of many countries, development linked with industrial and trade promotion may be preferred, especially in the Southern African subregion. Meanwhile, as stated earlier, transport costs in Sub-Saharan Africa are extremely high compared with those in other regions. As shown in Chapter 1, the ratio of indirect costs (e.g., transport, energy, security) to total costs is high in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, high logistics cost are big disincentive to industrial promotion and economic growth, e.g., as found by Amjadi and Yeats, 1995 (“High transport cost in Africa is a greater trade barrier than import duties and other trade restrictions”) and World Bank, 2007 (“Transport cost in Africa can be even higher than the value of products themselves”).

In addition, as mentioned in Section 5.1, the worldwide economic structure is changing. The prices of primary products are increasing compared with those of industrial products, and an inflation of resources and deflation of industrial products is ongoing. This is mainly caused by growing demand worldwide (especially in BRICs and other emerging economies), the restriction of supply for such growing demand, and decreasing natural resources. A paradigm shift or crustal change of the economic structure is taking place as the relative prices of primary products and industrial products are adjusting (although resource prices are currently in a adjustment phase following the financial crisis later last year). Since Japan is a trading nation, the disadvantage in trading conditions (relative prices of industrial products) will cause a persistent deterioration in trade balance and may weaken the Japanese economy in the long term. Although there are other options including “urban mine” development and Arctic Ocean development as previously stated, securing mineral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa is vital for the Japanese economy over the medium and long term.

In addition, as discussed in Section 5.2, it is essential in the short run to redevelop both the institutional distribution system and the physical distribution infrastructure to facilitate the transportation of agricultural products, whereas productivity improvement in subsistence crops such as rice\(^{20}\) and maize are also important in terms of food security in the medium and long run. Also, the agro-processing industry, selected as one of the promising industries in the industrial development policies of most East African countries, is expected to greatly contribute not only to an increase in various potentials for export promotion but also to achievement of “pro-poor growth”. Accordingly, focusing on this industry ca be expected to be substantially beneficial for both industrial development and poverty reduction.

Among the major players in resource development, as mentioned in Section 5. are mining giants/majors, who are said to reject partial participation of other firms such as Japanese trading companies. In contrast, the mining juniors/minors, who make quicker investment decisions than mining giants/majors and tend to deal with small and medium projects mainly for rare metals and non-ferrous metals, are becoming active. As pointed out in Section 5.1, although prices of mineral resources have been sharply dropping as a result of the financial crisis in late 2008, many specialists expect prices to increase over the long term. Future trends in mineral resource prices should closely monitored.

---

\(^{20}\) Rice consumption is very high in West Africa compared to other parts of Africa. The staple food in East Africa is maize (corn), except in Madagascar and in some parts of Tanzania, Malawi, and other areas.
5.3.3 Strategic Directions

To maintain sustainable economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is of great importance to break the “negative spiral” shown in Figure 5.3.1 resulting from a delay in transport infrastructure development, together with laggard regional and industrial development in this subregion. Transport demand for CBTI in Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly lower than that in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) of Southeast Asia, the study area in the previous phase of this research series. Thus, implementation of strategies to stimulate traffic demand through industrial development in conjunction with CBTI development is very much needed in this subregion.

To narrow down these points, the following measures may be proposed as part of CBTI development strategies, or industrial development and trade promotion strategies: (i) elimination of various barriers to promote market expansion within and outside the subregion, (ii) fostering of the agro-processing industry and promotion of exports of primary agricultural products, (iii) effective linkages with mineral resources development, as well as (iv) the development of industrial human resources and employment creation as a sub-strategy to complement the first three strategies.

Figure 5.3.1 CBTI Development and Trade and Industry Promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa
Strategy 1: Reduction of physical and institutional barriers to contribute to expansion of interregional and intraregional markets

CBTI development in terms of both “hardware” and “software” will help increase transport speed and reliability and significantly reduce costs. These achievements will improve company earnings. For example, it is estimated that in East Africa, if vehicle operating conditions along a corridor improve dramatically after an improvement project, transport costs will decrease by about 15% and forwarding and other prices by 7–10%.\textsuperscript{21} CBTI development will directly decrease transport costs for imports and exports, dramatically improve the business environment, and eventually contribute to trade promotion and market expansion within and outside the region. (This market expansion will lead to intraregional specialization in the medium and long term and will contribute to region-wide growth in production and trade over the longer term.) Concrete examples of possible effects are that: (i) within the region, cross-border distribution of consumable goods and subsistence crops such as rice and maize (corn), the trade of which is growing along with high economic growth, will be promoted, and the corresponding food security system will be reinforced (especially in the case of drought conditions); (ii) outside the region, domestic distribution and the export of strategic primary agricultural products (to be described later) will be promoted.

In addition, efforts to increase the flexibility of freight rates by further promoting the deregulation of the transport/distribution industry in the region and to eliminate freight cost cartels are required (although this may be difficult for political reasons\textsuperscript{22}).

It may also be effective to indirectly support the ongoing market integration and currency unification in regional economic communities (RECs) and at the same time carry out measures to reduce trade barriers, although these actions have no direct relation with CBTI development. Since there have been developments such as the establishment of a customs union (2005) and abolition of tariffs (2010 as a target) in the EAC, creation of a Free Trade Area (2000) and introduction of common tariffs in the region (by 2008) in COMESA, and introduction of a customs union (by 2010), a joint market (by 2015) and a single currency (by 2018) in SADC, it is proposed to provide technical assistance (TA, including the dispatch of experts and the introduction of public-private initiatives) to improve various policies and systems in these RECs. It is important to ensure consistency between the implementation schedule of the abovementioned measures in RECs and the timing of CBTI development.

Strategy 2: Development of the agro-processing industry, promotion of the export of primary agricultural products, and demand stimulation

As shown in Chapter 1, the key industry of Sub-Saharan Africa is agriculture. About 60-70 % of the working population is engaged in agriculture, and primary agricultural products are the major export items in many countries in the region. As discussed in Section 5.2, especially in East Africa, in addition to traditional export items such as coffee, tea, and tobacco, horticultural products such as flowers and fresh vegetables have been promoted as a major trade promotion measure, and the export of such products has been rapidly growing. (Horticultural products have become the biggest export items of Kenya.)

\textsuperscript{21} For details, see World Bank (2008), “Transport Prices and Costs in Africa – A Review of the International Corridors.”
\textsuperscript{22} A Ugandan business owner stated in an interview with the Study Team that “Government officials and politicians are always involved in the Kenyan transport industry, without exception, and it has become a hotbed for cartels and a major cause of high transport costs.”
Regarding the strategic export of these agricultural products, as stated in Section 5.2, there are many adverse business factors in terms of price setting and access to market information for small-scale farmers who mainly produce such products, because such items do not acquire high added value through the processing steps in countries such as Kenya (except for some items for which processes of large-scale production, processing, distribution, and export have been established with the aid of foreign capital23) and distribution routes are very complicated with many middlemen (intermediaries). In particular, distribution infrastructure such as access roads to markets and cold chains with refrigerated/chilled trucks and equipment are not well developed,24 which has become the biggest disincentive to further expansion of exports.

Considering these issues, in this study the following policies coupled with CBTI development will be proposed. Note that it will also be worthwhile to consider the effective linkage between CBTI development and agro-processing industry promotion, given that this industry has not only been positioned as a strategic export industry in the region but that it also contributes to achievement of “pro-poor” growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide comprehensive support with a view to a value chain from input, production to processing, distribution and export, and promote the export of strategic agricultural items through effective linkages with CBTI development. (Provide support that will contribute to the addition and maximization of value at each stage of the value chain.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) **Production phase**: Provide support to enhance access to market information. In particular, develop mobile phone and information technology (IT) infrastructure (including wireless-LAN facilities) in rural areas along corridors and secondary roads. (taking public-private initiatives/cooperation into consideration.)

(ii) **Processing phase**: Provide support concerning techniques for agro-processing and packaging. (Enhanced processing techniques will help to keep products from deteriorating during transport and therefore resolve various problems related to quarantine issues.)

(iii) **Distribution phase**: Improve distribution systems. (Build secondary roads feeding main corridors, developing a cold chain along a corridor, and fundamentally improving the distribution system by building Agro-Processing EPZ/SEZs (to be described later) (taking public-private initiatives/cooperation into consideration).

(iv) **Distribution/export phase**: Support quality control/management and product tracking/traceability management.

(v) **Processing/distribution/export phase**: Construct an EPZ/SEZ near a mode junction (port) or a border to draw agro-processing businesses, and develop it as a core of processing and distribution systems. In addition, stimulate the demand of businesses

---

23 For example, most Kenyan roses are produced in foreign-owned large farms, and processes from production to transport and export are centrally managed through the use of a cold chain developed by such foreign-owned companies. The business model has been almost established, and regarding the export promotion of roses, it does not seem that there is much room for Japanese ODA except for value addition to products. (Reference: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2007), “Basic Research Report on Consistency in Policy-Making for ODA and Trade of Agricultural Products – Roses and Tea”)

related to agriculture and service industries, with a view to including related service industries (e.g., microfinance and other finance businesses, logistics, retailing)(take public-private initiatives/cooperation into consideration.)

Figure 5.3.2 depicts the development of the agro-processing industry along the value chain and enhancement of export competitiveness.

![Figure 5.3.2 Development of Agro-Processing Industry along the Value Chain and Enhancement of Export Competitiveness](image)

In addition, as stated in Section 5.2, expansion of production and intraregional distribution of staple foods (rice in West Africa, potatoes in Central Africa and maize in East and Southern Africa) is important in terms of food security and poverty reduction, and it is urgently needed to improve productivity, which has extremely low compared with other regions such as Asia. Along with introduction of the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) initiative, which was discussed at TICAD-IV, and development of small-scale irrigation facilities, the adjustment of high fertilizer prices may be an effective policy and CBTI development may indirectly help lower fertilizer prices because it reduces transport cost and freight prices. (To achieve additional effects, the transport/distribution industry in the region needs to be further deregulated and transport price cartels need to be eliminated, as already explained.)

Strategy 3: Linkage with mineral resources development

Considering the adjustment of relative prices of primary and industrial products mentioned in Section 5.3.2, and the current situation of resource development in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will propose the following actions in coordination with CBTI development to secure mineral resources:

(i) One such action is the building of access infrastructures in specific mine development projects (e.g., construction of roads to inland mines, upgrading of embarkation ports), based on cooperation with mining juniors/minors (especially targeting rare and non-ferrous metals);

(ii) Considering that the targeted region is Southern Africa, which has a large amount of rare and non-ferrous metal deposits (the region is more promising in terms of the type and scale of deposits than East Africa), coal and iron ore deposits along the Mtwara Corridor and
nickel mines in Burundi could be the targets in East Africa, although such metals are not abundant in the subregion.

(iii) Coordination of CBTI development with other TICAD-IV commitments (e.g., support to infrastructure development for electricity, water, sewage), for example by combining development of electric power resources and that of mines and of related infrastructure.

Sub-strategy: Development and employment promotion of industrial human resources

In this study, the development of industrial human resources and employment promotion will be proposed as a complementary strategy. Targeting the logistics and transport industries addressed in Strategy 1 and the agro-processing and distribution industries addressed in Strategy 2, concrete actions are recommended as follows:

(i) Development of industrial human resources for the logistics and transport industries: Support forwarders and logistic service providers in customs clearance, border crossing procedures, and the like.

(ii) Capacity building among customs officers: Strengthen the JICA Technical Cooperation Project (TCP) scheme.

(iii) Development of industrial human resources for the agro-processing and distribution industries: Transfer processing technologies, support processing business owners in business management techniques, and provide technical support related to distribution quality control and traceability management, among other measures.

(iv) Capacity building for quarantine officials: Conduct capacity building using the JICA Technical Cooperation Project (TCP) and other schemes (especially for the quarantine of agricultural products for strategic export).

The summary of the above strategies and the direction of actions in detail are shown in Figure 5.3.3. Box 5.3 presents a candidate agro-processing EPZ/SEZ project, while Box 5.4 assesses the possibility of sea transport of cut flower exports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Strategic Directions</th>
<th>Induced Impacts (Anticipated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 1:</strong> Reduction of physical and institutional barriers for trade promotion</td>
<td>Through CBTI development, improve transport speed and reliability, and reduce transport cost</td>
<td>Improve company earnings and business environment, expand regional market, accelerate regional division of labor and increase in production level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirectly support the market integration and currency unification in RECs (through public private initiatives)</td>
<td>Improve the environment for trade and investment promotion, Accelerate regional market integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support the promotion of deregulation of the transport/distribution industry in the region</td>
<td>Increase flexibility of freight rates, Lower freight rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive support along the &quot;value chain&quot; of agricultural products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production Phase: Enhancing accessibility to the market information - Dissemination of mobile phone along the corridor, and provision of Information Technology (through public private initiatives)</td>
<td>Enhance small scale farmers’ accessibility to the market information, and facilitate them to obtain market information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processing Phase: Technical assistance for agro-processing technology - Support for adding more value by the introduction of wrapping technology</td>
<td>Keep products from deteriorating during transport by enhanced processing techniques, Resolve various problems related to quarantine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution Phase: Improvement of distribution system - Development of main corridor and access roads - Development of a cold chain (cold storage warehouses, etc) along a corridor</td>
<td>Reduce travel time for distribution, improve quality of products by developing a cold chain, diversify and newly develop potential export markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution / Export phase: Technical assistance for quality control / management skills of agricultural products, and for traceability management skills of them</td>
<td>Respond to the requirement of export market, such as European standard of EUREP-GAPP, Develop new export markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processing / Distribution / Export phase: Construction of &quot;Agro-processing EPZ/SEZ&quot; - As a major centre of processing and distribution of agricultural products - Demand stimulation through introducing related service industries</td>
<td>Drastically improve distribution system, enhance efficiency of value chains as a whole, promote employment generation and induce synergy effect by attracting other industries to EPZ/SEZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance for poverty reduction and food security issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce fertilizer transport cost by CBTI development (Through deregulation of the transport/distribution industry) Lower fertilizer prices</td>
<td>Expand production and domestic distribution of staple food (rice, potato and maize) and enhance food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 2:</strong> Development of the agro-processing industry, export promotion of primary agricultural products and demand stimulation</td>
<td>Build access infrastructures in specific mine development projects based on cooperation with Mining Juniors/Minors (through public private initiatives) - Target region: Southern Africa - Target minerals: Rare metals, Non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>Facilitate optimal risk allocation between public and private sector in mine development, Induce secondary spillover effects (attraction of other industries, promotion of regional development, etc.) by the development of access infrastructure such as roads and railroads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective linkage between CBTI development and other TICAD-IV commitment of the Government of Japan - Combination of development of electric power resources and that of mines and of related infrastructures</td>
<td>Comprehensively improve business environment for other potential projects and related business in the region, Optimal allocation of mining risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-strategy Development and employment promotion of industrial human resources</td>
<td>Development of industrial human resources for the &quot;logistics and transport industries&quot;: Support forwarders and logistic service providers in customs clearance, border crossing procedures etc. - Capacity building among customs officers - Development of industrial human resources for the &quot;agro-processing and distribution industries&quot;: Transfer processing technologies, and provide technical support related to distribution quality control and traceability management, etc - Capacity building among quarantine officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.3.3 CBTI Development and Industrial Development/Trade Promotion Strategies**
The biggest rose producing area in Kenya is around Lake Naivasha, and as stated in Section 5.3, they are mostly produced in large foreign-owned farms through centrally managed processes from production to processing, transport and export. Also for tea, a traditional export item, an original product chain has already been established in the country. Regarding promotion of the exports of such “mature” agricultural items, room for Japanese ODA seems very limited. However, other horticultural products including fresh vegetables and fruit are grown and produced by small-hold farmers with a few exceptions, and distribution systems for such products (cold chains and other infrastructure) are not well developed and quality control issues remain.

With the purpose of promoting the export of such vegetables and fruits, it can be considered to develop a Horticultural Product Processing EPZ/SEZ near the border between Kenya and Uganda and to develop it as a major center for horticultural product processing and distribution systems in this cross-border region, mainly targeting the horticultural commodity producing areas in western Kenya and eastern Uganda. The possible benefits of developing such an EPZ/SEZ in this region are as follows:

- Current serious problems such as the electricity shortage and rising costs in Kenya can be addressed by supplying the necessary electricity from Uganda, which produces a surplus. (In an EPZ development project near the border between Laos and Thailand, electricity was supplied from Thailand.) It is also close to the Bujagali hydropower plant in Uganda, which will start operation in 2010.
- Electric power supply between Uganda and Kenya has a long history. Additional investment for infrastructure related to electric transmission can be reduced by using existing cross-border transmission lines. (Japanese ODA can productively be provided to build access roads between producing areas and the EPZ/SEZ, and to develop distribution infrastructure including cold chains and related infrastructure such as water supply and sewerage facilities.)
- Eldoret Airport in Kenya can be used for the export of horticultural products. (Regular airfreight service provided by Emirates Airlines can be used on a short-term basis.) Alternatively, Kismu Airport, which was designated an international airport in 2008, could also be used. ODA can be provided to build facilities necessary for air transport. (Alternatively, rehabilitation and expansion of Eldoret Airport by with yen loan assistance can be considered.)
- Employment will be increased in rural areas along the border of the two countries with many labor-intensive agro-processing industry enterprises to be located at this EPZ/SEZ. This job creation will contribute to a reduction of poverty among low-income residents living in the vicinity of the border.
- Through cooperation with EAC’s horticulture research and test center, located at Soroti (Uganda), R&D for seed development and quality control can be effectively conducted.

---

25 About 95% of Kenyan farmers are small scale and 90% of the horticultural products are for domestic use. The number of small-hold farmers involved in export is only 16,000. (Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2007), “Basic Research Report on Consistency in Policy-Making for ODA and Trade of Agricultural Products – Vegetables and Fruits”.

26 French beans are a typical export cash crop in Kenya. Domestic consumption is small and they are mostly exported to British supermarket chains (e.g., ASDA, TESCO, Sainsbury’s) by air freight services of British Airways and other carriers. A consistent network from production to retail has been established for this item. (See above source.)
using existing knowledge. (This is an example of cross-border R&D. It will also be effective to move the center itself into this EPZ/SEZ.)

✓ Cooperation with the OSBP in Malaba (e.g., customs clearance in the EPZ/SEZ) will contribute to efficiency improvement of intraregional and domestic transport of agricultural consumer products.

✓ Logistic systems can be improved by adding to the EPZ/SEZ a transit dry port function for goods heading for Juba in southern Sudan.

✓ A positive impact on other regions may be expected through a “demonstration effect”.

In addition, as proposed in Section 5.3, demand for businesses related to horticulture and associated service industries can also be stimulated with a view to including associated service industries (e.g., microfinance, other financial businesses, retail) when developing such EPZ/SEZs. As a possible negative impact, employment issues for brokers and employers who have been involved in the local production and distribution systems in the region must be considered. A feasibility study will be carried out before the development of such EPZ/SEZs, but it is necessary to have a broad perspective (for close examination of types and degree of economic benefit in Kenya and Uganda) in making investment decisions.

---

### Box 5.4 Possibility of Sea Transport for Cut Flower Exports

One of the priority matters for the export of cut flowers is quality control including temperature control. All exporters struggle to preserve freshness at a certain level. Therefore, air transport is generally chosen as the most appropriate means of transport because it is quickest, but again, the bottleneck is high transportation costs. (Another reason for the high utilization of air transport in Kenya is to effectively use air cargo on the way back to Europe.)

In fact, air cargo is not necessarily the best choice as there are issues such as difficult temperature control and complicated work processes up to shipment. In consideration of these issues, possibilities of sea transport are currently being sought as an alternative to air transport. The Basic Research Report on Consistency in Policy-Making for ODA and Trade of Agricultural Products issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan in 2007 (in Japanese) shows a record air transport of cut flowers between the Netherlands and the United States*, and concluded as a result of interviews, that technically it is possible to maintain quality for about two weeks, and therefore sea transport can be an option if the date of sale is known. The report also states that possibilities of air transport from South Africa and Kenya to the Netherlands are being studied and it is estimated that the transport operation including customs clearance will take about three weeks.

Regarding the cost comparison with air transport, the report also found transport costs can be reduced by about 75% compared with air transport. If this is correct, a dramatic change may happen in the transport system for export of cut flowers over the medium and long term. Since the strategic position of flowers and other horticultural products in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania is likely to remain unchanged, it can be envisaged that the importance of upgrading the Northern and Central Corridors will become even more important and, as production scale increases, the efficient utilization of the Ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam will seriously be considered. This may become the best example of harmonization between CBTI development and trade promotion/industrial development.

※ The report states that the transport from the Netherlands to the United States took about 10 days in total (6 days for travel and 3–4 days for customs clearance) and there was no quality control issue (quality was well maintained when the temperature of the refrigerator on the ship was kept at 0.5 degrees C under low-oxygen conditions).
5.4 Views on Future Prospects for Public-Private Initiatives for Cross-Border Transport Development

5.4.1 Background of Public Private Initiatives/Cooperation and Past Actions

Since the United Nations announced the Global Compact, measures to promote public-private initiatives/cooperation in development projects, especially cooperation between European and United States aid agencies and local private companies has been increasing. In Japan, although the importance of public-private initiatives/cooperation in ODA projects has been insisted on mainly by trading companies and manufacturers against the background of the effectiveness of “Japanese-style” public-private partnerships in the economic growth of Asia, the government has been slow in acting in contrast with the private sector, due to questions about fairness and transparency guarantees concerning support to one company (i.e., utilization of public funds for a particular private company).

On the other hand, triggered by the increased importance attached to national interests in providing ODA, starting in 2000, the abovementioned moves in Europe and the United States, and also the recent attitudes of China and India toward assistance regarding African mineral resources, public-private initiatives/cooperation emerged as a major topic at TICAD-IV in May 2008. About the same time many recommendations regarding private-public initiatives/cooperation were presented one after another by Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), an ODA expert panel, and other parties, and eventually the search for ODA projects based on proposals from private Japanese companies received an official “green light”. In November 2008, the government started to accept proposals for public-private initiatives/cooperation projects from private companies, and many such proposals for Consultation Services for Public-Private Initiatives/Cooperation were developed by relevant ministries and JICA.27 Moreover, in February 2009, the ODA expert panel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended to the government the resumption of JICA’s investment and loan scheme, which had been abolished in 2001; the panel noted the necessity of strengthening public-private initiatives/cooperation to promote private investments and trade.28

Table 5.4.1 shows schemes and achievements regarding public-private initiatives/cooperation carried out by Japanese, European, United States, and international organizations.

27 A total of 63 proposals had been submitted as of January 2009, of which 35 are for Africa. Such proposals are mostly for infrastructure development and technical cooperation projects. (Source: Document of International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – “Our Country’s Roles in International Cooperation and Progress of Public private initiatives/cooperation” (a handout for an open seminar held on January 20, 2009)).

28 The purpose of this recommendation is to resume JICA’s investment and loan scheme is to reduce the risk of investments and loans by Japanese companies involved in development of mines and infrastructure, especially in Africa. Considering the impacts of the serious financial crisis starting in late 2008, the recommendation called for redevelopment and/or active utilization of some schemes to reduce the risk of private investments and loans for ODA. On the other hand, JICA’s investment and loan scheme was deeply discussed in the context of ensuring accountability for investments and loans made by public-interest corporations and demarcation with the then-existing JBIC when there was a trend of rationalization and streamlining of public corporations; the Japanese Cabinet decided to abolish this scheme in 2001. In consideration of such history, it seems that there may be many “twists and turns” regarding the resumption and redevelopment of this scheme.
## Table 5.4.1 Public-Private Initiatives/Cooperation by Developed Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Services</th>
<th>Performance Results</th>
<th>Target Countries / Regions</th>
<th>Private Company Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Global Development Alliance (GDA)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Grant Aid/TA</td>
<td>• 6 billion US$ in total since 2001 (US$1.4 billion from public sources and US$4.6 billion from private sources) &lt;br&gt; • Formulated more than 500 alliances with 1,800 private partners</td>
<td>Africa (35%), Central and South America (25%), Asia (15%)</td>
<td>Starbucks Coffee, Mars, Coca Cola, Cisco Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Development Credit Authority (DCA)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Risk Guarantee</td>
<td>• Implemented 110 projects in 42 developing countries</td>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>SPM Ghana, MTN, AES Sonel, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>• Specialized in the development of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa &lt;br&gt; • Provided long-term loans (both in Euro and US$) to private companies &lt;br&gt; • Jointly established by Swedish and Dutch governmental agencies</td>
<td>45 countries with 12 projects in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>TA</td>
<td>• Implemented projects relating to policy matters in energy, water, infrastructure, and multi sectors</td>
<td>65 developing countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ/ KfW/ DEG</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Loan/TA</td>
<td>• Contributed 299 million Euros in total, for variety of sectors such as environment, health, trade, energy, etc. &lt;br&gt; • Invested about 60% of the total from private companies</td>
<td>More than 90 countries with 771 cases in total, including South Africa and India</td>
<td>Daimler, Volkswagen, Deutsche Telecom, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC/ World Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Private Participation in Infrastructure Database</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>TA</td>
<td>• In cooperation with PPAIF from 1990 to 2007, provided information of more than 1,500 PPP projects in 150 countries &lt;br&gt; • Included PPP projects in energy, telecommunications, transport, and water/sewerage sector</td>
<td>Many, especially in East Asia, Central and South America, and Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in the above table, European and United States development partners commenced public-private initiatives/cooperation around 2000, and have accumulated considerable experience to date, including cooperation with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities and the development of infrastructure. In contrast, Japan is about 10 years behind in public-private initiatives/cooperation.29

5.4.2 Basic Concept

This study has paid attention to the recent development assistance trend of “going back to infrastructure”30 and “the role of infrastructure development in reducing poverty which

---

29 It is not that JICA has taken any actions, but it has been studying USAID’s Global Development Alliance (GDA) and other initiatives through personnel exchange with this United States organization.

30 The move to reconsider development in Africa based on the successful experience of Japanese ODA in Asia (especially the role that infrastructure development played in the region’s economic growth) is the fruit of a series of lobbying activities by the Government of Japan through the TICAD process and others. The growth model that links economic growth in Asia and trade investment in Africa, led by both the internal and external private sectors, is
contributes to pro-poor growth.” Possibilities of coordination with CBTI development strategies in Africa are considered in respect to each of the public-private cooperation models presented by Keidanren, the ODA expert panel, and other parties in early 2008.

Keidanren stated in its recommendation\(^{31}\) that traditionally Japan raised increased private investment after preparing the investment environment in developing countries through yen loan assistance. However, in order to promote Japanese companies’ business expansion in Africa and enhance the effect of the country’s assistance to Africa, Japan should establish a scheme to complement and support private sector led projects through yen loans, technical assistance, and grant aid. Keidanren further stated the hope that the government would provide support to improve systems and organizations, to upgrade related infrastructure, and to develop human resources, especially when private companies work on a project that will help secure a stable supply of energy and mineral resources. Keidanren’s recommendations regarding public-private cooperation is presented in Box 5.5.

Moreover, the ODA expert panel presented similar proposals to those of Keidanren, including (i) development of supporting infrastructure for private investments, (ii) Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), and (iii) improvement of the trade investment environment.

### Box 5.5 Keidanren’s Recommendations regarding Public-Private Cooperation

(“Ideal International Cooperation in the Future”, issued on April 15, 2008\(^{32}\))

**Priority areas and policies**

1. Economic growth (further reinforce economic relations with eastern Asia; handle huge demand for infrastructure, contribute to Africa’s economic growth.)
2. Resources and energy (the public and private sectors will reinforce relationship with countries with resources; develop resources (utilizing ODA, other official flows/OOF, and trade insurance).
3. Global environment issues (secure financial resources through a “new financial mechanism”; promote clean development mechanism/CDM projects and other international cooperation activities for the environment.)

**Examples of methods for public-private initiatives/cooperation**

1. Development of supporting infrastructure related to private investments
2. PPPs (public-private partnerships)
3. Intergovernmental dialogues and monitoring of policies and institutional systems
4. Utilization of knowledge and knowhow of private companies where industrial human resources are well developed.
5. Generation of synergistic effects through cooperation with CSR and ODA
6. Cooperation between yen loans and private finance
7. IT environment development in developing countries utilizing advanced IT technologies

Figure 5.4.1 presents an overall schematic of public-private partnerships for increasing economic growth in developing countries.

\(^{31}\) For details, refer to the Keidanren website: http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2008/019/index.html.

\(^{32}\) See the source in the previous footnote.
In the abovementioned context, this study proposes application of the following six perspectives for public-private initiatives/cooperation in CBTI development: (i) development of surrounding infrastructure related to private investment (in terms of both “hardware” and “software”), (ii) implementation of economic infrastructure projects through PPPs (public-private partnerships), (iii) intergovernmental dialogues and monitoring for improvement of policy making and institutional development (in particular, improvement of the trade investment environment), (iv) coordination of ODA with private companies’ CSR activities and BOP (bottom of pyramid)-targeted businesses, (v) coordination between yen loans and private finance, and (vi) others (e.g., utilization of the knowledge and knowhow of private companies where industrial human resources are well developed). Regarding each of these six models, strategic directions for public-private initiatives/cooperation are shown as follows, from the viewpoint of coordination with CBTI development.

In fact, Japan already has experience in (i) to (iii) above through ODA projects. For example, the ODA projects related to the construction of the second East-West Corridor in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) falls into Category (i). Another example is SEZ development through public private initiatives/cooperation, currently envisaged in the development of Nacala Corridor to connect Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, or other similar plans in East Africa. Also, regarding improvement of trade investment environment, mentioned in the (iii) above, Japan has had experience in providing assistance to Vietnam for institutional improvements to promote private investment, although this was not be directly related to corridor development. Moreover, some private companies and other entities are showing interest in corridor development.

---

33 The former JBIC (now part of the new JICA) is working on a program to transfer experience and knowledge from the GMS 2nd East-West Corridor development to the development of the Mozambique Nacala Corridor.

34 The Ishikawa Project (officially called the “Study on the Economic Development Policy in the Transition toward a Market-Oriented Economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), led by Shigeru Ishikawa, Professor Emeritus of Hitotsubashi University, was carried out in three phases from August 1995 to March 2001 as a JICA development research project, following an agreement in the Japan-Vietnam Summit in April 1995. It was conducted as a collaborative research project between Japan and Vietnam, with major topics including: (i) development of agriculture and agricultural communities, (ii) industrial and trade policies, (iii) fiscal and monetary policies, and (iv) government-run company policies (Source: website of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies: http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/ishikawa.htm). Wit is widely considered a good practice for public academic cooperation in policy-support-type ODA.
development itself. Along with CSR activities (e.g., as Toyota’s HIV prevention activities and Sumitomo Chemical’s Olyset Net), such moves need to be closely reviewed as an approach to public-private initiatives/cooperation.

Box 5.6 summarizes public-private initiative/cooperation models proposed in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 5.6 Public-Private Initiative/Cooperation Models Proposed in This Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Development of surrounding infrastructure related to private investment (in terms of both physical and institutional aspects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Implementation of economic infrastructure projects through PPPs (public-private partnerships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intergovernmental dialogue and monitoring of improvement of policy making and institutional development (in particular, improvement of the trade investment environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Coordination of ODA with private companies’ CSR (corporate social responsibility) activities and BOP(bottom of pyramid)-targeted businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Coordination between yen loan and private finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Others (e.g., utilization of knowledge and knowhow of private companies where industrial human resources are well developed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.3 Strategy Development Issues

As stated in Chapter 1 and the previous section, the key for recent investments in Africa is “mineral resources,” and the need for oil development and rare metal mine development is especially high among major trading companies, mining companies, and construction equipment companies in Japan. (For example, see Figures 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 present by JETRO in its 2007 Field Survey of Japanese Companies Operating in Africa.) The needs and issue awareness of the private companies are centered on “how much the government will mitigate risks,” especially because, for such development, private companies’ decision making for investment largely depends on the magnitude of mining risks. For example, a geothermal power generation project (yen loan) in the Philippines where the government has hedged mining risks is a good example of public-private initiatives/cooperation, from a private company point of view.

In addition, for EPZ/SEZ development along the previously-mentioned corridors, the private sector considers it best if the public sector takes charge of the development of supporting infrastructure for risk allocation. Especially in East Africa, transport and communication infrastructure is not well developed, development of access infrastructure (e.g., roads and railways), EPZs/SEZs, and utilities (electricity, water supply and sewage) is probably what private companies seek most through public private initiatives/cooperation.36

---

35 On May 21, 2008, the Kyodo News Service reported that West Nippon Expressway Company (Osaka) would start construction and maintenance of expressways and general roads in Africa. The company stated that it is part of the international contribution for technology transfer to Africa and human resource development, and that it is also looking to accumulate knowhow with a view to starting business operations overseas in regions such as North America and Asia. The company will probably establish a new department in charge of overseas operations in July 2008 to consider details of the business. The targeted area is Sub-Saharan Africa. The company has started discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, and will soon start negotiations with the African side as well. The plan is to dispatch about 20 people including engineers to foster human resources while continuing the road business. The aim of this cooperation is that Africans will be able to carry out all road construction and maintenance activities by themselves in about 20 years. (Source: Report by Kyodo News Service, May 21, 2008)

36 Electricity shortages are becoming obvious in Kenya, as stated earlier. The most effective actions for improving the region’s business environment include providing support for electricity supply from Uganda to Kenya, following
the start of operation of the Bujagali Hydro Power Plant in 2010, and further support through ODA for a cross-border power supply system known as the East Africa Power Pool (which was committed by the Government of Japan government at TICAD-IV).
Public-private initiatives/cooperation through private finance initiative (PFI)/PPP has been a major trend in infrastructure provision since the late 1990s, but all good PPP projects, such as an expressway project for the Maputo Corridor, seem to have already been identified by European and American companies. Therefore, in the context of CBTI development in Sub-Saharan Africa, infrastructure development through PFI/PPP should only be seen as one tool for public-private initiatives/cooperation.

Due to financial crisis that emerged in late 2008, public-private initiatives/cooperation for mine development are becoming difficult in the short term at least, as mining giants/majors and others are making drastic reduction in their mine-related investment. However, considering that a steep increase in resource prices is likely unavoidable over the medium and long term and that it is vital for Japan to secure mineral resources as mentioned in Section 5.1, action should still be strategically focused on mine development through public-private initiatives/cooperation.

### 5.4.4 Strategic Directions

Table 5.4.2 shows, with respect to each model, directions of public-private initiatives/cooperation for CBTI development combined with the industrial development and trade promotion measures presented in Section 5.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details of Type/Possible Approaches from Public Side</th>
<th>Directions of Public Private Initiatives/Cooperation Linked with CBTI Development</th>
<th>Notes/Case Examples/ Typical Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Infrastructure Development</td>
<td>✓ Develop supporting infrastructure to assist private companies involved in the development of industrial parks, Special Economic Zone (SEZs), and mineral resources ✓ Suitable for projects that are less profitable and not feasible by private investment only</td>
<td>✓ Develop supporting infrastructure (e.g., electricity, water, sewerage, ports, access roads and railways) for EPZ/SEZ construction at transportation nodes and national borders ✓ Develop access roads and railways (cross-border) in mine development ✓ Develop physical distribution infrastructure (e.g., cold chain)</td>
<td>✓ Seems to be the most feasible approach for linking to CBTI development in Sub-Saharan Africa ✓ One of the typical approaches of Japanese ODA in Asian countries (e.g., the Southern Thailand Coastal Development Project) ✓ Case example: Tamasina Port project in Madagascar ✓ Provided yen loan for refrigerated/chilled facilities development for the horticultural industry in Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details of Type/Possible Approaches from Public Side</th>
<th>Directions of Public Private Initiatives/Cooperation Linked with CBTI Development</th>
<th>Notes/Case Examples/Typical Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)</td>
<td>✓ Provide yen loans for the construction of physical infrastructure (with a separation of service provision) under “two-tired public-private partnership” approach</td>
<td>✓ Apply for port operation under PPPs (for Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Ports) ✓ Apply for construction projects for a cross-border bridges ✓ Apply for operation and maintenance, and service delivery of infrastructure projects ✓ Building capacity for government officials in charge of PPP projects</td>
<td>✓ Feasible projects have already been identified by private Western companies (e.g., a toll road construction project in the Maputo Corridor). ✓ Very difficult to achieve optimal risk allocation between the public and private sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Making and Institutional Development</td>
<td>✓ Based on private sector’s knowledge and experiences, provide recommendations on policies and system improvements in order to facilitate trade and investment environment</td>
<td>✓ Assist RECs in establishing a customs union, free trade zone, and monetary union ✓ Collaborate among industry, government, and academia to implement the above ✓ Improve inspections related to food safety standards and the quarantine system (responding to EurepGap, an internationally recognized set of farm standards) ✓ Assist deregulation of the transport/distribution industry</td>
<td>✓ Case example: Japanese ODA projects in Indonesia and Vietnam (e.g., the “Ishikawa Project”) ✓ JICA (and formerly JBIC) has been providing program loans and dispatching specialists for improving the legal system and investment environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Bottom of Pyramid (BOP)</td>
<td>✓ Assist private sector business activities relating to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Bottom of Pyramid (BOP) enterprises</td>
<td>✓ Support CSR activities of private companies located in EPZs/SEZs ✓ Provide projects linking One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) development and HIV prevention ✓ Assist SME/NPO activities for the fair trade of primary agricultural products (especially of main export products of each country) ✓ Provide market information for agricultural products (e.g., through the development of mobile phone network and wireless LAN system)</td>
<td>✓ Case examples of CSR, HIV prevention activities for employees of Japanese automobile company such as Toyota South Africa ✓ Case example of BOP: Providing technical assistance for quality improvement of East African cut flower companies to promote exports to Japan ✓ Need to facilitate a more thorough discussion on the necessity of public spending for CSP activities of specific private companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-35
For node junctions (ports) and EPZ/SEZ development along borders, provision of ODA and OOF for supporting infrastructure development utilizing the experience in Asia is the most feasible option. In the case of mine development in relation to industrial development, mining risk allocation between public and private sectors is the biggest need among the private sector, and public sector cooperation for developing access railways/roads and financing mining costs is sought. PPP/PFI projects may be difficult because, as noted, there are only a small number of good projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and private companies in the European Union and the United States are already involved in the few good projects. However, possibilities of participation by Japanese companies through PPP can be considered for such projects as improvement of port container terminals and the construction of cross-border bridges.

38 There are five types of risks associated with mine development projects: (i) risks at the stage of mining, (ii) risks at the stage of construction proceeded by the “green light” decision from the evaluation result of trial excavation, (iii) risks at the stage of production of mine products, (iv) market risk, and (v) political risk as external factors. Among these risks, Japanese private companies mainly desire to hedge the mining risks, implying a need to improve the existing investment support program of the Japan Oil, Gas and Metal Corporation (JOGMEC), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) and to redesign JICA’s loan and investment program as previously mentioned.

39 Transport infrastructure is generally recognized as not very suitable for PPP projects since it is basically not very profitable (because of large initial investment costs compared with the low willingness to pay/affordability of users), and the relatively long project lives. Moreover, other common challenges in PPP projects in the transport sector in developing countries are reported as (i) the poor capacity of various institutional systems for delivering PPP projects, and (ii) the lack of administrative capacity of governmental officers in the local government. [Source: JICA (2005), Research Study on Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects (in Japanese)]. Especially in Africa, in addition to the low willingness to pay and immature implementation system of local governments, there are many other critical problems such as the very limited locations suitable for profitable projects mainly due to the low density of traffic demand in this region, as mentioned in Chapters 1-3. In view of the foregoing, based on learning from success projects such as the Maputo Corridor (i.e., the benefits of designing comprehensive, integrated projects including transport, telecommunications, and other private investment projects and sharing the development and growth vision by providing information to domestic and foreign investors through Bankable Packages), the possibilities of
Moreover, in conjunction with the trend of market integration in many RECs, technical assistance through public-private initiatives/cooperation regarding policy making and legal systems, as well as support to improve the investment environment through partnership among industry, government and academia utilizing the experience of Vietnam may also be effective.

Public support for CSR activities may be effective, although it is not directly related to CBTI development. In particular, public support in the form of grant aid or technical assistance for the CSR activities of private companies located in EPZs/SEZs (e.g., the government dispatch of specialists to assist HIV prevention activities following the model of Toyota South Africa) would meet the needs of private companies.

With regard to the linkage between BOP enterprises and ODA, there are many possibilities and alternatives in coordination with the previously-mentioned strategy to develop agro-processing industry and the export promotion of primary agricultural products. Recent research has shown the effectiveness of mobile phone services for providing market information of primary agricultural products to small-scale farmers.\(^{40}\) Thus, in collaboration with mobile phone companies, the diffusion\(^ {41}\) of mobile phone services to small-scale farmers may be a possible options under this approach, with concurrent construction of access/feeder roads in rural areas through ODA.

---

\(^{40}\) The success story of Grameenphone Ltd. in Bangladesh is widely acknowledged.

\(^{41}\) It will be more beneficial to also provide technical assistance (TA) for the development of application software for delivering market information utilizing short message services (SMS).
Chapter 6  Strategy for Cross-Border Transport Development in East Africa

6.1 Directions for CBTI Provision in Sub-Saharan Africa

As shown in Chapter 2, accelerating pro-poor growth is an essential element in achieving poverty reduction and MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa, and this aim can be facilitated by industrial and trade development, and overall economic vitalization. High transport costs, including time costs and related economic costs, represent one of the largest barriers to economic vitalization. In this respect, CBTI development is critically important to enable efficient cross-border transport with reduced transport costs. However, various complex barriers prevent efficient cross-border transport in the region. Since a piecemeal approach will have only a marginal impact in achieving overall improvement in cross-border transport, it is imperative to adopt a comprehensive program approach, including development of CBTI projects from the viewpoint of the entire cross-border transport system, to prepare effective measures beneficial for the poor, and generate economic multiplier effects, through the promotion of industry and trade and the establishment of partnerships with the private sector.

This chapter presents future directions for CBTI development. First, poverty reduction and the achievement of MDGs through pro-poor growth are established out as the ultimate goals of CBTI development in Sub-Saharan Africa, while two comprehensive themes are set out to provide direction for CBTI development toward pro-poor Growth. Further, four CBTI development strategies are proposed to achieve these goals; they are then disaggregated into sector strategies under cross-cutting thematic perspectives. Base on these strategies, a model program for CBTI development in East Africa has been prepared, and fields where Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) may be most suitable are proposed. The whole framework is illustrated in Figure 6.1.1 below.

Source: The Study Team

Figure 6.1.1 An Overall View of CBTI Strategic Development
6.2 Comprehensive Themes for CBTI Provision

A comprehensive transport sector strategy embracing CBTI needs to be built on a subtle balance of satisfying multiple national mandates (e.g., national prestige; the interests of trade associations; assurance of equity for parties concerned; the building of an infrastructural network from a long-term perspective; responding to the region’s urgent tasks of disaster recovery and poverty alleviation, the priority of which is very often driven by political motivations). Therefore, it is imperative that the CBTI strategy of each country manifest itself as one of the country’s goals and objectives. The present study proposes to establish a CBTI development strategy under two thematic tiers: (i) Regional Integration of Sub-Saharan Africa, and (ii) Collaboration of Sub-Saharan Africa with the rest of the world, and proposes that assistance be extended in accordance with this framework. These two themes have been formulated accounting for the fact that most of African countries are isolated from the regional and the world markets, and suffer from the small size of their domestic markets.

(1) Integration of Sub-Saharan Africa

The first theme envisages the economic and social integration of Sub-Saharan African countries through provision of seamless and efficient transport services over an integrated transport network through the strategic development of CBTI. It will contribute to pro-poor growth and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa, by means of market vitalization and economic growth, with enhanced human interactions, reduced economic gaps between and among Sub-Saharan African countries, and improved international relationships.

In order to accelerate Sub-Saharan Africa’s integration, it is imperative to provide CBTI in the corridors or regions to facilitate trade among the region’s nation states. For example, road and railway corridors connecting state capitals and major economic centers are necessary. In addition, it is essential to simultaneously develop and promote industries to serve intraregional markets within Sub-Saharan Africa.

As shown in Chapter 4, many regional economic communities (RECs) have been established in Sub-Saharan Africa and are actively promoting regional integration. However, as the composition of these communities are very complicated (the “spaghetti bowl” problem), many countries joins several communities at the same time. Also some communities such as the EAC, COMESA, and SADC are seeking further integration through merger of existing RECs. While it may be practical to integrate within RECs in the first stage, the ultimate goal of integration should entail the integration of all of Sub-Saharan Africa.

(2) Linkage between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of the World

The second theme envisages facilitating Sub-Saharan Africa’s efficient interaction with world markets, which will eventually become a single global market served by seamless and efficient transport systems through the strategic development and provision of CBTI. It will contribute to pro-poor growth and poverty reduction in the region through the industrial development and trade promotion, and it will assist in reducing import prices and enhancing export competitiveness through enhanced collaboration with the world market(s).

To promote interregional trade, it is essential that corridors connecting landlocked countries with seaports be developed. Many densely populated agglomerations in the 15 African landlocked states are disadvantaged geographically with respect to industrial and trade development. Therefore, the development of corridors that connect landlocked countries with seaports shall be accorded a high priority.
6.3 CBTI Development Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa

6.3.1 CBTI Development Strategy

In order to materialize the two aforementioned comprehensive themes, the study proposes four CBTI development strategies to provide direction for the development of CBTI.

- **Perspective as a System**: A systematic approach to developing CBTI projects should be taken through assessment of interrelated factors and their priority for achieving overall efficiency in an integrated system.
- **Coordination with Regional Economic Communities**: The development of CBTI should be implemented in collaboration with improvements in soft infrastructure undertaken in the context of the RECs.
- **Effective Linkage with Trade and Industrial Development**: CBTI should be developed in association with trade and industrial development.
- **Introduction of Public-Private Partnerships**: CBTI should be developed based on private sector needs and in a manner that will reduce private sector business risks.

Details are elaborated below.

(1) **Perspective as a System**

The analysis of CBTI in East Africa in Chapter 3 identified major obstacles increasing transport cost and time in corridors in the Subregion. These costs were found to be greater than originally envisaged, even while substantial time savings from improved border crossing procedures have been observed. The analysis showed that specific parts of the overall distribution process require improvement in view of their impacts on overall efficiency of corridor transport systems. It has also been identified through field interviews that issues relating to intangible soft infrastructure present additional burdens on freight transport operators, e.g. with bond guarantee requirements, inefficient operations at checkpoints, and decreased reliability due to delays when crossing borders.

Therefore, it will be important to implement specific CBTI projects/measure that will reduce the costs and risks borne by private operators, in addition to leading to benefits from time and cost savings. In particular, a program approach is recommended, focusing on one or two corridors and/or RECs, by implementing a diverse set of measures for achieving corridor transport efficiency based on an analysis from a regional or corridor-wide perspective.

(2) **Coordination with Regional Economic Communities**

Soft infrastructure plays a critical role. In particular, it is essential to introduce a multilateral legal framework that will facilitate cross-border procedures, including a common bond guarantee system and other cross-border procedural improvements. Across Sub-Saharan Africa RECs been established to, among other things, provide for harmonized international regulations. Accordingly, in the short-term perspective, substantial benefits can be expected from developing CBTI within existing REC structures. In particular, improving institutional arrangements related to CBTI within the EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA should be aggressively pursued. Moreover, strengthening corridor coordination agencies will be important; these include the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority and the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency in East Africa.
(3) Effective Linkage with Trade and Industrial Development

As the ultimate goal of CBTI development is to promote economic growth by increasing trade and industrial development through reduced transport costs and enhanced reliability of transport, it is important to create a robust growth cycle generating new transport demand via trade and industrial development, which in turn will create the need for more and better CBTI. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, with its weak industrial base, poor trade competitiveness, and relatively low traffic demand, solely developing CBTI will be insufficient to trigger trade and industrial development; therefore, the development of CBTI should be coupled with trade and industrial development measures, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.1.

![Figure 6.3.1 CBTI Provision Coupled with Trade and Industrial Development](image)

Source: The Study Team

(4) Introduction of Public-Private Initiatives

Private sector initiatives are key to successful implementation of the development of CBTI as well as to trade and industrial development. The public sector in Sub-Saharan Africa lacks the resources to achieve economic growth without involvement of the private sector. In this context, CBTI system development should aim to provide for private participation based on private sector needs.

6.4 CBTI Sector Development Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa

6.4.1 Sector Development Strategy in View of the Comprehensive Themes and CBTI Development Strategy

The foregoing sections have proposed four CBTI development strategies to be applied in providing CBTI under two comprehensive themes. Since the development of CBTI involves many sectors, this section examines the priority of each sector as well as strategies by sector, based on CBTI development strategies under the two comprehensive themes, which are shown in the form of 2x4 matrix and summarized by priority development sector.
(1) Development Strategy 1 – A Perspective as a System

Comprehensive Theme 1 – Integration of Sub-Saharan Africa

Considering that corridor development contributes to intraregional trade development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the road subsector should be accorded the highest priority. Not only does this subsector already serve a majority of intraregional traffic volumes in the region, but the sector also can deliver benefits from international trunk corridors to poor areas in the hinterland, thereby promoting pro-poor growth.

Measures to improve road freight traffic have two aspects: (i) the development of hard infrastructure (e.g., road development) and (ii) soft infrastructure such as improving laws and regulations related to cross-border transport. However, each region has its priorities. For example, in East Africa, the development of hard infrastructure and the implementation of one-stop border posts (OSBPs) are farthest along compared to other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, improvements are still required, e.g., in weighbridge and checkpoint operations, as these pose heavy burdens on transport operators. On the other hand, hard infrastructure is considered relatively less developed in West Africa, and accordingly should be given a higher priority in that subregion.

Comprehensive Theme 2 – Linkage between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of the World

Facilitating trade with the rest of the world requires development of transport corridors that connect inland areas and landlocked states with international seaports. In particular, improving the links between targeted 15 landlocked states in Sub-Saharan Africa (which are geographically disadvantaged with respect to interregional trading) and seaports in African coastal states will greatly contribute to poverty reduction. In view of the need for an integrated transport system, the port sector is considered a critical bottleneck, with insufficient port capacity requiring an urgent solution. In addition, the railway sector is important as railways provide a low-cost means of accessing inland areas and landlocked states. Existing railway network potential is not well exploited in Sub-Saharan Africa, due partly to operations issues. Moreover, customs clearance, quarantine, bond guarantee, and checkpoint issues, all of which represent hindrances to an integrated transport system, need to be addressed.

(2) Development Strategy 2 – Coordination with Regional Economic Communities

This strategy relates to both of the comprehensive themes.

In the short term, it is important to proceed with both the hard and soft aspects of CBTI improvement in collaboration with the ongoing regional integration processes undertaken by the RECs. In particular, it is recommended to assist regulatory reforms such as the improvement of cross-border transport and customs regulations undertaken by SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, and COMESA. Moreover, it is necessary to implement road, port and railway sector improvements, as these are priority (sub)sectors as mentioned above, together with required legal and institutional improvements. Over the long term, CBTI development should be expanded from the member countries of the RECs to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa.

(3) Development Strategy 3 – Effective Linkage with Trade and Industrial Development

Comprehensive Theme 1 – Integration of Sub-Saharan Africa

It is important that CBTI and industrial development be implemented simultaneously, with the latter targeted at the intra-Sub-Saharan African regional market with subsistence farm
production and consumption goods, which contribute to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. In particular, industrial development with a pro-poor perspective is essential in delivering benefits from CBTI.

**Comprehensive Theme 2 – Linkage between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of the World**

This linkage is centered on the promotion of export industries, targeting markets outside of the Sub-Saharan Africa and the attraction of foreign direct investment. In particular, it is critical that CBTI and industrial development proceed concurrently focusing on competitive mineral resources and strategic agro-products.

(4) **Development Strategy 4 – Introduction of Public-Private Initiatives**

This strategy relates to both two comprehensive themes.

Public-Private Initiatives should be promoted for infrastructure development, as well for industry and trade promotion. Although the implementation of PPPs (Public-Private Partnerships) for infrastructure development is farthest along in the port and railways (sub)sectors, this implementation has been far from smooth, and therefore a number of obstacles need to be addressed. At the same time, it will be essential to reduce the business risks faced by the private sector in promoting trade and developing industries, and accordingly it will also be important to understand private sector needs. The target private sector includes African enterprises as well as foreign business enterprises that have invested or intend to invest in Africa (e.g., Japanese firms).

Based on the above analysis, Figure 6.4.1 presents priority sectors for CBTI in Sub-Saharan Africa. The following sections summarize strategies in each sector, including directions of CBTI development as well as improvement measures in each sector.

![Figure 6.4.1 Priority Sectors for CBTI Sub-Saharan Africa](image-url)

Source: The Study Team
6.4.2 Hard Infrastructure

(1) Port (Sub)Sector

Among the Sub-Saharan African transport subsectors, the port subsector is the one with the highest priority. Particularly lacking is international ports (both in number and capacity) with a high handling capacity. Therefore, it is essential to increase the handling capacity of existing international ports, particularly those linked to international corridors. It is important to improve these ports both in terms of hard and soft infrastructure.

In particular, it is critical to strengthen and expand container ports as container handling capacity is undersupplied, incapable of accommodating rapidly growing container demands. However, since a large-scale international container hub port can only be formed based on either a huge freight demand or a very advantageous geographical location (e.g., as at Singapore or Salalah, Oman), it may be difficult to justify establishing a new large-scale hub port in Sub-Saharan Africa in addition to the existing large-scale port at Durban. However, developing a medium-scale international hub port supplementing Durban may be necessary as the port of Durban’s capacity is reaching its limit as was indicated in Chapter 2. Candidates for such medium-scale ports include Mombasa, Lagos, and Abidjan, which would need to be equipped with facilities capable of handling and accommodating 4,000-TEU class container vessels with a berth water depth of more than 15 m. It is recommended to increase the capacity of other ports connected with international corridors to accommodate Panamax (2,000 TEU class) container vessels, considering the growing demand of routes directly connecting Sub-Saharan African port with ports in the rest of the world.

Further, intermodal transport connectivity improvements will be vital for transshipping freight between port and railways, and/or between port and roads. As in the case of Mombasa, where the time spent waiting for cargo trains can amount to two months, the full benefits from integrated CBTI systems cannot be generated simply by port capability improvements. It is imperative to concurrently strengthening road/railway capacity, commensurate with the improved freight handling capacity of the port.

**Hard Infrastructure**

- Port capacity and efficiency improvements in terms of yard space, number and length of berths, and loading/unloading facilities of major international ports
- Improving ports connected with international corridors to achieve world-class standards
- Improvements in intermodal connectivity with railways and roads, and development and strengthening of ICDs

**Soft Infrastructure Supporting the Hard Infrastructure**

- Assistance for moving to a “landlord” model of port operation (involving concessions to private operators)
- Improving port operation efficiency through single-window port procedures, electronic forms submission, simplified port procedures, certification of clearance and forwarding agents, and other measures

(2) Railway (Sub)Sector

Railway transport, in general, is more advantageous than road transport in terms of per unit weight costs and for long-distance haulage. As shown in Chapter 3, railway transport costs in some instances are as low as half of road transport costs. In particular, landlocked states can derive significant benefits from a reduction in transport costs from railway haulage of freight.
transshipped to/from ports, realized via a modal shift from road transport, which carries a disproportionately light cargo on backhauls.\textsuperscript{1} Transporting bulky mineral resources such as coal, copper ore, and iron ore (except for rare metals) entails development of railway systems as they offer an advantage for hauling heavy cargo.

As was pointed out in Chapters 2 and 4, many railway systems in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from deteriorated infrastructure and weak management/operation (even after privatization). Therefore, a serious under-capacity remains, leading to longer port dwell times. As a result, the potential benefits that the railway transport system can provide are currently unavailable.

A short-term strategy of strengthening railways would include improvement of the capacity of lines connecting inland states with ports and lines associated with mineral resources development sites. In particular, it is urgently necessary to implement rehabilitation and improvements of tracks, rolling stock, and other facilities/equipment on such lines suffering from long port dwell times due to limited operating capacity. It is also urgently needed to address operation and management issues, e.g., by contracting out operation concessions, for which technical assistance is recommended.

**Hard Infrastructure**

- Rehabilitation of facilities and track
- Strengthening of rolling stock capacity
- Improving intermodal connectivity, and developing transshipment facilities
- Building a regional railway network with a unified track gauge

**Soft Infrastructure Supporting the Hard Infrastructure**

- Improving railway management, operation, and the management and services
- Addressing concession issues, and improving the means and modality of privatization

**(3) Road (Sub)Sector**

Regarding the development of road infrastructure, it is essential to eliminate missing links in the trunk road network by paving/improving paved roads with the assistance of international development partners. Moreover, provision of rural roads is critical for delivering the benefits from CBTI to poor rural areas. For example, provision of roads linking poor areas with trunk roads will reduce transport costs and therefore reduce consumer prices in the areas.

In addition, connectivity of the road network with other transport modes is critical. It is important to improve connectivity with railway, port, and airport hubs. ICD and freight terminal development are also recommended in order to create an efficient, integrated transport system.

Further, it is important that further assistance be provided for maintenance and management institutions and capacity strengthening, through careful assessment of the results of the World Bank assisted Road Fund initiative.

Since it is understood that soft infrastructure is major bottleneck in the road sector, the standardization and harmonization of legal aspects of the cross-border transport system should be undertaken in association with work by the RECs. Assistance from international development partners is required.

\textsuperscript{1}A Ugandan logistics operator informed the Study Team that it would switch all of its traffic to the railway if the dwell time could be eliminated, since railway haulage offers more or less the same transport time and a cheaper cost.
The Research on the Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure: Phase 3

Chapter 6

Hard Infrastructure

- Developing international corridor networks connecting key international ports with inland areas
- Developing a branch (feeder) road network that connects key cities, production sites, trunk roads, and key railway stations.
- Developing rural roads that link poor areas with trunk roads
- Developing ICDs at strategically important points of large cities, railway stations, seaports, and airports.

Soft Infrastructure Supporting the Hard Infrastructure

- Improving regulatory aspects associated with the cross-border transport system (e.g., weighbridges, checkpoints, escorts)
- Harmonizing traffic rules and transport institutions (e.g., third-party transport insurance, axle load control, driving on the right or left side of the road)
- Strengthening operation and management institutions for roads and bridges and securing funds
- Strengthening contractors’ competence and capability
- Introducing a participatory road traffic policy
- Human health measures, in particular, measures against HIV/AIDS at international borders

(4) Air Transport (Sub)Sector

Air transport hauls smaller volumes compared with maritime transport and is suited to the transport of light, high-valued goods including perishable food products. Therefore, it is recommended to implement improvement of the air transport sector concurrently with the development of industrial products suited for air transport. For example, in Kenya horticulture products are exported to Europe and fish caught in Lake Victoria is also exported by air. Some private mining firms have developed airports near their mines to transport gold by air. Moreover, air transport development policy requires additional attention by landlocked countries because of advantages vis-à-vis seagoing vessels and land transport, in terms of transport time and cost. As shown in Chapter 4, an all African-wide liberalization of the air transport sector is being undertaken.

Hard Infrastructure

- Extension of runways
- Expansion of airport terminals
- Developing and strengthening of airport storage and warehouse

Soft Infrastructure Supporting the Hard Infrastructure

- Liberalization and privatization of air transport services
- Improving air transport regulations
- Strengthening air traffic safety

6.4.3 Supporting Measures for CBTI - 1: Trade Promotion and Industry Development

The strategies concerning trade promotion and industrial development should target agriculture since it is a major industry in Sub-Sahara Africa. Accordingly, there is a focus on the agro-processing industry (agrotechnology), which is especially relevant to export promotion and also contributes to pro-poor growth as stated above. Further, measures that relate to expansion of
production and distribution of subsistence crops such as rice and maize also contribute to food security and poverty reduction and should therefore be implemented.

Regarding the linkage between CBTI development and mineral resources development that has been taken as another pillar of the strategies, it must be noted that there is a wide variety of mineral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, and they tend to be unevenly distributed across the region. Accordingly, the Southern African subregion, where potential reserves of rare and nonferrous metals are abundant, should be selected as the highest-priority area for this aspect of the strategy, and resources development in East Africa (e.g., the coal and iron ore reserves in the Mtwarra Corridor, nickel deposits in Burundi) could be considered as a “second option”.

(1) Reduction of Institutional Barriers Contributing to the Expansion of Interregional and Intraregional Markets

- Deregulation of transport/distribution industry
- Support for integration of interregional and intraregional markets

(2) Development of Agriculture and Agro-Processing Industry, Export Promotion of Agricultural Products, and Demand Stimulation

- Comprehensive support along the “value chain of agricultural products” (refer to Figure 6.4.2)
  - **Production Phase:** Enhancing accessibility to market information, dissemination of mobile phones along the corridor, and provision of information technology (through public-private initiatives)
  - **Processing Phase:** Technical assistance for agro-processing technology and for adding value through the introduction of wrapping technology
  - **Distribution Phase:** Improvement of the distribution system, development of main corridor and access roads, and development of the “cold chain” (e.g., through cold storage warehouses) along the corridor
  - **Distribution/Export Phase:** Technical assistance for quality control/management of agricultural products, including tracking
  - **Processing/Distribution/Export Phase:** Construction of Agro-processing Export Processing Zones/Special Economic Zones (EPzs/SEZs) as centers for the processing and distribution of agricultural products, and demand stimulation through introduction of related service industries
  - **Other:** Assistance for food security and poverty reduction (reduction of transport cost and wholesale fertilizer prices by the development of CBTI)

---

2 Rice is also cultivated as a cash crop in some subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa.
(3) **Linkage with Mineral Resource Development**
- Development of specific mines in collaboration with small mining companies and provision of road and rail access infrastructure (through public-private initiatives)
- Coordination of CBTI development and the TICAD-IV commitment by the Government of Japan, for all-in-one packaging of power resources development, mineral resources development, and related infrastructure development

(4) **Development and Employment Promotion of Industrial Human Resources**
- Industrial human resources development for agro-processing and distribution industries

6.4.4 **Supporting Measures for CBTI - 2: Public-Private Initiatives**

As stated in Section 5.4, public-private initiatives are an indispensable scheme to provide effective linkages between trade/industry development and CBTI development. In principle, public sector thinking needs to consider “what types of policies/measures are most desirable in order for the public sector to pull and promote private investment in Sub-Sahara Africa, and to what extent the public sector can support the wide range of activities by the private sector”.

With the current global financial crisis intensifying, it is envisaged that private sector interests in entering into the market in Sub-Sahara Africa will decline substantially. The following comprehensive measures to reduce the risks faced by the private sector are urgently needed. Especially as outlined in Section 5.1, securing a stable supply of mineral resources is a lifeline of the economy of a trading nation such as Japan. Accordingly, bold government support for private sector investment should be provided to secure mineral resources in this region.

(1) **Surrounding Infrastructure Development**
- Development of supporting infrastructure for EPZ/SEZ construction at transport nodes and international borders
- Construction of road and rail access infrastructure for mine development
- Development of physical and institutional distribution system
(2) **Public-Private Partnership (PPPs)**
- Application of PPPs to port operation
- Application of PPPs to large cross-border bridge construction projects
- Application of PPPs to operation and maintenance, and the service delivery of infrastructure projects
- Capacity building of a PPP institutional mechanism

(3) **Policy Making and Institutional Development**
- Assistance for establishing a customs union, free trade zone, and monetary union
- Assistance for improving the food safety standards and quarantine system
- Assistance for deregulating the transport/distribution industry

(4) **Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP)**
- Support for the CSR activities of private companies moving into EPZs/SEZs
- Linkage between One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) development and HIV measurements
- Assistance for small and medium enterprise (SME)/non-profit organization (NPO) activities for the fair trade of primary agricultural products
- Provision of market information on agriculture products

(5) **Financing**
- Risk sharing between the public and private sectors for high-risk projects such as mine developments

(6) **Others**
- Development of human resources in the distribution industry and assistance for business management of domestic distribution companies
- Assistance to secure human resources for private companies moving into EPZs/SEZs
- Support for NPOs/NGOs involved in agricultural development/trade promotion projects

### 6.5 Model Program for CBTI Development in East Africa

Among the required CBTI measures/projects listed above, short-term measures (i.e., implementation desirable within 2–3 years) and medium-to-long-term measures (i.e., implementation desirable thereafter) specifically in East Africa were identified as set out below. While all of these measures are necessary for CBTI development in East Africa, they include some that are not eligible for Japanese official development assistance (ODA).

#### 6.5.1 Development of Hard Infrastructure

**1) Port (Sub)Sector**

It is essential to conduct a detailed study of the Dar es Salaam port and the Mombasa port, both of which have mixed issues of both hard and soft aspects as well as railway operation issues.

**Short-Term Measures**
- Introduction of a single-window electronic submission system that enables consolidated form inputs by trading firms and/or by customs clearing agents (e.g., as Kenya is introducing with its integrated system)

---

3 The “bottom of the pyramid” is the largest, but poorest socio-economic group.
Elimination of duplicate and unnecessary procedures (e.g., management and control of submitted forms by random inspection, improved coordination between/among the customs authority and related agencies, strengthened risk management)

Strengthened coordination by the customs authority with the private sector, introduction of a system of certified importers/exporters (simplified customs clearance procedure applicable for trading agents that have established large-scale transaction volumes)

Expansion of port capacity and efficiency through the expansion of yards/berths, and the strengthening of freight handling facilities and equipment, targeting Dar es Salaam Port (strengthening of Mombasa Port is underway with yen loan financing)

Moving toward the landlord port model, assisting Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Ports in building public-private partnerships for port operations by private container terminal operators on a competitive basis, including the dispatch of expatriate specialists in port management and operations

**Medium- and Long-Term Measures**

- Improvements of intermodal transshipment facilities and equipment: Targeting Mombasa and Dar es Salaam
- Development and provision of ICDs to Supplement Port Capacities: Targeting Mombasa and Dar es Salaam

**Railway (Sub)Sector**

As one of the most serious issues in physical distribution along the Northern and Central Corridors is the deterioration and insufficient capacity of railway infrastructure, assistance is required for rehabilitation. However, since this problem has been exacerbated by poor operation and management capacity under concession schemes, sustainable improvement of the railway systems cannot be achieved without addressing concession issues. Therefore, the current concession problems should be focused on urgently, followed by improvements in hard infrastructure.

**Short-Term Measures**

- Assistance to address the concession problems: Assist TRC and RVR in solving managerial issues related to their concessions. Assist TRC and RVR in establishing efficient and rational relationships between the governments and the private railway management companies, including rational risk sharing between the public and private sectors, and securing a sound business environment that affords a private business base4
- Maintenance of facilities and tracks: Needed is urgent maintenance for railway infrastructure in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda
- Strengthening railway operation and management: Improving capacity to manage and operate track and rolling stock, inclusive of strengthening the capacity and providing technology transfer in the areas of mechanical, civil, and electrical engineering

**Medium- and Long-Term Measures**

- Capacity expansion of locomotives and freight wagons: Targeted at TRC, KRC, and URC
- Rehabilitation of the Lake Victoria wagon-ferry line: present ferry transport capacity has been substantially decreased due to the aging ferry fleet, which was unable to carry past freight traffic volumes (up to 2003) (half of Ugandan railway freight traffic was routed from the Central Corridor via ferry services connecting Mwanza with Port Bell near Kampala)

---

Rehabilitation of Ugandan rail lines currently out of service

Expansion of the rail network: Developing a new line serving Isaka–Bujumbura–Kigali, over the long term

Harmonization with systems with other gauges: While most East African railways have a meter gauge (1,000mm), TAZARA and DRC railways are of narrow gauge (1,076mm). There is a plan to integrate all African railways into standard gauge (1,435mm). While any such effort would be costly and time consuming, gauge unification required due consideration from the (very) long-term perspective of an Africa-wide rail network.

Upgrading of railway service: Necessity to enhance financial efficiency in the railway sector and to develop capacity to serve market demand, adoption of unified railway technical standards by respective states, and introduction of relevant guidelines.5

(3) Road (Sub)Sector

As mentioned earlier, while improvement of most road sections along major corridors have been committed by development partners, it is important to continuously assist the required road improvements through continuous monitoring and evaluation of the project implementation. In addition, it is important to realize area-wide benefits through the development of feeder roads and subsequently rural roads; pro-poor development of the road sector is essential, in particular development targeting upgrading of poor areas near the border.

Imminent major bottlenecks relate to soft infrastructure issues, including the establishment of maintenance and management institutions, checkpoint administration, and legal and regulatory institutions for cross-border transport. While the World Bank has taken the lead in assisting introduction of road funds for maintenance and management, there remains the issue of enhancing the capacity of road maintenance contractors. Considering the progress with the development of hard CBTI components in the road subsector (i.e., physical infrastructure), complementary soft components should also receive attention.

Short-Term Measures

Developing feeder roads and rural roads: Improvement of access to the major road corridors. Delivering CBTI development benefits over a wider area, in particular providing areas of with high proportions of poor people with improved road access.

Improving weighbridge operation: Implementation of the following measures such as (a) weighing vehicles only at the point of loading, (b) use of weigh-in-motion rather than static weighbridges; (c) regular calibration of weighbridges by joint (multinational) teams to assure the accuracy and reliability of weighing equipment and create confidence in weights registered by respective countries along the corridor; (d) providing vehicles carrying containers with a certificate of compliance at the originating weigh station, after which they should not be subject to further weight controls until exiting the country; (e) operating axle load controls on private contract management, as has been done in Tanzania, with specification of fair and enforceable contract condition; and (f) levying user fees rather than fines for a criminal offense, thereby reducing delays by avoiding court proceedings, as also has been instituted in Tanzania.6

---

6 The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005, Chapter 4.
Third-Party Motor Insurance: Assistance in implementing the COMESA Yellow Card scheme including computerization of Yellow Card operations, with the national bureaus to link their databases to monitor the use of the card along transport corridors; and harmonization of Yellow Card coverage between/among counties so that insurance coverage is uniform.\(^7\)

Harmonization of Axle Load Controls: In view of disparities in maximum gross vehicle weight allowable in the SADC and EAC/COMESA RECs, and disparities in tolerance levels for axle loads allowable in Uganda and Tanzania, measures may include implementation of uniform legislation provisions, operational procedures, and rules by the EAC partner countries.\(^8\)

Road Transport and Health: Assistance in providing measures to alleviate the health impacts of cross-border road transport, including development of a multisectoral framework to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, focusing on long-distance truck drivers; and a move towards the use of more environmentally friendly fuels.

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Strengthening Road Maintenance Capacity: Strengthening maintenance contactors’ capacity, implementing necessary assistance through review and monitoring of outcomes from the Road Fund programs.

- Developing Trunk Routes other than the Central/Northern Corridors: Coordination among development partners, as many are involved in the development of trunk routes. Candidate trunk routes include; Nairobi–Kenya/Ethiopia border, Nairobi–Juba (Sudan), Kampala–Juba, Mombasa–Arusha, and Mombasa–Dar es Salaam.

- Harmonization of road traffic rules and regulations: Generally, the East African countries have not acceded to latest international conventions, including the Convention on Road Traffic (Vienna, 1968) and the Convention on Road Signs and Signals (Vienna, 1968). Therefore assistance is needed to harmonize traffic rules and regulations among the EAC partner states, including consideration of the right-hand drive/left-hand drive issue.

(4) Air Transport Sub(Sector)

Developing airports and improving air transport service is vital. Currently, facility improvement at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi with funding by the World Bank and liberalization of airport transport service is on-going. Specifically, provision of air shipment facilities and equipment for industrial promotion targeting at horticulture produce are warranted.

Medium- and Long Term Measures

- Liberalizing Air Transport Services: Assistance: (i) to complete the Yamoussoukro Decision (YD) legal and institutional framework, including adoption of common competitive regulations, adoption of guidelines/procedures/implementing provisions for the competitive regulations, and establishment of the executing agency; (ii) to agree on a permanent framework for external relations, and (iii) to agree on a YD implementation timetable and on

---

\(^7\) Refer to details on the Yellow Card Scheme presented in Section 4.2.4(2).

\(^8\) Refer to http://about.comesa.int/attachments/059_yellow-card-compendium.pdf; and the Chapter 5, the East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005.


- **Air Transport Regulatory Reform**: Assistance to set up a two-tier regulatory system, consisting of an independent civil aviation authority and a policy formulation bureau and strengthening capacity to formulate policies through laws/regulations and the negotiation of international agreements (including bilateral air services agreements).\footnote{E.g., the negotiation of bilateral air services agreements is a complex exercise, as the rights exchanged may not have the same economic value to the respective parties. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAIRTRANSPORT/Resources/514573-1117230543314/050617-East_Africa_Air_Transport_Survey_Revision_2.pdf [East Africa Air Transport Survey, 2005], p. 35.}

- **Reconditioning and rehabilitating existing cold storage facilities at the airports and their periphery, with respect to air shipment exports of cut flowers and horticultural produce, to be installed at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and Eldoret Airport (which presently lacks a cold storage facility) as well as at Kilimanjaro International Airport near Arusha.**

### 6.5.2 Soft Infrastructure

This section presents candidate measures for improving regulatory, legal, and management institutions, for which the assistance of development partners is envisaged, based upon the assessment of priorities of soft CBTI set out in Chapter 4.

#### (1) International Collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities

**Short-Term Measures**

- **Assisting Regional Integration of Multiple Economic Communities**: Assistance for the establishment of a free trade area (The Africa Free Trade Zone, AFTZ) encompassing the 26 states that are members of the EAC, COMESA, and SADC.\footnote{On 22 October 2008 in Kampala the heads of state of the EAC, COMESA, and SADC approved the establishment of a free trade area.}

- **Assistance to the EAC countries in their pursuit of the interests in the transport sector, including their adoption of a uniform approach in various international organizations such as COMESA, SADC, and NEPAD. Comprehensive guidelines for a common transport policy should be adopted sooner rather than later.**\footnote{See CPCS, *East African Railways Master Plan Study, Interim Report*, prepared for the East African Community, January 2008, p. C-22}


- **Assistance for Internalizing International Commitments into a National Legal Framework**: Assistance to help the customs officers and police understand and apply the new regulations, documentation, and formalities and strengthening of the capacity to put in place an effective monitoring and enforcement mechanism to assure adherence to agreed measures and timings.\footnote{See p. C-19, CPCS, *East African Railways Master Plan Study, Interim Report*, prepared for the East African Community, January 2008.}
Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Assistance for Accession to Major International Conventions: In the longer term, accession to and implementation of the major international transport facilitation conventions (including the Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets, the so-called TIR Convention, Geneva, 1975) should be undertaken.

(2) Customs and Transit

Short-Term Measures

- One-Stop Border Posts (OSBPs): Assistance in the establishment of a regional convention to provide a basis for an international framework for OSBPs, e.g., covering: (i) institutional arrangements, (ii) site configuration, (iii) status of the land of the control area, (iv) status of the infrastructure and equipment, (v) modality of the inspection process, (vi) status of expatriate staff, (vii) extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (viii) miscellaneous facilitation measures.

- Measures to Reduce Corruption: Assistance for: (i) reducing the level of bureaucracy by streamlining and simplifying clearance procedures and making them transparent; (ii) establishing a code of conduct for both customs officers and clearing and forwarding agents (CFAs), which should include standards for customs clearance in terms of duration as well as a provision of appeals of customs decisions; (iii) capacity enhancement, including information technology (IT) solutions, which will reduce documentation requirements and increase transparency, and workshops for CFAs, so that they can more effectively handle clearance documentation procedures; and (iv) implementation of anti-corruption campaigns.

- Assistance to Sensitize Frontline (Border) Officials: Assistance to sensitize frontline officials in understanding the problems faced by the private sector, and frontline officials.

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Customs Bond Guarantee: Assistance for making the COMESA Regional Customs Transit Guarantee (RCTG) fully functional (the RCTG is being developed with the support of USAID to bond goods on a regional basis instead of country by country), with the ultimate goal remaining accession and implementation of the major international transport facilitation conventions (including the TIR Convention).

(3) Cross-Cutting Issues

Short-Term Measures

- Assistance for Introducing Performance Measures to Monitor Transport Facilitation and Other Non-physical “Soft” Measures to Improve Transport Efficiency: Assistance for developing performance measures can support, analyze, and assess decisions in corridor management.

- Enhancement of Technical and Managerial Capacity for the Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport: Capacity strengthening including train-the-trainer exercises, e.g., provision of private sector associations (e.g., freight forwarders’ associations) with training to strengthen their capacity to articulate the costs of logistics inefficiencies on their business and investment prospects.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^\text{16}\) See Chapter 15, The East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005
Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Harmonizing Respective National Laws and Regulations with those of Regional Agreements: Assistance for partner states of respective regional conventions in harmonizing domestic laws and regulations, including close review and due diligence work; regional agreements to be reviewed may include the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (1985), the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement (2006), and the Tripartite Agreement on Road Transport between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of Uganda and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (2001).

6.5.3 Supporting Measures for CBTI - 1: Trade Promotion and Industry Development

(1) Reduction in Institutional Barriers

Even if a reduction in transport costs can be achieved through CBTI development, induced effects based on actual transport prices charged in the market may not occur due to the current inflexible structure of the transport industry, which is controlled by transport carriers/forwarders. In order to address problems stemming from industry cartels in the transport sector in region and subregion, it is necessary in the immediate term to move toward deregulation of the transport/distribution industry to lower freight rates. Moreover, over the medium to long term, new entrants to the transport market should be assisted to provide for a more competitive industry structure, although political difficulties may be expected.

Short-Term Measures

- Promoting deregulation of transport/distribution industry in Kenya, through the provision of technical assistance for transport-related agencies, the Kenya Transport Association (KTA), and the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority (NCTTCA), among others.

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Incubation of private sector enterprises in the distribution industry

(2) Development of the Agro-Processing Industry and Promotion of Primary Agricultural Product Exports

As stated in Section 5.2, the environment for small-scale farmers in East Africa is unfavorable, in part due to distribution system problems (e.g. an excessive excess number of intermediaries or “middleman”, the complexity of sales channels). It will therefore be important to rebuild the physical and institutional system of distribution in the subregion. More precisely, comprehensive support along the value chain of primary agricultural products is urgently required, e.g., support for enhancing the accessibility of small-scale farmers to market information (i.e., at the phase of production), support for adding value with the introduction of wrapping technology (i.e., at the phase of processing), and construction of a major processing center for the agro-processing industry (i.e., at the phases of processing, distribution, and export).

Over the medium and long term, it may be effective to tackle issues of quality control and tracking management of primary agricultural products, considering the emphasis on consumer demands for higher food safety standards, e.g., in developed countries such as those of the European Union. In addition, it is also necessary to continuously strengthen the food security system, although recent decreases in food prices have lessened the urgency of this requirement.
Short-Term Measures

Comprehensive support along the value chain of agricultural products:

**Production Phase:** Enhancing accessibility to market information for small-scale farmers in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania who are cultivating traditional primary products (e.g., coffee, tea, cacao, tobacco, horticultural products and subsistence crops), through the dissemination of mobile phones and the provision of information technology (IT).

**Processing Phase:** Technical assistance for agro-processing technology (mainly wrapping technology) for horticultural products in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.

**Distribution Phase:** E.g., construction and rehabilitation of feeder roads to the Northern and Central Corridor, introduction of refrigerated (chilled) trucks and reefer (refrigerated) containers, development of the “cold chain” at inland container depot (ICD)s.

**Processing/Distribution/Export Phase:** Construction of an Agro-processing EPZ/SEZ as a major center for the processing and distribution of agricultural products. Candidate sites include: Mombasa, the Nairobi suburbs, the Kenya–Uganda border, the Kenya–Tanzania border, Dar es Salaam, and Isaka, where ICDs are located. It is necessary to conduct a feasibility study in the short run.

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Comprehensive support along the value chain of agricultural products.

**Distribution/Export Phase:** Technical assistance for quality control/management skills for horticultural products (responding to the European Retailer Produce Good Agricultural Practice or Eurep-GAP standard), and for tracking management skills of horticultural products (e.g., to introduce the same management system of the World Bank project that utilizes Global Positioning System technology).

- Assistance to contribute to food security and poverty reduction: To promote cross border movement of the main food products of East Africa (e.g., rice, maize), and to enhance the food security system in the subregion.

(3) Linkage with Mineral Resource Development

As stated in Chapter 5 and the previous section, there is a wide variety of mineral resources in Sub-Saharan Africa and they are unevenly distributed across the region. Available evidence is that deposits in East Africa are not particularly promising. Therefore, in the short run CBTI development strategy linking with mineral resource development in the Subregion may be focused on the coal and iron ore reserves along the Mtwara Corridor and on the nickel deposits in Burundi, through public-private initiatives (to be elaborated later).

Short-Term Measures

- Potential mineral resources: e.g., the coal and iron ore reserves along the Mtwara Corridor, nickel deposits in Burundi.

(4) Development and Employment Promotion of Industrial Human Resources

It is necessary to have a medium- and long-term perspective when fostering industrial human resources for the agro-processing sector. Especially, providing training courses for the top management in this sector in order to improve management skills and quality control/assurance technology important.

6-19
Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- E.g., provision of training courses for the top management of the agro-processing industry in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; capacity building for industrial human resources in the distribution sector in this area; assistance to upgrade tracking management skills.

6.5.4 Supporting Measures for CBTI - 2: Public-Private Initiatives

As pointed out in the previous section, it is urgently needed to deregulate the transport/distribution industry in East Africa, and is very important to rebuild the physical and institutional system of distribution in the subregion. In this connection, comprehensive support along the value chain of primary agricultural products is urgently necessary. Possible priority public-private initiatives may include: (i) utilizing the private sector’s knowledge and experience for deregulation of the transport/distribution industry, and (ii) provision of ODA funds for the development of supporting infrastructure such as “cold chains”.

Regarding the initiatives linked with mineral resource development, it is essential to introduce a mechanism for substantially hedging the mining risks of the private sector through public-private operation, e.g., regarding the coal and iron ore reserves along the Mtwara Corridor and the nickel deposits in Burundi.

(1) Development of Supporting Infrastructure

Short-Term Measures

- Development of distribution infrastructure in relation to horticultural products through the application of grants and yen loans.
  - There is a past record of “cold chain” development for the horticultural industry with yen loans. However, post evaluation results showed that facility utilization ratios have been poor, due to competition with private reefer companies. Thus, care should be taken that such projects do not compete with other “cold chain” developments financed by foreign investment, i.e., to secure coherence with similar private sector projects.

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Development of “agro-processing” EPZs/SEZs: E.g., construction of supporting infrastructure such as power plants, water supply and sewerage systems, ports, access roads and railways, telecommunication facilities, in Mombasa, the Nairobi suburbs, the Kenya-Uganda border, the Kenya-Tanzania border, Dar es Salaam, and Isaka, where ICDs are located.
  - Since Kenya is experiencing a power crisis, it would be effective to construct a new power transmission line connecting Kenya and the new Bujagali Hydropower Plant in Uganda, which will commence operations in 2010.
  - Securing industrial water as a lifeline for the development of EPZs/SEZs is also recommended, considering that the agro-processing industry consumes a large amount of water. When utilizing underground water, environmental considerations should be taken into account.

(2) Public-Private Partnership (PPPs)

Short-Term Measures

- Application of PPPs to port operation: For Mombasa and Dar es Salaam Port.
- Application of PPPs to operation and maintenance, as well as the service delivery of infrastructure projects: Introduction of performance-based contracts for operation and
maintenance activities for the high-standard highways to be developed along the Northern and Central Corridors

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Strengthening PPP institutional capacity: Capacity building of government officials of transport-related agencies in each country in terms of PPP institutional mechanisms

(3) Policy Making and Institutional Development

Short-Term Measures

- Assistance for the deregulation of the transport/distribution industry: Policy making support through a collaborative relationship among industry, government, and academia

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Indirect support for promoting the elimination of tariffs, establishing a monetary union, and other endeavors of the EAC and COMESA, through a collaborative relationship among industry, government, and academia (such as the “Ishikawa Project” in Vietnam, i.e., the Study on Economic Development Policy for the Transition toward a Market-Oriented Economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam).
- Assistance for improving inspection related to food safety standards and the quarantine system for horticultural products (e.g., flowers, fresh vegetables).

(4) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Bottom of Pyramid (BOP)

Short-Term Measures

- CSR activities with public support: Public assistance for CSR activities (such as HIV/AIDS prevention measures) to be implemented by private companies that will move into EPZs/SEZs
- HIV/AIDS prevention measures at OSBP developments: Public support for HIV/AIDS prevention measures at Malaba, Namanga, and other OSBP sites to be developed.
- Enhancing accessibility to market information: Dissemination of mobile phones and IT equipment for small-scale horticultural farmers in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, through public-private initiatives

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Assistance for fair trade activities by SMEs/NPOs: Public support for SMEs/NPOs that are involved in the fair trade of primary agricultural products in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (especially coffee and tea)

(5) Financing

Short-Term Measures

- Risk sharing between the public and private sectors: Optimal risk allocation in high-risk projects such as mine development (main target: Southern Africa). In East Africa, mining development along the Mtwara Corridor and geothermal power resource development in Kenya are potential projects for this scheme.
(6)Others

Medium- and Long-Term Measures

- Development of human resources in the distribution industry in East Africa, and assistance for business management of private distribution companies in the subregion, through public-private initiatives
- For private companies that will move into agro-processing EPZs/SEZs as called for above, assistance to secure industrial human resources (e.g., to provide short-term vocational training with public support)

6.6 Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) for CBTI Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

6.6.1 Roles for Japanese Assistance

(1) Strengths and Weaknesses of Japanese Assistance

An underlying principle that has supported Japan’s ODA is “helping [he/she] who helps himself”.\(^\text{17}\) This principle of Japanese assistance has been remarkably consistent since the outset, while the principles adopted by other international development partners have at least arguably changed every 10–15 years. This consistency indicates a strong domestic consensus in Japan. This principle has led to a few salient features of Japan’s ODA relative to that of other international development partners, e.g., the high percentage of the loan portion in Japanese ODA in comparison with that of others and the strong emphasis on human resource development on any project or program supported by Japan. While it has often been claimed that the effectiveness of this principle was verified by the economic take-off of East Asian and Southeast Asian economies that were early recipients of Japanese ODA, this claim is likely an afterthought. Right after the Meiji Restoration (in the latter half of the 19th century), two publications became long-running best sellers in Japan: Encouragement of Learning by Yukichi Fukuzawa and Self-Help by Samuel Smiles. Valuing self-help is indeed deeply rooted in Japanese cultural tradition. The other side of this tendency is a dislike of charity, and the country’s ODA policy is no exception.

Another characteristics induced by the self-help principle has been the “on-request” principle. Japanese ODA is only provided in response to a request by the recipient country. In practice, however, particularly for major recipient countries, an annual consultation with the recipient country provides an opportunity for flexibility and continuity, and actual operation has not been so rigid. Still, in recent years, intensified competition among development partners and growing emphasis on mutual cooperation has eroded this “on-request” principle along with a general recognition in Japan that the “on-request” principle may not be consistent with national interest.

Another salient feature of Japan’s ODA has been that it is strongly led by government administration without revisions brought about by political change. It therefore has maintained a high level of consistency. On the other hand, this aspect has the deficiency of being slow in

\(^\text{17}\)Professor Toshio Watanabe, Economist, Takusyoku University, Tokyo.
adapting to changed environments. In addition, the vast majority of counterparts of ODA projects are also government officials, making it difficult to establish relationships with the private sector except for direct beneficiaries of projects.

(2) Role of Japanese ODA to Africa

The characteristics of Japanese ODA as mentioned above could either be viewed as a strength or weakness.

An important strength of Japanese ODA is that Japan can provide a comprehensive program combining various schemes that as a whole can promote self-help. This kind of assistance is rather unique among development partners.

However, even in such a case, if subject areas, subject fields, and subject targets are spread too thin in a country or a region, and consequently the results of such assistance can hardly be measured or felt except for those immediately involved, the net effect will not be favorable for the recipient (or the development partner).

Japan has consistently given Asian countries its assistance with the message of supporting their economic growth in a visual manner by heavily investing in visible infrastructure. The success of Japanese ODA to Asia has largely been due to the effect of this clear governmental message to the private sector, giving them a kind of psychological security. This has resulted in inducing foreign direct investment of a magnitude far larger than the official assistance itself.

Considering that the density of economic activities in Africa is generally much lower than that in Asia, it is important to select good “subjects” for assistance and to avoid spreading aid too thin. It is also probable that in order for a “subject” to be successful it could well be several countries grouped together, unlike in Asia where the “subject” has almost always been the individual country.

6.6.2 Japanese Assistance for Developing CBTI in East Africa

In providing assistance for CBTI development, it is necessary to focus on areas where Japanese advantages and strengths can be best employed, in coordination with other development partners. Since it is apparent that that remains to be done regarding legal/regulatory and institutional issues, it is important to provide effective assistance through a variety of programs, combining hard and soft infrastructure. Regarding a suitable portfolio for Japanese assistance for the development of CBTI in East Africa, drawing upon Section 6.4, the following are prioritized areas where Japan’s experiences and know-how could be particularly effective and well received in the subregion.

(1) Port Development

Concurrent with the ongoing Mombasa Port expansion project, which is financed by a yen loan, assistance in improving port clearance procedures and intermodal connectivity with trunk railway and road links is necessary. For Dar es Salaam Port, which suffers from worse traffic congestion than Mombasa port, it is also urgently needed to facilitate efficient port processing coupled with yard expansion.

(2) Railway Operation Improvement

In order to assist improvements in the operation and management of Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) and Rift Valley Railways (RVR), mobilization and employment of private Japanese railway company management experience, grants for freight rolling stock (wagons),
and yen loans for track improvement and the purchase of wagon may be considered. It is also necessary to examine the need for urgent assistance to rehabilitate the East Africa’s extremely deteriorated rail infrastructure, while concession issues of TRC and RVR may perhaps be best being assisted by the World Bank.

(3) Cross-Border Systems Improvement
Along with assistance for OSBPs, the efficiency of transit freight management system should be improved through IT solutions including computerization of the customs transit system, improvement of weighbridge operations and police checkpoint administration, and introduction of a truck tracing system with the use of GPS and IC (integrated circuit)-tags. Considering that pilot projects undertaken by the World Bank have not yet realized the level of performance expected, Japanese technology could likely be productively employed in this field and indeed a similar pilot project funded by Japan has already been implemented in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) of Southeast Asia.

(4) Assistance in Industry Development
It is necessary to assist agro-processing industry development, mineral resource development, human resource development, and the construction of EPZs/SEZs at ports and at nodes of regional corridors in coordination with CBTI development.

6.7 Issues of JICA Assistance
Issues of further JICA assistance for developing CBTI in Sub-Saharan Africa are summarized below.

(1) Needs for CBTI Project Formation in East Africa
This study prepared a model program for East Africa including priority sectors and measures. Based on this program, additional studies are required to formulate projects in East Africa. As mentioned, ports, railways, border crossing facilities and systems, and industrial development are proposed as CBTI development initiatives that can be productively assisted by Japanese ODA. It is important to proceed with scoping studies and detailed surveys/analysis to realize project implementation as early as possible.

(2) Studies of CBTI in Sub-Saharan African Subregions Other than East Africa
The results of this study of CBTI development strategies focused on the case of East Africa. However, it is acknowledged that the situation and conditions of the transport sector and transport infrastructure may differ among subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in other subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa longer times may be required for border crossing and road conditions may be worse. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake CBTI development studies to identify projects and priority sectors for each subregion.

Specifically, further CBTI studies may be implemented regarding the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique in the SADC Region, as well as the Nigeria–Cameroon Corridor and the Mali–Senegal Corridor of the ECOWAS Region, for which JICA assistance is ongoing.

(3) Examination of Risk Sharing between the Public and Private Sectors, and Private Sector Needs
As developing Sub-Saharan African CBTI requires proceeding with public-private partnerships as well as industrial development and trade promotion, it is necessary to better understand the
needs of the private sector, and to develop risk-sharing schemes between the public and private sectors. In particular, it is essential to establish institutional arrangements that enable quick decisions in response to demands by the private sector.

(4) Response to Operation and Management Issues of Ports and Railways

It is imperative to establish an institutional arrangement capable of delivering advice on appropriate countermeasures and responding to operational and managerial issues confronting the railway and port (sub)sectors, which are of vital importance regarding CBTI in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it is deemed essential for JICA to accumulate additional expertise on privatization issues.

(5) Studies of (Sub)Sector Issues

It is important for JICA to conduct sector studies to formulate individual CBTI projects based on a CBTI development program. Specifically, it is necessary to conduct further studies in subsectors in addition to the railway and port subsectors mentioned above, including road transport, air transport, trade and industrial development, and public-private partnerships, feedback these studies into the CBTI development program. For example, the railway studies may cover cross-boundary facilities and associated institutions, and trade and industry studies (e.g., addressing agriculture and mining) may analyze the required CBTI; the study results may then be made available for future CBTI planning.

(6) Assessment on Regional Impacts from CBTI Development

It is essential to assess the regional impacts of CBTI development, which are expected to include benefits such as poverty alleviation, and trade and industrial development. It is also important to assess negative impacts induced by CBTI development, including possible adverse effects on income disparities between/among the regions affected, induced income gaps, and environmental impacts; this knowledge should also be used for future CBTI planning. For example, the effort can commence with training programs on regional impacts of CBTI development for transport-related officials in several countries the region to raise awareness of the regional benefits of CBTI development.

---

18 Although suitable risk sharing between the public and private sectors may differ by project, generally it is necessary for the public sector to take considerable risk in PPPs for transport infrastructure projects with very low demand such as usually the case in Africa. For example, it is desirable that the public sector provide risk money (subsidy) for toll road projects because toll levels should remain low to ensure reasonable traffic volumes in view of the low affordability (and willingness-to-pay) of users.
Appendix on East African Railway Concessions

Tanzania

1. General Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Date of Agreement</td>
<td>3 September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parties</td>
<td>RELI Asset Holding Company Limited (Authority) and Tanzania Railways Limited (Concessionaire) – Government has 49% stake, RITES of India 51%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Concession Activities | • Use, manage, operate, maintain, and develop the concession assets  
• Provide rail transport services on the railway network |
| 4. Delegation of Concession activity Rights | Yes, subject to RAHCO consent |
| 5. Third-Party Access | Trans Africa Railway Company (TARC) |
| 6. Concession Term | 25 years (from date of commencement, which is determined by completion of conditions precedent and shall not be greater than 180 days from date of the agreement) |

2. Responsibilities of the Concessionaire

- Accepts all risks and benefits associated with concession assets (taken as is, where is, and with all apparent and latent defects) and undertakes to support all expenses related to those responsibilities, from its own resources, ensuring that they are maintained in good repair, condition, and working order so as to facilitate the provision of the required railway Transport Services
- Maintains infrastructure
- Prepares separate maintenance plans for moveable and immovable assets
- Submits an investment plan to RAHCO every five years – a total investment required of USD 364.37 million
- Conducts railway operations in accordance with applicable requirements and meets base passenger service requirements as specified in the agreement, with freedom to conduct business on a commercial basis (special provision for third-class passenger fares)
- At its own discretion, selects and employs ex-Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) employees with TRC responsible for all costs associated with those employees not so selected
- Achieves local participation by the sale of shares to Tanzanian investors
- Pays to RAHCO a fixed (USD 6-14.5 million p.a. inflation adjustable) and variable (5.0 and then 7.5% of gross revenue) concession fee
- Maintains appropriate books of accounts and financial statements, which are subject to oversight and review by the authority
- Adheres to base passenger service requirements as specified in concession agreement schedule 8
- Establishes a performance bond

Appendix-1
3. Responsibilities of the Authority

- Owns the infrastructure
- Responsible for modernizing/upgrading infrastructure and developing new lines (including signaling and communications infrastructure)
- Provides warranty for past contractual liabilities but after commencement date the concessionaire succeeds TRC to contracts
- Responsible for collection of trade debts and settlement of all liabilities of TRC
- Promotes and ensures the concessionaires access to assets and network
- Assists concessionaire with employment issues
- Assists concessionaire with commercial issues as necessary
- Establishes an escrow account

4. Observations

- Currently estimated that freight shipments amount to some 600,000 tons per year with a breakeven requirement for 2 million tons, which is not anticipated to met until 2011; this will require a subsidy
- Rail network at the outset of the concession (October 2007) was found to be in much poorer condition than was anticipated under the concession agreement
- The World Bank assisted the concession by the provision of loans of USD 36 million for track improvements (USD 8.5 million disbursed to date) and USD 44 million for rolling stock (USD 14 million disbursed to date)
- Railway freight customers have been lost due to delays in rehabilitating the lines to the extent that many of those ex-customers have made alternative transport arrangements focusing on roads or other ports – but note the bottleneck situation at Mombasa port
- Wagon availability is currently the major operational constraint but speed limits are also significant constraints on capacity
- Congestion at the port is also a constraint on railway operations but Dar es Salaam port has been rehabilitated for the last 30 years by external support and still the problems persist so no speedy, effective solution can be envisaged
- Development of inland clearance/container depots (ICDs) is ongoing but benefits will only be realizable once rolling stock requirements have been met
- Ferry facilities across Lake Victoria are also constraining freight development
- There is significant potential for rail-based freight ranging from nickel and paper products through to transit traffic to central African countries and particularly to the Democratic Republic of Congo – but the current reappearance of military conflict there presents further difficulties
- Gauge standardization is a further ongoing issue, which demands heavy investment and has not been resolved to date
- The TRL line is also dependent on links with TAZARA, which is in turn currently the focus of concession proposals restricted to Chinese companies as Tanzania has not repaid the Chinese credit used to build TAZARA in the 1970s
- Passenger traffic is not profitable with three passenger trains to/from Dar es Salaam per week
- About 40% reductions in staff numbers in terms of pre/post concession status’ the current staffing level is 3,200
5. Conclusions

- Track conditions and wagon availability are the major constraints at present although a broad range of operational difficulties are contributing further to lack of profitability
- Operational costs are significantly above target due to the operational constraints noted above
- Efforts to resolve the constraints are in hand but seem to be slow in implementation as witnessed by disbursement levels on existing loan facilities
- Technical assistance does not seem to be a high priority except perhaps in the area of marketing
- While the concession has only been effective for just over one year to date, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions but clearly much remains to be done

Uganda and Kenya

Note: Separate concessions applicable to the two countries have been granted, with a combined concession “over the top”; for this reason and given that there is a common network, comments for the two countries are presented together with country-specific observations as necessary.

The two countries agreed to undertake a joint concession of Kenya and Uganda railways to a single concessionaire – Rift Valley Railways (RVR) being the subsequent winning bidder. The joint concession was awarded through a bidding process governed by the laws of Kenya and Uganda. The concession covers more than 3,000 km of rail network across Kenya and Uganda, and will run for 25 years for freight services, and five years for the long-distance and commuter services in Kenya (Uganda has no passengers services).

The concession legal structure entails two national concession companies registered in each country (for revenue and expenditure accounting), and owned 100% by a Holding Company (HC). In December 2003, harmonization work was concluded and joint restructuring agreed by the Joint Steering Committee in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Governments of Kenya and Uganda. Further, the establishment of a joint railway commission for harmonization of regulations was envisaged. An interface agreement for cross-border issues and inter-governmental agreement to further harmonize regulations and operations was signed.

Financing

The value of the infrastructure assets of Kenya and Uganda railways jointly was estimated at USD 184 million. The value of the rolling stock able to provide services was estimated at USD 120 million (almost 50% of registered rolling stock items was regarded as scrap). About USD 120 million will be required in form of deferred maintenance so that all rolling stock assets are running again. The total value of equipment assets was estimated at USD 53 million (including USD 25 million for the marine vessels in Uganda). The total value of the real estate assets was estimated at USD 166 million (this includes value of operational buildings estimated at USD 38 million and the value of land at USD 128 million).

The concession’s long-term investment in Kenya (25 years) was estimated at USD 250-300 million (with USD 30-40 million in the first five years). The long-term investment for the concession in Uganda was estimated at USD 54 million, and USD 18 million for the short-term investment for the first five years.
The European Union (EU) is financing the repairs of the Nile Bridge, new culverts, and construction of 30 km of new track along the main Kampala-Malaba railway line in Uganda.

The proposed joint concession shareholding structure (transaction configuration) entails the formation of a Holding Company (that will comprise two national companies, one registered in each country). The Lead Investor is required to take at least 35% of the Holding Company. Specific targets were set for at least 20% Kenyan ownership and at least 20% Ugandan ownership of the Holding Company. A total of 40% of shareholding is reserved for local ownership is open to both public and private ownership with equal opportunity.

The concession fee structure entails:

(i) an upfront fee of USD 3 million in Kenya and USD 2 million in Uganda;
(ii) a variable annual fee for each concession for 25 years: 5% of annual gross revenues for the first five years; 7% of annual gross revenues thereafter;
(iii) a fixed annual fee for each Concession for each of the 25 years: amounts may vary from one year to the other; and
(iv) a fixed annual concession fee for each of the 7 years for the Kenya passenger services (the amounts may vary each year)

A performance bond by each concession company was prepared to cover penalties for non-performance of obligations and cap liquidated damages for concessionaire default. Core infrastructure and existing assets (and their rehabilitation) remain owned by the Governments of Kenya and Uganda. New investment in infrastructure remains the responsibility of the governments.

1. **General Conditions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Date of Agreement</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parties</td>
<td>Rift Valley Railways (concessionaire), Authority (Separate for individual countries and as a unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Concession Activities</td>
<td>Definition not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Delegation of Concession Activity Rights</td>
<td>Definition not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Third-Party Access</td>
<td>Definition not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Concession Term</td>
<td>25 years for freight, 5 years for passenger activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Observations**

- The operations of Rift Valley Railways are poor; a consultant found that the existing meter gauge track can serve Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but they need to modernize locomotives and wagons, and undertake track rehabilitation. The concessionaire is required to start track rehabilitation and procure new locomotives and wagons but these requirements have not been met to date.
- Existing management is poor in relation to both the concessionaire and authority entities.
- The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group and Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW, the German Development Bank) not disbursed funds to Rift Valley Railways yet due to covenants and due diligence shortfalls (conditions precedent).
• There has been some restructuring of shareholding (although the current structuring is not available in detail).
• Current freight traffic is 1.7 million tons per year as compared with theoretical network capacity of some 7 million tons.
• Cross-border processes are a continuing constraint.
• The concession agreement envisaged capitalization of USD 30 million but now the concessionaire estimates actual need is in the region of USD 190 million over the first five years.

3. Conclusions

From the data and status information available on these concessions, it is apparent that they suffer from very similar difficulties. It is also clear that such experience is not restricted to the East African region, but rather is a common feature of sub Sahara Africa-experience.

The World Bank has identified four core problem areas together with appropriate remedies and these are reproduced here for purposes of illustration and comparison with the situations encountered in the current focus countries.

Problem No. 1:  
Limited capacity and/or willingness of private operators to finance track renewal.

The true cost of track renewal needs to be acknowledged upfront. This cost should be carefully assessed to ensure full value extraction from the existing assets, and factored into the realities of the business. The fees for the concession should be modulated accordingly. Solutions that have the advantage of limiting up-front cost to governments while keeping the financial liability of the planned investment squarely on private operators need to be explored and, if feasible, favored even at the expense of lower concession fees.

Problem No. 2:
So far, railway concession financial returns have been low.

National transport policies that explicitly recognize the critical linkages between direct/indirect road user subsidies and railway concession financial returns, need to be defined. This could be done with the help of international donors and organizations such as the Sub Saharan Africa Transport Program (SSATP). Private operators also need to be realistically compensated for the financial risks associated with the operation of loss-making passenger trains, as Governments often fail to honor their subsidies commitments to these operations.

Problem No. 3
Effective and efficient regulation of private rail operators is needed.

Better enforcement of concession contract rules by regulatory bodies is needed in order to make private rail operators more accountable. This could be done by strengthening concessionaires’ contractual, financial and operational information disclosure requirements, strengthening regulatory bodies’ capacity as well as imposing annually independent financial and operational audits as part of concession contracts.

Problem No. 4

Government behavior vis-à-vis railway concessionaires needs to be more consistent, and in line with good business practices to promote efficiency and economies of scale.

Government-appointed oversight committees that are properly staffed, skilled and financed are necessary to ensure effective concessioning. Such committees must be politically and legally robust to protect private railway operators from unpredictable and arbitrary changes in their business environment that are often sought by disparate Ministries and other agencies. The members of these committees should meet on a regular basis with their counterparts from other railway concessions in order to share ideas, experience and information.
References

JICA, *The Research on the Experience and Perspective of ODA on Infrastructure Development in the Developing Countries*, 2004


Japan Research Institute, *Research Eye*, June 2008


JBIC Development Institute/UFJ Sogo Kenkyusho, *Pro-Poor Growth in Asia and its Application to Africa (Phase 2): Pro-Poor Growth through Creation of Employment Opportunities*, 2006


Jean-François Arvis (World Bank), Monica Alina Musta (World Bank), John Panzer (World Bank), Lauri Ojala (Turku School of Economics), and Tapio Naula (Turku School of Economics), Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy, The Logistics Performance Index and Its Indicators, 2007


Creck Buyonge and Irina Kireeva, Trade Facilitation in Africa: Challenges and Possible Solutions, World Customs Journal, Volume 2, Number 1, 2008

Global Transport Knowledge Partnership Newsletter, May 2008


C. Jakobeit, T. Hartzenberg, and N. Charalambides, Overlapping Membership in COMESA, EAC, SACU and SADC: Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations, GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 2005


Ernest Vitta Mbuli, Improving Transit Transport in East Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Contribution to the Mid-Term Review of the Almaty Programme of action, 16 April 2007

The East and Central Africa Global Competiveness Hub/Bearing Point (Harold Kurzman and others), Strategy for Implementing Harmonized Transport Policy Reforms and COMESA Facilitation Instruments in the Northern Corridor Region, Final Report, April 2005

Prome Consultants Ltd. in association with Dr. C. K. Kaira Associates Ltd., *Project Document for Support Services for Elimination of Non-Physical Barriers along the Northern Corridor, Final Report*, Appendix 3, prepared for the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority, April 2006.


*OSBP [One-Stop Border Post] Newsletter*, June 2008


Wambui Namu, Commissioner, Customs Service Department, Kenya Revenue Authority, *OSP [One-Stop Border Post] Operational Model [Background and Outlines]*, 14 May 2008

PADECO Co., Ltd., *West Africa Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program – Joint Border Posts (PHRD P0 79749), Final Report*, prepared for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), and the World Bank


The Steadman Group, *Report on the Assessment Study on Corruption at the Northern Road Corridor Transit Points (Baseline Study July 2007)*, for USAID Anti-Corruption Program, 2007, pp. 41-42, 44-45, and 62-64 [in spite of the study title, study coverage included Tanzania and points in locations other than the Northern Corridor]

*Performance Contract between the Government of Kenya and the Kenya Ports Authority for the Year 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*

Samuel O. Helu, Principal Planning Officer, Kenya Ports Authority, *Trade Negotiations and Pro-Poor Services Reforms in Africa: Status of Transport Services Reforms – Bridging the Gap for Enhanced Trade and Pro-Poor Growth*, Kampala, 4-8 February 2008

World Bank, *Port Reform Toolkit, Module 3, Alternative Port Management Structures and Ownership Modules*, 2007, p. 84


Kenya Ports Authority and the Kenya High Commission, Tanzania, *A Study of the Central Corridor (Dar-Rusumo/Mukutula) as an Alternative Route to the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Malaba/Busia)*, February 2008


http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/
[World Bank, Sub-Sahara Africa Transport Policy Program]


World Bank, *Road Network Upgrading and Overland Trade Expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2006


Aviation Week, *The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac*, 2002


EATTFP, *Report on Inspection Tour on Northern Corridor; 2008*


World Bank, *African Development Indicators*, 2007


http://www.integratedframework.org/files/english/Tanzania_DTIS_Vol1_Nov05.pdf  
[Tanzania Diagnostic Trade Integration Study]

[Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study]

[JICA, Corridor Map - Transport Corridor Inventory Information]

[Air Transport Liberalization Process in SADC, 2008]

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAIRTRANSPORT/Resources/514573-1117230543314/050617-East_Africa_Air_Transport_Survey_Revision_2.pdf  
[East Africa Air Transport Survey, 2005].

[World Bank, World Development Indicator]

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_toe_e.htm  

http://faostat.fao.org/  
[Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT]

[Gridded Population of the World]

[World Bank, Railways Performance Database]

http://www.ports.co.za/  
[Ports and Ships]