Peace-building and the Process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: the Experiences of Mozambique and Sierra Leone

March 2004
Peace-building and the Process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: the Experiences of Mozambique and Sierra Leone

Hinako Toki
（土岐 日名子）

March 2004

Institute for International Cooperation
Japan International Cooperation Agency
This report is based on the research findings by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 2003 Associate Guest Researcher. The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect those of JICA. Full text of this report is available in PDF format from JICA web site: http://www.jica.go.jp

The contents of this report may not be reprinted without permission from JICA.

Published by: Research Group, Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC)

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

10-5, Ichigaya Honmura-cho,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8433 Japan

FAX: +81 -3-3269-2185
E-mail: iictae@jica.go.jp
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary (in Japanese).......................................................................................... i

Executive Summary (in English).......................................................................................... vii

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. ix

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

2. Conceptual Analysis of DDR .......................................................................................... 8
   2-1 Definition of DDR....................................................................................................... 8
   2-2 Components of DDR — Lessons from the Past......................................................... 9
   2-3 From Reintegration to Development......................................................................... 13

3. Case of Mozambique ..................................................................................................... 15
   3-1 Background and Nature of the Conflict .................................................................... 15
   3-1-1 Internal Dynamics of the Conflict...................................................................... 17
   3-1-2 Economic Downturn .......................................................................................... 19
   3-1-3 Changes in the External Environment ............................................................... 20
   3-1-4 Peace Negotiation .............................................................................................. 22
   3-1-5 Post-Conflict Elections ...................................................................................... 23
   3-2 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique ............................................................. 24
      3-2-1 General............................................................................................................... 24
      3-2-2 Military Aspect of the GPA............................................................................... 26
   3-3 Overview of the Peacekeeping Operation................................................................. 26
   3-4 Design of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration .................................... 27
      3-4-1 Planning of the DDR Program........................................................................... 27
      3-4-2 Target Armed Forces ......................................................................................... 28
      3-4-2-1 The Mozambique Armed Forces .................................................................... 28
      3-4-2-2 Renamo ........................................................................................................... 29
      3-4-3 Implementation Structure .................................................................................. 30
      3-4-4 Demobilization and Reintegration Procedure.................................................... 31
   3-5 Implementation Process of Demobilization .............................................................. 33
      3-5-1 Outcomes ........................................................................................................... 33
      3-5-2 Constraints Related to Demobilization Process................................................. 33
      3-5-3 Post-DDR Disarmament .................................................................................... 36
      3-5-3-1 Operation Rachel ............................................................................................ 37
      3-5-3-2 Swords into Ploughshares Project .................................................................. 38
   3-6 Reintegration and Beyond ......................................................................................... 39
      3-6-1 Donor Involvement ............................................................................................ 39
      3-6-1-1 The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) by UNDP .................................... 39
      3-6-1-2 The Occupational Skills Development Program (OSD) by ILO .................... 40
      3-6-1-3 The Information Referral Service (IRS) by IOM ........................................... 41
      3-6-1-4 The Provincial Fund (PF) by IOM ................................................................. 42
      3-6-1-5 The Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) by GTZ ............................................... 43
      3-6-1-6 ISCOS Program .............................................................................................. 44
      3-6-2 Efficacy of the Reintegration Programs............................................................. 45
      3-6-3 Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants ............................................................ 48
      3-6-4 Towards Long-Term Development.................................................................... 49
3-6-5 Landmine Issues ................................................................. 52
3-7 Participation of Children and Women in DDR ........................................ 53
  3-7-1 Demobilization of Child Soldiers .............................................. 53
  3-7-2 Reintegration of Child Soldiers ................................................. 54
  3-7-3 Demobilization and Reintegration of Female Soldiers ................. 55
3-8 Regional Aspects of the Internal Conflict ........................................ 56
3-9 Lessons Learned ........................................................................ 58
  3-9-1 General .................................................................................. 58
  3-9-2 Disarmament .......................................................................... 59
  3-9-3 Demobilization ....................................................................... 59
  3-9-4 Reintegration .......................................................................... 59

4. Case of Sierra Leone ............................................................................. 61
  4-1 Background and Nature of the Conflict ......................................... 61
  4-1-1 From War to Peace ................................................................... 61
  4-1-2 Post-Conflict Elections and Reconciliation ................................. 64
  4-2 Overview of the Peacekeeping Operation ....................................... 66
  4-3 Design of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration .......... 67
    4-3-1 Planning of the DDR Program .................................................. 67
    4-3-2 Disarmament Component ......................................................... 67
    4-3-3 Demobilization Component ....................................................... 68
    4-3-4 Reintegration Component ......................................................... 68
    4-3-5 Resettlement Program .............................................................. 69
    4-3-6 Community Arms Collection and Destruction ......................... 72
  4-4 Implementation Process of DDR .................................................... 73
    4-4-1 Phases of Demobilization ......................................................... 73
    4-4-2 Outcomes ............................................................................... 73
      Table 4-1: Total Disarmed, by Group .............................................. 74
    4-4-3 Constraints in the Process ......................................................... 74
  4-5 Reintegration and Challenges Ahead .............................................. 76
    4-5-1 Involvement of Donors ............................................................ 76
    4-5-1-1 World Bank ......................................................................... 76
    4-5-1-2 UNAMSIL ........................................................................... 77
    4-5-1-3 The Department for International Development (DFID) .......... 78
    4-5-1-4 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ... 78
    4-5-1-5 The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 79
    4-5-2 Economic Reintegration .......................................................... 80
    4-5-3 Social Reintegration ............................................................... 81
    4-5-4 A Linkage to Development ....................................................... 82
  4-6 Participation of Children and Women in DDR ............................... 84
    Table 4-2: Estimated Total Forces, Child Soldiers and Girl Soldiers .... 84
  4-6-1 Demobilization of Child Soldiers ................................................. 84
  4-6-2 Reintegration of Child Soldiers ................................................... 85
  4-6-3 Involvement of Women and Girls in DDR Process ....................... 87
  4-7 Regional Aspects of the Internal Conflict ....................................... 88
  4-8 Lessons Learned .......................................................................... 92
    4-8-1 Peace Process and DDR .......................................................... 92
    4-8-2 Disarmament .......................................................................... 93
    4-8-3 Demobilization ..................................................................... 93
    4-8-4 Reintegration ....................................................................... 94
Executive Summary (in Japanese)

本研究の目的は、モザンビークとシェラレオネの事例研究をもとに、平和構築における武装解除・動員解除・社会復帰（DDR）の成功要因や問題点を考察し、それぞれの経験に基づく教訓から DDR 支援のあり方に関する具体的提言を試みるものである。特に除隊兵士の社会復帰分野に重点を置き、ドナーの援助動向およびプログラムの有効性を分析し、DDR が平和構築プロセスにより効果的に寄与する可能性を模索する。それぞれの事例研究では、紛争の歴史的背景や性質、和平プロセス、国連平和維持活動を概観するとともに、DDR の計画策定、実施体制、プロセス、成果および問題点を分析する。さらに女性や子どもの DDR への参加の実態にも着目する。モザンビークとシェラレオネは一般的に DDR の成功例として評価されているながら、その実施プロセスにおいて指摘される問題点も多い。本事例研究は、わが国が国際協力の一端として DDR 支援をより積極的に進めていく上で重要な指標を提示するものである。

平和構築は、人道的な緊急援助から、紛争後の復興開発、紛争の再発予防までも含む包括的な概念である。DDR はその一連のプロセスの中で重要な基軸を形成するものであり、紛争解決のための短期的および長期的な目標を達成するために不可欠である。すなわち、兵士を武装・動員解除することにより、治安の回復や政治的安定をもたらすといった短期的効果が期待される。また、除隊兵士の社会復帰はより恒常的な平和を促し、開発へと移行する基礎を築くことから、紛争解決にあたって長期的な意義を持つ。特に社会復帰は、武器や暴力のない将来を兵士に提示することにより、武装・動員解除を促進するインセンティブとなりうる。このように、除隊兵士の社会復帰は平和構築の短期的および長期的な課題を結ぶ重要な役割を担うものであるが、これまで実施されてきた DDR プログラムでは、それらの課題が常に変化的に連動してきたとは言い難い。DDR プロセスの多面性や、内包する要素の因縁関係に対する理解を深めることができたギャップを克服する一助となろう。

社会復帰支援は一般的に、除隊兵士が市民社会の経済的・社会的ネットワークへ戻っていくための個人の持てる能力を強化するものと考えられている。この作業は武力紛争によって荒廃した国にとっては多くの困難を伴う。紛争から平和への転換期には、悪化した経済状況の中で十分な雇用創出が困難であり、また除隊兵士が帰るコミュニティでも彼らを受け入れる経済社会的基盤が完全には機能していない場合も多い。さらに、紛争中に武装勢力から攻撃を受けたり、さまざまな暴力の犠牲となった民間人が多いコミュニティでは、帰ってくる除隊兵士に対する不安や不信感が著しく高まっていることがあり、除隊兵士の帰還が必ずしも歓迎されることは限らない。このように、武力紛争によって多くの人的および社会経済的
被害を受けたために、DDR 実施のための資源を十分に確保することが難しい国に対して、国際的な支援が果たしうる役割は大きい。

DDR 支援の基本的視点として、緊急人道支援から復興開発へのスムーズな移行を実現するにあたり、DDR 完了後を見据えた長期的な視野での DDR のインセンティブを設定することが重要である。インセンティブは除隊兵士のみではなく、コミュニティも対象とするものであることが求められる。例えば紛争による被害が著しい国では、破壊されたインフラや基本サービスの復旧を除隊兵士の社会復帰支援プログラムに連結させることにより、除隊兵士の雇用促進ならびにコミュニティ全体への利益の還元を実現することができる。それは開発への基礎となるだけではなく、コミュニティ自体が生活向上を実感することにより、除隊兵士への差別・不満を解消し、彼らの社会的な受け入れを助長することにもつながる。同時に、紛争の再発しない社会の再構築を目指す上で、国内避難民や難民、障害者も含め、紛争によって多大な影響を受けた社会的弱者への支援も、DDR プログラム実施時に求められる重要な視点である。（第1章）

第2章では DDR の概念を概観し、武装解除、動員解除、社会復帰それぞれの内容やプロセスの相関関係を考察する。平和構築にあたって実施される DDR には典型的なべきプログラムは存在せず、それぞれの紛争の様相や和平プロセスも含めて当該国の国情にあったアプローチが適宜選択されなければならない。しかし、多様な状況に共通する要素を DDR に見出すことは可能である。本章では、国際社会がこれまでの DDR 支援の経験から得た教訓をもとに、プログラム実施上の重要な留意点を指摘する。特に、紛争終結後の復興から長期的な開発へと移行していく過程において除隊兵士の社会復帰プロセスが持つ意義を、平和の配当の観点から、また経済的発展に寄与する社会復帰プログラムの観点から検討する。

第3章はモザンビークの事例を取り上げる。1992年10月に締結された包括的和平協定をもって、1977年以降フレリコ政権内の政府軍と反政府勢力のレナモが対立した内戦が終結した。その後国際支援を受けて実施された DDR では、国連の監視下、政府軍およびレナモの兵士約9万2千人が武装・動員解除され、武器も20万個近く回収された。社会復帰支援として、除隊にあたって配布されたパッケージ（服、2週間分の食糧、農具・種・バケツ等）に加えて、除隊兵士に対する退職手当として18ヶ月分の給料の支給や、職業訓練、職業紹介サービス、マイクロクレジット等のプログラムが実施された。

除隊兵士の社会復帰の実現にあたり、これらのプログラムの有効性には多くの問題点が指摘された。たとえば、不十分なニーズアセスメントや労働市場調査、職業訓練と雇用との関連性の欠落、識字を含めた一般的な学習スキルの訓練の欠如、都市部偏重のプログラム実施、プログラム実施機関の調整不足等が挙げられる。これらの結果として、コミュニティの実情やニーズにそぐわない職業訓練が実施され、長期的な雇用機会の拡大にはつながらず、さらに受益者間の格差が広がる事態が発生した。他方、雇用創出およびコミュニティの基本サー
ビスやインフラ復旧を目的とした労働インテンシブなプログラムの好例として、国際労働機関が実施した支線道路プログラムがある。しかしながら、このような労働インテンシブな事業に際しては、時間とともに変化するコミュニティのニーズに対応する柔軟性が要求されるとともに、その事業を超えた長期的雇用に結びつける努力が重要となる。

女性の DDR への参加は、武装・動員解除の段階で全体の 1.48%を占めるにとどまり、その数値の低さゆえに女性参加を想定した社会復帰プログラムが少なかった。子どもに関しても、児童兵士を対象とした DDR 支援プログラムが国連児童基金主導で実施されたが、武装勢力からの子どもの解放やアクセスの確保に関する問題が多く、実際にプログラムに参加できた人数は少なかったといわれる。

第 4 章では、シエラレオネにおける DDR プロセスを分析する。1991 年 3 月にシエラレオネ革命統一戦線 (RUF) の侵攻から勃発した内戦は、シエラレオネ政府軍、市民防衛軍 (CDF)、軍事革命評議会 (AFRC－RUF) といったさまざまな武装勢力間で戦闘が展開された。複雑な様相を呈した武力紛争も、西アフリカ諸国経済共同体 (ECOWAS) の介入や国連シエラレオネ派遣団の活動を経て、2002 年 1 月に各勢力の武装・動員解除完了とともに正式な内戦終結を迎えた。武装解除する兵士数の目標の 4 万 5 千人をはるかに上回る 7 万 2 千人を最終的に武装・動員解除し、4 万 2 千個の武器回収を達成したのは国際的に高く評価された。同年 5 月に実施された大統領・議会選挙も成功に終わり、現在は内戦復興、和解の促進、貧困削減を中心とした開発の課題に取り組んでいる。

DDR はその成果に関わって高い評価を受けるものの、プロセスとしては 1998 年 9 月に開始されて以来、停戦合意が三度見故にされるなど数多くの苦難を伴った。特に、資金不足を原因として DDR プロセス全体の遅延が重大な問題となった。確約された支援を受けることができないために除隊兵士の不満は高まり、暴動などが治安面での問題を誘発する要因となった。社会復帰に関しては、職業訓練や雇用促進・創出プログラム、教育、農業などの分野でのプログラムが策定されたが、それらの実施に際しても遅延の克服が最大の課題となった。各プログラムへの参加期間が 6 ヶ月と限定されていた点も、スキル習得といった目的に照らしてその有益性が問われた。

女性や子どもの DDR への参加は、シエラレオネの内戦での彼らの役割をあわせて国際的に大きな注目を集めた。子どもは反政府勢力の約半数を占めていたといわれるが、DDR プログラムに参加できた子どもは 7 千人程度（全体の 9.4%）に過ぎない。モザンビークと同様、武装勢力からの解放が困難だっただけではなく、動員解除後に再度徴兵されるという問題も指摘された。社会復帰で実施された教育や訓練・雇用プログラムでは、元兵士の子どもたちが社会的污名や差別に苦しむことがないように、内戦の影響を受けた他の子どもたちと区別なく支援されるよう配慮された。他方、女性に関しても DDR への参加者数は 4 千 7 百人程度であり、性的奴隷としてなど武力勢力内で強制的に働かされていた多くの女性の数を反映する
ものではない。内戦における女性のさまざまな役割や経験に対する理解不足、また DDR についての情報提供不足などが DDR プロセスから女性が排除される要因となった。

最後に第 5 章は、二つの事例の総括として、引き出された教訓を以下の 4 つのテーマに集約し、DDR 支援に際する指針として提案する。

(1) 和平合意への政治的意義:
紛争当事者による和平合意に対するコミットメント、DDR の実現に最も重要な要素である。モザンビークの例が示すように、各武装勢力は和平合意が破裂した場合を想定し、DDR プログラムでは粗悪な武器を排出する一方で良質な武器は温存する、あるいは敵対する武力勢力の DDR の進捗を懸念し自らの DDR を進めないなど、DDR プロセスの遅延に大きな影響を及ぼした。むろん、武器回収の量や質のみが DDR の成否を判断する材料とはなり得ない。重要なのは、武器排出状況の背景にある武力勢力の動静や政治的意図を正しく分析し、平和構築の進展を確実なものとするよう当事者に働きかけることである。紛争当事者の DDR に対する理解と合意遵守を促すためにも、当事者間の信頼熟成への努力は和平交渉の段階から重要がある。

また、シエラレオネの和平プロセスにおいて重大な阻害要因となったスポイラー（spoiler）の問題についても、DDR 実施と平行してその対処のための措置が講じられるべきである。和平合意の策定において細心の注意を要するだけではなく、スポイラーを可能にする要因（例えばシエラレオネの場合は「紛争ダイヤモンド」）を除去する、あるいは和解に良い効果をもたらすものへ転換するような多方面からの努力が必要である。

(2) 迅速な行動:
DDR の実施には安全の確保が不可欠である。国際社会は、そのために十分かつタイムリーな平和維持軍の派兵を実現するための資金協力を担う責任がある。迅速な支援の実現は支援プログラムの遅延を防ぐだけでなく、治安問題を予防する効果ともなりうる。また、モザンビークとシエラレオネは双方とも最終的に巨額の資金が投資されたが、DDR 実施にあたっては、前者は国際社会主導であり、後者はシエラレオネ政府がプログラム調整の主要な役割を担うという大きな相違点があった。シエラレオネのように、キャパシティビルディングの視点が DDR プロセスに組み込まれることにより、内政復興という意味で長期的な効果を期待することができる。

(3) 開発志向の社会復帰プログラム:
長期的な開発の視点から DDR プログラムを立案するのは、内戦によって崩壊した社会全体を再構築する上で重要である。コミュニティの基本サービスやインフラ復旧のための労働インテンシブなプログラムは短・中期的に雇用機会を創出し、元兵士とコミュニティ双方が利益を得ることができる有効な方策の一つである。しかし、それらのプログラムを実施する際にも長期的な雇用や所得増加の機会を拡充し、経済全体の再建も視野に入れた努力がなければ
ば、持続可能な開発へとつなげていくことはできない。また、ニーズ調査や労働市場調査のみならず、除隊兵士の属性、例えば教育や社会経済活動の経験の有無、武力勢力への参加経歴や役割についての詳細な情報収集に努め、プログラム策定に生かすことが肝要である。なぜなら、「除隊兵士」を同質なグループとして捉えるのではなく、個々人の状況や特性が勘案されるべきだからである。その意味で、女性や子どもへの配慮を平和合意に含める必要があり、またそれらの文言が実際に行動に移されるような体制を構築し、モニタリングを強化するといった方策が求められる。

コミュニティ重視のプログラムを実施する上で、DDR や除隊兵士に関する理解を深めるための啓発活動や情報提供を徹底することにより、コミュニティと元兵士の間の緊張関係を緩和することにもつながる。カウンセリングなども含めた精神面での支援は、トラウマを抱える人すべてが長期的で享受できるような仕組みをコミュニティ内に構築する必要がある。

(4) 和解と紛争予防:
平和とは単に紛争の不在を意味するものではなく、そこには問題解決のための積極的な対話のプロセスの形成が必要とされる。シエラレオネの真実和解委員会や特別法廷といった試みや、またモザンビークの例ではコミュニティごとの伝統的な儀式など、和解へのさまざまな取り組みが結果的に元兵士の社会復帰にも貢献するものと考えられる。和解努力をあわせて、平和の文化を築く土壌も作られなければならない。そのためには平和教育や人権保障の促進が肝要である。子どもをコミュニティ内で保護するシステムを構築することは、再徴兵も含めてさらなる子どもの人権侵害を阻止する有効な手段となりうる。

さらに平和構築の枠組みで行われる DDR では、小型武器問題も兼ねて指摘されなければならない。周辺国からの武器流入や非合法な取引が適切に制限されない限り、DDR の進捗は多大な影響を受ける。また DDR プロセスにおいて中途半端な武器回収や残存する武器管理が行われた場合、紛争終結後に当該国内外において小型武器蔓延の原因の一つとなる。もちろん小型武器問題は DDR での武器回収のみで解決されるものではない。地域的な法整備、協力体制の確立等の施策は DDR の成否を左右する要素の一つでもあり、小型武器の適切使用の防止や削減に向けても重要である。さらにコミュニティのレベルにおいても、非合法な武器を除去し平和の定着を目指すために、開発へのインセンティブを含むような自発的な回収プログラムなども DDR を補完する取り組みとして検討されるべきである。

以上の 4 点に基づき、また独立行政法人国際協力機構（JICA）によって作成された「課題別指針：平和構築支援」でも指摘されている事項も踏まえた上で、平和構築のための国際協力としてわが国が行う DDR 支援を次のように提言する。

・ 和平交渉の段階から DDR に関するプログラム立案に携わり、DDR と紛争的政治的解決を有機的に結びつける。
- 社会復帰分野の支援では、ニーズやプロファイルに関する事前調査を徹底し、長期的視野を持ちかつ柔軟な対応が可能な労働インテンシブプロジェクト、コミュニティ重視、マルチセクターアプローチ、といった視点でプログラムを実施する。
- 当該政府や NGO のキャパシティビルディングを念頭に置いた実施体制を用いる。
- DDR 終了後に開発援助を進めていく中で、母子家庭や孤児、障害者など、元兵士の中でも特に社会的に脆弱な立場にある人びとに対しては、物的および精神的な支援を必要に応じて長期的に継続する。
- 平和構築分野において、地域機関（例えば ECOWAS や南部アフリカ開発共同体: SADC）との連携を強化する。
Executive Summary

This study provides a general overview of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and analyzes the experiences of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, in which key issues and challenges were identified in the DDR and peace-building processes. The aim of this study is to analyze the factors that determine effective DDR processes, as well as to provide practical recommendations to the Japanese government to expand the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the field of DDR in support of peace-building. It examines the complex relationship among disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, with an emphasis on reintegration in connection with development. It seeks to explore possible incentives throughout DDR processes that would best facilitate transition from war to peace and subsequently to sustainable development in the long-term.

The comprehensive concept of peace-building involves responses to emergency needs, reconstruction, and prevention of recurrence of armed conflict. A process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants plays a critical role in the context of peace-building, meeting both short-term and long-term objectives. Successful disarmament and demobilization can particularly contribute to immediate political stability and security. Reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life lays a foundation for lasting peace and development. Specifically, effective reintegration opportunities allow combatants to foresee their future without violence, which consequently motivates them to lay down their weapons. Thus, understanding the complexity and interdependence of the DDR process is key in developing strategies and policies of DDR. Nonetheless, evidence from past experiences demonstrates that an effective link between the short- and long-term objectives in peace-building is not necessarily formed in the DDR process. Reducing the gap between the two requires well-executed reintegration initiatives that can provide viable incentives for disarmament and demobilization, which in turn connect to recovery and further development.

The DDR experiences of both Mozambique and Sierra Leone demonstrated that successful DDR is essential in peace-building; however, DDR by itself cannot solve every potential post-conflict problem. In war-torn societies, DDR initiatives must be accompanied by a broader set of recovery efforts, including reconciliation, reconstruction and governance. In this context, development organizations can play a critical role in bringing a long-term perspective of community-based development into DDR exercises, which would complement the political peace process. Responding to the pressing and divergent needs of former combatants and their returning communities with a development orientation would contribute to mutually reinforce other components of DDR and peace-building.

Among all the valuable lessons learned in the cases of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, this study illustrates four central elements as a synthesis. First, DDR exercises in both cases highlighted the importance of the commitments to the peace settlement by all the parties to the conflict. Much effort must be made to build confidence and trust among warring parties from the peace negotiation phase and throughout the DDR process. At the same time, an effective strategy should be devised at the domestic, sub-regional, and international levels to reduce financial and other means of spoilers to exacerbate the war. Second, prompt action is required on the part of the international community to ensure
sufficient financial support to DDR in order to minimize delays in the DDR process, which tend to cause security related problems. All the actors involved in DDR efforts must consider ways in which the effects of DDR can be optimized in the long-term. Thus, capacity building of government institutions and local NGOs has to be underscored in the process of DDR. Third, development perspectives should be included in DDR planning in the transition from war to peace. A community-based approach is desired in reintegration programs, as there are other groups of vulnerable people, including refugees and the internally displaced, returning to the same community as ex-combatants. For instance, labor-intensive public works to rehabilitate community services and basic infrastructure are beneficial to both ex-combatants and receiving communities; however, they need to be carefully designed to meet the evolving needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries and to link with longer-term opportunities. Needs assessment and market surveys of former combatants and communities are also essential in planning DDR. Fourth, broader undertakings should be ensured in the areas of reconciliation and the prevention of violence and crimes, in parallel to the DDR process. In response to the problems of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, effective undertakings are paramount both during and post-DDR period, within the context of conflict prevention.
Acknowledgements

I would particularly like to thank Ian Johnstone, Assistant Professor of International Law, and Peter Uvin, Henry J. Leir Associate Professor of International Humanitarian Studies, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, for providing valuable advice. I am highly indebted to Markus Kostner at the World Bank whose advice was vital for my research. I also would like to express appreciation for their assistance and insights to the staff at the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Institute for International Cooperation. I also owe my deepest gratitude to Taryn Lesser and Sharifa Pastori for editing and sharing their wisdom.

Lastly, I am most grateful to those individuals who provided valuable personal support to me in preparing this document.

Note that none of the above individuals or institutions are responsible for any factual errors in this document and the views contained herein are solely the responsibility of the author.
1. Introduction

Effective peace-building in armed conflict is dependent on successful implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life. DDR is imperative in promoting political solutions to conflict because it facilitates the restoration of security on the ground, and creates an impetus for recovery of a country emerging from conflict. DDR makes a crucial contribution to stabilizing a post-conflict situation, reducing the likelihood of renewed violence—either because of a relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry—and to facilitating a society’s transition from conflict to normalcy and development.¹ Effective DDR ultimately leads to a successful and lasting transition from conflict to peace.

DDR has been increasingly regarded as a priority in post-conflict peace-building efforts during the past decade. The first United Nations peacekeeping operation to conduct disarmament and demobilization was the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in 1989.² Since then, a number of UN operations assumed various responsibilities for DDR, either within or outside of the mandate.³ The Brahimi Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations recommends that demobilization and reintegration programs are to be considered for the first phase of complex peace operations in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict.⁴ Therefore, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs are primary elements in all new peacekeeping and peace-building operations. In view of addressing the institutional capacity of the UN system to support DDR efforts, the UN established a Task Force on DDR in September 1999. The Task Force, chaired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), developed guidelines on the institutional division of labor of DDR as well as a broad strategy for DDR.⁵ It defined a leadership and coordination framework in the con-

² Ibid., para. 9.
³ Examples for the latter include the UN operation in East Timor. See, Ibid, para. 10.
text of DDR, and developed ways of mobilizing the wide range of expertise and resources available both within and outside of the UN system.\textsuperscript{6}

In addition to the changes within the UN system, both multilateral and bilateral aid donors have increasingly recognized the significance of support for DDR activities. In recent years the World Bank has become increasingly involved in providing technical, financial and capacity-building support in the area of DDR.\textsuperscript{7} As a prime example, the World Bank set up the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to facilitate broad donor support to the DDR program in Sierra Leone, which accounted for roughly 50 percent of the overall resources invested in the DDR activities.\textsuperscript{8} Other financial support by the World Bank included direct financing through Emergency Recovery Credits, budget support and a Post-Conflict Fund Grant.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guideline of conflict prevention explicates, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have come to agree on the eligibility of a broad range of peace-related assistance to be classified as official development assistance (ODA). These include, for instance, demobilization and explosive mine removal for developmental purposes.\textsuperscript{10} These positive trends in donor attitudes concerning DDR demonstrate the wide acknowledgement of DDR and peace-building as central issues leading to development.

It is generally acknowledged among the donor community and practitioners that there is no blueprint for DDR. Programs and strategies that are successful in one DDR operation might not suit the circumstances of another. The nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes, for instance, have implications for the DDR process and affect what type of program will be most appropriate. Nevertheless, there is a range of issues of critical importance commonly observed in DDR practices that calls for concerted international responses. One of the major issues is the complex involvement of children and women in armed conflict. Two million children were killed in the last decade’s conflicts, six million

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{9} Bradley, Fusato, and Maughan, “Sierra Leone.”
disabled, 20 million fled from their homes and more than 300,000 forced to fight.\textsuperscript{11} The abundance of cheap and easy-to-use small arms made it easier to induce youth and children to take up arms.\textsuperscript{12} Girls can also be recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage, in addition to their participation in fighting.

However, DDR processes have often inadvertently excluded children, and especially girls, as was the case in Angola and Liberia.\textsuperscript{13} By the same token, DDR initiatives, at times, have failed to acknowledge female combatants. For example, the demobilization program in Mozambique only granted resettlement allowances to men and only men’s clothing was issued.\textsuperscript{14} In the course of planning DDR programs, special attention must be paid to the needs and priorities of female and child combatants, as well as other vulnerable groups such as disabled/chronically ill soldiers, and family members of demobilized soldiers. DDR activities that only focus on one segment of society, often former male combatants, without considering how that group interacts with the rest of society, only have limited success in transforming them into civilian life.

The process of DDR cannot be viewed as a simple sequence of events, but rather, these activities form a continuum and are related and mutually reinforcing.\textsuperscript{15} In particular, the reintegration component represents a complex element of the DDR process, which needs to be pursued in a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.\textsuperscript{16} As Joanna Spear rightly argues, reintegration is the most effective way to break former combatants’ ties to their former military units and allows a means for them to provide for their dependents.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time, it is imperative to strike a balance between assisting ex-combatants and other sectors of the war-affected population. It is important to


\textsuperscript{12} A child soldier is defined as “any person under 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage.” See, \textit{The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR}, para. 7.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., para. 53.


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR}, para. 8.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., paras. 80 – 81.

avoid giving the misleading impression that ex-combatants are rewarded for their acts during the conflict. The ultimate goals of DDR are to reintegrate former combatants in the community where they may reconcile with other people affected by the conflict and to restore the society resilient to conflict.

The aim of this study is to analyze the factors that determine effective DDR processes, as well as to provide practical recommendations to the Japanese government to expand the use of ODA in the field of DDR in support of peace-building. An emphasis is put on the part of reintegration, with a link to reconstruction and development assistance in the long-term. However, as already stated, the process of reintegration is intricately related to disarmament and demobilization, which warrants a thorough analysis on the continuity and correlation of each process within DDR practices. This paper focuses on the cases of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, in which key issues and challenges were identified in the DDR and peace-building processes.

The DDR programs in both Mozambique and Sierra Leone are generally considered as successful cases due to their pivotal roles in bringing an end to their civil wars. In Mozambique, the aspects of DDR were incorporated into the General Peace Agreement (GPA) for Mozambique signed in October 1992 between Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique: Frelimo) and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). The implementation was tasked to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1993 to 1994. The UN reported that 91,691 soldiers registered, of which 78,078 were demobilized\(^\text{18}\) when the demobilization process substantially concluded, and 111,531 pieces of military equipment were registered.\(^\text{19}\) According to the UN report, the success of demobilization in Mozambique is attributed to the adequate resources made available to the ONUMOZ operation as well as the constant high-level political attention given to the process.\(^\text{20}\)

The DDR program in Sierra Leone that commenced in 1997 was originally designed to target an estimated 45,000 combatants, comprising members of the Revolutionary United

---


\(^\text{20}\) *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR*, para. 65.
Front (RUF), former Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF). By January 2002, approximately 72,500 combatants were disarmed and demobilized, and 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed. On 18 January 2002, with disarmament completed all over the country, the government of Sierra Leone declared the 11-year war officially over. Demobilization processes in camps were completed by February 2002. This program, funded by the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom, is highly commended for its outcome.

The experiences in Mozambique and Sierra Leone provide valuable lessons. Despite its relative success, demobilization and reintegration programs in Mozambique experienced various shortcomings and complications. First of all, the process of demobilization was to a large extent delayed due to a number of factors, as ONUMOZ consequently faced logistical problems during the assembly of troops. Secondly, security issues constituted a constant problem throughout the DDR process. Thirdly, weapons collected at demobilization proved to be problematic. The weapons voluntarily turned over to ONUMOZ, in the first place, represented only a token gesture by the two parties, and the verification exercises conducted by ONUMOZ were often considered inadequate. The weapons were not destroyed when collected, and often went into the hands of civilians and the demobilized after ONUMOZ left Mozambique. The failure to destroy retrieved weapons during the ONUMOZ operation subsequently put national stability and regional peace in peril. Lastly, it is often criticized that concrete implementation of child-conscious demobilization plans had been entirely forgotten. A number of innovative reintegration programs facilitated large-scale demobilization; nevertheless, the extent of economic reintegration of former combatants achieved today remains questionable.

---

25 *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR*, para. 76.
In Sierra Leone, some critical concerns with regard to the DDR process included: the general discontent of the RUF with the DDR process, suspension of reinsertion payment, the problem of re-recruitment after implementing DDR, and inadequate DDR programs for children, girls, and women. More importantly, the delay and inadequacy of the reintegration programs was severely criticized. The Sierra Leonean government commenced the delivery of reintegration opportunities at the beginning of January 2000, albeit on a limited basis. The reintegration process was completed in February 2004; however, the youth particularly still do not envisage better prospects of employment or income generating opportunities. This can lead to a situation where former combatants decide to re-arm themselves and participate in continued fighting in neighboring countries such as Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Further support for the reintegration of former combatants will be key in consolidating peace and achieving development in Sierra Leone, as well as within the sub-region.

This study on the cases of Mozambique and Sierra Leone raises the following questions:

1. What are the factors of successful DDR?
2. What are the most viable methods in linking humanitarian assistance to development assistance in the course of DDR processes?
   How can demobilization, reintegration, and development be reconciled in the context of peace-building?
3. What is the role of the international community in supporting DDR efforts?
   How can regional initiatives be enhanced in this respect?

These are essential questions in pursuing effective peace-building, because the ultimate goal of conflict resolution is to reconstruct a country in a post-war situation and to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Disarmament and demobilization are vital steps in creating a ground for immediate peace; however, reintegration of demobilized combatants in communities where they can find alternative economic prospects bears far greater potential development in the long-term. In a country where much of the infrastructure is damaged by war and the government structure is weak, international assistance supporting DDR can be a considerable determinant of a successful peace process. Much attention has to be paid to regional approaches within the context of DDR, as the interests of adjacent countries are highly at stake in security and socio-economic terms. An effective control of the flow of
combatants and weapons to and from neighboring countries can prevent a relapse into armed conflict and spillover of violence to other countries. By answering the aforementioned questions, this paper attempts to explore variables of DDR processes, as part of a larger framework of peace-building in order to reconcile short-term goals of ending violence and long-term goals of development.

My main argument is that international assistance to the DDR process should put more emphasis on reintegration activities with a long-term perspective of community-based development. The process of reintegration of ex-combatants is closely related to disarmament and demobilization. If combatants cannot foresee their life without weapons and violence upon reintegration, disarmament and demobilization would not succeed in the first place. This means that appropriate incentives for disarmament and demobilization would have a significant impact on the success of reintegration. It is imperative to apply incentives for disarmament and demobilization with a progressive linkage to development in more concrete terms. In war-torn societies, where socio-economic infrastructure is vastly devastated, labor-intensive projects for rehabilitation can be an effective tool in reducing the gap between humanitarian emergencies and development. These incentives should not only target combatants, but all members of war-affected communities, in a holistic manner that leads to sustainable peace and development. Special care must be taken to address crucial issues of female soldiers, child soldiers, the disabled, and other vulnerable groups of people affected by conflict, including displaced populations. In other words, support of DDR efforts should not be undertaken to the exclusion of other elements of humanitarian and development assistance.26

This paper begins with providing a general overview of DDR, including a description of various components and pertinent issues of the DDR process. It analyzes the DDR experiences of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, and discusses central issues that provide lessons for future DDR programs in other conflict areas. It examines the complex relationship among disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, with an emphasis on reintegration in connection with development. It seeks to explore possible incentives throughout DDR processes that would best facilitate transition from war to peace and subsequently to sustainable development in post-conflict situations.

---

2. Conceptual Analysis of DDR

In war-torn societies, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are integral parts of a political-military solution to conflict. Although there is no universal application of a DDR program in all conflict-afflicted countries, it is imperative to understand the basic elements of DDR.

2-1 Definition of DDR

The concept of DDR may vary according to the context in which one operation is implemented as well as actors who implement it. According to the Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, the activities of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are defined as follows:

Disarmament is the collection of small and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management programmes, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction. Demining may also be part of this process.

Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new unified military force.

Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects. These measures frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons; economic development at the community and national level; infrastructure rehabilitation; truth and reconciliation efforts; and institutional reform. Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term success of reintegration.

28 The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR, para. 6 (a) (b) (c).
There are instances in which “reinsertion,” “rehabilitation,” or “resettlement” is also included as part of formal DDR programs. Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR), implemented by the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is one example. In general, “reinsertion” refers to the period between demobilization and reintegration. Entitlement packages, either in cash or in-kind, are in most cases provided to former combatants as a safety net during this transition for a period of about 6 to 12 months.29 The rationale behind this kind of assistance is that ex-combatants may have very limited resources for sustaining themselves in the short-term before establishing their lives in a civilian environment. Reinsertion assistance would commonly target the major survival concerns of ex-combatants and their families, such as food, housing, health support, and education for children.30

These definitions provide useful guidance for conceptual and planning purposes; however, the distinctions between these phases and kinds of activities are to some extent artificial.31 Many of demobilization and reintegration activities overlap, and the extent to which their interdependence is recognized at the planning stage is important for their long-term success.32 In addition, the issue of the sequence of DDR components is worth consideration. It is argued that it may be beneficial in some cases to start the reintegration activities before the disarmament and demobilization processes are completed. In such instances, a reintegration program can provide a venue for convincing combatants to disarm and demobilize while building confidence in the process. Economic and social benefits associated with participating in reintegration programs can serve as carrots.33

2-2 Components of DDR—Lessons from the Past

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in countries emerging from conflict encompasses at least five distinct dimensions: political,  

---

29 Typically, the duration is one growing season. See, Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2-3, 15.
30 Ibid., 15.
32 Ibid.
military/technical, security, humanitarian, and socio-economic. Every dimension needs to be integrated closely into the whole. Past DDR experiences suggest some key lessons for such an integrated approach and for the continuum of various components in DDR.

In disarmament, which commonly takes place in the assembly areas for demobilization or in the communities, arms must be registered and properly disposed of. They may also be transferred to a national army. In either case, management of weapons collected during the disarmament process is of vital importance. Improper management of weapons collected through the disarmament process can create security risks if retrieved weapons are stolen, such as the rearmament of ex-combatants, an increase in violence and crime, and the export of weapons to other conflict areas. Therefore, this process would not succeed without an overall political strategy. Mats Berdal correctly points out that disarmament per se does not necessarily enhance security unless it is part of a broader political process that seeks to reconcile conflicting parties and enhance security by a mixture of confidence-building measures. He further warns that partial disarmament can be potentially destabilizing.

In addition, an individual’s decision to disarm is often influenced by the perception of personal and economic security. This makes disarmament a continuing process that is dependent on a myriad of factors, such as the state’s ability to protect its citizens, crime levels, economic opportunities, and the degree to which the use of weapons has become legitimized within society. Therefore, the international community, which has a vital role in monitoring and verifying the disarmament process, must also take into consideration cultural elements of arms in the respective conflict zones.

In demobilization, the cantonment of combatants in specified, easily accessible assembly areas or discharge centers is a precondition for effective demobilization. It is necessary to

37 Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, 38.
38 Ibid., 28
39 UN, Department for Disarmament Affairs, “Gender Perspectives on Small Arms,” Briefing note 3, March 2001, 3.
provide adequate food and health services in the camps to avoid breakdowns in discipline, security incidents, and the outbreak of diseases. The duration of cantonment should be as short as possible, because experience points to the difficulty of sustaining discipline over longer periods of time and to the high costs associated with this phase.\textsuperscript{40}

Holding orientation sessions for combatants during demobilization, including the distribution of pre-discharge information, has proved beneficial. The sessions should give combatants information with regard to their benefits, program details, civic and community duties, training and employment opportunities, access to land and credit, income generating activities, and family and health issues.\textsuperscript{41} It is also pointed out that former combatants come from a range of political, social and economic backgrounds, and therefore, have varying perceptions, expectations and problems in regard to their future life. Reorientation programs with briefings, counseling and training should take these different personal situations into account and offer assistance for a return to civilian life.\textsuperscript{42}

Equally important is post-discharge information. Ex-combatants and their dependents should receive orientation shortly after their arrival at their destination, as many reintegration challenges confronting them are locale-specific. Counseling sessions should focus on relevant local issues such as economic opportunities, local institutions, customary rights of women, property rights, contract legalities, environmental information, and the particular social reintegration context. These sessions may also offer an opportunity for ex-combatants to be introduced to local officials, community leaders, and, potentially, other ex-combatants who have been demobilized previously.\textsuperscript{43} In this respect, sensitization of the local population is equally important to gain public support for DDR processes.\textsuperscript{44}

Reintegration is a continuous, long-term process that takes place at social, political, and economic levels. According to the World Bank, social and political reintegration is broadly defined as the acceptance of an ex-combatant and his or her family by the receiving community and its leaders. On the other hand, economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant’s household through productive and gainful

\textsuperscript{40} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 12.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{DDR of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment}, 75.
\textsuperscript{43} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{DDR of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment}, 77.
employment.\textsuperscript{45} It must be stressed that reintegration support must go beyond mere cash handouts. Reintegration programs must be designed to encourage long-term productive activity, as well as to address the problems of socially integrating former combatants into society.\textsuperscript{46} In this respect, counseling, information dissemination, and referral services are important to assist ex-combatants in accessing economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{47} Reconciliation at the local level would also play an important role in facilitating the reintegration of ex-combatants. Traditional forms of reconciliation, such as purification rituals, have proved effective in this regard.

The reintegration of former combatants often takes place in a very sensitive and difficult political environment.\textsuperscript{48} It is a reasonable concern that benefits provided to former combatants as part of DDR programs may give an impression to civilians that the ex-combatants are getting privileged treatment or rewards. Benefits and subsidies for ex-combatants should meet the individuals’ specific needs without engendering resentment on the part of their communities and society in general.\textsuperscript{49} DDR programs that enhance community development can contribute significantly to political and ethnic reconciliation, rehabilitation of the economic base, and restoration of social capital at the community level.\textsuperscript{50}

In every aspect of the DDR process, special consideration is required for vulnerable groups such as female and child combatants, the disabled, and dependents of former combatants. It is pointed out that a limited understanding of women’s multifaceted roles in armed conflict, such as cooks, spies, and sexual slaves, tends to exclude women from benefits under DDR programs. However, it is increasingly recognized that involving women in peacebuilding efforts is not only essential to a successful and lasting transformation, but is also a means to promote fuller participation of women in other aspects of a post-conflict society.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{45} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 18.
\textsuperscript{46} Berdal, \textit{Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars}, 46-49.
\textsuperscript{47} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 19.
\textsuperscript{49} DDR of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, 77.
\textsuperscript{50} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 8.
\end{footnotes}
It is recognized that women have a great deal to contribute to weapons collection and reintegration programs if they are properly educated and trained. But, such initiatives would not be effective unless the participation of women is accepted and their knowledge is utilized.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, some child soldiers participate in formal demobilization exercises with adults, but many are excluded because of age, gender, or function.\textsuperscript{53} This problem can partly be addressed by assuring inclusive, community-based reintegration, but it is vital to include the issue of child soldiers when devising peace agreements and DDR programs.

\textbf{2-3 From Reintegration to Development}

The economic benefits of ending a war extend well beyond savings in military-related costs. DDR initiatives affect the economy at both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. On the one hand, they contribute to the restructuring of government spending; on the other hand, they allow many people to enter the civilian labor market.\textsuperscript{54} Financial and economic returns resulting from DDR exercises can indicate a “peace dividend” for the government and the economy. But, it is probable that a substantial peace dividend will not be achieved in the short run, especially when the costs of DDR programs are enormous. Precise calculation of a peace dividend also may not be possible due to lack of relevant official data. However, peace dividends of DDR need to be understood in broader social and economic terms as well as in financial terms.\textsuperscript{55}

In order to enhance the economic impact of DDR processes, it is suggested to link a country’s overall macroeconomic reform program, especially as it concerns the public expenditure mix, to the planned reintegration program.\textsuperscript{56} This can be achieved by associating reintegration initiatives with public works programs designed to rehabilitate the basic economic infrastructure, for instance, rebuilding roads, bridges, schools and health clinics. These labor-intensive projects would create a significant number of jobs in the short- to medium-term, at an important period of social adjustment for demobilized soldiers. At the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 39-43.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
same time, the demobilized would acquire skills and work experience that would help them find work or create employment opportunities in the future.\textsuperscript{57}

Incorporating a development perspective in the reintegration of ex-combatants can serve to benefit all members of a community. On the one hand, the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society can place a heavy burden on a country’s labor market. Yet, on the other hand, ex-combatants can contribute to economic development by entering into productive, income-generating activities.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, the involvement of ex-combatants in measures to rehabilitate the infrastructure is effective in enabling the receiving communities to experience a direct and tangible improvement in the post-conflict situation.\textsuperscript{59} This, in turn, would raise the level of social acceptance for ex-combatants by the community members. Therefore, well-designed labor-intensive projects for rehabilitation of community with an appropriate long-term perspective can create a ground for sustainable development.


\textsuperscript{58} Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, \textit{The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa}, 43.

3. Case of Mozambique

In 1992, the government of Mozambique and Renamo signed a peace agreement in Rome, putting an end to the 16 years of devastating civil war. The peace process in the case of Mozambique is generally considered successful. In many respects, the short-term objectives of the international agenda for change have been met, which include: the internationally sponsored peace negotiations, which brought the civil war to an end; reconfiguring the country’s socialist economy through structural adjustment; economic growth resulting from privatization and a move towards a market economy; and the carrying out of internationally recognized elections. However, Mozambique today faces a myriad of challenges, particularly in poverty reduction. Despite the remarkable economic growth achieved after the war, Mozambique placed 170th out of 175 countries listed in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) in 2003, and also remains dependent on foreign assistance for much of its annual budget.

This case study examines the overall process of demobilization and reintegration implemented by the UN from 1993 to 1994. It identifies the factors that contributed to the success of peace-building in Mozambique, and analyzes the impact of DDR on the subsequent development in Mozambique.

3-1 Background and Nature of the Conflict

The armed struggle for independence in Mozambique began in 1962, when three dissident groups seeking Mozambican independence formed Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique: Frelimo) in Tanzania. Mozambique gained independence from colonial Portugal in 1975, and on 25 June 1975, Frelimo’s leader, Samora Machel, was sworn in as the first President of the new state.

Machel’s post-independence agenda was to transform Mozambique into a new, modernized, disciplined, socialist state. His domestic policies included removing or subjugating

---

traditional local authorities, which had played a vital administrative and social role in rural areas, both before and during the colonial period. Organized religion was suppressed. All schools, health care, and land and rental property were nationalized. Large-scale industry was nationalized and private commercial activity was outlawed. Family or subsistence agriculture was completely neglected by the state until 1984.

On the foreign policy front, Mozambique supported the Zimbabwean independence movement within Rhodesia. Mozambique not only used diplomatic and economic channels, but also applied military pressure on Rhodesia. Frelimo permitted the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to operate freely from Mozambican territory. In 1977, Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization created a new instrument of retaliation against Mozambique—the insurgent movement called Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), which later changed its name to Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo). Rhodesia recruited Renamo not only to attack the ZANLA, but also to increasingly destabilize the Mozambican government.

When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, South Africa took over the support to Renamo. South Africa provided far greater training to Renamo than Rhodesia had, and supplied the rebel force with significantly better and more armaments. By mid-1980, nine out of ten provinces in Mozambique came under Renamo’s attacks. Renamo terrorized civilians and destroyed infrastructure, such as school and medical clinics. The pattern of the atrocities was described in the Gersony report commissioned by the State Department of the United States in 1988:

> [a] larger number of civilians in these attacks and other contexts were reported to be victims of purposeful shooting deaths and executions, of axing, knife, bayoneting, burning to death, forced drowning and asphyxiation, and other forms of murder where

---

63 Under the colonial rules, the Portuguese had used traditional chiefs as administrators, for example, they collected taxes, secured laborers for the plantations, and generally served as the colonial authorities’ links to the population in the rural areas. See, Carrie L. Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 62.
64 Ibid., 50-51.
66 Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, 9-10.
68 Ibid., 15.
69 Ibid., 14-16.
no meaningful resistance or defense is present. Eyewitness accounts indicate that when civilians are killed in these indiscriminate attacks, whether against defended or undefended villages, children, often together with mothers and elderly people, are also killed.70

Machel sought making peace with South Africa to counter Renamo’s insurgency. Consequently, in March 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed a non-aggression pact called the Nkomati Accords.71 However, Renamo continued to pose a threat to Frelimo, as it still gained military assistance from South Africa after the signing of the Accords. The Mozambican government sought military assistance from Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe; however, the government’s offensive was not effective enough to defeat Renamo.72 Moreover, external support to both Renamo and Frelimo decreased as the Cold War came to an end, which led to a military stalemate between the two. Plus, the economic decline in Mozambique made the two parties realize only peace talks could resolve the conflict.

3-1-1 Internal Dynamics of the Conflict
To understand the nature of the conflict in Mozambique, it is critical to examine the internal dynamics in which Renamo emerged and evolved, as well as the underlying elements that Renamo capitalized on. The dynamics lie in two interacting factors, namely, the ethnic, regional, and ideological struggles within Frelimo, and Frelimo’s policies that fostered discontent among the mass population.

Prior to independence, younger and more radical groups who were generally well-educated and from the south formed the “ideological faction” of Frelimo. They pressed for a revolutionary approach to the independence struggle. As this faction gained power from 1963 to 1966, many of the original leaders of the movements had left or been expelled from the

71 South Africa pledged to cease its support for Renamo in exchange for Frelimo’s assurance that it would no longer provide sanctuary to the African National Congress. See, Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 16; Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, 11.
Frelimo hierarchy.73 Once Frelimo came into power following independence, the leaders sought to impose their vision of independence and national unity on the rest of society.74 The socio-geographic division within Frelimo continued in the post-independence period. Both Machel and his successor, Joaquim Chissano, were from the Shangana tribe in the south. As opposed to Machel, Chissano removed most non-black Mozambicans from senior positions in the government. His measures gave rise to the exclusion of “non-indigenous” Mozambicans, which further reinforced racial prejudice within Frelimo.75 On the part of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo’s second leader, was from central Mozambique. He belonged to the small Ndau tribe, which is a subgroup of the Shona, the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe.76 Other Renamo members in high positions were also from a rural background and mostly lacked educational advantages.77

Furthermore, the new structures for post-independence with which Frelimo sought to replace the old system were extremely weak. The new state was incapable of replacing the marketing network it had eliminated. When the economy began to collapse, and social and economic disruption was most acutely observed in rural areas, people felt isolated from both their economic means of survival and the authority and belief systems that they had relied upon.78 The formal establishment of Frelimo as a Marxist-Leninist party in 1977 drove state and society further apart.79 Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, popular support for Frelimo had dropped off significantly due to discontent with specific government policies, the collapse of the economy (not solely linked to Frelimo policy), and to what often amounted to a manifest disrespect for the law on the part of the state.80

As a consequence, Renamo effectively capitalized on this growing sense of isolation and grief, particularly in the rural areas. Popular grievances stemmed from a sense of ethnic and regional domination by southern groups against the center and center-north, as well as repressive measures taken by the Frelimo government to displace existing social and eco-

74 Ibid., 49. Although Frelimo enjoyed popular support and widespread enthusiasm for the new Frelimo government, it is argued that Frelimo made a mistake in confusing generalized public enthusiasm for Frelimo and for independence with political consensus on Frelimo’s revolutionary agenda.
77 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 51-53. The adoption of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and methodologies tended to reduce the party’s support base and diminish its ability to carry out its transformational vision.
80 Ibid., 52.
nomic relations in the countryside without prompt and effective replacements.\textsuperscript{81} Thus, Renamo was able to exploit the dissatisfaction among elites from the center and north, religious leaders, the “ideologically incorrect,” and ordinary citizens confronting local party officials.\textsuperscript{82} By way of example, studies in northern Mozambique show that many youth became attracted to Renamo due to the socio-economic crisis in the countryside.\textsuperscript{83} Alcinda Honwana argues that Renamo offered these discontented young people, for lack of food and employment alike, a sense of purpose and power by putting weapons in their hands.\textsuperscript{84}

3-1-2 Economic Downturn

The worsened economic situation not only deprived Mozambique of the necessary resources to continue fighting but also resulted in increasing resentment among the population against Frelimo. A combination of factors, namely Frelimo’s policies and external elements, caused Mozambique’s severe economic decline in the late 1970s, which continued throughout the 1980s.

By 1977, South Africa had replaced Portugal as Mozambique’s primary source of imports, including such critical commodities as machinery, iron, steel, fertilizers, and wheat.\textsuperscript{85} Mozambique had long relied upon income resulting from providing Mozambican workers to farms and mines in Rhodesia and South Africa. Thus, South Africa’s economic leverage against Mozambique made a significant impact on Mozambique. For instance, when South Africa decided to reduce the number of immigrant miners, the number of Mozambicans working in South Africa dropped by 70 percent from the end of 1975 to the beginning of 1978. This had a large negative impact not only on the trade deficit, but also on the overwhelming majority of rural households in southern Mozambique who were dependent on wage income earned in the mines. Moreover, the reduction in labor emigration significantly increased unemployment in Mozambique.

Mozambique’s border closure with Rhodesia in March 1976, in support of the Zambian independence struggle, also worsened the Mozambican economy. Ports at Beira and

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
Maputo in Mozambique had handled 80 percent of Rhodesia’s external trade prior to independence. The loss of income for Mozambique (from trade, tariffs, and tourism alone) resulting from the border closure was estimated at US $550 million. Production further declined because of the fall in Mozambique’s commodity export prices, which resulted from the 1974 worldwide recession, a serious drought in the early 1980s, and the ongoing war in Mozambique.

Furthermore, Frelimo’s agricultural policies yielded to the economic crisis in the countryside. Agriculture was declared to be the basis of economic development when Frelimo formally became a Marxist-Leninist party. Agricultural cooperatives, as well as communal villages, were used as a means to achieve this goal. However, up to 90 percent of the state’s agricultural resources went into the large state farms. Between 1977 and 1981, only 2 percent of total agricultural investment actually went to cooperatives. The family, or subsistence sector, suffered from total state neglect despite the fact that the family sector produced 36 percent of commercialized production and fed 80 percent of the population.

Frelimo made changes in its agricultural policy in 1983, acknowledging the importance of the family farming for economic and security reasons. Some measures were introduced to encourage small-scale agricultural producers, however, they were imperfectly implemented. This, compounded by intensified fighting in the country, resulted in the economic and social collapse in the rural areas, which increased discontent in the rural areas towards the government.

3-1-3 Changes in the External Environment

In addition to the deteriorated economy, international support for both Frelimo and Renamo significantly dropped by the end of the 1980s. Frelimo had long enjoyed support by the Soviet Union, which had provided Mozambique with heavy equipment and military

---

87 The impact of reduction in commodity prices worldwide was extensive in Mozambique, as Mozambique was dependent on primary commodity exports. The total value of Mozambique’s agricultural exports fell by almost half from 1974 to 1976. Between 1981 and 1986, national production fell by 30 percent, per capita income was cut in half, and exports were reduced by 60 percent. See, ibid., 55-56.
88 There were serious food shortages throughout the southern half of the country, where it is estimated that more than 100,000 Mozambicans died from the famine in 1983, and an even greater number in 1984. See, Isaacman, “Mozambique,” 152.
90 Ibid., 57.
91 Ibid., 56-58.
advisers or trainers. Meanwhile, the neighboring countries, such as Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe, provided Frelimo with troops. Nonetheless, such external military support was decreasing towards the end of the 1980s. In 1989, the Soviet Union pulled out its military advisors in Mozambique. East German training stopped when the country itself ceased to exist, and Tanzania withdrew its troops in 1988. And by this time, there were doubts in Zimbabwe as to the viability of its intervention in the Mozambican dispute.

Frelimo turned its attention to not only the Communist bloc, but also sought ties with the West. In order to boost the devastated economy, the government shifted the emphasis in economic policy from large state projects to smaller, market-oriented projects. In 1984, Mozambique joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in 1987, the government adopted World Bank/IMF stabilization and structural adjustment recommendations. They took such measures as devaluation of the currency, reductions in the state sector, cuts in subsidy programs, more fiscal responsibility, and a greater role for the private sector. Frelimo was turning away from socialism and becoming more open to the West.

Renamo similarly experienced a significant drop in its international support. Its bases in Malawi had been taken away by 1987 and South Africa also reduced its assistance to Renamo by the end of the 1980s. In the face of looming domestic political changes and escalations in the scale of attacks on civilians in Mozambique, the government of South Africa found itself increasingly embarrassed by its link with Renamo. Largely due to

---

92 Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, 19.
93 Tanzania sent more than 3,000 troops to assist in the heavily populated Zambézia province. Malawi sent a battalion of less than 1,000 troops to protect the rail line in the Nacala corridor in the north. Zimbabwe provided security for the Beira corridor, and troops were active in the Limpopo corridor in the south and along the Tete corridor road in the north, linking Zimbabwe and Malawi. See, ibid.
95 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 19.
96 Cabrita, Mozambique, 270.
98 Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, 20.
99 In an attempt to weaken South Africa’s stranglehold, since 1982 Mozambique has increasingly turned to the West for economic, diplomatic, and even military assistance. Isaacman asserts that this was based on a careful calculation that the socialist countries were either unwilling or unable to provide the aid and development capital to Mozambique, and that only the West can pressure South Africa to cease its military aggression. See, Isaacman, “Mozambique,” 148.
100 Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique, 40.
the Gersony Report, which made the atrocity committed by Renamo well known to the world as mentioned earlier, open support for Renamo became politically unacceptable for many countries.\textsuperscript{101} With diminished support from South Africa, and drought conditions in Mozambique reducing Renamo’s ability to live off the local population as it had before, Renamo was increasingly willing to pursue the possibility of peace negotiations. As the immediate threat by Renamo ceased, many Western countries also opted to apply pressure on Chissano to reach a political solution.\textsuperscript{102}

3-1-4 Peace Negotiation

In 1988, both the Mozambican government and Renamo began to explore the possibilities of talks to end the conflict. Preliminary talks about peace negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo began in 1989, mediated by Zimbabwe and Kenya. In addition to international pressure to end the war, the road to political settlement had been built on the domestic political developments made by Frelimo.

Decisions made at the fifth Frelimo Party Congress in July 1989 were significant in breaking the impasse on negotiations. These decisions with the direction of reform included abandonment of Marxist-Leninism orientation.\textsuperscript{103} In December 1990, the National Assembly adopted a new multi-party constitution presented by the government, which allowed for direct elections for the presidency and legislature, guaranteed freedom of the press and religious expression, and an independent judiciary.\textsuperscript{104}

Formal negotiations commenced in Rome in July 1990, hosted and mediated by the Italian government and the Roman Catholic Sant’ Egidio community. Observers included major donors, such as the United States, Great Britain, Portugal, and Germany.\textsuperscript{105} Although distrust between Frelimo and Renamo was high and progress was slow, they came to sign the first Protocol in October 1991.\textsuperscript{106} On 4 October 1992, they completed the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique containing seven Protocols.

\textsuperscript{101} Berman, \textit{Managing Arms in Peace Processes}, 20-21
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{103} Simpson, “Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo,” 331.
\textsuperscript{104} Constitution of Mozambique, November 1990, replicated in Constitution Finder, (accessed January 10, 2004); available from \url{http://confinder.richmond.edu/MOZ.htm}.
\textsuperscript{105} Manning, \textit{The Politics of Peace in Mozambique}, 28.
\textsuperscript{106} Berman, \textit{Managing Arms in Peace Processes}, 23.
3-1-5 Post-Conflict Elections

Presidential and legislative elections were held from 27 to 29 October 1994. Twelve candidates participated in the presidential election and 14 political parties and coalitions were included in the legislative election. On the eve of the election, Renamo’s leader, Afonso Dhrakama, announced that Renamo would not participate in the polling, alleging that the government was preparing to engage in massive fraud during the election. But, following the intervention of the international community, Dhrakama decided to participate in the elections as it was assured that the electoral process would be closely monitored.

Joachim Chissano received 53.3 percent of the votes in the presidential election, while Afonso Dhrakama received 33.7 percent. Out of the total 250 seats in the new National Assembly, Frelimo won 129, while Renamo won 112. Almost 88 percent of all registered voters participated in the presidential election, and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique declared on 19 November 1994 that the elections had been free and fair. The inauguration of the newly elected President of Mozambique on 9 December 1994 marked the expiry of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.

Based on lessons from the Angolan experience, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented in Mozambique. As a result, the elections were held two years later, as opposed to the original schedule of holding elections within one year of the GPA. This premise may have contributed to the “free and fair” elections in Mozambique. However, it should be noted that the elections were held without disarmament having taken place. This came about not despite, but

109 Ibid., para. 9.
111 The UN Mission in Angola was to conclude shortly after the elections held on 29-30 September 1992, and therefore ending the civil war. President of Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola: UNITA) did not abide by the election results, and heavy fighting subsequently broke out between the UNITA and government forces. Berman argues that the failure of the two parties to disarm as called for in the 1991 Peace Accords gave the UNITA the means to return the country to war. See, Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 31-33.
112 Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: “[i]n the light of recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of paramount importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented…. ” Cited in Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 34.
rather with, the acceptance of the UN.  

Inadequate disarmament activities during the ONUMOZ operation, as will be discussed in Section 3-5, had created other problems in post-war Mozambique.

There were no provisions for a formal power-sharing scheme in Mozambique. Weak opposition has been defeated in all three elections since 1994. This was strongly contested by Frelimo at the time of the peace negotiation in Rome, and as a result, a united government was not established. For Frelimo, a one party system meant “democracy,” as it was fairly elected by the Mozambican people.

3-2 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique

3-2-1 General

The GPA consists of seven Protocols composed of the following elements: the dismantling of Renamo’s armed forces and the integration of some of its troops into a new, unified national army; the reform or disbandment of various government security forces and the restructuring of the police force; the reintegration of Renamo-held territory into a unified state administration; and the holding of the country’s first multiparty elections. A ceasefire was to come into effect no later than 15 October 1992, referred to as E-Day. All the tasks stipulated in the GPA were to be completed within one year, but the deadline for the elections was later revised to October 1994. The UN was called in to participate in monitoring the implementation of the GPA.

A series of peace commissions were established for the implementation of various tasks within the framework of the Agreement. These commissions were composed of representatives of Renamo, the government and/or Frelimo, and in most cases, representatives of several donor countries and ONUMOZ. For example, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was to guarantee the overall implementation of the Agreement; the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) was to monitor the cease-fire, demobilization, and disarmament; and the Commission for Reintegration (CORE) was to plan and oversee the social

113 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 42.
114 Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique, 23.
115 Ibid., 26.
integration of demobilized troops. All three commissions were chaired by Mr. Aldo Ajello, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique.

Overall, the GPA provisions were not specific and many important issues were left for further discussion. It is worth noting that Mr. Ajello felt, in retrospect, that problems encountered during the ONUMOZ operation were mainly due to a lack of provisions for confidence-building and reconciliation measures in the Peace Agreement. These measures included the absence of a provision for monitoring the police, a neutral body assuring impartial governance in the transitional period, and a power-sharing arrangement for the post-election period. Berdal contends that these deficiencies manifested themselves in the disarmament and demobilization process in Mozambique.

In terms of the institutional arrangements, Carrie Manning asserts that transitional institutions responsible for the implementation of the GPA from October 1992 to October 1994 embodied political balance, decision-making on the basis of consensus, and an equal representation of the two parties based on their status as ex-combatants. Renamo found legitimacy of the transitional structure in these institutions. During the transitional period, Renamo was accorded full jurisdictional powers over the areas it controlled, and the government pledged not to show any hostility towards the movement’s administration structures or traditional authorities in place in such areas. In addition, Renamo, as a partner in the peace process, was entitled to financial assistance for the process of transforming itself from a military organization into a political party. Thus, it can be said that failure to establish a power-sharing arrangement for the post-election period was a setback for Renamo, compared to the privileges they had enjoyed under the transitional

117 The membership of these commissions was as follows: the CSC – France, Italy, Portugal, the UK, the US, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (with Germany joined in later); the CCF – Botswana, Egypt, France, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, the UK, the US, and the OAU (with Kenya and Zimbabwe joined in later); the CORE - Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, and the European Community. See, United Nations, The United Nations and Mozambique, 25.
118 Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, 22.
119 Ibid.
121 Ibid. On 3 September 1993, the President of Mozambique and the President of Renamo signed an agreement to integrate all areas that had been under Renamo control into the state administration. See also, UN Peacekeeping: Mozambique, Background, (accessed December 18, 2003); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozFT.htm.
122 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Protocol III, para. IV.7. For this purpose, the UN Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Mozambique was established in May 1993. See also, United Nations, The United Nations and Mozambique, 58.
for Renamo, compared to the privileges they had enjoyed under the transitional arrangement.

3-2-2 Military Aspect of the GPA
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the government and Renamo soldiers were part of a broader demilitarization program stipulated in the GPA:

- Withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory
- Formation of the Mozambican Defense Force
- Disbanding of private and irregular armed groups
- Establishment of the State Information and Security Service
- Depoliticisation and restructuring of the police forces
- Demobilization and reintegration of the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) and Renamo forces

3-3 Overview of the Peacekeeping Operation

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique was established by UN Security Council Resolution 797 to help implement the General Peace Agreement. The mandate of ONUMOZ included: facilitating the implementation of the Agreement; monitoring the cease-fire and demobilization; monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the transport corridors; providing technical assistance and monitoring during the entire electoral process; and monitoring humanitarian assistance. Mr. Aldo Ajello, the then interim Special Representative for Mozambique, and a team of 21 military observers arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement entered into force. Although ONUMOZ was not a transitional administrative authority, its involvement became extensive and multifaceted in implementing the GPA.

123 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Protocol IV, paras. II.1 and VI.(i).2.
126 Ibid., Protocol IV, para. IV.
127 Ibid., Protocol IV, para. V.
128 Ibid., Protocol IV, para. VI.
130 Subsequently in March 1993, Mr. Aldo Ajello was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique.
131 UN Peacekeeping: Mozambique, Background.
Eric Berman points out the underlying tension between the Mozambican government and the UN as one of the causes of the complication of the ONUMOZ operation. The delay in formally requesting UN assistance after signing the GPA was due to Chissano’s strong desire to marginalize the role of the UN in the peace negotiations. The concern of the government to protect its sovereignty and maintain its pride was so intense that it constituted a major source of tension throughout the subsequent UN operation in Mozambique. On the other hand, during the negotiations, Renamo had sought to maximize the role of the UN in an eventual agreement to establish their legitimacy. Although UN participation in the GPA was greater than initially anticipated, it is significant to note that the government continued to resist this expanded role. The UN, however, was ill-prepared to assume extensive responsibilities, as shown by the fact that it took eight months after the signing of the GPA to fully deploy its military component.

The intention of the international community to expand the role of ONUMOZ was largely affected by lessons from Angola. Both the size and cost of the UN mission was far greater in Mozambique than those of the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola II (UNAVEM II) from 1991 to 1995. The relapse into war in Angola in 1992 is considered to be a consequence of the lack of political will of both conflicting parties as well as the scant resources allocated to UNAVEM II. Therefore, the number of troops to be deployed in Mozambique was anticipated as inevitably higher, and the UN Security Council authorized the force of more than 7,300 troops. This further fueled the tension between the UN and the Mozambican government, which had never expected, nor wanted, such a large UN force.

3-4 Design of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

3-4-1 Planning of the DDR Program

The idea of DDR first emanated in 1990 when the government of Mozambique approached Switzerland for assistance. Upon request by the government of Mozambique, the Swiss
developed a plan that called for the unilateral demobilization of 45,000 soldiers and 6,000 employees of the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{139} However, this proposal did not gain support by the international community when submitted to the Consultative Group Meeting in Paris in December 1991. The lack of support was primarily because the proposal was too costly, and also because some donors felt it to be politically problematic to support such a program before a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{140} This Swiss plan was reshaped to meet the new circumstances engendered by the GPA.\textsuperscript{141}

3-4-2 Target Armed Forces

ONUMOZ could only estimate the total number of soldiers that it would have to register for demobilization. Following the earlier registration of 13,717 government soldiers who were demobilized before the signing of the GPA, ONUMOZ expected to register approximately 80,000 government soldiers and 21,000 Renamo soldiers.\textsuperscript{142} Nonetheless, the following information would help to project the scope of disarmament and demobilization of the two parties to the GPA.

3-4-2-1 The Mozambique Armed Forces

Following independence, Mozambique initially viewed South Africa as its principal national security threat, rather than Renamo. With this view, Machel created conventional armed forces trained in conventional warfare.\textsuperscript{143} The FAM was composed of ground forces (approximately 35,000 army, 5,000 border guards, and 15,000 militia,) a small navy (probably less than 2,000) and an air force (several thousands).\textsuperscript{144} The official figures show that defense expenditure had been between 20 and 30 percent of the budget during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{145} Berman points out that the lack of motivated and well-trained soldiers, suitable and functioning equipment, and effective command and control had always undermined the fighting ability of the FAM.\textsuperscript{146}
As a direct response to the increasing Renamo insurgency in 1980, the government undertook several measures. In May 1982, the Mozambican government activated more than 1,500 former freedom fighters, many of whom were organized into counter-insurgency forces. Working under newly appointed provincial military commanders since 1982, the civilian militias that had been disbanded after independence were extensively revitalized. By August 1982, approximately 40 percent of the adult rural population in the Sofala province was armed, and in the capital, the newly formed militia boasted upward of 30,000 men and women. There were approximately 155,600 government military and paramilitary troops in Mozambique by the time of the ONUMOZ operation.

As far as the number of small arms is concerned, the figure of the government procurement is impossible to quantify. A report in 1995 estimated that six million AK-47s existed in Mozambique and that the government distributed 1.5 million assault rifles to the civilian population for protection purposes during the war.

3-4-2-2 Renamo

It appears that Renamo grew significantly between 1982 and 1984. The strength of Renamo stood at 16,000 in 1984 and further rose to 20,000 from 1990 to 1992. Berman asserts that the chief source of recruitment and discipline consisted of a combination of coercion, fear, and violence.

Renamo procured large supplies of light infantry weapons such as small arms, mines, and grenades. South Africa provided considerable shipments of captured Soviet equipment from its operations in Namibia and Angola. The Renamo forces were not as well equipped as the FAM, but they were often better than the FAM in intelligence, command

---

147 The government reorganized the army into three regional commands in 1980. Subsequently in 1982, 10 provincial commands were created to replace these regional commands, as they were not effectively functioning to counter-attack Renamo. See, ibid, 45.
150 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 50-51. The Soviet Union was the single largest supplier of light weapons to Mozambique. East Germany, Bulgaria, and North Korea supplied small arms such as AK-47. The UK and Portugal also provided weapons to Mozambique.
151 Ibid., 48.
152 Ibid., 55.
153 Ibid., 52.
and control, morale, initiative, and tactics. In addition, pro-Christian and anti-communist organizations in the West were known to have provided Renamo with financial resources to purchase weapons and supplies on the black market, if not to have provided these supplies directly.

3-4-3 Implementation Structure

The GPA stipulated that the UN assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilization process. Within the framework provided by the GPA, the CCF was responsible for monitoring the cease-fire, demobilization, and disarmament. Specifically for demobilization, the CCF was to undertake broad tasks, ranging from planning, organization, supervision, registration of troops and issuance of the respective identity cards, and collection, registration and custody of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms and documentation. It also included destroying or deciding on the other disposition of weapons and other items, medical examinations, and the issuance of demobilization certificates. The CORE was responsible for planning and overseeing social and economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

Staffed by civilian personnel, the ONUMOZ Technical Unit was to assist in implementing the demobilization program and to collaborate closely with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the program’s humanitarian aspects.

The ONUMOZ Technical Unit was responsible for:

(a) the distribution of food, medicine, health care and other essential services to the assembly areas;

---

154 Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War, 14. Communication equipment provided by South Africa was more sophisticated than the FAM, and Renamo also benefited from intelligence from the South African Defense Force (SADF). See also, Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 54.
155 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 52.
158 Ibid., Protocol IV, para. VI.(ii).2.(a) and (d).
(b) the organization of a database, as well as the issue of personal documents for the demobilized;

(c) the supply of civilian clothing and the organization of transport for the ex-combatants when they leave the assembly areas for their homes;

(d) the establishment of a solid link with the provincial and district authorities responsible for the civilian dimension of the demobilization process.\(^{160}\)

At each assembly area, the Technical Unit was to organize all these matters in conjunction with the local camp commander in charge of the troops. They were also to assist in the processing of selected soldiers for the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM).\(^{161}\)

3-4-4 Demobilization and Reintegration Procedure

Combatants of the FAM and Renamo were to report to locations for cantonment. The GPA stipulated that there should be 49 assembly areas (AAs), of which 29 were for the government soldiers and 20 for Renamo soldiers.\(^{162}\) At the AAs, combatants were to hand over all weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniforms and documentation in their possession, as well as to register and receive the relevant identity card and demobilization certificate.\(^{163}\) ONUMOZ anticipated that the cantonment period for each demobilized soldier at an AA would be roughly three weeks. This was the minimum time needed to complete such administrative tasks as entering the registrants’ information into a central database, informing the parties of the soldiers’ intentions vis-à-vis the FADM, and contacting the Ministry of Finance so that demobilized soldiers would be able to draw their stipends. They planned to transport up to 250 demobilized soldiers per week from each AA.\(^{164}\)

During the period of cantonment in the assembly areas, a range of activities was conducted to lay the foundation for the psychological reintegration of combatants into civilian life. These activities included literacy classes, recreational activities such as football matches, camp radio broadcasts, and lectures, as well as general information about the nature of the


\(^{162}\) General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Protocol VI, para. I.6.(e).

\(^{163}\) Ibid., Protocol IV, para. VI.(i).2.(d).

peace process and specifics on demobilization. Health issues such as HIV/AIDS were also raised.

Once all the administrative tasks were completed, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) transported the demobilized and their dependents to the places they chose to reintegrate. Demobilized combatants were to receive three months of back salary upon departing from the AAs and coupons for three months salary to be paid in monthly installments in the capital of the district where they chose to settle. The FAM soldiers who served for 10 years or longer would be eligible to receive a pension. Both Renamo and government soldiers were entitled to disability benefits that included cash payments. In addition, demobilized combatants were to receive a package of civilian clothing, a food ration for two weeks, an agricultural tool kit along with a bucket and seeds, and an all-purpose capulana.

The international donor community decided to expand the initial reintegration program because of their concerns that former combatants who fail to reintegrate into civilian life could pose a threat to peace both in the long- and short-term. The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) is one of the additional programs created in 1994. Implemented by UNDP, the RSS provided an additional 18 months salary to demobilized combatants. Furthermore, three other programs were created under the CORE scheme to assist demobilized combatants: namely, the Occupational Skills Development Program (OSD), the Information and Referral Service (IRS), and the Provincial and Open Reintegration Funds (PF/ORF). These programs were designed to provide continued assistance to former combatants for vocational training and job searches after the period of 18 months covered by the RSS. These reintegration programs will be discussed more in detail in Section 3-6.

165 Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State, 41.
166 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 71.
167 A one-time cash allowance of approximately US$2 was provided to each demobilized combatant to cover any additional transportation costs to their destinations. See, ibid., 78.
168 Ibid., 77. The clothes were originally planned to be provided upon departure from cantonment sites. However, in response to the Renamo’s request, ONUMOZ agreed to provide them to each Renamo combatant upon registration at the AAs. A capulana is a piece of cloth, which is often used as women’s outfit or to carry items.
169 Creative Associates International Inc., The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund: Final Evaluation, Final Report prepared for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), March 1997, 31-32. Skepticism about the government’s implementation capacity and accountability has led donors to develop and implement support programs without much government involvement. See also, Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 68.
3-5 Implementation Process of Demobilization

3-5-1 Outcomes

The demobilization of government and Renamo troops was substantially concluded by 22 August 1994, and shortly thereafter the CSC formally declared the completion of the process. A total of 91,691 (67,042 government and 24,649 Renamo) soldiers had been registered by ONUMOZ. Some 78,078 soldiers (57,540 government and 20,538 Renamo) were demobilized,\(^{170}\) and 12,353 soldiers joined the new FADM. ONUMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons from the various forces, as well as from the general population. A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the FADM.\(^{171}\)

3-5-2 Constraints Related to Demobilization Process

The demobilization process was faced with a number of obstacles. First, it suffered substantial delay (in establishing in AAs, cantonment period, etc.) in the process due to a mixture of factors. In June 1993, ONUMOZ approved six AAs and declared them open;\(^ {172}\) however, no soldier reported to those AAs.\(^ {173}\) The first 20 AAs were formally opened on 30 November 1993 and the actual assembly of the first troops ensued.\(^ {174}\) As of 24 January 1994, 16,609 soldiers assembled at AAs, 9,895 from the government and 6,714 from Renamo.\(^ {175}\) There were also delays in the dismantling of government paramilitary forces and militia, which was scheduled to begin simultaneously with the assembly and demobilization of regular troops. After several attempts to set a deadline for the beginning of this process, the dismantling of the paramilitary groups was initiated on 12 January 1994.\(^ {176}\)


\(^{171}\) Ibid., para. 11.

\(^{172}\) One government and one Renamo AA were established in each of the three regions defined by the UN.

\(^{173}\) Locations of AAs were supposed to be suggested by both parties to the GPA, based on the guideline established by ONUMOZ. ONUMOZ found some unacceptable sites as AA because of inaccessibility, lack of basic security (due to landmines) or absence of basic infrastructure, especially water. See, United Nations, *The United Nations and Mozambique*, 39.


\(^{176}\) UN Peacekeeping: Mozambique, Background.
Demobilization of the government and Renamo forces formally commenced on 10 March 1994, as opposed to UN Security Council Resolution 882, which urged the parties to initiate demobilization by January 1994 and complete it by May 1994. Furthermore, combatants stayed in AAs for several months, instead of the few weeks of cantonment as initially envisaged by the UN. This prolonged stay of combatants in AAs put additional logistical burden on the UN.

The initial delays in the opening of the AAs, as Berman explains, resulted from the time-consuming and complex process in meeting the criteria of the AAs. The lists of soldiers who would demobilize submitted by both parties were also incomplete. However, much of the reasons seem to be attributed to the reluctance of both Renamo and the government to demobilize. Both parties seized on perceived shortcomings in the ONUMOZ operation to justify their lack of adherence. Virginia Gamba also points out that the parties’ overwhelming preoccupation with simultaneous progress in demobilization made them extremely hesitant to adhere to their commitments without being assured that the other side was doing the same.

Further logistical problems for ONUMOZ arose from spontaneous demobilization of troops. The two parties agreed that, in addition to moving soldiers into AAs for demobilization, a certain number of military personnel would be demobilized in their present locations for practical reasons. Such unassembled locations included military hospitals, air bases, naval bases, and both government and Renamo military headquarters, for a total of approximately 70 locations. It was estimated that some 17,000 soldiers, including some 4,830 disabled, had to be discharged in this manner.

---

178 UN Peacekeeping: Mozambique, Background.
179 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 63-65.
180 For instance, Renamo conditioned their compliance for the demobilization process with the UN deployment of 65 percent and the withdrawal of foreign forces in Mozambique. Although the UN fulfilled these two conditions by June 1993, Renamo did not start demobilization. On contrary, the government was not willing to conclude a status-of-force agreement (SOFA) with the UN until 14 May 1993, which had hampered the ONUMOZ activities. SOFA is a standard instrument in the UN peace operations that allow the UN freedom of movement in their operations. See, ibid., 66-67.
Second, security problems were prevalent throughout the DDR process. Combatants’ frustration and annoyance with the AAs sometimes led to acts of violence. Unmet demands for back pay, unpleasant conditions and meager rations at the AAs all contributed to difficulties in maintaining discipline during demobilization. But, disturbances at unassembled locations were more problematic than at AAs.

Third, the issue of collection, control and destruction of weapons had considerable implications for post-war Mozambique and neighboring countries. The number of weapons collected by ONUMOZ was below what was expected because not every soldier registering arrived with a weapon. But, not only the quantity of the collected weapons, but also their quality, was generally poor. It was felt that those of better quality were being held elsewhere. Martinho Chachiua points out that most of these arms caches might have been deliberately hidden by the parties to the conflict during the negotiation and implementation phases of the peace process, and the weapons were thus kept as a guarantee. The warring parties perceived the weapons to be useful if the peace process failed or its outcome was less than desirable – to either resume fighting or as a political card.

Indeed, the verification exercise conducted by ONUMOZ after demobilization uncovered a substantial number of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, armored personnel carriers and mortar bombs. In addition, a small number of previously unregistered military personnel were identified at some government and Renamo bases. Nevertheless, concerns remained as to hidden weapons that were not retrieved during the ONUMOZ verification. The fact that ONUMOZ destroyed very little of the arms and ammunition

---

183 Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 71-72.
184 Ibid., 75.
186 Vines, “The Struggle Continues.” It appears that individuals had their own reasons for hiding better weapons, and there were also situations in which both Frelimo and Renamo commanders deliberately ordered soldiers that weapons be hidden.
189 Ibid., para. 12. Despite such achievement, the ONUMOZ verification exercise is often subject to criticism that it made only limited progress, as both sides showed little interest, and there was insufficient time for comprehensive checking. The process did not begin as scheduled due to the delay in demobilization. See, Vines, “The Struggle Continues.”
registered during demobilization created opportunities for them to be leaked to the black market or to be transferred unlawfully.\textsuperscript{190}

Certainly, the proliferation of weapons has become a significant problem in post-conflict Mozambique. In addition to the weapons leaked from Renamo and the FAM, there are weapons that continue to be leaked from the armories of the present army and police arsenals.\textsuperscript{191} Many members of the new national army have deserted since December 1994, taking their weapons with them. Some senior members of the armed forces have also been implicated in illegal arms deals involving weapons from state armories. Such behavior was a result of low salaries in the FADM, inadequate discipline, low morale and a profitable market for weapons in South Africa and other Central and Southern African countries.\textsuperscript{192}

Fourth, in relation to the aforementioned problems of the FADM, the formation of the FADM itself constituted a factor in derailing the demobilization process. First of all, few demobilized soldiers wanted to join the FADM. The questionnaire distributed to demobilized soldiers at the AAs revealed that roughly 10 percent of Renamo combatants and between 5 and 6 percent of FAM soldiers opted for the FADM.\textsuperscript{193} It appears that the demobilization benefits were far more attractive to the demobilized than the FADM. The creation of the RSS, which provided 18 months of salary, accelerated this tendency.\textsuperscript{194}

\textbf{3-5-3 Post-DDR Disarmament}

As already stated, the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique left a large number of redundant weapons in the hands of demobilized soldiers and civilians, as well as caches hidden in the bush.\textsuperscript{195} Failure to destroy collected weapons during the ONUMOZ operation resulted in a vast scale of illicit operations regionally, which have ultimately increased levels of internal violence and criminal activity in Swaziland, Zambia, the Great Lakes re-

\textsuperscript{190} ONUMOZ transported all military equipment in excess of 200 arms from each AA to the UN controlled regional arms depots (RADs). Weapons and equipment classified as “beyond repair” were to be destroyed; however in the end, all equipment at the RADs was transferred to the FADM due to the financial constraints. See, Berman, \textit{Managing Arms in Peace Processes}, 73-75.

\textsuperscript{191} Chachiua, “The Status of Arms Flows in Mozambique.”

\textsuperscript{192} Gamba, “The Management of Arms in Conflict Resolution Processes.”


\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 71.

gion of Central Africa, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. By 1998, Mozambique constituted the largest single source of small arms supply for the South African domestic market. The government of Mozambique undertook several measures to counter these problems.

3-5-3-1 Operation Rachel

In 1996 Mozambique and South Africa agreed on bilateral cooperation between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) on a joint weapons removal operation, which was code-named “Operation Rachel.”

The program, that was carried out in four phases, resulted in retrieving 11,891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6,351 anti-personal mines and 3,192,337 rounds of ammunition. However, Chachiua contends that these successful figures still represent only a minute amount of the estimated figures of arms existing in the country. He also argues that the principal achievement of Operation Rachel is the fact that it managed creatively to forge a sound working relationship between two police forces. The police forces in Mozambique and South Africa had never worked together in any meaningful way before, and also had uneven operational capabilities and endowments of resources.

For example, Mozambique had neither the financial resources nor the expertise to destroy arms caches. On the other hand, the SAPS lacked the knowledge of the Mozambican terrain and had no legal right to operate inside Mozambique. The combination of these problems, however, became the operation’s strength. The SAPS would not only supply the bulk of the financial resources, but also offer landmine-resistant vehicles and other specialized equipment, as well as highly trained senior police officers. The PRM would gather intelligence and with its knowledge of the local conditions, would facilitate contacts with local communities.

The philosophy behind this operation also contributed to its success. A proactive policing strategy, in this case, only found very reluctant community support. It was therefore decided that the operation would be intelligence-driven. In addition, an undeclared blanket

---

197 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
amnesty was to be given to those found with weapons. This was not only a disarmament measure, but also a move towards political reconciliation. Given the levels of poverty, informers and caretakers of arms caches were rewarded as an incentive and an informal buy-back component was brought in.\(^{201}\)

It must be noted that each one of the four operations yielded substantial results, yet they were paid for entirely by the government of South Africa with no international or national finance available for these tasks. Many other cross-border operations to stop illicit trafficking in Southern Africa were planned but never implemented because of the financial constraints in the countries involved in such planning.\(^ {202}\)

\textbf{3-5-3-2 Swords into Ploughshares Project}

The Swords into Ploughshares (\textit{Transformação de Armas em Enxadas: TAE}) project is a voluntary weapons collection program, in which beneficiaries receive agricultural tools, bicycles or other productive tools in exchange for weapons. Since 1995, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) has been implementing the program with various sources of international assistance. Participants in the program are guaranteed anonymity and no identification is required to participate in the exchange.\(^ {203}\) The program also has a dimension of peace education, as collected weapons are converted into works of art. The TAE proved to be an effective program in collecting weapons from communities with a linkage to development. From October 1995 to January 1997, it achieved collecting 874 firearms, 79 other weapons (e.g. knives), and over 20,000 armaments ranging from bullets to bazooka shells.\(^ {204}\) It is expected to be a model project for other countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

However, the SADC did have some flaws. Some observers indicate that the weapons collected through the TAE project included obsolete ones that had been used in armed struggles for independence in the 1960s. It is also pointed out that the program was short


\(^{202}\) Gamba, “The Management of Arms in Conflict Resolution Processes.”


\(^{204}\) Vines, “The Struggle Continues.” According to CCM, 25,000 pieces of weaponry and accessories have been collected since 1995. CCM estimates that more than 10,000 people have benefited from the TAE scheme, receiving tools and other incentives. See, Christian Council of Mozambique, “Transforming swords into ploughshares,” (accessed January 10, 2004); available from \url{http://www.ccm.co.nz/abauttae.htm}. 
of money and people complained that they had not been rewarded for handing in weapons.\(^{205}\) Moreover, the TAE has a geographical limitation, as the initial implementation was limited to an area in the far south around Maputo city.\(^{206}\) CCM is currently considering a countrywide implementation of the TAE.\(^{207}\)

### 3-6 Reintegration and Beyond

#### 3-6-1 Donor Involvement

As already mentioned, several reintegration programs were developed in addition to the packages given to the demobilized soldiers upon their departure to their places of reintegration. The following sections present a brief overview of such programs and analyze the impact of the reintegration efforts on demobilized soldiers and their communities, as well as on subsequent human development.

#### 3-6-1-1 The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) by UNDP

The RSS was a cash subsidy which benefited 92,881 demobilized soldiers from the FAM and Renamo forces, based on their rank for an 18-month period. It was intended to supplement the six months severance pay of the government following the different periods of demobilization. The program, totaling US $35.5 million of subsidies, was implemented from March 1994 until December 1994.\(^{208}\)

UNDP implemented the RSS by making financial arrangements with the People’s Development Bank (Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento: BPD) for direct payments to demobilized combatants. The beneficiaries would receive their monthly disbursements in bi-monthly checks at district-level banks.\(^{209}\) The common soldier, who constituted the largest percentage of total RSS recipients (51.3 percent), received an equivalent of US $10 per month.\(^{210}\) According to UNDP, “RSS provided a financial safety net to support the demobilized soldiers to integrate into civilian life, facilitated their participation in other

---

\(^{205}\) Vines, “The Struggle Continues.”

\(^{206}\) Ibid.


\(^{210}\) Lundin et al., “‘Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise’,” 184. This program was financed by Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Finland, Spain and Portugal.
programmes for reintegration, limited urban migration and fostered confidence among beneficiaries to interface with banks and administrations.”

The RSS was a success, providing demobilized soldiers with time and money. However, there were groups of people who were excluded from receiving benefits granted by the RSS. For example, the Namparama, a paramilitary group that had operated in Zambézia province as a local force, did not receive the RSS subsidies or other reintegration benefits.

3-6-1-2 The Occupational Skills Development Program (OSD) by ILO

The International Labour Organization (ILO) initiated the OSD program in September 1994, which aimed to provide training and vocational skills for the target group of demobilized soldiers in order to facilitate employment opportunities or self-employment. The OSD increasingly emphasized assisting graduates to access credit for self-employment, principally through the poverty alleviation fund of the BPD, although there had been considerable delays in processing applications. Once it was terminated in March 1997, ILO planned to continue to provide technical support for the new Ministry of Labor’s proposal for vocational training and employment promotion. It was proposed to target the population as a whole, rather than only targeting the demobilized, although particular vulnerable groups would be given priority in its activities.

The data as of October 1996 showed that 9,239 beneficiaries enrolled in vocational training. Of these, approximately 70 percent of the OSD trainees secured employment.

---

213 Ibid.
215 Cecily A. Bryant, *Training and employment programmes for war affected populations: Lessons from experience in Mozambique*, ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (ILO, 1997). With the termination of the CORE, the responsibility of reintegration was transferred to the Ministry of Labor.
216 Ibid. According to Baden, approximately 88 percent were ex-combatants, as the program also offered training to other candidates to a limited extent. See also, Baden, “Post-conflict Mozambique,” 118.
One of the major constraints in the program implementation was the pressure for immediate action that resulted in inadequate time for effective planning of the projects. The selection of training courses was not related to the needs and potential of the labor market, and trainees did not have much access to opportunities for credit and employment after completion of their courses. It was criticized that training was implemented in isolation from the reality of the local labor context.\(^{218}\) In addition, Cecily Bryant points out that inadequate credit mechanisms also minimized opportunities for self-employment and the creation of micro-enterprise by the project beneficiaries, although some steps had been taken afterwards to overcome this constraint.\(^{219}\)

According to Bryant, strong links were forged with the community only in the latter part of the project. Community-based activities, for instance, the building of the primary school by demobilized trainees in the Buzi district in Sofala, were undertaken in nine locations. The demobilized combatants in such circumstances gained a double benefit as trainees and recipient community members.\(^{220}\)

3-6-1-3 The Information Referral Service (IRS) by IOM

Beginning in April 1994, IOM was responsible for the IRS to provide information on benefits and opportunities for the demobilized throughout the country. Once the Provincial Fund (PF) was initiated (see below), the IRS functions were combined with potential PF activities. The IRS also collected information on the situation of the demobilized in order to keep operational organizations up to date in terms of their situation and on-going needs.\(^{221}\) Counseling and referral visits numbered over 79,000 during the course of the project, and these visits were considered to have contributed to a successful reintegration process.\(^{222}\) However, another data set suggested that 24,502, or only 26.4 percent of the demobilized soldiers used the IRS services.\(^{223}\)

One of the main problems was the content of the counseling. Chris Alden contends that much of the IRS work involved assisting ex-combatants with problems related to the RSS

\(^{218}\) Bryant, \textit{Training and employment programmes for war affected populations}.

\(^{219}\) Ibid.

\(^{220}\) Ibid.

\(^{221}\) Ibid.

\(^{222}\) Creative Associates International Inc., \textit{The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund}, 41-42, 77. According to the same reports, the average number of visits of demobilized soldiers to or with IRS staff was four.

\(^{223}\) Lundin et al., “‘Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise’,” 185.
payments and general advice or counseling, as opposed to the functioning as an employment referral service as originally envisaged.\textsuperscript{224} Indeed, with the termination of the RSS subsidies, there was a significant reduction in requests for assistance from the IRS. Since then, only a small number of the demobilized then made use of the IRS, predominantly seeking help in resolving pension issues or seeking access to the PF opportunities.\textsuperscript{225} Furthermore, the relationship between the IRS and the PF resulted in several problems. A report prepared for IOM revealed that the combined effort did not prove effective, as the needs of the demobilized soldiers identified in the IRS registration were seldom matched with the actual implementation of PF projects, particularly in the provinces where the IRS and the PF operated.\textsuperscript{226} The report states that the IRS “ultimately became more of an adjunct to the PF,” which made the IRS functions less effective.\textsuperscript{227}

\textbf{3-6-1-4 The Provincial Fund (PF) by IOM}

In addition to the IRS, IOM subsequently assumed responsibility for the Provincial Fund from November 1994.\textsuperscript{228} The Fund was designed to complement other reintegration projects, especially the IRS activities. It made small grants available to demobilized soldiers for initiating small businesses and micro-enterprises, and promoted employment opportunities for the ex-combatants. One of the criteria for the eligibility of funding was to provide employment to former combatants, involve them in community-oriented activities, or help them establish themselves in their communities.\textsuperscript{229} IOM was responsible for its implementation in six provinces: Maputo, Gaza, Zambézia, Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado. Since September 1995, funds were also offered to graduates of the OSD training programs who presented viable proposals for small-scale business initiatives.\textsuperscript{230}

The major activities assisted by the PF ranged from job creation through employment subsidies to existing businesses, on-the-job training, apprenticeships and work placements for a six month period, and labor-intensive projects in rehabilitation for three to six months. According to Bryant, these projects were most beneficial for the community in terms of improved social facilities, but proved to be problematic for the beneficiaries themselves, as

\textsuperscript{224} Alden, “The Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique.”
\textsuperscript{225} Creative Associates International Inc., The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund, 37-40.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{228} The PF officially began in March 1995 following the pilot phase. See, ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., 24-26.
\textsuperscript{230} Bryant, Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.
their short duration and minimal skills investment did little to promote longer-term economic support. This led many of the recipients in these projects to return to IOM for further assistance. Although labor-intensive projects often served as an effective means to provide employment to a large number of people, this case highlights the difficulties in such projects to form a solid link to sustainable economic activities.

The IRS and PF projects for the demobilized soldiers ended in January 1997. Overall, 4,415 PF projects were implemented, assisting a total of 26,175 beneficiaries, 22,757 of which were former combatants. A report prepared for IOM recommended that demobilized soldiers no longer be treated as a separate group as of 1997. Where IOM was no longer operational, the Ministry of Labor continued to provide a referral service and to monitor existing projects until their termination.

3-6-1-5 The Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) by GTZ

The ORF began in July 1994, funded by the German government under its bilateral support program for reintegration. It aimed to promote opportunities for employment and income generation for the demobilized and their families that would also serve their communities. The Fund provided assistance in the identification and formulation of projects, finance or co-finance for viable micro-projects, administrative and logistical support for implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the micro-project. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (the German Agency for Technical Cooperation: GTZ) implemented the ORF in four provinces: namely, Inhambane, Tete, Sofala and Manica, that were not covered by the PF.

231 Ibid.  
232 Creative Associates International Inc., The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund, 43.  
234 Bryant, Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.  
236 Bryant, Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.  
237 Creative Associates International Inc., The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund, 23.
The criteria for a project proposal included participation of at least 50 percent demobilized combatants, with a primary focus on rural and suburban rehabilitation. The projects were required to benefit as large a number of the target group in as short a time as possible. Wherever possible, GTZ attempted to link the project activities with other relevant rural development projects implemented through GTZ.

But, experience illustrated that only 50 percent of implemented micro-projects proved to be sustainable, and Alden points out that there was a number of projects that failed outright. Furthermore, there were instances where some of the employers who saw fit to utilize start-up funds for business, and were able to justify this position by hiring the requisite number of ex-combatants, did not continue employing them once the funding dried up.

3-6-1-6 ISCOS Program

*Instituto Sindical Italiano de Coperação Ao Desenvolvimento* (Italian Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation: ISCOS), an Italian non-governmental organization (NGO), initiated reintegration courses for the demobilized in January 1994 under the bilateral agreement of the Italian cooperation program. Acknowledging the importance of maximizing the opportunities for demobilized soldiers for employment and self-employment, the program sought to link vocational training with such work opportunities. Key project activities, therefore, included support and strengthening of the public or private institutions involved in training, placement and the promotion of activities leading to employment. Courses comprised of three months of skills training plus two weeks of basic management training. Upon completion of training, beneficiaries had a choice of a formal work placement or self-employment. The ISCOS training was predominantly carried out in the urban areas.

---

238 The requirement was 80 percent in the case of World Bank funding.
239 GTZ’s Rural and Infrastructural Reconstruction Program in Manica Province (MARRP) is one example of such rural development program. See, Bryant, *Training and employment programmes for war affected populations*.
240 Alden, “The Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique.”
241 A formal work placement was a six-month contract. Data suggested that 36 percent of those employed under this scheme were subsequently maintained by the companies for further employment contracts. On the other hand, the candidates choosing self-employment received kits containing basic essential tools for the profession on the basis of a six-month loan. See, Bryant, *Training and employment programmes for war affected populations*.
242 Ibid.
The target group for training was initially demobilized combatants and thereafter opened up to include the unemployed in general. The demobilized comprised 80 percent of the project beneficiaries. Under the Italian cooperation funding, approximately 1,160 individuals received assistance, and about 220 additional beneficiaries choosing self-employment received assistance in the form of a small capital start-up fund.\(^{243}\)

Despite its outcome, ISCOS suffered from some constraints in the implementation of the program, including poor staff capacity, lack of resources to run training courses, and the paucity of information on the labor market.\(^{244}\) ISCOS also felt that three-month periods were too short for the recipients to properly learn a new skill.\(^{245}\)

### 3-6-2 Efficacy of the Reintegration Programs

In general, improving access to work and employment forms a central element of economic reintegration. The acquisition of skills should increase chances of former combatants on the labor market.\(^{246}\) However, a wide range of reintegration programs in Mozambique, as explained above, did not result in enhancing employment prospects for individual former combatants. Approximately 71 percent of all the demobilized were still unemployed in 1997.\(^{247}\) The efficacy of the reintegration programs, particularly the economic aspect, is affected by a number of factors.

First, it is commonly pointed out that reintegration programs in general lacked or conducted inadequate needs assessments and labor market surveys in the planning phase. This often resulted in programs that were poorly tailored to the places where former combatants were returning. It is also pointed out that vocational training offered the same types of courses for a number of demobilized soldiers in the same or nearby areas and thus the beneficiaries could not use the acquired skills. It actually worsened the already difficult market situation by offering more of the same skills.\(^{248}\) For example, some demobilized soldiers were trained to be electricians but were returning to areas without electricity; others were trained to be car mechanics and returned to areas where there were few if any

\(^{243}\) Ibid.
\(^{244}\) Ibid.
\(^{245}\) Maslen, *The reintegration of war-affected youth*.
\(^{247}\) Lundin et al., “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise,” 187.
\(^{248}\) Ibid., 195.
Training programs have to be responsive to the needs of the community and to job opportunities that actually exist or can be generated. The best way of achieving this is to conduct labor market surveys and demographic profiling of ex-combatants before designing programs.

Second, of greater concern was the failure to link the training with the creation of new jobs by promoting appropriate employment. It was alleged that very few of those trained had obtained jobs connected with their training. For instance, trainees claimed that they could not start self-employment because they had no raw materials and no raw equipment. The lack of established credit mechanisms in Mozambique was another problem in terms of promotion of self-employment for former combatants who completed training. They complained in particular that banks required large deposits in order to secure loans, which effectively excluded the demobilized. Moreover, little effort had been made to identify potential employers. Some practitioners asserted that formalized training had been more of a burden than a benefit to the society, as thousands of the demobilized had been thrown into a labor market where there were no vacancies.

Third, as Bryant points out, none of the reintegration programs provided an element of training or support for general learning skills. As the program approaches related specifically to vocational training or to employment promotion, more basic skills such as literacy and numeracy were not addressed. While there were some types of training made available to those without numeracy and literacy skills, the majority of the training was predominantly addressed to those who already had some competence in these areas. This approach consequently limited the number of demobilized combatants to benefit from self-employment opportunities.

249 Maslen, *The reintegration of war-affected youth.*
251 AMODEG claimed that demobilized combatants were trained in unmarketable skills, and were sometimes given poor quality kits that they later had to sell. See, Maslen, *The reintegration of war-affected youth.*
252 Bryant, *Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.*
253 Maslen, *The reintegration of war-affected youth.*
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Bryant, *Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.*
257 Ibid.
Fourth, the implementation of reintegration programs centered around urban settings. Alden asserts that demobilized soldiers in the rural areas faced problems, as all the programs depended upon urban or semi-urban locations as points of delivery of their respective services. In some cases, the cost of transport between a former combatant’s village and the town in which the bank was located, or provincial capital where one could find the IRS office or OSD training program, was excessive, eating up as much as half the monthly pension payment. This tended to encourage settlement in or near the urban and semi-urban areas, which was something that the reintegration programs were explicitly hoping to prevent.

Fifth, the poor coordination between implementing agencies during reintegration efforts is often viewed as an obstacle. The Mozambican war veterans association (Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra: AMODEG), for example, contended that the vast majority of demobilized soldiers allegedly did not benefit from any reintegration support projects, while some soldiers received support from multiple sources, due to the inadequate coordination among disparate implementing actors. This situation inevitably resulted in widespread and considerable frustration and discontent on the part of those excluded. A study by Irae Baptista Lundin, Martinho Chachiua, Antonio Gaspar, Habiba Guebuza and Guilherme Mbilana also points out that the poor coordination between local and international organizations or NGOs aborted good opportunities to contribute to sustainable development in rural areas and support the real reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities. On the part of some donors, there was a reluctance to involve local sectors and the government in the program. It can be said that the perspective of capacity building was predominantly lacking throughout the peace process.

258 Alden, “The Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique.”
259 Beginning in March 1995, the IRS/PF began outreach activities, conducting field visits in districts outside of the urban and peri-urban areas in order to achieve greater penetration into outlying areas. In total, more than 30,000 demobilized soldiers were contacted through the outreach program in rural areas. See, Creative Associates International Inc., The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund, 41.
260 Alden, “The Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique.”
262 Maslen, The reintegration of war-affected youth, endnote 42.
263 Lundin et al., “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise”, 189.
264 Ibid.
Finally, the purpose of the demobilization package that contained agricultural tools and seeds warrants attention in assessing the efficacy of DDR. Alex Vines contends that international donors held a misconception that small-scale agriculture could facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{265} However, for several decades prior to the end of the conflict, small-scale agriculture did not have the sole capacity to guarantee the subsistence of the large-size rural family, and the poorer peasantry relied on wage labor, along with household production, to secure its livelihood.\textsuperscript{266} Similarly, ex-combatants left their families in the fields and looked for income-earning alternatives, particularly in informal commerce in the cities. In addition, the weakness of small-scale agriculture was exacerbated by other problems, such as a lack of roads and rural shops, land shortages and landmines.\textsuperscript{267} In parallel to the DDR process, issues of access to assets, such as land, equipment and credit, need to be addressed in the broader scope of rural development.

3-6-3 Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

In terms of general social reintegration, traditional healings and rituals appear to be an important means of conflict resolution, reconciliation, and social reintegration of war-affected people.\textsuperscript{268} After the war, when soldiers and refugees return home, cleansing or purification rituals are viewed as a fundamental condition for individual and collective healing and protection against “war pollution.”\textsuperscript{269} The traditional mechanisms differ from region to region, between rural and urban communities, and within different symbolic, political and religious sets of ideas. Nonetheless, they have a common thread in that they all help manage post-conflict societies where there is great interdependence between individuals and social groups, and where solidarity must be reinstated.\textsuperscript{270}

Despite the fact that the community plays a significant role in the reintegration of ex-combatants, the economic reintegration scheme did not envisage the benefits of a commu-

\textsuperscript{265} Vines, “The Struggle Continues.” Maslen also argues that the assumption that agriculture would attract demobilized soldiers was a strategic mistake. See, Maslen, \textit{The reintegration of war-affected youth}.

\textsuperscript{266} Marc Wuyts, “The Agrarian Question in Mozambique’s Transition and Reconstruction,” \textit{WIDER Discussion Paper} No. 2001/14, June 2001, 12.

\textsuperscript{267} Vines, “The Struggle Continues.”

\textsuperscript{268} Honwana, “Children of War,” 136.

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid. Generally speaking, a ritual has three phases: namely, the reconciliation with oneself, in which purification is necessary to cleanse one of the evil; the reconciliation with the collective, through the ancestors; and the reconciliation with those who were injured or killed, through their relatives, where the victim is invoked by the officiant with a request for forgiveness. The moment of conflict-resolution normally culminates in a celebration in the community. See, UNDP, \textit{National Human Development Report Mozambique 1998: Peace and Economic Growth: Opportunities for Human Development}, (UNDP, 1998) 38.

nity as a whole. Baden argues that while the stated objectives of at least some of the reintegration programs extended beyond the demobilized soldiers to their families, and to a limited extent, wider groups in the community, there is little evidence that significant efforts were made to extend benefits beyond the demobilized as the main target group. This reflects a narrow and misconceived understanding of the process of reintegration, which serves to reinforce a male breadwinner model, and is a missed opportunity for skills development of women and wives of ex-combatants. Gender issues in the DDR process will be further discussed in Section 3-7.

3-6-4 Towards Long-Term Development

In the period shortly after the signing of the GPA, it was widely expected that demobilization would free resources that could be diverted towards development projects and the social sectors. However, the problems in the reintegration process, as discussed above, illustrate that years after the official end of demobilization, the Mozambican society is still struggling with reintegration and further development. It would be useful to analyze whether any peace dividends have been generated since the end of the war in Mozambique, by examining the military expenditure during the war and the costs of the demobilization process.

With regard to spending on military resources, the defense expenditure was consistently between 20 and 30 percent of the budget during the war. It was not until 1992 when expenditure on education and health (21.6 percent) first exceeded that of defense (18.5 percent). Although this turnover by itself appears to be a positive change, overall military expenditure warrants further analysis. In addition to the state military budget, a large portion of social resources that were drawn to the Mozambican conflict should be reflected on the overall figure. Hence, Lundin et al. assert that a comprehensive assessment of the costs of the military effort in Mozambique should add to an estimated 40 to 50 percent to the official military expenditures. The costs of war in Mozambique were much higher than the official military expenditure showed.

272 Lundin et al., “‘Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise’,” 174.
273 Ibid., 179.
274 Ibid., 179-180. Berman also points out that the military expenditures consistently represented between 40 and 50 percent of the government budget in the latter half of the 1980s. See also, Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 44.
In 1995, the government development strategy included an aim to increase expenditures on health and education by 44 percent in real terms. For this purpose, military expenditure was to fall by 36.7 percent in real terms in 1995 to 2.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Defense cuts, however, were not without problems. It is pointed out that the scale of the cuts has undermined the ability of the newly created FADM to transform itself into a professional army. With a limited budget, the FADM is reportedly unable to conduct training, equip troops, maintain bases, purchase fuel and even provide soldiers with clothes and food.

On the other hand, the overall costs of demobilization and reintegration support were estimated at around US$95 million, of which the international community provided US$80.6 million. Thus, even though the official defense expenditure had significantly decreased after the war, Lundin et al. conclude that the government of Mozambique has not yet had any financial dividend from the demobilization process. But, they rightly point out that “the ‘peace dividend’ could be much more than merely the identifiable shifts of resources away from the military. ..., even if the costs of demobilization and reintegration are high, the ‘peace dividend’ is in fact the peace itself – providing an environment for productive and financial dividend-generating activities.”

However, such costly peace may not be practicable for every armed conflict. In this respect, it is imperative to design reintegration programs that can eventually contribute to the growth of the economy. Not surprisingly, the chronic lack of infrastructure and extreme underdevelopment that characterize countries emerging from conflict hinder economic recovery and limit the financial coverage for DDR programs. But, ex-combatants offer a ready source of labor for infrastructure projects and employing them in this fashion would lessen the financial burden on governments. One possible strategy is to link employment programs explicitly to economic growth, particularly by introducing employment

---

275 Lundin et al., “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise,” 190.
277 Ibid.
279 Ibid., 208.
280 Ibid.
concerns into mainstream investment policy. Adoption of labor-based methods in infrastructure can provide this link, as investment in basic services like roads, irrigation, markets, housing, and schools can contribute to growth while creating jobs for the poor. The ILO’s employment-intensive infrastructure program (EIIP) is based on this idea, trying to orient infrastructure investments towards the creation of higher levels of productive employment through the use of labor-based technologies.

A good example of such program is the Feeder Roads Program (FRP) in Mozambique implemented by ILO. This labor-intensive public works scheme was supported by a large number of donor agencies. Phase I (1992-1996) of the FRP had an objective of developing rural areas in Mozambique, rehabilitating and maintaining tertiary roads, and promoting institutional development. The creation of temporary employment opportunities during rehabilitation, and a lesser number of permanent posts in routine maintenance, were additional objectives. The program employed approximately 4,500-5,000 people, and rehabilitated 1,936 km of road in 1992-1996, which was 81 percent of the target 2,400 km. Shortages of supplies, particularly fuel and vehicle parts, and late payment of workers were the main constraints identified in the program implementation.

As Rizwanul Islam explains, in situations affected by crises such as armed conflicts, the EIIP approach can demonstrate “the potential for simultaneously achieving the objectives of reconstruction, development, as well as employment and incomes for the poor and social reintegration of the affected population through investment in labor-based infrastructure.” However, these programs must evolve as the needs and circumstances of ex-combatants and other war-affected population change over time.

---

283 Ibid.
285 Ibid. There were 29 brigades operational in mid-1996, in nine provinces (except for Tete). Brigades had average size of 170-180 persons, as against a target of 250 persons. The percentage of women workers was at around 14 percent, which was significantly below the target of 25 percent.
286 Ibid.
287 Islam, “Decent Employment through Labour-Based Technology in Infrastructure.”
3-6-5 Landmine Issues

According to Mozambique’s first comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey published in August 2001, virtually every part of Mozambique experienced negative social and economic consequences from landmines and unexploded ordnance. During the war, Renamo was accused of mining places such as cultivated fields, access paths, and areas near schools, hospitals, cattle-dips, water wells and factories. The government, on the other hand, laid mines to protect economic and strategic targets such as electricity pylons, bridges and pipelines. The total affected population is estimated at 1.3 million in the 2003 updated report. While mines are reportedly a problem in all 10 provinces of the country, Inhambane is the most affected province, followed by Zambézia and Nampula.

The National Clearance Program was created in early 1993, but the demining process suffered considerable delays. After the departure of ONUMOZ, demining was taken over by the Mozambican authorities. The National Demining Institute (IND) is a semi-autonomous governmental institute reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which coordinates all mine action in Mozambique. At the end of 2001, the IND produced its first Five Year National Mine Action Plan: 2002-2006 (NMAP), based on the findings of the Landmine Impact Survey. The mission of the plan was to create a “mine-impact free” Mozambique within 10 years.

Mine action is integrated into the government’s Absolute Poverty Reduction Plan of Action (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta: PARPA), which is aimed at reducing poverty by 20 percent over the next 10 years and raising the standard of living of all Mozambicans. In keeping with these overall national priority concerns, the National Mine Action Plan adopted a “development orientated” approach that seeks to maximize the socio-economic impact and benefit of mine action in the country. However, some NGOs involved in mine actions criticize the government’s strategy. For example, various

---


289 Lundin et al., “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise,” 207.


291 Lundin et al., “Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise,” 207.


293 Ibid.
sectors such as agriculture do not include the mine as problematic in their activity plans, which delays the explosive devices removal. There are also situations where the government’s plans are “contradictory,” such as when the government cites mine removal as a priority for the development of the country, but such priorities are not properly reflected in the PARPA.  

3-7 Participation of Children and Women in DDR

It is estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 children in Mozambique were recruited by Renamo and participated in the conflict. During the war, Renamo regularly abducted children from their homes, gave them basic military training, and then sent them to the battlefield. Children were used to carry weapons and other equipment in the front lines, in reconnaissance missions, in planting land mines, and in espionage. This systematic preference for children as soldiers was often based on assumptions that children are easier to control and manipulate, that they are easily programmed to feel little fear or revulsion for their actions, and that they are easily programmed to think of war. In addition, there is also an account of the use of child soldiers by government forces.

3-7-1 Demobilization of Child Soldiers

Almost 28 percent (25,498) of the 92,881 officially demobilized soldiers were younger than 18 years old when recruited. It must be noted that, shortly after the signing of the GPA in October 1992, many of the children ran way from the military bases. But, due to the lack of official recognition of youngsters as soldiers, there was no structured program to meet their needs, and their support depended on the circumstances and the opportunities created by the international organizations. Some of the child combatants managed to

---

294 Ibid.
295 Honwana, “Children of War,” 128.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid., Confidential Mozambican government statistics show that out of a group of 15,682 FAM soldiers registered for demobilization in 1992, 12.4 percent had been enlisted when they were 16 or 17, 4.38 percent when they were 14 or 15, and 2.16 percent when they were 13 years old. See also, Cabrita, Mozambique, 258.  
299 Mauusse, “The Social Reintegration of the Child Involved in Armed Conflict in Mozambique.”
have access to the assembly areas for demobilization and were formally demobilized, others benefited from the services for family reunification, and others simply returned to their areas of origin through their own means and without any type of assistance.  

To accommodate the children until their families could be located, 12 transit centers were established in seven provinces, under the supervision of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and with the assistance of various NGOs. UNICEF guaranteed shelter, food, water, sanitation and medical assistance at these centers. The majority of children remained there for less than three months. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save the Children Fund US were responsible for reunifying unaccompanied children with their families. By the end of December 1994, all registered children had gone back to their families. Children were provided with one-month’s food rations, two blankets and a set of clothes when they were taken home.

Difficulties in demobilization of child soldiers arose from gaining access to them in the areas under Renamo control. On some bases, Renamo commanders were reluctant to release children, and UNICEF had to request the assistance of representatives at the Cease-fire Commission to facilitate their release.

3-7-2 Reintegration of Child Soldiers
Several analyses of cleansing or purification rituals illustrate that family and community involvement is vital for the processes of social reintegration of war-affected children. In general, rituals for former child combatants are similar to those performed on war-affected adults. An acknowledgement of the atrocities committed and a subsequent break from that past are articulated through a ritual performance, which is attended by family members and the broader community. Honwana concludes that there is no doubt that these rituals are instrumental in building family cohesion and solidarity and in dealing with the psychological and emotional side of these children’s problems. However, it must be noted that

300 Ibid.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
305 See for example, Honwana, “Children of War.”
306 Ibid., 137.
307 Ibid., 140.
these children return to a countryside that remains as poor as it was when they left, with no job opportunities and no vocational schools. Therefore, social reintegration of former child soldiers must be dealt in conjunction with the economic aspect of reintegration and rehabilitation.

3-7-3 Demobilization and Reintegration of Female Soldiers

Women constituted a small portion of those recognized as combatants in the demobilization process, 1,380 out of the total 92,881, or 1.48 percent. However, the figure could be higher, if it includes those who assumed various other functions in armed forces. Indeed, at the 19 Renamo bases to which the UNOHAC gained access in 1994, 40 percent of the 2,000 children found at these sites were girls. Nevertheless, female combatants did not benefit from the same entitlement as male combatants. For example, only men received the 18-month resettlement allowance under the RSS scheme. At the demobilization sites, clothes were issued which fitted only men, and women were given only small capulas.

With regard to reintegration, none of the programs specifically targeted women, and no courses were provided for women until the women’s department of AMODEG began to present demands and proposals. Through the OSD program supported by ILO, 7,700 ex-combatants have been trained, out of which 1.86 percent constituted women. Because women formed a tiny portion of the total number of the recognized ex-combatants, no consideration was given to gender issues, or the special needs of women, in the design of programs or the selection of candidates.

However, due to the AMODEG’s pressure, since September 1995 three sewing courses were specially set up for female ex-combatants as part of the OSD program. Another course in secretarial skills in Maputo also recruited mainly women. An additional example

---

307 Ibid.
309 Aird, Efraime Junior and Errante, “Mozambique.”
310 Baden, “Post-conflict Mozambique,” 73.
311 Ibid., 78.
312 Ibid., 118.
313 On completion of their training, each student was given a sewing machine to take away. A few of the best students were given small cash grants to assist with the purchase of materials. The micro-enterprise wing of the OSD project assisted former trainees from these courses to apply for loans. Beyond this, there were no formal provisions for on-going support. See, Ibid., 61.
is the Active Training Promotion Center in Inhambane (one of six government vocational training centers) that trained women in “non-traditional” skills, such as plumbing and panel beating, under the auspices of the OSD program.\(^{314}\) It is also worth noting that slightly over 10 percent of micro-enterprises supported through OSD were female-run.\(^{315}\)

But despite the introduction of female-focused training, AMODEG contended that these courses were too short and the machines provided at the end of the course were inadequate. Once trainees completed the courses, funds were not available for most of them to start businesses.\(^{316}\) Other problems faced by female ex-combatants included the absence of child-care provisions or complementary services such as health, family planning and counseling, the lack of specialized psychological support, and housing problems.\(^{317}\)

### 3-8 Regional Aspects of the Internal Conflict

The Mozambican conflict had regional implications, particularly on security and socioeconomic dimensions. Mozambique’s dependence on South Africa, for instance, meant that any “domestic” conflict in Mozambique was inherently regional, and that any bilateral encounter between the government and insurgents ultimately became multilateral, involving South Africa and other external powers.\(^{318}\) Issues of refugee movement and small arms proliferation in the Southern African sub-region also demonstrate that there could be no purely internal solution for the conflict in Mozambique.

First, the armed conflict in Mozambique displaced an estimated six million Mozambicans, of which 4.3 million were internal and 1.7 million were refugees in six adjacent countries.\(^{319}\) The number of refugees in these countries varied greatly, from over a million in Malawi to figures in the range of 20,000 in Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. The refugee count in South Africa was never precisely ascertained.\(^{320}\) The repatriation of Mozambican

---

\(^{314}\) Ibid., 119.

\(^{315}\) Ibid., 120.

\(^{316}\) Ibid., 73.

\(^{317}\) Ibid., 73, 78.


\(^{320}\) Ibid.
refugees was the largest refugee operation ever conducted primarily by the UN, with most of the massive assistance originating from the international community as well as local agencies.321 The speed and scale of the entire operation, which repatriated 1.7 million refugees in less than three years, have been regarded as a success.322 Perhaps, the fact that the countries surrounding Mozambique were not at war made it easier for them to adopt a generous asylum policy, despite their own economic woes and the merciless drought and floods that beset Southern Africa from 1989 to 2001.323 Mario Azvedo contends that the absence of wars in Southern Africa, with the exception of Angola and Mozambique, enabled the international community to concentrate its resources and energies on the Mozambican refugee caseload.324

Second, arms flows in Mozambique have affected political and security dimensions in Southern Africa. Although the major destination of many of those arms was South Africa, Chachiua asserts that there are many accounts in which former soldiers from both Frelimo and Renamo smuggled weapons into Zimbabwe and Swaziland.325 The influx of illegal firearms was stimulated by political conflict, growing crime and a sustained, perceived need for self-protection. Criminal gangs have armed themselves to intimidate and control certain areas and are increasingly using light weapons in criminal activities linked to financial gain.326

In 1998, regional interest grew in reinforcing and strengthening SADC and its Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO)327 component as mechanisms for action on the control and reduction of illicit small arms trafficking.328 As a regional instrument, the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Re-

323 Azvedo, Tragedy and Triumph, 189-190.
324 Ibid., 190.
326 Vines, “The Struggle Continues.”
lated Materials in the SADC Region was created. Known as the SADC Protocol, it will be legally binding when ratified.\textsuperscript{329} The SADC Protocol is considered one of the most far reaching documents that exist for practical action on the combating of the illicit trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{330} This Protocol is unique in several respects. Supporting structures that were developed in parallel to the Protocol included the European Union (EU)-SADC process in determining joint programs of action to combat illicit small arms trafficking. SADC member states have committed themselves to cooperating in a structured manner, which includes active participation of civil society and extensive public awareness programs to eradicate illicit small arms and light weapons.\textsuperscript{331} Prospects for the expansion of sub-regional security arrangements and their collaboration with UN peacekeeping operations is a separate issue that deserves further discussion in another report.

3-9 Lessons Learned

3-9-1 General

DDR in Mozambique was to a large extent internationally driven. The international community made a significant financial contribution to the DDR efforts, and the number of international agencies and NGOs which operated within the country was high. The institutional arrangement for the implementation of the General Peace Agreement of October 1992 led to the expanded role of the UN. As some examples of reintegration programs illustrated, poor coordination among implementing agencies in effect limited the scope of capacity building. Involvement of local sectors and the government in planning and implementation of DDR programs is of vital importance in strengthening local capacity for consolidating peace and development.

\textsuperscript{329} As of April 2003, six of the SADC member countries have ratified the Protocol, namely Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{330} Gamba, “Implementation of Small Arms Initiatives in the Southern (SADC) and Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Regions (Nairobi Initiative) 2001-2003.” The Protocol includes, for instance, the need for SADC member states to enact national measures to ensure proper controls over the manufacturing, possession and use of firearms and ammunition; provisions promoting legal uniformity and minimum standards as to the manufacture, control, possession, import, export, and transfer of firearms and ammunition; provisions relating to brokering; mutual legal assistance and information exchange, and; the destruction of surplus, redundant or obsolete state-owned firearms, ammunition and other related materials.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
3-9-2 Disarmament
Both the quantity and quality of the collected weapons were lower than the expectation of ONUMOZ. As most of the better ones were deliberately hidden for security and political reasons, significant efforts must be made during the peace negotiation to build confidence and trust between the parties to the conflict. Measures ensuring their compliance with the political settlement would help facilitate a smooth DDR process.

The widespread availability of small arms in Mozambique and neighboring countries had the most far-reaching security effects, such as an increase in criminal violence. Therefore, the control and destruction of weapons during the DDR process must be pursued thoroughly. Significant achievements were made in the post-DDR weapons collection efforts such as Operation Rachel and the TAE project; however, their effects would be limited without broader undertakings in reducing illicit arms trade at the regional level.

3-9-3 Demobilization
The demobilization process encountered a number of security problems. High expectations of combatants turned into frustration due to the delay in the process and poor conditions and assistance at assembly areas. Timely planning and provision of assistance are essential.

The special needs of child and female combatants should receive more attention. It is of foremost importance to recognize their multiple roles in armed conflict, and to prevent their exclusion from benefits granted under DDR programs. For this purpose, it would be helpful to include issues of child and female soldiers in the provisions of peace agreements.

3-9-4 Reintegration
Appropriate and adequate needs assessment and labor market surveys are imperative in planning reintegration programs. Ex-combatants do not constitute a homogeneous group of people with the same backgrounds and expectations, and reintegration programs should therefore reflect the diversity of ex-combatants as well as socio-economic conditions of the receiving communities.
Linking vocational training and creation of employment opportunities is crucial for successful reintegration. Bryant rightly points out that “training in itself does not constitute economic reintegration.”

Much support should be rendered for self-employment initiatives, establishment of credit mechanisms, and creation of longer-term employment. Follow-up support for both trainees and micro-project beneficiaries should be adequately provided.

The vast effects of war in Mozambique, notably the devastated infrastructure and capacity, were the primary contextual limitations in implementing reintegration programs. This resulted in an acute lack of formal training providers and resources for the successful implementation of training. Credit mechanisms have also been undeveloped and inadequately structured for effective access. Poor employment opportunities in the formal sector, and lack of experience and support in self-employment and micro-enterprise creation have also posed a myriad of challenges in reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life. Reintegration initiatives for ex-combatants have to be undertaken in the broader context of such economic recovery.

As IOM and ILO projects illustrated, labor-intensive work proved to be beneficial to the communities in terms of rehabilitation of the local infrastructure. However, they were problematic for ex-combatants, as the projects were short-term and minimal skills investment did little to promote longer-term economic activities. Support for longer-term opportunities would be paramount for the economic reintegration of former combatants.

Economic and social reintegration of former combatants is not a separate process. Provision of education, vocational training, and employment opportunities are main factors that would determine successful social reintegration. Concurrently, reconciliation among former combatants and other divergent groups of people within a community would not only facilitate social reintegration but also lead to economic stability. Traditional mechanisms for reconciliation can play a significant role in reintegrating former combatants into the social fabric of their community.

332 Bryant, Training and employment programmes for war affected populations.
333 Ibid.
4. Case of Sierra Leone

Much of Sierra Leone was devastated by 11 years of the brutal civil war, with over one million of the Sierra Leonean population displaced within the country.\(^{334}\) 450,000 refugees sought asylum in Liberia and Guinea at the height of the conflict,\(^{335}\) a minimum of 50,000 people were killed, and there were 100,000 victims of mutilation. In UNDP’s last four annual Human Development reports, Sierra Leone was consecutively ranked last in the world on the basis of HDI value.\(^{336}\) Despite the fact that the war officially ended in January 2002, and successful elections followed in May, peace in Sierra Leone is still volatile. But, much effort is being made to consolidate the peace, including strengthening the capacity of police and armed forces, reintegrating ex-combatants, and promoting human rights and national reconciliation.\(^{337}\) Although the UN Mission in Sierra Leone is currently in the process of downsizing in accordance with progress achieved in these areas, the progress must be carefully observed to avoid jeopardizing the peace.

This case study aims to analyze the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration within the framework of the peace process in Sierra Leone. The experience of Sierra Leone demonstrates a mixture of success and failure of DDR efforts and the prospects for future endeavors to achieve long-term development.

4-1 Background and Nature of the Conflict

4-1-1 From War to Peace

The civil war in Sierra Leone broke out in March 1991, when a group of insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, attacked two small towns in the Kailahun district near the Sierra Leone-Liberia border. Despite the intervention made by the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the violence spread to all parts of the country.\(^{338}\) In February 1996, the

\(^{334}\) UNHCR Regional Directorate, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, Plan of Operation: Repatriation and Reintegration of Sierra Leonean Refugees, September 2001, 8.

\(^{335}\) Ibid.


\(^{338}\) ECOMOG originally had presence in Liberia for its peacekeeping operation.
first multiparty elections were held in which Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) became president. Notwithstanding some coup attempts on the new regime, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between President Kabbah and the RUF after the RUF was expelled from some key positions. However, some factions of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) staged a coup against the Kabbah government in May 1997. The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah, established the new regime in coalition with the RUF.

A cease-fire was agreed on between Kabbah and the RUF in May 1999, after heavy fighting in January 1999 when the RUF invaded Freetown. Following difficult negotiations, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July 1999 by all parties to the conflict in order to end hostilities and to form a government of national unity. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was accordingly established in October 1999 to assist the government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé Agreement. However, Foday Sankoh, who received an absolute pardon and was given the vice presidency by the Agreement, effectively “spoiled” the peace process. As Adekeye Adebajo describes, “Lomé was a feast for Sierra Leone’s sobels.”

The violent conflict in Sierra Leone had complex factions of armed forces. In addition to the existence of so-called sobels, a civilian militia called the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF) was created in support of the government Sierra Leone (GoSL) to provide local security against AFRC/RUF insurgency. In 1995, mercenaries from Executive Outcomes, a private South African security firm, were called by the GoSL to help train and provide logistical support to the army and militias. Executive Outcomes played a crucial military role, for instance, in clearing rebels from the Freetown area in 1995 and attacking rebels in the minefields.

---

339 The agreement formally lifted the death sentence over Foday Sankoh (Article IX); called for the RUF to be transformed into a political party (Article III); enabled the RUF members to hold public office (Article IV); provided cabinet appointments to the RUF to create the government of national unity (Article V); gave Sankoh the vice presidency (Article V) as well as the chairmanship of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, in charge of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone’s gold, diamonds and other resources (Article VII).


342 Ibid., 84.

tal in making possible the holding of 1996 elections.\textsuperscript{344} The Kabbah regimes also relied on ECOMOG, particularly the Nigerian troops, for military support. While the Nigerian troops made a substantial contribution to counter-offensives against the rebels, they also employed excessive and condemnable military force against civilians.\textsuperscript{345}

The scale and magnitude of human rights abuses committed by armed forces were enormous. Civilian sufferings took the form of mutilations, such as crude amputations of the feet, hands, arms, lips or ears. Women and girls were systematically raped. Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, were abducted by rebel forces. The violence resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing rebel-controlled rural areas, primarily in the east, north and northwestern regions of Sierra Leone into neighboring Guinea and Liberia, or becoming the internally displaced within Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{346} The CDF was also responsible for acts of cruelty, including indiscriminate killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF.\textsuperscript{347}

On 10 November 2000, a one-month cease-fire agreement was signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Abuja, Nigeria. The agreement contained a number of provisions for the RUF to fulfill, including: returning of UNAMSIL weapons and equipment; opening of the roads and allowing free movement of people, goods, and humanitarian agencies; allowing the deployment of UNAMSIL; and allowing the GoSL to extend its authority to areas controlled by the RUF. UNAMSIL was tasked to monitor and report on compliance with the provisions of the cease-fire.

On 2 May 2001, the cease-fire agreement was duly reviewed by ECOWAS, the GoSL, the RUF, and UNAMSIL. After expressing satisfaction with the holding of the cease-fire, the groups agreed for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to recommence im-


\textsuperscript{345} Adebajo, \textit{Building Peace in West Africa}, 95.


The causes of the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone are rooted in a mixture of bad governance, denial of fundamental human rights, economic mismanagement and social exclusion.\textsuperscript{349} In particular, one of the main underlying causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone is considered to be the marginalization of the rural population by a small Freetown-based political-economic elite through large-scale patronage and public-sector corruption.\textsuperscript{350} The political and economic cleavage between the regime and the general population resulted in an unfair distribution of wealth and opportunity.\textsuperscript{351} William Reno contends that the security provided by mercenaries and the local operations of foreign aid organizations helped to further marginalize most people from the centers of power.\textsuperscript{352}

4-1-2 Post-Conflict Elections and Reconciliation

The presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 14 May 2002. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won 70 percent of votes and his party, the SLPP, won 83 of the 124 parliamentary seats. The electoral campaigning was generally peaceful, and the electoral observers characterized the elections as free, transparent and generally violence-free. All the opposition political parties, including the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), who did not win enough votes to gain a single seat in parliament, accepted the election results.\textsuperscript{353}

Although the elections are perceived as a remarkable step forward in consolidating the peace in Sierra Leone, the GoSL today continues to face challenges in accomplishing fundamental reforms in the country, including the promotion of national reconciliation and

\textsuperscript{348} The program was halted since May 2000 by the outbreak of hostilities among the fighting forces.
\textsuperscript{350} Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Peace-building Unit, Sierra Leone Conflict Diagnostic, Draft Mission Report, February 2002, 3.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{352} Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 135. International agencies and NGOs, in many cases, have appreciated the security provided by Executive Outcomes that made their activities possible.
\textsuperscript{353} Peace and Liberation Party, led by the former AFRC/ex-SLA leader Johnny Paul Koroma, gained only two seats. However, a concern was raised regarding potential divisions between the army and the ruling party as indicated by the large numbers of votes cast for Koroma by the armed forces personnel. See, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone, UN doc. S/2002/679, 19 June 2002.
justice. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court were established for this purpose.

The TRC was created in accordance with the Lomé Agreement, to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.”^354^ The TRC is to investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It serves to provide an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations suffered and obtain redress.^355^

By contrast, the Special Court, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1315, is to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.^356^ The Court has a three-year mandate to prosecute persons most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed from 30 November 1996 (the Abidjan Agreement). The jurisdiction of the Court also includes certain crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone after 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Agreement).^357^

The simultaneous existence of the TRC and the Special Court provides a unique opportunity to advance multiple and complementary levels of accountability. At the same time, experts have pointed out the need to address the relationship between the two institutions.^358^ Some concerns raised include: the Sierra Leonean population in general do not know the difference between the two institutions and their mandates; perpetrators in particular fear that testimony given to the TRC will be later used by the Special Court to

---


^356^ UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1315, 14 August 2000. The Special Court was established by an Agreement signed between the UN and the GoSL on 16 January 2002, and is therefore a unique treaty-based court of mixed jurisdiction and composition. There are both local and international prosecutors and judges.


^358^ See, for example, Marieke Wierda, Priscilla Hayner and Paul van Zyl, “Exploring the Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone,” The International Center for Transitional Justice, 24 June 2002; Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Renewed commitment needed to end impunity*.
initiate prosecution against them and; the fact that the two institutions function at the same
time might adversely give an impression that they are competing entities and undermine
their efforts. The prospect for these two institutions still remains to be seen.

4-2 Overview of the Peacekeeping Operation

On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much larger mission with a
maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Sierra
Leonean government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lomé Agreement. The
Security Council terminated the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL) accordingly. The mandate of UNAMSIL included monitoring the adher-
ence to the cease-fire, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and assisting the
government in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
plan.

The size of UNAMSIL was expanded over the course of its operation. On 7 February
2000, the UN Security Council decided to revise the mandate of UNAMSIL to include a
number of additional tasks. It decided to augment the military component to a maxi-
mum of 11,100 military personnel, and to expand other areas such as civil affairs, civilian
police, and the administrative and technical components of UNAMSIL. Provisions of se-
curity at key locations, as well as at all sites of the DDR program, then became a
paramount task for UNAMSIL. Moreover, the hostage incident of May 2000 prompted
further expansion of UNAMSIL. Finally, as authorized by the Security Council on 30
March 2001, the size to the troops reached 17,500 military personnel, making UNAMSIL
the largest UN peacekeeping force ever deployed.

---

360 UNOMSIL monitored and advised about efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation’s security
forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, also monitored human rights situa-
363 In April 2000, as UNAMSIL deployment progressed, the RUF hostility towards UNAMSIL mounted
leading to attacks. In early May 2000, approximately 500 troops from Zambia were deployed to reinforce the
Kenyans but were ambushed by the RUF and taken hostages with all their equipment. All the hostages were
released between 16 – 28 May 2000, as brokered by the President Charles Taylor of Liberia.
364 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1346, 30 March 2001. The same resolution approved a revised
concept of operations.
4-3 Design of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

4-3-1 Planning of the DDR Program

In mid-1998, the government of Sierra Leone took the initiative to design a comprehensive DDR program through the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR).\(^3\) The program was originally designed to target an estimated 45,000 combatants, comprising members of the RUF, the former Sierra Leone Army, and the CDF. It was expected that 12 percent of the total would be women.\(^4\) The immediate objective of the program was to assist all combatants in laying down their arms and to reintegrate them into their respective communities. The ultimate goal was to support the national strategy for peace that includes the consolidation of the political and security process, which forms the basis for a viable post-war national recovery program.\(^5\)

4-3-2 Disarmament Component

Disarmament was conducted at reception centers. The disarmament exercise consisted of five main segments, namely, assembly of troops, interview for collecting information and registration, weapons collection, eligibility certification as beneficiary of the DDR program, and transportation to demobilization centers.\(^6\)

Group disarmament was introduced in Phase III of the DDR process,\(^7\) which allowed a group to bring in one weapon to enter the DDR program. Commanders of the armed forces would disarm along with the combatants they led in their respective districts, and the criterion for group disarmament was applied uniformly for the CDF and the RUF beginning in October 2001.\(^8\)

---

\(^3\) The NCDDR was chaired by the President of Sierra Leone. It comprised the following members: representatives from the donor community; Minister of Information and Broadcasting; Minister of Finance; Deputy Minister of Defense (who was the CDF coordinator); Special Representative of the UN; UN Military Force Commander (UNAMSIL); and Head of the RUF. See, Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilisation,” in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, Institute for Security Studies Monograph No 80, March 2003.

\(^4\) Ibid.


\(^6\) Thusi and Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilisation.”

\(^7\) See Section 4-4 for the Phases of demobilization process.

\(^8\) Communiqué, the Joint GoSL / RUF / UNAMSIL Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 11 October 2001, replicated in Sierra Leone Web, (accessed January 12, 2004); available from [http://www.sierra-leone.org/jointcommittee1011001.html](http://www.sierra-leone.org/jointcommittee1011001.html).
All weapons collected as part of the DDR process were to be destroyed, due to the concerns about the capacity of the GoSL to safely store them. Thus, UNAMSIL subcontracted GTZ for the destruction of weapons and GTZ developed a program to destroy weapons mainly through cutting the weapons into smaller pieces and rendering them inoperable.  

4-3-3 Demobilization Component
At demobilization centers, ex-combatants were provided with basic necessities. They were further prepared to enter civilian life through the implementation of pre-discharge orientation activities, such as trauma healing and psycho-social counseling, information and sensitization seminars, and civic education.

4-3-4 Reintegration Component
The government strategy for the reintegration of former combatants was to support the “social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants by engaging them in productive activities beneficial to them and facilitating their return to their families and communities in a responsible manner.” The strategy included: reinsertion benefits for post-discharge resettlement support; short-term reintegration opportunities, such as short-term employment, acquisition of basic skills, basic inputs for agriculture, self-employment, or formal education; and referral and counseling services.

When disarmed, demobilized and discharged, former combatants were to receive a transportation allowance, equivalent to approximately US$15, to enable them to travel to their places of reintegration. Upon registration at the provincial reintegration offices of the NCDDR, the demobilized combatants were to receive reinsertion benefits, which were meant to assist the former combatants and their families in resettlement for the first three months. It was initially equivalent to approximately US$300, but was reduced to US$150 due to financial constraints. Subsequently, demobilized combatants were to be supported by training and employment activities through the reintegration program of the NCDDR and other agencies. Furthermore, former combatants and their dependents would benefit

371 Thusi and Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilisation.”
373 Ibid.
from community-based initiatives supporting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic services and the recovery of the local economy as they reintegrated into communities.375

4-3-5 Resettlement Program

Reintegration of former combatants has to be considered in conjunction with the resettlement program conducted by the government of Sierra Leone. The resettlement program, designed to benefit internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and former combatants, was completed at the end of November 2002. The question remains as to what extent reintegration of former combatants was achieved within the scheme of the resettlement program.

The GoSL’s Resettlement Strategy was developed in consultation with partner agencies, which was approved in December 2000.376 The strategy aimed to “support the resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced, refugees and ex-combatants with their dependants back into their communities, strengthen their livelihood security and promote reconciliation.”377 In the context of the peace process, the resettlement program was implemented by the Sierra Leonean government through the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) 378 with support from various international agencies.379 The process was conducted in five disparate phases beginning in April 2001, enabling the resettlement of more than 220,000 persons by December 2002.380

For the resettlement program, a phased approach was adopted because the resettlement process was closely linked with the recovery of security. In order for the beneficiaries to enter the resettlement program, it was a prerequisite that their chiefdoms of origin were declared “safe” for resettlement under certain conditions.381 Under this program, IDPs and

---

375 Ibid.  See Diagram 4-1.
376 NCRRR, Sierra Leone. The Resettlement Strategy was revised in October 2001.
377 Ibid., 4.
379 Ibid. The agencies included the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), WFP, UNAMSIL, IOM, CARE, Catholic Relief Services and ICRC.
380 Ibid.
381 Areas were declared safe for resettlement by both District and National Assessment Committees comprising representatives from government line ministries, the NaCSA, the NCDDR, local authorities, UNAMSIL, UNOCHA, UNHCR and representatives from the National Council of Displaced Persons. The conditions for the areas to be declared “Safe” for resettlement were:
registered returnees were entitled to transportation and a resettlement package,\textsuperscript{382} the potential for entry into employment-based programs, and benefits from community rehabilitation and reconstruction targeted at basic service provision and income generation.\textsuperscript{383} Former combatants were eligible for community-based support being provided in their areas of resettlement, as were unregistered IDPs, and non-displaced, war-affected populations living in areas of resettlement.\textsuperscript{384}

\begin{itemize}
  \item There has been stability and peace in a chiefdom for an extended period of time;
  \item On-going disarmament program in the chiefdom;
  \item Presence of UNAMSIL peacekeepers/SLA security forces in the area;
  \item Unhindered access for humanitarian agencies and the NaCSA to the area;
  \item Presence of local administration functionaries;
  \item Spontaneous returns of IDPs and returnees to the area.
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{382} It comprised of a two-month food ration and a non-food items per household.

\textsuperscript{383} NCRRR, \textit{Sierra Leone}, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 6, 8.
Diagram 4-1: Interface Between Resettlement and Reintegration

**TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT**

- **Reinsertion Package:**
  1. Transport allowance
  2. Reinsertion benefits

- **Social Protection**

- **Employment Generation Schemes (e.g. Public Works)**

- **Reconciliation**

**RECONSTRUCTION & REHABILITATION**

- **Targeted Ex-combatant Reintegration Programme:**
  Vocational training, apprenticeship, job placement, formal education and subsistence support

- **Communities** (inc. existing population)

**DEVELOPMENT**

- **Agricultural Rehabilitation**

- **Rehabilitation of basic services, e.g. health, education, water and sanitation**

- **Reconstruction of Shelter and Community Infrastructure**

- **Capacity Building of Local Organisations**

- **Small Enterprise Promotion and Vocational Training**

---

4-3-6 Community Arms Collection and Destruction

Acknowledging that the formal DDR process does not cover certain categories of weapons and armed individuals, the Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) program was created. It aimed at collecting arms that were defined as not being part of the DDR process, such as hunting rifles and pistols, and weapons in the hands of civilians. This comprehensive voluntary weapons collection program was implemented by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) with the assistance of UNAMSIL. The CACD program commenced on 1 December 2001, and was implemented to cover the whole country.  

The program ended in April 2002 and resulted in the retrieval of approximately 9,660 weapons and 17,000 rounds of ammunition. These weapons included shotguns, pistols, bombs, and other explosives. At the end of the amnesty period, which was parallel to the CACD program, it became illegal to possess arms in Sierra Leone. The SLP conducted limited search operations in collaboration with communities in order to recover illegally held firearms after the amnesty period expired.  

To further follow-up DDR and the CACD efforts, UNDP developed a planning project aiming to decrease weapons-related insecurity and create a favorable environment for sustainable development, peace-building, and conflict prevention. The CACD II, or referred to as the Community Arms Collection and Development Program, was designed to give the government control over the weapons present in the country by establishing legal norms and a centralized arms registry and database. It also aimed to develop regional legislation in relation with the movement of arms. In addition, the Preparatory Assistance phase of the project sought to identify the extent of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Sierra Leone, as well as to test pilot approaches for arms collection and related development activities to reward communities that gave up their weapons. For example, a development incentive would be given for the declaration of arms-free chiefdoms in or-
der to foster “the mindset of an arms-free community.” This represents a significant development in terms of community benefits and regional aspect of arms control.

4-4 Implementation Process of DDR

4-4-1 Phases of Demobilization

There were four phases of demobilization, as follows:

Phase I (September 1998 – December 1998)
Phase II (October 1999 – May 2000)
Interim Phase (May 2000 – May 2001)
Phase III (May 2001 – January 2002)

Phase I was aborted due to the escalation of fighting in late 1998 and early 1999. Phase II of the program was reactivated and implemented within the framework of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The program was halted in May 2000 by the outbreak of hostilities among the fighting forces, and the situation continued until two cease-fire agreements were negotiated a year later. Following the establishment of a Joint Committee on DDR in April 2001, Phase III was convened. On 18 January 2002, with disarmament completed all over the country, the Sierra Leonean government declared the 11-year war officially over. Demobilization processes in camps were completed by February 2002.

4-4-2 Outcomes

The data as of August 2002 showed that the number of disarmed soldiers was 72,490, 71,043 of whom were demobilized (See Table 4-1). Approximately 2,385 ex-combatants (ex-RUF and ex-CDF) were recruited into the military after DDR. UNAMSIL retrieved 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million ammunitions.

---

392 The Joint Committee on DDR comprising representatives of the government, the RUF and UNAMSIL met on a monthly basis to discuss issues.
Table 4-1: Total Disarmed, by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category disarmed</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Interim Phase</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>19,267</td>
<td>24,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharged/Ex-SLA</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>28,051</td>
<td>37,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (including paramilitary)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>2,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>18,898</td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>47,781</td>
<td>72,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The evaluation of the DDR programs by the Sierra Leonean government recognized that the disarmament process was “qualitatively and quantitatively successful.” It indicated that key achievements in DDR included, among many other aspects: the total number of over 70,000 combatants demobilized, outnumbering the original planned figure of 45,000; the development of the CACD program; the destruction of weapons by GTZ; and the overall improvement of the security situation in the country. It also commended that the period of encampment at demobilization was progressively reduced from 21 days to less than seven days. The elements of successful implementation of DDR are attributed, in part, to the flexible policy framework, the expertise and resources made available by UNAMSIL, and the collaboration with other relevant agencies and NGOs.

4-4-3 Constraints in the Process

As explained above, the implementation of disarmament and demobilization, by and large, is considered to be successful. Nevertheless, a myriad of obstacles were experienced in the process. First, financial constraints were one of the major hindrances in DDR implementation. As a consequence, the delay in the DDR process caused many other problems. This financial difficulty resulted in poor conditions in the demobilization camps and ex-combatants not receiving their entitlements in due time. For instance, the payment of the reinsertion benefits of US$150 was slow, and there remained a US$20 million shortfall in

---

394 Ibid., 6.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid., 7.
397 Thusi and Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilisation.”
international contributions to DDR in March 2000. The NCDDR only initiated registration and payments in Phase III in the wake of rioting over their non-payment in October 2001. Ex-combatants’ frustration resulted in incidents that posed a threat to security at camps. In some cases, ex-combatants refused to leave the camp without their benefits—in the form of identification cards and traveling allowances—although the camp was at capacity. This stalled the program as additional accommodation had to be found for new combatants.

Second, a lack of trust between the RUF and the CDF also had an impact on the pace of disarmament. The RUF expressed discontent with the DDR process, which in turn constituted an impediment in the overall peace process. By the same token, re-recruitment of demobilized soldiers became a significant issue. Some ex-combatants who had completed the DDR program allegedly rejoined the rebels in January 1999. For instance, many of the “demobilized” child soldiers had reportedly returned to the RUF, some because of intimidation and others because there were no funds available for rehabilitation.

Third, concerns were raised about the low quality of the collected weapons and the ratio of collected weapons to the number of former combatants, as many of them reported for demobilization only with ammunition or hand grenades. Some observers pointed out that ex-combatants used the reinsertion benefits of US$150 to purchase better weapons in neighboring countries to resume fighting. Moreover, according to Berman, there are reports that the DDR program had the effect of bringing weapons into Sierra Leone from Guinea.

---

400 Thusi and Meek, “Disarmament and Demobilisation.”
401 Ibid.
Notwithstanding all these problems faced during the course of DDR in Sierra Leone, the major obstacles were observed in the implementation of reintegration. This will be further discussed in the next section.

4-5 Reintegration and Challenges Ahead

4-5-1 Involvement of Donors

The NCDDR commenced the delivery of reintegration opportunities at the beginning of January 2000, albeit on a limited basis. Reintegration efforts in the early stages were hindered by considerable problems, including inaccessibility to over 50 percent of the country, limited economic opportunities, concentration of government and other NGO services in larger towns, and a focus on relief activities by all agencies. Although as of February 2004 the reintegration phase was completed, the current state of Sierra Leone demonstrates the difficulties facing ex-combatants in returning to civilian life. Some of the major donor assistance for the reintegration of ex-combatants is illustrated in the following sections.

4-5-1-1 World Bank

The World Bank has provided the Sierra Leonean government with financial, technical and capacity-building support. First of all, it played a major role in setting up and administering the Multi-Donor Trust Fund that committed more than US$35 million for the DDR process. In addition, the Bank assisted the GoSL through the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (CRRP). The Project consisted of two components: namely, the reintegration of demobilized combatants, and the rehabilitation of communities. For the former, the Training and Employment Program (TEP) was implemented to support the social and economic reintegration of former combatants through targeting counseling, training, and employment initiatives. For the latter, the Emergency Recovery Support Fund (ERSF) was established to facilitate the social and economic recovery of communities and the restoration of basic services through demand-driven, community-oriented...
projects that targeted IDPs, refugees and the communities affected by the conflict. With an aim to strengthen the local capacity through the implementation of the project, institutional support was provided to the NCDDR and the NCRRR, respectively, as implementing government agencies.

According to the World Bank, of the 72,500 demobilized soldiers, over 56,000 have registered for reintegration opportunities, and 48,000 participated in the TEP. Approximately half of those who participated in the TEP funded activities were employed or self-employed one year after completing the program. In parallel, the ERSF supported 269 community projects in the affected areas, benefiting an estimated 1,000,000 people in all of the districts of Sierra Leone. The World Bank report pointed out weak community participation in the identification of the project as one of the difficulties in the ERSF. However, it also acknowledged a trade-off between quickly re-establishing basic community services that motivate IDPs to return, and high levels of community participation in projects.

4-5-1-2 UNAMSIL

UNAMSIL has implemented Special Emergency Projects (Stop-Gaps), which provided short-term reintegration support to former combatants through engagement in small, labor-intensive community infrastructure projects. The projects were designed to assist ex-combatants awaiting the NCDDR reintegration opportunities in less accessible communities. These projects were mainly two to three-month interventions involving the rehabilitation of carefully selected community/government infrastructure. UNAMSIL has been gradually scaling down the scope of this program by directing remaining resources, in collaboration with other donor agencies, to developing the capacity of the reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities. This new orientation is supported by UN Volunteers (UNV) by means of a special fund, and is being implemented in close collaboration with the UNDP youth engagement program and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Sierra Leone. For example, in September 2003, the UNV/UNAMSIL section

409 Ibid.
410 Ibid., 7.
411 Ibid., 11.
412 Ibid., 23.
launched its “Reintegration and Transition to Peace Building” program in Koidu, Kono district. The program is a joint UNV/UNAMSIL initiative to promote social reintegration, reconciliation and peace-building in Sierra Leone.415

4-5-1-3 The Department for International Development (DFID)
The UK’s DFID launched a broad-based multi-sector community reintegration project in the northern region in 2001 to support the GoSL’s overall recovery effort in the country. The project concentrated its activities in two districts (Port Loko and Kambia) initially, but was expanded to cover two additional districts.416 The initial strategy was to provide only stop-gap support to ex-combatants waiting to enter the NCDDR’s reintegration programs or to those completing their training programs. However, adjustments were made to include approximately 2,900 ex-combatants to benefit from the various initiatives.417

4-5-1-4 United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of USAID started to operate in Sierra Leone in 1997.418 The objective was to help address the root causes of conflict by involving Sierra Leone’s civil society in peace-building initiatives.419 Specific activities benefiting ex-combatants conducted by OTI include: reintegration of ex-combatants and war-affected youth, expanding of employment opportunities, and an entrepreneurial development program.

The Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) program created a nationwide, non-formal, and remedial education network for ex- and non-combatant young adults, many of whom had not attended school for nearly 10 years. From March 2000 until March 2002, 46,480 individuals participated at over 2,000 sites. During the year-long train-

416 Bombali and Tonkolili districts.
419 Ibid., 40-41. In addition to the specific programs for ex-combatants, OTI provided assistance in direct support to the NCDDR, technical assistance for monitoring of the diamond trade, media and communications support, and election assistance.
ing, the YRTEP participants gained literacy and math skills while learning about self-reliance, conflict resolution, agriculture, health, and civic participation. The program was broadened to include a second track called Nation-Building, a nationwide adult non-formal education initiative for public and private sector leaders.420

To expand employment opportunities, the Skills Training and Employment Promotion (STEP) and Skills Training and Employment Generation (STEG) programs were built on the gains of the YRTEP program. They were designed to facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants and war-affected youths through community-based strategies. They aimed to strengthen life skills and promote social reintegration, create temporary employment, and stimulate cooperation between ex-combatants and community members working together in civic works projects.421 In addition, the Small Grants Program addressed issues related to the setbacks in the peace process in May 2000, the reconciliation and reintegration of war-affected women and girls, the development of community leadership, and civic education in preparation for the elections in 2001.422

Through the Entrepreneurial Development Program, OTI supported a series of intensive two-week workshops with participants from throughout the country to foster self-reliance and economic development through assimilation of improved business practices.423

4-5-1-5 The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

GTZ started working in Sierra Leone in 2000. During previous experience in Guinea and Liberia, GTZ developed a concept for working in crisis situations, which was applied in Sierra Leone. This ReAct-concept is a multi-sectoral approach to crisis situations, aiming at quick impacts for war-affected communities and high visibility to create confidence. The multi-sectoral approach of GTZ included skills training, construction, income-generating activities, agricultural development, and community services. The reintegration

422 Ibid.
program aimed at long-term impacts mainly through capacity building measures and peace-building activities.\textsuperscript{424}

GTZ’s reintegration initiatives did not target ex-combatants only. Its activities extended to all sectors and communities in Sierra Leone, including residents and IDPs, women, children, and individuals who have contracted HIV/AIDS. With a strong engagement in rural areas and communities, support was provided to local NGOs in reintegration activities, such as peace-building, training and education, rehabilitation, and economic empowerment. GTZ supported skills training and education in, for example, business management. Beneficiaries were given three months of micro-project training, including managing funds, and were inserted into enterprises.\textsuperscript{425}

Besides reintegration activities, it is worth noting that GTZ conducted weapons destruction as part of DDR assistance. Subcontracted by UNAMSIL, GTZ initiated a weapons conversion program aimed at destroying weapons collected from former combatants and converting them into agricultural tools for the benefit of skills training centers across the country. These tools were handed back to the government for distribution through the NCDDR.\textsuperscript{426} Some 25,089 weapons have been destroyed through this process.\textsuperscript{427}

\textbf{4-5-2 Economic Reintegration}

As already discussed above, the delay and inadequacy of the reintegration of ex-combatants was particularly criticized during the DDR process in Sierra Leone. A number of factors, compounded by financial constraints, have hampered the reintegration process. First, much of the reintegration assistance was provided for a six-month period only, which makes it difficult for ex-combatants to acquire sufficient training crucial to become competitive in the labor market.\textsuperscript{428} Second, there has been low investment in social and physical infrastructure in terms of creating employment and supporting job placement.

\textsuperscript{426} Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, 15 May 2001, (accessed December 12, 2003); available from \url{http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0501.html}.
Limited economic growth and the slow pace of private sector initiatives meant that even when ex-combatants developed marketable skills, their opportunities were limited.429

Lastly, the problem of the participation rate should not be neglected. According to the NCDDDR, the number of participating ex-combatants in reintegration programs was lower than the number of ex-combatants registered for support.430 For instance, a sample of various projects in all the regions and sectors of support showed only a 67 percent participation rate.431 The NCDDDR believes this discrepancy indicated possible efforts at self-reintegration and perceived unattractiveness of the structure of assistance. In addition, shifting preferences by the beneficiaries, as well as delay in placement of beneficiaries into programs, may also be contributory factors to the low participation rate.432

4-5-3 Social Reintegration

A major challenge in social reintegration has been to restore relations between ex-combatants and their communities. It was acknowledged that there has been growing resentment among many Sierra Leoneans who claim that those responsible for committing atrocities are being supported, to a much larger extent, than their victims. While former combatants have received reinsertion benefits of US$150 and were promised additional training, victims of sexual violence, mutilations, and displacement complain that they have not received adequate support.433 According to the NCDDDR, the provision of targeted assistance to ex-combatants has often been perceived as rewarding the perpetrators of the violence, and not as an investment in peace and security.434 In response to this problem, the NCDDDR and its partners have facilitated the return of ex-combatants to their home communities and acted as mediators to facilitate social acceptance through a network of re-

429 Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants.”
430 GoSL, NCDDDR, “The DDR Programme,” 15. Ex-combatants expressed their intent for participation in reintegration programs at the registration. The collected information reveals initial preference and choice of the ex-combatants and provides the basis for programming, identification of delivery partners and contracting for implementation. Ideally, the number of ex-combatants registering for support should be equal to those participating at anytime under review.
431 Ibid., 15-16. Public works projects have the lowest participation rate of 48 percent. Job creation recorded a 94 percent participation rate, for which NCDDDR analyzes that measures that reinforce ownership and self-esteem are more acceptable to the target population.
432 Ibid.
434 Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants.”
ferral and counseling officers, information dissemination and supporting community initia-
tives for reconciliation.435

In addition to the local efforts to overcome the resentment of communities towards ex-
combatants, addressing impunity at the national level is critical in achieving reconciliation.
Effective functioning of the TRC and the Special Court are expected to bring to justice
perpetrators of human rights abuses, including crimes under international humanitarian
law. At the same time, Sierra Leone’s national judicial system must be strengthened so
that all those responsible for serious crimes committed before 30 November 1996 can also
be prosecuted. Social acceptance of former combatants within a society will be possible
when victims are able to obtain redress and adequate support for their wounds, both physi-
cal and psychological, of the brutal conflict.

In parallel to providing justice to victims, ex-combatants themselves may also need long-
term psycho-social support. A study showed that the attitudes of some ex-combatants have
made full reintegration into their communities difficult.436 A number of them have failed
to acknowledge, or comprehend, that many killings during the conflict were morally
wrong. In fact, some ex-combatants believe that they deserve to be rewarded for their role
in the conflict. For instance, some former RUF combatants have tended to think of them-
selves as legitimate revolutionaries, while the others in the CDF have tended to portray
themselves as saviors of the people.437 Thus, appropriate psycho-social counseling and
trauma healing for former combatants during the demobilization and reintegration process
would help them prepare to return to civilian life. Furthermore, those ex-combatants who
are also victims of forced recruitment, sexual abuses, and other atrocities, should be given
adequate support and care in the long-term.

4-5-4 A Linkage to Development

In view of the possibility that after the completion of reintegration programs ex-combatants
may face unemployment if the economy does not grow fast enough to create more durable
opportunities, the NCDDR planned to work within the framework of the government’s Na-

435 GoSL, NCDDR, “The DDR Programme,” 18-19. Some other specific measures include radio-discussion
programs, soap operas, live drama performances, TV documentaries, and community sensitization sessions,
with an aim to provide pertinent information and raise awareness in the larger society about the need for
peaceful co-existence with ex-combatants.
436 Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants.”
437 Ibid.
tional Recovery Strategy (NRS). The NRS is “designed to form a bridge between emergency interventions and longer-term development and aims to engage Sierra Leonean society in the reconciliation and democratisation process.” The NRS lays a foundation for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), submitted to the World Bank, IMF and other principal development partners. It also aims at promoting a people-centered approach that seeks community empowerment and participation. In regard to ex-combatants, the NRS 2002-2003 focused on facilitating the economic and social reintegration of 23,879 ex-combatants who had not been placed in reintegration programs. The strategies included strengthening the capacity of partners to expand their activities to absorb more ex-combatants; increasing social reconciliation activities to build the confidence of ex-combatants; increasing activities in the areas of highest concentration of ex-combatants to promote more community-based programs with ex-combatants’ participation; enhancing the monitoring systems to follow the longer-term impact of reintegration program; and identifying transition issues for integration of the larger community and national recovery efforts in order to consolidate the gains made from the DDR process.

In line with the PRSP, the World Bank developed the National Social Action Project (NSAP), with an aim to assist war-affected communities to restore infrastructure and services, and build local capacity for collective action. The participation of the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) and the inclusion of local initiatives to implement projects were expected for capacity building purposes. These include community-based sub-projects, such as rehabilitation of primary schools, health posts, community water and sanitation, drainage, etc., and rehabilitation of feeder roads and other rural infrastructure. Under the NSAP, Rural Labor Based Public works and the Shelter Program for Vulnerable Groups are designed to benefit ex-combatants and other vulnerable people. They are to provide employment for demobilized soldiers and unemployed youth, housing for displaced persons and feeder roads to stimulate local economic activities.

440 Ibid.
441 Ibid., 29-31.
442 Ibid.
444 Ibid., 29-32.
445 Ibid.
4-6 Participation of Children and Women in DDR

The scale of the use of child combatants in the conflict in Sierra Leone was extensive. Some estimates indicate that up to 50 percent of fighters in rebel forces were children and some 10-30 percent of force members were women (See Table 4-2). The RUF is well known for its abduction and forcible recruitment of children, both boys and girls, for use as soldiers, forced labor and sexual slaves. However, the CDF also recruited children to a large extent. In some instances, kidnapped children were forced to participate in atrocities in their own villages as a way of breaking ties with their community and making them fully dependent on the commander and unit who had seized them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Total Force</th>
<th>Child Soldiers</th>
<th>Girl Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>68,865</td>
<td>17,216</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137,865</td>
<td>48,216</td>
<td>12,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carlson and Mazurana, “From Combat to Community.”

4-6-1 Demobilization of Child Soldiers

Approximately 7,000 children went through the formal DDR process. The support services for child combatants were oriented to: remove the child soldiers as quickly as possible from the adult combatant population; quickly integrate child ex-combatants and other non-combatant children who were camp followers or other unaccompanied children in a given area; provide interim screening and counseling, medical assistance and family tracing; and provide alternative care in the event that families could not be traced within six weeks. Based on these principles, child combatants followed a separate procedure for demobilization and reintegration. UNICEF assumed the central responsibility in this process with support by a number of international agencies and NGOs.

---

448 Originally from Save the Children Sweden in the 2002 publication Africa Report: Sierra Leone.
Following demobilization, former child combatants were cared for in Interim Care Centers (ICCs) run by various child protection agencies. In addition, in cases of separated children, family tracing networks worked to locate their families and reunify them. Children continued to be transferred to ICCs in their areas of origin, reunified with their families, or placed in foster care. UNICEF worked with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and other NGOs to trace families and also to establish a database of background information about the children and their condition. In addition, UNICEF carried out sensitization programs among both communities and the military to raise understanding about the condition and needs of former child soldiers.

A range of problems occurred in the DDR programs for child combatants. Of critical importance in demobilization was how to ensure the release of child soldiers from armed factions. Moreover, continued recruitment of children during the DDR period became a serious problem confronting child protection in Sierra Leone. Another problem was related to eligibility for the DDR program among child combatants. Officially, those under 18 were not required to present a weapon to enter DDR. However, according to Khristopher Carlson and Dyan Mazurana, there was widespread inconsistency among the UN, government officials, and NGO staff on whether children were required to turn in weapons. Their study showed that the weapons test was repeatedly administered to children. The issue of exclusion of child soldiers from DDR benefits is also attributed to the fact that rebel commanders were concerned about accusations of war crimes, so they encouraged child combatants to register as adults.

4-6-2 Reintegration of Child Soldiers

The main objectives of the NCDDR reintegration assistance provided to child ex-combatants were to address immediate post demobilization needs and continue the reunification of the child with their family, and to ensure access to education, training, family

450 These ICCs were supported by UNICEF and run by child protection agencies such as Caritas, Cooperazione Internazionale, International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK. See, UNDP Evaluation Office, “Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 4-5.
453 Carlson and Mazurana, “From Combat to Community.”
mediation and health. The components of reintegration included two programs, namely the Community Education and Investment Program (CEIP) and the Training and Employment Program (TEP).\textsuperscript{455}

Sponsored by UNICEF, the CEIP started in May 2001. The program supported formal education or accelerated learning programs in communities including ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{456} This program, designed to facilitate reintegration of ex-combatants (below 15 years-old) through communities, offered one of three options to schools: learning, teaching or recreational kits. For each enrolled child ex-combatant, 200 other pupils in a targeted school were to benefit directly from the package.\textsuperscript{457} The NCDDR regarded this program as an important component of facilitating social reintegration, as well as forming the basis for access to future economic opportunities. It is envisaged that as part of the reintegration assistance, child ex-combatants would be included in the larger education framework established by the Ministry of Education development programs.\textsuperscript{458} The CEIP benefited 2,001 ex-combatants and 260 separated children, and by May 2002 there were 648 child ex-combatants in apprentice training in carpentry implemented by the NCDDR. This training included support for nine months, the provision of training materials, a monthly subsidence support, a tool kit at the conclusion of training, and basic literacy training.\textsuperscript{459}

On the other hand, the TEP targeted former child soldiers between the ages of 15 and 17 for non-formal skill programs.\textsuperscript{460} UNICEF also worked on the Development of Children Associated with the War Project (CAW), in cooperation with a local catholic NGO. It was a six-month program that consists of education, group counseling, play and recreation, vocational skills and apprenticeship training.\textsuperscript{461}

Child protection has been one of the central issues raised by the international community in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone. For instance, child protection advisers were de-

\textsuperscript{455} GoSL, NCDDR, “The DDR Programme,” 8.
\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{458} NCRRR, \textit{Sierra Leone}, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{459} Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants.”
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.; NCRRR, \textit{Sierra Leone}, 8-9.
ployed in UNAMSIL to ensure that the rights, protection and well-being of all children are a priority throughout the peacekeeping process, the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of the war-affected country.\textsuperscript{462} One important lesson learned in the implementation of the aforementioned types of reintegration programs is that the activity should not be carried out exclusively for child ex-combatants, but rather should involve a larger group of children all affected by the conflict in one manner or another.\textsuperscript{463}

4-6-3 Involvement of Women and Girls in DDR Process

The total number of 72,490 demobilized combatants included 4,751 women (6.5 percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 were girls.\textsuperscript{464} Nevertheless, some other estimates indicate a larger portion, maintaining that up to some 10-30 percent of force members were women.\textsuperscript{465} Girls and women played varied roles in the CDF and RUF forces. They were spies, commanders, and frontline fighters; some were herbalists, meant to supply fighters with magic potions for invulnerability. Others were cooks, medics, and spiritual leaders. Many served as captive “wives” of commanders, particularly in the RUF, and were responsible for distributing weapons, food, and loot confiscated from village raids.\textsuperscript{466}

Notwithstanding the significant level of involvement of women and girls in the Sierra Leonean conflict, the number of demobilized female combatants who went through the DDR program is low. Carlson and Mazurana contend that Sierra Leone’s DDR process failed women and girls. By being classified as “dependents” only, their real experiences were not acknowledged, and they were precluded from receiving the benefits provided to “combatants.”\textsuperscript{467} The assumption that women and girls were victims only, with no role in either the execution of war or the building of peace, consequently limited their access to different forms of benefits provided. Such assumption had been reflected in the peace negotiation. Vanessa Farr points out that the Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999, which had involved only two women representatives, did not surpass the stereotypical and narrow

\textsuperscript{462} Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “Child Protection Advisers,” (accessed January 10, 2004); available from \url{http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/}.
\textsuperscript{463} Bradley, “Child Combatants,” 38.
\textsuperscript{464} Carlson and Mazurana, “From Combat to Community.”
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
understanding of women’s experience of armed violence.  She further argues that women’s absence, from the planning through to the implementation stages of the process, had a critical impact on the extent to which women’s and girls’ particular needs could be anticipated and catered for.

The survey conducted by Carlson and Mazurana, which showed that half of the women and girls had not gone through official disarmament and demobilization, highlighted a number of gaps in the process. A notable one is that 46 percent of women surveyed cited not having a weapon as a barrier for entry into the DDR program. Many women in the CDF were ordered to hand in their weapons prior to demobilization, and then were left behind as their male colleagues were transported to cantonment sites. Others indicated that their guns were taken away by their commanders and handed to male combatants, while many never possessed guns themselves.

Moreover, the survey revealed that many women did not enter the DDR program because they had no knowledge of the program or felt there was nothing to gain by participating. It appears that their misinterpretation of the process, or the lack of information, stemmed from inadequate sensitization about the DDR process for female combatants.

The needs of girl combatants should also receive special attention. Evidence indicates that this group faces particular challenges in reintegration. These include almost complete dependency on the male combatants for their and their children’s support, and while they are generally accepted back by their original families and communities, the children of their combatant “husbands” are not.

4-7 Regional Aspects of the Internal Conflict

The armed conflict in Sierra Leone had vast regional implications. The regional dynamics of the conflict are mainly characterized by the nature of conflict, illicit arms and diamond...
trades, population displacement, and the involvement of sub-regional organization in the peace process.

First of all, the nature and causes of the conflict are largely characterized by the Liberian influence. The former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, used the conflict to draft the RUF and other dissident Sierra Leoneans to conquer the economically rich areas of Sierra Leone, and to use foreign exchange earned from the country’s trade to support his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The RUF also shared Taylor’s ties to Ivorian merchants, and developed its own ties to impoverished Guinea soldiers who sold weapons to the RUF in exchange for loot and local products. Libya and Burkina Faso also provided military assistance to the RUF.

The effects of illicit arms trades and transfer are immense in both Sierra Leone and neighboring countries. In the West African sub-region, approximately eight million illegal arms are reportedly in the hands of non-state actors. Weapons are recycled between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and among belligerents in other conflicts, such as in Casamance, southern Senegal. In this connection, it is widely acknowledged that “conflict diamonds” fueled the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. Diamonds were used by the RUF to finance arms purchases and other illegal activities. In 1999, Sierra Leone’s official diamond exports were about US$1.2 million, compared to a conservative industry estimate of US$70 million as the real commercial value. With the increasing international concern of the role played by the illicit diamond trade in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo and selective travel ban on non-governmental forces, as well as a ban on the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled by the GoSL.

---

474 Ibid., 124.
477 Ibid.
Moreover, the international diamond industry took steps to increase the diamond industry’s ability to block conflict diamonds from reaching market. An inclusive, worldwide consultation process of governments, industry and civil society, referred to as the Kimberly Process, was also launched to devise an effective response to the problem of conflict diamonds.\footnote{United Nations in Africa, “Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War,” (accessed December 29, 2003); available from \url{http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html}.} Concurrently, several donors have provided technical assistance to the government of Sierra Leone in order to develop new diamond policies and establish new mining and exporting operations.\footnote{See in general, USAID OTI, Sierra Leone.} The efficacy of this wide range of on-going efforts in reducing the illicit diamond trade, its related activities, and its associated arms trade, will be a significant determinant for longer-term peace and development by utilizing the rich resources in an effective manner.

In addition to the illegal diamond and arms trade in the region, the impact of war on population displacement was massive at the sub-regional level. Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia suffered from security risks, such as cross-border attacks by the RUF and harassment by the authorities, particularly in the case of Guinea. In Liberia, of approximately 90,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, the 35,000 living in northern Lofa county became vulnerable to attack by both Liberian insurgents and security forces when fighting between the two erupted in August 1999.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, “Sierra Leone: Human Rights Development,” \textit{World Report 2000}, (accessed March 30, 2003); available from \url{http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-09.htm}.} With the end of war in Sierra Leone, over 100,000 Sierra Leonean refugees returned and 124,000 IDPs went back to their home areas in 2002.\footnote{UNHCR, “Sierra Leone,” in \textit{UNHCR Global Appeal 2003}, (accessed January 6, 2004); available from \url{http://www.unhcr.ch/}.} However, as the situation in Sierra Leone improved, conditions in Liberia deteriorated. The intense fighting in mid 2002 generated the influx of 37,000 Liberian refugees, bringing the total number of Liberian refugees to 58,000 in Sierra Leone.\footnote{Ibid.} The camps that used to accommodate Sierra Leonean returnees were then transformed into refugee camps for newly arriving Liberian refugees. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002 put Liberian refugees within the country at risk. Peace in Sierra Leone can still be jeopardized by these volatile situations in neighboring countries.

All these factors affecting not only Sierra Leone, but also its neighboring countries, have called for comprehensive solutions to achieve durable peace in the sub-region. ECOWAS was extensively engaged in the peace process in Sierra Leone, both diplomatically and militarily. While the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone highlighted the opportunities of sub-regional peacekeeping, it also raised complex issues about the legitimacy, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of sub-regional organizations. Serious concerns were expressed about the hegemonic position of Nigeria; however, the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone was not possible without the political and military commitment by Nigeria. Hence, the trend of using sub-regional organizations for peace operations warrants a careful review.

Meanwhile, ECOWAS has made efforts in small arms control in the sub-region. With a recognition that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons constitutes a destabilizing factor for countries within the sub-region, a moratorium was declared on the import, export, and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states in October 1998. The three-year moratorium took effect on 1 November 1998 and was renewed in 2001. The implementation of the moratorium is supported by the Program for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED), which was established in 1997 with UNDP assistance. The effective functioning of the PCASED and the moratorium form part of a critical agenda for ECOWAS in reducing the security threat in West Africa.

The current situation of Liberia is worth mentioning, as it can potentially disrupt the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding the signing of the peace agreement on 18 August 2003, and the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), fighting continued between some armed forces until November 2003. As a significant component of the peace process, the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of over 40,000 combatants began on 7 December 2003. UNMIL envisages the

setting up of a maximum of 10 cantonment sites for this exercise.⁴⁹⁰ Three camps have been opened initially to disarm the government force, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), respectively.⁴⁹¹ UNICEF coordinates the DDRR of Liberian children associated with the fighting forces, which is expected to benefit 15,000 children.⁴⁹²

According to the original plan of the DDRR, after the three weeks of cantonment, each combatant would receive an initial US $150 before being discharged from the camps. Upon discharge, they would start vocational training and interim employment. The last US $150 would be paid to former combatants after being reintegrated into their communities.⁴⁹³ This plan, however, was modified on the second day of the DDRR process in order to appease the former combatants who resorted to riots and demanded an immediate cash payment for handing in their weapons. UNMIL decided to provide an immediate cash payment of US $75 to each combatant who handed in a weapon. Another US $75 was to be given after seven days of cantonment.⁴⁹⁴ Defense Minister Daniel Chea considered that the reason for their rampaging behavior was that the combatants were not sensitized enough to the disarmament process.⁴⁹⁵ Another setback experienced at the beginning of the DDRR process was that the LURD expressed misgivings, maintaining that they would not disarm until given the share of jobs they were promised under the peace accord of 18 August 2003.⁴⁹⁶ There seems to be a myriad of challenges ahead for DDRR in Liberia, which could have potential ramifications for the peace and stability in Sierra Leone.

4-8 Lessons Learned

4-8-1 Peace Process and DDR

The foundation of a successful process of DDR is the political will and the commitment of the parties to the conflict to peace.⁴⁹⁷ The spoiler problem by the RUF imperiled the peace

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.
⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.
⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.
⁴⁹⁷ The Role of UN Peacekeeping in DDR, para. 4.
process. It is imperative to address the underlying factors enabling them to spoil peace initiatives at both the domestic and international level.

Related to the above issue are the implications of conflict diamonds. Necessary action has to be based on two premises: that controls on conflict diamonds cut off sources of funding for rebels, help shorten wars and prevent their recurrence; and that peace in diamond-producing regions will bring about the potential for economic development and tax revenue for building infrastructure as legitimate mining ventures increase.\(^{498}\)

\section*{4-8-2 Disarmament}

An innovative voluntary weapons collection, the Community Arms Collection and Destruction program, was effective in complementing the formal DDR process.

Destruction of weapons upon collection proved to be helpful. The conversion of those weapons into agricultural tools provides a link to productive activities in rural areas.

\section*{4-8-3 Demobilization}

Re-recruitment of the demobilized was a significant issue for both adult and child combatants. In parallel to the demobilization process, measures must be taken to cut off the vicious cycle of forced recruitment. By the same token, alternate economic and social opportunities have to be offered to demobilized soldiers in a timely manner to prevent their return to fighting.

Ensuring the release of child combatants from the armed forces is the most important first step in their demobilization. It is imperative to reach out to child combatants, because many of them fail to access any services due to a number of different factors. Equally important, prevention of (re-) recruitment should be reinforced, including strengthening child protection mechanisms. In particular, children separated from their families are at extreme risk for recruitment into armed forces. Thus, it is essential to identify separated children and reunite them with their families as early as possible.

\(^{498}\) United Nations in Africa, “Conflict Diamonds.”
Adequate assistance should be provided to former combatants at demobilization locations in order to avoid their discontent and frustration turning into acts of violence. Disturbances caused by dissatisfied former combatants can further delay the DDR process, and it is thus essential to sensitize ex-combatants about the procedures of DDR programs. It is foremost important for the international community to provide necessary resources to ensure security at disarmament and demobilization areas.

4-8-4 Reintegration

Delay in delivering reintegration programs to the demobilized was a fundamental obstacle in the DDR process. Donor communities need to plan such programs as early as possible in the peace process.

Women’s participation in the formal DDR process was hindered by various factors. From the outset of the peace negotiation, women should be involved in the process and be encouraged to participate in the planning and implementation of DDR. Multiple roles played by women in the execution of war and peace processes should be reflected in DDR programs.

The armed conflict affected all the children in Sierra Leone one way or another; thus care must be taken not to expend resources only on child soldiers. Involving families and communities in these processes is of critical importance. Efforts should be made to avoid stigmatization of former child soldiers.

Reintegration should not give privilege to ex-combatants over that of civilians and communities. It is important to strike a balance between supporting war-affected vulnerable groups and preventing ex-combatants from spoiling the peace. A community-based approach is effective in the reintegration of ex-combatants, and community sensitization can play an important role in reducing tension between ex-combatants and other members of the community.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The comprehensive concept of peace-building involves responses to emergency needs, reconstruction, and prevention of recurrence of armed conflict. A process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants plays a critical role in the context of peace-building, meeting both short-term and long-term objectives. Successful disarmament and demobilization can particularly contribute to immediate political stability and security. Reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life lays a foundation for lasting peace and development. Specifically, effective reintegration opportunities allow combatants to foresee their future without violence, which consequently motivates them to lay down their weapons. Thus, understanding the complexity and interdependence of the DDR process is key in developing strategies and policies of DDR. Nonetheless, evidence from past experiences demonstrates that an effective link between the short- and long-term objectives in peace-building is not necessarily formed in the DDR process. Reducing the gap between the two requires well-executed reintegration initiatives that can provide viable incentives for disarmament and demobilization, which in turn connect to recovery and further development.

Reintegration support, in general, is considered as enhancing the potentials of ex-combatants to integrate themselves into social and economic networks of a civilian society. This represents a challenge for a country emerging from armed conflict due to the devastating effects of the violence. In the transition from war to peace, the communities where former combatants are returning are yet to improve the general social conditions and macro-economic capacities. The overall economic situation is often inadequate to create employment opportunities. Moreover, resentment felt by the members of the community against ex-combatants could be strong, particularly when civilians were subject to cruel violence by armed forces during the conflict. Return of ex-combatants in such cases may not be appreciated by the communities, but rather, can be perceived as an additional burden on the devastated economy. Therefore, international support provided for the DDR process plays a significant role in assisting war-torn societies where sufficient resources are not available for DDR.
The experiences of Mozambique and Sierra Leone are cases in point. Both are among the poorest countries in the world that have suffered lengthy and brutal conflict. The entire peace processes, including DDR, have not been accomplished without the large financial contributions made by the international donors. Contextual differences exist, however, between the two countries. In Sierra Leone, diamonds enabled the rebels to continue fighting and inevitably spoil the peace process, whereas Mozambique had no resource to fund the war. Although the lack of adherence to the settlement by the warring parties in Mozambique hindered the peace process, they both recognized that military solution was not an option. As a consequence of lucrative resources available for the continuation of war, the peace operation in Sierra Leone had to apply more coercive measures to ensure compliance to peace agreements than in Mozambique.

Moreover, the extensive involvement of the international community in DDR efforts also highlights some differences in approaches. First, in Mozambique, skepticism about the Mozambican government’s implementation capacity and accountability led international donors to develop and implement reintegration programs without much government involvement. By contrast, in Sierra Leone, capacity building of the government and local institutions was incorporated into the DDR and reconstruction programs. The Sierra Leonean government agency assumed a central role in coordinating DDR related activities. Second, reintegration programs in Mozambique were implemented in isolation from the efforts in poverty reduction. But in Sierra Leone, rehabilitation of community services and infrastructure was implemented in parallel to the reintegration of ex-combatants. Community-oriented projects that benefit all the war-affected populations were expected to facilitate reconciliation within a community and to lay a foundation for long-term development.

Both Mozambique and Sierra Leone demonstrated that successful DDR is essential in peace-building; however, DDR by itself cannot solve every potential post-conflict problem. In war-torn societies, DDR initiatives must be accompanied by a broader set of recovery efforts, including reconciliation, reconstruction and governance. In this context, development organizations can play a critical role in bringing a long-term perspective of community-based development into DDR exercises, which would complement the political peace process. Responding to the pressing and divergent needs of former combatants and
their returning communities with a development orientation would contribute to mutually reinforce other components of DDR and peace-building.

5-1 Synthesis of the Lessons Learned

This paper intended to identify lessons learned in the cases of Mozambique and Sierra Leone in implementing DDR programs. Among all the valuable lessons, four central elements can be illustrated as a synthesis. The recommendations for future DDR programs are subsequently presented for the Japanese government to enhance its assistance in the area of DDR efforts.

1) Political will to the peace settlement: DDR experiences in both Mozambique and Sierra Leone highlighted the importance of the commitments to the peace settlement by all the parties to the conflict. In Mozambique, much of the causes for delay in the demobilization process can be attributed to the reluctance of both Renamo and the government to demobilize. The hesitance to adhere to their commitments stemmed from the fact that both parties were overwhelmingly concerned about the demobilization of the other side. They both held better weapons in reserve, keeping a military option open in case the peace process failed. Similarly in Sierra Leone, rebel commanders reportedly did not permit their troops to demobilize against the wishes of soldiers. The DDR process in Sierra Leone was heavily influenced by the successes and failures of the political process. The World Bank stated that “[t]he overriding lesson is that DDR can complement a peace agreement, but it cannot lead the political process.” Much effort must be made to build confidence and trust among warring parties from the peace negotiation phase and throughout the DDR process. Effective mediation is also required in this respect.

The “spoiler” problem was eminent in the peace process in Sierra Leone. The contents of the peace agreement have to be carefully devised in order to minimize potential manipulations by warring parties. Moreover, it is imperative to address the factors that enable belligerent parties to derail the peace process. For instance, in Sierra Leone, conflict diamonds constituted part of the complex dynamics of the regional and international involvement in the conflict. The lessons of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the challenges

499 Bradley, Fusato, and Maughan, “Sierra Leone.”
now confronting West Africa underscore the need for an effective strategy at the domestic, sub-regional, and international levels to reduce financial and other means of spoilers to exacerbate the war.

2) **Prompt action:** DDR cannot be implemented in the absence of security for the implementing actors. Security provisions at demobilization centers and other key locations need to be ensured by timely and adequate deployment of peacekeeping forces. Sufficient financial contribution must be made by the international community in order to minimize delays in the DDR process, which tend to cause security related problems.

In relation to the cost of DDR, both Mozambique and Sierra Leone resulted in expensive DDR exercises. Both UN operations spent approximately one million US dollars per day. Mozambique, in particular, experienced a donor-driven implementation of the DDR process, whereas in Sierra Leone the government played a leading and coordinating role. All the actors involved in DDR efforts must consider ways in which the effects of DDR can be optimized in the long-term. As was the case in Sierra Leone, capacity building of government institutions and local NGOs has to be taken into consideration in the process of DDR.

3) **Development-oriented reintegration:** In the transition from war to peace, development perspectives should be included in DDR planning. In a post-conflict environment, emergency aid measures, quick-impact programs, and reinsertion or settling-in packages are aimed at direct and immediate improvement of the situation in the communities. For longer-term sustainable development, the war-affected communities must be strengthened as they form a social network to which former combatants return. In ensuring the sustainability of those short-term measures and connecting to longer-term development, development agencies can play a pivotal role. Development projects to rehabilitate community services and basic infrastructure could provide short- to mid-term employment to a large number of ex-combatants. These labor-intensive public works are beneficial to both ex-combatants and receiving communities; however, they need to be carefully designed to link with longer-term opportunities. As the examples of Mozambique showed, these approaches can be detrimental unless they are planned in accordance with the evolving needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries.

---

As the reintegration programs in Mozambique demonstrated, needs assessment and market surveys of former combatants and communities are essential in planning. The fact that backgrounds of ex-combatants differ to a great extent must be taken into consideration. For instance, education levels and socio-economic skills profiles are different, and the length of service in the armed forces, reasons why they joined the armed forces, and the way a conflict ended also influence ex-combatants’ expectations, as well as the possibilities for support measures.\(^{501}\) Thus, it is important to collect information regarding profiles of demobilized combatants when shaping a scheme of reintegration programs. In this connection, particular attention must be paid to the issues of female and child soldiers, the disabled, as well as other vulnerable groups. Their special needs should be incorporated in the design of reintegration programs. Graça Machel, an independent expert appointed by the UN Secretary-General to study the impact of armed conflict on children, states “[t]he participation of children must be recognized in all peace agreements so that effective planning can be made for reintegration programmes.”\(^{502}\) This is also applicable to women who tend to be excluded from benefits granted by DDR programs. Equally important is that provisions of peace agreements need to be fulfilled in practice.

In a war-torn society, there are other groups of vulnerable people, including refugees and the internally displaced, returning to the same community as ex-combatants. Therefore, a community-based approach should be adopted in reintegration programs. This would allow for the reduction of potential tensions between ex-combatants and other community members, and the creation of better socio-economic conditions for sustainable development. Community sensitization and information dissemination efforts are paramount in preventing the stigmatization of ex-combatants as unfit for military service, or as conveyers of disease and violence. Concurrently, the fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed.\(^{503}\) Providing psycho-social support in the long-term would benefit all members of the community affected by conflict.

When focusing the entire community on reintegrating ex-combatants, it is imperative to facilitate community participation in the design and implementation of reintegration


programs. The reintegration programs should serve to build the capacity of the government to design and manage internationally financed projects. In addition, capacity building of the local structures and NGOs would also be important in rebuilding a society.

4) Reconciliation and conflict prevention: Peace does not only mean the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged in solving conflicts. Hence, broader undertakings should be ensured in the areas of reconciliation and the prevention of violence and crimes, in parallel to the DDR process. A combination of the TRC and the Special Court in Sierra Leone, for instance, illustrates a unique opportunity to obtain justice. Concurrently, as the Mozambican experience showed, traditional healings and rituals serve as an important means of conflict resolution and reconciliation, creating conditions for the community to accept former combatants. Achieving social reintegration through various forms of reconciliation, in turn, facilitates the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities.

As part of the reconciliation initiatives, efforts in fostering a culture of peace must be stressed in post-conflict situations. There is a wide range of possible measures to discourage the normalization and glorification of war, weaponry, military force, and violence. Peace education and promotion of human rights should receive much attention in rebuilding a society. Strengthening a mechanism for child protection is instrumental in preventing abuses of the rights of children. Furthermore, reduction of small arms and light weapons is paramount as they facilitate the creation of cycles of violence.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to pose a threat to peace and security of people in war-torn societies. As Gamba rightly points out, the improvement of disarmament components during UN peacekeeping operations will assist in one type of control of small arms, and will diminish the magnitude of the problem of illegal weapons flows considerably; however, this is not enough. Possible measures at the regional and international levels include legal agreements related to marking, transfer and exportation of small arms and light weapons. The moratorium introduced among the ECOWAS member states is one example. Moreover, weapons collection programs, such as Operation Rachel

and the TAE projects in Mozambique, can also be effective in reducing the proliferation of small arms in the post-DDR period. Arms proliferation and its impact on violence and crime have a strong regional dimension, making regional cooperation imperative. It is therefore in the interest of neighboring countries to prevent the spill-over of armed conflict in the first place, and to provide widespread assistance for continued disarmament and arms control operations, as well as to ensure efficient demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.507

5-2 Recommendations for DDR Assistance

Based on the aforementioned four central elements, the following list of recommendations is presented for the Japanese government to enhance its use of ODA in the areas of DDR.

Planning has to take place in the early stages of the peace process. In order to be able to contribute to maintaining the peace process on track by linking the political process with DDR efforts, it is of vital importance to be involved in the negotiation phase. In war to peace transitions, demobilization and reintegration issues should be addressed at the earliest stages of the peace negotiation process.508

Reintegration programs need to be designed as appropriate to the profiles of ex-combatants and local socio-economic conditions. Any short-term measures have to envision longer-term implications for ex-combatants and their communities as a whole. Labor-intensive programs, benefiting the entire community, should be implemented in conjunction with other initiatives to revive and rebuild the economy. Multi-sectoral approaches are desirable, as consolidating peace requires a broader set of reconstruction efforts.

Implementation arrangements for DDR warrant consideration with a view to enhancing local capacity. Strengthening local institutions and NGOs is of vital importance in the process of DDR. In addition, special attention can be paid to recruit female staff in order to address the gender dimension of DDR.

507 Ibid.
508 Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhoefer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.
In the post-DDR period, when demobilized soldiers are no longer considered as a target group, continuous support should be considered for vulnerable groups, such as female-headed households, the disabled, and unaccompanied minors, in the form of development assistance. Psycho-social and material support may be a long-term necessity for those who suffer from serious trauma and other difficulties.

Support should be expanded to sub-regional organizations in the area of peace-building. As discussed in the case of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone, there is a range of concerns raised about the role of sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, they can potentially play crucial roles, particularly in the reduction of illicit arms trades, border control, intelligence, and humanitarian relief.
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Assembly Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMODEG</td>
<td>Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra (Mozambican Association of Demobilized Soldiers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (People’s Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACD</td>
<td>Community Arms Collection and Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACD II</td>
<td>Community Arms Collection and Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAW</td>
<td>Children Associated with the War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cease-fire Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Christian Council of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civilian Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEIP</td>
<td>Community Education and Investment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Commission for Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRP</td>
<td>Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Supervisory and Monitoring Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DdRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIIIP</td>
<td>Employment-Intensive Infrastructure Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSF</td>
<td>Emergency Recovery Support Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defense Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Moçambique (Mozambique Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRP</td>
<td>Feeder Roads Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement for Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Co-operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSL</td>
<td>Government of Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Interim Care Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>National Demining Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Information and Referral Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCOS</td>
<td>Instituto Sindical Italiano de Coperação Ao Desenvolvimento (Italian Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARRP</td>
<td>Rural and Infrastructure Reconstruction Program in Manica Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDR</td>
<td>National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRRR</td>
<td>National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAP</td>
<td>National Mine Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRS</td>
<td>National Recovery Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAP</td>
<td>National Social Action Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NaCSA</td>
<td>National Commission for Social Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORF</td>
<td>Open Reintegration Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Occupational Skills Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARPA</td>
<td>Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (Absolute Poverty Reduction Plan of Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCASED</td>
<td>Program for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Provincial Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Police of the Republic of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Regional Arms Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Reintegration Support Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUFP</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development &amp; Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-force agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEG</td>
<td>Skills Training and Employment Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP</td>
<td>Skills Training and Employment Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAE</td>
<td><em>Transformação de Armas em Enxadas</em> (Swords into Ploughshares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>Training and Employment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Angola II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td><em>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</em> (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOHAC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRTEP</td>
<td>Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

**Primary Sources:**


**Secondary Sources:**


Communiqué, the Joint GoSL / RUF / UNAMSIL Committee on Disarmament. Demobilisation and Reintegration. 11 October 2001.


______. NCRRR, Recovery Process and Progress. NCRRR Presentation at the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, Freetown, 8 November 2001.


落合雄彦（2000）「シエラ・レオーネにおける国連部隊襲撃拘束事件」『アフリカレポート』第 31 号

（2002）『西アフリカ諸国経済共同体（ECOWAS）』国際協力事業団国際協力総合研究会
国際協力機構 課題別指針作成チーム (2003) 『課題別指針：平和構築支援』
国際協力事業団（2000）『南部アフリカ援助研究会報告書』第 3 巻 モザンビーク
国現状分析資料編
国際協力事業団（2000）『南部アフリカ援助研究会報告書』第 3 巻 モザンビーク
本編
国際協力事業団（2000）『モザンビーク国 除隊兵士再定住地域村落開発計画調査事前調査報告書』
Profile

土岐　日名子（とき　ひなこ）
最終学歴：米国タフツ大学フレッチャー法律外交大学院修士課程修了。
（法律外交修士）

経歴：国際基督教大学在籍時より、アムネスティ・インターナショナル日本支部にて難民コーディネーターを担当（1994～1999）。
民間企業退職後、国連ボランティアとして、国連難民高等弁務官事務所ユーゴスラビア（現セルビア・モンテネグロ）にて勤務（1999～2001）。
2002年夏、同事務所シエラレオネにて勤務。
2003年、タフツ大学フレッチャー法律外交大学院にて修士号を取得。