Seminar Report: English Version
Afghanistan’s political process stated in Bon Agreement has ended in 2005 and the renewed framework for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy, has been announced at London in January, 2006. Afghanistan government and partner countries including Japan have stepped in the full-scale development stage.

On the other hand, Afghanistan holds formidable obstacles for steady economic development such as growing trend of opium production, deteriorating security conditions especially in southern and east-southern areas, glacial progress on governance rebuilding, etc. Those issues demand us, international partners, to have regional perspectives towards Afghanistan when we try to find out the effective solutions for them, because Afghanistan is located at the cross road of South-West Asia, Central Asia and Middle East and has a long history of interactions and interchanges of the people with these surrounding countries.

This seminar focuses on how International partners can hold a sound observation on the regional context about Afghanistan’s today and the future, and how we can make the better contribution to sustainable development of Afghanistan based on such observation.

Program

◊ Date: 14:00 – 18:30, March 22, 2007
◊ Venue: 2nd floor, Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency
        10-5, Ichigaya Honmura-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-8433
* Language: Japanese and English

13:30 – 14:00  Registration

14:00 – 14:15  Opening Address: Mr. Kazuhisa Matsuoka, Vice President, JICA

               Dr. Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow,
               Center on International Cooperation, New York University

15:05 – 15:25  Coffee Break
Afghanistan's future from regional perspectives

15:25 – 17:25 Panel Discussion
   Moderator:
   Prof. Shigemochi HIRASHIMA, Meiji-Gakuin University
   Discussants:
   Dr. Barnett R. Rubin
   Prof. Takako Hirose, Senshu University
   Dr. Manabu Shimizu, Sofia University
   Dr. Hisaya Oda, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization

17:25 – 17:30 Closing

17:30 – 18:30 Buffet Party
Profile of the Speakers

Barnett R. Rubin, as a Keynote Speaker
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Shigemochi HIRASHIMA, as a Moderator
Professor Emeritus, Meiji-Gakuin University, and Visiting Senior Advisor, Institute for International Cooperation, JICA
He holds a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics at Cornell University, U.S.A. After having worked for nearly 30 years as a Research Economist in charge of Pakistan, he started teaching at Meiji-Gakuin University for 16 years. Meanwhile, he worked for ILO (1980 – 82), was a visiting professor at various institutions including University of Delhi, Institute of Economic Growth in India and University of the South Pacific in Fiji.
In 2004, he served as a chairman at government’s Drafting Committee on Japanese ODA for Pakistan, and then served as a Project Formulation Advisor at JICA Pakistan Office, Islamabad for 2 years.
His major publication includes; The Structure of Disparity in Developing Agriculture (1978), Hired Labour and Rurak Labour Market in Asia (co-ed. 1986), State and Community in Local Resource Management (co-ed.1996), Pakistan: toward building a sustainable society (ed. 2003), Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) in SAARC Countries (co-ed. 2006).
Afghanistan's future from regional perspectives

Discussants:

Prof. Takako HIROSE
Professor at Senshu University
She specializes in Indian politics, Pakistan politics and international relations in south Asia including India-Pakistan relationship and Japan-South Asia relationship.

Dr. Manabu SHIMIZU
Adjunct professor at Sofia University
He specializes in theoretical research on market, regional and comparative studies on market in Central and South-West Asia, and international political economic analysis on energy, such as oil gas.

Dr. Hisaya ODA
Assistant Director, South Asian Studies Group, Area Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization.
He specializes in Pakistan economy, labor migration and economic growth.
Opening Address

Mr. Kazuhisa Matsuoka, Vice President, JICA

Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, we would like to start today’s seminar, which is divided into 2 parts. The first part is the keynote speech to be delivered by Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University. After the coffee break, we start panel discussion by the three distinguished panelists on the subject of this seminar.

Now, we would like to ask Mr. Kazuhisa Matsuoka, Vice-President of JICA to make an opening remarks.

Mr. Matsuoka: Ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming to this seminar despite your very busy schedules. As you all know, Afghanistan, following the Bonn Agreement signed on December of 2001, has ended its political process, and then in 2006, the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has been established. And we also have a document agreed by the international communities to support Afghanistan based on ANDS. This document is entitled the Afghanistan Compact. However, we still see that the security in the Eastern and Southern area is still unstable. Moreover, we see the growing opium cultivation, and also the administrative structure in the central and local level remains very vulnerable. There are many challenges ahead for a stable Afghanistan, and therefore, we cannot be very optimistic when we look to the future of Afghanistan.

The Japanese government, since the start of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, has made very strong commitment, and the government has respected the ownership of the Afghanistan government.

JICA, also following the instruction of the government and also with its own basic policies, has cooperated in the area of infrastructure, education, heath care, water supply, agriculture, and so on. We have provided all kinds of assistance, technical assistance and cooperation with a human face. But in order to see a success in the midium to longer term, and also in order to contribute to the stability of life of Afghanistan people, of course, security is the most important aspect. And under such situation, JICA believes that capacity maximization in Afghanistan would be important in order to have a sustainable economic and social development in the country.

When we think about reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan, we need to also consider the geographical situation of Afghanistan, about its neighboring countries and the situation in those countries. The relationship with Afghanistan and its neighbors would be very crucial. This is something that we tend to overlook when we only consider bilateral assistance, because we only think about one country to another. But we should consider these multi-lateral aspects when we do provide assistance.

Very fortunately today, we have eminent scholars who are very much involved in the study of
Afghanistan. One of them is a Professor Barnett Rubin, a keynote speaker of today’s seminar and a prominent person in the study of Afghanistan who has been involved in support of reconstruction efforts. When we consider the development of Afghanistan and its neighboring regions, I believe that we should have a very powerful line up of panelists who could shed lights on the subject in regional perspectives. In this context, we could invite 3 distinguished panelists. Among the discussants are Professor Takako Hirose, Professor Manabu Shimizu and Professor Hisaya Oda, who have been involved in the study of Afghanistan. And the panel discussion will be moderated by Professor S. Hirashima from Meiji Gakuin University. In the second half of the panel discussion, we would like to open the floor for questions and comments. Therefore, I would like to ask the audience for your active participation in that part, so that we can look at the issue from all kinds of perspectives.

I would like to end my brief welcome remark by wishing that this seminar turns out to be a very fruitful one. Thank you very much.
Keynote Speech: Afghanistan’s Future in the Region and the World

Dr. Barnett R. Rubin,
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow,
Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Chairman: Now, we would like to start the first session, the keynote speech by Professor Barnett Rubin.

Before we have his presentation, I would like to introduce him briefly. Professor Rubin completed the doctorate programs at the Chicago University, and served as the special advisor to Mr. Brahimi, a special advisor to the UN Secretary General, and also he has served on a number of committees on foreign affairs and preventive measures, and also taught at Columbia University. Today, he is serving as the director of the Center on International Cooperation, New York University. His specialty is peace building and conflict prevention. And he is also specialized in the Afghanistan area, Central Asia as well as South Asia. Now, Professor Rubin, please.

Dr. Rubin: Thank you. What I am going to present is an overview of the operations in Afghanistan focusing on how multiple goals have at times hindered the achievement of the overall objectives.

I am going to start by going back before September 11, 2001. The operation that began after that day was assembled very quickly under tremendous pressure by many different organizations pursuing different agendas. The United Nations had been engaged in a variety of activities in Afghanistan before September 11, but the United States and most other major powers had been disengaged. Before September 11, different organizations were pursuing 6 or 7 different policies in Afghanistan as follows:

1) The UN Special Mission for Afghanistan was pursuing a policy of peacemaking under resolutions of the General Assembly, which seated the government of the Northern Alliance. The UN Special Mission for Afghanistan promoted an inter-Afghan dialog between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in order to bring peace to Afghanistan by creating a broad-based government that would adhere to a set of principles that had been agreed at least theoretically by all the neighboring countries.

2) The Security Council, led by the United States, had enacted a regime of sanctions, including a ban on military assistance, only against the Taliban in order to force them to expel Usama bin Ladin and his associates, who of course, had been charged with responsibility for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Previous arms embargoes which were not binding, were just declaratory, had been requested on all sides to the conflict in support of the peace efforts. But this embargo, which was binding by the Security Council, was imposed for counter-terrorism purposes, and was only against the Taliban.

3) The UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for Afghanistan was active on the ground in Afghanistan, delivering services, and therefore, had to engage with whoever the de facto
powers on the ground were, which meant the Taliban in 90% of Afghan territory. They were trying to deliver what they called rights-based assistance through a kind of program called Principled Common Programming, and also trying to build peace from the grassroots up rather than through a political negotiations with the leaders by supporting local councils at the village level. And in fact, the humanitarian wing of the United Nations did a study of the impact of the sanctions enacted by the Security Council and actually criticized their humanitarian impact.

4) The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and several special rapporteurs condemned both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

5) Of course, Afghanistan had become the leading producer of opium poppy in the world, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime was trying to promote alternative livelihoods, mostly in the areas controlled by the Taliban. They conducted surveys of the opium economy, which we are still using today, and worked on interdiction of drug trafficking with the neighboring states. The Taliban responding to some of this pressure, banned the production of opium poppy in 2000 to 2001. But when they requested recognition of their efforts, they were referred back to policy no. 2, that is, their concern over their harboring Usama bin Laden. As a result of their banning the production of opium poppy but not trafficking, the price of opium increased by the factor of 10, and in fact, the price of opium has never gone back down to the relatively low price that it had before the Taliban ban.

6) Pakistan had a policy of supporting the Taliban in order to achieve strategic depth against India, and also to create training grounds for fighters for Kashmir off of its territory. It was under pressure from the United States to stop support for fighting in Kashmir and it used these training grounds in Afghanistan to create deniability. On the other side, Iran, Russia, India and the Central Asian states were supporting various parts of the Northern Alliance.

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan was rather confused at that time. There had been a number of direct contacts between the United States and the Taliban, including one event when Mullah Omar himself, the leader of the Taliban, placed a telephone call directly to the State Department without arranging it in advance after the missile attacks on Afghan territory following the bombing of the embassies in Africa. But the United States had a very long list of demands for the Taliban, about terrorism, drugs, peace and stability, women’s rights, human rights and so on, and it never resolved them into a clear list with priorities, and told the Taliban what it could expect, what they could expect if they responded in different ways. The Taliban had thought of their ban on opium as a way of testing the international community to see if they were sincere, and from their point of view, what it showed was that meeting some demands only led to escalation. On the other side, of course, for the United States, although they didn’t make this clear enough to the Taliban apparently, the overriding priority was the terrorism issue.

In response to that, in 1999, the United States started intelligence cooperation with the Northern Alliance. It helped train intelligence personnel for Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the main military commander of the Northern Alliance. The United States did state clearly to both the Taliban and to
Pakistan that the next time there was an attack on U.S. targets that could be traced to Usama bin Laden, the United States would respond militarily, not just against bin Laden and his Arab associates, that is against al-Qaida, but also against the Taliban because they were harboring him. And I personally heard one such message delivered at a second-track meeting in the summer of 2000. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration did not respond to the attack on the U.S.S Cole, the warship off of the coast of Yemen during the election campaign in 2000 because they thought the evidence wasn’t clear enough.

Now, when the Bush Administration had to decide on a response to September 11 — well, let me put it in this way — the Bush Administration policy toward Afghanistan was a response toward September 11 that is toward an attack on the United States. It was not an attempt to create policy on Afghanistan. And in fact, according to all the accounts that have now been published, at least the ones that I have read, I think I have read all of them, about the deliberations that took place at the high levels of the U.S. government after September 11, it appeared that the only subject that was discussed among President Bush and his closest advisors was how to destroy al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and how to overthrow the Taliban regime.

In the speech that he gave to a joint session of the U.S. Congress on September 20th, President Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban. He said they should deliver all members of al-Qaida to the United States and close all terrorist training camps, or, he said, the Taliban would share in the fate of al-Qaida. He noted that the Afghans were also victims of the Taliban, that is, he didn’t blame all Afghans for what had happened, but all that he offered to Afghanistan in this speech was humanitarian aid. He didn’t say anything about a political transition or the reconstruction of the country.

Over the coming weeks after the military strategy had been agreed upon, the State Department proposed that the United States should bring in the United Nations to help create a transitional government and create a framework for the reconstruction of the country. The Bush Administration agreed, or rather I should say the President, President Bush agreed, provided that this political road map did not interfere with the planned military campaign. In other words, they gave primacy to the military campaign to destroy the Taliban regime, and the political strategy for a transition was brought in to manage the consequences. So President Bush hired retired, well, not quite retired, Ambassador James Dobbins as a special envoy to undertake that political work and the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan asked Lakhdar Brahimi to reassume the position that he had held until 1999 when he had suspended his mission. He had been the special envoy and personal representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan from 1997 to 1999 when he suspended his mission because of lack of cooperation from the neighboring countries of Afghanistan, and particularly Pakistan. And at that time, he recruited Ashraf Ghani who later became the finance minister of Afghanistan, and myself to join him on his team.

That process lead to the Bonn Agreement, which was signed on December 4th, 2001, and that agreement was inspired and structured to a certain extent after the settlement of the Lebanese Civil War over which Brahimi had presided in the talks in Taif in 1989. It was an arrangement under which an interim administration for Afghanistan that was chosen at Bonn, and then placed in power essentially by
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the force of American arms, would be gradually replaced by more legitimate governments through a series of political events. The first was an emergency Loya Jirga, or Great Council which would be opened by the former King of Afghanistan, which then chose a transitional administration for the rest of the transitional period. That was after the first 6 months. The transitional administration then appointed a constitutional commission which drafted a constitution, which was adopted at another Loya Jirga, and then under that constitution, elections were to be held for a fully representative government. And of course, this process was carried through and was completed with the swearing in of the parliament in December 2005.

Now we come to where I analyze how the differing goals of different organizations led to problems in implementation. The United States did more than any other UN state, UN member state, in terms of funding and so on to assure that the political events required by the Bonn Agreement took place. It funded the Loya Jirgas, and it helped provide security for them, and so on. However, the Bonn Agreement also contained other measures which were essential to enable those political events to accomplish the purposes for which they were intended, that is, making the government more legitimate and more effective. On the UN team, we considered that the strategic goal of this operation was rebuilding the state in Afghanistan, that is, establishing a structure that would empower and assist Afghans to build an Afghan state that would be more stable than its historical predecessors. And for various reasons, in particular, contradictory goals, this project has had only limited success.

The political reform, the Bonn Agreement was essentially an agreement on political reform, on broadening the government and making it more legitimate through various procedures. But on the UN team, we realized that control of the country, the fact that the country of Afghanistan was now essentially under the control of armed groups, and that particularly, the capital of the country was under the control of armed groups, could undermine these Loya Jirgas and other representative meetings, and make the new government powerless, and make the meetings relatively meaningless. In other words, you can’t necessarily, if power is actually held by groups of men with guns, you can’t change that solely by having a meeting.

During the consultations that Brahimi and Ashraf Ghani had with Afghans before the Bonn Agreement, they traveled all around the region and met people in various countries, quite a few of them, in particular women, expressed concern over the re-empowerment of militias as part of the American military strategy against the Taliban. Therefore, the Bonn Agreement contained several provisions that were aimed at creating the security conditions which would assure that the political events that were benchmarks in the Bonn process would have the intended effects, rather than simply serving as legitimation for rule by these armed groups.

The most important such measure was the demilitarization of Kabul, the demilitarization of the capital, and of major regional centers that had fallen under the control of various commanders. Annex 1 of the Bonn Agreement requested the United Nations Security Council to authorize the early deployment to Afghanistan of the United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be
progressively expanded to other urban centers and other areas. Note we didn’t ask for a peacekeeping force because this is not a peacekeeping mandate, and also it needed to be deployed more quickly than a UN peacekeeping force, which takes a long time to assemble.

The purpose of this multi-national force which was to be authorized by the Security Council, was made clear in the following paragraph where it said, “The participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan, that means the Afghan parties, pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed.” In other words, the security of the capital city, and eventually of the major regional centers were supposed to be in the hands of this neutral multi-national force, not in hands of these militias, the idea being to create a neutral political space in which Afghans could meet freely from all different ethnic groups, regions of the country, political tendencies and so on, and decide about the composition of the government.

However, the only portion of these provisions that was implemented as anticipated was the dispatch of the International Security Assistance Force to Kabul and the surrounding areas. The militias did not withdraw from Kabul. It remained under the occupation, or maybe I shouldn’t use that word because they weren’t foreigners, but it remained under the partial control of the forces of the Northern Alliance, and the United States for several years did not use its influence with those militia forces to get them to withdraw because they were the U.S.’s ally in the war in terror. So the capital, rather than solely being under the control of a neutral force was under a kind of a dual force until the summer of 2004 when the demobilization of those troops was completed. And on a number of occasions, their commander, Marshal Fahim, used those military forces in Kabul to exert pressure on various parts of the government. At the same time, the presence of those International Security Assistance Forces did provide the government with a certain degree of autonomy, so that Ashraf Ghani when he was a finance minister said that he would not have been able to impose the reforms that he did, including some that went against the interest of the factional leaders, were it not for the presence of the International Security Assistance Force. Nonetheless, the fact that these armed factions were in control of the capital and the other major cities meant that they were able to gain control over customs revenues, duties on fuel, trafficking of natural resources, land and other assets.

Now, as I said, this international security force, ISAF, International Security Assistance Force, initially was deployed only to Kabul and the U.S. Department of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld opposed the expansion of ISAF, as it is called, to areas outside of Kabul because Secretary Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration generally had a kind of ideological opposition to peacekeeping. They did not want peacekeeping troops operating in the same area as their troops that were engaged in war fighting, which from their point of view, held priority. And the United States held to this position, opposing the expansion of ISAF, for several years, despite repeated requests to expand ISAF from President Karzai and UN Secretary General. The Department of Defense started to relax its objections in 2002, but finally only in 2003, that is 2 years after the start of the operation, did it agree to provide the guarantees for the safety and security of forces from other countries that those countries demanded as a price for deploying their soldiers outside of Kabul. And ISAF first expanded into the town of
Kaduz in the north where the Germans set up what became known as a Provincial Reconstruction Team, and now of course there are a large number of troop contributors all over the country. But as a result of the slowness in expanding ISAF, the regional commanders who had expected to be dislodged quickly found that they were able to consolidate their control of key areas of the country, and not only that, but to claim that they did so with the support of the United States.

Now in response to this standoff over security outside of Kabul, that is to say, the fact that there was no foreign troop presence outside of Kabul, others in the U.S. government tried to find a solution, and in particular, Jim Dobbins, the president’s special envoy and the military commanders on the ground realized that they did need some kind of security measures outside of Kabul, and if Rumsfeld opposed the expansion of ISAF, they would come up with another proposal. What they came up with was what came to be known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These were small teams of military people with civilians embedded in them. In other words, since the military wasn’t deployed to provide security in those areas so civilians could work, they would at least send small military teams with embedded civilians, so that people from aid agencies and political diplomats and so on could go out and work in the provinces as well.

These teams did not really have a mandate, however. They were too small to have a mandate to provide security to the local population. Essentially, the role of the military component was just to provide security to the aid providers. So essentially, the idea was that the provision of aid would win people over, and thereby increase security. And we know in the jargon of development, this is known as “securitizing assistance,” that is, trying to use assistance to create security. And generally, we know that simply trying to use aid to create security doesn’t work. Therefore, these PRTs met with rather limited success initially. Eventually, their mandate changed and they got more of a mandate to actually work closely with the local governments in order to try to build up their capacity by training police and generally linking the central government to the provinces better. But that took several years.

Now the deployment of the international force, the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, was always meant to be a transitional measure until the various militias could be disbanded and new security forces being created for Afghanistan with the help of the international community. And the Bonn Agreement referred to both of these. Because of resistance from commanders of the Northern Alliance, we could not actually mention disarmament in the text — they said it was dishonorable to disarm mujahideen — but the text did say, “that upon the official transfer of power, all mujahideen, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.” We understood this to mean that they would be reorganized according to the new requirements. That would mean that they would be demobilized or changed into new forces. The same annex also requested the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. In other words, although they weren’t addressed directly, the Bonn Agreement did contain references to demobilization, disarmament, and rehabilitation, DDR, and also to security sector reform.
For the first several years, the U.S.-led coalition affectively prevented the full implementation of the first provision, that is, of putting all militias under the control of the Afghan government because the coalition continued to arm and fund militias to fight along side the coalition troops against the Taliban. These militias were nominally part of the Afghan Ministry of Defense or Ministry of the Interior, but actually they often used the weapons that they received to fight the Taliban for other purposes, for their own local conflicts, for seizing land and so on, and were not really accountable to the government. So the pursuit of this military strategy, which was based on essentially giving big bags of cash to militias, continued to undermine the agenda of building a consolidated state which we had hoped to be at the heart of the Bonn process.

Now as far as creating the security sector, the new security forces was concerned, again, we encountered an obstacle due to the position of the Bush administration that it would not engage in nation-building. President Bush had in fact run on that stance during his campaign against Al Gore in 2000, and therefore, what the United States proposed at first was, that the United States would organize a new Afghan National Army. It was willing to organize the army because the army was part of its counter-terrorism policy, which was its main priority. However, Jim Dobbins was instructed by the Administration, that the United States would not get involved in other parts of the security sector which they thought involved nation-building, such as building the police, counter-narcotics, disarmament, demobilization and so on.

So, Dobbins set up a structure for security sector reform at a meeting in Geneva in April 2002 where he convened the G-8, and because the United States was only willing to be involved in building the army, he came up with what was called the lead nation system in which Japan also played a role, that is, the United States was the lead nation for building the army, Germany was the lead nation for building the police and so on. I’ll come back to that. However, this lead nation system meant that these different parts of security sector reform were, as we say, stove piped, that is, they were each in a separate channel under the leadership of particular nations, and there was no mechanism for coordinating them or ensuring that all of these security sector changes were coordinated with the political timetable in the Bonn Agreement.

But we already knew at that time that success in security sector reform in peacebuilding operations did require such a coordinated effort. For instance, in the so-called Brahimi Report, the report on peace operations by the UN Special Panel which was published in 2000, recommended a shift in doctrine to the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights. In other words, coordinating all of the different aspects of security sector reform because of course you need, if you have police, you need courts and so on. But it was impossible to implement this team approach because of the U.S. refusal to participate in nation-building.

The Brahimi Report had also recommended that security sector reform in order to assure that it would be coordinated, should be funded by the assessed peacekeeping contributions of the United Nations and go to the budget of the peacekeeping operation, and then they could be dispersed by the
Secretary General’s special representative in a coordinated manner. But instead, under the lead nation system, all of these programs were funded by voluntary contributions by the various lead nations, which again meant that there was no budgetary mechanism of coordination.

The result was that Germany, which had only a small federal police force, was responsible for rebuilding the national police. Japan took on the responsibility for demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation or reintegration of the fighters, but of course, Japan did not deploy any troops to Afghanistan because of Japan’s Constitution. And normally any such program of demobilizing tens of thousand of hardened fighters does require some kind of security force. And at the same time, the United States had a policy of not participating in DDR. And Italy, which at that time was under Premier Silvio Berlusconi, was responsible for judicial reform.

As I mentioned, the lead donor system included no mechanism for coordination despite obvious points such as that police and judicial reform are independent. It’s impossible to engage in counter-narcotics without functioning police and courts. It is not possible to build a national army without demobilizing non-national militias. And most important, it’s not possible to hold free and fair elections as required by the Bonn Agreement, or implement any other part of the Bonn Agreement, without the security reforms that would make those actions meaningful.

As I mentioned, the Department of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld particularly opposed participation by the U.S. in DDR. For most of 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld had put in effect what Brahimi called a fatwa which prevented, which forbid the American military from participating in the demobilization of those irregular forces even though was in fact the U.S. that had paid for and mobilized them. By November of that year, that is, by the end of the first year of the operation, it had become evident to those Americans who were trying to build the National Army, that they really could not separate the building of the National Army from the demobilization of the militias, because they were linked by the Afghans themselves.

While they were negotiating over how to build the new army, the Ministry of Defense under Northern Alliance control, had put forward a set of proposals which would essentially have created the new army out of the militias, that is, just putting new hats on the old mujahideen. So that what happened to the old militias was very intimately tied up with what kind of a new army you will get. And many people, I think most professionals believed that it is much easier to build an efficient professional army from new recruits than it is to take people who have a lot of bad habits or different types of habits from being guerilla warriors, and then try to train them into law abiding regular soldiers.

The result was that the U.S. military people on the ground who were working to build the Afghan National Army, took the case to the Pentagon, arguing that it was necessary for them to be involved in DDR. as well, and Rumsfeld eventually allowed them to become involved along with Japan and the United Nations in the policy committee that determined how the demobilization would be carried out. But it was only in 2004 in the run-up to the presidential elections that the Department of Defense finally agreed to let the U.S. military participate in providing some security on the ground to the demobilization process. And that was when they realized that it would not be a good idea to hold
national elections in a country that was essentially controlled by militias that opposed the candidate in the presidential elections favored by the United States, namely President Karzai.

By that time however, the emergency Loya Jirga, the first meeting that was required by the Bonn Agreement, had already taken place, and as Brahimi wrote in a note that he circulated among the diplomatic community before he left in 2002, the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 was a disappointment to many insofar as it failed to improve significantly the social and ethnic balance inside the government. And the fact that militia domination had limited the freedom of discussion at the emergency Loya Jirga led in turn to certain decisions about the constitutional process, which also, because they were afraid, we were afraid that if we opened the process too much, it would be hijacked by extremists who still were in control of these militias, and some of the flaws in the constitution could be traced to that process.

Now in addition, state-building also requires creating institutions of governance and making them sustainable by creating an economic base to pay for them. The failure to strengthen the government against competitors in the provision of coercion, that is against other militias, weakened the state’s capacity to get control over flows of taxation and its ability to deliver services and pay its employees. The government couldn’t control the customs posts, and they could not control the provincial banks through which the money flowed to pay salaries. It took a sustained effort by the Afghan government finally, especially by Ashraf Ghani after he became minister of finance in 2002 to get the United States to lead a major reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. As I noted initially, the only effort that President Bush had promised was humanitarian assistance. And in fact, of course the first reconstruction conference took place here in Tokyo in January 2002, and almost $5 billion were pledged, but most of that funding went actually for humanitarian assistance, especially to absorb the 2 million refugees who flooded back into the country, returnees who flooded back into the country, rather than for laying the basis for development. In certain respects, even the humanitarian aid had a harmful impact and contributed to the development of the next thing I am going to discuss, which is the development of the narcotics economy in Afghanistan.

Now the opium poppy had developed in a large way in Afghanistan since the 1980s as an adaptation to insecurity and illegality. It provided cash incomes to the farmers. It was very easy to market. Of course, the marketers came to the farmers. The Taliban had banned the production of opium for 1 year at the time when there was a glut, an excess, of supply. But after the Taliban were overthrown, the production of opium surged again. As part of funding the war, the United States had distributed a lot of cash dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, at least tens of million dollars in cash to Afghan commanders. The International Monetary Fund which was monitoring the exchange rate, showed that actually the value of the Afghani against the dollar doubled in several months because of the huge supply of dollars that came into the country, and as the dollar lost value in Afghanistan, people tried to cycle the new cash into new investments, so the main investment they put it into was the opium economy.

In addition, when these 2 million refugees came back, this was a very unexpected flow. I believe
UNHCR have planned for fewer than a million refugees to return in the first year, but more than twice the number they had anticipated came back, and they had to feed them somehow. Now, the mechanism that they used to feed them was essentially dictated by the United States, that is, they imported wheat which was bought from American farmers, and then delivered it to Afghanistan by the World Food Programme, and distributed to the returnees and others. Despite the protest of some in the Afghan government, this led to a fall in the price of wheat which was the main staple crop in Afghanistan at that time, and was another factor in creating an incentive for people to go into other crops and in particular, opium poppy.

Now the policy toward narcotics is not integrated into peacebuilding. As you know, peacebuilding operations are composed of different organizations which have different mandates. You have the international financial institutions, which have a kind of development mandate. You have the UN political department, which has conflict resolution or conflict management mandate. You have the humanitarian organizations, which have a particular mandate. And there is always a tension in these operations to try to make these different aspects of policy coherent. In some countries, such as Afghanistan, Columbia, probably others as well that I am not as familiar with, you also have counter-narcotics policies that are being implemented at the same time as a peacebuilding operation.

But the international policy toward narcotics does not derive from the imperatives of peacebuilding. It derives from the anti-narcotic policies of the consuming countries. In other words, it is basically aimed at reducing the physical quantity of drugs that are available for consumption. As a result, there is now an international regime which aims at the elimination of the production, trade and consumption of those narcotics that are internationally agreed to be outlawed. And it mainly treats narcotics as a law enforcement issue, as is shown by the fact that the UN organization that oversees it is the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Drug policy is not mainly the responsibility of the World Health Organization. It is not mainly the responsibility of the UN Development Programme. It’s the Office of Drugs and Crime. And the metrics that are used to measure success is basically in the physical quantity of drugs that are produced, traded or consumed. As I mentioned, in this respect, it’s like other areas of policy in that has its own kind of stove pipe logic, and then is just added to a peacebuilding operation.

But there is now the debate about the coherence of peace operations. Of course, some of you may know there was a rather well-known article that was published in, I think, 1991 by Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo about conflicts between IMF policies and UN peacemaking policies in El Salvador. And now there are attempts to make development policy and fiscal policy more coherent with peacebuilding operations.

A similar effort, I would argue, is necessary for counter-narcotics policy. There have been a number of cases where the counter-narcotics operation in Afghanistan has conflicted directly with policies of other agencies. In particular, I have more examples in the written version of this paper which I believe has been distributed to you (cf. Handout). You can look them up. But let me just summarize. Probably the most important one is that the focus on physical quantities of drugs has led to a policy of crop eradication, which deprives the farmers of their livelihood without giving them an
alternative. And in fact, because the farmers resist this crop eradication, it creates greater insecurity in the areas where you carry it out, and it actually becomes physically impossible for the people who are supposed to be helping the farmers develop alternative livelihoods to work in those areas.

Recently, there was an article published in the Washington Post by an American woman who was working on alternative livelihoods in Helmand Province, who said that because of the resistance that was generated by the crop eradication program, the people in her office actually could not do any work. So carrying out a counter-narcotics policy which is based on the policy objectives of the developed countries with respect to drug consumption, can actually contradict the aims of a peacebuilding operation.

Now in order to integrate counter-narcotics policy into peacebuilding operations, you would have to analyze both the short-term and long-term impact of different mixes of different counter-narcotics instruments, and not measure solely the amount of illicit narcotics available for consumption. In a way, what I am suggesting is, creating conflict impact assessments for counter-narcotics instruments as well as for other types of assistance.

But developing such an analysis would require a shift in mentality and models and also the collection of different kinds of information than is usually available to the organizations that carry out the international counter-narcotics regime. And we have some precedence for this. We know in the economic policy area, the World Bank and the IMF are forbidden by their statute to take political considerations into account in deciding on policies. Yet, they have had to recognize that sometimes economic policies can have an impact on the potential for armed conflict, which although is political, in turn can have a very damaging impact on the prospects for economic development. Therefore, they have started to develop mechanisms for assessing the impact on conflict of various development policies.

I suggest that we need the type of data on the drug economy that would enable us to do that as well. In particular, just to summarize what I would propose counter-narcotics policy, that will be consistent with overall objectives in Afghanistan would be one that focused first on alternative livelihoods, that is, on both rural development and also employment generation, including the cities, and focus law enforcement efforts not on eradication of crops, but on the interdiction of trafficking, and in particular, on the destruction of the laboratories that transform opium into heroin because that is where most the value was added. In that way we would be attacking the traffickers, who are actually subverting our efforts there, while at the same time providing assistance to the farmers so it would be consistent with our political objectives.

Next we come to the question of the international context which has to do with the very nature and structure of the Afghan state. Afghanistan formed within its current boundaries with a centralized administration as a buffer state within the sphere of influence of British India. This history explains something that has puzzled many observers. This country which needs decentralized governance to provide services to its population has one of the world’s most centralized administrations. But the state in Afghanistan in its present form did not develop to provide security and services to its people, but to enable an elite subsidized by foreign aid to control the territory in order to protect the security of
neighboring empires and states. And in fact, the neglect of the needs of the people of Afghanistan and of their human security has left them vulnerable to recruitment to armies and militias, and that’s still going on today.

The territories that make up today’s Afghanistan have not been able to sustain, to produce enough, really, and to pay the costs of running a state from their own resources. In essence, this territory has not produced enough to pay the costs of its own security. In the pre-modern era, the ancestor of today’s Afghan state was actually an empire which drew its resources not from the territory of Afghanistan, but by conquering neighboring territories that were wealthier, in particular, territories in India, Iran and Central Asia, and then redistributing the wealth of those territories back to the ruling elite.

When the European imperial powers moved into that area, with Russia coming from the north and Britain coming up from India, that brought an end to these imperial adventures on the part of Afghanistan’s ruling tribes. And at that time, that is, during the 19th century, the region started to assume its contemporary shape. As I said, the British and Russian empires put an end to the possibility of Afghan tribes conquering neighboring areas. But as the British moved up toward Afghanistan, eventually they developed a border settlement in which Afghanistan played a role as a buffer state. After the second Anglo-Afghan War, which was 1879 to 1881, Afghanistan became stabilized as a buffer state between the Russian and British empires. They arrived at a three-tiered border settlement which was formalized in 3 treaties. And it’s important, very vital to understand the situation today, that no Afghan government has ever accepted the legitimacy of this border settlement, which at that time was with British India and now is with Pakistan. This border settlement was very different from what we think of as borders today. It was basically a border settlement to separate empires, to keep the British and Russian empires from coming into contact with each other. It was not a border between 2 states that would have kind of a contact with each other on the basis of sovereign equality.

Now as I mentioned, this frontier had 3 layers, and these 3 layers are still relevant today. The first layer, the first frontier, was the line which is kind of a — well, okay, I’ll show you on this map (cf. p. 12 Map). It’s the line separating the areas of India, now Pakistan, that were under direct British control, from the areas under Pashtun tribal control. Now if you see that shaded area along the Afghan-Pakistan border, that is the federally administered tribal territories, and the line between them and the rest of Pakistan is the first tier of this three-tiered border structure.

The second tier, the second frontier, is the Durand Line — you see the Durand Line marked there — which is recognized by Pakistan and actually by the whole international community except for Afghanistan, as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the treaty that established this line, it was described as the line beyond which the ruler of Afghanistan would not extend his administration. So the administration of the Afghan state goes up to that line, and the administration of the Indian state or the Pakistani state does not go into the tribal territories. The tribal territories are run by tribal law as a kind of buffer within a buffer along the border.

The third tier of the border settlement was the external border of Afghanistan itself with Central Asia, China and Iran, Persia as it what at that time, and this was considered by the British to be the
security frontier of their empire, that is, Afghanistan would be a buffer, and the British would control its foreign policy so that no hostile forces could enter into that area near the border of the British empire, which is essentially the same as the Pakistani strategic, as the Pakistani doctrine, which they have basically inherited from the British of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Now the dissolution of first the British and then Russian empires, of course, changed the situation in the region during the 20th century. British India was partitioned twice, first into India and Pakistan, and Pakistan was partitioned into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Soviet Union dissolved and was broken up into the various constituent republics. But this border settlement has remained the same.

Now Afghanistan, as I mentioned, never recognized this border, and made claims that the Pashtun territories on the other side should have the right of self-determination, and ever since Pakistan was founded, there have been skirmishes between the 2 countries over this area. And in fact, it was the conflict over this border which led to, which determined how this area was integrated into the Cold War, that is, basically, Pakistan chose to side with the United States in order to obtain the arms that it needed to defend itself against India, and in reaction to that, Afghanistan ended up having its army built by the Soviet Union. So from Pakistan’s point of view, there was a Delhi-Kabul-Moscow axis, perhaps I should say a Moscow-Delhi-Kabul axis of powers that were aligned against Pakistan, and this same kind of axis, this same kind of alignment is still basically at the heart of Pakistan’s strategic thinking today.

As a result, throughout the period of warfare that started in 1978, Pakistan’s military has treated the wars in and around Afghanistan as a function of its main national security interests, which were first and foremost, balancing India, a country with over 8 times its size and population and economic resources, and whose elites in Pakistani perceptions do not recognize the legitimacy of the existence of Pakistan. They also wanted to neutralize the separatist nationalism of the border nationalities or ethnic groups, Pashtuns and Baluch (or Baloch), and they have done that by supporting Islamist groups among those ethnic groups and trying to weaken the nationalists.

So in Afghanistan, Pakistan has tried to bring the country under its influence by supporting ethnic Pashtun Islamists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Taliban, in order to assure that they would be no Indian influence there. During the period that Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban, in fact Pakistan was able to shift more of its armed forces onto the border with India, because it felt secure on the Afghan side. In addition, as I mentioned, the Northern Alliance received aid from Russia, Iran and to a certain extent also from India, and Pakistan has seen and still sees the Northern Alliance as being pro-India and perhaps as penetrated by Indian intelligence.

After September 11, there were very hurried negotiations between the United States and Pakistan, maybe negotiations is not the right word, there was an ultimatum from the United States to Pakistan, and Pakistan agreed to change its behavior, but its interests remained more or less the same, that is, Pakistan was concerned that if it did not allow the United States to use bases in Pakistan, and have overflight rights against the Taliban, the United States would instead ally with India, which would do great harm to Pakistan’s national interest. And Pakistan was happy to collaborate against al-Qaida because al-Qaida, a global terrorist group with very revolutionary objectives, was not serving interests
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But Pakistan did demand in return for this that the United States not allow the Northern Alliance to enter Kabul, not form the government on the basis of the Northern Alliance, and basically do a number of other things to protect Pakistan interests, virtually none of which was actually carried out. So Pakistan felt that in return for the concessions it gave, it did not get the type of government in Afghanistan that it felt it needed for its security. Therefore, it largely turned a blind eye when the Taliban fled Afghanistan, reconstituted themselves in Pakistan, and through Pakistan religious parties and the same network of training camps that had existed since the 1980s, began to reorganize themselves and launched a war again in Afghanistan. And the United States largely ignored that as well, because the Bush administration gave a higher priority to Iraq, and within this region, gave a higher priority to the fight against al-Qaida then to stabilizing Afghanistan itself.

There was a window of opportunity, perhaps that window is still open to some extent, to try to stabilize Afghanistan within the region by using the foreign forces that are there as a kind of deterrent to regional involvement in Afghanistan, and then investing in the Afghan state itself so it can become more self-sufficient. But that would require forming an Afghan state with sufficient resources and legitimacy to control and develop its territory, and that which would also have a geopolitical identity that would not threaten any of its neighbors. It would also require a foreign policy by the United States under which its forces and the forces of NATO in Afghanistan would essentially be balancers of the various neighbors of Afghanistan, but would not be seen as a threat to them. At least until recently, the policy of actually creating instability throughout the Middle East, which the Bush Administration has pursued, militated against that, and that is why Russia, Central Asian countries, Iran and others have begun to express concerns about the presence of U.S. military in Afghanistan and also U.S. military bases in Central Asia.

Let me just come to a conclusion here. The question people often ask them is, “Is it possible for Afghanistan ultimately to be stabilized if this territory does not produce enough resources to sustain a state itself, and is dependent on assistance from abroad which is not reliable and depends on external political considerations?” The weakness of domestic political legitimacy, regional disputes over control of the Afghan state and territory, and the proximity of global terrorists and narcotic networks also create a level of threat for Afghanistan which makes it even more costly for the country to pay for its security than at any time in the past. And we can see that today in the cost of the Afghan National Army which the U.S. is currently paying for. But the Afghan National Army’s cost is now 2 or 3 times the size of the entire budget of Afghanistan. So clearly, it is something that the country is not going to be able to sustain itself for the foreseeable future, and yet, it is still only about half the size that the government thinks it will need to provide basic security to the territory.

Now the Afghanistan Compact and the national development strategy which was referred to earlier, now do in fact provide a framework for state-building and the economic development that is needed to sustain it. These agreements go beyond the Bonn Agreement in that they provide commitments from the international community as well as from Afghanistan. They also provide
commitments for economic development and state-building as well as for political measures. Yet, no one has yet really done the calculations that would indicate that even if everything succeeded, Afghanistan would still have sufficient resources to pay the cost of sustaining a state in this territory under existing conditions.

And that poses a very difficult question, which is posed not only about Afghanistan — actually we discussed this at the seminar this morning — but about other countries with few natural resources, such as Somalia, many countries in Africa. The international community is now committed to sustaining the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the existing state of members of United Nations. Some of the states becomes through various sorts of processes such I described about Afghanistan, that is, Afghanistan did not develop as a sustainable state on the basis of its own power, it developed in these borders in order to fulfill a political function within the imperial architecture of the 19th century. Many sub-Saharan African states also were essentially administrative units that were developed by colonialism. East Timor, we have the former SRSG East Timor with us today, of course was not designed to be an independent and self-sustaining state. Many others as well. But if the international community is committed to sustaining the territorial integrity of these existing states as part of its overall security structure, it may in turn have to accept the consequences of that, which is providing a mechanism to sustain them in a reliable way as the aid system now does not.

A model for this, not that I am suggesting this as an immediate alternative, but Ashraf Ghani who now that he is no longer in the Afghan government, has started an institute on state-building, has suggested a model which he calls co-production, that is to say that international actors and national actors have to cooperate to provide public services such as security, health, education and so on, in areas where national governments are not able to do it by themselves and to do it in a sustainable way, and he suggests that the European Union is a model for doing that, and essentially that’s because the European Union started as a security community. After the experience of World War I and World War II, the European states gradually came to the conclusion that their security was so interdependent, they needed to have a higher level of governance then simply cooperation through international organizations, and they now have, of course, a very strong integration of economic functions in the provision of public services as well, and the provision of public services to common standards throughout the European Union.

Now that is a degree of integration that we do not see on the global level thus far. But the type of problems that we see in extreme cases such as Afghanistan, Somalia and so on, do indicate that there are some common characteristics between today’s global situation and the situation that Europe faced after World War II. At the moment, the existing structures for assistance and security are not at all equal to that task, and there will be of course a lot of, and there are all kinds of political incentives built into the structure of national sovereignty that will militate against it. But it appears that the alternative would be to have to accept these cycles of collapse of states in various parts of the world with all the attendant threats that that poses to the rest of the world, threats which we certainly couldn’t imagine. I studied Afghanistan since the 1980s and I was always arguing that we were neglecting it and not
realizing that the collapse of Afghanistan could threaten us. But nonetheless, I never imagined that I would be standing in New York City and see it be attacked by people who had a base in Afghanistan. That was beyond my imagination. And yet it happened. And if such things can happen, then we may need to cope, we may need to reckon with our security being much more interdependent than we have really been willing to recognize. And that seems to be not just a kind of a slogan, but a reality. Thank you.

**Chairman:** Thank you very much, Professor Rubin. We are about 5 minutes behind the schedule, but we would like to take a break as we planned. Before the break, I’d like to give you some information. Outside this hall, drinks are served, so please make them available for yourself. And in the packet you received, there is a questionnaire paper, so will you please fill them in and return them when you go home after the seminar. We appreciate your cooperation. Three twenty-five is the time we'd like to resume the second session of the seminar. We go for a break.
Panel Discussion and Question & Answer

Moderator: Prof. Emeritus Shigemochi Hirashima, Meiji-Gakuin University
Discussants: Dr. Barnett R. Rubin
Prof. Takako Hirose, Senshu University
Dr. Manabu Shimizu, Sofia University/Eurasia Consultant Ltd.
Dr. Hisaya Oda, Institute of Developing Economies,
Japan External Trade Organization

Chairman: Now, we would like to start the panel discussion. We have 20 to 25 minutes saved for Q & A at the end of the session.

We have the discussants seated, so I would like to introduce them to you. All the way to the right on the stage, we have Professor Hirashima, Professor Emeritus of Meiji Gakuin University. Professor Hirashima is a Visiting Senior Advisor at the Institute for International Cooperation, JICA. He has been concerned with the development of Pakistan, and served as a Chairman of the drafting committee on the Japanese ODA for Pakistan. He has also served as a Project Formulation Advisor at JICA Pakistan Office during 2004 – 2006. And we have, of course, Professor Barnett Rubin as one of the discussants. Next to him is Professor Takako Hirose. She is a professor of Senshu University who has been specialized the political development in India, Pakistan and other South Asian countries. Next to her is Mr. Manabu Shimizu. He is a lecturer at the Sophia University, and a consultant of the company called Eurasia Consultants. In 2004, he was involved in the research on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. He has been concerned with economic development in Central Asia and South Asia. Now the last but not the least, we have Professor Hisaya Oda. He is an Assistant Director of South Asia Study Group, Institute of Developing Economies, specializing economic development of Pakistan.

Now we would like to start the panel discussion. Professor Hirashima, please take the chair.

Prof. Hirashima: It is really my privilege to be here to learn lessons from everyone of you centering around Professor Rubin today. We are also honored to have the President of JICA, Ms. Ogaka. Despite her very busy schedules, she was kind enough to sit here in this floor. I am also grateful to Mr. Matsuoka, the Vice-President of JICA, who has been taking initiative of this seminar. And also to Mr. Taguchi, the Director General of the Institute for International Cooperation, JICA for his initiative and effort to organize this seminar.

Since we have invited eminent discussants who were introduced already, I will confine my role to be a time keeper of this seminar. Also we see several distinguished scholars sitting in this room who have done excellent study on the area. We expect a lively floor discussion later.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to listen first to Professor Hirose for her comment.
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Prof. Hirose: Thank you very much, Professor Hirashima. I am an expert on not Afghanistan, but India and Pakistan. So from that regional perspective, I would like to offer my own observation. Being not an Afghan expert, I have learned a great deal from Professor Rubin’s detailed account of the activities of not only Afghan government but also the outside agencies. But from my regional perspective, I would like to start with some specific observations.

It seems that the affairs in Afghanistan cannot be separated from the Pakistan affairs. Or rather, unless you solve Pakistan’s problem, you cannot solve Afghan problems. That is the first statement I would like to make it. And probably in that sense, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line at the moment, is probably less relevant than it used to be, especially say FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). It is called FATA, but actually it is their own state. Of course, the federal government cannot intervene unless they want to militarily attack the area. And even the provincial government cannot do anything about it. So it is a kind of more or less autonomous state, and that is in between the 2 countries. And you cannot make it a buffer state, but it is the people who matter. That is the first thing.

And then in looking back, Pakistan actually needed Afghanistan and the Taliban in order to fight against India, and so we were well aware that the Kashmir affairs and the Taliban phenomenon were actually going together. And I met a lot of people who were trained from Kashmir and trained in the Afghan camps, and they crossed the border and fought in Kashmir. But the situation is different now. The relationship between India and Pakistan has improved tremendously, so in order to fight against India, Pakistan no longer needs the Taliban, or for that matter, the strategic depth into Afghanistan.

So why does Pakistan need to, if I may use this word, maneuver the Taliban? That is the question that I would like to ask Professor Rubin. And my own sort of answer to that is the very survival of the Pakistan state, or the Musharraf regime. So the goal or, what shall I say, the role of the Taliban or Afghanistan has changed from Pakistan’s point of view. The Taliban used to be very, very useful for Pakistan’s “bleed India,” so-called “bleed India” policy, that means Kashmir policy. But now that the relationship is improved, for that Kashmir policy, the Taliban is not necessary. Or actually, it is an obstacle for the further improvement of the relationship.

But Pakistan government cannot, or the Musharraf regime cannot give up the Taliban altogether. Why? I think it is because of the domestic situation in Pakistan. Pakistan has 3 fundamental problems. One is the democratization as far as politics is concerned, either by military regime or democratic regime. So this is the first problem. The second one is to go for either moderate Islamic state or to a more fundamentalist state. And the last question is the very national integration of the Pakistan nation, which is actually the question of Punjab Province versus other provinces. So, now you have the insurgency in Balochistan and Sindh. If you go to the interior of Sindh Province, there is a strong, strong anti-Punjabi sentiment. So Pakistan has to solve these three problems.

And after the September 11, perhaps what the United States and the other countries gave permission to Musharraf to rule the country, simply because he was useful to cooperate on the war on terrorism. So his justification was probably, democratization can wait for some more, but at the
moment, we have to fight against this Islamic terrorists or fundamentalists. But in fact, you cannot separate the 3 issues mentioned above. These 3 have to go hand in hand. So if the democratization is delayed, then the people’s frustration mounts to such an extent that some, what shall I say, route through which this frustration can manifest itself should be provided. And that is this Islamic fundamentalist cause. So the Taliban, as you may be aware, are just students who learn Islamic principle, so you can find the Taliban anywhere. So what creates the environment in which Taliban is reborn? That is the more fundamental question to ask.

So Pakistan can solve neither of them by handling the Taliban. But why do they need the Taliban to some extent, but not to the extent that actually destroys their own society, is the role of the United States. After the September 11, the U.S. assistance to and the support of the Musharraf regime came back, and that is how the Musharraf regime has survived so far. But that has not solved any of the fundamental problems that Pakistan is faced with. So he is just walking a tightrope. And I was in Pakistan this month, but I found the situation very critical. Unless the Pakistanis themselves stand up and try to make their great efforts to build their own nation, there is nothing actually that the outsiders can do. So in that sense, I think this Pakistan phenomenon is very, very important for even to solve the problem of Afghanistan.

Now, I would like to raise some more fundamental questions. The first question I would like to raise here is that, “How relevant is the state borders?” Probably the Pashtuns live on both sides of the border and they move more or less freely, and the state legitimacy depends on which government can provide them with the better services, not their international border as such.

And the second question I would like to raise is the role of the outsiders in solving the problem, and also especially in nation-building. I think there is a very, very limited role that outsiders can play, especially the U.S. Every time I go to Pakistan, I see the nation more anti-Americans and more Islamic, and these 2 strengthen each other. So probably the conditions may be more or less the same in Afghanistan. And the very presence of the American troops and their visits, politicians visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan from time to time, and that creates a very, very anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, and possibly in Afghanistan, and that makes it more difficult for the government to solve any problems by themselves. So I would like to say that we have to be aware of the limit of the role of the outsiders.

Finally, I would like to suggest a more people-oriented solution on even the border questions. The Kashmir problem is a good example. They cannot solve the problem territorially. Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani government is in a position to give any concessions in terms of territory, not even an inch. That is what they say. But what they have done instead is to provide interstate railway service, and bus service, and now the Kashmiris can move without even a visa. So they are now at the moment much happier than they used to be, and the violence has calmed down. So the international border itself, unless you want to settle the border first, may create more problems. But if you allow people to move more freely and allow goods to move more freely, then what is the meaning of border? That is probably what we can learn from this Kashmir issue. Thank you.
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Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much, Professor Hirose. I think instead of asking Professor Rubin to have his response, let me pool some of the questions to be raised by the other panelists. May I ask Professor Shimizu next?

Dr. Shimizu: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed the presentation by Professor Rubin. Listening to his presentation, I would like to raise 2 issues concerning the peace process at present in Afghanistan.

In the beginning, I would like to raise the issue of Taliban. Taliban, as you know, is a very focal issue. What I want to raise here is the so-called re-emergence of the Taliban movement, or Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly in the southern part of Afghanistan. As you know since 2005, particularly in the Helmand area, we observed new emergence of Taliban. The question which should be raised here is, “What is Taliban now?” I mean, “Is it simply a re-emergence of the old Taliban, or the re-emergence is a new phenomenon, to some extent, taking into account the political and economic development after the debacle of Taliban government in Kabul?” It is a very difficult question, and I would like to have response from Professor Rubin also. But I think I have to take into account 2 factors. One is problems of narcotics production which Professor Rubin has raised, and the second one is re-emergence of Taliban and the position of Pashtoon ethnic group in Afghanistan.

As you know, the Pashtoon occupies the majority in the population structure of Afghanistan, but because of the Kabul government was mainly occupied by the representative of the Northern Alliance, so there could be dissatisfaction among some leaders, or tribal leaders among the Pashtoon areas. And I am afraid those dissatisfied elements or factors might have contributed, at least to some extent, to the re-emergence of Taliban. Or those factors try to engage in any activities, at least against Taliban. So this factor might be explained in other way, a sort of the dissatisfied elements of the Pashtoon leadership in the present framework of the political system of the Afghanistan. If it is the fact, how to neutralize those vis-a-vis the re-emergence of Taliban. I think this is one of the issues which we cannot evade at present stage of the development.

The second issue is the international framework or the role of the external factors in the development of Afghanistan. I am specializing in Central Asia, and as far as Central Asia is concerned, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan are concerned, for instance, they are engaged themselves in the process of nation-building. So they are more inward looking, and they cannot afford to meddle in a dynamic way in the Afghan affairs. So the problems come to the South. As Professor Hirose has rightly pointed out, Pakistan issue is very, very important.

As for the Pakistan issue, I fundamentally agree with the explanation given by Professor Hirose, but I would like to add, if possible, a little more positive trend between India and Pakistan. Of course, the most serious and traditional conflict of Kashmir issues have not been solved. They still remain to be the problem. But India and Pakistan are now trying to freeze the issue, not to be provocative to each other at least. And what are the factors, if there are, which tries to freeze this issue? This is my personal feeling that, because of the economic development in India as well as in Pakistan, the new
strata of the society have emerged which have stakes in the present status goal. So they don’t want to lose by making some adventurous venture against each other. However, this point is still very weak. I don’t say definite. But we have to be very careful to promote this process from outside with our limited resources.

And when we look at the relations between India and China, for instance, China and India have also problems, border issues, which have not been solved yet. But 2 countries are now re-approaching and trying to find areas for mutual merit, particularly in trade and economic cooperation. Of course, these trends are still strong, but I think this is also a very interesting development.

And China has a big stake in Pakistan traditionally. Two months ago, I paid a visit to the new port of Gwadar in Balochistan Province in Pakistan, and maybe tomorrow, their new port will be opened. What is important is that most of the fund did come from China, about 80% of the fund did come from China. For China, I think it is strategically very important, because theoretically in case something happens in the Indian Ocean, it is possible for them to bring the commodities and oil from the gulf through Pakistan to Xinjian in China. Of course, practically there are many problems, but theoretically, it is possible.

But at the same time, China is approaching to India much more sincerely than before. Last year was India-China year and this year is China-India year. They are promoting cultural exchange, exchange of the youth, and so on. Of course, this is a beginning.

So taking into account the new developments surrounding Afghanistan, I think that one idea or one hint given by Professor Rubin seemed to be very, very interesting. I think that in order to avoid unnecessary and negative meddling by Pakistan in Afghanistan, we have to give Pakistan a sort of a sense of security vis-a-vis India. Of course, it is not so easy. The former traditional formula is very strong, and particularly military wing of Pakistan has not lost any doubt about the intension of India. But if we mobilize, for instance China to some extent, or Russia or the U.S., we may be able to create a more favorable condition for Pakistan comparatively.

So I think we should have more dynamic vision, which is not limited to Afghanistan or the relations between India and Pakistan. We should have a wider perspective which could improve the external perceptions of Pakistan in the sense that there could be some more cordial development between India and Pakistan. Those forces which promote this trend might be economic. I mean the developers, those stakeholders in the economic development, particularly the development of the middle classes in India and Pakistan. So these are the 2 issues which I would like to raise and expect responses from the panelists, Professor Rubin and also the floor. Thank you very much.

**Prof. Hirashima:** Thank you very much, Professor Shimizu. Now, let me ask Professor Oda to make his remarks.

**Dr. Oda:** Thank you, Professor Hirashima. Dr. Rubin, thank you very much for your presentation. It was very informative and has a lot of implications.
My comment will be the ones that you might expect. But I know a little bit about Pakistan, so let me comment on the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Basically, there are three issues in my comment.

As Professor Rubin pointed out, currently and also in the past, there are always several actors involved in Afghanistan issues. Unfortunately, they never unite to work for the stabilization and the development of Afghanistan, as each actor has own interest, and also the interest differs from one country to another. And these interests also conflict each other, which has been the source of destabilization in Afghanistan. Pakistan is one of those actors involved in Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan is one of the most important and influential actors that have potential to stabilize and destabilize Afghanistan at the same time.

Pakistan has always tried to control Afghanistan and put Afghanistan under the influence. The reason is very simple. It is already explained by Professor Rubin and also Professor Hirose. Simply, Pakistan needs to have good western partners, western neighborhood, as it faces India on the eastern side. This is what we call a strategic depth. The current Kabul regime, which is dominated by Northern Alliance, is not pro-Pakistan but rather pro-India regimes. Quite obviously, Pakistan is not happy with this setup, and has incentive to destabilize Afghanistan. So unless the relationship between India and Pakistan improves, Pakistan has always a temptation to influence Afghanistan. So the ultimate solution is to make India and Pakistan trust each other. Though Professor Hirose pointed out that Pakistan-India relationship is improving, but I do not think it is improving to the point where they trust each other. So making good relationship between India and Pakistan seems to be a very long way off, and I am not sure when it will be happening.

Then, is it possible to have a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan? It seems to be difficult as well because other neighboring countries such as Iran and also Central Asian countries which have different interests from Pakistan will oppose to it.

Another important issue in Pakistan which has not been touched upon so far is the existence of pro-Taliban Islamic political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami, we call it JUI. JUI is a political party based on Sunni Deobandi group which has extensive network of Madrasah. Madrasah is a religious school which is all over Pakistan and it has been the source of Taliban forces. Now it is a part of MMA, which is the largest opposition party at federal government level in Pakistan. But it is a part of the ruling party in North West Frontier Province and also a part of the ruling coalition parties with Pakistan Muslim League in Balochistan. JUI is a part of the opposition party at the federal level, and PML is the ruling party supporting President Musharraf in Pakistan right now. But, President Musharraf’s party, PMLQ is heavily dependent on JUI on several accounts. This is an open secret.

And because PMLQ is not a single majority party at the federal level, they needed to have a coalition with other parties. So from time to time, the PML asks JUI for help on several occasions. As general elections may be held in Pakistan, probably this year, the relationship between the Musharraf regime and the JUI might be stronger. Under these circumstances, how is it possible for President Musharraf to stop the Taliban movement, or Taliban re-emergence which Professor Shimizu
pointed out in Afghanistan and in Pakistan? I am very pessimistic about this, so I’d like to ask Professor Rubin specifically about this issue.

The third issue is economic development of Afghanistan. This is very important issue to be addressed. As Dr. Rubin pointed out, Afghanistan must have sufficient resources to be a self-sustaining state. But unfortunately, it seems that the chances are very much limited in Afghanistan. In fact, I did a small survey on economic development strategy of Afghanistan in 2002 – 2003. The work was part of a project commissioned by Japan Society of Civil Engineers and chaired by Professor Nishino of GRIPS. The output was presented to President Karzai by Professor Nishino and others in 2003 in Kabul. While writing the report, I came to notice that it is almost impossible to establish a viable and legitimate economic sector in Afghanistan, because of geographical location; lack of natural resources, access to oceans, industry base except for a few minor industries such as cement productions, water resources and irrigation facilities. There was an irrigation facility, but it is not functioning and no irrigation facilities for agriculture production. Therefore, at the time of writing, I was not able to write something positive and also useful for Afghanistan’s development. It is already more than 4 years since I wrote it and it seems the situation is not improving, but rather deteriorating. So Dr. Rubin, I would like you to give us your more specific thought and comment on the economic development issues. Thank you very much.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much, Professor Oda. Dr. Rubin, before opening question and answer session to the floor, I would like to ask you to spend some of your time to respond to whatever relevant from your point of view if you do not mind. Thank you.

Dr. Rubin: Thank you very much for these useful comments. I will not be able to discuss all of them, but I hope in the course of the discussion we will be able to do that.

I think a number of the comments had to do with the Taliban and the role of Pakistan, so let me say a few words about that. First, the question of is this; a revival of the Taliban or an emergence of something new. The insurgency in Afghanistan is composed of a variety of different elements and groups, and not only that, it’s not just an insurgency in Afghanistan, it is a cross border insurgency. You have, first of all, the leadership, you do have the old leadership of the Taliban which is operating out mainly in the Balochistan area of Pakistan, Balochistan Province, and then they have cross border operations into Southwestern Afghanistan. But there, of course, although the commanders work out of bases in Pakistan, they recruit their fighters inside Afghanistan, and all those fighters are not members of the Taliban. That is, there is a kind of a formal definition of member of the Taliban, that is, if you take a certain kind of Islamic oath of loyalty to Mullah Omar, then you are a part of the movement. But most of the people who are fighting in Afghanistan have not taken that oath of loyalty. In fact, what the United Nations has found in some research that they have done is that the Taliban leadership in Balochistan is able to recruit people inside Afghanistan by exploiting local conflicts over resources, which you have all over Afghanistan — not only Afghanistan, of course, all over the world — conflicts
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over land and water. And then also political conflicts over the new power structure because certain particular tribes took power in various provinces, and they use that power generally to support their own tribes. So the Taliban are able to recruit people from the groups that feel excluded. Of course, they also, like any militia, profit from, they are able to recruit people more easily because of the high level of unemployment.

And then we add to that drug trafficking. Of course, drug traffickers have to provide their own security, so they have their own armed groups, and sometimes they will just pay Taliban or other armed groups to support them or to provide them with security. And of course, I should add, of course, that the counter-narcotics policy — this is what I mentioned in my talk — the counter-narcotics policy being carried out by various western countries and the Afghan government under pressure from those western countries has also pushed some farmers in the area into the arms of the Taliban as the Taliban offer them protection from crop eradication and so on.

Then especially in Waziristan area, you have former mujahideen commanders like Jalaluddin Haqqani who had allied themselves with Taliban but they were not actually in the core group of Taliban. They are operating cross border in the similar way. And then, you still have the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Hezb-i Islami. And in addition, of course, various groups announce their existence, rather obscure groups.

But in general, I would say the core element of the insurgency consists of people who were formerly allied with the Taliban, but they have developed in the last 5 years closer relations with al-Qaida. They have become more radicalized and so on, as a result of the global situation, and at the same time, they’ve recruited fighters inside Afghanistan on a very different basis.

Sometimes you hear people talking about the idea of negotiating with Taliban or talking with Taliban, and I am not against talking to anyone if you can have a useful conversation, but bear in mind, this is not an insurgency that is directed from one central headquarters as represented by one central leadership.

Now, why is the insurgency able to operate out of Pakistan so relatively easily? This is, of course, this discussion we’ve had about Pakistan and the Taliban and Pakistan’s relation to Afghanistan is a perennial subject going back 20 or 25 years, but I think I pretty much agree with the analyses that my colleagues presented. Of course, there is the long-term Pakistan strategic orientation. I have also noted in my discussions in Pakistan, as Professor Hirose did, that the people are now saying that strategic depth is an outmoded concept and so on, and that their greater interest is in economic cooperation. But at the same time, the Pakistani state does have a lot of internal weaknesses. They are not sure that strategic depth will always remain an outmoded concept because the relations with India, although they are improving, they are very far from being stable. They don’t know if the United States will stay there or will leave, and of course, it is an element of faith in Pakistan’s strategic doctrine that the United States is an unreliable ally.

And I would add one other factor. If Pakistan solves the problem of the Taliban, then the United States will not need Pakistan any more. In fact, Pakistan had this experience before and it had a very
big impact on their strategic doctrine. That is, after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, eventually the mujahideen overthrew the communist government, and the United States invoked the “Pressler Amendment”, put Pakistan under sanctions for its nuclear program and stopped giving Pakistan military aid. So Pakistan believes, probably accurately, that it will only receive the military aid from the United States that it needs to defend itself from India in its view as long as it is helping the United States to solve problems. But if it actually solves the problem, then the United States doesn’t need it any more and it will just go to India. So Pakistan needs to assure that there are always problems that can only be solved with the help of Pakistan. It’s a rather subtle point, but there is something to it.

But then of course, it is also true that Pakistan’s state is weak, and particularly right now, the military regime is in a political crisis. It was in a kind of medium-term political crisis, at the moment it’s in a short-term political crisis because of the crisis over the chief justice, but this year Pakistan is scheduled to have elections. It’s supposed to have legislative elections and presidential elections. Presidential elections are indirect elections. The president is elected by the legislative assemblies. Now in the past, governance in Pakistan was always based on what Hussain Haqqani has called the mullah-mosque alliance, I’m sorry, I mean the military-mosque alliance, that is the military with the Islamists, and they would use their alliance with the Islamists to marginalize the centrist parties that got the majority of the vote, Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League.

However, because of their reorientation of their foreign policy since September 11, the military’s alliance with the Islamists parties has become quite strained. Now the U.S. government has been pressing President Musharraf to form a different political alliance. They would actually like him to enter into the elections this year in alliance with the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pashtoon nationalists, the Awami National Party. In other words, to reorient, because they think if you take at face value President Musharraf’s statement that he is a modernizer and believes in this so-called philosophy of enlightened moderation as he calls it, then it would seem that those centrists, more secular oriented muslim parties would be more appropriate for him. And in particular, if in fact he does support the Karzai government as he claims to, and is actually against the Taliban as he says he is, then he should ally with the ANP, the Pashtun nationalists, who have the same policy.

But of course, the military cannot ally with the Pakistan People’s Party and the ANP because they are in a kind of structural opposition to those parties. The military will not ally with the People’s Party unless it abandons Benazir Bhutto, it will not ally with the Awami National Party unless it gives up its demands for a greater degree of federalism and ethnic autonomy. So therefore, President Musharraf is in a situation now, or let’s put this way; the ruling party in Pakistan, which is the military, actually, does not have any allies among the other parties. Therefore, it’s in actually a politically weak position. It cannot form an alliance with the parties that are against the Islamist parties which might give it a base for moving against the Taliban domestically, and it cannot ally with the Islamist parties because of its foreign policy. So therefore, there’s something inherently unstable in the current political situation in Pakistan which makes it very unlikely that the government will be able to undertake such difficult moves.

Now with respect to Afghanistan, I’ll just note, I think it was, maybe it was Mr. Oda or Shimizu
or both of them, mentioned this idea that the government in Afghanistan is dominated by the Northern Alliance. Actually the government in Afghanistan is not dominated by the Northern Alliance. It was originally. The Northern Alliance is now largely marginalized, and the governing elite is mostly Pashtun. Now however, these are not Pashtuns who have an organizational basis among the tribes. So the fact that they are ethnically Pashtun doesn’t mean that Pashtoons feel themselves to be represented. But on the other hand, the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan also don’t feel themselves to be represented. So you have both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, governments that have a very weak political base in their own society.

Finally, if I can just go to the question about economic development, I think the key to the Afghan National Development Strategy — I am not saying it will necessarily work, but this is the key idea — is to take the weaknesses of Afghanistan and try to turn them into strengths. That is, Afghanistan’s economic weakness has always been exactly those factors that you mentioned, in particular its landlocked position, lack of transport and so on, and its political status in the region has been a function of its economic status, that is, it was isolated, high cost of transport, therefore, difficult to conquer, difficult to rule, difficult to export from. Therefore it was a buffer state separating wealthier and more populated areas.

The idea of the Afghan National Development Strategy is to leverage Afghanistan’s current position as a key having high strategy value into investment in transport and governance infrastructure that rather than being a separator among the surrounding regions, Afghanistan becomes a connector. That is the regional cooperation strategy of the Afghan government. They see themselves as the kind of a fulcrum between Central Asia, Persian Gulf and South Asia. However, up till now, still the level of security is such that those investments have not been implemented, and the surrounding governments are not really willing to develop their economies in a way that would be integrated through Afghanistan because they have not reached a political and security consensus about the structure of state power in Afghanistan.

Of course, there was a kind of negative consensus about it during the previous period of stability in Afghanistan where it was a very weak government and everyone agreed, all the surrounding countries agreed that they would just give aid to different parts of that government. Now that state has broken down, and all the problems of the surrounding region are in a sense concentrated in Afghanistan. We have talked about how the India-Pakistan problem is now being played out in Afghanistan. The Sunni-Shia conflict which is spreading across the Middle East has implications in Afghanistan. There are struggles over different transit routes. Gwadar port is supposed to be part of a north-south transit route. At the same time, India and Iran are building east-west transit routes which are competing with the route from Karachi and so on.

So generally speaking, governments subordinate purely economic considerations to security considerations, just as we see the United States, the world’s greatest capitalist power, is trying to impose sanctions against oil companies for working in Iran. The governments around Afghanistan might see that there are economic benefits to cooperating in Afghanistan, but they are concerned that there are
also economic benefits to their enemies in cooperating in Afghanistan and therefore, they are reluctant to invest in it. So I am afraid that in a way, the political and security, the economic strategy of Afghanistan, I don’t know if it can succeed at all, but it certainly cannot succeed as long as there is no strategic consensus about the nature of state power in Afghanistan among the regional countries.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much, Dr. Rubin. I have a few remarks on your write-up, but do you have any additional questions, the 3 panelists at the moment?

Dr. Shimizu: A very few comments. As for the economic program for the future for Afghanistan, I am very much pleased to hear from Dr. Rubin almost the similar idea which I have, and I just want to add that the ‘buffer state’ has been thought to be a sort of closed country and difficult to access, and so on. But I think that we have to coin a new concept of buffer state which I would like to explain like this. I was thinking of the Afghanistan’s future as a buffer and transit state. Buffer means that Afghanistan can play as a sort of the country which balances, I mean the impact of the surrounding countries, but at the same time, the location of Afghanistan is now quite different before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now the Central Asiatic countries are looking for the way out to the sea, and Afghanistan route is the most convenient. But because of security issues, this route is not real as yet. But as a sort of dream or the future program, this is my proposal that we should coin a new concept, buffer-transit state. So this is my comment. Thank you very much.

Prof. Hirose: I just wanted to add one thing. I may have sounded rather sort of pessimistic about the role of the outsiders, but as far as Afghanistan or Pakistan are concerned, there is no short-term solution as such, and in that sense, there is a limit of the role that the outsiders can play. So the ultimate solution should come from the people themselves.

Take an example of the Pakistan. People are very capable. Some people are even more capable than the Japanese, probably. But when these people get together, the country does not seem to work properly, and it is the problem of management, I would say. But again, if you want to impose a kind of form of governance, then you are bound to fail. So in other words, I think unless you sort of bring out the people themselves through education, and also economic development, give them incentives to work harder, that kind of long-term solution is the only solution that I can envisage.

Prof. Hirashima: I am very much impressed with the Dr. Rubin’s analysis, particularly in historical analysis, and I understand why there is no faith, Afghanistan’s faith in her own nation-building. Every argument is made in the international context and the regional context, and not much in terms of the potentiality and capability of Afghan people, their zeal toward development, independent and building up a sustainable country with pride and dignity as Professor Hirose also points out. In his recent paper (January-February issue of “Foreign Affairs”), Professor Rubin made an interesting remarks. Let me just read out the last sentence to you. “U.S. policy makers have misjudged Afghanistan, misjudged
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Pakistan, and most of all, misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic change. I skip in between the lines, “If the United States wants to succeed in the war on terrorism, it must focus its resources and its attention on securing and stabilizing Afghanistan.” This is very much pertinent statement.

Currently, the national security forces at work in Afghanistan is being funded by the U.S.A. However, it reminds me when I examined the donor funded rural development projects in Pakistan that whenever the projects terminated, the sustainability was lost. It is mainly because the projects were sustained superficially by the influx of recurrent expenditure and capital goods. Of course, every donor has made a tremendous effort to enhance human capacity in the projects, but yet the sustainability question, in many cases, has remained after the foreign forces were receded. I am afraid this is the case for Afghanistan as well.

Now I am not in a position unlike Dr. Rubin, to make straightforward proposals on how to restore the sustainable society in Afghanistan, but I think international communities and regional neighbors in historical context have created the excuse for Afghan people. I think the international forces and neighboring countries should stop giving such kind of excuse to Afghanistan people. What I mean here is that the intervention from outside would deprive of the sense of ownership on nation building by the Afghan people. It may, as Dr. Rubin rightly pointed out, take 2 to 3 years, or maybe more, but whenever we discuss Afghan issues, we should try to bring Afghan people into the forefront by giving faith to their potential capability.

To talk about my personal experience in Pakistan, I have launched 2 projects in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province. These 2 provinces have been a hotbed for Islamic fundamentalists. They have been neglected in terms of public concerns and investments and far behind of Punjab in terms of income and social development. In this condition, what we tried to do was to launch the project that could develop something to be proud of by the local people. We are now trying to develop 5 fruits appeared in Holy Koran into the processed international commodities for export. We humbly believe that it is the local producers who could enhance the base of pride and dignity. We assume the key to sustainability is held by the private processing firms in the context of multi-sector approach of rural development. Also our projects have a direct bearing on the development of Peshawar and Quetta, which in turn would give positive impacts on the development of Kandahar and border areas of Afghanistan.

Now my suggestion based on my Pakistan experience, of course, is subject to modification and criticism by Dr. Rubin. However, one definite way to contribute to the Afghanistan’s restoration process is to assist the healthy growth of the neighboring states. In this context, Pakistan has a potentiality, but that potentiality has been threatened by the international politics.

And again, Professor Rubin said rural development is an alternative for narcotics and 30 to 50 % of the illegal economy is based on opium productions in Afghanistan. Why opium production cannot be ceased? Because under the given circumstances such as water scarcity, destroyed infrastructure, lack of law and order etc., it is easier to handle and more profitable compared to the staple production in
a highly fragile environment. Personally I believe that the conventional rural development may not be able to terminate opium production. Answer should be sought in the non-agricultural sectors.

Having said that, I think we would like to invite questions from the floor and again by taking advantage of being a moderator, let me have a privilege to nominate 3 distinguished scholars on the subject first. Professor Fukamachi, would you please initiate first?

**Mr. Fukamachi (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies):** Thank you very much, Dr. Rubin for your very instigating lecture, and thank you very much for all the comments by the panelists.

What I am trying to say is neo-Taliban, which came up about a year ago along the Durand Line. They have come up as a kind of religious fascists. Professor Rubin touched on it. And I have been thinking during the last 3 or 4 months that Pakistan is facing 3 dilemmas right now. No. 1 is, Pakistan has been trying to, especially General Musharraf, take in neo-Taliban as a kind of power to versus India. Although this is the dilemma, this faces the kind of dilemma because it does not go well with the policy of Pakistan for improving the relations with India.

And the second dilemma is as you all mentioned, Pakistan has been trying to control, in a way, Afghanistan. It has been trying to bring up Afghanistan under its own umbrella. That is also, Pakistan’s policy against India. But, the Afghan political voices can never become a friendly force with Pakistan because of the border problem.

And the third dilemma is the neo-Taliban which has come up about a year ago, may influence not only Pashtoon people, but also Pakistani people as a whole in a rather difficult way because of the Islamic problem. This taking in Afghan neo-Taliban people does not go well with the domestic Pakistan people who are not for Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic if I may use this, Islamic fascism which seems to be growing in Pakistan these days. Could you discuss this?

**Prof. Hirashima:** Thank you Mr. Fukamachi. May I ask Mr. Suzuki, who has been studying Iran for a long time, to give us your perspective from Iran on the issues we have been discussing?

**Mr. Suzuki (Institute of Developing Economies):** Thank you very much, Professor Hirashima and all the discussants who talked almost all aspects surrounding Afghanistan issue. I think most of the point for discussion has been talked, so maybe it is difficult to add any further points.

Well, I don’t want to make a special comment from Iranian side. Rather, I want to make question because the first part of the discussion made me a little bit pessimistic about Afghanistan’s future, but at the last part, comments from Dr. Rubin and also Mr. Chairman shows that the future of Afghanistan which is not so pessimistic as we can imagine from the situation right now. And in order to make some positive picture for the future, I will make about 3 points as questions.

First is the political question. Now that as all the discussants have commented, the Taliban or al-Qaida is reappearing as a fairly strong political actor in the southern part of Afghanistan and the bordering area with Pakistan. Karzai government is one actor in Afghanistan and there are some other
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main former warlords, including General Dostum, Ismail Khan and Hazrat Ali. Do you think that they will try to negotiate with these new Taliban, al-Qaida group in the future, or does this situation of new appearance or new “Talibanization” automatically means that there will be repertoire of late 1990s if there is a power vacuum because of the future drawing back of international forces like the U.S. army and NATO army? This is one question.

And the second question is concerning the opium production. As Professor Rubin wisely stated that they must be get rid of in the future. There is a discussion that opium production and the heroin smuggling which is now occupying about 90 % of the world market, of course, most of which is underground. Do you think that the Afghanistan national economy can possibly depend on this kind of international privilege if international society, it means first and utmost the U.S. and European countries, will fairly control that production and the market system? Or this kind of control is out of consideration because it is as difficult as trying to stop those activities. Anyway, it means serious maneuvering vis-a-vis the underground syndicate, gang syndicate are in the countries surrounding Afghanistan such as Pakistan, Iran and of course including several Central Asian countries. And the third question. In order that main states surrounding Afghanistan, such as Iran, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and also Russia and China will be able to cooperate in matters of reconstruction of Afghanistan and will find their own benefits from doing such efforts, what can international society including Japan do or how can they participate in that process?

It is my view that the most basic problem in Afghanistan is the reconstruction of moral system after the serious conflict inside the border. So I think the acceptance of new constitution and the new regime inside Afghanistan is a base for talking of several political actors. So my last question is that, “The new Taliban, will they accept this new constitution or not?” Thank you very much.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you. Is there any other question from the floor? You are free to raise your hand.

Mr. Kuroki: Thank you very much, Dr. Rubin, and the Japanese participants for your statement and discussion. Well, I understand that the issues such as Taliban and narcotics are very difficult to solve, and it will take time to solve all these issues, and I don’t even know if we or they can solve them. But, as this seminar is organized by JICA, which is an aid agency, I would like to ask Dr. Rubin what the priority areas are and what kind of approach the aid agencies should take for the future reconstruction and development of Afghanistan under these conditions? Thank you very much.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much. Is there any others? Yes, Professor Hanzawa.

Mr. Hanzawa (Meiji Gakuin University): Thank you very much for designating me. I am a historian of British Empire and I was very glad that Dr. Rubin mentioned Britain towards the last part of his presentation.
In connection to that, I would like to ask one question concerning what people call anti-American feeling or sentiment. And I am also glad that 2 of the commentators also mentioned this. This is something you don’t very often hear within the United States. But, when you go out of the United States, you are made to hear about it. But I think it is not just a sentiment of feeling, it is real, concrete, historically formed and very deep-seated. And of course, as a historian I know that it is not one-sided history. But, I think there are a lot of people, I believe, who are saying that the Americans are going down the same kind of path as the British. It is really easy to play down such feelings and label it, label these people who are talking about these things as agitators. Some commentator also raised new Taliban and there are a lot of complicated, relationships and I know this.

Then, my question is, is there anything the Americans or any friendly governments can do to redress? At least you need to cope with it in order to lessen the difficulties of peace building in the region, not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan or other places? There is a huge, really, perception gap between right and left on this problem. Could you explain some of your thought in this respect? Thank you.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much, Professor Hanzawa. Is there any other persons who would like to raise question? Yes, please.

Mr. Kanazawa: I am an individual consultant working for about 30 years in the development sector, and I have a brief experience working for Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. I have basically 2 questions.

First one is, I am still not clear why the new Taliban or Taliban re-emerged. Professor Shimizu pointed out that the re-emergence of the Taliban is because of the dissatisfaction of the Pashtoon with that the majority of the government officials or the cabinet might be occupied by the Northern Alliance. But I think Dr. Rubin said it is not. It’s a mixture of the people or communities. So maybe Dr. Rubin or Professor Shimizu may respond to this question.

Professor Oda pointed out that the economic development is constrained by the limited natural resources. I agree with that. But if you say so, there are so many countries in the world which you have to deny the development, for example, East Timor has only limestone, nothing else. Although it is surrounded by the ocean, fishing business is very much fundamental one. My view is that the limited natural resource is not their most critical issue but the secondary one. The most critical issue is human resource development. As Dr. Rubin pointed out, there are so many issues at the national or the international level. I agree that the international relation has to be improved, namely all the frameworks have to be improved first. But what I have realized while I was working in Afghanistan is the low level of staff’s capacity, or limited human resource capacities. I have found that the project or development activities are normally or mostly controlled by the minister or the warlord. Maybe some of the ministers are the leaders of the tribe or warlord, and they are supported by the refugees or returnees from the United States and the other countries. But basically, half or maybe only 10 % of their identities are the Afghanistan. It might be American, Canadian, Australian or some others. And those
warlord or ministers and the returnees are controlling most of the activities. And there are lots of Indian experts actually working on behalf of the Afghanistan government staffs. So that ordinary government officers are outside of the loop. And ordinary government officials, I don’t know whether Pashtoon or Northern Alliance, but they are very innocent and they have very limited knowledge and experience.

Here are some typical examples that ordinary citizens are totally outside of that loop, activities. I was in Afghanistan to help them to recruit the consultants. I prepared documents and discussed with the senior advisors who were coming from the other countries. Then I asked the Deputy Minister to send his responsible staff to finalize those documents. One day that government responsible people came. They were neither Ministers nor Advisors. They were government officials called Director or Director General. They did not bring any documents. So I asked them where the draft documents were which I submitted a week ago. They said they had not been given any instruction by the Ministers or Technical Advisors. People who controlled or administered are Ministers or Warlords and foreign experts.

So I think sustainability is important to develop a capacity of the ordinary government officials or citizens. What is a way to break out this kind of constraint? I think it is very difficult. This kind of situation prevails everywhere in developing countries. That comes from their traditional culture and mindset. So my question is whether they need to change those traditions for development or development can be taken place without changing this kind of cultures. If they have to be changed, what is the best way to apply for these countries? That is my question. Thank you.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much. I feel like responding to your last question. The most important thing for us outsiders is a sincerity or sympathy to the development issues. They may not be responsive to the level which you would like them to. But that is why they remain in underdeveloped. I think it takes time, but what we should do is to try to understand the root cause of the underdevelopment, and then with a full sympathy to do something, whatever modest it may be. That is the role to be assigned to the international communities, isn’t it? Some outside experts keep on saying that local people are not responsive or they are lazy and so on. But we should understand that is why you are sent. Your expertise has to be delivered for the development of their capabilities. There is no readymade answer, but if we lack sincerity to the development issue, it is not possible for us to expect anything positive in development effort.

Now, I would like to turn back to Dr. Rubin. There are several issues. Could you please try to respond to them within 10 to 15 minutes? Thank you.

Dr. Rubin: Well, thank you. I think there are 15 or 20 different questions, so I am not quite sure where to begin, but I will just start with something very specific.

You mentioned yourself, Dr. Hirashima, the issue of different kinds of fruits. Particularly Afghanistan has a history of horticulture. In that respect, the opium poppy is very consistent with agricultural history of the region. I will just mention that, besides being a theorist, I also started a business in Afghanistan. It was based on just looking at the opium business and thinking how to do it
legally, not legalizing opium, although that might be a good idea. But nonetheless, basically the idea is growing flowers and distilling them into something valuable and exporting it. So I started a company with some Afghan and French investors to manufacture essential oils for perfume from orange blossoms, roses and so on, and this is something which is very consistent with their culture which places a very high value on flowers, and as you know also, the use of perfumes and so on is part of the practice of Prophet Mohammed. In addition, the distillation apparatus that is used was actually invented in Balkh by Avicenna, which is today in the territory of Afghanistan. So I think there are a lot of possibilities if you just keep working with the local people. It is a very interesting project, probably not for JICA, but at least for me.

Now I should answer the question of what an aid agency can do, but first I have to say that there is already a framework for that, and I think it’s about as good a framework as exists. It is the Afghanistan Compact which provides different benchmarks for development, and there is one particular point I just wanted to raise about it, which is, there is an annex on aid effectiveness in the Afghanistan Compact. It has several different points, but one of them is to ask that an increasing amount of aid be given through the Afghan budget through the budgetary process. This is very important because if we want to, for Afghans to develop that sense of ownership and control, they actually have to have it. The process through which a national government decides how it is going to distribute its resources is through its budgetary process. And that really is the essence of democracy. After all, what does a parliament do? A parliament passes the budget, and then it monitors whether the government is executing the budget in a proper way. When aid is given outside the budgetary process through parallel structures of aid delivery, it actually weakens the government.

Now, it is necessary to do that to a certain extent, especially with humanitarian assistance, but some of the big donors like the United States, Japan and Germany have been very reluctant to put money through the Afghan budgetary process. And there are some special trust funds that are set up for that purpose since Afghanistan is still in the process of developing its systems of accounting.

And of course, there is another problem as well, which is Afghanistan has not been able to spend all of the money that the government has received. Last year it executed less than half of its development budget. However, this year it’s done 50 % better. They will probably execute about twothirds of its development budget. So one thing that I would suggest, I am not sure if it’s for JICA or for perhaps other parts of ODA structure in Japan, but that you explore how you can put more money through the government budgetary process at the same time that you engage in some targeted building of Afghan capacity to help them make better use of the funds that go through their budgetary process. Certainly that’s one of the top priorities of the Afghan government, and they mention it at every meeting.

Now so many different questions I should say something about, I guess again, about the neo-Taliban. Let me say something about, let me just mention something, another point about this. First, this Taliban is not just an Afghan phenomenon. It is a joint Pakistani and Afghan phenomenon. The Taliban or Taliban-like movements actually are in effective control of a number of the tribal agencies in Pakistan. In a way, they have more territorial control in Pakistan than they do in Afghanistan.
Now this is the result of a number of processes. Actually, it’s partly a result of the transformation of the political economy of those regions as a result of the changes of the last few decades. Previously, those areas were relatively self-governing and autonomous through their tribal structures, and those tribal structures were also the main structures of economic production and activity because the main resources land, animals, water and so on were owned through those tribal structures.

What happened in the last several decades is there has been as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and the wars based in Pakistan, a huge influx of cash into that area, which has commercialized the economy. You’ve had very large migrations of people who are uprooted from their land as refugees, you know, who have moved into refugee camps or into cities, in any case a kind of forced urbanization. You also have money that was directed very much into Islamist channels in order to serve Pakistan’s national interests rather than through the tribal elders. So that what you have had is a process which has occurred typically throughout the world in the last several centuries, that is, the increased penetration by markets and by states dispensing cash into societies where economic activity was more dependent on kinship. Now the result is that the tribal structures can no longer govern the economic activities in those areas, which consist of drug trafficking, remittances and other types of commercial licit or illicit activity.

And actually, these new religious movements that you see, which are not just movements, but actually forms of authority, are new methods of governance of these new forms of economic and social activity. In other words, it’s what Mark Duffield, the British scholar, calls “actually existing development,” that is, it’s not the development that we believe is normative and are trying to promote, but it’s the development that is actually taking place. We can see in the community level in Afghanistan, for instance, there is a whole structure of governance which is now emerging around mosques in some areas in order to govern the new flows of resources that are coming in from opium. And these structures of governance that are being organized around the flows of opium are competing with other structures of governance which are formerly sponsored by the government and international community, and that are organized around those aid flows.

Now, this is related to what Professor Hirashima said about sustainability because the people there actually consider the governance structures organized around the opium income as more sustainable than those government structures that are organized around the aid income because they don’t understand what the criterion is for giving out the aid and they have no control over it, whereas they do have some control over the resources that are coming in from opium. Now I do not have an immediate policy recommendation based on this, but we will just say that, I think it does point again to something we have come back to several times, the fundamental importance of the structures of economic interaction which require new forms of authority as well.

And some things that appear to be traditional reactionary, like I believe it was Professor Fukamachi who referred to religious fascism, actually, this development of political autonomy by the clergy and by Islamic movements is the result of the destruction of the tribal structures by the penetration of the society by both funds for covert action and also this kind of illicit international market economy that is developing there.
Now a new policy that we are now working on is to work with people in Pakistan and in Afghanistan to try gradually to invest in infrastructure for licit economic activity in the border regions between the 2 countries. In the recent supplemental authorization for Afghanistan and Iraq, the Administration, I think following up on some recommendations that had been made by others for several years, has allocated $750 million over 5 years for assistance to Pakistan to develop those tribal agencies to invest in their infrastructure and so on, education, health, transport, electricity and so on. On the Afghan side, they are also trying to start some special development zones and industrial parks et cetera, along the border. I don’t know if these things will work. They are somewhat artificial. But basically, a lot of the political activity that we see and which appears threatening to us is, really it consists of people’s survival strategies for coping with very new challenges.

Finally, on this questions of sustainability, that also has to be considered in a different light because there is this basic fact that I am aware of particularly as someone who was in New York City on September 11, 2001. I was, in fact, New York University is in Lower Manhattan, rather close to the World Trade Center, which is that, in a sense, Afghanistan is not such a distant foreign policy issue as it used to be, and because we really were attacked from a group that was in Afghanistan, the international presence in Afghanistan may be more sustainable than international presence in those areas was before, because it’s not just that kind of distant foreign policy interest.

Now at the moment the people in the region are still treating it as something that is transitory, and certainly everyone, Pakistan, Iran, all the neighboring countries and Afghans themselves is making decisions on the assumption that eventually it will go away. But because of this new security problem, I don’t know if it will go away. Now I don’t think the people in that area will tolerate that kind of international presence indefinitely, but at the same time, because of the immediacy of the threat that could come from there, in particular from al-Qaida or al-Qaida-like organizations, it is not that easy simply for the United States or its allies to abandon the area. So I have a feeling it might not be a very pretty process, but we are going to have to develop ways to regulate this higher level of interaction which is generated by the higher level of threat.

Prof. Hirashima: Thank you very much. Are there any remarks from the three panelists in the floor to what Dr. Rubin has answered to some of the key questions?

Now as being a timekeeper, I guess I did my duty. The grand objective of inviting Dr. Rubin as a scholar has been to extract wisdom and insights he has had, not only on Afghanistan and neighboring states, but also on the U.S. policies. I am grateful to his participation, as well as the comments and questions raised by the distinguished panelists and guests from the floor. I think we could achieve the objective, and it was a quite intelligent, analytical, and insightful lecture which cannot be obtained unless one has been involved in the issues for such a long time.

Given that the international presence in Afghanistan may be necessary at the moment, but my personal feeling is that a single country should not dominate in the presence. United Nations system is fragile and weak. Even UN system itself has to be reformed to be able to perform its
duty more effectively.

Presence of Afghanistan, the first mission for the international communities is to stimulate the identity formation process among Afghanistan people. If the international community is represented by a few countries who have been active in the region in the historical context, it would be counterproductive.

Now having said that, there are a lot of potentialities and a lot of opportunities for us to assist the integrated development of Afghanistan, and this should be centering around the initiative and ownership of the Afghan people. We should not underestimate their capabilities. The underdeveloped states are due to the historical product, and due to the product of the interplay in the international context. So they are the victim in one way or the other. So having recognized that, I think Afghanistan itself poses a lot of challenges for us and there are a lot of rooms for us too to change our perceptions. Instead of pursuing egoistic interest, international communities have to be sympathetic to the fate of the people which in many cases was caused historically by the factors beyond their control.

Thank you very much and I would like to again ask you to give a big hand to the keynote speaker, Professor Rubin and next, to the 3 distinguished panelists who have contributed to this seminar a lot.

Chairman: It has been a long 3.5 hours of intense discussion. We have had 84 people participating and we were able to have a very successful seminar. I hope that we can have another opportunity together like this. Thank you.