Appendix 1:
The TICAD Process and Japan

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This essay attempts to give a quick review of the history of the TICAD process. Looking back at the different policies and priorities agreed on at TICAD I through IV, and paying particular attention to the roles played by the Japanese government, the essay will try to shed light on the contributions that the TICAD process has had on African development. It will start with a chronological revisit to the process and, toward the end, offer some of the author’s views on its 20-year-long evolution.

TICAD I (October 1993, Tokyo)

TICAD I was held in 1993 in the midst of the drastically changing international environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. On the African continent, many countries were struggling toward democracy, while at the same time many were experiencing political turmoil and some, civil wars. Western donors, on their part, were generally experiencing waning interest in supporting Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and policy-wise, they were rather frustrated to see many African countries remaining stuck with slow improvement of macro-economic performance and poor governance. In the meantime, Japan, in 1989, had become the world’s top donor in regard to development assistance, overtaking the US, and its bilateral aid to Africa had been increasing rapidly since the late 1980s, including co-financing with the World Bank and IMF through Structural Adjustment Lending and Non-Project Grants supporting balance of payments aligning with structure adjustments.

Thus, TICAD I was held in an international environment where, on the one hand, there was a mounting sense, among African leaders, of the “Marginalization” of Africa in international politics, as well as that of discontentment vis-à-vis the Breton-Woods institutions and the Western donors; on the other hand, there was a mounting expectation toward
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Japan as an emerging, though a little unfamiliar, development partner. In 1993, as a multilateral forum, the conference was organized jointly by Japan, the UN, the UNDP and the GCA, and was participated in by 48 African countries (5 of which were represented by their heads of state), 8 international organizations, 12 bilateral donor countries and the EC.

The first TICAD conference came up with a message that, as I see it, mixed the dominant policy orientation in the international aid community at the time and Japan’s aid philosophy. The primary interests of the international community in the early 1990s were, on the economic front, economic reform toward a market economy and dealing with the debt crisis still lingering from the 1980s; and on the political/administrative front, the priority was democratization and administrative and financial reforms that the Good Governance principle demanded. These agendas inevitably echoed strongly in the Tokyo Declaration of TICAD I, but the document also incorporated policies and philosophies upheld by the Japanese Government, such as self-help efforts, south-south cooperation and sharing Asian experiences for African development (Horiuchi 2006:28).

In retrospect, it seems that the Japanese aid policy for Africa at the time of TICAD I was rather broad and not as clear as those that would be expressed later at TICAD IV. The commitment of the Japanese Government was also rather limited at TICAD I. It was later in TICAD II and thereafter that Japanese policy orientation took concrete forms and were translated into action programs. Despite these limitations, TICAD I, and Japan’s determination for African development that it represented, enhanced the expectations of African leaders for Japan; it was against this backdrop that the holding of TICAD II was announced in April 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 24).

TICAD II (October 1998, Tokyo)

Following the success of TICAD I, the Japanese government embarked on efforts toward taking the lead in agenda setting in African development and, more generally, in international development. The most notable result was the adoption of the Shaping the 21st Century, The

1. Global Coalition for Africa, a group of experts and intellectuals on political and economic issues regarding Africa
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Contribution of Development Cooperation, adopted at the DAC High Level Meeting held in May 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 25), which was more broadly known as “DAC New Development Strategy”.

The DAC New Development Strategy was different from the then-dominant development paradigms that called primarily for Structural Adjustment and Good Governance. While these policies largely aimed at institutional and regulatory reforms, the DAC New Development Strategy urged that governments and partners focus on the results to be achieved through development, highlighting the importance of self-help efforts and clarifying the complementary role of development aid. It also introduced numerical targets – an expression of the results-focused orientation – on such domains as poverty reduction, social development (education, health), and environmental conservation and sustainable development.

These principles upheld in the DAC New Development Strategy were incorporated in the Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II (Horiuchi 2004: 25); education, health and poverty reduction were identified as the key challenges. In addition, eight numerical targets and 370 development projects, mostly reflecting the targets, were presented.

Also, it was at TICAD II that the TICAD framework as we know it today started to be shaped and formalized; the principle of “support for self-help efforts” was adopted as the basic principle of TICAD to be called “Ownership and Partnership” (Horiuchi 2006: 30); and other characteristics of TICAD emerged, such as the emphasis on poverty reduction and social development, a results-oriented approach accompanying numerical targets, and support for South-South Cooperation.

This TICAD framework constituted a pioneering initiative in international efforts toward the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy by the IMF and the World Bank (1999), MDGs by the United Nations (2000) and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development,

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2. The Japanese government announced the provision of grant aid of about 90 billion yen over the subsequent five years in the fields of education, health and water supply.

3. UNDP reviewed the progress of the implementation of Tokyo Agenda for Action (UNDP 2003).
TICAD II also served as a platform to strengthen various then-existing international development-related initiatives. For example, the Tokyo Declaration and Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II incorporated the HIPC Initiative (Lyon Summit in 1996) and other decisions made before TICAD II about external debt issues. Subsequently, the expanded HIPC Initiative (Cologne Summit in 1999) was agreed on based on ownership and partnership principles and emphasis on poverty reduction and social development. The World Bank became a co-organizer of TICAD in 2001.

**TICAD III (September 2003, Tokyo)**

The most important topic of TICAD III was to support NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), which was presented to the international community at the TICAD ministerial-level meeting (December 2001, Tokyo). NEPAD was consistent with the basic principles of TICAD in that it emphasized ownership by African countries of their development process (Horiuchi 2006: 34). TICAD III agreed to mobilize the support of the international community and expand the partnership in its support. Concrete actions for supporting NEPAD were subsequently developed reflecting TICAD III outcomes; including Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) and One Stop Border Post (OSBP) initiatives highlighted in the TICAD IV Action Plan, and the African Infrastructure Development Program (PIDA) formulated jointly by the African Development Bank, African Union Commission and the NEPAD Agency, adopted at the African Union Summit in 2012.

The Summary by the Chair of TICAD III confirmed the three pillars of African development, consisting of (1) people-centered development, (2) poverty reduction through economic growth, and (3) consolidation of peace. Highlighting “poverty reduction through economic growth” as the second pillar, this summary could arguably be understood as reflecting the position of the Japanese Government: in order to reduce poverty, economic growth must first of all be promoted – a position not

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4. For details, see, for example, the Institute of International Affairs (2003)
5. Please see Chapter 8 of this volume.
necessarily identical with either the market-oriented approach promoted by the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustments, or with the position of the United Nations that was calling for a mobilization of a massive amount of development assistance funds to achieve MDGs by 2015.

Following this, this economic growth agenda became the central issue in the subsequent TICAD process, coinciding with the economic growth of Africa that had started in the early 2000s led by exports of energy and mineral resources. In TICAD IV, “Boosting economic growth” was made the first priority. And toward TICAD V, discussions are underway to move the agenda more in the direction of further acceleration of growth, as summarized by Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Kishida in the TICAD V Ministerial Preparatory Meeting in March 2013.

**TICAD IV (May 2008, Yokohama)**

TICAD IV was held in 2008. A total of 51 (out of 53) African countries participated in the conference, with 41 of them represented by heads of state or government. The conference positioned the issue of boosting economic growth as the first pillar, and came up with the outcome documents titled the Yokohama Declaration and Yokohama Action Plan, which clearly stated the commitments of the participants. Japan, for its part, announced that it would double its ODA to Africa and provide up to $4 billion of new ODA loans over the following five years to support the continent’s economic growth, despite its difficult fiscal position.

Another noteworthy development was the introduction of the follow-up mechanism for monitoring TICAD IV commitments and the Yokohama Action Plan; since 2009, follow-up ministerial meetings have been held every year to monitor the progress of these commitments. TICAD Progress Reports are compiled and reported to the ministerial meetings.

The TICAD IV Yokohama Declaration emphasized the importance of economic growth even more strongly than ever, putting it before other pillars, i.e., those related to MDGs, environmental issues and climate change, and consolidation of peace and good governance. The prioritization of economic growth in TICAD IV represented a remarkable shift from the traditional emphasis on social and human
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development since TICAD I and toward the development of infrastructure, trade and investment, and partnership with the private sector.

However, prior to TICAD IV, Japan was constrained in mobilizing its financial resources for supporting economic growth in Africa, due primarily to the debt accumulation problem in Africa. This constraint was relieved by the final settlement of long-standing debt problems agreed on at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, prompting the Japanese government to announce its ODA Loan support package for Africa through co-financing with the African Development Bank (EPSA). In TICAD IV, Japan pledged new ODA loans of up to $4 billion over five years focused on cross-border infrastructure projects in transportation and the power sector to promote regional integration in Africa. This pledge of “Doubling ODA to Africa” under the difficult fiscal situation in Japan was initiated by the strong political leadership of the Fukuda administration at the time, by switching the main destination of the ODA budget, which had been largely directed to other regions.

This also marked a major turning point in Japanese assistance to Africa, which had been virtually limited to assistance in social and human development mainly through grant aid and Technical Cooperation. The size of the pledged ODA loans ($4 billion over five years) may not look significant enough when compared with the vast financing gap in infrastructure investment reported to amount to $48 billion a year (World Bank 2008), but it could play an important role in complementing other financial resources, for example, through co-financing operations with the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

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6. EPSA stands for Expanded Private Sector Assistance for Africa. It aims at the provision of ODA loans of $1 billion over 5 years from 2005 through co-financing with the African Development Bank.
7. This does not mean that social and human development is no longer emphasized in the TICAD IV commitments of Japan; in parallel to infrastructure development, the Japanese contribution to the achievement of MDGs has also been strengthened through grant aid and Technical Cooperation as part of the commitment.
Contributions of TICAD to African Development
So far, we have looked at the development of directions and priorities at respective TICAD meetings, summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Priorities in the outcome documents in TICAD I to IV

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<td>Priorities</td>
<td>(1) Political and economic reforms (2) Economic development through activities of the private sector (3) Regional cooperation and regional integration (4) Emergency relief and development (5) Asian experience and African development</td>
<td>(1) Social development and poverty reduction: Promoting human development (2) Economic development: Promoting the private sector (3) Basic foundations for development</td>
<td>(1) People-centered development (2) Poverty reduction through economic growth (3) Consolidation of peace</td>
<td>(1) Boosting economic growth (2) Achieving MDGs (3) Consolidation of peace and good governance (4) Addressing environmental issues and climate change</td>
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(Prepared by the author based on information of JICA et al. (2007 and 2013) and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

We now have a look to see what contributions the whole process has made to African development.

To recapitulate, the following are some of the past major achievements of the TICAD process:

➢ Respect of the ownership of development through the formulation of the “ownership and partnership” principle at TICAD II.
➢ Facilitation of development initiatives through African ownership exemplified in such initiatives as NEPAD, agreed on at TICAD III.
➢ Emphasis on poverty reduction through economic growth as a pillar of the African development agenda at TICAD III, and the
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introduction of a growth-oriented development strategy at TICAD IV.
➢ Development of action plans based on numerical targets and outcome goals as well as the establishment of a follow-up mechanism in TICAD IV.
➢ Promotion of south-south and especially Asia-Africa cooperation since TICAD I.

The TICAD process also provided opportunities for the sharing of the development and growth experience between Asia and Africa, an agenda highlighted from TICAD I. The ideas drawn from Asian development experiences, like the role of the governments, growth-oriented development strategies, emphasizing the importance of infrastructure, and strengthening of ownership, added some values to the development strategies in Africa, which had traditionally been led by Washington Consensus-based thinking since the 1990s (Horiuchi 2006: 30, and JICA et al. 2013).

TICAD is different from other fora on African development in its character as a global, open, and multilateral forum. While the EU, China, Korea, India and Turkey, and others have held similar-looking summits or ministerial-level meetings with AU and African governments, these meetings are held with the aim of strengthening bilateral partnerships between the host government or institution and Africa. Unlike these, TICAD is a summit-level meeting on African Development between African governments and TICAD co-organizers, i.e., the Government of Japan, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank and the African Union Commission. TICAD has a unique character as a forum open to international institutions, civil societies, the private sector, and academics to discuss and reach consensus on the African development agenda and action plan for the next 5 years, not limited to a bilateral partnership and commitment between Japan and Africa.

As an open forum, the TICAD process has attracted the attention and participation of NGOs and the private sector. For example, the Japanese civil society, with the establishment of the Africa Japan Forum (AJF) in 1994, has been playing an important role in the TICAD process; their contributions included participating in the TICAD meetings, organizing side events and consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign

8. For more detailed discussion on south-south cooperation, see Chapter 13 of this volume.
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Affairs, presenting policy recommendations to TICAD meetings, communication with the public on Africa, networking with African civil societies (TCSF 2008). The private sector was also an important partner: the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) also holds consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presents proposals to the Government of Japan on the TICAD process and public-private partnership in Africa (Keidanren 2013).

With the changing environment surrounding Africa and the whole world, the challenge for the future TICAD process could be how it can continue to further promote debates and garner resources for African development, both in public and private sectors, while strengthening its unique character as a global and open forum, and building on the rich experience and assets it has created over the last 20 years.

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds meetings with the civil society and the private sector for TICAD V (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ticad/index.html)
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