Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Policies for Harmonious Development

Ethnic Patriotism and Markets in African History

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No. 20
September 2010
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Abstract

African economic and social history since 1800 suggests that the relationships between ethnic consciousness and market transaction is very varied and largely unpredictable. The early twentieth century was a period of important change. Before 1900 labour was scarce and land abundant: inter-ethnic relations were relatively flexible, thanks to a general demand for mobile labour supplies. By 1960 population growth meant that property had become more valuable than labour: inter-ethnic relations became harder, thanks also to the way in which the colonial imposition of state structures had tended to institutionalise ethnic groups as units of political competition.

Against this broad periodisation of social, economic, and political change, this chapter's case studies illustrate widely differing contexts and processes across African time and space. Much has depended on economic geography and on highly contingent historical circumstances, as also on the nature of the commodity traded in Africa's markets, whether labour (slave or free, skilled or unskilled), foodstuffs, cash crops, property, and political influence.

While analysis of ethno-market relations in Africa has generally focused on 'horizontal' inequalities between ethno-regional groups, this chapter places equal, if not more, emphasis on changing 'vertical' social inequalities between persons or categories (gender, generation, class) within ethnic groups as a source of social unrest and political pressure. Internal, intra-ethnic tension over the 'moral economy' between the strong and the weak, rich and poor, can provoke a crisis of 'moral ethnicity', a sense of loss of moral community. This may provoke a crisis of 'political tribalism', as internal tension is dissipated in external competition. The contrast between the relative degree of internal tension within the Kikuyu and Luo peoples of Kenya provides an instructive case study of these possible connections between internal and external ethnic patriotisms.

The chapter ends by proposing that Africa's history suggests that economists must look for more flexible, more agent-based, more class-conscious, models of possible ethnic relations with market economy than those that are currently relied upon.

Keywords: Moral economy, Moral Ethnicity, Patriotism, Political Tribalism.

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I am grateful for comments made at the first JICA-RI conference at the University of Kobe, especially from Henry Oyugi, Frances Stewart and Bruce Berman—and from other colleagues: David Anderson, Phil Bonner, Carola Lentz, Enocent Msindo and Richard Waller. Hino Hiroyuki and two anonymous colleagues in the JICA-RI group made valuable comments on an earlier draft. None bears any responsibility for my conclusions.
1. Introduction: The contingencies of history

My aim is to caution against reliance on ‘laws’ that claim to relate ethnicity and markets. I offer instead complexity, contingency, and context, for three reasons. The first is that I am an historian, neither an economist nor political scientist. Secondly, ethnicity resists precise definition or fixed identity. Our ethnicities are sets of segmentary possibilities, not bounded unities; since we have many possible identities our ethnicity will take different shapes, dependent on context. Horizontal inequality between regions can cause inter-ethnic conflict. Changing vertical inequalities between people of the same ethnicity can cause internal friction. Internal stress may foster external aggression. To rely, then, on an Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation index that measures neither the fluidity of ethnic belonging nor tension between its internal and external dimensions but, to the contrary, was compiled according to rigid Soviet nationality theory on data fixed in 1964, seems a risky enterprise. And a final reason for caution is that markets, too, differ in their social impact, depending on what is traded and how it is produced, whether human capital, agricultural or pastoral produce, artisanal manufacture, labour-power and so on, all of which possess values that vary from culture to culture and can be differently politicised from time to time.

My first reason for caution, then, is simply disciplinary. Most historians today are allergic to explanatory laws, regularities, and models. Economists devise models and then ‘shock’ them. Historians expect historical processes to deliver shocks as a matter of course; shocks make history interesting. While history may seem to show us similarities, analogies, and to teach lessons, and while historians use periodisation—to imagine a medieval or a post-Enlightenment era, etc—in order to identify relevant similarities or significant differences, history itself has no mathematical regularities; it never repeats itself in other than very broad brush-strokes, principally because the contexts in which people seek security or opportunity always change. History, as Bethwell Ogot, doyen of Kenya’s historians, has often said, is a
discipline of contexts, and all contexts differ.\(^1\) The African past is many foreign countries, where they did things differently in more ways than one.\(^2\)

The fate of the two schools of historiography which tried most ambitiously to devise causal models, the Marxist school and its antithesis, *Annales*, has been a salutary tale. Marxists, basing themselves on the concept of contradiction between successive modes of production (e.g., pre-capitalist and capitalist) and their social relations (feudal, bourgeois, etc), aimed to show that history moved according to a dialectic between them which, through struggle between dominant and subordinate classes, would lead first to the dictatorship of the proletariat and then, finally, the withering away of the state on a global scale. History has proved resistant to such prophecy. Of the attempts made to ‘correct’ Marxist teleology the most persuasive has been the most contradictory; by appealing to Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’ scholars have sought to rescue materialist history in the realm of ideas.

The French *Annales* school, by contrast, was largely anti-Marxist in origin. It emphasised not history’s dynamics but its continuities, thanks to friction between different layers of time. At bottom, it was argued, is the almost immobile history of economic geography, then at a middle level of causation the *longue durée* of slowly changing *mentalités* (e.g., from an age of faith to one of reason) and, finally, on the surface of history, the mere froth of the ‘events’ in which people think they exercise rational choice but are in fact trapped by the time-lags beneath them. There was much of value in such an approach but it did not explain the revolutionary changes in modern history. The *Annales* school was in consequence, primarily, a school of medieval and early modern—not modern, post-1750—European history.

A third grand theory, the political scientists’ concept of ‘modernisation’, a heretical Marxism without class conflict, in which small-scale loyalties inevitably give way to larger, national, ones, has found its burial ground in modern Africa.

Many historians have rected to these disappointments in determinism by taking up ‘history from below’, but an interest in the lives of the unregarded people of the past has
tended to place still more emphasis on difference and detail rather than structure and strategy. I myself take what I think is useful from the two opposed schools of history, while also exploring ethnic history ‘from below’—a once-deplorable eclecticism. From *Annales* I shall adapt the concept of the *longue durée* to discuss the changing relations between demography, state power, markets and ethnic *mentalités*, especially during the twentieth-century colonial conjuncture. From my earlier Marxism I still think class formation to be an historical force but, in another heresy, believe it has causal significance only within specific socio-political cultures. It is their culture that teaches people the value of their labour power in Marxist terms or, more simply, their human dignity. It is the loss, or threatened loss, of that dignity (or the alienation of one’s labour) that provokes collective self-defence. Marxists thought ethnicity to be a ‘false consciousness’, in the belief that culture was not a relation of production. In fact ethnicity is a powerful ‘language of class’, since cultures are shaped by ‘moral economies’—all those presumed social entitlements and obligations that shape one’s rational choices, in pursuit not only of material gain but also security and trust, honour and reputation.3

To sum up my disciplinary approach, I visualise three layers of causal context, neither entirely Marxist nor wholly *annaliste*. At bottom, almost immobile until the twentieth century, is Africa’s demography. This formerly put a high price on scarce labour and a correspondingly low price on abundant land. At a middle, more variable, level one can place frameworks of power, in which pre-colonial African kingdoms, colonial conquest-states and post-colonial nation-builders have repeatedly altered patterns of social (vertical) and regional (horizontal) inequality and, with them, ethnic *mentalités* or discursive traditions; and finally, on the surface of history, one can observe, within the moral expectations of those traditions, the strategic arguments whereby people seek to advance self-mastery, clientelist equity or neighbourly trust—subject always to the law of unintended consequences, the only law most historians will accept. To conclude, historians are therefore instinctively Keynesian insofar as we assume that what he called ‘animal spirits’ always influence allegedly impersonal markets—an agent-based
model, resistant to prediction. In a multi-disciplinary project such as JICA-RI’s, I see myself as a piece of shocking historical grit in the economists’ model oyster. For historians the algebraic value of ‘x’ or ‘y’ must always be ‘?’ or ‘??’. But this may be a pearl of great price to economic modellers.

Secondly, to get closer to our subject matter, *ethnicity* is difficult to define. Indeed it resists definition, like ‘the joker in a card-game’,\(^4\) since it is a relational concept of social belonging whose internal and external social relations respond to changing historical contexts. Moreover, belonging has many layers. Which layer of identity—gender, age, class, occupation, region, nationality, continent, ‘race’—is uppermost in one’s ethnic imagination at any time will vary; the degree to which people are conscious of their ethnicity varies, too. Ethnicity is a universal attribute, even among cosmopolitan academics. It animates the many tongues on city streets; it shapes the unspoken understandings of a hunter band in the African savannah. It makes us human, each in our culturally peculiar way. It tells us who or what is normal or unnatural, inherently trustworthy or potentially dangerous. For the most part we—Africans too—live our ethnicities unconsciously, in conformity to local norms of social intercourse. Recognition of mutual difference can be productive in a co-operative enterprise, on board of directors or in government, and destructive, when zero-sum assumptions rule competitions for scarce resources, whether social, political, or material. Like nationhood, ethnic consciousness is Janus-faced. It is often an inclusive, social construct in the cause of civility or business enterprise. It can also instil a fiercely exclusive sense of belonging, like that of a religious cult, defying all arguments for other arguably more rational constructs of self-interest and social trust. Ethnicity can also be variously imagined and institutionalised—and dissolved—over time and context.

Analysts of ethnicity are commonly divided into three schools, primordial, instrumental, and constructivist. *Primordialists* attach importance to separate origins, to supposedly unchanging ‘custom’, to bounded distinctiveness over time, not least in language,
an essentialist approach once given intellectual muscle by functionalist anthropology. *Instrumentalists* focus on ethnic groups as competitive teams, and see them as teams in part created by that competition—recruited by elite strategists for whom an appeal to fictive kinship is the most efficient means to create supportive interest groups. Marxists used to argue, for instance, that African bourgeoisies (like white rulers or capitalists before them) manipulated ethnic division to break up the hostile solidarities of workers or peasants. However, in ‘subaltern instrumentalities’, the poor can also press their claims for generous patronage on their powerful, literate, elite ‘kin’.\(^5\) *Constructivists*, the most recent school of analysts, observe that ethnic groups change in consciousness and composition, and in the inclusive or exclusive character of their boundary-maintenance, thanks less to deliberate strategy than to social processes that generate norms of moral economy, to which elites must respond.

Our analytical difficulty or, better, opportunity, lies in the fact that all three approaches are more convincing when used in combination rather than as alternatives. Ethnic groups acquire internal cohesion and a sense of distinctiveness from—but not inevitably opposed to—‘others’, not so much in response to individual actors’ wills as by a quantum of countless acts of ideological negotiation, innovation, and rejection in which the symbolic and moral markers of a discursive tradition change, generally slowly, over time.\(^6\) Such socially constructed cohesion is available—on conditions—for instrumental use by social, political, or economic entrepreneurs. And the most persuasive image of solidarity that an entrepreneur can invoke is that ‘we’ are all brothers and sisters (and always have been), despite our social inequalities and personal rivalries. This readiness to be grouped into rival teams of common ‘blood’ appears to be a truly primordial human condition, against the complex grain of history—one recalls Renan’s advice that nations forget their history or get it wrong—and often against the apparent self-interest of team members, especially when invited to become cannon-fodder. And yet, crucially—something not adequately considered by any interpretive school—as complex
societies ethnic groups are also moral communities, with a potential for internal dissent, for resistance to instrumental exploitation, for re-examination of moral economy.

Clearly, all these observations could as well be made of nations. What makes a ‘nation’ legitimately sovereign, and an ethnic group a problematic ‘sub-nation’ is a matter of historical accident. The JICA project must question how far ethnicity is inherently an obstacle to market-based ‘development’ or, to the contrary, how far certain modes of nation-building or trajectories of development have, contingently, made it so. Since humanity is naturally competitive, in what circumstances, for which purposes, and under what rules of the game, does the cry of ethnicity become more powerful than the appeal of other identities, of gender, age, religion, ideology, social class or ‘nation’? And why should that particular loyalty be deemed to be more economically destructive than others?

It was partly to suggest the historical plausibility of multiple identities for Africans (like anybody else) that scholars preferred the term ethnicity to tribalism. ‘Tribe’ not only suggests backwardness, a primordial pathology closed to change or to plurality of personal identity; it also, equally misleadingly, suggests one ethnic situation only: in which a small group of men supposedly descended from one ancestral core and obedient to a common traditional culture, are instinctively hostile to tribal ‘others’, but from whose daughters they may choose their wives. In the past there may have been a few such groups in isolated regions, and some may still exist, but even that possible context is too simple, for such ‘tribes’ will be frontier fragments of larger language- or culture-groups, or composites of several such pioneer fragments for whom common descent is a convenient myth. Such simple ‘tribes’ are already a mask for complexity and represent but one end of a spectrum of African ethnicity, using frontier distance and fluidity to protect them from some regional power threatening to enslave them.7 At the other end of the spectrum stand the three major language groups of Nigeria, Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, each claiming around 30 million people—people who cannot possibly know each other, who have overlapping identities that have nothing to do with
ethnicity and who are therefore as much an ‘imagined community’ as any sovereign nation—what they often call themselves. Yet within the still larger composite nation of Nigeria they can be called ‘tribes’. This segmentary opposition between nation and tribe can cascade down from level to level, so that within the Yoruba or Igbo nations, for instance, many smaller ‘tribes’ cluster round their respective cosmopolitan, commercial, hometowns. To repeat, ethnicity resists definition except as a sliding scale.

Finally, to conclude my introduction, markets are as much social and political as economic institutions. As one West African said to a researcher half a century ago: ‘[W]hen I get [to the market place] I look for three persons: my girl friend, my debtor, and my enemy. . . And when I go to the market and do not see them all, the market is not good.’ On this admittedly slender evidence markets are as varied as ethnicity in their effects on the human sense of belonging. As my case studies will show, they can encourage both inter-ethnic cooperation and competition. The public good of market trust can be created either by ethnic diaspora spread along trade-routes or by ethnic protection of producer interest. Human capital is often best be built within an ethnic community, in accumulating agricultural skill through time or in mobilising donations towards the next generation’s school fees—but ethnic continuity itself will often be facilitated by he inter-ethnic exchange of marriageable women. Markets in foods, tools, weapons, and clothing seem to have flourished best in multi-ethnic contexts. Labour markets, slave or free, are more variable in their implications. As my case-studies show, they can argue for inclusive, porous, ethnic identities in one era and foster exclusive ethnic chauvinisms in another. The same applies to markets in property and power.

Markets may transform social relations, whether vertically, between rich and poor or old and young within any given society, or horizontally, between groups that see themselves as ethnically distinct. Analyses of how inter-ethnic relations affect economic development focus on horizontal inequalities. I attach at least as much importance to the effects of changing
vertical inequalities on the internal ethnic patriotisms that are, arguably, Africa’s main indigenous source of political thought.9

It would be possible to sum up my sceptical historian’s approach with a series of dichotomies and contingencies that portray ethnic groups as seemingly primordial small groups of presumed common ancestry and/or as nations of many millions, of multi-ethnic origin; as inclusive organisations for the spread of public, commercial, trust through inter-state diaspora and/or the embodiment of exclusive regional competition for power within a nation state; as bureaucratic categories of population, language and civil law for the convenience of tax-collectors, biblical translators, employers, and magistrates and/or historically-imagined moral communities, cradles of self-discipline and social responsibility within which to argue the rights of the poor, metaphorically kin to the rich; as mutual aid societies for security, survival, and improvement among new townspeople and/or warlord-led magendo mafias for smuggling arms, drugs, diamonds, or other contraband over un-policed frontiers; as constituencies for competitive democratic elections and/or vote-banks intimidated by autocratic bosses with vigilante ‘youth wings’ at their heel.

One could for ever extend these complications—but one might also, still more subversively, suggest that ethnic diversity is only one, dependent, variable in Africa’s disappointing economic history. Others are of arguably greater significance: The eroded soils of an old continent, limited supplies of minerals and energy (until modern times), few navigable rivers, tropical diseases unchecked by annual winters, volatile climate, and a demographically-driven political weakness, vulnerable to adverse terms of external trade.10 But, looking at ethnicity and markets alone, and despite my instinctive cautions, it is just possible that Africa’s changing history in the last two centuries may offer some explanatory thread through the ethnic labyrinth. How far this history offers guidance for future policy is, naturally, debatable.
2. Moral ethnicity and political tribalism: patriotism in the longue durée

My thread through the ethnic maze uses data from 1800 to around 1975, the period of African history I think I understand. In ‘my’ nearly two centuries there has been at least one fundamental change of context in the relations between ethnicity and markets, what *annalistes* call a ‘conjuncture’, when different layers of time change together: demography, structures of power, *mentalités*, strategic thought.11

This conjuncture occurred in the short century of colonial rule from c.1885 to c.1965, and a decade or more longer in southern Africa. I say ‘occurred in’ since the imposition of colonial state structures was not the only change that obliged Africans to reconsider their ethnically constitutive moral economies and their strategic politics. Colonial rule was certainly of profound importance. Of arguably equal importance, however, were peace, accelerating population growth after 1920, the rising value of agricultural land, new forms of urbanization and labour, and the advent, outside the world of African Islam, of (largely Christian) literacy. All these changes together raised awareness of ethnic difference, hardened ethnic boundaries, and increased inter-ethnic competition, while also making ethnic publics more critically aware of their internal moral economies. If one had to choose one conjunctural cause only it could well be the reversal in factor values as labour fell and land increased in price. Markets may have had as adverse effect on ethnic competition as ethnic diversity has had (if it has had) on markets.

To take these changes in turn: Peace affected strategies of boundary maintenance in ways that need more research. In previous centuries local ‘big men’, chiefs and kings had exercised some control over the terms under which dependent strangers were assimilated, whether as enslaved prisoners of war, nubile women, famine-stricken pawns, or ambitious clients. The colonial pax, however, freed (or forced) large numbers of virile young men to cross boundaries in search of the means to marry or pay tax. These could be disturbingly less subservient to local norms and hierarchies. By the mid-twentieth century population growth,
next, had in any case led to a decreasing willingness to absorb such incomers. Not only was their labour less needed but agrarian capitalism placed a new premium on ownership of land, to defend it against the claims of juniors or ‘strangers’. In the nineteenth century Africans had traded, above all, in scarce people, in their skills and reputation, in ‘free’ markets disputed by rival big-man patrons or under the control of slave-catching royal armies. Wealth had lain in people: Kin or client, collaborator or captive. As labour supply began to exceed demand it was more profitable to manipulate the opportunities in employment and property derived from access to the state. In this increasingly politicised context the loss of labour power from rural households to alien towns added one more context in which belonging had to be re-thought, not least by men made anxious by the new freedoms available to unruly women.

Finally, if ethnicity is, among other things, a community of normative thought, then literacy extended the number of people whose thoughts counted and the range of comparisons they could draw with other peoples and periods (not least the biblical children of Israel), while examining their own situation. There was probably an increasing exchange of ideas within each local realm of the word, now demarcated in a standardised print vernacular by African and missionary intellectual labour. Europeans might enter but could never control these intimate societal conversations. Alien rule, however, did undoubtedly help to shape Africans’ discursive arenas.

All power tends to divide. Power is a scarce good. It exists by denying power to others; it is dangerous. But it works by offering opportunity, sharing authority and privilege with allies or agents. Others are excluded. Colonial power was even more divisive than other forms of rule. Europeans sought legitimacy in African eyes by treating ‘tribes’ as nations, by practising ‘indirect’ rule through chiefs as ‘tribal’ patrons. White employers stereotyped ‘tribal skills’. All this deliberate divisiveness helped to shape ethnic strategies of comparative advantage and to harden ethnic boundaries. But Africans themselves had to re-imagine from below the inner morality and external politics of belonging for the many reasons we have
mentioned, not just the supposed colonial ‘invention’ of ethnicity from above.\textsuperscript{16} Their imaginations could take entirely contrary directions to those of their rulers. To take three examples from colonial Kenya alone: The British distrusted the Kikuyu Central Association mainly because it tried to unite a people the British divided administratively between three districts; the Luyia of western Kenya, comprising over one dozen ‘tribes’, each of multi-ethnic origin, first united to resist the British attempt to subject them to a ruling dynasty and then a feared white-settler land-grab. The Kalenjin group, known to the British as ‘Nandi-speaking peoples’ whose cattle-rustling skills were their earliest, unwelcome, demonstration of ethnic co-operation, came together, periodically, and problematically, initially on the radio in the Second World War—\textit{Kalenjin} meaning ‘I say to you’—and then to gain competitive weight in more recent electoral politics.\textsuperscript{17}

To sum up, and to anticipate terms I will explicate shortly, colonial rule stimulated externally competitive ‘political tribalism’. The most legitimate African claim on governments’ attention was ‘tribal interest’; the chief ‘tribal interest’ lay in the horizontal, regional, inequality of economic growth. Internally argumentative ‘moral ethnicity’ on the other hand, a desire to live well together in the modern world,\textsuperscript{18} was preoccupied with the new vertical inequalities caused by the other conjunctural changes of the short colonial century.

Moreover, Africa’s historians are increasingly aware of pre-colonial (and post-colonial) contexts in which ethnicity was transformed—like other social formations or cultural traditions. It is true that in pre-colonial times, ethnicity was only one social identity among many that included Islamic brotherhoods, African cult followings, commercial partnerships, ‘snowball states’ that subordinated multi-lingual subjects to migrant war-leaders, riverine chains of village associations, kingdoms of conquered subjects of whose diverse origins it was a hate-crime to speak, and perhaps most of all, often ephemeral ‘Houses’ led by ‘big men’ who recruited skills without regard to ethnic origin. Nonetheless, rituals of initiation, harvest, chiefship, and so on provided occasions for enacting societal memory when behavioural norms
or the accountability of power were re-negotiated in theatres of belonging.\textsuperscript{19} The margins of the ethnicities thus dramatised might well be porous but they were still ethnicities; Africans tended to be multi-lingual, proof of flexibility but also of diversity. That remains true to-day; situational identity has outlived both colonial rule and the one-party state. Conflicts of autochthony, wars of ‘who is who’, show the growing perils in belonging,\textsuperscript{20} but they are not the only form of inter-ethnic relation in post-colonial Africa.

It is as much to the historical point that one can, without difficulty but against a common assumption, find cases of ‘hardened’ pre-colonial ethnicity—resentment, solidarity, pride—thanks to divisive dynastic power, commercial understandings, or social disruption, to take just three possible contexts. State-building among the Nguni-speaking peoples of south-eastern Africa in the early nineteenth-century, for instance, created ethnic inequalities between core members of the upstart Zulu kingdom and its peripheries, and resentment of group disadvantage marched north with the Ndebele kingdom that seceded from Zululand.\textsuperscript{21} An example of a possibly more widespread process associated with royal power is provided by the people in northern Uganda who became Acholi; their solidarity was organised by chiefships that resisted full subordination to the kingdom of Bunyoro.\textsuperscript{22} Commercial trust seems to have defined ‘Hausa’, an urban civilisation as much as a ‘people’, who were so named by their trading partners in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{23} As my case study of the Fulani in the nineteenth century will show, such a geographically dispersed people could acquire a conscious, assimilationist, identity. But it was in the disruption of their scattered \textit{diaspora}, in Cuba, Brazil, or Sierra Leone, as slaves or Christian freed slaves, that Yoruba from western Nigeria first imagined themselves as a people in the early nineteenth century: their first communal riot with members of the similar Igbo diaspora was in 1843. African-led Christianity and its project of biblical translation later absorbed the civic values of what became known as ‘Yorubaland’, so that different townspeople ‘became Yoruba’, years before British rule.\textsuperscript{24}
The colonial era, therefore, was one conjuncture among many, if also the most pervasive, in the history of African ethnicity; and ethnicity itself is a continuing process of formation and transformation, expansion and fission. Changing contexts offer new challenges and opportunities to instrumental ethnicity or political tribalism. But moral ethnicity, an ethnic culture’s constitutive values or moral economy, was disciplined by the need for social changes to be accepted within a remembered discursive tradition or mentalité. Any tradition must clearly permit some change if its society is to survive. Two conditions, however, are likely to apply. First, change will need to be negotiated over time, since traditions support incumbent authority and value consensus. Secondly, since upstart ambitions and dissenting opinions have hard cases to argue they can best do so by appealing to some past precedent that suggests other ways of being true to ‘ourselves’. This moral imagination, backed by plausible history, sets limits to ethnic ‘invention’.

The distinction I have made between ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’ may help us analyse the limits of cultural invention and, therefore, some of the relationships between ethnicity and markets. Both forms of group behaviour and thought can be said to be patriotic—which shows both how slippery term ‘patriotism’ can be and how closely interrelated are its internal and external dimensions. On the one hand a patriot is one who asks the critical question ‘Is my country (patrie)—or what I imagine to be my country—well enough governed both to honour the rights that previous generations have won and to earn the wider world’s respect?’ By this definition patriotism is both historically informed and comparatively aware. ‘Moral ethnicity’ suggests to me this introspective, lively, sense of collective responsibility, derived from a ‘searching self-examination’ of the mutual obligations owed between rich and poor, in order that society will deserve well of nature, so ‘healing the land’ and protecting its reproductive potential. While such self-critical patriotism implies an awareness of ‘others’ it has no need to be their enemy. But another common saying attributed to patriots is, to the contrary: ‘My country, right or wrong.’ Such unquestioning loyalty is
characteristic of ‘political tribalism’, an externally focused energy most often mobilised in self-defence when a region or its leaders feel threatened by exclusion from power and its fruits. But it may also be drummed up as a means to placate the angry, frustrated, moral ethnicity of poor clients who feel ignored or exploited by their patrons.

The idea of moral ethnicity has been implicit in the preceding discussion. It is derived from the concept of ‘moral economy’. ‘Moral economies’ place prudential, civilising, limits on market economy; they are those social webs of trust and obligation that sustain social order and the possibility of repeatable, because trustworthy, market transactions, even among people of unequal status. In unequal societies, as all are, moral economy is the often unspoken market in which to negotiate the terms of legitimate authority, of superior knowledge, of marriage, of responsible power, of honourable reputation, praiseworthy service, the reward of labour, and so on. In Africa it has been the critical arena in which the protection, dignity, and opportunity of clients’ loyalty and labour, their capacity to develop their own human capital, is bargained against the profit and power expected by patrons. Patron-client relations are negotiated, shifting, equations that weigh the co-operative creation of wellbeing against its selfish appropriation. They debate relative civic virtue, giving critical life to ethnic identity. Wealthy householders with many wives clearly had the hospitable capacity to manage wider welfare; if they refused such responsibility for clients, they risked a charge of selfish sorcery. In most areas of sub-Saharan Africa poverty attracted little sympathy, being blamed on idleness, too feckless to make one even a worthy client. Moral ethnicity had stern criteria of personal responsibility.

Moral ethnicity, then, provides Africans with a public sphere (if a local one), a materially based language of class, a moral test of accountability, and an alert political eye. It is neither primordially inherited nor politically invented. African ethnicities are ‘states of mind’ as much as ‘actual social organisations’; indeed, arenas of moral argument, especially at times of rapid social and political change such as the colonial conjuncture, when the labour
of even industrious clients became devalued against the profit that accrued to property and access to state power. Moral ethnicity, at bottom, is a mentalité, slow to change, governed by the personal honour due to those with the skills, knowledge and self-disciplined pride needed to meet the reciprocal obligations governed by particular ecologies, of hunting, cultivation, herding, or trade; in savannah, forest, or in the towns that often mediated the commerce between them.  

Indeed in much of pre-colonial Africa one can observe ‘ecological ethnicities’. Botanical identities emerged that valued the knowledge appropriate to changing climatic seasons, pastoral ethnicities honoured stern genealogical disciplines, cavalry cultures raised warrior nobility above peasantry, river-bank language-chains practised a cosmopolitan tolerance, forest-clearing agrarian civilisations celebrated household responsibility and its meritorious sweat. Ethnic cultures celebrated what best represented their productive relationships. In modern times ecological ethnicity was often reinforced by colonial cash-cropping policy, another formative aspect of the colonial conjuncture. Some ethnic groups found themselves becoming cocoa or cotton tribes, coffee, cashew-nut, or groundnut tribes. In the late-colonial period their marketing co-operatives and para-statal exporting monopolies provided ethnicities with market-orientated political strategies.

New skills and ways of earning a living, not related to ecology but also products of the colonial conjuncture, such as Christian literacy, clerical employment, school-teaching or midwifery, all made ethnic belonging still more disputatious; their practitioners had to negotiate their place within the pre-existing ethnic estimate of honour, pitching the questionable weight of new clerical knowledge and experience against the undoubtedly weighty environmental wisdom of elders.

African ethnic groups have never been able to survive on their own. They may often have been small societies. That was why they needed wide networks—of marriage, exchange of commodities or ritual skills, and insurance in case of drought or disease.  

Patriotic
ethnicities—and, perhaps more often, prudent ‘big men’ in the many precolonial societies that lacked an ethnically distinct sense within their wider cultural and linguistic zone of shifting allegiances—had to keep their horizontal relations with ‘others’ in good repair under the surface of periodic friction. Contrary to the self-serving view of their European conquerors, constant ‘tribal war’ was not something from which colonialism had to liberate Africans. In contemporary Africa on the other hand, ethnic discourse is often split between this former, continuing, patriotic desire to preserve relations of trust within an ethnic group as well as with its neighbours and, on the other, the new and often desperate, equally patriotic, need to compete ‘horizontally’, for a share of the national cake, by however unscrupulous means. Such inter-ethnic distrust is driven, above all, by the fear of exclusion from the state power by which a national economy is carved and distributed—and such distributional power was rather rare in pre-colonial times.

This fear is often what drives political tribalism, chauvinist patriotism. The most precious quality of moral ethnicity—as for a nation state—is eternal vigilance. Political tribalism, especially at times of parliamentary elections, seems to demand unquestioning loyalty. It is the only kind of ethnicity that western journalists see in Africa; it is the kind measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index. It maps the political segmentation of the nation-state. Representatives who compete for attention in national politics must not be weakened by disagreements in their ethnic back-yard. Their appeal for ethnic solidarity is premised on the zero-sum assumption that, in horizontal competition, to the extent that one group succeeds the other(s) will fail. Those who dispute the changing currency of internal reciprocity are expected to follow their leader in the external competition of political tribalism. In national electoral contests they are required to line up behind their ‘big man’ political patron, no matter what private criticisms they may have with regard to his behaviour towards internal clients. Without such solidarity, without a reliable vote bank, they cannot expect to ‘eat’ at the high-political table at which the national cake is shared. Such behaviour is the product of a
political system, not inherent in ethnic difference, and tends to be self-fulfilling, destructive both of market trust and the rule of law, forcing people to seek still greater protections from ethnic kin.42

Internal patriotism, moral ethnicity, is argumentative, vigilant, and historically disposed to inter-ethnic social, cultural, and material exchange. External patriotism, political tribalism, tends to do as it is told and favours economic protectionism.

Perhaps the key question to ask, in relation to ethnicity and markets, is how, when and to what political effect, moral ethnicity and political tribalism affect each other. Moral ethnicity—Kenyans talk of ‘positive ethnicity’—is a constitutive element, the self-examination, in any sense of ethnic belonging. Political tribalism, like international aggression, is contingent on wider political and economic processes. But we can all think of leaders who, facing trouble in their backyard, are tempted to suffocate internal dissent with the solidarity of external crisis. This argument can clearly apply as much to ethnic groups as to nation states. And Kenya, as we shall see, offers a striking contrast with which to explore relations between ethnicity’s external and internal dimensions. In the colonial conjuncture Kikuyuland experienced the sharpest reversal in factor values between labour and land, as patrons pursued agrarian profit on land hemmed in by white settlement. The agriculture of Luoland stagnated by contrast, further from markets, less fertile, and less reliably watered. Rising tension between Kikuyu clients and patrons, culminating in Mau Mau, forced elites to recover their reputation by seizing state power for ethnic benefit. Luo tenant rights were safer; their leaders, less pressured from below, had less need for aggression in the competitive arena of national politics.

Other cases, I intend, will suggest other relationships.

3. Case Studies: An outline

My case studies, chosen to demonstrate difference, all straddle the colonial conjuncture, from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. This straddling will, I hope,
show how the *longue durée* affects political and economic processes that *annalistes* would scorn as mere ‘events’ but which preoccupy policy-makers. The changes on which to focus are: the displacement of ethnic *diaspora* by colonial and then post-colonial states as suppliers of geographically dispersed public goods; the decreasing value of labour (even, recently, educated labour) against the rising value of politically-privileged property; the spread and intensification of divisive political power, from the scatter of nineteenth-century kingdoms to the continent-wide existence of polities with better claims to be states; and the growing politicisation, therefore, of markets. The end product—not the prime cause—of these changes has been the growth of political tribalism, most obviously in response to the segmentary competition encouraged by state power. More fundamentally, the horizontal conflict of political tribalism may in part respond to the vertical tensions engendered by intra-ethnic class formation, by the rising crisis, therefore, of moral ethnicity.

From *west Africa* my contrasts illustrate the difference between the ethnicities of savannah and forest, interior and coast, Muslim and Christian, between, in short, Fulani and Asante peoples, one possible contrast among many from that region. West Africa provides us with our best examples of ethnic *diaspora* as vehicles for the long-distance supply of such public goods as commercial trust, political protection, and enforceable contracts. The co-existence of Islamic brotherhood networks with these *diaspora* enriches rather than invalidates this observation. But markets may also bring new vertical inequalities and the rupture of previous networks of trust, betrayals felt more deeply within ethnic groups than between them.

In *east Africa*—the region I know best—I will attend to five points of contrast: The first is between states, as in the Great Lakes kingdoms of Uganda, and stateless peoples, as in most of what is now Kenya and Tanzania. Kingdoms could face internal tension with the spread of long-distance trade. The highland peoples without states, in what is now Kenya, offer a classic example of how inter-ethnic difference protected trade relations in the same way as medieval European guilds, by promoting complementary specialisations in production.
Then, for these stateless peoples, one must distinguish between those, now largely Tanzanians, who in the nineteenth century were most involved in Zanzibar’s commercial empire and those who were less affected, now Kenyans. Thirdly, in the twentieth century, one can contrast those who, like the Kikuyu, produced for the export market or fed centres of employment and others, like the Luo, whose distance from markets forced them to rely on selling their labour elsewhere. And, fourthly, for these labour-exporters, there could be a wide gulf between those whose literacy enabled them to enter the skilled labour market and those who had little to offer other than their ‘martial qualities’. Finally, one might explain the different fortunes of Kenya and Tanzania in the first years of independence by contrasting Kenyatta’s respect for moral ethnicity, as much as for political tribalism, with Nyerere’s fear of political tribalism, which led him to offend Tanzanian’s moral ethnicities.

In southern Africa the main economic influence on ethnicity has been the market in long-distance migrant labour for large mining industries and commercial farms. The political character of that market changed radically with a new, late twentieth century, conjuncture, the transfer of power from white minorities to African majorities. African xenophobia seems, in consequence, to have taken over from white racism. Inter-ethnic conflict had certainly existed before, but the fights had largely between young migrant workers, in rituals of manliness as much as expressions of ethnic competition in the labour market.

4. West Africa

West Africa’s inter-ethnic relations in the nineteenth century were governed—as annalistes would expect—by economic geography. The region has three ecological zones, stretching across the map from west to east. Its northern frontier is the Sahara, a sand and rock ocean networked by its caravan traders, Touareg peoples, who also controlled the slave-production of salt. The wide middle zone of savannah grasslands is comparatively well watered in some places and largely free of the tsetse fly, friendly therefore to horses and cattle.
Its dry seasons were as good for trade as for cavalry warfare. The river Niger, its main artery, was navigable for barges able to carry up to 60 tons of goods. This was the region of ethnic trading diasporas—or of linguistic networks that in retrospect seem to have had an ethnic character: Hausa, Malinke/Mande, and Fulani/Fulbe/Peul—to the last of which I shall return. The region’s southern frontier was the Atlantic Ocean, fringed by forests that needed large concentrations of labour to exploit. This need stimulated the emergence of some of Africa’s strongest kingdoms, the most successful of which supplied that other, notorious, demand for African labour—from the New World slave plantations at the core of Europe’s Atlantic empires.

West Africa was one vast market, with many smaller market areas indirectly connected to the wider commercial network. Each geographical zone traded goods and services with the others according to their comparative advantage. Regional cultures were shaped largely by their varied specialisations and modes of production. The Sahara was the commercial gateway to the Mediterranean and Islamic worlds. Its salt, essential to life further south, could be worked only by slaves supplied by the horsemen of the savannah. The savannah itself supported large urban populations, fed by slave-worked farms, whose artisans made textiles and leather goods prized throughout the region and beyond. The forest zone produced timber, gold and kola, all welcome in the savannahs, as well as the palm-oil that accompanied and in time supplanted overseas slave exports, which in turn financed the import of domestic hardwares, cheaper textiles and guns from the maritime Europeans.44

What ethnic relations grew out of or governed all this commercial activity? As already suggested, African ethnicities were often founded on the specialised skills appropriate to the subsistence and profit that could be gained in different ecological niches. My West African case focuses on two such skills. First, the Fulani were by origin a cattle-keeping people, too loose-knit to be called an ethnic group, who in their seasonal movement in search of grazing became active in long-distance trade. This enterprise required trust between strangers, often
several months’ journey apart. The savannah was also on the outer fringes of the world of Islam where, in the absence of state structures, long decayed since West Africa’s Islamic golden medieval age, Sufi brotherhoods were the organisers (and dividers) of the community of faith. Islam provided commerce with a common culture of trust and a literacy as useful for drafting contracts as for religious learning. The brotherhoods provided, in addition, the public goods of market intelligence over long distances, places of refreshment, protective companions, business partners and so on.45

Fulani traders were Muslim by 1800. Their literacy also made them welcome at the courts of pagan kings. Market, religious, and political contradictions, together with knowledge of upheavals elsewhere in the Islamic world, combined to instigate a series of Muslim revolutions in the early nineteenth century in which Fulani took the lead. Their largest, most lasting, revolution overturned the Hausa kingdoms in what is now northern Nigeria. Fulani success attracted ambitious individuals from other communities.46 ‘Fulani’ grew in diversity; they also grew in confidence. Their historians imagined an appropriately glorious past. Forgetting their complexity they told Fulani they were descended from tight-knit Berber clans who had first brought Islam across the Sahara to western Africa.

As Fulani civilisation absorbed more strangers, so ‘the’ Fulani became a primordial tribe in self-perception.47 But this self-placement in world history also gave their bookish leaders a self-critical patriotism that asked if Fulani rule was equal to the best in the history of Islam, a politically censorious religion. The first caliphs of the Fulani empire of Sokoto despaired of the venal ambitions of their lieutenants.48 It was from this supposedly natural ‘race’ of rulers that the British co-opted their leaders as allies in the ‘Indirect Rule’ of colonial northern Nigeria, and it is as a political tribe that Fulani have dominated the vote-banks of the Nigerian Republic ever since, and not simply as Fulani but as Hausa-Fulani, a culture that has brought together conqueror and conquered. But the complications do not end there. Other branches of the Fulani, further west, have been politically marginalised as formerly slave-
owning aristocrats, without their northern Nigerian ability to absorb and merge with a majority and formerly subject local culture.49

It was not ‘the market’ that made these different Fulani identities but a historical process that supplemented commerce with religious fervour, literacy, and revolutionary success; with the ambitions of strangers who became Fulani; with the different ‘tribal’ preconceptions of their later British and French rulers, and then the unequal social and economic changes over which colonial rule presided. For this complex of reasons Hausa-Fulani and Fulani patriotism today is divided between conservative and radical readings of proper Islamic rule. On the one hand Fulani notables still assert dynastic authority; on the other the Islam of the streets from time to time breaks into riotous protest at the loss of brotherhood among the local community that is part Fulani, part Islamic ‘umma. Their fear of the radical Islamic poor, hit by the vertical market inequalities, makes Nigeria’s Muslim elite the more determined to pursue the oil-fuelled competition in political tribalism that lies at the root of Nigeria’s economic stagnation.

The Asante, my second case, were a nation created by the labour of forest-clearance. For the past 250 years the narrative of their relations between ethnicity and markets is very different from that of the Fulani. The Asante kingdom was founded in the seventeenth century as a military confederation, in order control the internal and trans-Atlantic slave trades. Its political culture was formed not only in trade but also in war and production. All demanded massive investment of labour, to police trade-routes and to convert forest into an agrarian civilisation able to support an urban regime. Separate clans could not by themselves recruit and control that labour. They had to form a coalition, a confederacy under a king, the Asantehene.

Asante patriotism therefore subordinated private wealth to an ethic of public service for the Asantehene, without which neither private nor public wealth could be accumulated. Royal officials also had to swear not to reveal their subjects’ ethnic origins: Asante had
absorbed too many ‘strangers’, many descended from slaves who feared discrimination. In an entirely different context Asante nationhood had to be as capacious as Fulani ethnicity. But in the twentieth century Asante patriotism has differed from Fulani patriotism in two ways, in refusing to absorb strangers and in its mass rather than elite political tribalism.

The first difference relates to the way Asante (and others in Ghana and the Ivory Coast) recruited labour for their family cocoa farms, small capitalist firms. In the early twentieth century migrant workers from the interior, land-locked, French, colonies of Upper Volta and Soudan (Burkina Faso and Mali), sold their labour to the petty capitalists of the cash-crop colonies at the coast, in numbers as large as those employed by the corporately owned mines of southern Africa. Following a history of labour shortage and abundance of land, Asante cocoa-farmers welcomed in these strangers who, over time, often negotiated a rise in status from visiting worker to resident share-cropper. The cocoa-export market was opening the boundaries of ethnicity, as the military recruitment of labour had done earlier. But over time, especially during the colonial conjuncture, that relationship changed, as population grew and land became scarce. Today, people of distant origin, previously integrated vertically as clients, are horizontal strangers once again, whether share-croppers on the land or workers in the Asante capital of Kumasi. Patriotism has become less inclusive, more ‘tribal’ than regional. But that is also due to another stimulus found in Asante’s constitutional history. The labour market alone is not sufficient explanation.

Constitutional history is generally thought to be old-fashioned but it can be a matter of passionate patriotic concern in African societies, especially those created by pre-colonial kingdoms. For another effect of the cocoa trade was increased ‘vertical’ tension between Asante chiefs and their Asante commoners, as chiefs exploited their pre-capitalist privileges for capitalist advantage in the market and in allocation of land. The breaking of local reciprocities along what can be called class lines, between chief and commoner, made Asante commoners appeal to their king for redress—as we shall also find in Buganda. They also
feared rule by the supposedly socialist Kwame Nkrumah. On both counts Asante commoners called for a federal, not unitary, post-colonial Ghanaian state. But they frightened their elites, both their Asantehene and his chiefs, so much that the latter sought refuge from the class-consciousness of their people by submitting to the rule of the new Ghanaian state. Elites can fear the strategic instrumentality of ethnicity.

5. East Africa

The first of my five points about East Africa contrasts the economics of relations between kingdoms and between stateless peoples. In Uganda, dominated by kingdoms, the links between markets and ethnic patriotism have been devastating. And with the aid of a long history, one can also see, as in Asante but with different consequences, the relation between the internally vertical and externally horizontal dimensions of ethnic patriotism. My case centres on the friction between the Kingdom of Buganda and the rest of Uganda—a colonially-fabricated mix, as was Ghana, of kingdoms and stateless peoples.

The story is complex. The relevance of the case to our enquiry stems from two very different market relations in the nineteenth century; the Uganda area was penetrated by two Arab systems of commerce, from Khartoum in the north, and Zanzibar in the east. The Khartoum traders were poorly financed but had a relatively secure means of communication up the river Nile. The first circumstance forced, the second allowed, them to use coercion in their search for slaves. The Great Lakes kingdom most damaged by their intrusion was the most northerly one, Bunyoro, which concluded that foreigners were dangerous; resisted all subsequent foreign initiatives, with fatal consequences for its relations with its British colonial rulers.

Zanzibaris, by contrast, were well financed by British Indians; and on their long marches into the interior they learned to come to terms with those whose lands they crossed. For ivory and slaves they exchanged textiles, ornaments, and guns. The first Great Lakes
kingdom they met was Buganda. Its chiefs competed for the Zanzibari trade between themselves and with their king, the Kabaka. Their independent access to external commerce weakened the vertical ties between chiefs and king and therefore between chiefs and their peasant followers, since previously chiefs could win royal favour and promotion only by providing loyal peasant soldiers for the king’s wars and labourers on his roads. With its loyalties weakened, Buganda’s politics became more volatile. This historical contingency made it easier for the British to exert control over Buganda in the 1890s, simply by backing the winning side in one of the kingdom’s civil wars. This Anglo-Ganda alliance conquered the rest of Uganda, to both British and Ganda advantage; the alliance was cemented in 1900 by an agreement that distributed freehold land in Buganda to its chiefs. Secure property liberated them from the royal market in reputation and loyalty. They could demand more from their peasants than they had dared before—in forced labour on cotton and then coffee for the export market. Ganda peasants accused their chiefs of breaking their patriotic moral economy, under which patrons had had to care for the needs of followers who might otherwise line up behind a rival chief. The markets in land, no longer dependent on royal favour, and in exportable goods, had subverted the market in reputation.58

In the remaining sixty years of British rule a royalist populism looked to the king, as in Asante, for defence against his over-mighty chiefs. This constitutional argument, Buganda’s version of moral ethnicity, was more passionate than any nationalism felt for Uganda as a whole; and Buganda’s monarchy, secure in its British alliance (something Asante had never enjoyed), allowed itself to be pushed from below in demanding a federal status within Uganda. Nationalism in the rest of Uganda was as determined to overturn Buganda’s advantage as to get rid of British rule.59 So there are two points to make here in conclusion. One is that outraged moral ethnicity from below, pitching peasant rights against propertied chiefs, can drive elite politics into political tribalism—although Ganda nationalists would never see Buganda as a ‘tribe’. The other stems from the long-term inter-ethnic, or inter-kingdom effects
of the market. Those who first experienced the outside world through the brutality of the Khartoumers wanted to get even with the Baganda whose openness to the free-market Zanzibaris had paid such rich dividends. This fatal market-based flaw in Uganda’s politics needed, as we shall see, only the political irruption of my fourth East African market contrast to complete the country’s post-colonial tragedy.

If the relations between long-distance pre-colonial trade and kingdoms could have such far-reaching consequences, what of the contrasting case, of regional trade between stateless peoples? The classic example is found in Kenya’s highlands, in the triangular commerce between hunting, herding and farming, between the Okiek, Maasai and Kikuyu peoples, but it is paralleled, on a bilateral basis, between the Fur cultivators and Baggara pastoralists of the Sudan. In the Kenyan case it appears that there was a growing degree of specialisation in production in the centuries preceding colonial rule, so that by the late nineteenth century Okiek, Maasai, and Kikuyu were trading complementary goods and services, each buying from the other what they did not produce themselves.

The key relationship was between Kikuyu agriculture and Maasai pastoralism. Well-watered Kikuyu farming had reasonably secure returns; these were banked in livestock, the reserve currency of reputation and power. The Maasai, bankers to the highland market, could make spectacular returns in cattle-rearing but were vulnerable to equally spectacular crashes in droughts, when they had to turn to their kin among the Kikuyu for grain and vegetable hand-outs in return for various forms of service. Okiek hunters occupied an ambiguous position, despised as the stockless poor by Maasai, as idle non-cultivators by Kikuyu, but suppliers of ritual goods to both. Each group retained cultural boundaries that determined the allocation of productive resources—of farm-gardens, hunting estates, cattle and grazing rights—but allowed the passage of people over these boundaries on condition of some fee payment, a temporary degree of submission, and respect for one’s new culture as determined by its successful, wealthy, households. The links between economic growth, insurance against downturns, and
ethnic difference seem to have been exemplary here. And after the colonial conjuncture the negotiation of horizontal inequalities has been easier than between Buganda and its neighbours. It is true that the Rift Valley, the arena of inter-ethnic exchange in pre-colonial times, has seen terrible violence and forced evictions in recent years. But it is also the case that wealthy Maasai and Kikuyu have come together to exploit the agricultural potential of formerly pastoral lands. Inter-ethnicity retains its market attraction, at least for elites; and inter-ethnic violence has thus far been under elite control, ordered only when politically necessary.61

My second eastern African contrast, between stateless peoples (now in Tanzania) exposed to the nineteenth-century Zanzibar traders and those (in Kenya) less involved in that commercial network goes far to explain the difference between Tanzanian and Kenyan nationalism. The most striking effect of the contrast lies in the relationship between market and language, and therefore between commerce and the flow of ideas, a critical matter in the construction of nationalism. The language of Zanzibar’s ‘informal empire’ of free trade62 was Swahili, its culture of trust Islam. In the twentieth century Swahili became more widely used in Tanzania than in Kenya—even if Islam was politically as insignificant in both. It is difficult to think of a more important reason than this linguistic contrast for Tanzania’s greater unity than Kenya in both the nationalist era and then in their independent statehoods. Nyerere, found the rhetoric of nationhood came easily; Kenyatta spoke more readily of a country that was a ‘kind of United Nations in miniature’.63

Not the least important aspect of this contrast in Swahili usage has been that Tanzanian Christians more commonly read a Swahili Bible while Kenyan Christians started their literate lives more often by reading the Bible in their local vernacular. For Christians the Bible is a primer in nationhood.64 Kenyan ‘readers’—as they called themselves—could readily compare their own ethnic group with the children of Israel, and many local historians today claim their ethnogenesis occurred while in exodus, like the children of Israel, from Egypt. Tanzanian Swahili readers could more easily imagine themselves to have a national destiny. A Tanzanian
patriotism is, however, by no means universal, perhaps because of the further contrast between Kenya and Tanzania which rounds off my discussion of East Africa, below.

But why, in Kenya, should Kikuyu and not Luo take the lead in radical nationalist politics—an historical contingency which continues to split Kenya today? For an answer one needs my third East African contrast, between those who sold food or export crops and those who sold, chiefly, their labour power. This market contrast shaped both dimensions of their respective ethnic patriotisms so that the relative anger of their moral ethnicity influenced the energy of their competition for state power.

Kikuyu, twenty per cent of Kenya’s population, occupy the centre of the country, bordering its capital Nairobi. At the hub of the communications network they enjoy reliable rainfall on high, relatively disease-free, formerly forested land. What most caused them to engage in patriotic debate was change in their vertical social relations, thanks to the reversal in factor values between labour and land. The twentieth century production of food and charcoal for the Nairobi market subverted earlier relations between patrons and clients; property became more attractive than patronage in the competition for wealth and power. What mattered in the colonial market was an elder’s control of his land, worked by his wives; and not consideration for clients with whom his fathers would have shared usage of the land, in return for their support in litigation and war.

But how could those who were thrown off their patron’s land secure the self-mastery of running a self-sufficient household that lay at the heart of Kikuyu moral economy? Fear of social extinction, thanks to betrayal by one’s patron—as in Buganda—generated the radicalism of the Mau Mau movement. ‘Moral outrage’, as has been said of the mineworkers of South Africa, ‘has always provided excellent motivation for resolute action.’ In Mau Mau the outraged moral ethnicity of the socially discarded divided Kikuyu between Kenya’s most militant nationalists and its most convinced conservatives, the ‘loyalists’ who backed the British and were then most determined to inherit the state’s coercive powers at independence.
Both Mau Mau and ‘loyalists’ were equally patriotic Kikuyu. Both believed Kikuyu citizenship was earned by a sturdy, sweaty, self-reliance. But the generous patronage that had previously offered respectability to all who were prepared to sweat could now prefer property to people. Mau Mau members understood that that conventional road to civic virtue had closed. Loyalists considered it to be still open—to all, that is, who had not become Mau Mau ‘hooligans’. Kikuyu elites have since used the state to protect their conservative ethnic patriotism against its no less Kikuyu but dangerously radical opponents. This ideological split in Kikuyu patriotism explains the political ruthlessness of Kikuyu elites, more like Fulani than Asante.

Luo patriotism was less internally divided and was, therefore, less aggressive in Kenya’s inter-tribal political arena. About fifteen per cent of Kenya’s population, the Luo live on low-lying, irregularly watered, rather infertile, malaria-prone land at the far end of what was once Kenya’s main railway line. Lacking agrarian potential, they enjoyed two advantages in the East African labour market, paralleled by those of the Scots throughout the British empire. One was their relatively early acquisition of mission-literacy. The other was their muscular build, allegedly nourished by the protein their fishermen harvested from Lake Victoria. Both qualities created a reputation that took Luo youths and, increasingly, their families, far from their impoverished homeland. They became East Africa’s chief railway tribe, with Luo ticket clerks, station-masters and engineers scattered from Uganda to the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts. They also became the main workforce on many white-owned plantations. They led Kenya’s trade unionism, a politics that favoured negotiation with the regime, especially when the chief negotiator was that genius, Tom Mboya.

This migrant integration into the colonial market economy meant that Luo experienced much less of the social differentiation that poisoned internal Kikuyu politics. When the British pressed them to reform their land tenure in the 1950s Luo elders showed a concern for the rights of their dependants which market forces seem to have driven from many Kikuyu
Luo patriotism therefore remained united behind the rustic figure of Oginga Odinga to a degree that no Kikuyu leader, not even Kenyatta, could hope to attain. (Tom Mboya remained a man of the town until after his assassination when Luo, suspicious of his urban cunning in life, reclaimed him in death). Horizontal, external, Luo politics was not fired up by the vertical, internal, friction that propelled the Kikuyu. Odinga’s essentially moderate, if naively socialist, politics was only too easily outbid by ruthless Kikuyu conservatives, toughened by fear of their own radicals. Landownership and control of crop marketing trumped the relatively untroubled ethnic patriotism of the Luo and their trade union culture of negotiation, products of the labour market.

But it took the outcome of my fourth East African contrast, between those like the Luo with skills to sell and those with nothing but their supposed martial qualities, to plunge East Africa into its darkest modern tragedy—with the coup that brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda in 1971. Uganda’s politics, split between Buganda and the rest, were sufficiently volatile for President Obote, a man of Uganda’s stateless north, to place more reliance than Nyerere or Kenyatta on his army. His army also came mainly from Uganda’s north, recruited among people even more distant from export markets and mission literacy than most, whose sole opportunity for power came from casting their military strength into the political arena. No scholar has yet suggested that Idi Amin was driven by his ethnic (Kakwa) or even Ugandan patriotism. Self-preservation seems a more likely motive, more so than a military class-consciousness. But patriotism is not to be expected behind every political action derived from one’s relative market position.

But perhaps the most intriguing question to be asked of markets and ethnicity in East Africa is the last: how much, in the first decade or so of independence, was the relative economic success of capitalist Kenya, and the relative failure of socialist Tanzania, due to their respective Presidents’ understanding of moral ethnicity and fear of political tribalism, those twin patriotisms? Kenyatta was certainly not afraid of political tribalism; to the contrary, he
used it in order to stitch together a ruling coalition with non-Kikuyu that put paid to his internal Kikuyu radicals. But he also had a great respect for the disciplines of tradition that taught men and women how to strive for self-mastery, for self-respect, the essence of moral ethnicity. Nyerere dismantled chiefship, the focus of ethnicity; he also completely misunderstood moral ethnicity, thinking it to be an altruistic communalism when in reality it had fostered the reciprocities, the moral economy, that made the coexistence of wealth and poverty tolerable. It is not surprising that Tanzanians resisted the new communalism of Ujamaa vijijini, compulsory village collectivisation. Patriotic thought matters.

6. Southern Africa

Johannesburg’s Weekly Mail and Guardian has for many years run a strip cartoon called ‘Madam and Eve.’ Madam is the white housewife, generally sitting at leisure at the front of her suburban house, Eve her black maidservant hard at work at the back. In one episode a few years ago, Eve looks up from the newspaper to ask, ‘Madam, what is xenophobia?’ Madam replies, at first at a loss for the appropriate word, ‘Fear of, . . . fear of . . . Nigerians!’ South Africa, as Africa’s main land of market opportunity, feels itself to be full of increasing numbers of stranger Africans from further north, especially the Nigerians and Congolese who are said to run the rackets and, more recently, Zimbabweans fleeing tyranny and starvation. There have been street riots against this influx of foreigners, ever more competitors for scarce jobs and services.

But South Africa has been full of stranger Africans since the 1890s, when more migrant Mozambicans than black South Africans worked in the gold mines. Mozambique remained the single largest source of mine-workers into the 1960s. The enormous migrant labour market of southern Africa (of a size similar to the migrant farm-working market of West Africa), from the copper mines of Katanga and Zambia in the north to the gold mines of the south, has certainly witnessed inter-ethnic competition over jobs, housing, women, and the
petty trade, often in liquor, that has supplied the immigrants’ basic needs. Periodic riots and so-called ‘faction-fights’ made the mining towns much like those of the United States at a similar time. But they lacked the intensity and generality of the recent xenophobia.

It is important to realize that the earlier violence in the urban labour market was far from a matter of clashing primordialisms or of its converse, the anomic, normless, ‘detribalization’ once feared by colonial officials and anthropologists alike. What migrant labour encouraged was an enlargement of the moral imagination of ethnicity and its patriotic obligations.79

The first anthropologists to study this labour market in the 1950s, the ‘Manchester School’, were more impressed by the ‘super tribes’ that emerged on the way to work and in the workplace than by the clashes between them.80 Young men, ‘peasants raiding the cash economy for goods’,81 came from small rural communities who thought themselves discrete, but then allied themselves in town or down the mine with others who spoke more or less the same language, or who took the same bus or train to start their period of work away from home. In South Africa a ‘Nyasa’ was anyone who came from Nyasaland for work, irrespective of his ethnic origin. The most visible evidence of their various patriotisms was not fighting but the dance ceremonies they used so extravagantly to perform, competing in their mastery of the rituals of urban civilisation in order to win the respect of urban strangers.82

The expansion and contraction of ethnic consciousness in southern Africa, as in the rest of Africa, can in any case be observed long before the inception of the migrant labour market and colonial state-building. The construction, destruction and expansion of ethnic identity in early nineteenth century South Africa’s ‘time of troubles’ and state-building, referred to earlier, is well known to all undergraduate students of African history.83 In a study of ethnic relations since the 1860s further north, in what is now Zimbabwe, it has been shown how relations between Kalanga and Ndebele people varied between absorption and hostility according to changing contexts. And internal and external conceptions of patriotism also varied
over time. In the late nineteenth century, before the European conquest, Ndebele ‘commoner’
resistance to royal ambition did much to shape the language that missionaries adopted in
translating the Bible, and therefore the language of Ndebele moral ethnicity. Half a century and
a generation or two later the same commoners could develop a less questioning, more
aggressive, ideology of Ndebele identity when facing horizontal competition in the urban
labour market of Bulawayo. We need to keep a sharp eye on such changing contexts before
reaching any judgment on the labour market’s role in ethnic consciousness.

For it was not simply the experience of town and competition in the labour market that
helped to shape the ethnic patriotism of modern southern Africa. What was probably more
important in most workers’ assessments of how to build social solidarities was the relative
health of their rural political economies of origin—to continue a discussion begun with my
comparison between Kikuyu and Luo. The labour market was for long a risky and racially
oppressive arena of enterprise. By comparison (in a region of the continent where agrarian
profit was denied to Africans by white settler protectionism) rights to cultivable or pastoral
land ‘at home’ were relatively secure provided one nursed one’s status in the rural moral
economy. This consideration remained true probably until the later twentieth century when, on
different time-scales, rural economies became over-burdened with people on over-worked land.
Until that time, when peasants ceased to enjoy the periodic opportunity to raid the urban labour
market and began to look to it as the major source of subsistence, the need to maintain rural
property rights was the chief incentive to preserving and enhancing the many-stranded ties of
obligation that inhered in one’s ethnic identity, now conceptualised and at times romanticised
in an exile imagination.

Southern Africa’s labour market has therefore had varied effects on ethnic sentiment,
whether internal and vertical or horizontal and external. Books have explored the complexities.
But recent studies have focused on the need to understand the moral economies of personal
honour and integrity that carry men and women through often contradictory phases of their life
cycle, at times beholden to networks of ethnic kin and its traditionalised rural hierarchy of
authority and land allocation, at others proving their man- or womanhood in more contingently
composed urban neighbourhoods or labour compounds where the main moral preoccupation
may be a shared sense of humiliation by one's employer. ‘Manhood is hard’, runs a Sotho
proverb; ‘it is dug out from the rocks.’ The most consistent street violence of late-twentieth
century South African towns seems to have had nothing to do with ethnicity at all. Tsotsi gangs
were created by youths born in town and were based on entirely urban perceptions of territory
and male property in females. Rival gangs spoke a lingua franca, tsotsitaal, based on Afrikaans,
with borrowings from Zulu, Xhosa, and English. Tsotsis assessed each others’ cultural status
by reference not to ethnicity but to the way different townships developed their own tsotsitaal
dialect.

The other increasingly common if often socially disciplined violence seems, as
Africans began to sense the real possibility of majority rule, to have expressed vertical
grievance within ethnic groups rather than horizontal competition between them (which is not
to deny that the latter could at times be brutal and bloody). But the internal tension situates the
labour market more firmly in the ambiguous realm of moral ethnicity and ethnic patriotism. I
think here of the patriotic debates that for two centuries flared between Xhosa ‘reds’ who
stayed to mind the cattle and the ‘schools’ who ‘absconded’ from the homestead to live and
work in East London or, later on, in the 1970s, between youthful township ‘comrades’ and
their less radical elders in the townships of Cape Town. All the antagonists were of one ethnic
identity, Xhosa. A common accusation that the young yelled at their elders was to the effect
that ‘We asked for freedom and they (the whites) gave you beer!’ Young comrades burned
down their elders’ shebeen liquor stores; when they cornered a drinker they were known to
wash out his beery mouth with soap or to force him to vomit out his liquor. It is difficult to
imagine a more intimate expression of conflict over how to construct a patriotic manliness in
town. Similarly, there was as much violence between fellow Zulu, between the largely rural
supporters of Inkatha and the township members of the ANC, as between Xhosa and Zulu, in
the dying days of apartheid.

Selling one’s labour outside the household domain seems to have caused deeper,
vertical, tensions within ethnic groups than horizontally between them—but not so lethal a
conflict as the expropriation of dependants from one’s land had caused among Kikuyu.

But that reflection about the direction of the antagonisms stirred by the migrant labour
market applies to the period before 1994, before Africans could themselves wield much power
over each other and at a time when many had a common enemy not only in the white regime
but also in the social alienations of city life, alienations that many urban, ‘section 10’ Africans,
the ‘Drum generation’, those who were exempted from apartheid’s movement controls, found
so exciting and fulfilling. What has introduced xenophobia in the South African labour market,
then, is both the end of the apartheid influx controls that previously imposed some (if not
much) control over the supply of labour and, perhaps still more importantly, the inherent
divisiveness of state power that has become available to Africans.

This brings us back to conjuncture, a peculiarly South African one this time, when
slow-growing demography has been overtaken by massive immigration, when urbanization is
no longer subject to pass controls, and when African access to political power exploded almost
overnight.

7. Conclusions

Throwing all disciplinary caution aside, let me start with a generalisation: that patriotic
ethnic thought matters. Within historical kingdoms it is better called constitutional thought.
Whether expressed by commoners in Asante or Buganda, by Kikuyu juniors or by Tanzanians
more generally, it decided the relations between Asante and Ghana, between Buganda and
Uganda; it flourished in Kenyatta’s Kenya; it helped to bring down Nyerere’s Tanzania. Ethnic
patriotism is worth studying.
Secondly, patriotic ethnicity is as much a language of class within any given ethnic culture as a provocation to ethnic competition. Changing vertical inequalities need as much study as horizontal ones, not least because a moral ethnicity outraged by class formation can propel frightened elites into political tribalism. The instrumentality of ethnicity is not a simple matter of elite manipulation.

These first two conclusions, thirdly, are based on assumptions about the internal moral economy of ethnicity, on ethnicity as a moral community in which agents argue about rational choice within a framework of honour and reputation, however that is conceived by groups formed by different ecological and political contexts, often over long periods of time. Economic modelling seems more often to be based on assumptions of political tribalism as a constant; models need to be reconstructed, whose components possess interior as well as external dimensions.

But fourthly, even if patriotic ethnic thought is worth studying, there is still a question, how far it is an independent causal factor, how far a dependent variable. I have cited other, largely natural, reasons for Africa’s poor economic performance. I stressed, when discussing the colonial conjuncture, the interlocking of demographic and political change, the reversal in factor values between labour and land, the advent of literacy and peace. I argued that all these changes had marked effects on the hardening of ethnic boundaries, the enlivening of internal ethnic debate. From this discussion I conclude that by itself ethnicity explains nothing; its salience in any particular transaction is something that has to be explained. Nor can the relation between ethnicity and markets be studied in isolation.

Markets themselves, fifthly, must be specified, both in commodity and in their relative freedom of price movement. The Luo focus on the labour market had very different political effects to the Kikuyu division by the property market, itself driven by market production of food and wattle (for charcoal) and later, of tea and coffee. The relative freedom of the Zanzibar market gave Buganda great advantages—if indirect and unintended, as historians...
would expect—over Bunyoro, whose trade contacts with Khartoum were carried out under the threat of force.

Ethnic groups and their self-awareness have changed and transformed themselves throughout African history. It has been said by a distinguished anthropologist that they ‘make up the rules as they go along’. But it has also been suggested that ethnic connexions with commerce may create a more general, even cyclical, pattern, setting rules that nobody makes up but to which they must respond. One could argue that ethnicity facilitates trade by providing market intelligence and trust, as in the case of the Fulani and other ethnic diasporas, or in the very different logic of the triangular market of producer protection and banking insurance in highland Kenya. Should trade prosper it will increase or change inequalities both vertically and horizontally. This is as likely to disturb internal moral ethnicity as relations between ethnic groups. How far such changes damage the trust on which alone markets can thrive is clearly an important question and the whole issue of such a cyclical model is something to which economists might profitably turn their attention.

Historians are neither constitutional lawyers nor prophets, nor does history repeat itself. Nonetheless, perhaps the two most promising precedents one can draw from my cases are the heterogeneous composition of entrepreneurial ‘Houses’ in the past, and the public service ethic of nineteenth-century Asante. But there are disadvantages attached to both. ‘Houses’ rarely survived the succession disputes attendant on the death of their ‘big man’ founder. And Asante’s political culture split, before colonial rule, between a so-called ‘capitalist’, private, business interest pursued by royal trade officials, a ‘war party’ of army commanders and a republican mob on the streets of Kumasi, the Asante capital. There is not much historical comfort there.

If, finally, one generalises about ethnicity and markets in Africa let it be with extreme care for its diverse contexts and changing circumstances. The unchanging ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation index, that assumes ethnicity to be constant and takes account neither of context nor of patriotic thought, should be replaced.


16 Terence Ranger’s re-phrasing of ‘invention’ as ‘imagination’ is symptomatic of historians’ increasing scepticism about the ethnically inventive hegemony of colonial rule. Compare idem, ‘The invention of


20 For which see Bruce Berman, “Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa” (JICA-RI Working Paper, Tokyo, forthcoming).


23 Anne Haour & Benedetta Rossi (eds), *Being and Becoming Hausa: Interdisciplinary perspectives* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).


25 To quote a Burkean truth.

26 To echo Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism’.


31 For exceptions to this generalisation see John Iliffe, *The African Poor: A history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)


Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (Longmans, 1967)


Kuba & Lentz, *Land and Belonging*, chapters by Kojo Amanor and Gareth Austin.


See section 3 above.


Kikuyuland’s exposure to malaria is now increasing, since global warming allows the anopheles mosquito to thrive at higher altitudes than before: *The Times* (London, 31 Dec 2009), 16.


I owe my understanding of Nyerere’s moral thought to my colleague John Iliffe. For the consequences see James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), chapter 7.

Exact date is unfortunately lost.


Lentz, ‘”Tribalism” and ethnicity in Africa’, especially pp. 308-10, gives a useful summary account of the Manchester School.


90 By Professor Hino Hiroyuki in comment on an earlier draft.

Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

1800年以降のアフリカの経済・社会の歴史を振り返ると、民族意識と市場取引の関係が非常にバラエティに富み、極めて予測困難であったことがわかる。20世紀初頭は特に重要な変化があった時期である。1900年以前は労働不足で土地が豊富だったため、移動性の高い労働力への需要のおかげで民族間の関係は比較的良好だった。しかし、1900年以後1960年までの間、人口増加によって土地が労働に比べてより高価なものになっていき、植民地支配下で国家という新たな構造が課されて民族集団が政治競争の単位としてみられる傾向が強まったこともあって、民族間の関係はより厳しいものになっていった。

上で述べた社会的経済的政治的変化に関するおおまかな期間区分に対し、本稿で取り上げた事例は、アフリカの異なる時点と地域の間で、その変化の状況も経過も大きく異なるということを示している。多くは、経済地理や不確実な歴史的状況に加え、アフリカの市場で取引される商品の性質―労働（奴隷労働者か自由労働者か、あるいは熟練労働者か未熟練労働者か）、食料、現金作物、土地、政治的影響力―にも大きく依存してきている。

アフリカにおける民族と市場の関係に関する分析は、一般的に民族集団間の「水平的」な不平等に焦点を当ててきた。これに対し本稿では、社会的不安と政治的圧力の源として、民族集団内における、人と人の間、あるいは性別、世代別、階層別といった異なるカテゴリーのグループ間で見られる「垂直的」な社会的不平等の変遷も同じく強調する。同一民族集団内での強者と弱者、あるいは富める者と貧しい者の間にある「モラルエコノミー」を巡る緊張は、モラルによって規定されたコミュニティの喪失という形で「モラルエスニシティ」の危機を招きかねない。このことは、外との競争の中で内部の緊張が弱まっていくにつれ、「政治部族主義」の危機を引き起こす可能性がある。内部の緊張の度合いが、同じケニアでもキクユ族とルオ族の間で対照的であるということは、対内の民族バトリオティズムと対外的な民族バトリオティズムの関連性について教訓となる例を示している。

最後に、本稿では、アフリカの歴史が示すところによれば、経済学者は市場経済と民族の関係性について、彼らが現在依拠しているモデルに比べてより融通性に富み、よりエージェントに焦点を当て、より階級を意識したモデルを模索するべきであることを提案する。
Working Papers from the same research project

“Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Policies for Harmonious Development”

JICA-RI Working Paper No. 6
*Diversity of Communities and Economic Development: An Overview*
Gustav Ranis

JICA-RI Working Paper No. 7
*Market, Democracy, and Diversity of Individual Preferences and Values*
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Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer