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Lenses on ‘Japaneseness’ in the Development Cooperation Charter of 2015: Soft power, human resources development, education and training

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Abstract

The Working Paper provides a critical analysis of the 2015 Development Assistance Charter, paying particular attention to its case for Japan’s comparative advantage and uniqueness in its development cooperation policies and practice. The term ‘Japaneseness’ is used as a shorthand for this ‘Japan brand ODA’. The paper’s focus is especially on the softer side of Japanese aid, notably its long history of concern with human resources development, knowledge creation, and self-help. These priorities are all explicitly linked to and illustrated from the Charter, but it is noted that the Charter’s approach is not merely business as usual, but that there should be a more ‘proactive’ dimension to Japanese aid. In addition, given the centrality of human resources development in Japanese cooperation and in the Charter, there is an analysis of the influence of the Charter in the MOFA Learning strategy and JICA Position paper of 2015. For comparative purposes, there is a light illustration of parallels and differences in the aid policies of Britain and of China.

Keywords: Japaneseness; *Development Cooperation Charter*; Japan’s comparative advantage; priorities in human resources development.

Abbreviations

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DFID Department for International Development

ESD Education for Sustainable Development

HRD Human Resources Development

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

JICC Japan Information and Culture Centre

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

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Japan's recent Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter (2015)¹ attracted media attention principally for what it might or might not say about the traditional position of Japan as a 'peace-loving nation' using its development cooperation for non-military purposes. Japan intends to uphold this historic position but the language of Japan now being a 'Proactive Contributor to Peace' does leave the window slightly open for changes to this policy in the future (ibid. 1).² Some analysis has claimed that the new policy on foreign aid 'risks playing with fire' as aid moneys are fungible and the vague language of the new document leaves much to be decided by government and bureaucrats (Rafferty, 2015: 8).³ The question of reworking Japan's historically pacifist constitution has again arisen following the July 2016 elections in Japan.

1. Japan's 'distinctive characteristics' and uniqueness in development aid

However, JICA's new *Cooperation Charter* is also worthy of attention for a variety of other important reasons. It breaks some new ground in elaborating Japanese development's 'distinctive characteristics' (Japan, 2015: 10). This connects with JICA's interest in identifying what we have called 'Japaneseness' in Japan's development cooperation policies. In approaching this topic, we shall very briefly bear in mind the extent to which UK's aid has been concerned with 'Britishness', or China's with 'Chineseness'. For this purpose, we shall refer to the UK's White Paper on international development which followed the election of the

¹ Japan's original ODA Charter was adopted in 1992 and revised in 2003.

² 'Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance' (Japan, 2015: 10-11).

³ *The Japan News* (11th February 2015: 1) notes 'In some countries, the military is in charge of many activities in nonmilitary fields. The outline, therefore, stipulates that the government may approve assistance to those countries as exceptional circumstances'.

new Labour Government of 1997,⁴ and in the case of China, the government's two white papers on *China's foreign aid* (2011 and 2014), as well as China's two African policy papers (China, 2006; 2015).

The emphasis on Japan's distinctiveness is not entirely new, however. Like China, Japan puts a good deal of emphasis on 'the philosophy that has been formed over its long history' (Japan, 2015: 4). There have been several key characteristics of Japan's official development cooperation (ODA) over the period of 60 years from 1954 to 2014 (Kato et al., 2016: ch. 1), but a number of these features, such as self-help, go right back to the Meiji Restoration and beyond as we shall see later.⁵

The 2015 Charter in particular underlines that Japan 'overcame a range of problems' 'to become the first developed country in Asia'. But this was already there in the 2003 ODA Charter 'as the first nation in Asia to become a developed country' (Japan, 2003: 4). Nor is it new in emphasizing Japan's 'experience and expertise'. This too was emphasized several times in the earlier paper (ibid. 5). What does seem new is the claim that its 'philosophy in development cooperation, experience and expertise' have allowed it to 'deliver distinctive cooperation to Asian and other countries'. But what precisely is this distinctiveness? In answering this, we shall take as read several of the well-known characteristics such as 'extensive use of loans' or 'emphasis on economic infrastructure' (Kato et al., 2016).

Our focus will be rather on the soft side of Japanese aid, including its 'soft power', its expertise, its training provision, its Japanese values, private sector involvement, human resource development, and its attention to education and training.

Arguably, JICA's former President is one of the sources of the search for JICA's distinctiveness. He had been calling for some time for a Japan brand or a JICA brand in development cooperation, as in his 2015 New Year message:

⁴ See Ohno Izumi's (2016) contrast of the UK and Japan in a new era of development cooperation.

⁵ See Kuroda (2016) for an historical commentary on "'Japaneseness of Japanese aid': the case of education and training'.

Also, as I have repeatedly explained since last year, please always remember what our comparative advantages are. We need to refine our effective business models and tools and should crystalize them as ‘Japan-branded equity’ or ‘JICA-branded equity’. Let us incorporate into JICA’s operations a range of knowledge, expertise, know-how and experiences that are unique to Japan (Tanaka, 2015a: 2)

This search for Japaneseness in development cooperation was made quite explicit in January 2016, when the title and lead articles in *JICA’s World* were dedicated to celebrating *Japan Brand ODA* in the following terms:

From the projects implemented during the 60-year history of Official Development Assistance (ODA), JICA summarized the knowledge and technology that Japan presents to the world as Japan Brand ODA. (JICA, 2016: 3)

In this special issue, the lead articles were in fact on ‘Bringing Japanese maternal and child health to the world’, and ‘Kaizen’,⁶ but ‘science-mathematics education’ was also mentioned as a further illustration of Japan Brand ODA (ibid. 2-11).

This pursuit of Japan’s uniqueness in its approach to development is a recurrent theme in JICA’s *Annual Report 2014*. Thus, JICA’s Training and Dialogue Programme is said to be ‘truly unique in terms of scale and sphere of activities and is an outstanding characteristic of Japan’s international cooperation’ (JICA, 2014: 131). But one reason for this claim of a ‘Globally unique training programme’ is that it draws upon ‘Japan’s unique knowledge, skills, and experiences to promote human resource development and to solve development issues in developing countries’ (ibid.). Equally, it turns out that the JICA Partnership Programme (JPP), working with Japanese organisations that are ‘ardent’ about development, produces JPP projects which are also ‘unique as they contribute to the lifestyles and livelihoods of the people by carrying out detailed activities at the grassroots level’ (ibid. 112).

⁶ Kaizen: a Japanese business philosophy of continuous improvement of working practices, personal efficiency,

Of course, Japan is not alone in talking up its uniqueness. The UK's 1997 White Paper on *Eliminating World Poverty* claims that it 'reflects Britain's unique place in the world and our opportunity to adopt a new international role. No other country combines membership of the Group of Seven industrialised countries, membership of the European Union,⁷ a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) and membership of the Commonwealth. Our particular history places us on the fulcrum of global influence' (UK, 1997: 20).

Britain's claim to uniqueness is combined with a claim to global leadership, including in its approach to international development. Arguably, this leadership was associated with a decision dramatically to reduce the Britishness of its aid programme and adopt what had come to be called the International Development Targets associated with the OECD-DAC's key report of 1996, *Shaping the 21st century: The contribution of development cooperation*. Significantly, Britain's decision to 'refocus our international development efforts on the elimination of poverty' was directly associated with its support for these new 'international sustainable development targets' (UK, 1997: 8), and a downplaying of Britain's own development priorities.

By contrast, we shall see in the new Charter that Japan's determination to 'strongly lead the international community' is associated with a renewed emphasis on its Japaneseness or its distinctive characteristics. Whether a leadership ambition in international development can be successfully combined with a strong emphasis on Japan's special strengths and comparative advantage, we shall explore further in this short paper.

It is worth noting that China does constantly emphasise that it is the world's largest developing country, and though it hesitates to call its aid unique, it does say that its 'foreign aid has emerged as a model with its own characteristics' (China, 2011: 1).

⁷ To change in due course after the EU Referendum in June 2016.

One further element in conceptualizing the distinctiveness of Japanese aid before looking at the detail of the *Cooperation Charter* is that Japan, despite being a DAC donor, shares several approaches with non-DAC donors. This sense of Japan being, arguably, a reluctant DAC donor (King, 2007) or of its aid being ‘unique’ and not conforming with aid as charity, solidarity or investment (Fukuda-Parr and Shiga, 2015: 3) is an important aspect of Japan’s particularity. The same is true of its claim to have a ‘unique model’ of cooperation (Yamada, 2014); but this is not the main focus of this paper.

We shall now turn to look at a number of key features of Japan’s latest *Development Cooperation Charter* which might be thought distinctive.

1.1 Japan’s soft power⁸ and the Japanese language

One area where the 2015 Charter clearly breaks new ground is its mention of ‘the possibility of utilizing its soft power including the Japanese language’ (Japan, 2015: 10). Historically, there has been evident hesitation about promoting the Japanese language through its aid programme, and not least because of the legacy of its promotion of the Japanese language in neighbouring countries from the 1910s till the end of the Second World War. Whatever the different reasons for this possible diffidence in cultural and linguistic diplomacy, the result today is that compared with the language and culture promotion organisations of other major countries, Japan is rather poorly represented. Amongst other OECD-DAC countries, the Alliance Francaise, the British Council and Goethe Institute have, respectively, 1040, 200 and 149 offices worldwide. Russia has 83 offices of Russkiy Mir. As importantly, China has some 500 Confucius Institutes across more than 130 countries.

By contrast, the Japan Foundation has just 22 overseas centres in 21 countries (two in USA), with only one in the whole of Africa (in Cairo) and one in South America (Sao Paulo). Beyond this, there are a number of 10 Japan Centres in nine countries, mostly in East Asia and

⁸ Soft power is a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence.

the former Soviet Union. These focus on business, Japanese, and culture.⁹ For a country of Japan's great significance culturally, this is a very sharp and dramatic contrast with some comparator countries. Set against China, whose Chinese Language Council International, *Hanban*, has Confucius Institutes in some 100 universities in the United States, Japan has made few grants for Japanese studies to US universities (e.g. to Columbia University) in recent years.

Beyond these 32 centres mentioned above, there are a number of Japan Information and Culture Centres (JICC), linked to Japanese embassies, notably in Washington DC, and in Nairobi, but they are also to be found in Lima, Kinshasa and Manila, and under the name of the Japan Creative Centre in Singapore.

What this amounts to, when set alongside comparator cultural organisations, is a relatively small set of initiatives. There is apparently no plan to expand the number of Japan Centres from its present number. Though the Japan Foundation talks about its 'comprehensive international cultural exchange projects in every region of the globe' and its 'worldwide network', their main coverage is of course just 21 countries.¹⁰

Soft power and cultural promotion, including language, are inseparable from the movement of students to Japan and from Japan to other universities. Here there has been a flurry of initiatives to increase the number of long-term international students coming to Japan to 300,000 by 2020. Though the initiative was started in 2008, the total number of international students by 2013 was still not much more than half the target, and some 50% of these were coming from a single country, China.¹¹ The other side of the coin is that Japan desperately needs to increase student numbers in its own universities as the declining birthrate has had a massive impact on student numbers.

⁹ For a very dynamic example of these see the Cambodia-Japan Cooperation Centre: cjcc.edu.kh/. For more detail on the Japan Centres, see

https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/tech/projects/j_center/index.html

¹⁰ See details at <https://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/result/ar/2006/pdf/2-3.pdf>

¹¹ See JASSO for the latest data: http://www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/data12_e.html

Surprisingly, though Japan continues to offer very large numbers of training awards, through ODA, to short term trainees to come to Japan, it has not dramatically increased the number of its long-term scholarships. For example, there were only just 1,155 students from the whole of Africa studying in Japan in 2013, most of them on government scholarships. Whereas in China there are currently scholarships for 6,000 Africans annually for long-term training, and the total number of African students in China is now well over 30,000 (King, 2015a).¹²

The promotion of Japanese soft power, the Japanese language and culture, and the two-way internationalization of Japanese universities will require a coordinated strategy across ministries and agencies, including Foreign Affairs, Education, and agencies such as JICA. It will not be something that a single agency such as JICA will be able to promote on its own. Nevertheless, a contribution can be made by JICA to the promotion of a Japan brand, as has been noted earlier. But it would involve a substantial shift in Japan's traditional approach towards aid. A great deal will depend on what is included in the notion of a Japan brand – an issue to which we shall return later.

Indeed, in the new *Development Cooperation Charter*, Japan's concern does seem to be with the projection of its own 'strong leadership' role in respect of development assistance (Japan, 2015: 3).¹³ However, as Ohno has pointed out, 'Japan is yet to project its ODA vision effectively to the world. The country often takes the back seat in global development debates where major directions are determined by other players' (Ohno, 2013: 16).

1.2 Japanese versus universal values

It is intriguing that Japan's Charter should mention language and soft power in the same breath as Japanese values: '...given that Japan's distinctive characteristics such as Japanese

¹² I am grateful to Liu Jing of Nagoya University for information from the China Association for International Education (CAFSA) on African student numbers:
<http://www.cafsa.org.cn/research/72.html>

¹³ The Charter frequently mentions Japan's leadership role in development assistance.

values and occupational culture are highly regarded by the international community, it will take into account the possibility of utilizing its soft power including the Japanese language' (Japan, 2015: 10). What are these values that the Charter is concerned with, and are they likely to contribute to this concern with soft power as distinctive characteristics of Japanese assistance?

Those which are most evident in the Charter are the following terms: resilience, agility, proactivity, sincerity, reciprocity, steadiness, down-to-earth effort, and responsibility. There is also talk, surprisingly, of 'spiritual affluence' as one of the results of its aid in the social sectors such as education and health (Japan, 2015: 6). These are a mixed bag of values, but it is worth noting just how frequently there is a discussion of Japan's 'proactive' role, both in general, in its 'proactive contribution to international discussions' (ibid. 10) and more specifically in its 'proactive contribution to peace' (ibid. 1). But there are two different sides of this view of Japan's role here – the image of Japan exerting strong leadership as a 'responsible' and 'respected' member of the international community, and at the same time its steady and down-to-earth commitment to projects at the field level – what Ohno terms 'Japan ...operating very much at the micro level – engaged in specific projects at sub-national levels' (Ohno, 2013: 16).

Japan has frequently used the language of 'people-to-people exchanges' and 'friendly relations' as central to its vision of its role in development. Indeed, the former President of JICA emphasized that 'people-to-people interaction is the essence of Japan's international cooperation' (Tanaka in JICA 2014: 9). Interestingly, this particular term does not appear in the latest Charter, though 'promoting friendly relations and people-to-people exchanges' was there on the first page of the 2003 revised Charter (Japan, 2003: 1). Even if friendship doesn't appear in the new Charter, there is certainly talk of reciprocal relationships and even of learning from each other.

But compared with China's constant emphasis on its long-standing friendship with Africa, and its very frequent use of the terms 'mutual benefit', 'mutual trust', 'mutual respect', 'mutual support', 'mutual understanding' and 'mutual learning', Japan hesitates to employ this discourse.¹⁴ And the UK doesn't talk of friendship at all in its path-breaking White Paper on International Development, and mutual is only used in terms of the importance of public understanding of the mutual dependence and global interest amongst nations (DFID, 1997).

Japan is also aware that it is recognized for its 'occupational culture', but strangely it makes very little of this powerful Japanese set of values around work and employment (Japan, 2015:10). There is for instance no reference to '*kaizen*', even though the *JICA Annual Report 2014* recognises this as a critical area of comparative advantage: 'JICA is also spreading the use of *kaizen* methodologies for quality and productivity improvement, one of the areas of Japan's greatest competency' (JICA, 2014: 99).¹⁵

Even though a good deal of the Charter is about 'cooperation that takes advantage of Japan's strengths' and its comparative advantages (Japan, 2015:10), it does also underline the crucial importance of sharing universal values 'such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law as well as to realize a peaceful, stable and secure society (Japan, 2015: 6). These universal values are very much part of what is expected of OECD-DAC members, along with the realization of good governance and women's rights, as part of equitable and inclusive societies.

These political positions about state sovereignty, national dignity and human rights are also to be found in *China's African policy* (China, 2006: 4), though the terminology of human rights is not actually mentioned in the two foreign aid papers of 2011 and 2014. China,

¹⁴ In *China's African Policy* and *China's second Africa policy* 'mutual' is used no less than 17 times in 11 pages and 52 times in 12 pages, respectively (China, 2006; 2015).

¹⁵ JICA has supported the spread of *kaizen* methods in Tunisia, Ghana, and Kenya, but nowhere more spectacularly than Ethiopia where the former prime minister personally requested *kaizen* for the country. See Ohno's *Ethiopia information kit for Japanese businesses* (GRIPS, 2015), written by Ohno K. and Ohno, I.

however, seems to spend less time than Japan in spelling out its own special and distinctive strengths.

1.3 The ‘X’ factor: Japanese experts, experience and expertise

Another powerful ingredient in Japan’s distinctive characteristics, according to the *Development Cooperation Charter*, is its claim to knowledge. This knowledge-for-development has, Japan would claim, been derived from the lessons learned in becoming the first developed country in Asia, in its dramatic revival after the Second World War, but also from its responses to more recent challenges and disasters. The sheer numbers of experts which have been dispatched by Japan over the 60 years of its ODA are massive – 136, 000. Beyond these short- and long-term experts, many tens of thousands of others have gone out for development and feasibility studies as well as evaluations.

Japan, and to a lesser extent China, assume that knowledge and technology are embedded in people; so there is a whole philosophy around how to work with people. It is very far from the tradition of consultant and counterpart, but emphasizes capturing and reworking technologies:

Japan has maintained the spirit of jointly creating things that suit partner countries while respecting ownership, intentions and intrinsic characteristics of the country concerned based on a field-oriented approach through dialogue and collaboration. It has also maintained the approach of building reciprocal relationships with developing countries in which both sides learn from each other and grow and develop together. (Japan, 2015: 4)

There is a sense in which Japan’s own approach, since the Meiji Restoration, to this process of reworking knowledge which is termed: *Wakon Yosai* Western knowledge: Japanese spirit (See Sawamura, 2002) could be repeated in Japan’s engagements with its aid partners in

Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹⁶ These engagements could, in turn, reflect Japanese knowledge and local spirit, if they are really to be owned locally. For instance, Japanese knowledge: Kenya spirit could be *kekon wasai*, and Japanese knowledge: local spirit would be *jikon wasai*. Crucial to this ownership process is waiting till the partner is ready to take the lead and own the project. This emphasis on waiting till the time is right means that Japanese technical cooperation is not a high-speed operation, but is time-consuming. It also means that by definition, ideally there should be no 'JICA projects' or 'Japanese projects', just Kenya projects or Myanmar projects, since ideally the Japanese knowledge becomes Kenyan or Myanmar in spirit. Recognition and 'respect for each country's uniqueness' is a crucial element in Japan's 'core competence' in development aid (Ohno, 2016: 27).

This makes for something of a paradox in Japan's current pursuit of 'Japaneseness' since it means that to be truly successful Japan's cooperation initiatives have to lose their Japanese flag. In other words, Japaneseness is this very particular process of knowledge transfer and not the outcome which may appear to be Kenyan, Ethiopian or whatever. Thus the EKI in Addis Ababa is the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute, aimed at Ethiopian companies, not the Japan Kaizen Institute. We shall return to this issue of ownership briefly when we look at the traditional request basis of Japanese aid.

1.4 'The world's biggest training programme' (JICA's World, 2011, vol. 11)

Closely related to the previous topic of Japanese expertise is the issue of training. In an issue of *JICA's World* with the above title, there is a discussion of the huge scale of JICA's Training and Dialogue Programme which brings some 12,000 trainees to Japan annually to about 1300 different courses at a cost of some \$250 million dollars. In addition, there are a further 13,000

¹⁶ Historically, *wakon yosai* was originally *wakon kansai* meaning Chinese knowledge and Japanese spirit, but then was changed to Western knowledge from the Meiji period. I am grateful to Shimamoto Mamoru for this explanation, and to Sawamura Nobuhide for developing these ideas and creating these terms about Kenya spirit (*kekon*) and local spirit (*jikon*) (Sawamura to King, 23rd March 2015; 22nd July 2016).

trainees annually receiving in-country training and some 3,500 attending third-country training courses (JICA, 2011: 12).

It should be remembered that Japan is not alone in offering such a large number of short-term professional training awards. Three other countries, China, Germany and India, also offer massive amounts of short-term training. But unlike the others, Japan has a whole series of 14 domestic offices of JICA located across Japan. The *JICA Annual Report 2014* argues that ‘Fostering Japan experts and Japanophiles, revitalizing Japanese local areas, and fostering global human resources are other important benefits of the programme’ (JICA, 2014: 130-131). These domestic offices, seen by the *Charter* ‘as a node for various actors’ (Japan, 2015: 12), draw in a huge variety of Japanese agencies, including NGOs, CSOs, and both public and private sector bodies to support this training.

1.5 Is Japaneseness just aid with a Japanese Face?

Given the crucial role of Japanese expertise, and the many arguments in favour of training in Japan, it would appear that Japanese personnel, whether as volunteers, trainers, or short- and long-term experts, are absolutely critical to the implementation of Japan’s ODA. If this is the case, the question then must be: Is ‘aid with a Japanese face’ – ‘*nihonno kaoga mieru*’ – central to Japan’s understanding of aid?

If so, this is rather different from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) which dramatically broke the tying of aid to British priorities and British projects with its 1997 White Paper. By contrast, China certainly does talk about the crucial dispatch of its experts in both of its White Papers on foreign aid. But as China does not have a specialized development cooperation agency such as JICA, there is no exact parallel in China to the discourse of the *JICA Annual Report 2014* mentioned above.

Arguably, therefore, Japaneseness does mean very widespread participation of Japanese experts because it is state-of-the-art knowledge that is being transferred through the

processes discussed above. The other side of this Japaneseness, however, is that aid is now expected to involve and assist Japan itself. JICA's former President is quite open in discussing this win-win situation for Japanese cooperation:

Tackling these issues together is important and mutually beneficial to both Japan and our development partners; this is exactly what I mean by "international cooperation that invigorates Japan by invigorating the world" (Tanaka in JICA 2015: 10).

The *Development Cooperation Charter* also expresses quite openly its expectation that aid will benefit the growth of the Japanese economy, and nowhere more obviously than in the increased role for the private sector in development aid. We shall return to review aid with a Japanese face at the end of this paper, but another aspect of it is the role of the Japanese business community to which we now turn.

1.6 Hugely increased role for the private sector along with ODA

This Charter sees an increasingly more active role for the private sector in its relationship to ODA. In fact, both historically and currently ODA is seen as a 'catalyst' or as an 'engine' for the involvement of many stakeholders including the private sector (Japan, 2015: 4). Japan explicitly promotes the idea of 'development cooperation through public-private partnerships' (ibid. 12), but goes beyond this in the expectation that this will directly benefit Japan:

...utilizing the resources of the private sector and local governments and promoting private-led growth, in order to support economic development of developing countries more vigorously and effectively and to enable such development to lead to robust growth of the Japanese economy. (ibid. 12-13)

Even in the Charter's ambitions for quality growth it is clear that it is not just inclusive, resilient and sustainable growth that will lead to the eradication of poverty, but it is

‘private investment that is made along with development cooperation’ which ‘will contribute to “quality growth” in developing countries’ (ibid. 13).

In the sphere of JICA’s partnerships, it is worth noting that it is ‘partnerships with Japanese companies including small and medium-sized enterprises’ that is first picked out to illustrate ways to implement cooperation that creates ‘an environment conducive to the promotion of trade and investment’ (ibid. 13). Even JICA’s domestic offices, as mentioned above, are identified for a potential role with many stakeholders, but intriguingly it is the private sector that is mentioned first (ibid. 12).

1.7 Growth, human security and human development

A good deal of attention is given to the role of ‘human security’ in the new Charter. This concept is identified as a central or ‘the guiding principle’ in Japan’s cooperation, and its key focus on ‘the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want’ is spelled out in the Charter itself (Japan, 2015: 4). JICA’s former President has, in addition, taken a full half-page of *Japan News* to claim ‘Human security more important than ever’ (Tanaka, 2015b). Perhaps surprisingly, though the president links the concept back to the *Human Development Report of 1994*, the social dimensions of human security are not perhaps sufficiently elaborated here. In particular, the crucial social and economic provisions of human security such as basic education and health are not underlined in the way explained by Amartya Sen in his Tokyo lecture of 2000 on human security (Sen, 2000: 3).¹⁷

Growth continues to be emphasized as the crucial mechanism for poverty reduction, and a whole list of investments are seen as vital in the Charter ‘to secure the foundations and driving force for economic growth’ (Japan, 2015: 5). These include of course industrial infrastructure, but also a slew of other factors amongst which are ‘vocational training and industrial human resources development’. Of course, education for all and health care are

¹⁷ For a recent historical review of human security in Japan’s cooperation, see Kamidohzono et al., 2016.

mentioned as elements in human and social development. But it seems almost as if human security, human resources development (HRD) and human and social development are all in different silos in the Charter.¹⁸

We shall return to this issue when we examine the approach of the Charter towards HRD and education.

1.8 Self-help for them or for us?

For a country that translated the Scottish author, Samuel Smiles's, *Self-help* as early as 1871 – a work that became a key popular exemplar for Japanese seeking to learn from the West in the Meiji Restoration – it is perhaps surprising that the discussion about self-help in the 2015 Charter, as well as the 2003 revision of the Charter, is basically about self-help for developing countries. The language is all about Japan 'building the foundations of self-help efforts and self-reliant development such as human resources, socio-economic infrastructure, regulations and institutions'; this is 'aimed at developing countries' self-reliant development' (Japan, 2015: 4-5).¹⁹ There is no explicit reference back to this critically important experience from the Meiji period when self-help was so central.. But in other writings by JICA about the history of Japan's own development, there are clear lessons learned from this history, and the role of self-help in that process:

It is clearly reasonable therefore to identify as reasons for success the existence of "self-help" in terms of indigenous efforts and the extent of a receptive attitude vis-à-vis the educational experience of other countries. (JICA, 2004: .251)

These approaches are not dissimilar from China's. Its 2011 White Paper on *China's foreign aid* talks of 'helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity'

¹⁸ For a discussion of China's experience of human security see Ren (2015). The term does not appear in the UK White paper of 1997 on international development.

¹⁹ For a valuable discussion about how the Smiles's gospel of individual self-help gets translated into an institutional development policy, see Ampiah (2012) 'The discourse of local ownership in development: Rhapsodies about 'self-help' in Japan's economic assistance to Africa.'

(China, 2011: 3). Its experience has taught it that ‘a country’s development depends mainly on its own strength’. Aid is simply a mechanism to lay the foundation and to encourage ‘embarkation on the road of self-reliance and independent development’ (ibid.).

Clearly the self-help discourse also connects conceptually with the notion of ownership and the powerful notion of respecting recipient countries’ ‘intrinsic characteristics’ (ibid. 4).²⁰ But what is intriguing about the lengthy tradition of Japanese aid being based on a request basis from the recipient country, with its linkages to self-reliance and to ownership, is that the Charter proposes to break with this long tradition. This is perhaps why the term ‘proactive’ is used so much in the Charter. What exactly lies behind this new language is not clear, but the following sentence is a marker for an additional approach beyond request basis, and for a readiness also to engage directly with non-state actors:

It will also go beyond waiting for requests from partner countries by focusing on dialogue and collaboration with diverse actors not limited to governments and regional agencies of these countries, including proactively presenting proposals while giving full consideration to policies, programmes and institutions related to development in the country concerned (Japan, 2015: 5).

What this may imply is that Japan has become aware of the long-standing criticism that its aid processes are very slow, particularly when compared with China’s. Japan’s determination, discussed earlier, to wait until ownership is in place seems a very admirable principle. Consequently, its frequent use of the word ‘agile’ in the Charter and its plan ‘to increase the speed of implementation, improve related systems and operate them flexibly’ (ibid. 9) all speak of a more proactive responsiveness. May this mean that there will be more ‘JICA projects’ rather than Kenyan or Ethiopian ones? Only time will tell.

²⁰ Ampiah has warned however against the tendency to conflate ownership and self-help in writings about development cooperation (op. cit.).

2. Education and human resources development in the Charter: a Japanese angle?

Japan released two new international education papers in 2015, the same year the Charter was released. The policy and strategy paper came from MOFA (Japan, MOFA, 2015), and the position paper from JICA (2015). Both connected their education and training priorities to the Charter and referred to Japan's 'comparative advantage'. Accordingly, we will look briefly at how education and HRD are treated in the Charter, and then how the two subsequent strategy and position papers reflect notions of Japan's distinctiveness in its cooperation policies and activities.

Again, in looking at the new *Charter's* angle on education, we shall bear in mind the comparative dimension, with a glance at DFID's recent *Education position paper* (2013) and also noting the way education is handled in China's foreign aid.

2.1 Formal education in the Charter

Like the previous 2003 revision of the Charter, there is a clearer message about development education than formal school education. This is perhaps understandable in a paper about international development as it is critical for Japanese citizens to understand what their government is doing with the aid budget. But formal education gets little mention in the 2015 Charter except for a reference to 'quality education for all' in a whole list of dimensions of human and social development. Apart from this single mention, there is more said about the role of universities and think tanks than regular school education. Thus there is no reference to Japan's engagement for a whole decade in Education for Sustainable Development, nor to Global Citizenship Education apart from a mention of 'education for democracy'. But arguably this is more to do with institutional capacity building for good governance than about

the role of schooling in democratization.²¹

The universities and research institutions, by contrast, are given a central role in the key section of the Charter that discusses ‘Cooperation that takes advantage of Japan’s strengths’ (Japan, 2015: 10). Japan will make good use of their expertise and their allegedly ‘untapped capabilities’ (ibid.). Universities and research institutes are mentioned again as organizations to be progressively and creatively linked in to JICA’s domestic offices, along with many other Japanese institutions. But most strikingly, universities and research institutions are marked out to support and reinforce ‘the intellectual foundations for development’ (ibid. 15). This is an intriguing phrase, and all the more so as it comes in a section called ‘developing human resources and solidifying the intellectual foundations for development’ (ibid. 15).

It is reminiscent of the days when Japan, during the decade from 1989 which was the time it had become the largest bilateral donor, recognized that it needed to build up its own cadre of development experts. Hence it invested in developing graduate schools of international development in universities such as Hiroshima, Kobe and Nagoya instead of relying on sending staff to overseas development and area studies. But exactly why the Charter should, 20 years later, argue for the government, industry and academia to work together to create ‘globally competent human resources with specialized expertise’ is surprising.

There are two possible explanations. First is that Japan (and JICA) may be tempted to return to their original priorities of the 70s and 80s in supporting tertiary and technical vocational education rather than basic education in their partner countries. This would fit in with the global politics of internationalization, as well as with the very urgent need to recruit much larger numbers of overseas students to Japan, and to encourage their own tertiary level

²¹ In the 2013/4 *Global Monitoring Report*, there was a whole section of the report dedicated to the evidence about the impact of schooling on democracy (UNESCO, 2014); see also King (2014a) on education and democracy.

students to go abroad for international experience rather than be content to stay in Japan.²²

Second, and perhaps more likely, is that if Japan is to take a strong leadership role in international development then it is the quality of its own development studies' analysts that will be critical. Too often, Japan has punched below its weight in the international policy debates (Ohno and Ohno, 2013), and this is perhaps why the Charter says it will work with universities and research institutions 'in order to play a leading role in shaping the philosophy and trends in international development cooperation' (Japan, 2015: 15).

Illustrative of this rather tentative role in current international debates is the minimal attention given to the post-2015 agenda in the new Charter.²³ There are just two sentences in 15 pages on the MDGs and the post-2015 development agenda, and again there is just the stated ambition for Japan to 'take the lead in addressing these challenges, including through participation in the formulation of international goals and guidelines' (ibid. 7). This is perhaps surprising as Japan has been strongly represented in the Education for All steering committee concerned with the next education goal and its targets. It also had a continuing interest in Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), following the Nagoya Summit on ESD in November 2014.

China, too, has been relatively unengaged with the emerging post-2015 goals and their associated debates. There have been many meetings held in China on this topic, but the great majority of them have been sponsored by other development partners, international think tanks or international NGOs (King, 2014b).

The UK had played a highly visible role in relation to post-2015, with its leadership of the High Level Panel by the former British prime-minister, but in terms of DFID's *Education Position Paper* of 2013, there is actually no mention of post-2015 at all. It can be assumed that

²² The term *uchimuki* - inward-looking - refers to a hesitation about going abroad, but is probably more a reflection of Japanese corporate attitudes towards overseas experience rather than just student attitudes.

²³ In the 2003 revision of the Development Assistance Charter which was published just three years after the Millennium Declaration and the subsequent Millennium Development Goals, there is not a mention of either.

DFID would not have wanted, as early as 2013, to be identified with any particular angle or priority for education post-2015. The same could of course be argued for Japan's minimalist approach to post-2015 in its Charter. It might have been expected however that there would be some reference in the Charter to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) if not to the UN's Open Working Group process with its 17 draft Goals and Targets.²⁴

Certainly, there is no indication of a Japanese brand of thinking about post-2015, despite the fact that Japan organized in 2011 a high level follow-up meeting to the 2010 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) summit on both education and health. Significantly, Japan does have a *Strategy on global health diplomacy* (2013), but no counterpart on global education diplomacy.

2.2 Human resources development (HRD) and the Charter of 2015

The Charter clearly gives more attention to HRD than to formal school education. In the earlier 2000s, capacity development and capacity building were very frequently discussed by JICA, even if they did not appear in the 2003 revision of the Charter. But the term HRD is deployed in a whole series of different ways in the new Charter.

First it is used to discuss Japan's own historic experience of building its human resources, and the current need intensively to utilize its development cooperation cadres to increase its international influence and presence on the world stage.

Second, as part of its creed, it states quite clearly that the solution of the poverty situation is 'economic growth through human resources development, infrastructure development and establishment of regulations and institutions' (Japan, 2015: 5). This growth is to be inclusive, sustainable and resilient; and it is precisely this resilience that Japan's human resources have learned about through crises and disasters, and which fits them to help build similar human resources in other countries. Expertise and experts from Japan are thus an

²⁴ See King (2015b) for the history of the global targeting of education.

inseparable component of human resource development overseas. ‘People-centred development’ (ibid. 4, 6), or ‘people-to-people interaction’ (JICA, 2014) are thus other ways of expressing HRD being at the core of development. It should not be surprising therefore that human resources (and resource) development are used no less than 75 times in the 180 pages of the *JICA Annual Report 2014*. The emphasis on the ‘cultivation of people’ [*hitozukuri*] is seen as the very basis of nation-building (Yamada, op.cit. 80).

Third, human resources development is intimately connected to human security, another key concept that Japan espoused during the 1990s, and which has already been discussed. ‘In introducing the concept of human security explicitly into its ODA discourse in the key revision of 2003, the text reminds us that ‘Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development (Japan, 2003: 2).

Fourth, HRD as one of the driving forces for economic growth is illustrated more through technical and vocational education than just schooling. Thus, ‘vocational training and industrial human resources development’ are picked out in the Charter of 2015 as key foundations of growth (Japan, 2015: 5).

Fifthly, HRD is used twice in the key paragraph of the Charter that outlines ‘Cooperation that takes advantage of Japan’s strengths’ (ibid. 10). The term captures both Japan’s own human resources, as well as its emphasis on the need for both hard and soft infrastructure. It is this non-physical infrastructure which is illustrated in HRD, and which is also linked to the concept of soft power, discussed earlier.

Finally, and in summary, HRD should be seen as linked to all four missions of JICA in addressing the global agenda, reducing poverty through growth, improving governance, and achieving human security.²⁵ It is therefore a powerful confirmation of this that the Charter, in a

²⁵ See JICA’s home page, retrieved on 27th March 2015: <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/index.html>

highly suggestive phrase on the last page, should state that HRD, in its two sides (Japanese and its partners), is at the very heart of development: ‘Developing human resources and solidifying the intellectual foundations for development cooperation’ (ibid. 15).

It can be seen, therefore, that there is what might be called ‘Japan-branded HRD’ running as a red thread through this Charter. This is perhaps why it has been recognized that a key ‘characteristic of Japan’s ODA is its very strong –almost “obsessive” – emphasis on human resources development (Kato et al., 2016: 11). It is multi-faceted but is also a key element in Japan’s determination to take a leadership role in the international community.

Before concluding our discussion of the Charter, we should review briefly the way that the Charter has influenced thinking about Japan’s policies and strategies in education – appearing just half a year after the Charter. We shall note that running through these MOFA and JICA papers there is a tension between the so-called global agenda and the agenda of Japan’s distinctiveness or comparative advantage in educational aid.

3. Learning strategy for peace and growth (Japan, MOFA, 2015)

At the most general level, the MOFA document draws directly from the Charter with its focus on human security, self-reliant development, joint creation of things that suit partner countries, based on a practical, field-oriented approach (*Gemba*) (Japan, 2015: 4). MOFA adopts this entirely as its first priority in its education policy: ‘Cooperation for realizing human security and supporting self-help efforts based on field-oriented approach’ (Japan, MOFA, 2015: 4).

Arguably, however, the MOFA *Learning strategy* combines a highly ambitious attempt to provide leadership in responding to *Agenda 2030* – the summary outcome of the UN agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals, on the one hand, and to offer a powerful case for pursuing those general principles of aid philosophy along with areas of education which have been distinctive to Japanese cooperation, on the other.

What this amounts to is a demanding proposal for educational aid to play a role in cross-sectoral and multi-sectoral cooperation. Not only does Japan acknowledge it needs to support the global SDG education goal and its targets which cover all sub-sectors of education and skills. But, beyond the principles of Japanese aid philosophy just referred to, it has a whole range of priority areas which play to Japan's distinctive contribution in education cooperation. These illustrations of Japaneseness in education aid include science and maths education, school-based management, lesson study, engineering education, disaster risk reduction education, environmental education and ESD (ibid., 3). In several of these, Japan claims to have a 'competitive advantage'. (ibid. 6).

Intriguingly, in respect of one of the SDG's concerns with decent work for all (SDG 8) along with SDG 4's concerns with access for all to technical and vocational education and training, MOFA adds the distinctive Japanese contribution of 'broadly applicable skills such as work ethics and teamwork' (ibid.).

3.1 The Charter in relation to the JICA position paper in education cooperation

Like the MOFA strategy, JICA's position paper links education support directly back to the Charter with its concerns for human security. It too adopts the ambitious demands of the MOFA paper and proposes that education be recognized as 'an enabler for realizing all the other Sustainable Development Goals' (JICA, 2015: 3). Its 'new vision' connects the 16 other goals with education but also to its traditional underlying concept of 'human security' (ibid. 7). This is a huge, cross-sectoral global challenge, as are the remaining challenges it outlines in the areas of quality, disparities, youth unemployment, skill development and HRD.

In meeting this ambition and these challenges, the paper claims quite explicitly to be 'Guided by the Development Cooperation Charter of the Government of Japan' (ibid. 9) with its focus on country ownership and self-help, but then it turns to draw openly on Japan's

‘comparative advantages in education cooperation’ (ibid.) in four specific areas.²⁶

1. Comprehensive solutions to quality links very directly to a whole range of distinctive characteristics of Japan’s education cooperation, already referred to in the MOFA strategy, such as science and maths, school-based management and lesson study, along with ESD. There is even a reference to school ‘cleaning’ which connects to the very traditional non-cognitive domain of 5S for the organization of the work place (including education institutions).²⁷

2. Education for equitable and sustainable growth picks up the Charter’s focus on ‘quality growth’ as well as on skills development, industry-academia links, and, again, the pointer to the Japanese tradition of ‘work ethics and teamwork’ (ibid. 14).

Surprisingly, there is no explicit reference to the kaizen concept, though arguably some of the long-standing Japanese approaches such as lesson study are educational parallels to kaizen.

3. Education for knowledge co-creation re-emphasises the Charter’s concerns with North-South knowledge partnerships across different sectors. Central to this is a focus on human resources development for science, technology and innovation (STI) which reinforces the role of STI in the economic growth just mentioned. This area also picks out ‘Japan’s strengths in engineering education’ (ibid. 15) and its ‘competitive advantage in science and technology’. So again we have an emphasis on Japan’s distinctiveness.²⁸

²⁶ For a discussion of JICA’s education position paper, these four issues, and the expectation of ‘greater proximity between international cooperation and Japan’s own issues’ see Kayashima, 2016. Also for a detailed analysis of Japan’s education priorities by country and region, see Ishihara, 2016.

²⁷ **5S** is the name of a workplace organization method that uses a list of five Japanese words: *seiri*, *seiton*, *seiso*, *seiketsu*, and *shitsuke* to emphasise efficiency and productivity.

²⁸ For a proposed study of this Japanese concern with ‘mutual learning and knowledge co-creation’ see Matsunaga, 2016.

4. Education for inclusive, peaceful societies focuses on the vulnerable and marginalized including in conflict and disaster areas. It echoes directly the Charter's focus on human security and its concern with vulnerable groups (Japan, 2015: 4). But it also underlines 'Japan's rich experience in disaster risk reduction' (JICA, 2015: 17).

In summarizing JICA's 'New vision for education cooperation', we have noted that there are some highly ambitious new approaches, including especially the aspiration for education to be an enabler of all the other 16 SDGs. But one of the red threads running through the position paper is Japan's long-standing tradition in particular areas where they claim to have 'comparative advantage', 'competitiveness', 'experience', 'expertise', and 'knowledge'. This emphasis on the Japaneseness of its educational cooperation is much more evident than in the case of China or the UK.

After these illustrations of how the Charter has in particular influenced the educational policies and strategies of MOFA and JICA, we shall consider Japan's new concern with leadership, and then return to our earlier concern about aid with a Japanese face.

3.2 Japan's leadership of the international community

A last key dimension of the Charter is that it constitutes one of the pillars of Japan's bid to be acknowledged and recognised as a leader internationally. The assertion that 'Japan must strongly lead the international community' is a theme that is right up front in the first full paragraph of the Charter, and it runs right through its 15 pages. Presenting Japan as a 'responsible major player in the world', contributing 'strong leadership' and contributing 'proactively to the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community' illustrate this claim (ibid. 3).

In this sense, the Charter should be read in parallel with prime minister Shinzo Abe's bid, for the 11th time, to secure a seat in the Security Council. In his address on the 70th

anniversary of the founding of the UN, it is fitting that he should propose that the UN should incorporate 'human security' into its new post-2015 development agenda (Abe, 2015).

There too he talks of 'Japan's unique contributions', including its claimed prowess in dealing with aging. But it is to the promotion of the concept of human security that he keeps returning, reminding his readers that 'giving weight to each human being, teaching them reading, writing and arithmetic, and aiming to free them from want and fear was the path that Japan had consistently followed'. This connecting of human security to securing the education of all is Abe's first illustration of Japan's ODA:

Indeed, it is education that gives rise to people's dignity as human beings and creates the foundation for peace and prosperity. Education prevents crime and extremism and leads to social stability.

That all children without exception deserve high-quality education always stands as one of the pillars of Japanese development assistance. (ibid.).

3.3 Japaneseness and 'Aid with a Japanese Face'

We come full circle to the search with which we started this working paper and which we touched on earlier, the desire to identify the 'distinctive characteristics' or uniqueness of Japanese aid. We have noted the older expressions of its traditions of self-help and ownership, and newer interests in 'proactively' promoting its language, culture, values and soft power. But it is the human resources, expertise and experience of Japan that is constantly being linked to the human development and human security of the rest of the world. These human resources are seen as the very intellectual foundation of development assistance.

There is a strong sense, therefore, that 'aid with a Japanese face' -*Nihonno kaoga mieru*, - remains a key to Japanese aid. Japan's technology, and its expertise in hard and soft infrastructure are inseparable from its own experts. In the 180 pages of the *JICA Annual*

Report 2014, for example, these experts can be seen in so many of the illustrations, whether as volunteers, members of domestic offices, NGOs, short- and long-term experts, or as the leaders of JICA and its many departments. By contrast in the 253 pages of DFID's *Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14*, there is not a single British face apart from the Secretary of State for International Development appearing once at the very beginning (DFID, 2014: 5).

Both JICA and DFID present their results in the first few pages of their annual reports. None of the listed results in DFID's 'Headline results' relate to British experts or to training in the UK (ibid. 4); they all relate to substantial numbers of people in partner countries, and especially women, children, and girls, reached through DFID's assistance. In contrast, JICA's parallel headline numbers on page one include 136,000 Japanese experts dispatched, 46,000 Japanese volunteers dispatched, and 538,000 training participants accepted, more than 300,000 of them for training in Japan (JICA, 2014: 1).

4. Japaneseness: different versions?

In this brief journey through the *Development Cooperation Charter*, many distinctive characteristics of Japan's assistance have been alluded to and indeed promoted. But it is the Japanese that are at the centre of Japaneseness. Their traditions of quiet, long-term, down-to-earth support, modestly to ensure that their aid does not produce JICA projects but Kenyan, Cambodian or Caribbean ones, are maybe challenged by the Charter's demands for speed, agility, and a move away from the request basis of their support. It is also challenged by the desire to involve the Japanese private sector more proactively.

One specifically educational example of promoting Japanese educational expertise abroad has emerged in 2016 and is termed 'Building of a government-private sector platform for advancing Japanese-style education overseas' (Sato, 2016: 5). It derives from the Ministry of Education (MEXT) but it anticipates the involvement of many other government

departments such as MOFA, as well as private companies, educational institutions, and local governments. The presentation points to a 'demand for Japanese-style education' in a whole series of different countries. It also points to some of the attractions of Japanese education such as 'disciplined behaviour' and 'high scholastic ability', as well as the fostering of engineers and technicians, and the provision of educational services by schools and private companies (ibid.).

If this MEXT proposed platform goes ahead and secures funding, there could be two separate but possibly overlapping versions of Japaneseness available. The version associated with development cooperation has long been promoting the best of Japanese education, such as science and maths or lesson study, through aid funding, and JICA has already thoughtfully reflected on the implications for developing countries of its own expertise in education (JICA, 2004). The new proposed platform would not be an aid project of course, and therefore its recipients would be countries ready to pay for this Japanese-style education. Interestingly, the countries mentioned as interested so far include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, India, Brazil and Malaysia. No country from Sub-Saharan Africa is referred to.

The sharp dichotomy between aid projects and private sector projects is breaking down, however, and, as we noted above, the Charter expects that 'government will promote development cooperation through public-private partnerships' (Japan, 2015: 12). It will be important to follow and monitor what emerges if aid funds begin to support private sector initiatives in education.

In conclusion

The paradox at the heart of Japaneseness is that the tradition of relying on Japanese experts to create projects that are not Japanese but fully owned by their partners goes along with a new proactivity, agility or assertiveness and a new claim to international leadership in development

cooperation, both evident in the Charter. Japan's soft power certainly does need to be institutionally more visible and recognised than now; but ultimately Japan's pursuit of human resources development, human security and of all the many areas where Japan claims to have expertise will depend on a recognition by the world and by Japan's partners that these are highly responsible ways of responding to the ambitious targets of the sustainable development goal in education. Given the very vagueness of the way the SDG targets in education have been finally framed, it may continue to prove attractive to many countries to be offered Japanese tried and tested products, approaches and modalities which they can then make their own. In other words, just as in the Meiji Restoration, Western knowledge was 'Japanised', will it be possible for Japaneseness in knowledge transfer and in aid modalities to be effectively localized?

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Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

本稿では、2015年2月に閣議決定された「開発協力大綱」を対象に、特に日本の開発協力政策とその実践における比較優位とユニークさに注目して分析をしている。本稿の中で、「Japaneseness」（日本らしさ）という言葉はこの「日本ブランドの政府開発援助（Official Development Assistance : ODA）」を端的に表す単語として使用されている。

本稿で注目しているのは日本の援助のソフト面、特に人的資源開発、知識創造、自助努力に関するその長い歴史である。これら優先事項はすべて大綱に明白に紐づけられ説明されているが、大綱のアプローチをただ単にこれまでの延長線上で捉えるだけでなく、日本の援助にもっと積極的な広がりを持たせる余地があることに留意すべきである。加えて、日本の協力と大綱における人的資源開発の重要性に関し、外務省の「平和と成長のための学びの戦略～学び合いを通じた質の高い教育の実現～」(2015年9月)と国際協力機構(JICA)の「教育協力ポジション・ペーパー」(2015年10月)への大綱の影響を分析した。また、比較のために、英国と中国の援助政策との類似点や差異について述べている。