The Continuum of Humanitarian Crises Management: Multiple Approaches and the Challenge of Convergence

Oscar A. Gómez and Chigumi Kawaguchi
Use and dissemination of this working paper is encouraged; however, the JICA Research Institute requests due acknowledgement and a copy of any publication for which this working paper has provided input. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official positions of either the JICA Research Institute or JICA.

JICA Research Institute
10-5 Ichigaya Honmura-cho
Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo 162-8433 JAPAN
TEL: +81-3-3269-3374
FAX: +81-3-3269-2054
The Continuum of Humanitarian Crises Management: Multiple Approaches and the Challenge of Convergence

Oscar A. Gómez* and Chigumi Kawaguchi†

Abstract

The notion that “relief alone is not enough” is common to all actors involved in the management of humanitarian crises. This notion was officially framed at the United Nations (UN) in 1991 as a “continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development,” and today remains a challenging task in the agenda of international assistance organizations. Despite periodic efforts to understand the problem and to put forward solutions, reviews report a lack of conceptual clarity and little progress. We suggest that one of the reasons for this is the paucity of efforts to clarify the meaning of the continuum in a way that leads to an understanding of both humanitarian crises in general and crisis-specific settings. Thus, the present paper aims to contribute to advancing this conceptual front by comparing general approaches to the continuum of humanitarian crisis management, with those that can be found through the work on two emblematic types of crises: disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding. We show that parallel understandings of the continuum as a matter of actors and as a matter of phases coexist, and need disambiguation; besides there is difficulty internalizing the non-linearity of the process and a lack of clarity on the position of prevention within humanitarian crisis management. We put forward a multi-layered activities model as the most basic understanding of the continuum to which all actors can converge, and describe its strengths and weaknesses. Local ownership is the most important limiting factor, and pursuing approaches internal to or among foreign actors as an alternative to realizing the continuum is not a substitute.

Keywords: humanitarianism, development, international organization, resilience, continuum

* Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute (Gomez.Oscar@jica.go.jp)
† Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute (Kawaguchi.Chigumi@jica.go.jp)

This paper has been prepared as part of JICA Research Institute research project entitled "Comparative Study of Humanitarian Crisis Management from the Perspective of Bilateral Cooperation Agencies."

The research would not have been possible without the precious support of the staff from government offices, bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs, think tanks and universities who made room for our questions and offered candid insights. We have benefitted greatly from the support of Julia Steets, and three project advisors, Professors Yukie Osa, Hiroshi Higashiura and Toshiya Hoshino, as well as from the comments made by the authors of forthcoming case studies.

A draft of this paper was presented at the 4th Bi-annual International Humanitarian Studies Association Conference, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2016, where a lively audience offered a great opportunity for further discussion. To all of them our heartfelt appreciation. An early version of the paper was also distributed at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Introduction

The notion that “relief alone is not enough” is common to all actors involved in humanitarian crises and their management. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations,” the Magna Carta of today’s humanitarian activity (Oshima 2004), makes it clear that prevention is to be pursued as much as possible to reduce the impact of crises, and asserts that once a crisis occurs, “a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development” is the ideal goal (UN 1991). This ideal underlying humanitarian crisis management was framed in the resolution as “the continuum” between phases and among partners, and since then has been one of the most recurrent issues in the discussion of humanitarian affairs (Smillie 1998; WHS Secretariat ([2015] 2016a, 2016b; UN 2016). Yet, despite much talk, recent reviews on the topic show that there is no conceptual agreement on what realizing the continuum means (Steets 2011; Otto 2013), and include generally negative reports about progress in practice. However, the continuum is important not only because of the possible gains in efficiency, but also because aid that fails to recognize the dynamics of a crisis can harm already embattled populations. For instance, free provision of goods and services can destroy the jobs of local actors who provide those things during normal times. Unmanaged recovery may interfere with the plans for building back better, making societies less resilient. Besides, giving priority to the continuum opens opportunities to include crisis prevention and preparedness in established development activities. Recognizing and acting within the continuum throughout humanitarian crisis management is thus a human security challenge that deserves more attention (See Gomez 2014; Tanaka 2015; Kamidohzono et al. 2016).

This paper aims to advance the discussion on realizing the continuum - both in terms of understanding the underlying problems and then striving to address them - on the
conceptual front. Without clarity about what the problem is, the many different actors involved in humanitarian crisis management struggle to communicate their goals, hindering joint action. Our starting point is therefore the following observation: while there has been relatively much attention paid to the problem of realizing the continuum in general, there have been few attempts to systematically link these general discussions to accounts of realizing the continuum after specific types of crises. We consider that, since many of the actors and activities that are expected to converge to this aim are not general but specific to each type of crises, the lack of such connections seems to be a major weakness. Therefore, in the following pages we compare general conceptualizations with crisis-specific approaches for disasters triggered by natural hazards and armed conflicts, perhaps the two more emblematic types of crises. In the next section, we set the framework for these comparisons based on the initial UN resolution, and offer a general background of the types of approaches to the continuum that we are discussing. Next, each of the three major groups - approaches to humanitarian crises in general, and two specific approaches to natural disaster and armed conflict - are explained individually. In the final section, we discuss these in tandem, putting forward the basis for a general model of the continuum, as well as recognizing the limits of such an effort.

Before moving on, a couple of clarifications are however necessary. First, it should be clear that by sticking to the original framing of the problem as the continuum, we are not favoring any single approach or specific policy. We use the word “continuum” as a neutral, analytical concept to describe the problem and allow comparisons across different policies and approaches. In the 1990s, the word “continuum” was put forward as an approach to the problem, but one that emphasized a linear sequence of phases and actors, and was strongly criticized for its inaccuracy (DHA 1995). This explains its early disappearance from some organizations’ parlance, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) (Smillie 1998, XXIII), and the European Commission's Directorate
General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO). This view still can be heard (Macrae 2012), especially when new approaches are presented; but no alternative to describe the problem has been agreed. Other candidates have important limitations: the term “contiguum” has received little attention outside its European proponents, and it is not properly a word; the concept of a “gap” is too generic, and is historically too close to the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Crisp 2001); and, while the “humanitarian-development divide” is an appealing name, it conceals what may be in fact part of the problem - for those affected by crisis, the difference between humanitarian and developmental aid makes no sense (OCHA and DARA 2014). Mindful of these criticisms and ready to reflect them through our analysis, the concept of the continuum still seems an attractive option to frame our discussion of the problem.

Second, in this paper, realizing the continuum is presented as the heart of crisis management, by which we understand the comprehensive effort of the international community to deal with humanitarian emergencies. This understanding is not central to the scholarship on crisis management (Boin et al. 2008), but through the process leading up to the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 it has been put forth as an umbrella concept that tries to align in the field certain mandates that sometimes work in silos at the international level: humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction, development and climate change.¹ Therefore, management implies attention to the different phases of a crisis, and thus our research is not limited to relief only. Multiple phases and actors reflect the dynamic change of needs throughout a crisis and its aftermath, requiring both short-term and long-term commitments to achieve the final goal of securing humans. Thus, “Management” is preferred over mere assistance and aid because the term

reflects the changing nature of the global commitment, suggesting there is some sort of system covering all phases of crisis, as well as the multiplicity of actors involved.

Lastly, while conceptual in spirit, the present research is also the result of a series of 50 semi-structured interviews held with different stakeholders involved in crisis management. Two rounds of face-to-face interviews were held in February and May–June 2015 at headquarters in Tokyo, Brussels, Geneva, London, New York, and Washington DC., together with complementary videoconferences, consultations, and interviews. Interviewees included the employees of bilateral agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academics and practitioners who work in single mandate or multi-mandate organizations. All have experience in the approaches covered by the research. In addition, insights gained from several events held during the 2015 World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, as well as the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and its preparatory activities, provided important inputs to the research.

2. A framework for comparison

The UN Resolution 46/182 presented the ideal of the continuum as an essential goal and tool for the emerging humanitarian system in general. This resolution was not the first time such a vision had been put forward (see Kent 1983; McAllister 1993; Barnett 2011), but because it is a widely-recognized landmark in global humanitarian affairs, it offers an appropriate starting point for our work. The resolution gave impetus to the emergence and consolidation of humanitarian affairs through the UN system, as well as among donors, who created specific divisions to deal with humanitarian affairs in the following years (Borton 1993). For example, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (now Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance DCHA) was created by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1992 (Olson 2005), ECHO was created in 1992,
the United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration (ODA, now Department for International Development, DFID) modified its structure to cover relief assistance shortly after the UN resolution, and in April 1992, the International Emergency Relief Division was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

In terms of funding, while humanitarian aid given by developed countries accounted for less than 2% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1988, by 1991 it had reached 6% (Borton 1993), and since the end of the 1990s it has stabilized at around 10% (Development Initiatives 2013). This growth represents moving from less than a billion US dollars equivalent in the late 1980s, to a total of 18.7 billion US dollars from governments, out of the full humanitarian budget of 24.5 billion in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2015). Growing humanitarian needs and the availability of resources resulted in a constellation of actors getting involved, including NGOs, militaries, private companies, and academics, all of whom now take part in the thriving humanitarian business (Weiss 2013). The main goal of the 1991 resolution was to coordinate this system, a herculean task that is still very much in progress more than two decades later. Realizing the continuum was an aspirational, follow-up priority.

In this sense, the resolution is ambiguous in its description of the continuum: in some sections it is presented as a matter of phases, and in others as a matter of actors. Regarding phases, the resolution emphasizes the importance of prevention and preparedness, explaining that “economic growth and sustainable development are essential” for this purpose. Then, once a crisis occurs, the continuum implies “a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development” (UN 1991). In other sections, it also refers to “reconstruction” and “recovery,” evidence of the multiplicity of similar concepts resulting from a lack of general agreement on definitions. Regarding actors, the resolution distinguishes between development assistance organizations and “those responsible for emergency and recovery,” who are merely expected to collaborate. The
resolution also warns against contributions to humanitarian assistance affecting existing contributions to international cooperation efforts for development.

This ambiguity between phases and actors regarding the crux of the continuum offers an appealing frame to compare existing approaches. While the two components overlap, and both are necessary in practice, they represent different perspectives on what the problem is. Realizing the continuum in terms of phases suggests the problem is devising the strategy for undertaking in a timely manner the different types of necessary post-crisis activities. On the other hand, describing the problem in terms of actors implies that coordination is the main hurdle preventing or promoting the realization of the continuum. If we take strategy to be the major concern, covering needs is more important than who does it. On the other hand, coordination assumes that actors and their mandates are fixed, so success is mainly a matter of joint efforts. Comparing the weight given to either phases or actors in approaches to the continuum during the last quarter century will help elucidate the commonalities and discrepancies between these approaches.

Finally, there is an additional factor that deserves special mention: funding. How money flows during the management of a crisis greatly influences the kinds of problems that are relevant in realizing the continuum. Does it help to connect phases? Or does it help to connect actors? Or both? Or neither? For instance, the resolution established contingency funding dedicated to emergencies only, so it hindered from the very beginning the process of transforming relief money into recovery money. Observe how Steets (2011), in her analysis of the continuum/contiguum, argues for distinguishing the disconnect between humanitarian and development assistance and the funding gap, as the two issues deserve separate treatment. While we consider the two to be close enough to make overall suggestions, we take her point and include funding as an additional parameter for comparison.
3. General approaches to the continuum

We identify two types of approaches to realizing the continuum: general approaches covering any type of crisis, and specific approaches to individual types. General approaches are direct follow-ups of the 1991 resolution, usually linked to actors and/or activities related to humanitarian mandates. Among existing approaches, we focus on the following:

- **Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)** (European Commission (EC) 1996) is perhaps the longest standing example. Suggested by the European Union (EU), there have been two EC communications devoted to it (1996, 2001), and it was later part of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (EC 2007). LRRD is usually associated with ECHO, although ideally it was to involve also the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) for development, and even the European External Action Service (EEAS) in charge of foreign and security policy. The implementation of LRRD still today receives attention, as recent reviews (Otto 2013; Mosel and Levine 2014) and reports (Morazan et al. 2012; ADE and Humanitarian Futures Programme 2014) suggest; nonetheless, that the resilience agenda seems due to displace it.

- **Relief to Development**, as recommended in the report of the Inter-Agency Team on Rapid Transitions from Relief to Development (1996), was an early approach of the USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and the U.S. government, which lately has also endorsed resilience.

- **Early Recovery** is the most concrete example of a general approach to realizing the continuum through the UN system. Early recovery started as one of several clusters of action in the so-called Cluster System created in 2005, but little by little it has become a crosscutting approach - see UNDP’s policy (2008) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2012).

- **Seamless assistance** is one of the main strategies of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “that spans everything from prevention of conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or disaster, assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term development assistance.” It can be considered an expansion of UNHCR’s work on the “gap” concept (Kamidohzono et al. 2016), and has been specially elaborated for the case of natural disasters (JICA 2015).

---

2 The Fragility and Resilience Unit was created in 2013 inside DEVCO, partly to take charge of LRRD.
3 The U.S. government commitment to the continuum is longstanding. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in 1964 as part of USAID, and oversaw initial relief. In the seventies and eighties this responsibility was broadened to disaster assistance, implying prevention/preparedness as well as recovery and rehabilitation (Olson 2005). However, these efforts to realize the continuum have not been crystalized into a single approach, but instead involve several bureaus in different departments having roles (Yoshikawa 2013, 11). The 1996 report is an exception.
Resilience is an emergent concept embraced equally by USAID (2012), DFID (2011) and the EU institutions (EC [2012] 2013, 2015). The definition of this concept is mostly common, referring to “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” (USAID 2012). Resilience is still considered experimental but has gained much traction through the UN system - including in the World Bank.

In the rest of this section, we offer further details about what addressing the continuum means to the proponents of the general approaches introduced above. We use the strategy-coordination-funding framework to organize the presentation. The aim is to highlight commonalities and divergences, as well as emerging trends that could be useful when proposing a model that links with crisis-specific views of the continuum challenge, described later. Particularly interesting here is the emphasis on coordination, which tends to concentrate attention on problems internal to each donor, including funding and the flow of resources. We present a summary of the main characteristics of the general approaches in Table 1, and include a row summarizing the main issues highlighted by each of the approaches.

### 3.1 Phases and strategy

The first row in Table 1 gathers the phases included in each of the approaches reviewed. Relief and development are common for four of the five approaches (the exception is Resilience), but in between these two, different terms such as rehabilitation, emergency, prevention, prompt recovery, are included in two of the five approaches. While the term rehabilitation is used, its meaning is not well-understood (Rebelle 1999, 36; Steets 2011), and instead recovery has become a more standard word for this phase. UNDP early recovery policy (2008) stresses that early recovery is not a stage in the continuum, though the seamless approach and others present it as such (Steets 2011).

---

5 Graphic depictions of early recovery show preparedness and recovery as other phases, but the explanation does not provide further detail (UNDP 2008).
Table 1. General Approaches to the Continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>LRRD</th>
<th>Relief to Development</th>
<th>Early Recovery</th>
<th>Seamless</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phases</td>
<td>Relief, Rehabilitation, Development</td>
<td>Relief, Development</td>
<td>Relief, Development</td>
<td>Prevention, Emergency, Prompt recovery, Development</td>
<td>(No special emphasis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Issues</td>
<td>Strategic planning, Coordination, Timing, Implementing partners, Resource mobilization</td>
<td>Local responsibility, International strategic coordination, Relief reinforcing development, Development for prevention or mitigation</td>
<td>Augment ongoing emergency assistance, Support spontaneous recovery activities, Prepare for longer term recovery</td>
<td>Timeliness, Multi-sector, Multi-level of local governance, Combine structural and non-structural measures for mitigation and adaptation</td>
<td>Focus on the most vulnerable, Shared objectives, System wide approaches, Pre-emption-early action, Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors involved in practice</td>
<td>ECHO-DEVCO</td>
<td>USAID &amp; US agencies</td>
<td>Cluster system, UN actors</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>ECHO-DEVCO Partners, DFID-UK Partners, USAID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

Perhaps the most interesting feature is the way Resilience places less emphasis on distinguishing phases. Definitions of resilience do include an overall idea of different activities, for instance when the terms “mitigate, and adapt to and recover” appear in the USAID case. However, the essence of the approach is defined by the efforts taken to avoid the identification of phases. A key message, which originates on the LRRD and is reaffirmed in the proposition of Resilience, is that all activities occur in parallel. A commitment to resilience pursues contiguous participation during the entire crisis. Moreover, it is worth observing that prevention is not conceived as a phase in these propositions, but rather as a major issue to be internalized in humanitarian and developmental action. To be clear: there is no lack of support for preparedness and prevention, but this is not conceived as a phase in the process. Other specific issues, such as timing and implementing partners, are also ambiguous about the essence of the problem of the continuum. So, as far as it can be seen from the viewpoint of phases, it is difficult to distinguish whether activities or actors with fixed mandates are emphasized.
3.2 Actors and coordination

Seen from the viewpoint of their origin, general approaches tend not to go beyond the organizations that propose them. LRRD is mostly about connecting ECHO with DEVCO, whereas Developmental Relief and the Seamless Approach focus on connecting projects and programs internal to the country and their organizations - across U.S. agencies, including USAID/OFDA, and inside Japan. They reflect a trend among donors to adopt the so-called whole of government approach (WGA); ideally developing cross-governmental structures for decision making, planning, coordination and funding under a single strategy, and encouraging some donors to “integrate humanitarian and development responses and bridge aid, security and peacebuilding” (Bennett 2015, 14). While the proposition of the WGA is, in principle, motivated by the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian crisis management, accountability and value for money also play an important role (Bennett 2015, 11) - which explains the observations about funding presented below.

The Resilience approach, as presented by the EU, and by other bilateral agencies and NGOs, has tried to go beyond donor-centric action, and the EU compendium of activities showcases progress (EC 2015). Large initiatives that are still ongoing have been tested on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Yet, tools presented as joint planning cells (USAID), Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework (JHDF) methodologies (ECHO-DEVCO), and Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessments (DFID), suggest internal practices are the main engine for action.

Underlying the Resilience approach’s lack of emphasis on phases is the push for deeper and more meaningful coordination. This concern for coordination is common to most of the approaches, and is highlighted in the extent to which the terms “humanitarian” and “development” refer not to phases but to actors. Now, and twenty years ago, making different kinds of organizations sit down and work together is difficult. In the case of the

---

6 At the field level this works between ECHO and the EU delegation.
USA, the fact that the Secretary of State oversees refugee situations, that the Department of Defense also plays a distinct role and commands an independent budget, and that over twenty other government offices are also involved in assistance, makes coordination even more complex (Koddenbrock and Büttner 2009). Resilience aims partly to offer a common framework for all these actors.

Issues included in Table 1, and the tools described above, evidence efforts to get everyone on the same page, at least in terms of understanding each crisis. Difficulties ensuing from different planning and funding cycles are the target of these tools, but ulterior problems are also pointed out. As an evaluation of the implementation of the European consensus on humanitarian aid (ADE and Humanitarian Futures Programme 2014, 90) observes, “[H]umanitarian aid strives to remain independent, while development aid seeks to align with recipient governments.” The evaluation suggests that the issue of getting humanitarian and development actors to talk has all along been challenging. The call for political will, shared objectives, and governance embraced through Resilience is a consequence of this background.

It is also worth noting that the Seamless Approach is an outlier in this sense, in as much as its focus on coordination is mainly on different levels of local actors, rather than on the donor or international level. This does not mean that other approaches have no consideration for these actors: they explicitly put more vulnerable people in the center and recognize local responsibility. Nonetheless, it is not clear in an overall sense to what extent the other approaches include affected populations, not to mention conferring on them the actual ownership of cooperation activities.

3.3 Funding
Funding is scarcely mentioned by the approaches listed, mainly because these address internal arrangements. It also follows that these approaches are not necessarily supported
by new resources, but instead focus on improving the use of existing funds. The case is
different for EU institutions since they deal with several pots of money, which are
intended for different purposes. Something similar occurs in the Japanese system, where
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controls humanitarian funding, while JICA uses mainly
development funds. The dedicated report on LRRD and EU financing instruments by
Morazan et al. (2012), discusses in detail the pros and cons of considering the need for new,
transition-oriented pots of money, versus adding flexibility to existing instruments
favoring the latter. However, in the case of Japan, the Seamless Approach does not address
the division of funds in any way.\footnote{Halperin and Michel (2000) notes that, out of all major donors, only Japan and the EU do not implement all aid through a single organization.}

It is worth observing that Early Recovery is one of the clusters receiving less
support from donors, which is one of the reasons its emphasis has been transformed into
crosscutting support for other clusters. This is certainly to do with the lack of
understanding about what early recovery means, but also with the fact that in recovery
situation different actors come into play, especially International Financial Institutions
(IFIs), who may see no need in channeling resources through the cluster system (OCHA et
al. 2015, 37). IFIs promote and administer their own donor pooled funds (Fengler et al.
2008), and these are different from those the OCHA uses for resource allocations during
emergencies that on principle are limited to funding life-saving activities and
humanitarian needs. Nevertheless, such funds only represent a very small portion of all the
resources; 4.4% of the total humanitarian response in 2014 (Development Initiatives
2014). In fact, the overall flow is far from clear, as it goes from donors to agencies and
NGOs directly, and is not easily distinguishable using the available statistics.
4. The continuum in disasters triggered by natural hazards

In addition to these general approaches, there are crisis-specific ones: those focusing on disasters triggered by natural hazards (natural disasters), and on armed conflict. These two cover a good range of the global attention on emergencies, particularly since pandemics, slow-onset emergencies like drought, and even technological risks have been linked to the “natural” disasters agenda.

In the case of natural disasters, we focus on the progress towards global agreement through the outcomes of the World Conferences on Disaster Risk Reduction, starting in Yokohama in 1994, followed by Kobe in 2005, and then Sendai in 2015, all in Japan. These conferences originated from the progress of mainstream action against disasters through the UN, beginning with the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in the nineties. The last two conferences resulted in frameworks for action that describe the tasks and priorities for advancing disaster risk reduction in each country, which includes the full cycle of crisis management. There is an inclusive and elaborated process underlying the craft of these frameworks, including formal inter-governmental negotiations and, so, the results are adopted by UN Member States and endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Their outcomes have thus become a global referent on this specific type of crisis; highlighting the importance of local ownership.

4.1 Phases and strategy

The literature on disaster risk reduction (DRR) usually invokes the idea of a disaster management cycle (Carter 1991; Wisner and Adams 2002; Akaishi et al. 2013) (see Figure 1). Depending on the author, this cycle may contain three, four, or five phases, with mitigation and preparedness presented as being different from prevention, and with relief, recovery, and some form of prevention always present. While there is less attention to
relief, the activities part of recovery generally includes “the social sectors (housing, land and settlements, education, health, and nutrition), production sectors (employment and livelihoods, agriculture, commerce and trade, and industry), [and] infrastructure sectors (community infrastructure, water, sanitation and hygiene, transport and telecommunications, and energy and electricity)” (GFDRR 2015, 17).

Prevention linked to recovery encompasses “strengthen[ing] disaster preparedness for response, taking action in anticipation of events, integrating disaster risk reduction in response preparedness, and ensuring that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels” (UN 2015a). Activities include structural and not-structural measures like construction codes, disaster-conscious reconstruction planning, risk assessments, risk governance, mitigation (for example through land use controls), early warning systems, community DRR, and other mitigation/preparedness measures (JICA 2015). From the prevention perspective, recovery is an opportunity to *build back better* (BBB).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1. The disaster management cycle**

*Source: Authors.*
The cycle is fundamentally a linear representation of the process that may not reflect the way situations work in the field. But, while the cycle has been contested by some (Neal 1997), it remains the basic understanding underlying DRR. This is probably though an unforeseen consequence of the way the international DRR system came to existence. From the outset, the DRR movement has been inspired by the premise that “prevention is better than cure,” and so it has heavily focused on how to avoid disasters before they strike, mainly by mainstreaming DRR as part of development. The consequence has been that adopted frameworks for action had little to say about relief and, until the last one in 2015, even recovery. The Yokohama strategy acknowledged the importance of the continuum, but quickly emphasized that “notwithstanding the full continuum, disaster prevention is better” (IDNDR 1994, 10).

In Hyogo (UN 2005), preparedness was included as one of five priorities, and recovery was acknowledged as a “window of opportunity,” but the emphasis remained on risk reduction. The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 was a turning point because it was the first time in history that there was enough money for cooperation to look well beyond relief on such a massive scale. In 2011 the first world reconstruction conference was held, and the BBB mantra became a major trend inside DRR, giving way in 2015 to one of four new priorities framed as: “Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction” (UN 2015a). In principle, the continuum is fully recognized through the outcome, but the framing suggests two things: the emergence of a strong recovery focus group inside the DRR community, and the continuation of the traditional sidelining of relief, which did not manage to maintain its own standalone priority. In fact, the concept of crisis management has been carefully
avoided, partly to underscore the importance and urgency of disaster risk management (UNISDR [2004] 2015).  

There is thus competition between phases in disaster management, but until recently the connection between those phases has not figured prominently in the major documents. Since recovery became a field of active engagement, related work (Fengler et al. 2008; GFDRR 2015) recognizes the need to start working as soon as possible while relief is still ongoing, ideally building upon humanitarian aid, but that is as far as the present framework goes. From existing experience, there are two sectors that have been repeatedly shown to be the most critical in connecting relief with recovery: housing and livelihoods (Christoplos 2006; GFDRR 2015). Housing and livelihoods are not only critical but extremely complex, to the point that they are a big issue not only in developing countries but also in robust societies such as the Japanese one (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). There are multiple examples of work and guides being done on these two sectors, such as the ones prepared by the International Recovery Platform and several UN agencies, but since any solution is very contextual, generalization is difficult.

Lastly, prevention in DRR is still framed as occurring prior to disasters, so how prevention and preparedness enter the picture of crisis management has not been addressed (Brusset et al. 2009). Once again, the rise of BBB has been a way of resolving this issue by linking prevention to recovery, but the approach does not necessarily cover the full range of prevention and, especially, preparedness activities. The interface, if any, between recovery and prevention phases/actors remains to be made clear with a better model of the continuum, which we suggest should acknowledge the overlap of phases and how middle and long term activities for prevention are engendered from crisis day one.

---

8 It was suggested by an interviewee that structuring the framework for action around the disaster management cycle was resisted internally at the UN level.

9 See http://www.recoveryplatform.org/resources/guidance_notes_on_recovery.
4.2 Actors and coordination

The most significant characteristic of the realization of the continuum following natural disasters is the centrality of local communities and governments. While World Conferences on DRR gather many diverse stakeholders at the global level, the process remains an inter-governmental one. However, the model in terms of phases does facilitate local ownership, since it is the affected people and their governments who must go through the full process.

The way external actors come into the picture is mainly through assessment tools and the plans derived from those assessments. This is most clear from the recovery framework, in which there is international agreement to use common tools, as for instance the EU, World Bank, and the UN post-disaster needs assessments (PDNA) (EC 2015, 109). National officers are supported in different degrees by international partners to produce the assessments, and then develop recovery plans that donors will support depending on their capabilities. This process aims to avoid the risk of international agencies, and their development partners, appropriating control of the process (GFDRR 2015, 37).

At this point, similar mechanisms for relief dovetailed to DRR do not exist. OCHA, in conjunction with the national government, coordinates emergency needs assessment based on national requests, which inform the flash appeals for the clusters; yet, all agencies involved in humanitarian action undertake their own needs assessments. For example, OFDA has the DARTs (Disaster Assistance Response Teams), and ECHO and JICA also deploy their own teams. The extent to which multiple needs assessments for relief can or cannot be coordinated is an issue heavily influenced by the flow of funding.

From the UN perspective, some progress can be seen in the IASC (2015) admission that “adequate and not constrained government capacity” may result in working through

---

10 The IASC introduced the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) in 2012 to address the lack of joint needs assessments in sudden onset emergencies. This effort is still work in progress.
national sectors instead of clusters. Since relief is followed by different forms of informal recovery that can interfere with future BBB plans, efforts at early coordination have been encouraged.

There is an important caveat to the relatively positive picture of the response to natural disasters. International attention to the DRR process has been so far very unequal. During the two decades since 1991, Japan has contributed as much as 68% of all the money to DRR (Kellet and Caravani 2013), and is the only country that addresses disasters from both its humanitarian and development branches in a very clear manner. For the remaining donors, activities related to disasters are mainly seen as part of the humanitarian aid portfolio.

4.3 Funding

Funding issues in relation to disasters mostly address the lack of money for DRR. This is argued in relation to other types of crises: in 2010 figures, DRR amounted only to about 10% of what is spent on peacekeeping. Lack of funding is also criticized as a share of the ODA, less than 1%, and as a share of humanitarian aid, 6.4% in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2015; Kellett and Caravani 2013). This shortage of funding underlies the goal of mainstreaming DRR into development, although it is recognized that data is poor and tracking expenditures difficult. The low share of resources for humanitarian assistance also suggests limitations in addressing multiple parallel phases of the continuum through this budget line, in which relief needs override prevention needs. Funds for DRR, as distinct from BBB, are not necessarily included in recovery plans if they are not explicitly there from the start. Since, apart from Japan, all bilateral assistance and donors provide DRR through humanitarian funding, it is not clear how the goal of preventing crises from repeating can become part of the continuum in the long term. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that the biggest contribution of funds comes from citizens within a country
and from abroad, largely during recovery, but to a lesser extent during all the phases (GFDRR 2015, 42-43).

The lack of a multilayered understanding of phases does contribute to tensions between relief and recovery actions. On the one hand, from the national government perspective, the ideal is to finish relief as soon as possible to provide its people with some sense of normality, or at least progress. This requires careful assessment of the situation, since populations under stress and the organizations supporting them could perceive this as a political decision. On the other hand, there is the perception that the humanitarian world “often stretches out the relief phase (immediate or delayed) until the funds earmarked for relief have been exhausted” (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 32). In other words, funding sources may also be a source of conflict between implementing partners and local authorities, generating unfriendliness and reinforcing prejudices between actors. The issue is not, however, merely about funding because, as de Ville de Goyet (2008) recognizes, organizations receiving humanitarian funding do move into recovery projects as needs change on the ground: the work of the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent is a conspicuous example, and Yoshikawa (2013) as well as the interviews conducted as part of this review support this observation. Large enough organizations without mandate constraints can internally balance different funding sources feeding into their evolving programs. Still, it seems to be the case that humanitarian money is easier to get than development money (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994), creating a perverse incentive to apply for available funds. A strict humanitarian mandate tries to prevent this, but this actually discourages the goal of the continuum, by for instance banning the words permanent or reconstruction from flash appeals (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 33).

It is also important to observe that time-constrained allocations are not only an issue of relief. Support for the recovery process, as an extraordinary type of assistance,
can also be limited by donors or local authorities to a certain time period that may or may not reflect the actual capacity of the implementing actors to absorb resources on the ground. The rush to spend money does therefore facilitate co-optation and waste. However, there is also a trade-off between speed, quality, and control that can only be managed on a case-by-case basis (Akashi et al. 2013).

5. The continuum after armed conflict crises

In the case of armed conflict, coming up with the right model to describe the continuum is a major difficulty. Figure 1 describes eight different intervention models in the transition between conflict and peace (OECD 2010; Bailey et al. 2009). Two of them – counter insurgency and counter terrorism – are primarily security oriented, and so are not relevant to our discussion. Of the rest, Stabilization normally includes rapid reaction and military activities, but it also can include humanitarian assistance, recovery, and development activities (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014; Collinson et al. 2010, 3). State-building is recognized as an essential aid objective for fragile states in transition, but remains less concerned with relief and, instead, may be part of peacebuilding. Early recovery emerges from relief activities, and is also part of peacebuilding. As mentioned earlier, such general approaches are supposed to cover any type of crisis, particularly conflict as it has been one of the main motivations of humanitarian action. So, it is strange that none of these general approaches except early recovery are included in Figure 2. This is direct evidence of conceptual confusion and a need for clarity. In any case, peacebuilding seems to be the most promising model to examine as an approach for the continuum, after armed conflict, and so we concentrate on it in this section.
5.1 Phases and strategy

Peacebuilding has been developed mainly through the UN. The Report of the Secretary-General “An agenda for peace preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping” (called An Agenda for Peace), introduced in 1992 the idea of peacebuilding as one of the UN approaches to engage armed conflict, following preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding is described as a post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN 1992). Before peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy aims to avoid armed conflict through confidence building, early warning, fact finding, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones, but, when conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping come into play. Peacemaking embraces a wide range of measures such as mediation and negotiation efforts, sanctions and the use of military force. Peacekeeping is primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and providing crucial support for political efforts by peacemakers. Once these have achieved and
sustained their objectives, then cooperative work in peacebuilding dealing with underlying economic, social, cultural, and remaining humanitarian problems can take place. Post-conflict peacebuilding primarily overlaps with development activities, and it is also referred as post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. In terms of phases, An Agenda for Peace showed a fundamentally linear understanding of crisis management.

Later, the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” in 2000 (UN 2000) redefined the four UN approaches to armed conflict to three: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, thus avoiding a linear presentation of the approaches but emphasizing how they overlap. The “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline” (called Capstone Doctrine) in 2008 reaffirmed the overlapping nature by using new categories of approach: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement, and how they rarely occur in a linear or sequential way but mutually reinforce each other (UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 18-19). As can be seen in Figure 3 from the Capstone Doctrine, there are no relief and prevention phases. However, the model emphasizes how relevant actors including IFIs and other donors, UN agencies, and civil society organizations work together throughout all phases and share the same tasks - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. However, the timeline of the three phases of transition in Figure 3 - stabilization, peace consolidation, and long term recovery and development - still demonstrates a linear understanding, and a focus that is exclusively on the recovery phase (UNDPKO and DFS 2008).

This linear peacebuilding template can be associated to the idea of a liberal peace model.11 As showed in the yellow circles in Figure 3, political events such as signing peace agreements, holding democratic elections and the departure of peacekeeping

---

11 The liberal peace model is a theory which suggests that democratization, the rule of law, human rights and the free market would result in peaceful and stable societies. See Wallensteen (2015) on how previous studies have dealt with the “liberal” peace model.
missions are understood as landmarks for the handover phases. The liberal peace suggests a political sequence that is expected to match with the broader process of international aid.

Figure 3. The core business of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations

Source: UNDPKO and DFS 2008, 23. Timeline added by the authors.

Compared with the Capstone Doctrine, the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture, “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” (UN 2015b), did not limit the scope of peacebuilding to the post-conflict context. The report strongly emphasizes prevention of both lapses and relapses into conflict. It is based on a critical examination of the linear peacebuilding template, which starts from mediators achieving a peace agreement, and is followed by a limited transition period, a new constitution, and democratic elections. The report also argues that this template resulted in fragmentation of efforts on the ground, where “there is little effective UN attention to prevention, great attention to crisis response...and again relatively little attention in the recovery and reconstruction phase” (UN 2015b, para.68). Based on that examination, the review calls for redefining peacebuilding as a broader, comprehensive approach encompassing pre-crisis activities through deployment and subsequent drawdown of peace operations, and recovery and reconstruction beyond post-conflict. Such an understanding suggests more attention to
the overlapping of phases; however, the review still focuses on the handover from peace operations to development actors.

Peacebuilding seems the most over-arching strategy that encompasses all relevant phases and actors involved in the continuum challenge under the common aim of sustaining peace (UN 2015b). Yet, in practice phases and actors do not come together easily (Chandran et al. 2008; Boutellis 2013; Schulenburg 2014; UN 2015b, para.137). This can be evidenced in the proliferation of other strategies, some of which are included in Figure 2, such as transition, stabilization, and comprehensive approaches. These represent some complementarity, but also the distinct framing of the gray zone between peace and conflict. Underlying the proposition of these concepts is the fact that contending principles and the operational requirements of different actors prevent the integration envisioned in the peacebuilding agenda (Eide et al. 2005; Fraser and McNamara 2004).

One deficiency of peacebuilding as a continuum strategy is the difficulty of encompassing humanitarian relief. For example, Eide et al. (2005) pointed out how a humanitarian dilemma, especially focused on UN integrated missions, arose from the relationships between humanitarian, political, security and development actors. Humanitarian principles, especially neutrality, which make possible access to all conflict areas and communication with all actors to save lives, are incompatible with the political position of the UN and donors. This is because neutrality implies refraining from taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature, while the UN and donors need to rely on internationally recognized transitional governments to push the process towards peace. Linking the phases of the continuum may be desirable, yet these two approaches to armed conflict crisis management - peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance - cannot easily overcome such dilemmas and integrate relevant actors in one single strategy.
5.2 Actors and coordination

The multiplicity of approaches to armed conflict suggests the presence of a constellation of actors that find it difficult to work under a single roof. Besides the UN and its agencies, there are also the World Bank and regional development banks which fund development programs, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), and international NGOs which provide humanitarian and development assistance as final implementers. Bilateral donors are also involved as mediators, personnel providers for peace operations, funders to multilateral organization, and implementers working parallel through bilateral assistance programs.

Coordination appears to be the more critical issue for realizing the continuum in armed conflict crises. At the multilateral level, there have been discussions about coordination among humanitarian actors in the relief phase, including protracted relief, and between humanitarian actors and others in both relief and recovery phases through the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) and the Civil-Military Coordinator. Also, there are discussions within donor governments, such as the EU and the US, about whether they should link humanitarian assistance and development, security, foreign, and economic policies or not, due to concerns over humanitarian principles (Steets 2009). Donors are not restricted by a single humanitarian or development mandate, but still they have independent humanitarian structures, such as ECHO and OFDA, partly to maintain neutrality through distinct portfolios. Separate portfolios allow bilateral donors to provide humanitarian funding to multilateral agencies and NGOs, and this avoids to a certain point the need to raise the humanitarian dilemma.12 Those portfolios,  

---

12 How acute the dilemma is does also depend on donor behavior. For instance, Steets observed that OFDA is more pragmatic, and the European Union more principled (Steets 2009, 21-22). This also affects partnerships so, to give another example, Oxfam accepts funding from OFDA but not from USAID.
however, increase the demand for coordination between implementing partners and even inside donor governments.

The peacebuilding strategies reviewed above, such as *An Agenda for Peace* and *Capstone Doctrine*, primarily focused on how to coordinate international actors. These strategies assumed that peacebuilding initiatives would come later in the handover from international actors to local governments. In this sense, local governments are passive recipients in peacebuilding. However, the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture highlighted a broad inclusivity of national stakeholders - not only of national elites but also of people and actors who are stationed in conflict affected areas, since peace cannot be imposed from the outside and locals are the best actors to understand the dynamic context of any conflict (UN 2015b). In other words, “national ownership” has been enlarged to cover local people as well as government. Still, in conflict affected societies promotion of national ownership is not an easy task, since local governments are often authoritarian and mistrusted by people, and local capabilities are not extensively developed.

As we mentioned in section 3, many donors have developed domestic strategies and coordination mechanisms as a solution for more effective and efficient humanitarian crisis management, particularly for conflict and, thus, are deserving of mention. On paper, WGA implies that a long-term perspective of development and prevention is embedded in responses, although cross-governmental decision making in the capital has yet to translate well into the field (Bennett 2015). The most advanced form of WGA addressing armed conflict is the UK’s Stabilization Unit. Under “the Building Stability Overseas Strategy,” DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) jointly work to provide expert staff at short notice, and to support interdepartmental analysis and planning for practical implementation on armed conflict and stabilization (DFID et al. 2011). As Rotmann and Steinacker (2014, 16) point out, the Stabilization Unit
is designed to link activities for pre-crisis prevention, response, and recovery to build structural stability. Still, Rotmann and Steinacker show that this objective remains far from realized in field operations. Other examples of WGA are the Danish Whole of Government Board, and the Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START); while the Australian government is now developing a new humanitarian strategy able to combine preparedness, relief, and recovery together under the newly formed Department of Foreign Assistance and Trade (DFAT).

5.3 Funding

Funding issues in armed conflict crises are the most visible in the segmentation of the aid architecture from the macro perspective, as well as in the prioritization of peacebuilding sectors from the micro perspective. There is a great imbalance between allocations available for peacebuilding and global funding, either for humanitarian response or for peacekeeping operations (UN 2015b; OECD 2010). An OECD analysis of aid flows in 2010 demonstrated that donors provide substantial financial support to post-conflict countries, and that the resources are drawn from different budget lines - humanitarian, development and defense. Due to the segmentation of such aid architecture, including the separation of ODA and non-ODA funding, and the different mandates and remits of aid instruments and agencies, critical activities in the early peacebuilding period may go unfunded (OECD 2010).

From the micro perspective, ODA spending on “conflict, peace and security” is relatively small, only 2.5% of total ODA (Development Initiatives 2015). Funding for some activities like governance, demobilization of former soldiers, and security sector reform remain a challenge for donors,13 while funding for traditional development sectors

---

13 The Group of Seven Plus initiative, a lobby group of self-acknowledged fragile states, has advocated five key sectors of priority peacebuilding intervention such as legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenue and services.
such as health, education, infrastructure, and agriculture receive most of the donor attention. Activities in early peacebuilding receive much less funding than humanitarian or development activities, mainly because of the limitations of the different instruments available during the period, and a lack of flexibility to shift that funding between different instruments once donors have allocated money (OECD 2010). To address the issue, some donors have developed specific funds for transition activities, using pooled funds combining ODA and non-ODA financing, that offer a flexible response in crisis situations requiring a more holistic view of peacebuilding. There are several examples of this, such as the UK’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, the Peace and Stability Fund of Denmark, and the EC’s Instrument for Stability.

It is worth adding that there have been various attempts to embed national ownership through different aid modalities, such as peacebuilding funds, multi-donor trust funds, and quick impact projects, in, for instance, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. However, the recipient governments’ lack of capacity to operationalize these resources in a timely manner has been a source of frustration.

6. Bridging the three approaches to the continuum

The aim of providing more than relief is common to all the approaches to the continuum of humanitarian crisis management policies reviewed in this paper: including the general ones in Table 1, DRR as the disasters-specific approach, and peacebuilding as the armed conflicts-specific approach. All approaches hint at the need for recovery and include some concern about prevention. They also attempt to involve a constellation of actors involved in managing crisis, although the actual reach varies considerably. The emphasis on phases in the DRR contrasts with the salience of actors in peacebuilding. The general approach, reflecting mostly humanitarian concerns, appears sidelined in both crisis-specific frames,
in which a broader set of phases and actors are at the center. We thus put forward a general model of the continuum for convergence through crisis management that reflects the commonalities of the existing approaches and the lessons from their evolution. The model is not radically new, but it tries to connect related discussions taking place in parallel that hinder conceptual advances in crisis management.

6.1 A model for convergence in humanitarian crisis management

The most basic depiction of the continuum between the approaches reviewed is as a linear movement between phases and/or between actors. Therefore, a general model should at least address these two issues: the issue of linearity, and the issue of giving prominence to phases or actors. These two issues are closely interlinked, so we discuss them in tandem.

As we mentioned in the introduction, linearity was a major reason of disagreement on the use of the continuum as an approach. The linear understanding originates from presentations such as “from relief to development”, for which there is total correlation between phases and traditional actors. Linearity takes usually the shape of a handover between aid providers and between funds. The presumption is that humanitarian and development are well-defined, static identities of actors. However, it should be noted that this may apply, and only to a limited extent, to those actors with strict mandates such as OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, OFDA, or ECHO, but it seems to be less important for the rest of the actors, particularly for most of the NGO implementers, for bilateral assistance in general (Yoshikawa 2013) and, perhaps more importantly, for local actors (OCHA and DARA 2014).

Including a phase or a gray zone in the middle of relief and development disrupts the correlation between phases and actors, but the idea of linearity is not necessarily changed. The gray zone in the middle has received multiple names: rehabilitation, early recovery, reconstruction; with early recovery becoming a standard term for the Cluster
System, and recovery a standard for natural disasters. In the case of armed conflicts, early recovery, transition or peacebuilding play a similar role. The gray zone implies that for crisis management the traditional division of actors is not enough, requiring either: 1) some expansion of their work; 2) joint-work between them; and/or 3) the help of new actors. A continuum model based on actors would promote 2) in the form of coordination, while a model based on phases would encourage the innovation and transformation of organizations implied by 1) and 3). Given the challenging nature of crisis management, we suggest that changing mandates and mindsets must remain an option, and so emphasize phases over actors.

There is another compelling reason to favor phases: the centrality of local actors in pursuing the continuum. By downplaying phases, the actor coordination-oriented understanding of the continuum accommodates external actors, particularly those with established humanitarian and development mandates. However, this is at the cost of overlooking those actors without such constraints, beginning with local government, which ideally should lead all the phases, and not merely be treated as one actor among many. In other words, an actor-based conceptualization of the continuum tends to become an international coordination guide, rather than a demand-driven crisis management model. The fact that phases also play a crucial role conveying the idea of progress is not a minor point. The idea of progress is the basic motivation of affected populations, local authorities, and even aid providers.

Adopting phases at the heart of the model does not mean linearity. The point about contiguity and joint work highlighted through coordination models is still valid and needs to be internalized. Indeed, it could be said that the importance and the challenge of continuum conceptualizations is to ensure that a framework based on phases does not interfere with the multiple, non-linear processes that are ongoing in the affected areas. As we suggest in Figure 4, the different phases should be presented as layers that overlap for
long periods, although they present different intensities as the crisis progresses. Note that this multi-layered activity model combines sequencing and layering in so far as changes within the dominant phase follow one after the other, but still for extended periods of time activities belonging to different phases overlap on the ground, addressing diverse, quickly-changing needs as the crisis evolves.

To keep phases to a minimum compatible to all crises, the model is made up of only three of them. Relief relates to emergency activities to guarantee short term survival, while recovery covers activities oriented to restore or improve living conditions before the crisis. We then include prevention - including mitigation and preparedness - as a different phase demanding explicit attention, as in the case of natural disasters. Prevention here includes actions beyond recovery that are devised to stop or attenuate the occurrence or effects of future crisis. However, contrary to the common practice, we suggest that the prevention activities that are necessary after the crisis, even from day one, are the ones in need of recognition from the point of view of the continuum and crisis management. For both armed conflicts and disasters, existing models introduce prevention mainly as a before-crisis activity, while the prevention that comes after is less clear. Observe how this imbalance on the sequencing of prevention did not encourage the DRR community to pay attention to more specific approaches to recovery for long. Peacebuilding conflates recovery and the prevention of conflict re-emergence, but how the latter transcends peacebuilding is less clear. This is not to say that there are no current prevention activities. DRR projects, and multiple activities for the protection and promotion of human rights are well-known examples. But how they enter the long-term continuum picture after a crisis has occurred is not usually considered.
6.2 Issues and limitations of the model

The discussion above suggests only a minimum common understanding, so what the model can explain is limited. Our model suggests a frame for the continuum through humanitarian crisis management, but does not cover all the issues we found through the above examination.

The first problem with this rationalization is that the most basic division of phases may not be good enough to cover all types of crises. This is especially critical in armed conflicts, where relief is not part of the peacebuilding agenda, and a different arrangement of armed and unarmed relief is preferred. Subsequent phases, a.k.a. the gray zone, remain disputed, and multiple names have been given to whatever happens after the emergency peak subsides. Questioning the liberal peace model though attacks what are supposed to be the hallmarks of this process. A general model of the continuum must therefore allow for different configurations of phases to exist. Besides, protracted crises require the inclusion of several episodes of crisis in the model, something that the World Bank (2011) has attempted with 3-D spiral representations. This approach is also used for recurrent disasters (JICA 2015).
We could do the same with our model, but those models either sacrifice clarity or the contiguity of phases, so we stick to the simple 2-D version, which can be combined to represent other types of crises as in Figure 5. Indeed, venturing even further, we suggest that, rather than developing further general approaches to the continuum, a global cooperation system divided by types of crisis (i.e., not in humanitarian and development boxes) would make more sense, at least in as much as the full humanitarian crisis management process is of interest. In the meantime, the multi-layered model as a common but flexible foundation can be adapted to crisis-specific settings.

Another problem is, how realistic is it to favor phases to increase local ownership? It is true that, depending on the type of crisis (e.g., armed conflict), putting the local at the center can be challenging, and may require very careful arrangements so as not to result in additional harm to the most vulnerable - for instance, affecting humanitarian access. Thus, crisis management after armed conflicts will require much more clarity on the implications of phases, their overlaps, and the defining a single “local” for the whole process. Nonetheless, the centrality of the local remains a fundamental guiding principle.

![Figure 5. Multi-layered activities model applied to a protracted crisis](source: Author)

Moreover, the centrality of local actors should be understood as an invitation to avoid approaches to the continuum that are focused exclusively on how each organization or donor links its own humanitarian and development activities. In the worst-case scenario,
mighty actors may attempt to supplant locals in commanding the process, which is a recipe for failure. In the best case, achieving continuity between each external organization action would be meaningless in the midst of local disarray. This is, we believe, why assessments about continuum approaches always paint a dismal picture. Contributions to specific components of the continuum are of course welcome, but they will not shine without progress on the bigger picture. And that bigger picture is beyond what a single actor can influence.

Funding seems to have been slow in reflecting the overlapping of phases, and how actors can actively bridge those phases regardless of budgetary constraints. Matters of principle underlie funding arrangements that undermine the realization of the continuum. In the case of armed conflict, there has been strong resistance from the humanitarian sector against approaches resulting in some form of integrated action, because the integrated continuum is posited as a threat to humanitarian neutrality. Therefore, differentiated structures, even within donor organizations, are deemed necessary. Different pots of money were originally created not to overlap, and thus structurally the system started, if not against the continuum, then without it in mind. Additional difficulties inherent to UN-centric action have given way to a multiplicity of strategies at the periphery of the peace and security agenda. Several forms of transition funds have been suggested as an approach to the consolidation of the phases, though actor-specific approaches still seem more prominent. All in all, if phases are the way to go to realize the continuum, it would be necessary to align institutional arrangements tools and mindsets to achieve this end.

Separate humanitarian and development budgets reinforce the identities of actors; failing to find a relief phase inside the peace conceptualization demonstrates how the system favors actors over phases. This separation is rooted not only in multilateral institutions but also in donors, who theoretically have no single mandate, but both through
funding and operations sustain parallel systems. Nonetheless, in practice several actors do move across phases, and so do their bit in the general continuum. Multi-mandate actors abound and put forward different strategies on the field, but somehow the policy dialogue remains one about humanitarian and development assistance. However, the multi-mandate approach does not mean that actors do not specialize on specific activities, a potential problem that authors such as Smillie (1998) and White and Cliffe (2000) expressed skepticism about, but means that the sectors within which they work are covered across phases. This is the direction the Cluster System seems to be evolving towards, dovetailing with national sectors that should lead recovery and preventive development. Once again though, the question is, in as far as the continuum is desirable, whether it is better to encourage expansion of the present humanitarian coordination system and the strengthening of a humanitarian identity; or, whether the separate structures for crisis types through which assistance modalities coalesce should be empowered. Also, while the problem of the quantity of funding is beyond the model, it could be argued that, when asking for more resources, streamlining the process would be of help against the counterarguments that more can be done with what is available.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the model intends to build bridges between conceptual models, but actual practice may question its validity. Our investigation thus needs to be matched with case studies, to further elaborate on what form global cooperation for humanitarian crisis management should take. Still, as a distillation of the frameworks in use nowadays, we think that the multilayer model offers a good enough option to continue the conversation.

7. Conclusion

We examined three approaches to humanitarian crisis management; namely a general, humanitarian approach, DRR for natural disasters, and peacebuilding for armed conflict,
to find the roots of the conceptual lack of clarity about what it means to provide more than relief - i.e., realizing the continuum. This comparative analysis revealed ambiguity relating to whether actors or phases were the most important focus of the problem, and identified lingering assumptions of linearity in the management process. While recognizing their importance, the local as the central actor, and prevention as a crucial phase of the management process to avoid relapse into crisis, appeared subordinated to international actor coordination, and plain development in some of the reviewed approaches. We reflect all these inconsistencies in a model we call the “multi-layered activities model,” which we believe can help in engendering a common understanding for crisis management. The model simplifies many terms in the grey zones between humanitarian relief and development into three phases, relief, recovery and prevention, putting upfront their overlapping nature. It encourages ownership by locals, since it is the process and not the actors that takes precedence. Still, the model is just a small part of the solution to the problem; actual practice poses many more daunting challenges. Nevertheless, we hope that this call for conceptual clarity can contribute to the transformation of the global cooperation system.
References


Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DARA. 2014. Saving lives today and tomorrow: Managing the risk of humanitarian crises. New York: OCHA.


Rotmann, Philipp, and Lea Steinacker. 2014. Stabilization: Doctrine, organization and practice: Lessons for Germany from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Berlin: GPPi.

Schulenburg, Michael Von Der. 2014. Rethinking peacebuilding: Transforming the UN approach. New York: IPI.


要約

1991年の国連総会決議において「救援、復興および開発の連続的実施（以下、コンティニュアムと呼ぶ）」の重要性が指摘されて以来、人道危機への対応として、「救援だけでは不十分」との認識は国際社会で広く共有されている。しかし現実には、コンティニュアムの実現は容易ではない。その原因の一つは、コンティニュアム概念の不明瞭さ、共通理解の欠如にあると考えられる。本研究ではこの認識のもとづき、人道危機において一般的に議論してきたコンティニュアム概念とアプローチを、自然災害に対する防災と紛争に対する平和構築を比較し、それぞれの特徴と課題を整理した。

その結果、これら三つのコンティニュアム概念には、アクターを意識したものと推移するフェーズを意識したものとの二つの考え方が並列して存在していること、人道危機対応のプロセスは連続的（linear）に移行するという認識がアクターの活動に強く反映されていること、既存のコンティニュアム概念では予防が明確に位置づけられていないことが明らかとなった。そこで本研究では、これらを補完し、あらゆる危機に共通するコンティニュアムの理念型として、多層的活動モデル（multi-layered activities model）を提示した。その上で、このモデルの長所や短所についても検討した。またコンティニュアムの実現には、アクター間、もしくはアクター内連携だけでは十分でなく、被災地と被災者を中心に据えることが最も重要であることが確認された。