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Stagnation of Integration in Aid Administration in South Africa—Choices Between Norms, Interests and Power Balance—

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Abstract

Conventional literature, which analyzes potential factors to determine aid approaches, initially focused on donor interests rather than recipient needs. Recently, this analysis is being replaced with new understandings that emphasize the importance of identities and norms. Once aid actors internalize these concepts, these identities and norms can both help to determine approaches to aid. This paper argues that the intensity of both interests and identities/norms may differ between donors as well as within donors, and it can also take on a variety of roles at different times. Hence this paper focuses on the roles that both the interests and norms of stakeholders take in integrating aid administration.

This paper analyses South Africa’s international aid approach, focusing on how and why the integration of its aid administration has stagnated. South Africa is not only a salient emerging aid donor individually but, at the regional level, is the only major donor on the African continent and, in a global sense, is the one member of BRICS from Africa. South Africa has been attempting to centralize and integrate its currently decentralized aid administration. Drawing on the sense of shared African identity fostered by the president, ruling party and foreign ministry, South Africa initially attempted to establish a centralized aid co-ordination mechanism—the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). However, the process of establishing SADPA has been stymied due to a number of factors: the change of president, corruption allegations against one president, the subsequent weakening of leadership, criticism by opposition parties, the economic recession and budget austerity, consistent economic interest in regional integration, and the indifference of the media and taxpayers.

The idea of an African identity, which puts considerable faith in solidarity with other African countries, is accepted in different ways by domestic actors, and support for it may rise or fall according to changeable political and economic situations. At this moment, arguments for the

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promotion of national interests in aid approaches are more common among aid-related workers than those for an African identity. Therefore, the relative power balance of actors is favorable to actors for South Africa’s domestic rather than external interests, causing the stagnation of integration of aid administration in South Africa. Therefore, it can be concluded that the integration of aid administration is a highly political process, although DAC recommends it be undertaken in a less politicized manner.

**Keywords:** South Africa, aid administration, norms, identities, power balance
1. Introduction

Emerging countries are increasing their influence in international politics and the global economy and, consequently, they are also increasing their presence as providers of foreign aid.¹ These countries, however, do not necessarily offer aid in the same form as the ‘ideal aid’ offered by traditional donors, particularly for members of the OECD/DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee). DAC has been making efforts to bring together—or integrate—aid-related directions, systems and procedures among member countries. These are variously referred to as ‘DAC norms’, ‘DAC standards’, ‘DAC recommendations’, ‘DAC guidelines’ or ‘DAC aid models’. For instance, both aid donors and recipients are expected to make responsible commitments to international aid initiatives such as poverty reduction, aid effectiveness and harmonization (OECD/DAC 2008, 22–24). Aid donors are also expected to improve their aid system by (1) integrating aid institutions, (2) introducing legal frameworks to define aid objectives, strategies and policies by a single ODA (official development assistance) act, (3) disclosing aid-related information, (4) monitoring and evaluating aid performance, and (5) gaining public support for aid through active dialogue with civil society (OECD/DAC 2008, 11–12). In this sense, the degree of integration of aid administration—the focus of this article—could also be a benchmark to measure how well emerging donors’ approaches are consistent with the ‘DAC aid model’.

In reality, however, this DAC aid model remains rather conceptual: individual DAC members are diverse and their aid approaches are not always fully compatible with the DAC approach. Similarly, emerging donors are also diverse and their approaches do not necessarily

¹ In this paper, regardless of the donor preference of formal terms, ‘aid’ or ‘aid approaches’ roughly includes all activities, such as financial assistance, economic co-operation, and South-South co-operation, which the emerging donors themselves generally consider to be aid. As Saidi and Wolf (2011, 7) argue, the aid-like behaviours of emerging donors do not fit this definition since the behaviours of emerging donors blur the boundary between trade, investment and aid in the narrow sense, as well as the boundary between public and private. This rough definition is used because emerging donors often lack a shared understanding of aid in the same sense as DAC members.
harmonize with the DAC aid model. This leads to questions about the origins of the diversity of individual aid approaches. Kondoh (2015) argued that the identities and norms of donors—which are shaped and constructed in the international community—define the interests of each donor, and this ultimately formulates their individual approach to aid. According to this logic, it is naturally appropriate to understand that identities and norms determine interests, but not vice versa. However, in reality, interests may precede norms. Moreover, conventional literature focuses on the performance of individual donors in terms of aid allocation by recipient regions, sector and modalities. Hence, the available literature on emerging donors does not pay due attention to the institutionalization of aid administrations of emerging donors, including South Africa.

Different sets of norms and interests may have different impacts on the integration of aid administration among donors. For example, a bipolar aid administration has been institutionalized in South Korea2 due to the rivalry between the foreign ministry, which advocates for universal norms and diplomatic interests, and the economic ministry, which pushes for interest-centered economic policies. On the other hand, a single aid administration has been established in Taiwan to promote the interests of the foreign ministry.

Unlike the universalistic and normative assumption by DAC that aid administration should be integrated for better aid effectiveness, this working paper examines how and why the integration of aid administration has stagnated in South Africa, focusing particularly on the roles of norms and interests of aid-related stakeholders in integrating or dis-integrating aid administration. To address this goal, in Section 2, this paper conducts a review of the literature on diverse aid and its origins. Section 3 summarizes the institutionalization process of aid administration in South Africa. South Africa is not only a salient emerging aid donor but is also the only major donor on the African Continent in a regional sense and, in a global sense, the only

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2 South Korea gained membership of DAC in 2010. However, it might also be considered an ‘emerged’ donor and, therefore, it remains different to the DAC aid model.
African country to be a member of the influential BRICS (Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa) group. In addition, South Africa has recently attempted to integrate its aid administration—an attempt that appears to have stagnated. The fourth section, therefore, examines the reasons for the unsuccessful integration of aid administration in South Africa.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Diversity of Aid Approaches

Aid is not a monolithic entity; instead, there is considerable diversity between donors. A number of researchers have developed systems for classifying this diversity. Lancaster (2007, 4–5, 13–17), for example, pays attention to the purposes of aid, arguing that aid purposes are dominant for individual donors and their relative balance may determine the patterns of aid, specific to each donor. While aid purposes, for example, can be classified into diplomatic, development, humanitarian and commercial aspects, in reality, donors frequently combine purposes—although the relative weights of each combination may differ (Kondoh et al. 2010, 8; Kondoh 2015, 14).

Hook (1995) and Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998), focusing on aid performance, considers the purposes of foreign aid from the US, Japan, Sweden and France. The approach taken by US aid—which puts salient importance on geopolitical national security considerations—aims at reinforcing its hegemonic rule as a superpower. By contrast, the prominent feature of Japanese aid is its heavy emphasis on promoting its commercial and neo-mercantilist interests. Swedish aid is rooted in its traditions of domestic solidarity and social-democracy: its middle power status in the international community constrains its choice of aid approach away from the kinds of costly aid programs offered by superpowers or major trading nations—the main reason why Sweden has chosen its focus on humanitarian aid. France has a particular interest in maintaining close ties with its former colonies, and therefore, French
aid is characterized by deepening its economic interdependence with recipients in order to expand French culture and promote its economic and cultural interests. Hence, an examination of aid purposes suggests that aid approaches are diverse, ranging from ‘realist’ aid for advancing donors’ military, political, diplomatic, economic and cultural powers, to ‘idealist’ aid to advocate humanitarian purposes. By contrast, there have been only a few attempts to classify the diverse aid forms of emerging donors. Kondoh (2015) points out the diversity of emerging donors by categorizing them into the emerging superpowers model (China and, potentially, India), the regional powers model (South Africa), and the middle powers model (Arab donors and South Korea).

2.2 Origins of the Diversity of Aid Approaches

Conventional literature on aid by DAC/non-DAC members reveals the diversity of aid approaches. However, this literature seems to have paid limited attention to the question of how diverse aid approaches are formulated. In other words, it is not clear why Nordic countries have adopted a humanitarian approach to aid, and why Japanese aid has been neo-mercantilist. What is more significant is that the analytical scope of conventional literature has been limited to traditional donors; hence it could not explain why the aid approaches of new donors have been diverse.

It has generally been pointed out that external elements, such as geopolitical interests, political relationships with donors’ neighboring countries, donors’ diplomatic strategies for advancing their status in the international community, and even pressure from other donors, could all be major factors that result in diversity of aid approaches (Kondoh 2015). In addition to recognizing the importance of these factors, this paper places emphasis on domestic factors among donors. This is primarily because domestic factors determine donors’ responses to external factors. As Lancaster (2007, 9) argues, aid policies are not only influenced by external considerations but are also influenced and constrained by domestic factors. Domestic politics is
of particular significance, playing mediating roles between international/external interests and domestic/internal interests. This may be relevant since, despite similar international conditions, different domestic actors within individual donors may respond differently. Thus, this paper notes that both external and domestic factors are closely related to each other.

The next question, therefore, concerns the major domestic factors that may determine aid approaches. Traditionally, the interests of donors or domestic actors in aid approaches are considered to be the first domestic factor. McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979) and McKinlay (1978), analyzing US aid allocations from the 1960s to the 1970s, examined whether recipient needs (RN) or donor interests (DI) could explain the country’s aid allocations. They conclude that donor security and political interests are decisive. Furthermore, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) argue that, while recipient needs are significant in multilateral aid, donor interests are the primary factor in determining bilateral aid in the case of the US, France, Germany, Japan and the UK. This is highly relevant since ODA is not purely charity but a government action that is implemented through a donor’s public policy. This conclusion suggests that aid is basically donors’ activities to advance their own national interests. Therefore, this paper should primarily focus on donor’s interests rather than recipient needs. Moreover, this conclusion implies that the formulation and integration of aid administration at the national level could be reflected in a donor’s national interests—something that is supposed to be the goal of aid activities.

The second domestic factor, by contrast, is a rather non-material factor that has come into focus more recently. Non-material and often invisible elements—such as values, norms, identities, ideas and ideologies— are internalized by major actors, and such internalized

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3 Hereafter, ‘identities and norms.’ Identities are concisely defined here as ‘collective self-image in society.’ ‘Norm’ is defined as a set of expectations on appropriate behaviors (Reilly 2012, 73). Norms also mean rules to regulate actions that are consonant with certain values supported by a specific society. They include laws, ethics, morals and customs. In short, it is a set of ‘ought tos.’ International norms are referred to as “ideas of shared expectations on appropriate behaviors of specific actors in the international community” or “codes of behaviors which are regarded as the appropriate for most of actors in the international community (Inada 2013, 19–20). Norms, at the individual level, may be reproduced through learning (socialization and sanctions) to maintain social order. This understanding is
identities and norms may determine the diverse attitudes of each actor to the DAC aid model (Kondoh 2015). Constructivism recognizes that, once norms and identities are institutionalized and internalized, they construct how the world is interpreted. They also constrain the inappropriate behaviors of actors and promote the acceptance—or the convergence—of appropriate behaviors by actors (Oyane 2013, 10–1). Identities and norms play an increasing role in influencing actors’ attitudes to the DAC aid model. As an example, while South Korea has been maintaining commercial interests in aid policy, it has also been active in accepting the DAC aid model (Kondoh 2013). It seems contradictory that South Korea has chosen to pursue its own commercial interests as well as the DAC aid model, which is rather negative regarding donor interests in aid approaches. This contradictory choice of aid activities could not be fully accounted for in the traditional literature on donor interests. Rather, as Lumsdaine (1993) argues, the direction of aid approaches may be determined by non-material elements, including moral concerns. Therefore, aid approaches could be chosen as a result of non-material concerns as well—beyond material interests.

Differences in interests and identities/norms are not confined to actors in DAC. For non-DAC donors, the set of interests and identities/norms may not only differ from other DAC members but could also diverge from those of other non-DAC donors. This paper argues that this diversity of interests and identities/norms can also be seen in different actors among individual donors—in other words, different interests and identities/norms are preferred by different individuals, groups and organizations. Competition and relative power balance among such actors may determine the specific interests and identities/norms for the donor as a whole. Aid-related actors consist of politicians, foreign ministries, economic ministries, aid agencies, interest groups such as businesses, and civil society, as well as taxpayers (Kondoh et al. 2010, 11). Civil society organizations, including NGOs, play a particularly influential role as ‘norm likely to be the case at the international level as well (Kondoh 2015, 2).
entrepreneurs’ (Yamamoto 2008, 99). However, in the case of emerging donors, political space for civil society is often limited and, instead, conservative political elites often have predominant power in determining the interests, norms and ideologies of donors, thus lowering the level of convergence. In particular, competition between foreign ministries, which may often share international aid norms, and economic ministries, bodies more oriented to economically defined national interests, could be one of the determinants of interests and identities/norms of individual donors as a whole.

The coalition among stakeholders also matters in terms of convergence. If the strongest possible coalition prefers advocacy-oriented civil society over economic concerns, the relative power balance of political actors will favor more humanitarian norms of aid approaches—thereby promoting convergence. In contrast, if the economic ministry aligns with the business sector, this may result in conservative commercialist aid practices. Thus, when influential interests and identities/norms of emerging donors are examined, attention should be paid to the relative power balance and coalitions of domestic political actors (Kondoh 2015, 16–7). It should be emphasized that the intensity of norms and interests is neither a given nor static; rather it may be diverse and changeable. Consequently, different donors may prefer specific aid approaches that are based on specific norms at one time while, at other times, they may pursue specific donor interests. Thus, it is implied that aid approaches do not necessarily develop from neo-commercialist to humanitarian forms of aid in a unilinear or irreversible manner.

2.3 Analytical Framework

Based on the above brief literature review on the causes of the diversity of aid approaches, this paper pays particular attention to (1) the roles of both interests and norms of stakeholders (such as presidents, political parties, aid-related ministries and agencies, civil society and taxpayers), and (2), the relative power balance of the stakeholders. Different stakeholders prefer different sets of norms and interests. Public policy—including the organizational design of the aid
administration—would be the political output that is made through interactions among different actors and the relative power balance of diverse actors. In South Africa, some stakeholders are likely to have particular norms or interests which are opposed to the integration of aid administration.

3. South Africa’s Aid

3.1 Formation and Transformation of South Africa’s Aid

South Africa has a longstanding and complicated experience of being an aid donor. It has recently been attempting to streamline its aid administration by establishing a new aid agency, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), although analysis later in this section indicates that it is not operational yet. Initially, South Africa’s political isolation provided the motivation for assisting neighboring countries under its apartheid regime. Until 1994, when the apartheid was abolished, South Africa was under sanctions from the international community. The State Security Council of South Africa, independent of the foreign ministry, pursued a military approach to the pro-African National Congress (ANC) and neighboring majority-ruled countries. This Council also assisted Lesotho, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Comoro and Paraguay in cultivating diplomatic support for South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 11–2; Sidiropoulos 2012, 220).

The collapse of the apartheid regime drastically changed this aid policy. The Apartheid Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund was replaced by the newly established African Renaissance Fund (ARF) in 2000. Under the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the ARF became a systematically institutionalized aid agency that was

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4 Aid to deal with diplomatic isolation/competition can also be seen in Korean aid until the 1970s and Taiwan’s aid up until the present. Through the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), South Africa also provided ‘international’ aid to pseudo self-governing black territories (described as ‘homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’), which only South Africa recognized as legitimate and independent states (Besharati 2013, 17).
used as an instrument to promote the diplomatic goals of South Africa. The establishment of ARF was based on Thabo Mbeki’s concept of an African Renaissance Spirit, which strongly supported partnership and solidarity among African nations. The ARF had a mandate to offer funds comprehensively and provide assistance in advancing democracy, good governance, conflict resolution, socio-economic development, humanitarian disaster relief, technical co-operation and capacity development (Besharati 2013, 19). However, the ARF was strongly criticized by opposition parties in 2010 on the grounds that the ARF was too bureaucratic, causing organizational problems such as operational delays, lack of co-ordination and poor strategy. They also argued that it was not properly monitored and, consequently, it propped up rogue states that violated human rights (Guinea and Zimbabwe). It even assisted with non-developmental projects such as the African Cup of Nations in Mali in 2002 (Sidiroopoulos 2012, 227–30; Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 3).

Preceding such criticism, in 2007, the ruling ANC discussed the introduction of a new agency, which would cover poverty reduction in all countries on the African continent. It was decided to establish a new agency to streamline and co-ordinate aid activities in a coherent manner and to double its aid volume from 0.2–0.5 as a percentage of ODA/GNI (official development assistance/gross national income) (Besharati 2013, 34). DIRCO drafted the SADPA bill, which was approved in December 2012. Accordingly, it was intended that SADPA would be established in June 2013 as the new agency for development co-operation from South Africa. It was envisioned that SADPA should help to ‘to develop partnerships that drive innovation around development cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create self-sufficient societies’ (Casoo 2012). One of the key strategies of SADPA would be to ensure co-crafting of the policy focus. This meant that SADPA should operate in a demand-driven manner. SADPA would also prioritize other African countries as recipients.

It should be noted that, as proposed, SADPA, can be seen as typically a South-South co-operation model, which emphasizes common interests and mutual benefits among recipients
South Africa is thus endeavoring to advocate non-interference for recipient countries, emphasize its coalition and partnership with other African countries and respect the ownership of the recipients. However, while South Africa’s aid does emphasize its partnership with African countries, South Africa has already secured its own economic interests through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and DBSA. At the same time, it also advocates the Paris Declaration and Good Governance Agenda, seemingly approaching the DAC aid model. While some similarities can be seen between South Africa’s aid approach and the DAC model in their prioritization of democratization and good governance of the recipients, South Africa is less positive about imposing these priorities on the recipients as political conditionalities.6

In sum, South Africa has a unique emphasis towards aid in its focus on Africa for Africa. Kobayashi (2013, 249) suggests that South Africa may have a hybrid aid model, which combines South-South co-operation and DAC-like ODA. Among the other aid-related organizations of South Africa, perhaps SADPA would be closer to the DAC aid model while it also maintains an identity as South-South co-operation model. Its hybrid aid is distinct since it skillfully integrates horizontal South-South co-operation and vertical DAC-recipient co-operation.7 By mixing both,

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5 According to the UNOSSC (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation), established in 1974 to promote South-South co-operation, ‘South-South cooperation can be defined as an exchange of knowledge and resources in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental or technical domain between developing countries. It can take place on a bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional basis and can involve two or more developing countries.’ UNCTAD (2006), a mainstream organisation to promote horizontal South-South co-operation rather than vertical DAC-recipient aid transfer, defines South-South co-operation as “economic and technical co-operation among developing countries in trade, investment and finance.” South-South co-operation is referred to as the wide-ranging exchanges of resources, technologies, skills and technical know-how among the Southern Nations to promote development (Besharati 2013, 36). This emphasis, particularly towards the productive sectors, is different from the recent development discourses where the focus is on social sectors (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 17). Rowlands (2008, 17) identified South Africa and Brazil as regionally specialised small-scale donors.

6 In the DIRCO interview in 2013, the interviewee mentioned that issues of human rights and democratisation in recipient countries are scopes of aid, not conditions of aid. However, as an exception to this rule, South Africa pre-conditioned good governance reform in exchange for approving a loan requested by the Government of Swaziland in 2011.

7 By contrast, both China and India have not formulated hybrid aid approaches since they do not incorporate the DAC aid model while advocating South-South co-operation. Rather, Japanese aid approach has been hybrid since it combines its own aid and the DAC aid model.
South Africa is attempting to create a Southern hybrid aid model. In addition, SADPA exists only as a legal entity and has not yet materialized; therefore, aid administration is far from integrated. It could provisionally be concluded that its attempt has not been successful so far.

3.2 The Performance of South Africa’s Aid

Although South Africa faces serious domestic challenges of domestic poverty and inequality, as a regional power, it has been engaging in South-South co-operation with African countries in particular. However, South Africa’s aid has been implemented under a highly decentralized administrative structure: individual ministries and agencies, provinces, and municipalities have been engaging in international co-operation. Despite the difficulties in estimating the total volume of South Africa’s aid, the aid burden of South Africa seems heavy. The ODA/GNI ratio is estimated to be as high as 0.7–1.0 percent (Besharati 2013, 32). However, it is arguable whether or not all aid by South Africa fits within the DAC-defined concept of ODA (32). This is because assistance by South Africa includes wider efforts, such as peace-building, debt cancellation, non-concessional loans to infrastructure development, de facto ‘budget support’ through the revenue from customs duty tariffs, and some training, scholarships and technical co-operation (36). If transfers through SACU and Common Monetary Area (CMA) as well as assistance by the defence ministry are excluded, and if DAC standards are applied, other estimates have indicated that the aid volume of South Africa in the 2000s was US$280 million,\(^8\) equivalent to 0.17 percent of ODA/GNI (Rowlands 2008, 12).

The various schemes and sectors of South Africa’s aid are diverse, reflecting a decentralized aid administration. The ARF covers untied grant assistance from peace-building\(^9\)

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\(^8\) Before the plan to establish SADPA reached an impasse, the volume of SADPA’s annual budget was predicted to be approximately 500 million rand (US$50 million dollars) (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 1).

\(^9\) South Africa has been engaging in a number of peace-building projects. In particular, governance projects have been implemented to assist legislative bill drafting, diplomat trainings, and capacity-building of public services in DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. This governance assistance has been identified as components of peace-building assistance (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 5).
to general technical co-operation. For example, the ARF offers technical co-operation in the areas of public services and administration as well as institutional and capacity-building for democratization and good governance to Burundi, South Sudan, Comoro, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Njange 2013, 2). By contrast, DBSA, a huge financial institution with an annual disbursement of 17 billion rand in 2016, provides long-term loans for infrastructural development on the African continent, though they are less concessional (Interview with South African aid worker, June 21, 2017).

3.3 Aid Administration in South Africa

South Africa’s aid approach has hitherto been implemented in a decentralized framework, lacking a centralized co-ordination mechanism, and resulting in the fragmentation of aid projects. Against this background, it was intended that SADPA would co-ordinate among aid-related administrations and implement a wide range of aid schemes. Government ministries are very aware of the necessity of centralized co-ordination. According to the explanation by DIRCO, the macro functions of SADPA are to:

1. Develop policy guidelines on outgoing South African development cooperation and ensure coherence throughout government in implementation;
2. Support programmes and projects for outgoing development cooperation partnerships and use the Fund to support programmes and projects;
3. Provide technical advice on foreign policy in the area of development cooperation;

10 The volume of assistance by ARF in 2016 was approximately 100 million rand. The ARF is the aid agency in charge of grant aid; however, exceptionally it also has also extended a loan project to Cuba, which was undertaken for diplomatic considerations.
11 According to one interviewee, the election in DRC in 2012 was assisted by ten South African organisations, with South Africa’s government ministries agreeing to greater co-ordination in aid (Interview with South African aid worker: June 23, 2017).
4. Build and maintain close cooperation and liaison with international development cooperation agencies and other stakeholders on behalf of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation;

5. Maintain oversight for all South Africa’s officials on outgoing development cooperation and assistance (for bilateral, trilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries, development institutions, civil society and the private sector);

6. Conduct an annual accountability audit, and monitoring and evaluation for all outgoing development co-operation; and


The fifth function, in particular, clearly states that SADPA has the authorization to monitor overall aid functions of the South African government.

South Africa was scheduled to centralize its fragmented aid administration under SADPA on the initiative of DIRCO in 2013. At the time of writing, in 2017, SADPA had been legally established but, due to delays in the legislative process, it has not yet been operationalized as an aid implementing agency and aid co-ordination mechanism. Instead, a provisional step seems to have been taken: the ARF was upgraded to a legislation body by legislative proceedings in 2015, and it was restructured with more staff members and a wider scope of operations. Although financial allocations from the National Treasury (NT) to ARF have been curbed following the austere fiscal policy from 2016 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016), the newly reinforced ARF generally incorporated all of the functions of SADPA except for the co-ordination functions of South Africa’s aid (Interview with South African aid worker: June 23, 2017).

If and when SADPA is successfully established, its financial constraints, as well as the division of labor among other ministries, agencies and provinces, are expected to confine its
scope to grant aid and technical co-operation, as with ARF (Besharati 2013, 54). What differentiates SADPA from the ARF is their co-ordination functions rather than their aid scope and scale. ARF under DIRCO was supposed to co-ordinate the ARF’s own projects while SADPA was expected to co-ordinate the aid operations of South Africa as a whole. However, as noted above, the process of SADPA’s establishment has become stagnant.

Hence, the tradition of decentralized aid administration remains: in addition to major aid agencies such as the ARF under DIRCO, as well as DBSA under NT, at least four ministries of DIRCO, NT, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Presidency have been playing significant roles in their aid approach; other ministries of justice, defence (offering PKO-related projects), police, education (offering scholarship programmes), energy, agriculture, and science and technology are visible actors. Most provinces also have their own aid-related operations (Besharati 2013, 31, 45, 7). Overall, South Africa’s aid seems rather complex, and different organizations have different interests and norms, which are not coordinated.

4. Factors that Lead to Less Integration of Aid Administration

As seen in the previous section, South Africa initially commenced aid under a decentralized administrative structure, but more recently it embarked on a process of integrating aid administration. Nevertheless, its integration of aid administration has so far been less than successful. This section analyses the factors that may influence administrative integration by

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12 For instance, DBSA would be able to maintain large-scale loan schemes even after SADPA’s establishment.

13 Since South Africa recognises that regional stability is significant to South Africa itself and that peace and security are preconditions for development, more than half of South African aid is allocated to the defence and security sector (Rowlands 2008, 8).

14 This decentralised aid mechanism can also be seen in overall aid provision. For instance, it was estimated that the aid volume of the ARF covered just 3–4 percent of the total aid volume of South Africa (Besharati 2013, 19).
focusing on three questions raised in Section 2. In particular, this section focuses on identities and norms as well as interests in aid.

4.1 Aid-Relating Identities and Norms

As an African middle power, South Africa has more complicated norms to balance against DAC-led norms and South-South co-operation. Under the apartheid regime, South Africa maintained its identity as a developed country, which functioned as the outpost of white civilization in ‘the Dark Continent’ (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). Since the collapse of apartheid, South Africa has had multiple complicated identities as an upper middle-income country (UMIC), a member of BRICS and G-20, an aid recipient and donor, an African country, a leader of South-South co-operation, and an outstanding center of triangular co-operation (Besharati 2013, 58).

Within these complex identities, the ANC regime, in particular, has emphasized its African and its ‘nation of the South’ identities (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). At the time of SADPA’s establishment, there was a vision that South Africa could be an actor that contributes to sustainable development, democracy, rule of law, peace and security on the African continent (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). This perception became attached to the concept of an ‘African identity’. Even now, such a perception is shared by some influential actors, as obviously seen in the comments by a Member of Parliament for the ANC, Ms. M. Dikgale, that South Africa’s assistance should not place disproportionate emphasis on the economic sector but instead pay greater attention to humanitarian assistance to other African countries (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016).

Nevertheless, different actors internalized some aspects of the complex identities and norms of South Africa. In addition, actors’ preferences regarding these identities and norms are changeable according to shifting circumstances in the domestic political economy. Certainly, DIRCO still argues that South Africa—as a UMIC, BRICS and G20 member—is required to
make its due international contributions, based on the international norm of allocating one percent of GDP to international co-operation. DIRCO also argues that South Africa should assist neighboring countries for as long as it clearly emphasizes its African identity (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). However, enthusiasm for the concept of an African identity, which was reiterated when SADPA was established, recently seems to have waned in the government and society in South Africa. This is probably due to the recent deterioration of the South African economy, bureaucratic infighting, and growing support for the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA)—factors that have embedded attitudes toward South Africa’s aid approach much more in its domestic logic. This makes South Africa’s aid more representative of domestic and material interests, rather than an equal coalition with other African countries, motivated by its African identity.

4.2 Aid-Related Actors’ Interests

The complex identities and norms identified in the previous section in South Africa are not shared by all actors with equal intensity nor are always influential with the same intensity. In reality, some actors may at some time prefer their own interests and national interests.

Support for the African identity, which was a norm basis for the establishment of SADPA, seems to be weakening. This illustrates that both identities and norms can be changeable according to fluctuating situations in the political economy and that specific political and economic interests, in some situations, may be more influential in regard to aid than certain identities and norms. In fact, the current aid approach of South Africa is embedded in various political, social and economic interests as a means of reconciling internal development needs with external aid policy (Besharati 2013, 58).

In regard to political interests—particularly diplomatic interests—South Africa has been actively engaged in multilateral organizations for its political strategies. For example, South Africa has been reinforcing the African Union (AU) as its main channel for multilateral security,
development and political decision-making in Africa. In fact, since the foundation of the AU, the Government of South Africa has remained in the top five largest contributors to the budget of the AU\(^1\) as well as one of the few countries that pay their subscription punctually. South Africa also hosted the AU’s Pan African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa, and the former Foreign Minister of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, became a candidate for the Chairperson of the AU in 2012. Similarly, South Africa has been vigorously committed to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Among the 15 member countries, South Africa is the biggest contributor, contributing 20 percent of the operations budget of the SADC. It chaired the political, defence and security organs of the SADC between 2009 and 2010, as well as playing an active role in the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Besharati 2013, 22; Kondoh 2015, 25). The linkage with the national interests can be seen in the case of the establishment of SADPA. According to South Africa’s Parliamentary Monitoring Group (February 17, 2016), the Parliamentary Committee discussed the progress of SADPA’s establishment. A Chief Operations Officer of DIRCO, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, explained the following to committee members:

The approach South Africa takes on development cooperation is that it is seen as a tool used to advance South African foreign policy goals. These foreign policy goals are guided by domestic priorities or national interests. … South Africa, inspired by its national interest, has a vision to be a globally competitive economy and an influential and leading member of the international community. South Africa should be a key promoter and contributor to sustainable development, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern Africa and Africa (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016).

\(^1\) South Africa contributes 150–200 million rand annually. This contribution is equivalent to about 15 percent of the annual budget of the AU (Besharati 2013: 22).
On the other hand, South Africa has been viewed with caution by neighboring countries. Although South Africa identifies itself as ‘a largely benevolent and productive partner or neighbor’ (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 2), it had to face not only the adverse legacy of its former apartheid system but also the negative perceptions of South Africa as ‘a hegemon, big brother, and regional bully’ (Besharati 2013, 23). The common critique is that South Africa is proactively engaged in aid only for its own selfish economic interests (Sidiropoulos 2012, 218). These adverse discourses have even been heard among the high-ranking government officials of recipients. For instance, a government official of Botswana explained that Botswana has not traditionally received aid from South Africa—except for revenue from SACU and loans from DBSA—due to its opposition to the apartheid regime and, more recently, for its high economic dependency on South Africa (Interview with Botswanan government official: August 6, 2013). With this wariness and similar sensitivities prevalent across African countries, overt realpolitik options for South Africa’s self-interest are not usually possible in terms of aid from South Africa. This is part of the reason why South Africa has diluted its interests as an aid donor by clearly advocating DAC norms that donors should only benefit the recipient’s development. Cautious bilateral approaches by South Africa to African countries are also related to its active approach to multilateral channels such as the AU and SADC (Besharati 2013, 23). In short, to ease the skepticism of recipients, it has been necessary for South Africa’s approach to aid to incorporate DAC-like norms, which emphasize the equal partnership between donors and recipients (Kondoh 2015, 44–5).

There certainly are social interests in South Africa’s aid approach: tackling the various challenges caused by economic inequalities with neighboring countries. Since there are huge economic inequalities between South Africa and its neighbors, massive numbers of economic immigrants and criminal groups from these neighboring countries (as well as other countries like DRC, Nigeria, Ghana and Somalia) have emigrated to post-apartheid South Africa. This has negatively affected the sentiments of South African people, as they believed that immigrants
from neighboring countries have cost South Africans’ jobs, leading to xenophobic attacks in 2016 (Interview with South African aid worker: June 20, 2017). For South Africa, if its post-conflict assistance to fragile African countries contributes to their stability and development, it would also be of benefit for South Africa. This attitude was also confirmed in a statement from DIRCO’s Chief Operations Officer, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, who asserted that “it is important for South Africa to contribute to the development of countries so that there is no migration. … should the situation in Lesotho for instance be favourable for agriculture production, people will not migrate” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016).

With regard to economic interests, although the aid of South Africa—particularly potential assistance by SADPA—claims to pay little formal attention to its commercial interests (Interview with South African aid worker: August 14, 2013), it seems misleading to say that South Africa does not attach any economic interests to its aid approach. Rather, economic interests in aid are increasing. Since regionally embedded South Africa can further secure its economic interests through further regional integration, aid is also used as an instrument to promote regional integration for its economic interests (Kondoh 2015, 25–6). South Africa has a number of channels with which to advance its economic interests in the African continent. In 2010 the Economic Development Department indicated that assistance to regional growth is not only an act of solidarity but also an instrument to ensure economic opportunities for South Africa (Besharati 2013, 24). DTI also co-ordinates international co-operation programs through SACU. SACU, comprised of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, imposes customs and tariffs on trade with countries outside of the region. Customs and tariffs are pooled and distributed to member countries. For member countries, apart from South Africa, the revenue from SACU is very crucial: it is equivalent to 20–70 percent of national revenues. The revenue from SACU is similar to general budget support—or a form of de facto aid—from South Africa to neighboring countries (Sidiropoulos 2012, 224–5). In addition, unlike other developing countries, with their massive inflows of Chinese products, the markets of Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are dominated by products from South Africa, largely due to protection by SACU. Furthermore, South Africa has established regional development financial institutions, such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and DBSA. While IDC offers finance to promote industrialization in Southern Africa, DBSA is a state-owned financial institution that offers a sizeable amount of finance for infrastructure development in SADC member countries. South Africa was one of the co-founders of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, becoming its biggest contributor, and hosting the NEPAD Secretariat in South Africa (Besharati 2013, 20–1; Kondoh 2015, 26–7).

While some actors are keen to aggressively pursue South Africa’s diplomatic and economic interests through aid, others are more skeptical about the benefits of offering aid. Mr. W. Faber, a Member of Parliament of the opposition DA party, argued that the establishment of SADPA would worsen the organizational overlap problem since most of SADPA’s roles had been already taken by DIRCO and DTI (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). South African taxpayers, moreover, have recently become more critical of government expenditures—for instance, there was criticism of the ARF peace-building mission, which resulted in the deaths of 14 South African soldiers in the Central African Republic. This mission became a target for public scrutiny, which included the issue of the cost-effectiveness (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 4).

4.3 Relative Balance of Power of Aid-Related Actors

As shown above, different aid-related actors prefer different norms and interests, and they often build policy coalitions to increase their influence on policy. However, different policy coalitions

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16 SACU has already ensured the markets of BLNS for South Africa; therefore, SADPA should be able to concentrate on aid for solidarity rather than for commercialism.
17 The total amount of loans of DBSA is more than 10 billion rand (Besharati 2013, 44). One-third of projects of DBSA are distributed in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, mining, transportation, water, manufacturing and health (Sidiropoulos 2012, 231–2).
may have different policy instruments: some may have very powerful policy instruments while others may not. Different combinations of policy coalitions and their policy instruments determine the power of their coalitions. It should be noted that the power of their coalitions is not equal; thus, the relative power balance of actors/coalitions enables some powerful actors’ interests and norms to be represented in aid policy. The integration of aid administration is also determined by the relative balance of power of actors. If all actors’ norms and interests were highly converged, and if there were no other actors to countervail against such mainstream norms or interests, the aid administration could be integrated into one. By contrast, if aid-related actors pursue their own diverse and conflicting norms and interests, and if none of them have decisive power to overwhelm the others, it will become difficult to integrate the aid administration into one.

South Africa’s case, illustrating both promotion and recent stagnation of the establishment of SADPA, can be largely explained by political factors. It is certainly true that, in 2013, policymakers of South Africa—particularly ANC members—emphasized African identity and ‘universal values’ at a time when the establishment of SADPA was being promoted. South Africa seemed to be confident about its rising international political and economic power as one of the emerging BRICS. Because the anti-apartheid struggle by the ANC was for basic human rights, the ANC’s clear position of supporting pro-‘universal values’ such as human rights, civil liberties and democratization naturally reflected the diplomatic policies of the new South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 12). The new government began replacing career diplomats with black South Africans and by 2000 half of them were black. The Mandela regime welcomed the active engagement of civil society in the consultative process (Alden and le Pere 2003, 13–4, 33).

In 2007, leftists gained power within the ANC, and this resulted in a rather more populist redistributive policy to domestic social sectors (Besharati 2013, 12). As was the case with Nordic countries (Noël and Thérien 1995), active commitments in domestic welfare policy may be linked to their activeness in international aid policy. In 2007, the ANC also suggested the
concept of ‘ubuntu’ (humanity); that is—South Africa should share with other African brothers in the spirit of solidarity and co-operation. The concept of ubuntu is reflected in the diplomatic approaches of South Africa. The White Paper by DIRCO argues for a ‘diplomacy of ubuntu’ that includes the values and notions of interconnectedness, partnership, and collaboration within the African and global family (Besharati 2013, 25). Accordingly, South Africa stresses its differences with traditional donors, its commitment to its identity as a nation of the South and its alignment to developing countries. South Africa not only prefers terms such as ‘partner’ rather than ‘donor,’ and ‘development co-operation’ rather than ‘aid’ but also avoids conditionality, which might be indicative of the sensitivity to South Africa’s prevailing image of economic dominance, as ‘a big brother’ in Africa (Sidiropoulos 2012, 232). The change in dominant norms and major players thus resulted in changes to its aid approach. In the case of aid policy, particularly for SADPA, norms and identities derived from its domestic poverty and African solidarity seems to matter (Kondoh 2015, 39–40).

However, the government of South Africa has never been monolithically integrated. In reality, it has cleavages of various norms and interests among actors, which are expressed differently according to changing situations of its domestic and international political economy. For example, at one time President Jacob Zuma was facing a number of challenges that influenced aid policy: allegations of his own corruption, economic recession, and the subsequent austere fiscal policies. All of these factors show how he was defined by the logic of domestic politics, resulting from recent increases in South Africa’s own interests in finance, commerce, politics and defence through its diplomatic policy.18 The increasing predominance of domestic logic in aid policy seems to be coincident to the waning enthusiasm for SADPA’s establishment.19 Both DIRCO and SADPA seem relatively powerless to address this drastically

18 Nonetheless, South African still maintains a number of channels to realise business interests apart from foreign aid (Interview with South African aid worker: August 14, 2013). Therefore, it would not be realistic to estimate that South Africa’s aid is dominated solely by its economic interests.
19 In addition, as a purely administrative problem, South Africa’s aid administration has a weakness in
changing situation. This may be because they have no strong policy instruments, resulting in a relatively less powerful ministry and agency in the Government of South Africa.

In fact, firstly, DIRCO had its power circumscribed by the budget-making authority, NT, which was in conflict with a rival ministry, DTI, and was marginalized by the defence ministry (Alden and le Pere 2003, 16–7). Other examples of typical intra-bureaucratic infighting can also be seen: some ministries have reservations about the central co-ordination and control of aid policy by DIRCO. According to an aid-related person, SADPA was initially supposed to consolidate all statistical data and reporting on aid; however, its mandate was gradually expanded to the point that SADPA was becoming a super-agency of aid. Other ministries and agencies become concerned that DIRCO may intervene in their aid projects, although such projects are not funded under DIRCO’s budget. NT is said to have argued that it should control aid as long as the aid budget is allocated through NT’s budget processes (Interview with South African aid worker: June 21, 2017). DIRCO, despite its aggressive quest for central control over all aid, lacks budget-making power, which only the powerful NT has.

Secondly, even inside of the foreign ministry, there have been divisions between ‘idealistic internationalists’, who “returned from long years in exile with an orientation towards a demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing

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20 It might be controversial to say that the interests of South Africa’s military industry are not negligible; South Africa was the 10th largest arms manufacturing country in 1994, with 800 military companies employing a labour force of 50,000 people, earning 1.03 billion rand by exporting weapons to 61 countries. The armament industry was also the second largest exporter in the manufacturing sector in South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 24). Moreover, the South African military has been involved in the provision of assistance to the security sector in the region and has participated in election observation missions in Zimbabwe (Interview with South African aid worker: August 6, 2013).

21 To take an example of another concrete problem, South Africa’s Department of Defence has been not only providing huge financial resources to PKO activities but also increasing its operations. The defence department thinks that intra-departmental decision-making enables swift and flexible responses. Nonetheless, some aid-related people wonder if DIRCO centrally controls South Africa’s aid, and the bureaucratic process of adjustment may damage the flexibility of aid (Interview with South African aid worker: June 21, 2017).
world’,” and ‘realistic neo-mercantilists’, who belonged to the apartheid-era ruling government which focused on “the importance of trade and self-interests over all else” (Alden and le Pere 2003, 14, 26; Kondoh 2015, 41).

Thirdly, outside of DIRCO or the public sector in general, few actors have supported DIRCO’s initiative to establish SADPA. The volume of South Africa’s aid remains 500 million rand out of a 3,000 billion rand national budget; thus few government bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, businesses, civil society groups, journalists or taxpayers have paid attention to this ‘minor issue’. South Africa’s aid is discussed only in a small circle (Interview with South African aid worker: June 20, 2017). The opposition DA party, supported by the wealthier white and black class, prefers a small government and is cautious about expanding external aid. While businesses may seem remote from DIRCO and SADPA, there are several South African construction companies and consultancies that have been already engaged in various aid projects (Interview with South African aid worker: June 21, 2017). Businesses can ensure their economic interests in aid policy without SADPA. Civil society organizations (CSOs), after participating in public policy-making during the Mandela regime, were marginalized during the Mbeki administration (Alden and le Pere 2003, 17, 33). In sum, there are few actors, outside DIRCO, who have high expectations for the establishment of SADPA.

This section examined the question of why South Africa’s efforts to integrate its aid administration have been less than successful. It was found that the actors who advocate centralized policy co-ordination and aid for African identities and ‘universal’ norms—both of which are supposed to be materialized by SADPA—are relatively powerless. By contrast, those who support political, social and economic interests of South Africa have powerful instruments to influence aid policy process and realize their interests under the decentralized aid system. This difference in the relative power balance of actors, which is favorable to actors among South

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22 President Mbeki is said to have disempowered the roles of Parliament and the ruling ANC in public policy-making (Alden and le Pere 2003, 32–3).
Africa’s domestic interests, has resulted in the stagnation of integration of the aid administration in South Africa.

5. Conclusions

This paper examined the question of how and why the integration of the aid administration has been stymied in South Africa. As seen in the second section, conventional literature—which examines the factors that can potentially determine approaches to aid—initially focused on donors’ interests rather than recipient needs. This type of analysis is now being replaced by a new emphasis on the roles of non-material elements: identities and norms. Once they are internalized to aid-related actors, identities and norms can determine aid approaches.

Nonetheless, this paper has argued that the intensity of both interests and identities/norms may be different among donors, within donors and at different time periods. To understand why different interests and identities/norms are chosen, this paper examined the interests and norms of stakeholders, and how the relative power balance among stakeholders determines the integration of aid administration.

The third and fourth sections analyzed the reasons that the integration of aid administration has stagnated in South Africa. South Africa is the only influential emerging donor on the African continent and has—to some extent—adopted an African identity, and this is shared by those currently in power. This was crucial in attempts to establish a central aid co-ordination mechanism, SADPA. However, a range of political, social, and economic factors, along with the indifference of media and taxpayers, have prevented SADPA from proceeding. The emergence of an African identity, through which a great amount of faith was offered in solidarity with other African countries, is accepted differently by various domestic actors. However, at least at this moment, national interests in aid approaches are more clearly recognized among the aid community than arguments for a shared African identity. Therefore,
the relative power balance of actors is favorable to those working for South Africa’s domestic interests, thus resulting in the stagnation of the process of integrating the aid administration in South Africa.

This paper has revealed that South Africa’s aid approach is formed and transformed by complex processes and structures, particularly due to the relative power balance of major actors. That is, unlike the debate around either interests or norms, it is not either-or but both interests and norms together that led to the stagnation of the process of integrating aid administration. It should also be noted that interests and norms themselves do not determine aid approaches. Rather, through the relative power balance of actors, particular interests and norms are reflected in an aid approach. As for the question of why aid approaches are so diverse and changeable, the findings in this paper suggest that more attention should be paid to the actual political processes in which the diverse interests and norms of individual donors are coordinated. The integration of aid administration is a highly political process that may differ among donors, regardless of whether they are from traditional or emerging spheres. Nonetheless, the DAC recommends that further integration take place in a less politicized manner. The stagnation of the integration of South Africa’s aid administration uniquely illustrates that politics matters: those who were positive about integration were politically weak while those who were negative were politically influential.

This paper is comprised of a single country case study, and further comparative research is anticipated that will analyze how the different power balances between actors within donors institutionalize different political processes, and how this results in different aid processes.

**Acronyms**

ANC  African National Congress
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>African Renaissance Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLNS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Area</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DI</td>
<td>donor interests</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>gross national income</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>National Treasury</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>RN</td>
<td>recipient needs</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADPA</td>
<td>South African Development Partnership Agency</td>
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<td>UMIC</td>
<td>upper middle-income country</td>
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<td>UNOSSC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation</td>
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References


**Interviews**

Botswanan government official: August 6, 2013.


要約

本ワーキングペーパーは、南アフリカの援助行政の統合が、どのように、なぜ実現していないのかを分析する。

援助決定要因を分析した先行研究は当初、援助受入国の開発ニーズよりも援助供与国の利益に焦点を当てていた。近年、こうした分析はアイデンティティ・規範といった非物質的要素の役割を重視する理解が主流を占めている。つまり、援助関連のステークホルダーが特定アイデンティティ・規範を一度内面化すれば、それらアイデンティティ・規範が援助戦略や政策のあり方を決定するようになると考えられる。しかし、本ペーパーは、選好される物質的利益もアイデンティティ・規範もともに重要であり、それらの内容・強度は援助供与国によっても、同一援助供与国内であったとしても時期によっても異なることを論じる。従って、本ペーパーでは、援助行政の統合において、ステークホルダーが選好する利益・規範双方の役割に焦点を当てることにする。

南アフリカは、卓越した新興援助供与国であるだけでなく、地域的に見てもアフリカ大陸で唯一の主要ドナーであり、グローバルな視点で見ても影響力ある BRICS の一角を占めている。近年、南アフリカは前大統領、与党、国際関係・協力省が「アフリカ・アイデンティティ」を強調し、同時に、分権的であった同国の援助行政を集権化・統合する試みを重ねてきた。その結果、集権化された援助調整メカニズムとして、南アフリカ開発パートナーシップ庁（SADPA : South African Development Partnership Agency）の設立が準備されてきた。しかし、大統領の交替、現職大統領の汚職疑惑とリーダーシップの後退、野党による批判、景気後退と緊縮財政、南部アフリカ地域統合における経済利益の重要性、メディア・納税者の関心により、SADPA 設置のプロセスは大幅な後れを取っている。他のアフリカ諸国との連帯を重視するアフリカ・アイデンティティに対する国内のステークホルダーの受け止め方も様々であり、政治経済状況によって大きく変動するものとなっている。少なくとも現段階では、アフリカ・アイデンティティよりも、援助供与国南アフリカの国益についての主張がなされることが多いとなっている。従って、ステークホルダーのパワーバランスは、南アフリカの国益を重視するアクターに優位となっており、援助行政の統合が停滞する原因となっているのである。

本ペーパーは、援助行政の統合は、高度に政治的なプロセスによって行われるのであり、DAC 提言が想定するような非政治的で技術的なプロセスのものではないことを示唆する。
キーワード：南アフリカ、援助行政、規範、アイデンティティ、パワー・バランス