Safety and Security Management for International Volunteers: A Case Study of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers in Colombia during the War on Drugs

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Safety and Security Management for International Volunteers:
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Abstract

The safety and security of aid workers has emerged as an important theme for humanitarian organizations and in scholarly literature. However, there is a dearth of research on volunteers who work abroad with governmental programs such as the US Peace Corps and the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV). In particular, no research has been published on the safety and security issues faced by those within the JOCV program. To this end, the paper aims to explore how JOCV volunteers managed their safety in Colombia between 1985 and 1991 by analyzing their first-person accounts in their 隊員報告書 Taiin hōkoku sho or JOCV working reports. It also looks at how the safety and security challenges of Colombia at that time affected their ability to carry out their projects. Their experiences provide rich material for study because Colombia experienced frequent domestic terrorist attacks and growing instability during this period. As the study will demonstrate, the stringent security approach introduced by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) worked to protect JOCV volunteers in Colombia. The volunteers demonstrated growing awareness of their personal safety and security, in addition to complying with JICA’s security mandates, adopted individual strategies to stay safe. Thus, the numbers reporting encounters with crime and violence fell annually even though Colombia’s security situation continued to deteriorate. However, JICA’s security requirements, such as restricting where and when volunteers could work, created significant challenges for the advancement of their projects and their need to deepen trust in their working relationships with locals. The study also raises key implications for contemporary security management. These include recognizing volunteers as a rich source of field intelligence when assessing safety and security, avoiding a ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach to security protocols, and communicating about security measures that could be construed as insensitive to local staff.

Keywords: Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), Safety and Security, International Volunteering, Security Management, Colombia.

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the role of aid workers has evolved to become more varied and complex compared to that of the last century. As aid organizations have started providing aid to areas experiencing insecurity or armed conflict, violence against aid workers has risen considerably (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009). Relief and research organizations started to quantitatively record violence against aid workers from the early 2000s (Neuman 2016, 32). As such, the safety of aid workers has become an important theme in the scholarly literature and public awareness of the insecurity faced by aid workers has grown as well. On the other hand, some researchers have questioned the dominant discourse that suggests that insecurity problems for aid workers have been increasing over the past twenty years. They have pointed out methodological limitations in previous studies, such as the inconsistency of definitions around who is an ‘aid worker’ and what is a ‘security incident’ (Weissman 2016; Fast 2014). So, for example, the criteria for an aid worker may be too restrictive, and it is more likely that other volunteer or governmental aid groups who provide services abroad are excluded as research targets. In addition, when the data also counts security incidents that affect aid workers but occur outside of working hours or work assignments, this can distort the tracking of insecurity faced by staffers that is directly tied to aid work.

Volunteers from governmental aid agencies have faced some insecurity because of their unique status as temporary foreign government sponsored volunteers. For instance, in the late 1960s through to the early 1970s, the Peace Corps offices and its volunteers in Bolivia were attacked by locals due to rising anti-US sentiment in the country. Then in 1971, the Peace Corps program was expelled by the Bolivian government (Siekmier 2011, 133 and 140-146). The Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) has also had occasion to terminate its program due to a change in the political climate of a host country. In the case of Laos, after the Pathet Lao communist organization assumed power in 1975, the new government regarded development
projects led by Western countries, including Japan, as the product of imperialism. As such, the
JOCV program was asked to leave the country (JICA 2001, 63-64). Thus, volunteers from
governmental agencies risk being perceived as extensions of their government and its policies,
and can become the target of negative sentiment or more by locals.

The study explored JOCV volunteers’ experiences of safety and security during their
assignment in Colombia. The JOCV was established in 1965 as one of the technical
cooperation programs of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The JOCV is one
of the governmental international volunteer agencies that trains ordinary citizens as volunteers
and places them overseas to serve a two-year term. Since its inception, the JOCV has dispatched
42,997 volunteers (as of July 31, 2017). Despite its long history of sending volunteers to various
countries, the safety and security issues faced by JOCV volunteers, especially those who have
worked in countries with unstable politics and high levels of crime, have not been studied.

The JOCV program in Latin America started with the placement of eight volunteers in
El Salvador in 1968. However, according to the JICA Annual Report of 1979, the JOCV decided
to withdraw its volunteers that year due to escalating violence linked to guerilla activities and
social unrest. Under such volatile and dangerous conditions, it became extremely difficult to
protect the lives of its volunteers as well as to effectively cooperate with the local population
(JICA 1979, 291). In Latin America from the 1970s to 1980s, political instability and high rates
of violence associated with guerilla activities and terrorism were frequently cited as the rationale
for the withdrawal of programs not only by the JOCV, but also the Peace Corps.

In light of these conditions, the paper aims to explore how JOCV volunteers managed
their safety in Colombia (1985-1991) and how the safety and security challenges of the host

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1 In the English language, as Randolph Martin (1999) stated, safety refers to “illness and accidents”
while security refers to “acts of violence and crime”(4). In the Japanese language, both safety and
security are typically covered by one word, anzen. Therefore, in many cases, “safety management” and
“security management” are referenced in same way in Japanese, namely, as anzen kanri.
country affected their ability to carry out their projects. Between 1985 and 1991, Colombia experienced frequent terrorist attacks and the experiences of JOCV volunteers provide rich material for the study of safety and security issues faced by volunteers. To this end, the paper examined the 隊員報告書 Tain hōkoku sho (known as the JOCV working report in English) of the JOCV volunteers posted in Colombia between 1985 and 1991. In order to explore the safety and security management experiences of JOCV volunteers, the paper covers the following areas: 1) the placement patterns of volunteers; 2) the security management practices of the JICA Colombia office; 3) the awareness that JOCV volunteers exhibited of crime and danger in their surroundings and in managing their personal safety; 4) the security strategies of JOCV volunteers and; 5) striking a balance between the security and safety of volunteers and the delivery of programs in high risk locations.

2. Literature Review: Safety and Security Management for Aid Workers

Since the late 1990s in particular, the safety and security of aid workers in the field has become an important theme for research by humanitarian organizations and in the scholarly literature. One of leading scholars on this topic, Larissa Fast, has argued that violence against aid workers is neither new nor a particular characteristic of the post 9/11 context, and pointed out that there are some gaps in “our collective knowledge about the dangers aid workers face” (Fast 2014, 67). As Fast underscored above, this was not a new phenomenon for aid agencies, from religious-based organizations to governmental development agencies, whose staff and volunteers had been experiencing violent incidents, including deaths. In the case of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the agency began to operate in “high-risk environments” such as Afghanistan and El Salvador at the end of the 1970s. With this shift, the number of incidents impacting their volunteers in the field grew. However, at that time, the agency did not have a formal structure for responding to these incidents (Neuman 2016, 22-23). The governmental
volunteer agency, the Peace Corps, also faced a similar situation. The testimonial document, *Voice of Experience in Central America: Former Peace Corps Volunteers’ Insights into a Troubled Region* (1985), covers the Civil War period through to the mid-20th century, and captures the direct and indirect experiences of Peace Corps volunteers with significant security and safety threats (RPCV Committee on Central America 1985). At that time, compared to today’s Peace Corps security management, the agency had not yet established formal and organized security policies and procedures.

Between the late 1990s and 2000s, aid agencies began to formally collaborate on their approach to security policies and procedures. In addition, the stance of the “professionalization and standardization of security management” was initiated in earnest in the late 1990s and enforced during the 2000s (Fast 2014, 180-185). Security became part of the formal agenda of international institutions as exemplified by the 1997 adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 52/167 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel (Neuman 2016, 27). Aid agencies started publishing their own security manuals. For instance, in 1993, a series of short pamphlets of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeared. Then the group, Save the Children UK, published *Safety First* in 1995 and the ICRC’s *Staying Alive* was released in 1999 (Beerli and Weissman 2016, 71). Since the early 2000s, many aid agencies have increased their budgets for establishing security posts at their headquarters as well as in regional/field locations. The tracking of security incidents has increased among aid agencies though a problem related to data collection remains (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009, 7-8). In particular from the 1990s to the early 2000s, aid agencies hired a large number of former military personnel or police officers as their security experts. Many of them were male and of North American or European origin, but locals were also hired as security officers (Fast 2014, 181-182). So, the reality is that aid agencies started to rely on external experts for security management well before 9/11.
Examining the characteristics of violence against aid workers, Dennis King (2004) found that NGO personnel and locally hired UN staff (or contractors) who died were more likely to be victims of violence than UN international staff. Also, Mani Sheik and colleagues (2000), who analyzed 382 cases of death amongst aid workers between 1985 and 1998, found that many of these incidents were associated with banditry and occurred early in an assignment. Stephen W. Hargarten and Susan P. Baker (1985) analyzed 185 Peace Corps volunteers’ cause of death records between 1962 and 1983, and the results of the study showed that the major cause of death among the volunteers was from unintentional injuries such as motor vehicle accidents. Nancy M. Nurthen and Paul Jung’s study (2008) also looked at the causes of volunteers’ fatalities in the Peace Corps between 1984 and 2003. Their paper is the sequel to the academic article by Hargarten and Baker on the same issue. According to the study, homicides increased in number from 1984 to 2003 compared to the period between 1962 and 1983. Homicides accounted for 16.7% of the total death cases and in about half of the homicides, robbery was recorded as the possible cause (97). As some of the studies above illustrate, research examining violence against aid workers is skewed towards serious violent incidents. Fast (2014) warned “the emphasis on fatalities tends to shift the data in favor of violence and away from other types of risk that represent more prevalent threats over all” (84).

Turning to the issue with definitions, the category of aid worker was not consistently and systematically defined or used in the existing data, nor in the data collection process. This has affected the results of the quantitative research examining the trends of security incidents (Fast 2014; Weissman 2016). Furthermore, when exploring the increase in insecurity in the field, it is necessary to look at whether or not aid workers were attacked because of their professional activities. Fabrice Weissman (2016) showed that the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) recorded security incidents that occurred in a market, at a restaurant, and even while hiking in the forest, and that this tended to happen when tracking incidents related to national staff (57).
There have been a limited number of studies published about the safety and security of volunteers. One of them, by Joe Weber (2008), explored the strategies used by volunteers with the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) and Australian Volunteer International (AVI) programs to minimize their risk for crime and violence in Papua New Guinea (PNG). In this paper, Weber touched on three major “ideal type” security strategies presented by Van Brabrant: acceptance strategy, protection strategy and deterrence strategy.\(^2\) In the case of VSO, the volunteers rely on both acceptance and protection strategies. One of his findings suggested that acceptance strategy continues to be an appropriate security strategy for international volunteers working in Papua New Guinea. He stated that, by taking care to understand cultural and social norms and by striving to avoid cultural insensitivities, volunteers can develop their own security strategies. In some cases, the volunteers pointed out that acting and behaving on the basis of western cultural norms could increase the risk to their personal security.

As discussed in this section, the safety and security risks faced by aid workers has been a growing and significant scholarly field since the late 1990s. On the other hand, there is a dearth of research on the safety issues faced by “non-professional aid workers,” that is, “volunteers” who are dispatched overseas by their governments to work for limited periods in areas with high rates of lawlessness and violence. The Peace Corps and the JOCV are examples of such programs. This imbalance suggests that the security issues of “volunteers” in these governmental or semi-governmental aid agencies has gotten less attention than security incidents concerning aid workers for groups such as the United Nations, ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières. In particular, no scholarly articles on the safety and security issues for the JOCV program and its volunteers have been published. Also, although JICA’s annual reports include a

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\(^2\) Weber (2008) summarized the characteristic of three security strategies as below: (1) Acceptance strategy “attempts to reduce or remove threats by increasing acceptance for the organization and individuals and their work in a particular environment”; (2) Protection strategy “uses protective devices and procedures to reduce the vulnerability of the agency”; and (3) Deterrence strategy “uses a counter-threat to deter threat, such as the defensive use of force”.
short section on security policy, no detailed and separate statistical reports on safety and security have been published.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Selection of Country: Colombia from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s

In Colombia, the number of terrorist attacks, homicides and kidnappings tied to drug trafficking increased sharply from the mid-1980s and peaked in the 1990s. Kidnappings also surged in number from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Kidnappings and terrorist attacks such as indiscriminate bombings increased during the second year of the JOCV program in Colombia. Peruvian scholar Jorge Pablo Osterling (1989) stated: “The year 1986 may be considered a ‘typical’ violent year for contemporary Colombia” (266). He said that, in 1986 alone, 339 terrorist activities were reported and 789 civilians died. These incidents took place in a variety of public places such as government buildings, banks, buses, parks, educational facilities, and even at churches (Osterling 1989, 267).

According to the World Bank Country Study, *Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital* (1999), the homicide rate for men increased 13.5 times between 1980 to 1995 with the most affected group being “younger, lower-income, and less educated men” who were more likely to be both victims and perpetrators (4). In addition, the study noted that municipalities with the presence of guerilla activities increased from 17 percent in 1985 to 58 percent in 1995. Some areas also experienced paramilitary and drug-related armed force activity in addition to guerilla activities. As a result, the internal displacement of the population became a serious problem in Colombia and many of its victims included women, children and indigenous peoples (4-6). During this period, “social cleansing” was also taking place in Colombia. At least 500 street children were killed in the 1980s: 300 children in Medellín with the remainder assassinated in Bogotá and Pereira (6).
Kidnapping became another serious threat for Colombians as well as foreigners. JICA started the JOCV program in Colombia in 1985 and in that year, the incidence of kidnappings increased sharply. The increase in kidnappings and guerilla activities is correlated with kidnappings undertaken for political as well as financial reasons (Ps thesis and Suárez 2006). Koichi Ooizumi (2002) provides some key statistics for the Colombian kidnapping industry and noted an increase in kidnappings since the mid-1980s. He said that the number of reported kidnappings skyrocketed to 621 cases in 1985 alone, although the annual average until 1982 was less than one hundred cases. And it continued to grow into the 2000s. In 2000 alone, there were 3,706 reported cases of kidnapping. The study did not touch upon the kidnapping of foreigners from the late 1980s to the early 1990s but noted that during the five year period from 1996 to 2001, 280 foreigners were reported kidnapped.

Colombia was a country where the Peace Corps shut down its program due to security concerns before JICA started its local program. Peace Corps volunteers started working in Colombia soon after the Peace Corps was established in 1961. However in 1977, Richard Starr, a Peace Corps volunteer, was kidnapped by a left-wing guerilla group known as Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (hereafter, FARC). Starr was released after being held hostage for three years. In March 1981, the Peace Corps made the decision to terminate Colombia’s program (Peace Corps FY 1983, 33).³

The kidnapping of a volunteer had an immense impact on the Peace Corps. According to the “Country Development Review” submitted to the Latin American Regional Director by Jose S. Sorano, the Peace Corps’ Country Director in Colombia, no volunteer or staff in Colombia had fallen victim to violence in the 15 years since the inception of the Peace Corps program. In

³ The Peace Corps annual reports are prepared for the US Congress and their purpose is to justify budget plans and report on performance. There is a time lag when reporting on performance. For instance, the report for fiscal year 1983 covers the events and actual performance of 1981. In addition, in the past, the Peace Corps annual reports have tended to exclude information that hurts the image of the agency such as security incidents affecting volunteers.
the review, Sorano stated that the recent kidnapping of Richard Starr by FARC illustrated that the Peace Corps was “not immune to acts of violence and terrorism” (Peace Corps, 1977, 6). To mitigate the risk of other volunteers being kidnapped and in response to the Country Development Review, the Peace Corps office in Colombia began to periodically review the security of volunteer sites. They also transferred several volunteers to the safer areas of the country and closed programs in mainly rural areas with guerilla activity (Peace Corps 1978, 1).

Even though none of the details of Starr’s kidnapping ever appeared in the Peace Corps’ annual reports, the Peace Corps Annual Report FY 1983 stated that the presence of guerilla activities and drug trafficking in Colombia was the reason for shuttering the Peace Corps program (Peace Corps FY 1983, 33). Thereafter, the Peace Corps did not dispatch volunteers to Colombia for 30 years. Then, in September 2010, the first group of Peace Corps volunteers returned to Colombia as English teachers (Peace Corps FY 2012, 19).

Given these circumstances, JICA started the JOCV program in Colombia by confirming the safe areas where its volunteers could be placed. Around that time, Western donors criticized Japan for spending relatively little on overseas development assistance despite being an economic powerhouse. In 1983, in response to this criticism, the President of JICA, Keisuke Arita, proposed a plan to increase the number of newly dispatched JOCV volunteers annually from around 400 to 800 within the following three years (JICA 2001, 19-21). Therefore, the kick off of the JOCV program in Colombia in 1985 was not only a response to requests from the Colombia government for volunteers but likely influenced by this determination to significantly expand overseas aid.

As described in this section and highlighted by the withdrawal of the Peace Corps during this period, Colombia was a perilous place for a volunteer to work. However, despite the risky security conditions, JICA opened the JOCV program in 1985 and successfully placed new JOCV

4 The dispatch agreement for JOCV volunteers was concluded between Japan and Colombia in January 1985.
volunteers in Colombia without interruption until they announced a temporary suspension of the
program in the early 1990s. As a result, Colombia between 1985 to 1991 represents a rich period
for the exploration of JOCV volunteers’ safety and security experiences.

3.2 Data Collection

This study relied mainly on archival research and the principal source was the JOCV volunteers’
working reports known officially in Japanese as Taiin hōkoku sho. The author collected and
analyzed all of the JOCV working reports completed by volunteers who arrived in Colombia
between 1985 and 1991 (62 males and 29 females). These reports, totaling 91, were stored at the
JICA Library located in Tokyo, Japan. This study explored 91 different individual experiences of
safety and security during the volunteer assignment. As supplementary data for the study,
semi-structured interviews were conducted with recently returned JOCV volunteers from
Colombia as well as JICA officers working in the JICA Colombia Office. The aim of the
interviews was to gain insight into the context for JICA’s security management decisions and
how the lessons learned from past experiences have informed their current approach to the
security management of volunteers. All of the data for this study was collected between 2014
and 2015 with the approval of JICA.

3.3 Using First-Person Experiences from JOCV Working Reports

The JOCV working report (JOCV WR) is an official report on the living and working conditions
as well as the progress of volunteer projects that all JOCV volunteers are required to write and
submit to the JICA headquarters in Tokyo.5 As of 2016, JOCV volunteers were required to
submit reports six times over the course of their assignment. Depending on the individual, the
length of the reports varied. For example, short reports are around 15 to 20 pages while the

5 The JOCV WR acronym is used extensively in the footnotes in reference to specific working reports
longest one was over 100 pages with rich appendixes. In addition, the format of the report has changed over time. During the period of the study, the volunteers needed to report on the following items: (1) description of the host country and working site; (2) description of their volunteer project along with the schedule and support system; and (3) their daily life and the conditions of the country. Since it was a free essay format, the volunteers wrote about different things such as the cultural differences and their relationships with locals. There was no section designated in the report for the safety and security concerns in the host country; however, some volunteers described those issues within the sections on their daily lives, the country conditions and the support system.

Wakako Horie (2008), who has studied cross-cultural adaptation using the JOCV working reports, said that, apart from a few extremely successful or unsuccessful cases, this large body of accumulated JOCV experiences has not gotten the attention from academia or the general public that it deserves. Horie pointed out that these reports constitute very fruitful data on the JOCV volunteers’ subjective view of their experience as part of development projects.

3.4 Data Analysis of JOCV Working Reports

The study was based on an analysis of the content and context of JOCV working reports completed by 91 volunteers. First, the author read each report in its entirety with the goal of understanding the experiences of each volunteer in Colombia and identifying the main themes and data related to safety and security. Based on the information obtained through the first in-depth reading of all the reports, a preliminary list of codes was created for detailed coding of the data. In addition, each volunteer was assigned a number in lieu of their actual name. Then, a line-by-line analysis of each JOCV working report was undertaken to see which of these preliminary coding categories could be applied to the content. The output was recorded on a

submitted by JOCV volunteers to the JICA office.
spreadsheet. As part of this initial phase, the author uncovered other interpretations of the content and identified themes or connections with other third-party research. The author continued to refine the coding structure and scope by reviewing the output, tweaking the coding, re-applying it to each report and capturing the data. After several rounds of this analysis, which also included comparing the data at a summary level across all 91 reports as well as between individual volunteers, 14 code categories were finalized and applied to the analysis (see Appendix 1).

3.5 Approach to Supplemental Interviews
To collect supplementary data for the study, interviews were conducted with recently returned JOCV volunteers who had worked in Colombia between 2010 and 2013 as well as with JICA officers, both Japanese and Colombian staff, based in the Colombia office. No interviews were conducted with any of the authors of the 91 JOCV working reports. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the interviews was to gain insight into the context for JICA’s security management decisions and how the lessons learned from the past experiences have informed contemporary practice to the security management of volunteers. Participants were recruited through the JICA Research Institute with the cooperation of JICA’s headquarters in Tokyo. Contact details for the JOCV/Colombia returnees who wished to participate in the study were provided by the JICA Research Institute and, initially, the author emailed them about the purpose of the interview and for its scheduling.

All interviews were structured to be consistent across participants and were open-ended and semi-structured. The JOCV volunteers were quizzed mainly about safety and security in Colombia and their opinion of JICA’s safety and security management. The interview questions

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6 Of the two JOCV volunteers interviewed, one was a female volunteer who had worked in Cali and the other was a male volunteer who had served in Cartagena. Both returned to Japan in 2013. The participants from JICA’s office in Colombia comprised three Japanese staff members stationed in Colombia and one Colombian staff member who had retired from the national police service.
for JICA officers were narrower in scope. They delved into specific safety and security incidents in Colombia during the period of this study and the background of the department’s safety management approach for those incidents.

3.6 Privacy and Confidentiality of the Research Data

The privacy of individuals and the confidentiality of the data has been protected in this study. In lieu of using their names in the report, each JOCV working report and the corresponding volunteer was assigned an identifying number. Participation in interviews was entirely voluntary. Prior to conducting an interview, the author explained the purpose of the session and outlined how their information would be anonymized. In addition, participants could choose to skip questions that they felt uncomfortable answering.

4. Results

4.1 Overview of JOCV Volunteers Posted in Colombia between 1985 and 1991

There were 91 sets of JOCV working reports submitted by JOCV volunteers who worked in Colombia between 1985 and 1991. In this section, the author analyzed the content of these JOCV working reports to provide an overview of the JICA Colombia office as well as the characteristics of JOCV volunteers who worked in Colombia (see Table 1).

The JOCV program in Colombia began with the dispatch of two male volunteers in 1985. It expanded steadily and, with the exception of 1987, more than 10 new JOCV volunteers arrived annually. Before JICA officially announced the temporary suspension of the JOCV program in Colombia, its Colombia office had already activated a special security strategy in response to the unstable security conditions in Colombia. For example, the JICA office ordered those JOCV volunteers who worked in areas with security concerns such as Medellín to relocate from their assigned job location to Bogotá for their safety. However, in response to the kidnapping of two
Japanese businessmen that year, 1991 was the first year that the JICA Colombia office directed all JOCV volunteers across the country to leave their assigned job sites and move to Bogotá. Despite this situation, 1991 was also the year in which JO CV Colombia welcomed its largest number of newly arrived JOCV volunteers: 24 individuals in all including four volunteers who transferred to Columbia from Peru. In March 1992, JICA officially ceased sending new JOCV volunteers to Colombia because of the deteriorating security situation (JICA 2001, 185). However, JOCV volunteers who were already working in Colombia were not withdrawn and continued with their assignments.

4.1.1 Volunteer Characteristics: Placement and Gender Ratio

JOCV volunteers were required to attend intensive Spanish language classes as part of pre-dispatch training in Japan for approximately three months and also attended Spanish language training in Mexico before arriving Colombia. As a result, in most cases, JOCV volunteers spoke Spanish well enough to communicate with Colombian locals and kick off their projects including teaching classes.

The JOCV volunteers who arrived in Colombia from 1985 to 1991 typically worked inland in urban areas rather than in coastal or tropical rural regions. In particular, they were assigned to populated Andean cities such as Bogotá, Cali and Medellín; their host organizations were relatively large organizations such as universities in urban areas. During the period of this study, the major focus of JOCV volunteers’ work in Colombia was the fine arts professions including music and the arts. Many of the fine arts volunteers taught at the National University of Colombia located in the capital city, Bogotá. In their assigned departments, their goal was to...
help Colombian teachers improve their instructional methods and the curricula. They travelled to other areas to hold workshops on several occasions in response to requests. In addition to these urban professions, agricultural volunteers were another large group within JOCV Colombia (see Table 1 for more detail).

When considering the male-female ratio of JOCV volunteers in Colombia between 1985 and 1991, the number of male volunteers was much higher than that of female volunteers: 62 males to 29 females. With the exception of 1989, the number of newly arrived male volunteers always exceeded that of female volunteers. In particular, in the two years before the temporary suspension of the JOCV program, four times as many new male volunteers arrived in Colombia as new female volunteers. This gender imbalance amongst the volunteers during 1990 and 1991 was likely not directly attributed to Colombia’s precarious safety situation (see Table 2).

In all likelihood, this gender imbalance was directly related to the type of jobs that these JOCV volunteers undertook in these last two years before the program was suspended. A closer look at the work assignments of the JOCV volunteers who arrived in 1990 and 1991 shows a predominance of so-called male-dominated industries such as agriculture, forestry and engineering. Since the JOCV program dispatches volunteers based on the requests it receives from the host country, both the type of requests from Colombia and the availability of JOCV applicants that matched the requested positions resulted in this gender imbalance, and especially so in 1990 and 1991.

4.1.2 Transfer of JOCV Volunteers Within Colombia

Sixteen of the 91 JOCV volunteers who arrived in Colombia between 1985 and 1991 were ordered to change their job location during their assignment by the JICA office (see Table 3). In

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10 During the 1980s and the early 1990s, men constituted the majority of the JOCV volunteers who worked in the areas of agriculture, fishery, forest management, water management, computer and electrical engineering.
their JOCV working reports, 15 out of those 16 volunteers said that this was because JICA and the local JICA office in Colombia were concerned about their safety.\textsuperscript{11} For these 15 individuals, these moves occurred during 1989, 1990 and 1991. According to those volunteers’ working reports, they were ordered to change their work site when guerilla activity and drug trafficking were detected in or near the province or cities where they worked. For example, a female volunteer dispatched in 1990 reported that the rapid activation of guerilla groups in 1991 in Cúcuta where she worked was a factor behind her transfer from her original job site.\textsuperscript{12}

4.1.3 Overview of Security Management for JOCV Volunteers in Colombia

Table 4 summarizes the major violent incidents such as indiscriminate terrorism in Colombia (right hand column) and JICA’s safety responses to protect JOCV volunteers in Colombia (left hand column) by year. The summary of JICA’s safety management approach was mainly derived from the descriptions in the JOCV working reports. The main results are as follows.

From 1989, the JICA Colombia office expanded its security management policy for volunteers. JOCV volunteers received evacuation orders from JICA for the first time in 1989. From that point onwards, descriptions of JICA’s security management approach and its impact on their volunteer work became conspicuous in the JOCV working reports of volunteers. As noted in Table 3, 1989 was the year that the Medellin Cartel declared “total and absolute war” against the Colombian government and with that, the number of indiscriminate bombings across the country increased. Under these circumstances, in 1989, JICA ordered the JOCV volunteers who worked in the Medellin area to evacuate their job sites because it was regarded as a base for drug cartels. Following their evacuation, the volunteers were ordered to stay at the JOCV contact

\textsuperscript{11} Only one volunteer changed his work site for the following reason unrelated to security concerns. A male volunteer who was assigned to Chiquinquirá asked to change his job because he realized that the host organization had requested a volunteer for a political campaign. Also, he realized that the host organization wanted to have a doctor and not a JOCV volunteer like himself.

\textsuperscript{12} JOCV volunteer #63, JOCV WR, no.5. Note the JOCV volunteer’s report is used anonymously. Thus, a number was assigned in lieu of a name. This holds true for all 91 volunteers.
office in Bogotá for a few months. During their time in Bogotá, they were prohibited from returning to their job sites. Once again in 1990, JOCV volunteers in Medellín area were ordered to evacuate and left. Then, in 1991, when the kidnapping of the two Japanese Toshiba engineers occurred in the Antioquia Department in August, all JOCV volunteers in Colombia had to temporarily vacate their job sites and stay in Bogotá for three months.  

In order to continue running the JOCV program under a highly unstable security situation, JICA implemented a special security policy and measures. For instance, in order to minimize the risk of JOCV volunteers becoming targets of violence such as kidnapping, JICA prohibited them from participating in publicity activities, taking intercity buses, and working in rural and impoverished regions or towns (JICA 2001, 185-186). In addition, in response to the kidnapping of the Japanese businessmen in 1991, JOCV volunteers in Colombia were mandated to report in daily on their personal safety to the JICA Colombia office for a specified period of time.

JOCV volunteers overtly criticized at least one of the new safety measures. In this case, the JICA headquarters in Japan shipped a lock and a megaphone to each JOCV volunteer to use for their personal safety. With regard to the megaphone and lock, the male JOCV volunteer’s description that follows illustrated how ineffective these safety measures were for JOCV volunteers at that time in Colombia:

A megaphone and lock were sent from JICA in Tokyo previously; both seemed to be security measures... the megaphone was to broadcast an emergency, but I am not sure whether it would be useful in an emergency situation or not. And, since the lock sent from Japan is a fitted type of lock, it is not at all useful for the Colombian style door with an iron grille. This is the result of not sufficiently investigating the situation in Colombia. I would like to ask [JICA] to undertake further investigation.  

13 The JICA Colombia office, the Japanese Embassy and the JOCV contact office are all located in Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia. As such, it was the best place for the temporary relocation of JOCV volunteers in response to the security crisis.

14 JOCV volunteer # 62, no. 5, JOCV WR.
4.2 Perceptions of Personal Safety by JOCV Volunteers in Colombia

This section explores the JOCV volunteers’ perception of their own safety. The author tabulated the cases of volunteers becoming victims of crime or witnessing crime during their service period from the JOCV working reports. Figure 1 shows (1) the percentage of JOCV volunteers who voiced his/her concern about their safety during their service (blue line), and (2) the percentage of JOCV volunteers who wrote about their experience of encountering crime (red line), including witnessing a crime, in their JOCV working report.

Since the launch of the JOCV Colombia program in 1985, JOCV volunteers have exhibited growing awareness of their personal security in the host country. It peaked in 1988 at 100% in terms of JOCV volunteers’ perceptions of personal security, meaning that every single JOCV volunteers who arrived in 1988 expressed concern for their safety in their JOCV working report. 15 This was not prompted in any way since the format of the report remained unchanged. 16 And 1988 exemplifies that as the JOCV volunteers’ awareness of personal security grew, there was a decline in the number of volunteers who reported encountering or witnessing crime. This heightened awareness of safety and security amongst volunteers can likely be attributed to JICA’s actions to protect them, including evacuations, security training seminars and the frequent distribution of security-related information. Thus, though the safety and security circumstances of the host country had not yet stabilized or improved, the risk of crime impacting volunteers was declining, in part, because of their increased awareness of the situation.

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15 As a general rule, JOCV volunteers need to work in a host country for two years. Thus, the JOCV volunteers who arrived in Colombia in 1988 generally stayed until 1990.
16 As mentioned in the methodology section, the JOCV working reports are in a free essay format but also feature some standard sections. The section on “Their daily life and the conditions of the country” was where volunteers were most likely to comment on their experiences and concerns about safety and security.
Table 5 summarizes the type of dangerous experiences that JOCV volunteers encountered. During the seven-year period, robbery (including armed robbery) was the most common dangerous event encountered by JOCV volunteers. The second most common dangerous experience reported was being at the scene of shooting or a bombing in the street or on campus. In their descriptions, they expressed their fear and anxiety about living and working under such unsafe conditions. Some themes emerge as we look at the location of these experiences. Most of JOCV volunteers tended to encounter those crimes while they were commuting or on vacation. That is, it was rare that they became a victim of those crimes while they were working except for a few instances (see Table 5). As an example of encountering crimes where they worked, many volunteers who worked at Colombia National University in Bogotá reported being anxious about unsafe working conditions because of the frequent violent clashes between students and police on campus. Nevertheless, none of them were actually attacked or injured even if all of them witnessed these events on or near to campus.

In terms of gender, more female volunteers reported their experiences with crime and violence than male volunteers: the female to male ratio was 11 to 7. As shown in Table 4, half of the volunteers (9 out of 18 volunteers) who reported their fear and anxiety had dangerous experiences in Bogotá. For around 80% of the female volunteers who reported their hazardous experiences in their JOCV working reports, these also took place in Bogotá. A female volunteer who arrived in 1986 recounted their life in Colombia at that time as follows:

We female volunteers are always stressed out (because of the anxiety and fear from living in Colombia). I do not know about the safety and security situation in other host countries but I do not agree with assigning female volunteers to Bogotá. It seems problematic to assign female volunteers to Bogotá.  

17 JOCV volunteer #10, no. 2, JOCV WR.
Thus, some of female volunteers who were assigned to the Bogotá felt stress from living in such unstable and unsafe environments. It caused them to be more concerned about their personal safety than their volunteer projects. This tendency was also identified among female VSO volunteers working in Papua New Guinea. Female volunteers felt that their personal freedoms were restricted by the insecurity of the country and they faced higher risks for violence compared to their male counterparts (Weber 2008).

4.3 Safety Strategies Developed by JOCV Volunteers

In addition to following JICA’s instructions on safety and security, JOCV volunteers managed their safety by developing their own practices that varied according to where they lived and worked in Colombia. Table 6 summarizes the range of safety practices that JOCV volunteers implemented of their own accord. In reviewing the JOCV working reports, it is clear that the most prevalent safety practice amongst volunteers was the gathering of information and safety tips from Colombian locals. And to this end, they also sourced information from the local media as well as the Japanese community in Colombia. In this way, JOCV volunteers built up their own safety guidelines based on insights and learning from the JICA offices as well as the local population.

Unlike volunteers who worked in rural areas, JOCV volunteers who worked in urban areas such as Bogotá tended to report their practices for safety and security management in their JOCV working reports. They often wrote about how they protected themselves from becoming the target of robberies, kidnappings and bombings. To this end, they organized their routines and lives to significantly reduce their chances of being attacked by strangers in the street. On the other hand, they rarely pointed to trouble arising from relationships between men and women as one of the threats to their safety.
4.4 Striking a Balance Between Security Management and Volunteer Activity

From 1989 onwards, JOCV volunteers started mentioning in their JOCV working report that the safety and security management policies of JICA were hindering the progress of their volunteer projects and impeding their ability to build trust in their relationships with Colombian locals. With the JICA offices implementing more and more restrictions on the range of volunteer activities (e.g., evacuation orders) from 1989 onwards, JOCV volunteers found it difficult to carry out their designated projects. This is especially true for those who worked in or visited rural areas. With the enforcement of the restrictions, volunteers needed JICA's permission to work in rural areas. In addition, in many cases, they had to decline requests from Colombian locals to hold workshops and classes in rural locations or cancel scheduled events. Furthermore, they could not go on business trips to these remote locations with their colleagues. As a male volunteer pointed out in his JOCV working report, it was impossible for agriculture and forest management volunteers to implement their projects without leaving the office. In his report he questioned what kind of work they could do without visiting the fields [in rural areas].

In addition to the restrictions on where they could work, JOCV volunteers pointed out other ways in which the safety and security management approaches had become an obstacle to sustaining trust in their relationships with their local colleagues. This was true even for JOCV volunteers who were not ordered to leave their assigned area because the security restrictions still impeded Japanese volunteers from operating like their Colombian counterparts. The restrictions contributed to feelings of isolation and discomfort in their working environment. A male volunteer described in his JOCV working report how he felt stressed by the following security mandates in this situation:

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18 For example, JOCV volunteer # 61, no. 5, JOCV WR; JOCV volunteer # 38, no.5, JOCV WR; JOCV volunteer # 58, no.5, JOCV WR.

19 JOCV volunteer # 90, no. 5, JOCV WR.
For more than four months, I need to call JICA’s Colombia office every day from my workplace. It is my obligation as ordered by JICA. I just need to report to JICA’s staff that I am alive today. While I am talking on the phone, my co-workers stare me. So I am so embarrassed by why I have to do such a thing at my place of work.\(^{20}\)

A female volunteer also reported how the security constraints negatively affected the relationship between herself and her Colombian counterpart:

I used to take many business trips for my project but those business trips (depending on the area) became subject to considerable security restrictions. Now, my JOCV work was in the second half of the period, and my project was on the right track. However, due to the security policies, my business trips outside of Bogotá were subject to restrictions and so I needed to cancel my business trips and remain at the office. I was so disappointed with this situation. And I understood that this situation was caused by a misunderstanding between the JOCV Colombia office and my work site, and the slowness of contact in this country…But, because of the strict security restrictions I faced, my counterpart’s motivation for the project was gone. It was sad for me.\(^{21}\)

Another female volunteer described her experience of a Colombian colleague’s overt annoyance, among other issues, caused by the demands of JICA’s security restrictions:

I was told by my colleague at my host institution, “If we only worked with Colombians, we would not need to worry about security management. But you are here [And as a result, we are required to implement some security measures for you]. So I am annoyed with you.” After that, I worried a lot about working there. All of the plans that I submitted were rejected in the workplace, except for those with zero budget. I was subjected to a lot of harassment while I worked there.\(^{22}\)

Several JOCV volunteers felt that the JICA office did not step up sufficiently to fulfill the role of being an intermediary on their behalf and this had a negative impact on their work relationships with locals. One male volunteers described his feeling in his JOCV working report:

\(^{20}\) JOCV volunteer # 50, no. 5, JOCV WR.
\(^{21}\) JOCV volunteer # 58, no. 5, JOCV WR.
\(^{22}\) JOCV volunteer #72, no. 2, JOCV WR.
For me, the primary obstacle to working in Colombia was JICA’s security policy. I could not concentrate on my work due to the many restrictions. Moreover, after I had the experience of being ordered by JICA to transfer to another host institution for security reasons, my colleagues at my new place of work were uncertain about the reasons for my transfer and what I was there to do. This situation was caused by JICA Colombia’s office not providing any explanation (about the JOCV project, my transfer or my specialty). I felt very uncomfortable while I was working there.23

Several other JOCV volunteers demanded that JICA’s office play a larger role in and pay more attention to redeeming the program and shoring up trust in the volunteers amongst the Colombians in the communities they worked in. For instance, they proposed that the JICA Colombia office should carefully explain the objectives of the JOCV project as well as details of JICA’s security policy to their local colleagues at their place of work.

JICA’s criteria for closing or evacuating work locations was also criticized by some JOCV volunteers. One male volunteer expressed his indignation about the unclear rationale behind JICA’s decision to withdraw from certain locations. He complained that JICA did not pay attention to the people actually living there but relied on the advice of a security delegation visiting from Japan who had only gone to the volunteer’s working area once.24 This male volunteer’s quote below summarizes the issue quite well:

From a safety standpoint, I understand that JICA needed to do this [to implement these security restrictions for volunteers]. But it is true that there was a significant difference in the level of danger perceived by JICA’s headquarters in Tokyo compared to the perceptions of volunteers actually working in Colombia. Thus, many volunteers were dissatisfied about leaving their work site [in the midst of their projects when they received JICA’s order to transfer].25

23 JOCV volunteer #84, no.5, JOCV WR.
24 JOCV volunteer #82, no.2, JOCV WR.
25 JOCV volunteers #91, no.5, JOCV WR.
It should be noted that while some JOCV volunteers saw the safety measures as obstacles to working on their projects and building trust with locals, others expressed their appreciation of JICA’s security policy in their JOCV working reports. Moreover, some volunteers who were working in Colombia during the same period never mentioned JICA’s security policy nor commented that it impacted their projects in any way.

4.5 Volunteer Management in Colombia: Lessons Learned and Current Direction

After halting the dispatch of new JOCV volunteers to Colombia in 1992, JICA evolved its safety and security management approach. This section deals with the main reasons behind the suspension of the program in 1992 and, going forward, how JICA developed its security management approach in Colombia. According to interviews with the JICA office in Colombia, the kidnapping of the two Japanese businessmen and the Peruvian guerrilla group’s attack on the Japanese experts was a tremendous shock to the Japanese government. The Peruvian incident, in particular, triggered the evolution of JICA’s safety measures. In addition, attacks on Japanese in Latin America were on the increase around that period. This is one of the main reasons why JICA officially ceased sending new JOCV volunteers to Colombia in 1992.26 And in 1993, the number of JOCV volunteers on the ground in Colombia dropped to zero. The JOCV Colombia program was reinstated in 1994 and, as the dispatch of new volunteers resumed, JICA officials stressed that they had carefully planned the safety measures in cooperation with the Colombian National Police. This included setting restrictions on public outings during certain times and, based on National Police intelligence, designating areas where entry was prohibited for security reasons.27 The reopening of the JOCV program aligned to a major transition for volunteer management because JICA solicited professional security experts to help develop its safety management approach and security policy for volunteers in Colombia.

26 Interview, JICA officials in JICA Colombia Office, February 12, 2014, video conference.
An analysis of current safety and security manuals as well as handouts and a video provided by JICA officials indicate that lessons learned from the experiences of JOCV Colombia volunteers prior to 1992 are being applied to JOCV volunteer safety management. The safety and security materials expansively covered various practical topics from health issues to detailed information about crimes that frequently occur in Colombia today. The JOCV volunteers who recently returned from serving in Colombia have said that the most shocking but effective seminar on safety management was a video screened of actual crime scenes in Colombia.\textsuperscript{28} The footage showed general crime scenes including several robberies and pickpocket incidents. With regard to the restricted areas for travel in the country, the handout explains that JICA related personnel who must work in those regions are required to request an escort from the Colombian National Police.\textsuperscript{29}

Currently, JICA has turned to the issue of how to effectively counter the threat of terrorist attacks. Following the incident in Dhaka, Bangladesh in July 2016 where 8 Japanese nationals working on JICA projects were initially taken hostage in a restaurant, with seven subsequently killed and one injured, JICA elevated their security measures based on expert consultation. They held five meetings with experts and published a final report, now available on its website. The report indicates that JICA will actively communicate with various agencies and actors to improve information gathering. Additionally, the report states that JICA has increased the number of external advisors and regional experts on safety and security management. In addition, they are taking steps to strengthen the security of JICA offices and lodgings in countries with significant threat levels.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} Interview, JICA officials in JICA Colombia Office, February 12, 2014, video conference.
\textsuperscript{28} Interview, female JOCV Colombia returnees and male JOCV Colombia returnees, February 5, 2014, Tokyo.
\textsuperscript{29} Further to discussions with the JICA participants, the names of the materials provided by JICA as well as additional details on the content cannot be disclosed. They contain sensitive security management information affecting current and recent volunteers in Colombia.
5. Discussion and Conclusion

This study explored the safety and security arrangement for the Japanese government’s JOCV volunteer program in Colombia and specifically, the evolution of related policy and measures, the impact on volunteers in the field, and the issues that arose from these.

From JICA’s point of view, guerilla activity and drug trafficking in rural areas constituted the biggest threat to the safety and security of JOCV volunteers. JICA’s concerns led them to periodically evacuate JOCV volunteers from their project sites in rural areas and relocate them to the cities. Volunteers were also prohibited from conducting training or traveling to rural sites. However, the research suggests that volunteers in fact experienced more security incidents in urban rather than rural areas. In addition, some of the security incidents that JOCV volunteers encountered were not tied to their aid work. For example, JOCV volunteers fell victim to crimes such as robbery in Bogota, and especially while they were commuting or on vacation. Thus, as Weissman’s study (2016) underscores, when exploring insecurity in the field, understanding whether or not crime or violence was tied to aid work is an important analytical consideration.

JICA’s stringent security management for JOCV volunteers in Colombia at that time also created problems and two major issues were revealed in the study. First of all, the security restrictions placed on volunteers had the effect of suspending or ending a project against the wishes of the volunteers and their local colleagues. This likely demotivated locals from continuing to implement needed projects. Secondly, the security constraints seriously eroded trust in the working relationship between JOCV volunteers and locals in several cases. This stemmed from the fact that JOCV volunteers were absent from their job sites for a few months and might have been required to change how they worked (e.g., restricted to the office or from visiting certain regions) to comply with the enhanced security rules ordered by JICA.
However, despite these challenges to deepening relationships and advancing projects for JOCV volunteers, the findings indicate clear benefits from JICA’s security management practices. They had the effect of increasing volunteers’ self-awareness of their safety. As a result, the number of JOCV volunteers who experienced both ordinary crimes such as robbery and dangerous incidents such as armed clashes declined annually despite the ongoing deterioration of public safety in Colombia over the same period. Thus, the study concluded that JICA’s strict security management worked to protect JOCV volunteers in Colombia.

JOCV volunteers also employed key personal strategies to keep themselves safe such as developing an understanding of the cultural and social norms, getting to know the locals and following their advice on safety and security. Weber’s study (2008) in Papua New Guinea underscores that using acceptance and protection strategies can be effective for international volunteers in managing their personal safety and security. Thus, in a similar vein in Colombia, the efforts by JOCV volunteers to avoid cultural insensitivity and to increase the local acceptance of themselves and their work was highly complementary to JICA’s formal security measures.

In terms of the limitations of the study, the insights into the volunteers’ experiences were mainly derived from the written text in the JOCV working reports. Relying solely on these may have narrowed the range of data on the JOCV volunteers’ experiences with safety and security in Colombia. To mitigate this, the author conducted interviews with JICA’s Colombia office and some former JOCV volunteers to more profoundly understand the situation in Colombia. In addition, it was determined that focusing on past rather than recent cases of volunteer activity would be best, since the safety and security of volunteers is a sensitive topic and should be handled carefully in the public domain.

The research also has several implications for contemporary security management in general and particularly when placing volunteers abroad. One implication for governmental agencies or volunteer groups is to become more conscious of potential discrepancies in how
safety and security are assessed between administrative sections who are mostly in an office and volunteers in the field. Groups that can systematically gather and leverage the insights of volunteers in the field and their local networks are likely be more effective with their security management approaches. Minimizing the information gap could also lead to more nuanced decision making about halting local activity or relocating volunteers in the midst of assignments and thus, prevent wasteful suspension or withdrawal of programs. Another implication of the findings is the need to rethink a “one-size-fits-all” general approach to security measures in the field. The JICA example of sending megaphones and locks to volunteers is an example of a generalized measure that was not well received nor deemed particularly effective. Agencies should develop a wide-range of security measures but tailor how these are applied to individual volunteers by location and context. A further implication is that agencies or groups should support their volunteers in the field by communicating with key local colleagues about the rationale and duration of security protocols that volunteers must adhere to. They should also evaluate whether the security protocols could be construed as insensitive to local staff and team morale. For example, one JOCV volunteer was mortified at having to place a call in front of his colleagues every day to report that he was still alive. On the face of it, open communication and more sensitive implementation of protocols could head off misunderstandings about the behavior of foreign volunteers, raise morale in the short term and promote good faith in the program long term.

The body of research on safety and security for volunteers with governmental programs who work abroad is not as comprehensive as the research on aid workers or humanitarians. With this context, it is timely to briefly consider whether international volunteers differ significantly from humanitarian aid workers and thus should be categorized separately for research purposes. It is true that the two differ in key respects. Aid workers can be dispatched to high risk countries with significant insecurity and where groups are known to target aid workers. Governmental programs, on the other hand, tend to avoid such high risk environments but can operate under
some degree of insecurity. That said, if the security situation significantly deteriorates, the example of JOCV and Peace Corps shows that they will suspend their programs and withdraw volunteers. In other ways, they are quite similar. Both international volunteers and aid workers live in the host country and work directly with local populations on a number of levels, including training and development. Both are targeted for opportunistic crime, political violence and other security events because they are foreigners or are members of an aid or volunteer group. And all programs, whether governmental, semi-governmental, international NGO, UN, or other, have implemented security practices. Therefore, when collecting data on the impact of insecurity, there is good rationale for tracking volunteers and humanitarian aid workers, where they are both present, within the same study.

Since the late 1990s, aid agencies have published or partially disclosed their safety guidelines or annual safety and security reports. For the most part they provide the agency’s perspective. Thus, there are few opportunities for us to understand safety issues from the perspective of aid workers themselves. In keeping with Bertrand Taithe (2016) who pointed to the ways in which effective utilization of data about the experience of staff working in the field can help “raise new notions of risk and danger in the field at headquarters and country capital levels” (49), the hope is that the findings of this study deliver new perspectives on the impact of safety and security measures on the life and work of international volunteers as well as local staff.
References


Fig. 1: Comparison of Volunteer Reports of Concern about Security and Experience of Security Incidents (in %)

* Total Number of volunteers who wrote about security concerns in their JOCV WR. 
* Note: The figure was created by the author. In terms of percentage in the figure 1, 100% indicated all JOCV volunteers who arrived in the indicted year recognized danger.
Table 1: Characteristics of Volunteers (N = 91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N=91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialty</th>
<th>N=91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Management/Afforestation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Hygiene</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Research</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality Survey/Water Management</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development/Youth Development</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Husbandry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering/Network(telephone)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Mathematics Teacher</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: JOCV WR of JOCV volunteers who arrived in Colombia between 1985 and 1991. The table is created by the author.

Table 2: Trend of JOCV Volunteer Arrivals in Colombia from 1985 to 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Volunteers (male/female)</td>
<td>5 (4/1)</td>
<td>14 (8/6)</td>
<td>9 (6/3)</td>
<td>10 (9/1)</td>
<td>17 (7/10)</td>
<td>12 (10/2)</td>
<td>24 (19/5)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: The table was created by the author on the basis of JOCV WR (Colombia between 1985 and 1991).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Work Including Transfer</th>
<th>N=91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahia Solano → Armenia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barranquilla</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cali</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru → Cali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartagena</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartago</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquinquirá</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquinquirá → Yopal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cúcuta</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cúcuta → Caldas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cúcuta → Bogotá</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cúcuta → Armenia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru → Cúcuta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuga</td>
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<td>Fusagasuga</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena → Nariño</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marinilla</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medellín</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medellín → Armenia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nariño</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nariño → Pereira</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samacá</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santuario</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru → Sangil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru → Pamplona → Manizales</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popayán → Armenia</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aguacalera → Barragán → Armenia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Negro</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Negro → Bahía Solano</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolima</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolú</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumaco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunja</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: JOCV WR of JOCV volunteers who arrived in Colombia between 1985 and 1991.

The table is created by the author. Gray shading indicates a change in job location.
### Table 4: Example of JICA's Safety Response to Security Incident in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>JICA Colombia Office</th>
<th>What Occurred in Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The M-19 guerrilla group takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Assassination of Minister of Justice Rodorigo Lala Bonilla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1985 | • JICA started dispatching JOCV volunteers to Colombia  
 • Emergency Dispatch of short-term JOCV volunteers for natural disaster relief, Eruption of Nevado de Ruiz | • The M-19 takeover of the Palace of Justice and the Supreme Court of Colombia (98 people were killed)  
 • Eruption of Nevado de Ruiz |
| 1986 | • Temporary evacuation from Medellin of JOCV volunteers for security reasons. They were ordered by JICA to relocate from their job site and to stay in Bogotá for one month (Aug.) | Guerilla activity left 1,703 persons dead during the year of 1986 (339 reported terrorist activities: cited in Osterling 1989). |
| 1989 | • Temporary evacuation of JOCV volunteers from Medellin due to frequent bombings and murders reported in the area. The JOCV volunteers who worked in that area were ordered by JICA to leave their job locations and relocate to Bogotá (Jun.). | • The Medellín Cartel declared total war against the Colombian government (Aug.)  
 • Assassination of Luis Carlos Galán who was nominated as the Liberal Party's presidential candidate in the 1990 election (Aug.)  
 • The bombing of Avianca Flight 203: All 107 people on board were killed. This indiscriminate terrorism was planned by the Medellín Cartel (Nov.)  
 • Truck bomb attack in Bogotá: The bomb targeted the Administrative Department of Security headquarters and destroyed more than 300 commercial properties. This indiscriminate terrorism was planned by the Medellín Cartel (Dec.) |
| 1990 | • Temporary evacuation of JOCV volunteers from Medellin due to frequent bombings and murders reported in the area. The JOCV volunteers who worked in that area were ordered by JICA to leave their job locations and relocate to Bogotá (Jun.). | Exposures linked to terrorism in major cities such as Bogotá and Medellin. |
| 1991 | • JOCV volunteers who worked in Macarena were officially evacuated from their job site. A female volunteer was transferred to Nariño (Jan.).  
 • All JOCV volunteers in Colombia ordered to evacuate their job locations and stay in Bogotá for 2 months (approx. Aug to late Oct.)  
 • Four JOCV volunteers from Peru arrived and they also were mandated to stay in Bogotá with other volunteers for 2 months. (approx. Aug. to late Oct.)  
 • After the Toshiba employees’ incident, JICA enforced its safety management for volunteers, with volunteers being required to report in daily on their safety to the JICA Colombia office by phone or fax. | Pablo Escobar of the Medellín Cartel was arrested (Jun.)  
 • Guerilla activity had become recognizable in the Cucúta area since the latter half of 1991.  
 • Two Japanese Toshiba engineers were kidnapped by a guerrilla group in Antioquia (Aug.)  
 • Two Japanese Toshiba engineers were released (Dec.) |
| 1992 | • JOCV volunteers who worked in provinces with reports of active guerrilla groups were ordered to leave their job locations. (Late Feb.)  
 • JICA sent two padlocks and one megaphone to JOCV volunteers in Colombia as one of the safety precautions instituted for volunteers.  
 • JOCV volunteers who worked in Medellin were ordered to leave their job locations and move to a different job site.  
 • JICA suspended new arrivals of JOCV volunteers in Colombia (Mar.) | Explosions linked to terrorism in major cities such as Medellin. |

*Note:* The author created the table based on descriptions in the JOCV WR based on information from JOCV WR (Volunteers who arrived between 1985 and 1991), JICA (2001) and Osterling (1989).
Table 5: Reports of Dangerous Experiences by JOCV Volunteers in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of volunteers</th>
<th>Reported Experiences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>• Burglaries (M, volunteer #2, Cali)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1986                | • Being attacked with knife by a band of thieves and having his belongings stolen in the mountains of Bogotá (M, vol. #8, encountered the incident while visiting Bogotá)  
  (1) Being at the scene of a snatching crime  
  (2) Being ripped off by a taxi driver and asked for a date repeatedly in the taxi (F, vol. #10, Bogotá)  
  • Having a gun pointed at her on the street in the city (F, vol. #12, Bogotá)  
  • Being at the scene of a shooting at the bus stop (F, volunteer #13, Bogotá)  
  • Hearing gunshots often when at home (F, vol. #14 Cali)  
  (1) Soon after arriving at Colombia, the JOCV volunteer had her necklace that had been in her T-shirt snatched; (2) Groups of students and police clashed on campus (at her workplace) once a week on average. Due to grenades, tear gas and the mass arrest of students, she experienced headaches and nausea until the next day (F, volunteer #15, Bogotá) |
| 1987                | • Theft at the bullring (M, vol. #20, Tolú)  
  • Burgaries during a business trip (M, vol. #24, Bogotá)  
  (1) One month after being appointed, the volunteer was attacked by three men (no injury). His bag was torn open with a big knife in the middle of Bogotá city; (2) Stoning and the destruction of property at the host institution (National University of Colombia) (F, vol. #25, Bogotá) |
| 1988                | • The wheels of the bus were destroyed while riding the bus (M, vol. #30, Marinilla)  
  • Having a gun pointed at him by the police when he had a run in with them (M, vol. #39, Chiquinquirá etc.)  
  • Having a wallet stolen in the night bus while asleep (F, vol. #42, Bogotá)  
  • At her workplace (National University of Colombia), students and police threw molotov cocktails and began a firefight that continued through the morning. Because of the chaos, classes at the university were often cancelled. (F, vol. #47, Bogotá)  
  • On weekends, numerous people wounded by machete or gun attacks came to the hospital where the JOCV volunteer worked. She removed the bullets from patients' bodies. She did the night shift alone several times. She had limited electricity and water in this region. She felt anxiety when she needed to care for the wounded and also about the limited supply of electricity and water. (F, vol. #48, Macarena etc.)  
  (1) JOCV volunteer was robbed of a wrist watch on the bus; (2) One of her students died as a result of bomb explosions on campus (her workplace) and an evacuation order was issued after some people died in the riots in May 1990. (F, vol. #54, Bogotá) |
| 1990                | (1) Attacked from behind and robbed of a watch one week after arriving in Colombia (2) Groped on the street two weeks after arriving in Colombia (F, vol. #63, Cúcuta etc.) |
| 1991                | • Being at the scene of the explosion of a bomb (M, JOCV #81, Popayán etc.) |

Note: The author created the table based on descriptions in the JOCV WR (from 1985 to 1991).  
‘Group of volunteers’ categorized by volunteer’s arrival year. JOCV volunteers who arrived in 1985. Abbreviations in the table are as follows: M refers male, F refers female, and vol. refers volunteer.
# Table 6: Examples of Volunteers’ Self-Management of Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Personal Communication + Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Stop judging things from my Japanese 'common sense' perspective. It was important to have consideration for others (M, vol. # 2, Jul. 1985-Jul. 1987, Cali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Information Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Build a network to exchange information with students and counterparts (F, vol. #15, Jul.1986-Sep. 1989, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Commuting + Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Avoid going downtown by myself in the city of Bogota (F, JOCV vol. #10, Mar. 1986-Mar. 1988, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* When going out, always go out with Colombians (F, vol. #10, Mar. 1986-Mar. 1988, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Stay away from banks and shopping centers (F, vol. #41, Mar. 1989-Mar. 1992, Cali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Try not to visit rural areas (F, vol. #72, Dec. 1991-Dec. 1993, Bahía Solano etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Do not enter mountainous areas where guerilla groups are active (M, vol. #85, Jul. 1991-Oct. 1995, Peru etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. While working in case of Columbia National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Leave the campus immediately when clashes occurred between students and police on campus (F, vol. #10, Mar. 1986-Mar. 1988, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* When clashes between students and the police are starting up, store the medication in a safe place and leave the university immediately (F, vol. #15, Jul. 1986-Sep. 1989, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Since I worked at the National University of Colombia where clashes between students and police often took place, I was careful especially during working hours (F, vol. #47, Jul.1989-Jul. 1991, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Stay away from the areas with student riots and political activity (F, vol. #67, Jul. 1990-Jul. 1992, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Avoid dozing off to sleep while riding on the bus or in a taxi (F, vol. #25, Dec. 1987-Dec. 1989, Bogotá)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Public relations identity

- Refrain from doing public relations about JOCV and his project (M, vol. # 66, Jul. 1990-Jul. 1992, Cucuta etc.)
- Try not to talk about myself and especially my JOCV affiliation (F, JOCV vol. #72, Dec. 1991-Dec. 1993, Bahía Solano etc.)

7. Belongings + Dress

- Follow safety tips on the style of dress and personal belongings from Colombians to avoid becoming the target of crime (F, vol. # 12, Mar. 1986-Mar. 1988, Bogotá)
- Avoid carrying a purse and only take enough money for the day (F, vol. #72, Dec. 1991-Dec. 1993, Bahía Solano etc.)

8. Rules

- Obey the curfew and do not go out (M, vol. #38, Jul. 1988-Jan. 1992, Medellin)

Note: author created the table based on descriptions in the JOCV WR (from 1985 to 1991). Abbreviations in the table are as follows: M refers male, F refers female, and vol. refers volunteer.
**Appendix 1: Coding Categories for Analysis of JOCV Working Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assigned Province/City and Host institution (work place)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Transfer of assigned city/province (where to where, how many times? when?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Volunteers’ assigned work (specialty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Working period (arrival/departure of year and month, renewal of working period or not?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Safety and security information pre-arrival of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Safety of dispatched area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anxiety and Safety and Security Concerns during their assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Places and acts/behaviors that volunteers perceived dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Actual dangerous experiences and incidents encountered by volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Safeness of dispatched area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Volunteer’s safety strategies and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>JICA office’s security management for volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Balance between security management and volunteer activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
要約

近年、世界各地でテロ事件が多発し市民の安全管理が課題となっており、1990年代後半から紛争地帯で支援に携わる人々が犯罪に巻き込まれる事件が増加した。このような背景によって、国際協力における安全管理に関しては、国連職員等の人道支援従事者を対象とした研究が主流であり、米国平和部隊のような海外で協力活動を行うボランティアに関する安全や危機管理に関する研究は少ない。本研究では、無差別テロや誘拐事件が頻発した麻薬戦争下のコロンビアで活動した政府系ボランティア組織・青年海外協力隊員（以下、隊員）、91名分（1985年-1991年コロンビア着任者）の『隊員報告書』をもとに、当時のコロンビアにおける隊員を取り巻く治安状況や安全対策、また安全管理が隊員のボランティア活動に与える影響に関して分析を行った。調査の結果、一時退避や任地変更等をはじめとする隊員への安全管理の強化は、現地の人々との関係性にマイナスな影響を与えることがわかった。しかし、その一方で、安全管理の強化が現地で活動する隊員の危機管理意識を高める可能性も明らかになった。

キーワード：青年海外協力隊（JOCV）、安全とセキュリティ、国際ボランティア、安全管理・危機管理、コロンビア
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