

Chapter 12: State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa

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1. Introduction

Violent conflicts have been one of the major obstacles to economic growth and development in Africa.¹ However, in the 2000s, according to the UCDP/PRIO datasets, the African continent witnessed a decrease in the number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths compared to the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts in the world hit its peak in the early 1990s, but started to decline from 1993. In Africa, the number continued to increase to 18 in 1998, but started to decrease in the early 2000s (refer to Figure 1). The battle-related deaths per year in Africa, which used to be some 20,000 to 80,000 in the late 1990s, are some 3,000 to 10,000 in recent years. Today, Africa is no longer a continent with many large-scale violent conflicts.

Although the negative impact of violence has declined, we need to remain attentive to potential risks and continue to work on peace-building and conflict prevention. Conflict risks are still major concerns for foreign investors. According to a JETRO survey (2013), political and social instability is the largest concern for Japanese investors in Africa, and more companies are worried about it in 2012 than in 2007.


In the past, some countries suddenly became unstable and fell into violent conflict; there are only 15 countries in Africa that have gone through the past three decades without any armed conflict (based on UCDP/PRIO's criteria). Besides, many countries experienced the

1. Although the statistics provided in the first section cover the entire African continent, the main focus of this chapter is countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having gone through the Arab Spring in 2011, many of the countries in North Africa are facing the challenge of a transition to more stable democratic rule. Though there are some similarities and inter-connectedness in challenges of state-building in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, contexts and characteristics differ so widely that it would be difficult to address both regions in the limited length of this chapter.

recurrence of conflict in a transition period from conflict to sustainable peace. As discussed in World Bank (2011), post-conflict peace-building is a long-term endeavor, which requires more than a decade of institution-building efforts.

Alarming, a new type of conflict is on the rise in recent several years, producing an upward trend in the number of armed conflicts. Today, there are many conflicts in which trans-national non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab, AQIM, FDLR, and LRA are involved. The recent tragic incident in Algeria demonstrated the political and security risks posed by these non-state armed groups to foreign investors.

Figure 1. Number of armed conflicts in Africa (top) and in the rest of the world (bottom)



Source: Author’s calculation based on UCDP/PRIOD datasets²

2. “Internationalized” conflicts are ones that occurred between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. “Extrasystemic” armed conflict occurs between a state and non-state group outside its own territory (mostly colonial or imperial wars).

As the characteristics of violent conflicts have shifted from purely internal strife to violence and fragility caused by transnational non-state actors, capable state institutions that provide basic public services, including public safety in remote areas, are a significant element in preventing these problems. The lack of such capable institutions is one of the reasons that allow transnational non-state actors to be active in these fragile areas. The building of an “effective, legitimate, and resilient state” (OECD 2008, 7) is definitely necessary to address such problems.

Coercive measures are frequently needed to counter terrorists, however, it is also essential to look at structural problems that lead to these phenomena. To prevent the spread of the general public’s support for these non-state armed groups, poverty, inequality, and other social problems need to be addressed. It also requires a political/social mechanism that articulates citizens’ expectations and enables the state to respond to society’s demands. In this sense, state-building is a vital endeavor for achieving a stable and peaceful Africa.

The chapter discusses the challenges of state-building in Africa, particularly in relation to conflict prevention. It first highlights important points, which have been raised by existing literature and discussions, concerning state-building (Section 2). It emphasizes the importance of state legitimacy in the eyes of the people, livelihood improvement in addition to public safety, and a long-term perspective for state-building. Section 3 then introduces major research findings by JICA-RI and a JICA survey of its operations. For donors to help improve state legitimacy, the section calls attention to context-sensitivity, horizontal inequalities (HIs), and people’s perceptions. In Section 4, JICA’s current field experience related to state-building will be discussed. On the basis of the analysis in Section 2 and Section 3 and the review in Section 4, the final section will present policy implications for the future.

2. State-building: Building of Capable and Legitimate Institutions

Through their experiences of post-conflict peace-building, the international community, acknowledging the high risk of the recurrence of violent conflict, expanded its focus from short-term emergency response to long-term institution building. Not only in post-conflict

settings but in general, to prevent violent conflicts and establish public safety, state institutions with sufficient capacity to maintain law and order are indispensable. However, to effectively maintain public order, the state needs to be recognized as legitimate by society. In short, effective state-building needs the consolidation of a capable as well as legitimate authority.

Among various discussions on state-building, the importance of state legitimacy, livelihood improvement, and a long-term perspective needs to be underlined. Long-term institution building should not only focus one-sidedly on public safety but also include the task of supporting people’s livelihood. Livelihood improvement is necessary for people to understand the dividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate. These perspectives for long-term institution building have to be introduced in the early stage of any emergency response to humanitarian crises. Development agencies have endeavored to realize “seamless” transitions from short-term emergencies to long-term development, and have implanted long-term visions into their engagement in an early post-conflict period.

Table 1 below summarizes the shift from short-term focus to long-term orientation.

Table 1. Conceptual Framework for State-building

	Short-term (emergency response)	Long-term (state-building)
Public Safety (Law and Order)	Ceasefire monitoring Peace by force	Security Sector Reform (SSR) Rule of Law
Livelihood	Emergency aid	Strengthening of (both central and local) public organizations Human resource development
Objectives	Avoidance of humanitarian disaster	Building of a capable and legitimate state

2.1 Building of capable and legitimate state institutions

In the post-Cold War peace-keeping operations in the 1990s, the international community often failed to avoid the recurrence of conflicts and recognized the lack of effective institutions as one of the reasons for such failures. Failures of international engagement in establishing

sustainable peace forced the international community to pay greater attention to the building of public institutions that guarantee long-lasting sound governance. As incidents such as 9/11 increased global concerns about security vulnerability spilling over from weakly governed countries, scholars, including Fukuyama (2005), Chesterman (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2005), Ghani and Lockhart (2008), and Paris and Sisk (2009), debated the importance of and difficulties in state-building in recent years.

This argument also resonated with the international development community that has recognized the importance of good governance since the 1990s. The donor community started to discuss the need to improve its development effectiveness in fragile states, and accepted the idea of state-building in that context. In the OECD/DAC, the INCAF (International Network on Conflict and Fragility) functioned as an active forum to create policy guidance on state-building in fragile states (e.g., OECD 2011). Among the donors, state-building is understood as an effort to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions to consolidate effective, legitimate, and resilient states (OECD 2008).³

The lack of capable and legitimate state institutions that protect people from human security crises makes the state vulnerable to violence by non-state actors. Public safety is one of the most fundamental public goods that should be provided by the state. Although such public safety may be temporarily and partially provided by international forces and/or civic groups, the state remains as the primary guarantor of public safety. Therefore, the strengthening of the state security capacity is fundamentally important to protect human security.

However, the mere reliance on coercive forces does not guarantee long-term stability. The state will face new challengers to public safety unless it has peaceful and stable relations with society. To be accepted by a wide range of social forces as the legitimate authority, the state needs to be equipped with inclusive institutions. If the state excludes some parts of its population from public services and the development process, it cannot be regarded as legitimate by the excluded groups. For instance, as we discuss below, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and group-based

3. Leaders of the fragile states themselves formed a group named g7+ and actively participate in the debates, contributing to the international dialogue between fragile states and donors on designing better international engagement to support state-building in fragile states.

grievances have been the major causes of violent conflicts in Africa (Stewart 2010). What inclusive institutions look like, however, differs from one country to another depending on a country-specific context (e.g., OECD 2010).

2.2 Peace-building “from below”: greater emphasis on livelihood

Among various aspects of institution building, the past decade has seen an increasing focus on public-safety issues, as typified by security sector reform (SSR). Critics, however, opposed the imposition of state institutions “from above,” and called for promoting the voices “from below” (e.g., Hilhorst et al. 2010). The efforts for institution building such as the formulation of a constitution, democratic elections, and justice sector reform, may not be the primary concern of the local populations. Advocates of peace-building “from below” emphasize the importance of welfare, livelihoods, and perceptions of the local people and communities (Richmond 2009, Shanmugaratnam 2008). Improvement of welfare and public service delivery is the key for the people to understand the dividends of peace. Richmond (2011) insists on the need to localize, contextualize, and hybridize international state-building policies to adapt to everyday human needs. Roberts (2011) suggests the shift of emphasis from political institution-building to institutions that serve society. Responding to local human needs would help improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local people.

The state’s capacity to deliver services to the people largely depends on effective administrative organizations as well as on the ability of public officials who actually deliver the services to the people. Institutional capacity and human resource development are indispensable to improve the state capacity to support people’s livelihood.

2.3 Bridging the “gap” by institutional and individual capacity development

In the late 1990s, it was pointed out that there is a “gap” between humanitarian assistance and development assistance in a post-conflict situation. Development assistance often came too late in the transition from humanitarian crises to reconstruction phases. Although short-term relief can be provided by external actors, service delivery by local public organizations is indispensable for longer-term livelihood improvement. Besides, the two instruments have different *modus operandi* as humanitarian assistance tries to address emergency needs, while

development assistance aims to support long-term development in more stable environments (Crisp 2001, Ogata 2011).

As a consequence of the increasing awareness of the gap, humanitarian agencies became more concerned about their long-term sustainability, while development agencies started to get involved in post-conflict situations much earlier than before. By infusing a long-term perspective into post-conflict assistance, the seamless supports aim at a smooth transition from short-term emergency to long-term institution building for improving the livelihoods of local people.

3. Research Findings from JICA-RI on State-building Efforts

With regard to state-building and conflict prevention, research projects at JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI) are mainly concerned with state legitimacy. Research findings by JICA-RI indicate that international engagement can support state-building by helping improve state legitimacy. Some of the findings are being reflected in JICA's operational approach, which will be discussed in Section 4.

3.1 Capacity traps and legitimacy traps

In the article "Capacity Traps and Legitimacy Traps: Development Assistance and State Building in Fragile Situations", Takeuchi, Murotani, and Tsunekawa (2011) illustrate how the difference in political environment affects the impact of development assistance, and call for heightened awareness of the different types of fragility when donors decide upon their policies. They categorize post-conflict situations into two types: "capacity trap" and "legitimacy trap." Capacity trap countries are those that have failed to improve state capacity to provide security and basic social services and consequently have failed to establish state legitimacy. Legitimacy trap countries are those that have demonstrated the capacity to provide security and services to the population but suffer from shaky legitimacy due to expanding inequalities and authoritarian management. In this environment, improving state capacity may not necessarily improve state legitimacy. On the contrary, it can further curtail state legitimacy. These two traps create very different contexts in which donors are required to plan their strategies carefully.

3.2 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)

Inequality has always been an important factor that explains grievances and instability. To address group-based grievances, the perspective of horizontal inequalities (HIs), that is, inequalities between identity groups, has been developed.

Based on case studies and quantitative analysis in ten African countries, Mine et al. (*Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions and Institutions*, 2013) reconfirms the significance of HIs on instability and violent conflict in Africa. Particularly when one group is disadvantaged in multiple dimensions of inequalities (political, social, economic, and cultural), HIs are most likely to cause violent conflicts as demonstrated by the histories of South Africa and Kenya.

In *Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Hino et al. (2012) suggest that ethnic diversity, though not leading by itself to inter-group conflict, can be a potent force of instability when HIs are high, and particularly when high HIs coalesce with high vertical inequality within each ethnic community.

In short, the alleviation of inequalities is a necessary condition for enhancing state legitimacy, which is fundamental for long-term state-building.

3.3 People's perceptions of inequalities

In assessing the legitimacy of states, people's perceptions are sometimes more important than objective HIs, as people take actions based on their subjective beliefs. As advocates for peace-building "from below" argue, successful state-building efforts should be based on the understanding of the perceptions of local people. According to the analysis of Mine et al. (2013), people's perception of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is not equal to the objective inequality that appears in statistical data. For instance, as observed in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, a group perceiving itself as the poorest is not necessarily the poorest according to social and economic statistics. This implies that external actors should pay attention not only to objective HIs but also to people's perceptions.

Mine and his associates' study demonstrates that this distortion of perceptions is most probably associated with political HIs. The groups that are politically marginalized tend to regard themselves as also being

economically marginalized, even when this contradicts the objective evidence. The Igbo in Nigeria clearly show such tendency. On the other hand, their analysis also indicates that economically advantaged groups tend to behave in a hostile manner through the fear of losing their advantaged positions, when political power relations shift rapidly to their disadvantage. All this evidence points to the importance of political power distribution in post-conflict societies.

Regarding the political HIs, Mine et al. (2013) point to the importance of inclusive mechanisms, either formal or informal, that are open to various identity groups. Their case studies demonstrate the relative political stability of the countries that have power-dispersing mechanisms combining sustainable power-sharing based on informal practices and advanced decentralization. In various Sub-Saharan African countries, informal customs assure every major identity group is represented in decision-making. These power-dispersing mechanisms help fortify legitimacy by means of the inclusive political participation of major groups. If such an arrangement is combined with efficient service delivery and citizen safety (state capacity), the efforts for long-term institution building are on the right track.

JICA's survey report titled *Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict Affected Countries*⁴ (2012) also highlights the importance of people's perception as a lesson learned from its operational experiences. This survey demonstrates that, although it is important to support socially vulnerable populations such as refugees and IDPs, widows, orphans, traumatized people, and handicapped people, exceptionally generous treatment of these people created tensions within communities in past JICA projects. Special consideration to ex-combatants can also create animosity among other people in local communities. External actors need to be careful of these sentiments and try to build confidence between socially vulnerable people and others within local communities.

4. JICA's Approach to Support State-building

JICA has already integrated into its field practice many of the insights obtained from past research and discussion on state-building. JICA has been especially eager to support long-term strengthening of institutional

4. Details of the report will be discussed in the Section 4.1.

and individual capacity, especially for the purpose of improving people's everyday livelihood. Helping the recipient government to effectively connect itself with local residents to strengthen its legitimacy has also been the main goal of JICA activities.

JICA has also promoted "seamless" transition from early humanitarian aid for protection to development assistance for empowerment. This focus requires JICA to get engaged in institution building from the early stages of reconstruction.


Finally, JICA has tried to be more attentive to political contexts in each country, and mainstream conflict-sensitivity ("do no harm") to ensure the positive impact of its activities on state-building.

4.1 Enhancing state capacity and legitimacy

The Government of Japan and JICA have focused their attention more on post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building since the mid-1990s. The revised ODA Charter in 2003 recognizes "human security" as one of its five basic policies, and peace-building as one of its four priority issues. After Sadako Ogata became the President of JICA, JICA integrated the "human security" perspective, especially for conflict-torn countries, as its operational philosophy. As a result, Japan's ODA spending in 43 countries that the OECD categorized in 2010 as "fragile states"⁵ increased its share in total ODA spending (net ODA total, excluding debt relief) from 9.86% in 2000 to 24.24% in 2009 (refer to Figure 2).

5. For statistical purposes, OECD chose 43 countries and areas as "fragile states" in 2010 by using CPIA of the World Bank, ISW (Index of State Weakness) of the Brookings Institution, and CIPF (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index) of Carlton University as their benchmarks.

Figure 2. Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA (Net ODA total, excluding debt relief)



Source: Author's calculation based on OECD Stat.

In some of these countries (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo), JICA engaged in the capacity building of security forces. However, JICA has been more active in the area of livelihood improvement. JICA regarded the capacity of public institutions and public officials directly involved in livelihood improvement efforts as the core function, and provided support to strengthen this function in post-conflict countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire. This core function centers on health, education, vocational training, and local administration.

JICA's programs for community-based development and vocational training intend to simultaneously strengthen the capacity for public service delivery and improve people's welfare. In doing so, it aims to enhance both state capacity and legitimacy, as improved service delivery by the central or local government organizations would enhance people's welfare and their trust in the state. Emphasis on enhancing people's trust is important particularly in fragile situations. Although their direct impact is limited to project areas, JICA anticipates that these local actions will eventually be scaled up to contribute to the broader and longer-term endeavor of state-building.

JICA's survey report (*Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict*

Affected Countries, 2012) contains evaluations of twelve such projects for community development and vocational training in nine countries and areas, including seven projects in five Sub-Saharan African countries: South Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The following are some of the findings from JICA's activities aiming at enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions, especially for livelihood improvement. Though the report is based on simple evaluations not as rigorous as academic research, the lessons learned from the field are suggestive.

■ ***Capacity development of local public officials***

In these projects, as the lack of individual and organizational capacity is acute in fragile situations, the process of implementation was designed to encourage capacity development of local government organizations. These entities were assigned the responsibility of jointly delivering public services with JICA experts, so that they could learn how to effectively provide services to the local population as on-the-job training.

The Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for Sustainable Peace and Development (LIPS) in South Sudan and the Study on Community Development in Cataracte District, Bas-Congo Province in the DRC are representative of JICA's approach to community development, which primarily features the capacity development of government (both local and central) institutions, instead of the provision of benefits to farmers directly or via NGOs. When the LIPS project started in 2009, the government of the Southern Sudan had just four years of experience. Basic policy guidelines and strategies had not been well articulated, and local officers had little experience of working in the field. In the project, the community development officers, after receiving training, cultivated the land in cooperation with farmers, built schools, and supported local farmers in starting businesses. This firsthand experience enhanced the officials' capacity and motivation. In the Bas-Congo Study, local government officials were directly engaged with local communities in conducting and monitoring pilot projects.

■ ***Feedback of data and knowledge into national policies***

On several occasions, local governments' experience of actual service delivery had a feedback effect of updating and improving the policies at higher levels including national development strategies. As most of the conflict-affected countries do not have sufficient statistical data,

firsthand information from the field can link the voices from below with national policy planning.

One good example is the LIPS project mentioned above. South Sudan's Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had had little information on agricultural activities in rural villages until the LIPS project provided them with community development manuals and agricultural technology packages. These documents were prepared on the basis of the field surveys, training, and sub-projects implemented in the LIPS project. The documents and information provided are being utilized to formulate a national agricultural development policy.

In Rwanda, the Project for Strengthening the Capacity of Tumba College of Technology (TCT) resulted in the TCT turning into a model for other vocational training centers. More specifically, the TCT conducted in-company training to strengthen the link between trainees and local companies. The Workforce Development Agency (WDA) of the Rwandan government subsequently adopted in-company training in other vocational training centers.

■ *Building confidence in local government institutions*

The nurturing of state legitimacy is important particularly in conflict-affected countries because public service delivery has been suspended for a long period and people may look upon the government as a predatory body rather than a service delivery organization. Under such circumstances, service delivery improvement through participatory planning and implementation can enhance communication between local government officials and citizens and help the local government build confidence among people.

In South Sudan, where public service delivery had barely existed during the war that lasted for more than 20 years, a LIPS sub-project – agricultural extension workers trying to help local farmers – contributed to cultivating local people's confidence in the new government. Local communities established their own rural development committees and directly negotiated with local governments. Communication between the two has been strengthened significantly in the process.

In the case of northern Uganda, local governments did not have even basic facilities such as city halls and offices; so the Project for

Community Development for Promoting Return and Resettlement of IDPs in Northern Uganda provided offices and multi-purpose halls for a variety of public events such as public meetings, training courses, music festivals, and cooking contests. Local governments intended to foster the sense of affinity among local residents, particularly women's groups. They also worked closely with returnees in designing sub-projects, so that local people's trust in government officials would be enhanced.

4.2 Seamless assistance

Under the leadership of President Sadako Ogata, JICA adopted the human security perspective as one of the key pillars for its operation. The human security perspective emphasizes both protection through emergency relief and empowerment for long-term development.

When Ogata became the president of JICA, she stressed the importance of "seamless" support bridging the gap between humanitarian and development assistance. In its mission statement of 2008, JICA endorsed "seamless assistance that spans everything from prevention of armed conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or disaster, assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term development assistance" as one of its four strategies.

In Sudan and South Sudan, for example, JICA joined the international joint assessment mission while separately conducted its own survey even before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. This rapid engagement resulted in quick impact projects in the early recovery period in South Sudan, such as the Juba River port reconstruction. These projects were soon followed by larger development assistance including human resource development to serve long-term development.

4.3 Mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity

JICA has also tried to become more sensitive to negative effects on conflicts and state legitimacy that may be inadvertently caused by the donor's activities. To avoid such pitfalls, JICA has introduced the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PNA) mechanism by which it analyzes potential conflict risks in each context, and pays due consideration to the impacts of such risks on state legitimacy. It stresses the importance of taking into account the coexistence and reconciliation between different social groups within local communities in designing community

development projects. JICA also plans to introduce the evaluation guideline that incorporate conflict-sensitivity for projects in conflict-affected areas.

One example of such consideration is JICA's efforts in Sudan and South Sudan that aim at mitigating grievances stemming from economic and social disparities among different regions. In South Sudan, in parallel with the assistance to the Juba areas, JICA has intensified its support to less developed regions such as Malakal. In Sudan, JICA has extended its support to less developed areas including Darfur, the eastern provinces, and Three Protocol Areas.

5. Conclusion

State-building and conflict prevention remain as vital challenges in Africa. Bearing in mind the changing nature of conflicts throughout the continent, the international community has increasingly focused on state-building. To prevent violent conflicts and establish long-term stability, building capable and legitimate state institutions, which look after both public safety and livelihood improvement, is essential.

JICA-RI's research findings also demonstrate that successful state-building needs the strengthening of state capacity and legitimacy. Legitimacy building is an especially difficult task because it is deeply affected by changeable perceptions of the people. To nurture state legitimacy, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and other inequalities must be tackled. At the same time, inclusive institutions need to be constructed to foster a sense of fairness among the population.

JICA, as well as other development partners, has already started to integrate some of these insights into its planning and implementation. Coordination and mutual learning between donors will also be essential. However, in order to make their efforts to help state-building and conflict prevention more effective and efficient, greater and more persistent attention should be directed to the following points:

(1) Building of inclusive institutions

Inclusive institutions are key to consolidating state legitimacy based on stable state-society relations. Inclusive institutions can mitigate the

adverse effects of HIs. This, however, does not mean that attending HIs is not important. HIs need to be reduced since they are a root cause of violent conflicts. Meanwhile, inclusive institutions will help foster consensus and compromise among contending forces. However, institutions should not be imposed upon people by external actors since institutions can be securely established only when major stakeholders accept them as legitimate. What donors can do is to provide the recipient country with the opportunity to learn about current and historical experiences of other countries.

(2) Human security perspective: protection and empowerment

In tackling the challenges of state-building, the human security perspective should always be remembered, as it can provide a comprehensive understanding on state-building (Newman 2011). Human security integrates top-down measures to protect people and bottom-up measures to empower them. Capable institutions to protect people and empowered communities to hold the state accountable and legitimate are essential for bringing about a stable state that can maintain public safety and improve people's livelihood. The human security perspective supports the seamless transition from emergency relief to long-term development. While top-down measures are necessary to protect people in emergencies, the empowerment of people and local communities are crucial for long-term development.

(3) Local context sensitivity

External actors need to be sensitive to local contexts so they can avoid doing harm while maximizing the positive impact of their activities. In such assessment of local context, they need to be aware that people's perceptions are not necessarily equal to statistical data. While HIs need to be reduced, at the same time, donors need to pay attention to how their efforts for HI reduction are perceived by various stakeholders and carefully design their projects. This caution is valid not only at the planning stage but also at the operation stage in which local people directly observe donors' behavior. Donor coordination and information sharing must be crucial to avoid harming people's perceptions.

Since the beginning of the millennium, Africa has started to witness a declining number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths. Though trans-national non-state armed groups may impose new types of challenges on peace-building in Africa, structural problems such as

poverty, inequality, and other social issues remain crucial for peace and security, and state-building remains imperative for a stable and peaceful Africa. African leaders have strived to establish sustainable peace throughout the continent. Donors can help their efforts by supporting the building of capable and legitimate states if they are sensitive enough to local contexts. TICAD will provide a forum for a wide range of stakeholders to discuss how we all can collaborate to address this crucial challenge.

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