

CASE STUDY ON HAITI



MAKING DISASTER RISK REDUCTION POLICIES INCLUSIVE



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**Paper Series on Women, Peace and Security:
Haiti Case Study**

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Making Disaster Risk Reduction Policies Inclusive:

**An Analysis of Humanitarian
Aid Organizations in Haiti**

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Introduction

I. Introduction

Haiti was thrown into chaos when an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 struck on January 12, 2010. 1.5 million people, nearly 15 percent of the population, were directly affected. Over 220,000 people were killed, and an additional 300,000 were injured. The earthquake shattered not only physical infrastructure, but also the economic, healthcare, and governance apparatuses of the Haitian state. Immediately following the earthquake, 1.3 million people were living in temporary shelters in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.¹ Humanitarian organizations, both local and international, sprang into action to address the immediate needs of the affected population.

The response to the earthquake was one of the largest and most complex undertaken by the international community at that time. Individuals and governments around the world donated money to the response, and aid agencies mobilized human resources and funding as quickly as possible. The international community pledged approximately \$10.4 billion for humanitarian relief and recovery efforts, including debt relief, and an additional \$3.1 billion was contributed through private charitable donations. \$6.4 billion of this total commitment had been disbursed as of July 2014.² Between January 2010 and September 2014, the U.S. government alone spent \$1.3 billion in humanitarian relief assistance and \$1.8 billion in recovery, reconstruction, and development – a total of \$3.1 billion in aid to Haiti.³ As the response took form, it became increasingly clear that women were disproportionately affected by the disruption of normal community structures, and rates of sexual assault increased rapidly.⁴ Many women had previously played a major role in the informal economy and struggled financially when markets were shut down.⁵ While working to ensure security and market access in the short-term, aid agencies began to realize that the Haiti response would require long-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) programming to increase community resilience and reduce risk in the case of future natural disasters. Haiti is a particularly interesting context in which to examine gender-responsive DRR policy and programming because of the widely perceived disparity between resources committed and outcomes gained.

The international community overlooked women's specific needs and failed to incorporate women's voices in their response. The post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) published by the Haitian government, with support of the World Bank, largely overlooked women's

¹ Government of Haiti and The World Bank, *Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs*, no. 70102, (March 2010): 5, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/19/000333038_20120619012320/Rendered/PDF/701020ESW0P1190R0Haiti0PDNA020100EN.pdf.

² Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-162, 128 Stat. 1858 (2014).

³ United States Department of State, "Government Assistance to Haiti: 2010 to 2015," (December 2014), <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USG-Assistance-in-Haiti-2010-2015.pdf>.

⁴ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): viii, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

⁵ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): 108, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

particular needs post-disaster, as well as their capabilities to inform and advance recovery efforts. The total lack of gender considerations in the PDNA was so stark – and inconsistent with the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, as well as all Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)⁶ standards – that a diverse coalition of Haitian and international women’s groups published a *Gender Shadow Report* to supplement the missing content.⁷ The *Gender Shadow Report* parallels the original PDNA outline, but with considerations and recommendations based on gender analysis. The report concluded, “without the direct involvement of women, neither sustainable development nor a disaster-response program [in Haiti] will be successful.”⁸

This study provides insight into the successes and shortcomings of the response to women’s needs in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In order to inform future action, this report highlights the importance of gender-responsive emergency response and long-term recovery processes. Finally, this study offers a resource to policymakers and practitioners for implementing and mainstreaming gender-responsive perspectives and policies. This study differs from the *Gender Shadow Report* by discussing not only immediate relief efforts, but long-term recovery and DRR work in Haiti as well, spanning 2010 to 2015. This study examines four humanitarian aid organizations—the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—in order to analyze diverse modes of response, both for immediate post-disaster needs and for long-term capacity-building. This study details the policies that guided the response of these organizations in Haiti and their evolution between 2010 and 2015 in order to inform future disaster assistance and to better incorporate women’s voices in humanitarian response.

There are multiple gaps in the literature on the response to the Haiti earthquake that this study seeks to address. The literature is not particularly focused on gender mainstreaming in DRR. On the rare occasions that gender was addressed after the earthquake, most of the focus was on responding to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). These initiatives, while important, were mostly reactive. Rather than an emphasis on prevention, programming targeted service provision for SGBV victims or delineated pathways for preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) reporting. Broadening the literature’s often singular focus on SGBV, this report takes the following questions into consideration: What were the impediments to implementing gender mainstreaming for humanitarian aid organizations in Haiti? How could DRR policies have included gender mainstreaming in

⁶ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian response and involves UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. (See: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/>)

⁷ 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, *The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction*, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010), <http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf>.

⁸ 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, *The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction*, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010): 12, <http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf>.

areas other than SGBV and PSEA? Is there still a gap between corporate policies and their practical implementation? Are gender mainstreaming tools and guidelines available to provide guidance to staff and implementing partners? While the literature discusses women as a vulnerable group, there is significantly less coverage of women as resilient actors who can contribute to disaster risk reduction programming. What opportunities existed for the four agencies to utilize women's knowledge and skillsets as part of prevention and response? Finally, the literature is unclear about the degree of accountability between contracting organizations and their implementing partners when addressing gender mainstreaming. If implementing partners are enacting agency policies, at what stage are gender considerations disappearing from programming?

Through these questions, this study examines the level of advancing gender considerations in DRR in the four organizations in the five years since the earthquake in Haiti. The analysis includes whether gender considerations have been taken into account in the design, implementation, and budgeting of DRR programs; identification of the supports and barriers to gender mainstreaming considerations; and the formulation of recommendations and lessons learned to improve gender mainstreaming in DRR.

The four organizations discussed in this study, as well as the humanitarian community more broadly, have undergone significant changes in approaches to women's needs and abilities, both in immediate response and long-term recovery and development. A global change in discourse emphasizing women's unique needs and agency has led to the increasing institutionalization of these issues in policy and practice for humanitarian, DRR, and development organizations. Institutional reform creates policies to facilitate change, but individuals are often the ones who make the real difference in incorporating women's needs and abilities into programming. Specific individuals and teams who have a background or interest in working on gender are often the ones who push for gender mainstreaming in program design and accountability mechanisms. In the wake of a disaster, humanitarian organizations have tremendous potential to address fundamental needs of women and girls, and to begin building a more equitable and more inclusive society.

Methodology

II. Methodology

The analysis and findings in this study are derived from a multifaceted qualitative data collection method that sought to understand the extent to which gender mainstreaming was incorporated in the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and whether there were any changes to their DRR policies since the earthquake to 2015. OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID were chosen as the subjects of this study because they are major actors in the humanitarian and DRR sectors, and because their activities represent the full range of disaster response and disaster preparedness efforts, from short-term recovery to long-term capacity-building.

A thorough review of academic literature, reports from organizations involved in the response to the 2010 earthquake, assessments of the response to the 2010 earthquake, and newspaper and magazine articles about the earthquake and emergency response was conducted. This provided an understanding of the state of art concerning the response, assessments of gender mainstreaming, and the media coverage of the earthquake in Haiti.

The study also involved a comprehensive textual analysis of 167 publications and reports released by OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID. These documents included annual reports, country reports, DRR strategic frameworks, DRR strategic plans, DRR operational plans, senior management memos, needs assessments, DRR preparedness toolkits, gender and DRR toolkits, fact sheets, monitoring and evaluation reports, and risk assessments. These documents were studied to understand how often and when the organizations referenced gender, how gender is incorporated into descriptions and expectations of programming, and the context in which gender is discussed. This process was crucial to understanding which types of documents and programming emphasize gender-responsiveness or sex-disaggregated data. The findings of the textual analysis were compared against a set of coded, semi-structured interviews.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted between December 2015 and January 2016 with a total of 27 key informants at OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, USAID, and at implementing partners of these organizations. A sample of five individuals at senior and mid-levels, stationed at headquarters and in Haiti, were interviewed from each of the four organizations. The criteria for selection consisted of individuals whose work focused on Haiti, DRR, and/or gender mainstreaming at these organizations between 2010 and 2015, to understand how staff responded to the earthquake in Haiti, their conceptualization of gender and DRR, and what has changed since the 2010 response. Individuals⁹ from implementing partners of these organizations, specifically the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as an implementing partner for OCHA, the Croix Rouge Française

⁹ One or two individuals from each implementing organization were interviewed, focusing on their organization's response in Haiti from 2010 to 2015. These individuals were mid-level professionals who were all deployed in Haiti during the relevant time frame.

(CRF) and J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO) as implementing partners for UNHCR, and the World Food Programme (WFP) as an implementing partner for USAID, were also included in the sample to understand the relationship between contracting or coordinating agencies' gender mainstreaming policies and partners' implementation work. These implementation partners were selected based on organizations that received the greatest funding from OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, or USAID through analysis of funding documents. It was not possible to interview individuals working for implementing partners for UNEP, as its funding documents and budgets were not available to the research team. Specific attention was paid to gender mainstreaming within these organizations and accountability mechanisms for reporting to donor or partner organizations. These interviews focused on the individual's responsibilities at their organization, the extent to which gender mainstreaming was incorporated into their daily work, their contact with gender focal points or gender specialists, whether their organization or office was able to collect sex-disaggregated data, and the challenges they experienced in implementing gender mainstreaming. While the information gathered through interviews with individuals at implementing partners was very helpful for understanding the response and overall DRR programming, data from these interviews were not included in this report, as it was not possible to show a direct link between the policies and practices of coordinating or contracting agencies and the policies and practices of implementing partners. Further research could help to illuminate how gender mainstreaming policies are connected between coordinating and contracting agencies and implementing partners. Inductive thematic analysis was used to develop themes from data collected in the semi-structured interviews.

This study will provide a brief socioeconomic background of Haiti, a discussion of the main definitions and themes in emergency response and DRR programming, and an overview of the vulnerabilities of Haitian communities, and especially women, that were exacerbated by the 2010 earthquake. This study will then provide an analysis of OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID response immediately following the earthquake, then an overview of the changes in programming and policy that have taken place between 2010 and 2015.

Socioeconomic Background

III. Socioeconomic Background

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, enduring decades of endemic poverty exacerbated by political instability and periodic natural disasters. This confluence of factors undermined Haiti's ability to withstand a catastrophic natural disaster such as the January 2010 earthquake. The severity of the disaster, combined with a struggling economy and weak governance institutions, impeded Haiti's resilience in the face of the shock brought on by the earthquake. Six years later, Haiti – despite significant international aid and an influx of resources post-disaster – continues to struggle to bounce back. Despite these challenges – given the country's long history of violence, rebellion, and emergencies caused by natural disasters – Haitians are neither unfamiliar with disaster nor entirely incapable of recovering from them. Haitians are neither helpless nor hopeless in the wake of natural disasters.

Covering an area of 10,714 square miles, Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with its relatively wealthier and more stable neighbor the Dominican Republic. With a population of 10.6 million, Haiti is the third-most populous country in the Caribbean region,¹⁰ with a GDP per capita of \$852 in 2014.¹¹ In 2010, Haiti was ranked 145th out of 182 countries in the Human Development Index published by the United Nations. Socioeconomic inequality within Haiti is vast, with nearly two-thirds of the population living in poverty.¹²

Yet to write Haiti off as a failed state – as many non-Haitian observers are wont to do – is an overly simplistic generalization about a country with a rich and complex political, economic, and sociocultural history. A lucrative French colony due to its sugar cane plantations, Haiti declared independence from France in 1804 following a rebellion led by African and native slaves.¹³ Post-independence, sugar and cotton production intensified, becoming sources of export revenue for the fledgling country, which was largely shunned or met with hostility by Western powers.

In 1957, Francois Duvalier, or 'Papa Doc,' became president of Haiti. Centralization of power, growth of black interests, oppression of minorities, and a total intolerance for dissent or pluralism characterized Duvalier's rule, which lasted until 1971. His son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, or 'Baby Doc,' who succeeded him and ruled until 1986, emulated

¹⁰ International Monetary Fund, "Country Specific Notes: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Population (Persons)," *World Economic Outlook Database*, (April 2015), accessed February 8, 2016, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=87&pr.y=3&sy=2015&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=263%2C243&s=LP&grp=0&a=>.

¹¹ International Monetary Fund, "Country Specific Notes: Haiti: Gross domestic product per capita (U.S. dollars)," *World Economic Outlook Database*, (October 2014), accessed February 8, 2016, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=58&pr.y=15&sy=2014&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=263&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=>.

¹² The World Bank, "Countries: Haiti Overview," accessed February 8, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>.

¹³ Kate Hodgson, "Internal Harmony, Peace to the Outside World: Imagining Community in Nineteenth-Century Haiti," *Paragraph* 37, no. 2 (July 2014): 179, doi:10.3366/para.2014.0120.

Duvalier's strong-armed, repressive approach to governance.¹⁴ Between 1986 and 2004, political chaos ensued; Haiti experienced several regime changes and violent demonstrations, as well as an American diplomatic and military intervention to restore order to the country. Although multiple elections took place, there were allegations of fraud, including in 2000 when Jean-Baptiste Aristide – who had previously been elected president in the early 1990s – returned to office. Aristide's return to power was controversial, marred by electoral violence, human rights abuses, a boycott of the election by the opposition, and a growing rebellion amongst his dissenters.

Aristide was deposed in 2004 after a coup d'état that plunged the country into another period of political uncertainty. Later that year, the Security Council responded by passing resolution 1542, thereby establishing the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was deployed to mitigate the threat to international peace and security posed by the violence and upheaval triggered by the coup.¹⁵ Peacekeeping troops have been operating in Haiti since the 1990s, often in contention with the local Haitian population. The 2010 earthquake destroyed several UN facilities and caused significant damage to MINUSTAH operations. The earthquake killed multiple senior officials, including the Head of Mission, Hedi Annabi. While MINUSTAH's original role in Haiti was a political one, they became involved by necessity in the earthquake recovery process.

The 2010 earthquake shone a spotlight on the socioeconomic challenges faced by Haitians, but underdevelopment and political mismanagement of resources had long existed.¹⁶ Although Haiti received some \$4 billion in foreign aid between 1990 and 2003, the level of human development in the country remains low due to corruption, poor governance, and weak institutions. Political turmoil has meant the lack of access to basic services such as education and health, especially in rural and remote areas. Prior to the earthquake, more than two-thirds of all health services in the country were provided by non-governmental organizations.¹⁷ Only two-thirds of primary-aged and one-third of secondary-aged children are enrolled in school.

Geographical disparities in income are a particular concern: nearly 70 percent of rural households are considered chronically poor, while that figure drops to 20 percent in cities.¹⁸ The rates of extreme poverty in rural areas have held steady, while slowly decreasing in

¹⁴ R. Anthony Lewis, "Language, Culture and Power: Haiti under the Duvaliers," *Caribbean Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (December 2004): 42-51, <http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/221161053?accountid=11091>.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1542, "On Establishment of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)," April 30, 2004, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48bfc5642.html>.

¹⁶ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti," *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

¹⁷ Alex Dupuy, "Commentary Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-Up Call for Haiti," *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 3 (May 2010): 195-204, doi: 10.1177/0094582X10366539.

¹⁸ The World Bank, "Living Conditions in Haiti's Capital Improve, but Rural Communities Remain Very Poor," (July 11, 2014), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/11/while-living-conditions-in-port-au-prince-are-improving-haiti-countryside-remains-very-poor>.

cities,¹⁹ a fact which, along with severe environmental degradation in the countryside, has led to significant migration to cities – nearly 57 percent of the total population now lives in urban areas.²⁰ In concentrated urban settings, such as the capital Port-au-Prince, many households are precariously crammed together in haphazard buildings, often built with cheap cement or without adequate foundations.²¹ Rapid deforestation has increased people’s vulnerability to storms, mudslides, soil erosion, and other environmental problems.²² In fact, even though the 2010 earthquake was catastrophic, Haiti had experienced multiple other significant natural disasters – albeit of lesser scale – in recent years. Haiti’s vulnerabilities exacerbate the impact of any potential natural disaster. Hurricanes Jeanne and Hanna, in 2004 and 2008 respectively, left a combined 3,500 dead in Haiti – a stark comparison to the combined death toll of 19 in the Dominican Republic.

Haiti’s ability to deal with large-scale natural disasters is limited, and, therefore, the state relies on foreign aid in the aftermath of such events. However, as Pyles and Svistova argue, “the majority of relief work is actually conducted by local survivors,” but this is oftentimes “lost on mass media” prone to “highlight[ing] the heroics of foreign first responders.”²³ Local resilience is aided by the strong local agricultural industry, comprising almost a quarter of GDP and employing half the labor force. Remittances are also a major source of income for many Haitians, who depend on relatives abroad for their livelihood and comprise twenty percent of the GDP.²⁴

Despite this, longstanding vulnerabilities remain. Gender inequality – in health, education, economic opportunity, and political participation – is a systemic problem that disenfranchises women. Padgett and Warnecke, in explaining Haiti’s poor socioeconomic indicators and political failures, note, “institutional arrangements within Haiti have perpetuated hierarchical power relations and gendered socioeconomic outcomes.”²⁵ Women are significant contributors to the informal economy in Haiti, as well as relentless entrepreneurs, but are often underpaid, lack reliable and consistent work, and have difficulty accessing credit.²⁶ Despite being a critical and significant part of the country’s

¹⁹ The World Bank, “Living Conditions in Haiti’s Capital Improve, but Rural Communities Remain Very Poor,” (July 11, 2014), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/11/while-living-conditions-in-port-au-prince-are-improving-haiti-countryside-remains-very-poor>.

²⁰ The World Bank, “Urban population (% of total),” *The World Bank DataSet*, (2015), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>.

²¹ “Why Was the Destruction So Severe?” *Inside Disaster*, accessed February 10, 2016, <http://insidedisaster.com/haiti/the-quake/why-was-the-destruction-so-severe>

²² Benedetta F. Duramy, *Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2014).

²³ Benedetta F. Duramy, *Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 60.

²⁴ Migration Policy Institute, “Remittances Profile: Haiti,” *MPI Data Hub*, (2011), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Haiti.pdf>.

²⁵ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, “Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

²⁶ Nédjée Mauconduit, Bénédicte Paul, and Etzer S. Emile, “Women and Economic Development: Women Entrepreneurship Situation in Haiti,” *Haiti Perspectives* 2, no. 3 (August 2013): 61-67, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375608.

informal labor force, women are often subject to unique gendered pressures and challenges. Women are responsible for the overwhelming majority of unpaid household and caregiving work, which undercuts their productive potential, as well as their opportunities for educational growth. This “time poverty” disempowers women and girls from a young age and throughout their lives.²⁷ Haiti has the highest fertility rate in the LAC region, resultant from cultural pressures on women to reproduce, as well as a lack of adequate access to family planning resources.²⁸

Violence against women – including domestic abuse and sexual violence – is highly prevalent in Haiti, which has devastating economic, health, and social consequences. In 2012, the Haiti Demographic and Health Survey reported that 29 percent of women have experienced intimate partner violence²⁹ – and this figure does not account for the many more cases that go unreported. The prevalence of violence against women is a complicated phenomenon caused by economic pressures, cultural norms, political instability, and the strongly patriarchal society that dictates the status of women as subordinate to men. At the same time, violence against women has also been politicized in Haiti, especially when committed in the context of conflict or rebellion and sanctioned by authorities as part of inter-group hostilities.³⁰ Until 2005, rape was not classified as a crime under law, and impunity for domestic or intimate-partner violence remains high.³¹

Prior to the 2010 earthquake, women were also grossly underrepresented in public office. Women occupied mere four percent of parliamentary seats (2007-2010) and led only one-tenth of cabinet ministries in 2008.³² Although there is a Ministry of Women’s Affairs that works to address women’s needs, it is underfunded, sidelined, and has limited influence overall.³³ While the presence of women in elective and high office does not guarantee progress for all women citizens, the lack of women in leadership positions does suggest another form of gender inequity. Low political participation of women also contributes to their systemic marginalization and the perpetuation of gender-blind or even discriminatory policies.³⁴ Despite this, women do occupy leadership positions in civil society and have historically advocated for their betterment and overall societal change for decades. Haiti

²⁷ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti," *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

²⁸ Population Reference Bureau, “2015 World Population Data Sheet with a special focus on women’s empowerment,” (2015), http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf

²⁹ Ministry of Public Health and Population, Haitian Childhood Institute, and ICF International, *Haiti: 2012 Mortality, Morbidity, and Service Utilization Survey: Key Findings*, (Calverton, Maryland: MSPP, IHE, and ICF International, 2013), http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/SR199/SR199_eng.pdf.

³⁰ Benedetta F. Duramy, *Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2014).

³¹ Alexis Gardella, “Gender Assessment USAID/Haiti,” *United States Agency for International Development*, (Washington DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2006), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdach597.pdf.

³² United Nations Statistics Division, “Haiti Series Data,” *Millennium Development Goals Indicators*, (2015), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>.

³³ Beatrice Lindstrom, *Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Haiti*, Freedom House, (2012): 8, <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Haiti%20-%20FINAL.pdf>.

³⁴ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti," *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 536, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

has long had a thriving civil society, with women's organizations acting as community networks and mobilizers.³⁵ Despite this, women's groups are consistently excluded from government consultations and even by international aid agencies, including the United Nations International Donors Conference³⁶ in March 2010 after the earthquake. Another obstacle that undermines effective policies and engagement by foreign and local authorities is the lack of sex-disaggregated data, and, in particular, differentiated information about urban and rural populations.

³⁵ 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, *The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women's Participation and Leadership in All Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction*, (Haiti: Collectif Haiti Égalité, 2010), <http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf>.

³⁶ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti," *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 542, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

**A Select Literature
Review on Disaster
Risk Reduction and
Gender in Haiti**

IV. A Select Literature Review on Disaster Risk Reduction and Gender in Haiti

DRR is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters.³⁷ In working to create resilient communities, DRR policies include disciplines as diverse as agriculture and food systems, land tenure and building construction, governmental risk mitigation, and financial and education systems.³⁸

The severity of a disaster is also closely tied to gender differences and inequalities. Gender equality is critical to sustainable development and, thus, equally critical to DRR policies and programming.³⁹ As a cross-cutting issue, gender impacts the diverse systems that DRR engages with, from environmental management to education, as well as the post-disaster experiences of women and men.

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) posits, “Mainstreaming gender into DRR offers an opportunity for re-examining gender relations in society from different angles and enhancing gender equality in socioeconomic development...[and]...makes it possible for nations and communities to achieve disaster resilience.”⁴⁰ Mainstreaming gender into DRR before a natural disaster occurs is important for achieving effective, gender-sensitive responses and prevention efforts, but it is also an opportunity for transforming society and addressing underlying causes of inequality.

Studies show that while women and men may live through the same natural disaster, women experience the effects of the disaster in dramatically different ways. As West et al. wrote in their seminal report *The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies*, “Disaster is a social product; vulnerability is contingent upon social pre conditions.”⁴¹ In a patriarchal world, social conditions penalize women. Neumayer and Plümper argue that more women than men have been found to die from natural hazards, linked to women’s unequal socioeconomic status.⁴² Even when they are less severe, natural disasters still have differentiated impacts on men and women. A report from UNISDR on gender-sensitive disaster risk reduction notes that slow-onset hazards leave women with an increased workload to collect, store, protect, and distribute water and food for the household, and

³⁷ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “What is Disaster Risk Reduction?,” accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/what-is-drr>.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Joni Seager and Betsy Hartmann, *Mainstreaming Gender in Environmental Assessment and Early Warning*, (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 2005), http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Mainstreaming_Gender.pdf.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Raymond Wiest, Jane Mocellin, and Thandiwe Motsisi, *The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies*, United Nations Development Program and the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: The University of Manitoba, June 1994), <http://www.gdnonline.org/resources/women-in-disaster-emergency.pdf>.

⁴² Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper, “The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact of Catastrophic Events on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97, no. 3 (2007): 551-566, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.2007.00563.x.

often must head households without the means or social capital to obtain resources for their families.⁴³ The same report identified that women also face limited access to credit, information, and relief services, making it even more difficult to recover from disaster losses.⁴⁴

While an entire community may be exposed to the same risk, women and men have different levels of vulnerability and access to resources, and therefore require different types of response programs from humanitarian organizations.⁴⁵ Often, however, organizations do not utilize a gender analysis in their assessments. De Silva's and Jayathilaka's study on gender-based vulnerabilities found that traditional needs assessment surveys did not ask questions that addressed the complexities of women's needs in a post-disaster environment⁴⁶ – and thus lost much useful information. A study by Padgett and Warnecke⁴⁷ on women in Haiti noted that development programs were not addressing longstanding gender inequities in Haitian society, losing valuable opportunities to kick start economic development through women's participation.

The broader scope of women's vulnerabilities and needs is often reduced to their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence. Studies by Schuller⁴⁸ and Duramy⁴⁹ extensively examined sexual violence in Haitian society before the earthquake. These studies show that Haitian women did not know what shelters, services, and resources related to sexual and gender-based violence were available to them prior to the earthquake, which likely carried over into post-earthquake life.⁵⁰ Following the earthquake, women lacked security and protection within camps that were often poorly lit at night, which contributed to their insecurity and sexual based violence.⁵¹

Few studies have examined how gender was specifically considered in overall disaster planning and response policies in Haiti, and what impact this may have had on women's lives and experiences post-earthquake. One of these studies, from Ginige et al., demonstrates how gender mainstreaming can help integrate perspectives of women into DRR in post-disaster environments to lessen their suffering and support their families and

⁴³ United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, United Nations Development Programme, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, *Making Disaster Risk Reduction Gender-Sensitive: Policy and Practical Guidelines*, (Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR, UNDP and IUCN, 2009), http://www.unisdr.org/files/9922_MakingDisasterRiskReductionGenderSe.pdf.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Kushani De Silva and Ramanie Jayathilaka, "Gender in the Context of Disaster Risk Reduction: a case study of a flood risk reduction project in the Gampaha District in Sri Lanka," in "4th International Conference on Building Resilience," special issue, *Procedia Economics and Finance* 18, (September 2014): 873-881.

⁴⁷ Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and Human Development in Haiti," *Journal of Economic Issues* 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 5527-577, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.

⁴⁸ Mark Schuller, "They Forgot about Us! Gender and Haiti's IDP Camps," *Meridians: feminism, race, transnationalism* 11, no. 1 (Indiana University Press, 2011): 149-157, doi: 10.2979/meridians.11.1.149.

⁴⁹ Benedetta F. Duramy, *Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women's Path from Victims to Agents*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2014).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

communities.⁵² Yet gender mainstreaming requires the participation and support of multiple actors to be done successfully. In an evaluation on humanitarian aid organizations, Mountain argues that when development programs and policies do explicitly address gender equity post-disaster – and not only in terms of sexual and gender-based violence – donor governments do not necessarily monitor how well these policies were implemented by field staff or organizations on the ground.⁵³ However, studies have shown that in order to be successful, gender mainstreaming in DRR should consist of two steps: identification of women’s DRR knowledge and needs, and the integration of their identified knowledge and needs into DRR in their environment.⁵⁴

⁵² Kanchana, Ginige, Dilanthi Amaratunga, and Richard Haigh, "Tackling women's vulnerabilities through integrating a gender perspective into disaster risk reduction in the built environment" in "4th International Conference on Building Resilience," special issue, *Procedia Economics and Finance* 18 (September 2014): 327-335, doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00947-2.

⁵³ Ross Mountain, "Haiti – Now is the time to work on gender issues," *DARA International*, (AlertNet, July 2011), <http://daraint.org/2011/07/12/2360/alertnet-op-ed-haiti-now-is-the-time-to-work-on-gender-issues/>.

⁵⁴ Kanchana, Ginige, Dilanthi Amaratunga, and Richard Haigh, "Tackling women's vulnerabilities through integrating a gender perspective into disaster risk reduction in the built environment" in "4th International Conference on Building Resilience," special issue, *Procedia Economics and Finance* 18 (September 2014): 327, doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00947-2.

Vulnerabilities in the Aftermath of the Earthquake

V. Vulnerabilities in the Aftermath of the Earthquake

The 2010 earthquake took a tremendous toll on everyone affected. 220,000 people were killed, and 300,000 more were injured. 1.3 million people were living in temporary shelters in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area following the earthquake. 105,000 homes were destroyed, and 208,000 more were damaged. 50 hospitals or health centers collapsed.⁵⁵ An assessment by Dalberg Global Advisors states,

“The January 2010 earthquake has exacerbated the already challenging situation in Haiti. Health risks have increased overall; levels of domestic violence and rape have risen, especially in camps; people have lost assets and have been unable to return to work; and legal, judicial, and legislative capacities have been further reduced.”⁵⁶

Haiti’s economic, healthcare, and governance structures were seriously weakened. Women faced a particularly bleak landscape following the earthquake; already economically vulnerable and facing weak healthcare services and high levels of GBV before the earthquake, the disaster further marginalized them.

Security

The security situation following the earthquake was threatening for many women. GBV was common in the camps, worsened by insufficient police presence and the government’s inability to meet the needs of women and children in the camps. Despite attention to these gendered security needs, the PDNA did not incorporate an analysis of root causes or gender-focused governance reforms. The assessment by Dalberg Global Advisors argues that since the earthquake, reported cases of violence and GBV have been alarmingly high, especially for girls under 18.⁵⁷ Data collected in four camps⁵⁸ revealed that 14 percent of the respondents said since the earthquake, one of more members of their household had experienced sexual violence.⁵⁹ Among the victims, 86 percent were women and girls. These incidents of sexual violence occurred both during the day and at night, most often when women were inside their shelters or on their way to get water.⁶⁰ A study conducted in Parc Jean Marie Vincent camp found that although the UN and Haitian police regularly

⁵⁵ Government of Haiti and The World Bank, *Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs*, no. 70102, (March 2010): 5, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSPIB/2012/06/19/000333038_20120619012320/Rendered/PDF/701020ESW0P1190R0Haiti0PDNA020100EN.pdf.

⁵⁶ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): viii, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Terrain de Golf, Place St. Pierre, Champs de Mars, and Parc Jean Marie Vincent.

⁵⁹ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law. *Sexual Violence in Haiti’s IDP Camps: Results of a Household Survey*, (New York: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, 2011): 3, <http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/HaitiSexualViolenceMarch2011.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

patrolled that area, most of the respondents still felt unsafe, citing poor integration of security forces into the community.⁶¹

The Dalberg report states that the earthquake could reduce health care access, increase risks for pregnant women, increase food insecurity, escalate frequency of GBV, increase the risk of child trafficking, and increase the risk of HIV infection and ARV non-compliance.⁶² Most poor women relied on petty commerce to make ends meet, but lost all assets in the earthquake and did not have the credit access to start up again. Many fell into debt to feed themselves and their families, and many traded sex for food or money to buy cooking fuel.⁶³ A 2011 UNHCR report states, “the phenomenon of women and adolescent girls engaging in transactional sex within IDP (Internally Displaced Person) camps in Port-au-Prince is widespread and exemplifies the exacerbation of their precarious and vulnerable conditions. They are facing insurmountable obstacles to accessing humanitarian aid and support from national authorities, and local and international actors.”⁶⁴ Women interviewed for this study state that their primary motivation for engaging in transactional sex was not only for their own survival, but also for the survival of their children.⁶⁵ Additionally, increased gang activity in Port-au-Prince anecdotally made women feel less safe.⁶⁶ The destruction of 80 percent of the justice sector in Port-au-Prince made it difficult to process violent crime offenders both in and outside of IDP camps. High levels of violence affect women’s ability to participate freely in public life and governance structures, but few GBV cases were reported, investigated, or prosecuted.⁶⁷

Health

The earthquake also had serious health consequences for women. Post-earthquake access to family planning varied based on women’s proximity to donor agencies,⁶⁸ and pregnant women faced specific challenges. Immediately following the earthquake, UNFPA estimated that 15 percent of the 63,000 pregnant women in affected areas were likely to experience potentially life-threatening complications; many women reportedly gave birth in the street, as most medical facilities were focusing on emergency care for those who had been injured

⁶¹ Kimberly A. Cullen and Louise C. Ivers, “Human Rights Assessment in Parc Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,” *Health and Human Rights in Practice* 12, no. 2 (2010): 66.

⁶² Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): 6, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Driven by Desperation: Transactional Sex as a Survival Strategy in Port-au-Prince IDP Camps* (Port-au-Prince: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 2011), http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/SGBV-UNHCR-report2_FINAL.pdf.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): 93, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

⁶⁷ 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, *The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction*, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010), <http://www.generationaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf>.

⁶⁸ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): 78, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

during the earthquake.⁶⁹ 7,000 HIV-positive women were pregnant at the time of the earthquake, and ensuring continued access to treatment in order to reduce mother-to-child transmission was a key challenge in post-earthquake Haiti. Haitian health officials and international organizations warned that new HIV infections may have risen given the increased levels of transactional sex and sexual assaults.⁷⁰

Financial Stability

According to the PDNA, the earthquake caused a total of \$7.8 billion in damages and losses, amounting to 120 percent of Haiti's 2009 GDP. A 2010 USAID-funded survey of almost 1,000 farmers in rural, earthquake-impacted areas suggests that survey participants saw between a 90 and 92 percent drop in petty commerce in the two to three months after the earthquake. This has a tremendous impact on already-vulnerable groups such as women-led households, particularly because women often work in the informal sector in commerce, selling goods in markets.⁷¹ For those women who were able to work, childcare and safe transportation were not always available.⁷²

⁶⁹ Ibid, 81.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 87.

⁷¹ Ibid, 108.

⁷² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Driven by Desperation: Transactional Sex as a Survival Strategy in Port-au-Prince IDP Camps* (Port-au-Prince: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 2011): 113, http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/SGBV-UNHCR-report2_FINAL.pdf

**Earthquake
Response and
Gender
Mainstreaming
Policy**

VI. Earthquake Response and Gender Mainstreaming Policy

OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID have different mandates and capabilities, and thus responded to the 2010 earthquake in different ways. OCHA and UNHCR responded primarily to immediate needs, focusing on protection and security concerns, though UNHCR played only an advisory role in the protection cluster. UNEP played a modest role in emergency relief, but provided strong gender-responsive programming for prevention and resilience for future disasters. USAID responded both to immediate concerns and long-term capacity-building needs, transitioning from a strong focus on protection and GBV to a focus on resilience and DRR. All four organizations were guided by internal gender mainstreaming policies, though these policies varied in terms of the degree of institutional rigidity in the application of the policy, the emphasis on accountability mechanisms, and incorporation of these policies in daily staff tasks. This difference in institutional attitude influenced the differentiated response and incorporation of gender considerations in the programming of each of these organizations.

OCHA

OCHA is the UN agency responsible for ensuring a coherent response to emergencies and mobilizing and coordinating humanitarian action. This involves creating a framework that facilitates the cooperation and coordination of humanitarian organizations, with an emphasis on preparedness and prevention, creating sustainable solutions, and advocating for the rights of people in need.⁷³ OCHA's role in Haiti was the organization of resources and programming to help ensure a smooth and effective response. OCHA was heavily involved in Haiti immediately following the earthquake, and managed several funds⁷⁴ that supported humanitarian response following the earthquake. The organization played a major role by coordinating and publishing appeals for funding, which delineated needs and funding requests according to cluster⁷⁵ and according to responding organization. OCHA's

⁷³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Who We Are," accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are>.

⁷⁴ OCHA hosts two types of funding mechanisms: the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and country-based pooled funds (CBPFs). CERF is made up of pooled contributions from donors that is set aside for immediate use at the onset of emergencies, in rapidly deteriorating situations, and in protracted crises that fail to attract sufficient resources. CBPFs are multi-donor humanitarian financing instruments that allocate funding based on identified humanitarian needs and priorities at the country level. A particular type of CBPF, the Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF Haiti) was established in 2008 and provided rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors to address urgent and unforeseen humanitarian needs in Haiti. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Who We Are," accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are>; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Country-Based Pooled Funds," accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds>; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Emergency Relief Response Fund," accessed February 10, 2016, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/haiti/emergency-relief-response-fund-errf>).

⁷⁵ Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations working in the main sector of humanitarian action, such as camp management, health, or protection. The clusters are used when actors within sectors and national authorities need coordination support. OCHA works closely with global cluster lead agencies to develop policies, coordinate inter-cluster issues, and disseminate operational guidance. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Cluster Coordination," accessed February 10, 2016 <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination>).

response in Haiti was primarily within the realm of disaster response, only the first stage of DRR programming, and it focused on protection of vulnerable populations and traditional security concerns in the short-term. While gender was integrated into parts of the response, especially in the objectives and outcomes described in the Flash Appeal, other areas, such as collection of sex-disaggregated data and coordination of protection and resilience activities, proved more difficult because OCHA had to rely on partner organizations for data and distribution of resources on the ground. OCHA's response is characterized by a divide between the external-facing activities, which incorporated gender relatively successfully, and internal processes, in which inclusion of gender was more challenging.

OCHA's work during the response was guided by its 2005 Gender Equality Policy (GEP). The GEP emphasizes OCHA's goal of gender equality, which is a responsibility shared among all staff, from the Senior Management Team to managers and advocacy staff. The GEP encompasses gender mainstreaming, empowerment of women and girls, prevention and response to GBV, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian personnel, gender balance, and advocacy on behalf of a human rights-based approach.⁷⁶ The GEP states:

- OCHA will work to ensure that humanitarian assistance recognizes and responds to the protection and assistance needs of women and girls, as well as men and women. Through its coordination role, it will identify gaps relating to gender issues and call upon the humanitarian community to develop strategies to fill these gaps.
- OCHA will strengthen gender analysis in humanitarian assistance and support the humanitarian community's analysis of gender dimensions thus contributing to an improved understanding of emergencies, recovery and rehabilitation.
- OCHA will play a leadership role in ensuring that all policy initiatives strive towards the goal of gender equality and incorporate a gender perspective.
- OCHA representatives will speak out for the rights of women and girls, including their equitable participation in emergency and reconstruction initiatives.⁷⁷

While the GEP is, in theory, a comprehensive gender mainstreaming policy, its goals are ambiguous and difficult to translate into direct action. This aligns with a review of the GEP by OCHA's Evaluation and Guidance Section in 2010, which posited that knowledge of the GEP within OCHA was limited and that a majority of the staff did not see gender as a priority for OCHA's Senior Management and administration. Staff felt that management did not provide the necessary leadership or resources to fully implement the GEP. The

⁷⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Evaluation and Guidance Section, "Review of OCHA's Gender Equality Policy," (December 2010): 4-6, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GEP_Review_FinalReport_Adobe.pdf.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 6-7.

review also found that gender mainstreaming was often a second priority at the field level due to overextended staff and the lack of skills and knowledge about how to mainstream gender effectively.⁷⁸ OCHA's coordinating efforts show mixed results; OCHA put resources and political support behind certain initiatives emphasizing gender equality, such as the Gender Capacity Standby Project (GenCap)⁷⁹ and the GBV sub-cluster,⁸⁰ but struggled to create truly gender mainstreamed programming through its partner organizations, as OCHA had little ability to ensure that responding organizations used a gender-responsive framework or collected sex-disaggregated data.

OCHA achieved several successes in their response: the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)⁸¹ team arrived in Haiti within 24 hours of the earthquake; the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Flash Appeal⁸² were prepared very quickly, and funding began pouring in. Gender was included in the Flash Appeal, most specifically in the Protection cluster. The Appeal used gender-sensitive language,⁸³ and gender was, in theory, considered a cross-cutting issue. The designation for some projects included in the Appeal included objectives and outcomes specifically related to inclusion and participation of women.⁸⁴ For example, the Early Recovery section of the 2010 Flash Appeal specifically states a goal of gender balance in the creation of employment opportunities.⁸⁵ One staff member noted that "gender is a key component" in the Appeal.⁸⁶ The 2010 Flash Appeal states, "A gender focus forms one of the main criteria for the selection of beneficiaries."⁸⁷ However, it should be noted that the Flash Appeal focuses primarily on prevention of GBV rather than inclusion of women in long-term recovery activities. The Flash Appeal also included sex- and age-disaggregated data for the

⁷⁸ Ibid, 4.

⁷⁹ The Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) is a program within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) created in collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) that supports the development and implementation of gender-sensitive programming to humanitarian organizations at global, regional, and country levels. GenCap advisors are deployed to support the Humanitarian Coordinator, Humanitarian Country Teams, UN agencies, cluster leads, NGOs, and governments. (See: "GenCap –the IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project," Humanitarian Response, accessed February 9, 2016, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/genicap>).

⁸⁰ The GBV sub-cluster operates within the protection cluster in OCHA's cluster system and focuses on prevention of GBV and support for survivors of GBV. For a full description of the cluster system, see footnote 74.

⁸¹ The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team is part of the international emergency response system for sudden-onset emergencies. UNDAC teams can deploy at short notice and are mandated to complete assessment, coordination, and information management. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "What is UNDAC," accessed February 8, 2016, <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview>).

⁸² In humanitarian emergency situations requiring international assistance, OCHA issues a Flash Appeal that articulates humanitarian needs, priority sectors for response, an outline of response plans, and roles and responsibilities. (See: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/CERF_and_FA_20.11.08.pdf)

⁸³ A programming process is gender sensitive when the gender dimension is systematically integrated into every step of the process, from defining the problem, to identifying potential solutions, in the methodology and approach to implementing the project, in stakeholders analysis and the choice of partners, in defining the objective, outcomes, outputs, and activities, in the composition of the implementation and management team, in budgeting, in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process, and in policy dialogue. (See Brigitte Leduc and Farid Ahmad, "Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Programming," International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, (November 2009): 1, <http://www.icimod.org>).

⁸⁴ Interview, 7 Dec 2015.

⁸⁵ United Nations, *Haiti Earthquake Flash Appeal*, United Nations, (16 Jan 2010): 29, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/Flash_2010_Haiti_SCREEN.pdf.

⁸⁶ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 84.

affected population.⁸⁸ Cluster coordination was done rapidly, and resources, both financial and human, were mobilized very quickly.⁸⁹

However, the distinction between the emphasis on gender in the Flash Appeal and the realities of implementation was stark. The response suffered from weak humanitarian leadership, lack of local ownership, difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster, and weak needs assessments.⁹⁰ Staff overwhelmingly cited the difficult pre-existing situation in Haiti – whether the lack of governance, local security, or urban planning – as significant challenges to providing effective, gender-responsive assistance.⁹¹ A lack of preparedness at OCHA for response in an urban area was also cited as a serious obstacle,⁹² and an April 2010 evaluation of the cluster system’s activities in Haiti noted that existing guidance often did not consider urban disaster settings.⁹³

Transitioning from the appeal and funding process, OCHA made efforts to ensure that gender was mainstreamed into each cluster. OCHA hosted two particularly innovative responses to address gender inequality and vulnerability in the emergency response: the PSEA⁹⁴ mechanism and the GenCap initiative.⁹⁵ These positions were supported by staff at the highest levels, which ensured that advocates for a gender-inclusive response had a seat at the table.⁹⁶ The Emergency Coordinator provided support for the PSEA, and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator’s support for the inclusion of gender in the inter-cluster coordination meetings was crucial for a gender-responsive response. OCHA also deployed a Senior Policy Officer in Gender Equality to support the GenCap advisor in mainstreaming gender issues into the clusters. The GenCap advisor initially assisted the GBV sub-cluster in ensuring that GBV was taken into account in the planning process. The GBV sub-cluster and the Gender in the Humanitarian Response Working Group⁹⁷ advocated for lighting and increased access to food, shelters, and separate sanitation facilities, especially those with lockable doors, for women and girls. The staff in the GBV sub-cluster made special efforts to extend GBV prevention to programming across other clusters as well, working extensively with the Camp Management cluster.⁹⁸ The GenCap advisor then focused on the Inter-

⁸⁸ Ibid, 8.

⁸⁹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, “Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (January 2011): 9, <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/1249.pdf>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Interviews, 7 Dec 2015b, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a.

⁹² Interviews, 7 Dec 2015, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a, 29 Dec 2015.

⁹³ Andrea Binder and François Grünewald, *Haiti: IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase*, Urgence Réhabilitation Développement and Global Public Policy Institute, (April 2010): 12, <http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/IASC-Haiti-USA-2010-016-2.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Sexual Exploitation and Abuse programming (PSEA) is based on core principles to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian contexts, and these principles are binding on OCHA humanitarian staff. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Gender Toolkit*, Policy Development and Studies Branch (December 2012), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GenderToolkit1_9_PSEAandOCHA.pdf).

⁹⁵ Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, “Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (January 2011): 22, <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/1249.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Interview, 12 Dec 2015.

⁹⁷ The Gender in Humanitarian Response Working Group was comprised in 2010 of staff from MINUSTAH-Human Rights, MINUSTAH-Gender Unit, UNIFEM, UNFPA, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, and several NGOs.

⁹⁸ Interview, 21 Dec 2015a.

Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG)⁹⁹ to provide technical support and guidance, which then facilitated training for assessment teams and cluster leads on entry points for addressing women's needs.¹⁰⁰

However, few training tools related to GBV or women's needs more broadly were developed and disseminated to the humanitarian community focusing on a gender-inclusive response during the emergency response phase. This was a prevalent issue across actors during the response. The 2010 evaluation of the cluster system noted that while the cluster system improved information sharing, information management remained weak, and information was often lost or not shared in a timely manner.¹⁰¹ Advocacy for prevention of GBV or separate sanitation facilities was difficult in many of the sectors, as gender-inclusive response was not as strongly mandated in programming outside of the GBV sub-cluster and Protection cluster.¹⁰² The PSEA coordinator was deployed in early April 2010, but the mechanism dissipated after the first coordinator left.¹⁰³ An evaluation of the OCHA emergency response to the Haiti earthquake found that "lack of continuity of...[gender] initiatives beyond the first three months has negated what could otherwise have been achieved."¹⁰⁴

A high rate of staff turnover led to nearly nonexistent institutional memory; losing momentum, the original gender initiatives dissolved, alongside an understanding of the importance of integrating gender into disaster response. A field staff member in Haiti noted in a 2012 evaluation, "we have so many other problems to deal with, we haven't even started to think about gender."¹⁰⁵ These other problems included overextended resources and agencies,¹⁰⁶ language barriers that kept local organizations from convening with international actors, and the lack of capacity from the local government to assist in the recovery.¹⁰⁷

While the Appeal and coordination of the cluster system emphasized the inclusion of women, gender mainstreaming in programming proved more difficult. Per OCHA's mandate as a coordinating organization, day-to-day implementation relied heavily on partners, who had differing capacities and commitments to collecting sex-disaggregated

⁹⁹ Inter-cluster coordination is a cooperative effort among sectors/clusters and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to avoid duplication and ensure that areas of need are prioritized. (See: "Inter-Cluster Coordination," Humanitarian Response, accessed February 8, 2016, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/inter-cluster-coordination>).

¹⁰⁰ Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, "Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (January 2011): 38-39, <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/1249.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Andrea Binder and François Grünewald, *Haiti: IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase*, Urgence Réhabilitation Développement and Global Public Policy Institute, (April 2010): 9, <http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/IASC-Haiti-USA-2010-016-2.pdf>.

¹⁰² Interview, 12 Dec 2015.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 65.

¹⁰⁵ Kristen Sørung Scharffscher, *Making Gender Matter in Humanitarian Operations*, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, (Oslo, Norway: January 2012): 28, <http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/making-gender-matter-in-humanitarian-operations.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, 7 Dec 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

data or including women in needs assessments.¹⁰⁸ The collection of gender-disaggregated data to inform the design and implementation of programming was a significant challenge during the response, and OCHA's policy was not strong enough to ensure that partners incorporated a gender lens in their work.¹⁰⁹ Staff at both senior and mid-levels in OCHA and UNDAC emphasized the difficulty in ensuring that data from partners would be disaggregated by sex and would include women's perspectives.¹¹⁰

Another serious challenge to effective gender mainstreaming was the muddled understanding of the responsibilities of GenCap advisors compared to gender focal points within OCHA. Staff often spoke about these advisors and focal points interchangeably, though gender focal points work internally within OCHA, and GenCap advisors are assigned within the broader cluster system. Staff at senior and mid-level positions showed a disparity in the extent to which they worked with any kind of gender advisor, either internal OCHA gender focal points or GenCap advisors. Senior level staff tended to have a clearer relationship with gender focal points and to consult with them more regularly.¹¹¹ The confusion about the distinction between gender focal points and GenCap advisors is characteristic of the external-internal duality at OCHA; while GenCap advisors are part of an external initiative and gender focal points work internally within OCHA, the two are intertwined in coordination and programming, as OCHA works with partner organizations and seeks to provide a framework for the cluster system. Ultimately, the muddled institutional structure made it difficult for staff to access resources on gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive approaches on a regular and routinized basis.

OCHA's work largely centered on immediate response rather than long-term resilience or capacity-building. OCHA and its partners struggled with the disparity between short-term financial and staff commitment and the long-term needs of the Haitian population. The focus on immediate life-saving response precluded real action on what survivors would need in the future, particularly economic opportunities and empowerment. One staff member described the issue facing the response teams, "How do you build anything sustainable when people are struggling for survival?"¹¹² This difficulty manifested as a priority on protection, but not as much on economic revitalization or the rebuilding of markets and businesses, which are vital for real recovery. One staff member argued, "As far as I know, what we did definitely strongly was the protection element [...] because that is, from the very beginning, an issue which is very much related to women and children. Because if they don't have the proper protection, they can become particularly vulnerable."¹¹³ This same staff member recognized the importance of including women in the revitalization of the economy, saying,

¹⁰⁸ Interview, 7 Dec 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, "Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (January 2011): 38-39.

¹¹⁰ Interviews, 7 Dec 2015, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a, 29 Dec 2015.

¹¹¹ Interviews, 7 Dec 2015, 15 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.

¹¹² Interview, 21 Dec 2015a.

¹¹³ Interview, 29 Dec 2015.

“And then also when it comes to the Early Recovery, I do recall that, too, women are also those who do, from the very beginning, kind of manage to get this small economy running, it’s often, very often women, so this is often an element where they need to be supported. This was done to at least a limited degree successfully in the Haiti response...If they get the proper support, they are kind of bringing this small economy running, these little stands.”¹¹⁴

However, this type of response remained largely outside the capacity and scope of OCHA’s response.

OCHA achieved several successes in its response to the earthquake; its rapid response and mobilization of funding and staff is laudable, as is its support for GenCap advisors and the inclusion of GBV sub-cluster staff in coordination meetings. However, the institutional structure of OCHA seemed to obscure the resources and responsibilities meant for true mainstreaming in implementation. Ultimately, OCHA’s role as a coordinating agency and its heavy reliance on partners for data and daily implementation seriously limited its ability to use sex-disaggregated data or guide programming according to gendered needs.

UNHCR

UNHCR is the UN agency that leads and coordinates international action to protect the rights and well-being of refugees. UNHCR’s role was limited in the response to the Haiti earthquake, and focused on providing support to the overall UN cluster system and to other organizations. Unlike in a conventional emergency response operation, where UNHCR is the lead agency in providing protection and assistance to the host government and to refugees, in Haiti the agency took on a mainly advisory role.¹¹⁵ Although it often has the lead role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of internally displaced persons, UNHCR’s mandate does not specifically include IDPs. Additionally, it did not have a physical presence in Haiti at the time of the earthquake, instead working on Haitian issues through a regional office based out of Washington D.C.¹¹⁶ Thus, other organizations that were more established in Haiti, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), became primary leads for the protection and camp management and coordination clusters, which are conventional responsibilities of UNHCR. This decision was in line with the standards of the Cluster Approach for natural disaster situations, which allows for the three agencies to pick the lead agency in a natural disaster setting on case-by-case basis.¹¹⁷ While UNHCR was able to provide input on women’s specific

¹¹⁴ Interview, 29 Dec 2015.

¹¹⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Coordinating Assistance,” accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/538dd3da6.html>.

¹¹⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Internally Displaced People,” accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html>.

¹¹⁷ Interview, 8 Jan 2016. (See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNCHR perspective*, accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html>).

vulnerabilities as IDPs, its limited role and lack of policies for natural disasters yielded a limited application of its gender mainstreaming policies in the Haiti emergency response.

Prior to its efforts in Haiti, UNHCR had strong but uneven policies on gender mainstreaming in natural disaster settings. In a textual analysis of UNHCR documents, 24 explicitly referenced gender, but only four specifically included or called for sex-disaggregated data. The agency published its first *Environmental Guidelines* in 1996; an updated version in 2005 uses gender-inclusive language, references women's specific needs and capabilities, calls for women and girls to be involved in environmental stewardship, and acknowledges the differential impact of the environment on men and women.¹¹⁸ Around the same time, from 2004 to 2007, the agency's Age, Gender, and Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM) strategy was rolled out, reconceiving UNHCR's protection mandate to include cross-cutting social, political, and economic dimensions, such as gender.¹¹⁹ This was a very innovative strategy for UNHCR, which actively called for mainstreaming gender and not merely including it. The AGDM strategy, although not mandatory, included an accountability framework to establish minimum standards, such as collecting sex-disaggregated data in assessments and evaluations.¹²⁰ As part of the overall review of gender policies, the 2008 UNHCR *Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls* considers the specific protection challenges for women and girls, and provides concrete strategies for field and headquarters staff to implement to confront these challenges.¹²¹ Despite these guidelines for mainstreaming gender in policy and practice, disaster risk reduction policies reflected limited gender concerns. The major UNHCR report on climate change, natural disasters, and human displacement – the first such UNHCR publication and released in 2009 – made no mention of gender-responsive policies and procedures.¹²²

In the aftermath of the earthquake, staff priorities reflected UNHCR's emphasis on the overarching principles on gender mainstreaming policies. There was a clear understanding among UNHCR staff, both at headquarters and in the field, that women's needs are an inherent part of UNHCR's protection mission.¹²³ In one staff member's perspective, referring to existing programming protocols, "If I am a protection officer and don't include gender, I have nothing to do in UNHCR."¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Environmental Guidelines*, (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR Geneva and IUCN, August 2005), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a54bbd10.html>.

¹¹⁹ Virginia Thomas and Tony Beck, *Changing the way UNHCR does business? An evaluation of the Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming Strategy, 2004-2009*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service, (Geneva, Switzerland: June 2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/4c206b449.html>.

¹²⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Accountability Framework for Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming*, (Geneva, Switzerland: May 2007), <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47a707950.pdf>.

¹²¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 2008), <http://www.unhcr.org/47cfa9fe2.html>.

¹²² Interview, 8 Jan 2016, (See also, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNCHR perspective*, accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html>).

¹²³ Interviews, 14 Dec 2015b, 6 Jan 2016 8 Jan 2016.

¹²⁴ Interview, 14 Dec 2015b.

Gender was mostly considered within the context of women’s vulnerability to gender-based violence (GBV).¹²⁵ Following *Handbook* guidelines on coordinating work with local women’s groups and associations, UNHCR staff targeted reports of GBV by partnering with The Commission of Women Victims for Victims (KOFAVIV), a local women’s organization that works to prevent sexual violence and provides material and psychological support for survivors. KOFAVIV sent monitors into camps to compile information on the status of women, with UNHCR protection officers meeting weekly with the monitors to discuss cases.¹²⁶ UNHCR staff also eventually set up a call center with KOFAVIV, which women could call to access services or request a monitor to accompany them to a clinic.¹²⁷ UNHCR also funded multiple safe houses and shelters for GBV survivors among the IDP population; it funded one shelter in 2010, opened one safe house and one shelter in 2011, and opened a safe house in 2012 through the French Red Cross.¹²⁸

While these actions demonstrate UNHCR’s strong overall understanding of the role of gender in protection response, the lack of specific protocols for gender mainstreaming in natural disasters contributed to limited success in responding to women’s needs in post-disaster Haiti. Protocols and policies that UNHCR had in place for other emergency contexts were not followed in the disaster response. For instance, multiple guidelines and handbooks discuss the intentional mapping of latrines and lighting in camps to prevent GBV.¹²⁹ Yet, more than one month after the earthquake, there was little to no adequate lighting near WASH facilities in camps, no mapping of GBV service providers, limited mixed-gender patrols in IDP camps, and limited planning for safety around food distribution.¹³⁰ UNHCR did respond to reports of GBV by later negotiating for lights near latrines and increasing protection monitors,¹³¹ but according to UNHCR’s own guidelines, these actions should have been taken much earlier during the initial assessment.¹³² Staff referred to the chaotic operating environment of post-disaster Haiti as a major barrier, given the lack of infrastructure and limited government capabilities.¹³³ UNHCR’s policies were not well aligned to disaster response scenarios; thus, the agency’s extensive expertise was not well deployed.

¹²⁵ Interviews, 14 Dec 2015b, 18 Dec 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 8 Jan 2016.

¹²⁶ Interview, 8 Jan 2016.

¹²⁷ Interview, 8 Jan 2016.

¹²⁸ Kim Thuy Seelinger and Laura Wagner, *Safe Haven: Sheltering Displaced Persons from Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. Case Study: Haiti*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Human Rights Center, (May, 2013), <http://www.unhcr.org/51b6e2b29.html>.

¹²⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Division of Operational Services, *A Guidance for UNCHR Field Operations on Water and Sanitation Services*, (Geneva, Switzerland: January 2008), <http://www.unhcr.org/49d080df2.pdf>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook for Emergencies*, (Geneva, Switzerland: February, 2007), <http://www.unhcr.org/472af2972.pdf>; Interview, 8 Jan 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNCHR perspective*, accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html>.

¹³⁰ Gender in Humanitarian Response Working Group, “Gender Mainstreaming in the Humanitarian Response in the Aftermath of the Earthquake in Haiti,” (Haiti: February 2010).

¹³¹ Interview, 8 Jan 2016.

¹³² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook for Emergencies*, (Geneva, Switzerland: February, 2007): 380, <http://www.unhcr.org/472af2972.pdf>.

¹³³ Interviews, 6 Jan 2016, 8 Jan 2016.

Exacerbating the lack of gender mainstreaming in disaster-specific policies was the confusion of the agency's role, given that UNHCR took an advisory approach to its actions in Haiti. While UNHCR's guidelines are clear about lighting in camps, the agency served as a technical advisor, not the lead on the Protection cluster. One staff member mentioned the difficulties of "leading a cluster without the means to lead a cluster," in trying to provide direction without holding the authority to truly do so.¹³⁴

The diffusion of responsibility in a chaotic environment limited UNHCR's ability to respond to women's needs. While the agency's staff individually attempted to follow best practices of gender mainstreaming, such as consulting with local women's organizations, these efforts were limited by the institution's lack of specific disaster response policies and its narrow role in the response.

UNEP

UNEP is the leading global environmental authority that works on global environmental and sustainable development. With a presence in Haiti since 2009, a UNEP team was on the ground in Haiti when the earthquake struck on January 12, 2010. Temporarily halted by the destruction of their office and pressing personal needs, UNEP staff members were fully remobilized within three weeks.¹³⁵ UNEP's response focused on technical assistance and advice on environmental issues, with the agency serving as focal point for the cross-cutting issue of environment in the IASC cluster system.¹³⁶ Given the limited human resources in the immediate aftermath, individual UNEP staff members also led specific missions based on their previous expertise, such as carrying out building inspections and seismic risk assessments,¹³⁷ even if these activities fell outside of UNEP's core mandate¹³⁸ of coordinating environmental policies and programs. The technical assistance that UNEP provided was unsuccessful at holistically incorporating women's needs in the emergency response, but UNEP's continued work into the early recovery stages of the response included a strong understanding of women's roles in resilience.

Overall, UNEP took a four-pillared approach to its immediate response: awareness raising, coordination, technical assistance, and direct action.¹³⁹ Awareness raising and coordination included conducting assessments and distributing among the many actors present in the humanitarian response. UNEP's first contribution to the response was its Rapid

¹³⁴ Interview, 6 Jan 2016.

¹³⁵ United Nations Environment Programme, *UNEP in Haiti: 2010 Year in Review*, (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, February 2011), http://onu-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/UNEP_Haiti_2010-Annual-Report.pdf.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, "UNEP's Coordination Mandate," accessed February 8, 2016, <http://www.unep.org/newyork/UNEPsCoordinationMandate/tabid/56200/Default.aspx>.

¹³⁹ United Nations Environment Programme, *UNEP in Haiti: 2010 Year in Review*, (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, February 2011), http://onu-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/UNEP_Haiti_2010-Annual-Report.pdf.

Environmental Assessment (REA),¹⁴⁰ which was published on January 17, 2010 and is subsequently updated on a regular basis. The REAs identified the important environmental issues in the aftermath of the earthquake: including oil and chemical spills, fires, landslides, resource depletion from displaced populations, waste management, energy demands, and flood risks.¹⁴¹ The REA from January 27th details UNEP's work within the cluster system, but has absolutely no reference to gender or gender analysis. Additionally, in the UNEP Haiti Mission Report from March 2010, the environmental overview of post-earthquake Haiti limits gender considerations to one sentence regarding the shared WASH facilities of men and women.¹⁴²

The technical assistance and direct action undertaken by the agency also were not gender mainstreamed. Action steps were directed to waste management for medical waste, with no indication of gendered impacts.¹⁴³ Technical assistance similarly had practically nonexistent gender analysis, but did mention UNEP's technical support to WFP's Cash for Work program, which was particularly targeted to women and other vulnerable populations.¹⁴⁴ One of UNEP's key recommendations to the program was to develop more inclusive structures for sustainable management of resources,¹⁴⁵ a recommendation aligned with UNEP's policies on gender mainstreaming practices.

Despite the response, there was a long precedent of UNEP protocols that emphasized gender mainstreaming and the environment. In 1985, UNEP held a session on women and the environment during the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya. Since then, multiple sessions of the Governing Council of UNEP have stressed the role of women in the work of the agency. The 2004-2005 work plan of the agency included gender as a cross-cutting priority;¹⁴⁶ in 2005, the agency contracted consultants to assess the status of gender mainstreaming in UNEP's Division of Early Warning and Assessment;¹⁴⁷ by 2006, UNEP had a detailed Gender Plan of Action with targets and timelines for instituting gender mainstreaming.¹⁴⁸ The continued steps suggest a commitment by senior leadership to significantly incorporating gender mainstreaming into the agency's mission, and UNEP

¹⁴⁰ United Nations Environment Programme, "Haiti Earthquake response effort: UNEP Haiti Rapid Environmental Assessment and Follow-Up Update 27 January 2010," *Post-Conflict and Disasters Management Branch*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Environment Programme, January 2010).

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Muralee Thummarukudy, *Haiti Mission Report: 20 January – 19 March 2010*, United Nations Environment Programme, (March 2010), http://www.eoearth.org/files/163901_164000/163952/haiti_unep_mt_mission.pdf.

¹⁴³ United Nations Environment Programme, *UNEP in Haiti: 2010 Year in Review*, (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, February 2011), http://onu-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/UNEP_Haiti_2010-Annual-Report.pdf.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 21.

¹⁴⁶ Joni Seager and Betsy Hartmann, *Mainstreaming Gender in Environmental Assessment and Early Warning*, (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 2005), http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Mainstreaming_Gender.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, *UNEP Gender Plan of Action*, (September 2006), http://www.unep.org/roa/amcen/Projects_Programme/climate_change/PreCop15/Proceedings/Gender%20strategies/Unep%20Gender%20Plan%20of%20Action_5_Feb07.pdf.

staff reaffirm an institutional recognition of women as an integral part of UNEP's mission.¹⁴⁹

Most of UNEP's policies on gender mainstreaming focused on the gendered dimensions of environmental stewardship and sustainability. The strong policies on gender mainstreaming before 2010 emphasized the links among gender, poverty reduction, and post-conflict settings, but had less specific protocols on gender considerations in natural disaster scenarios. However, two years before the earthquake in Haiti, UNEP produced a guide on conducting post-disaster environmental needs assessments that uses gender inclusive language throughout, discusses men and women's differentiated resource use and livelihood strategies, and recommends sex-disaggregated data.¹⁵⁰ While the 2010 Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) report on Haiti has some sex-disaggregated data and mentions gender in multiple places throughout the report, it falls far short of fulfilling the very specific recommendations of a 2005 review on how to better mainstream gender in GEO reports.¹⁵¹

It was therefore contrary to UNEP's existing gender mainstreaming guidelines when gender was not integrated into environmental assessments in Haiti. In a textual analysis of twelve UNEP Haiti country reports and risk assessments, eight did not contain sex-disaggregated data. There was a similar disconnect between rhetoric and action among UNEP staff, who spoke at length about the importance of the required gender analysis, but did not acknowledge or were not aware that sex-disaggregated data and an analysis of women's needs, vulnerabilities, and strengths had not been fully carried out.¹⁵² Staff did acknowledge some constraints of the response, particularly the challenge of prioritization. The failure to operationalize gender mainstreaming aligns with findings from a later UNEP internal evaluation that reviewed the agency's protocols. The evaluation found that, despite the development of institutional mechanisms, the integration of gender mainstreaming at UNEP was curtailed by low levels of resource allocation and low awareness among staff of the Gender Plan of Action.¹⁵³ As one staff member noted concerning the Haiti response, "You never had the budget plan that you thought you had when you start, in the earthquake."¹⁵⁴ Given that resource allocation at UNEP is tied to programs, funding processes were ill-suited to implement initiatives on cross-cutting issues such as gender. One member of the UNEP team noted that both gender and the environment were considered cross-cutting issues in the cluster system, and not included as among the life-

¹⁴⁹ Interviews, 11 Dec 2015b, 15 Dec 2015c.

¹⁵⁰ United Nations Environment Programme, *Environmental Needs Assessment in Post-Disaster Situations: A Practical Guide for Implementation*, (March 2008), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/UNEP_PDNA_draft.pdf.

¹⁵¹ Joni Seager and Betsy Hartmann, *Mainstreaming Gender in Environmental Assessment and Early Warning*, (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program, 2005), http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Mainstreaming_Gender.pdf.

¹⁵² Interviews, 11 Dec 2015b, 14 Dec 2015c.

¹⁵³ Franklin Mantilla, *Review of Gender Mainstreaming in UNEP*, United Nations Environment Programme Evaluation Office, (July 2012),

http://www.unep.org/eou/Portals/52/Reports/Review%20of%20Gender%20Mainstreaming%20in%20UNEP_final%20report%20with%20annexes.pdf

¹⁵⁴ Interview, 11 Dec 2015b.

saving priorities among the other clusters.¹⁵⁵ At the cluster level, funding was also not available, with the environmental cluster often underfunded.¹⁵⁶

Despite the breakdown between UNEP's gender mainstreaming protocols and agency action in emergency response, the agency's post-disaster recovery work has focused on women's capabilities for resilience. Post-disaster recovery projects included tackling food security issues by working with women's organizations to increase grain storage, as well as economic revitalization programs that emphasize two women-driven value chains.¹⁵⁷ Projects were created while considering the gender of its beneficiaries.¹⁵⁸ One staff member noted, "We're more focused at looking at opportunities to integrate women into the environmental and natural resources...much more from an economic perspective, and less so from the perspective of protection [or] security."¹⁵⁹ As UNEP's work moved into the recovery stage of its post-disaster response, they were much more adept at mainstreaming gender into their programs. In the non-emergency situation, UNEP's protocols on gender mainstreaming were operationalized with real success.

USAID

USAID is a U.S. government agency that works to end poverty and build resilient, democratic societies. USAID's response in Haiti included both immediate disaster relief and long-term economic recovery and DRR programming. USAID's response incorporated institutional guidelines and requirements for the inclusion of women's needs and capabilities, and the Agency's response focused on the transition between immediate disaster response and long-term recovery. However, USAID's early response in Haiti, limited by the scale of devastation in Haiti and lack of preparation for an urban disaster, focused on women almost exclusively through the lens of GBV. USAID's emergency response and long-term recovery programming differ in their incorporation of women's needs and voices; during the emergency response, collection of sex-disaggregated data and inclusion of women in all levels of program design and implementation were a challenge, but long-term programming focused on economic recovery and DRR have been able to include women to a greater extent. Institutionally, USAID has created a strong infrastructure for the inclusion of women's voices.

During the course of this study, interviews were conducted with staff within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of the Response Coordinator (ORC). However, these are not the only two offices within USAID that responded to the earthquake

¹⁵⁵ Interview, 11 Dec 2015b.

¹⁵⁶ Sun Mountain International and CHF International, *Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment: Haiti Earthquake – January 12, 2010*, United States Agency for International Development, (March 2010), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnads052.pdf.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

¹⁵⁸ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

¹⁵⁹ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

or have worked on gender concerns and DRR initiatives in Haiti. USAID was placed in charge of the U.S. government's response to Haiti, and offices within USAID worked in close partnership with the U.S. military and Department of State, as well as international organizations.¹⁶⁰ For the scope of this project, OFDA and ORC were chosen because they were in charge of the majority of the emergency response as well as the transition into long-term DRR programming. While many offices within USAID were heavily involved in the response to the earthquake and long-term rebuilding, OFDA and ORC were well-positioned to provide a coherent view of the USAID response.

USAID had relatively strong guidelines and requirements related to gender equality in place before the earthquake hit Haiti. The first of these was a cross-sector 1982 policy paper on women in development, which demonstrates how “LDC¹⁶¹ women's concerns” are to be integrated into USAID programming. This paper acknowledged the variety of unique challenges and opportunities that women encounter, and called for the entire agency to commit to implementing gender considerations in projects and programs. The policy recognizes the productivity of women and the obstacles that prevent their effective access to productive work, particularly lack of education and training. The policy calls for sex-disaggregated data collection, as well as the development of institutions and transfer of technology, to ensure the inclusion of women.¹⁶²

The 1996 *Gender Plan of Action* (GPA)¹⁶³ included requirements for gender integration in policy, personnel, procurement, performance monitoring, and evaluation. An evaluation of the GPA in 2000 by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance (ACVFA)¹⁶⁴ found several obstacles to the effective institutionalization of the GPA, including large budget cuts in combination with expanding budget earmarks, disruptions caused by reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance agencies, low levels of consultation and communication about the GPA with USAID staff, and concern of proliferation of USAID priorities. In 2009, USAID revised its Automated Directives System (ADS),¹⁶⁵ which contains USAID's policy directives and mandatory procedures, to provide a more detailed integration approach. Gender analysis is one of two mandatory analysis requirements that

¹⁶⁰ Interviews, 12 Jan 2016b, 30 Jan 2016.

¹⁶¹ Least Developed Countries.

¹⁶² United States Agency for International Development, *Women in Development*, A.I.D. Policy Paper, (October 1982): 1-2, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/womendev.pdf>.

¹⁶³ United States Agency for International Development, *Gender Action Plan* (1996), quoted in United States Agency for International Development, *Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2012): 4,

https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf. (See also: United States Agency for International Development, “Gender Plan of Action,” in CIB 99-13 Evaluating Gender Issues in Competitive Negotiated Solicitations, (March 1996), <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/cib9913.pdf>).

¹⁶⁴ For more information, see: ACVFA, “Strategies for Gender Equality in International Development,” (presentation, ACVFA Quarterly Meeting, May, 2010): 10-16, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj877.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ For details of the update to ADS 201 and 203, see: United States Agency for International Development, *Guide to Gender Integration and Analysis: Additional Help for ADS Chapters 201 and 203*, (March 2010), <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/201sab.pdf>.

are must be integrated into strategic planning, project design and approval, procurement processes, and measurement and evaluation.¹⁶⁶

Yet USAID's actions in Haiti largely do not reflect this early recognition of the importance of gender mainstreaming. A series of USAID fact sheets on the Haiti earthquake that were published demonstrate limited awareness of men and women's different experiences in disasters. An examination of 73 fact sheets about the earthquake released in fiscal year 2010 shows that 41 of these explicitly reference women or gender. 14 of these fact sheets discuss GBV, and 18 discuss issues related to maternal care, breastfeeding, or pregnancy. Only 18 fact sheets discuss women in relation to cash-for-work programs, cash transfers, livelihood support, sanitation needs, or participation in security brigades. When women are mentioned as having distinct needs, it is usually related to GBV in the IDP camps. A March 2010 rapid environmental assessment provides no information on gender and no sex-disaggregated data. These early reports show a clear gap in USAID's evaluations of the situation on the ground not including women or gender considerations.

USAID's immediate response to the earthquake focused heavily on protection of individuals living in camps.¹⁶⁷ One staff member said that OFDA has a long history of experience dealing with issues that women commonly experience in camps, noting, "So over time, there's been an evolution of best practice....in camps, where you put latrines, how do you light it up to make it safer for women. Collecting firewood, you have people go with them, you know, because sometimes women get raped when they go out too far from the camp. Safe spaces for women and kids, a whole host of things that you think about."¹⁶⁸ In the early response, women were rarely addressed or included in programming outside of GBV-related funding and assistance. USAID worked closely with the U.S. military and local police to provide security in the camps, and direction was given from high-level leadership in the Department of State to prioritize protection of women. This guidance was described as constant and direct, placing high priority on the protection of women.¹⁶⁹ The response in camps focused on lighting, especially around sanitation facilities for women. One staff member said,

"So one of the things we did was, we brought in these mobile lights, huge lights to light up whole place. The irony was that, of course, there wasn't light anywhere else, they just have the light in the camp. So we had lights, and we put more lights near where women, the female latrines were, we began to try to get more flashlights for people so they could navigate through the camps, and we did everything we could to kind light it up and make it safer."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ United States Agency for International Development, *Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2012): 4, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf.

¹⁶⁷ Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 11 Dec 2015a, 12 Jan 2016b, 30 Jan 2016.

¹⁶⁸ Interview, 8 Dec 2015.

¹⁶⁹ Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 12 Jan 2016b.

¹⁷⁰ Interview, 8 Dec 2015.

An effort was made to station police officers, especially women police officers, in the camps, and USAID prioritized the installation of lighting around sanitation facilities.¹⁷¹ However, these initiatives did not eliminate the GBV perpetrated in the camps.

Staff cited the urban nature of the crisis as a serious challenge to effective response.¹⁷² They also argued that lack of local governance and security forces were significant obstacles.¹⁷³ One staff member explained, “I think what’s very distinctive about Haiti is it was an urban disaster with sort of a...rural response, in the sense of we set up camps.”¹⁷⁴ It was very difficult to control entry and exit in these camps, exacerbating the security situation. The same staff member noted, “It had an urban disaster where communities were by and large just completely shattered, so whatever protective mechanism you had in your neighborhood...that you might have worked on, that was pretty gone.”¹⁷⁵ U.S. government staff were killed in the earthquake, and this made rapid response more difficult.¹⁷⁶ At that time, the response to the earthquake was also one of the biggest emergency responses that USAID had ever directed, and staff discussed the difficulty in mobilizing enough well-qualified staff.¹⁷⁷

Additionally, collection of sex-disaggregated data to inform a sex-disaggregated response was challenging, and there were disparities about how frequently gender advisors were involved in the response. There are also disparities related to the inclusion of gender in reporting mechanisms. While some staff members remembered receiving specific gender mainstreaming training, others were unsure. However, staff members were clear that gender considerations were perceived as an integral part of the emergency response – a rhetorical gap between institutional policy and action.¹⁷⁸

While USAID’s initial response did not make use of the Agency’s extensive experience and protocols for addressing gendered needs, the institutional understanding of the importance of gender analysis led to the creation of long-term priorities that included women’s needs and abilities. One staff member said, “We realized we had to get more of our own office focused on transition. So much focus on today and tomorrow. We tried to bring a transition focus to everything we did.”¹⁷⁹ The “Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement” produced by Dalberg Global Advisors for USAID in September 2010 was intended to create a baseline gender analysis on social, economic, and legal phenomena in Haiti, and provide recommendations for inclusive policy priorities to inform USAID’s future

¹⁷¹ Interviews, 11 Dec 2015a, 12 Jan 2016b.

¹⁷² Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 12 Jan 2016b, 30 Jan 2016.

¹⁷³ Interview, 30 Jan 2016.

¹⁷⁴ Interview, 8 Dec 2015.

¹⁷⁵ Interview, 8 Dec 2015.

¹⁷⁶ Interview, 8 Dec 2015.

¹⁷⁷ Interview, 12 Jan 2016b.

¹⁷⁸ Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 11 Dec 2015a.

¹⁷⁹ Interview, 12 Jan 2016b.

assistance in Haiti.¹⁸⁰ This report recognizes not only women’s vulnerabilities but also their unique capabilities and agency in four sectors: infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services, and governance, rule of law, and security.

The U.S. government’s strategy for Haiti following the earthquake, *Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity*, published in January 2011, elucidated the U.S. government’s priorities during Haiti’s recovery process. The majority of references to women in the strategy lie within the realm of protection; the strategy largely deals with women as victims or potential victims of violence. However, this document also takes a long-term capacity-building perspective to build resilience. The strategy proposes a focus on households headed by single women in the construction of new homes, the reduction of the use of charcoal as a fuel and the subsequent reduction in negative health consequences for women, and strategies to empower Madam Saras, women traders who are a key link in the agricultural value chain. The strategy also expresses support for inclusion of women-owned businesses in the U.S. government’s procurement strategy.¹⁸¹ This strategy directed resources and created priorities for continued assistance in Haiti; USAID’s response turned toward long-term efforts to “build back better.”

USAID staff members were clear that the consideration of women’s needs, vulnerabilities, and abilities should be included in the design and implementation of programming, and they were able to speak at length about specific challenges that Haitian women face. Staff members had detailed knowledge of the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to their work, but this was not always translated into action in the early days of the response. However, in the period following the immediate rapid response, USAID created long-term strategies for inclusive and effective response in Haiti.

¹⁸⁰ Dalberg Global Advisors, *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement*, (Washington, DC: Dalberg Global Advisors, 2010): v, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.

¹⁸¹ United States Department of State, *Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity* (January 2011), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156448.pdf>.

Changing Policies and Organizational Cultures

VII. Changing Policies and Organizational Cultures

The landscape of DRR and gender mainstreaming has improved in actionable and tangible ways at OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID. While each organization has created its own unique policy suited for its unique mandate, each has more prominently promoted gender equality in its work and created stronger accountability mechanisms for gender mainstreaming. OCHA has significantly strengthened its policies since the Haiti response in 2010, and UNHCR has strengthened both its focus on gender and on DRR and climate change. UNEP has made commitments to mainstreaming through the creation of the Gender and Social Safeguard Unit and the Gender Marker, and USAID has continued to strengthen and refine its institutional focus on gender analysis and women's empowerment. While challenges remain in responding to disasters and building long-term resilience, these organizations have taken significant steps to creating more inclusive programming, which will address the needs of women and men.

OCHA

OCHA has strengthened its policy and response procedures since its action during the Haiti crisis. The strengthening of gender focal points has also improved the understanding of gender mainstreaming and ability to implement gender-responsive techniques into programming within OCHA. OCHA staff perceive a significant improvement over time in the organization's inclusion of women's needs and abilities.

OCHA's policy on gender now delineates the specific procedures and tools to be integrated into daily tasks, making the requirements more concrete and providing clearer guidance for implementing the requirements. OCHA's 2012-2015 Gender Equality Policy requires all staff to incorporate the "Seven Minimum Gender Commitments" into their work. This policy provides much more specific guidance than the previous policy, and it is notable that OCHA has made such a step to clarify the previously ambiguous language. The policy lists these commitments:

OCHA staff will:

1. Apply the ADAPT and ACT C Framework in all programming areas, ensuring, at a minimum, the following three elements are addressed, as they are fundamental to an effective humanitarian response:
 - Routine analysis of gender concerns to inform humanitarian programming and policy processes
 - Regular and timely collection and analysis of sex- and age-disaggregated data
 - Support to coordination of gender programming in the response

2. Integrate gender issues into preparedness and resilience processes from data collection, assessments, planning, and capacity-building for national partners.
3. Support the application of the IASC Gender Marker into OCHA-managed appeals and funding mechanisms.
4. Ensure that monitoring and evaluation mechanisms can ascertain if the different needs of women, girls, boys, and men have been met in the humanitarian response.
5. Develop communication and advocacy products that capture the different needs, capacities and voices of women, girls, boys, and men.
6. Provide support to humanitarian country leadership, including cluster leads, to effectively integrate gender within humanitarian programming.
7. Put in place necessary actions to protect women, girls, boys, and men from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse by OCHA staff, in line with the Secretary-General's bulletin on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.¹⁸²

For the above policy, the ADAPT and ACT C Framework is a tool to help staff members take the larger concepts related to mainstreaming and turn them into actionable steps. The ADAPT and ACT C Framework helps project staff review their projects or actions using a gender equality lens. The framework promotes the active involvement of women and men and recognizes the multiple roles of women and men in post-crisis situations. The framework involves nine steps, which emphasize a complete gender analysis, participation and training of women and men, and use of sex- and age-disaggregated data.¹⁸³ These are specific and actionable steps for staff at all levels to follow. Additionally, OCHA's strategic plan for 2014 through 2017 emphasizes the importance of including women in the planning, consultation, and decision-making processes, with a particular focus on the inclusion of women's organizations.¹⁸⁴

The approach seems to have been successful; staff expressed clear understandings of what gender mainstreaming means in policy and implementation. Contrary to the findings of the 2010 evaluation of the impact of the GEP, staff at OCHA seem aware that gender mainstreaming is a priority and where to find resources to support mainstreaming. Staff at OCHA felt strongly that the organization has improved its gender mainstreaming ability, as well as its capacity to address women's needs and hear women's voices during emergency response.¹⁸⁵ They cited both institutional change and also the impact of donors and the shift

¹⁸² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Gender Equality: A People-Centred Approach*, (December 2012), <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/PI%20-%20Gender%20Equality.pdf>.

¹⁸³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Gender Toolkit*, Policy Development and Studies Branch (December 2012), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GenderToolkit1_9_PSEAandOCHA.pdf.

¹⁸⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Strategic Plan 2014-2017*, (2013), <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20SF%202014-2017%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf>.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a, 21 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.

in global dialogue about the inclusion of women at all levels of programming.¹⁸⁶ OCHA also undertook a Participatory Gender Audit in 2014.¹⁸⁷

However, opportunities for improvement remain. Staff reported not receiving any kind of gender mainstreaming training, and this was common both among staff who had been with OCHA for many years or only for a few months.¹⁸⁸ The collection of sex-disaggregated data is still a challenge, and offices lack the capacity to gather data independently of partners.¹⁸⁹

Additionally, OCHA staff members seem to be unclear about what the next steps should be to address these problems. The recommendations of the 2014 audit will be incorporated into operations, but there remains ambivalence about how change should happen in the organization. While several staff members cited external and donor pressure as a force to improve gender mainstreaming, one staff member voiced concerns that donor-driven change may not always be the answer, but that locally-driven approaches may be more appropriate. The staff member said, “Rather than communicating to donors in Norway that a budget has gender indicators, we should go out and work more with communities, understanding their requirements, then communicate to them why we are doing what we are doing.”¹⁹⁰ This connects with a broader debate about integrating gender in policy and whether the impetus for change and guidance should come from organizational leadership and donors or from the people that these organizations serve.

While it may be unclear what OCHA’s next step is for gender mainstreaming policy, it is clear that, within a short amount of time, the organization has made its policies and requirements more specific and more demanding. As a coordination agency working with many different international, national, and local actors, OCHA’s policy and institutional shifts may have a significant effect on making humanitarian response more inclusive.

UNHCR

UNHCR made significant progress in updating its policies and protocols to create a more inclusive version of its protection and assistance mission. The original perspective of the agency’s AGDM strategy has been strengthened and codified as UNHCR policy. UNHCR also is reconceiving its mission to include preventive and response strategies for mitigating the impacts of climate change. However, the progress in gender mainstreaming policies and disaster risk reduction policies remains unfortunately distinct, an approach that may continue to limit UNHCR’s ability to effectively respond to disaster scenarios.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a.

¹⁸⁷ Interview, 29 Dec 2015. (See also: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gender Equality Programming,” accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.staging.unocha.org/about-us/gender-equality-programming>).

¹⁸⁸ Interviews, 21 Dec 2015a, 21 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.

¹⁸⁹ Interviews, 21 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.

¹⁹⁰ Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.

In 2011, UNHCR updated its AGDM strategy, releasing a new Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) policy.¹⁹¹ Whereas the original strategy simply provided guidelines for UNHCR staff, the AGD policy is meant to be systematically applied to all UNHCR operations worldwide. The policy not only identifies a set of core commitments, but also targets the six pathways¹⁹² for a successful integration of mainstreaming principles, such as accountability for senior level staff and the allocation of both human and financial resources. The agency also developed a detailed accountability framework, with a list of minimum standards,¹⁹³ which must be completed in conjunction with its Annual Programme Review requirements.

UNHCR staff have felt the impact of the increased institutional attention to gender mainstreaming. Staff perceive that UNHCR is intentionally reconsidering its gender mainstreaming policies,¹⁹⁴ and both headquarters and field staff reported that the AGD policy holds staff accountable through specific indicators.¹⁹⁵ There is also a sense that there has been a change in the implementation of gender mainstreaming practices, with more support being provided and a more localized approach encouraged.¹⁹⁶

Additionally, UNHCR has increased significantly its research and policy efforts in the area of disaster risk reduction. The agency released numerous reports¹⁹⁷ over the past several years outlining UNHCR's unique place at the intersection of environmental degradation, climate change, and human displacement. These reports come alongside significant new investment and development in operationalizing DRR, including a new position at headquarters to provide technical support on DRR and climate change initiatives. As one staff member noted, "For us, DRR work is pretty new...Traditionally, we're a response agency. Now, within areas we have a say, within our camps, we have in place DRR activities."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity Policy: Working with people and communities for equality and protection," (June 2011), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/4e7757449.html>.

¹⁹² The six pathways include the following: Working in partnership with persons of concern; Accountability; Results based management; Capacity development; Human and financial resources; Oversight through monitoring, evaluation, audit and reporting. (See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity Policy: Working with people and communities for equality and protection," (June 2011), accessed February 10, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/4e7757449.html>).

¹⁹³ Leslie Groves, *Global Analysis 2012-2013, UNHCR Accountability Frameworks for Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming and Targeted Actions*, (2013), <http://www.unhcr.org/51c4569f9.html>.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews: 18 Dec 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 21 Jan 2016.

¹⁹⁵ Interviews: 12 Dec 2015, 18 Dec 2015.

¹⁹⁶ Interviews: 18 Dec 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 21 Jan 2016.

¹⁹⁷ See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR, Displacement and Disaster Risk Reduction," (2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/5665945e9.pdf>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR and Environmental Change: Protection, Migration, Adaptation," (January 2012),

http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/eventos/UNHCR_and_environmental_change.pdf?view=1; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Institute for Educational Planning, *Integrating conflict and disaster risk reduction into education sector planning*, (Paris, France: International Institute for Educational Planning, 2011), http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1096/IIEP_Guidance_notes_EiE_EN.pdf; Elizabeth Ferris, *Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future*, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Georgetown University (Sanremo consultation, March 2014), <http://www.unhcr.org/53c4d6f99.pdf>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Human mobility in the context of loss and damage from climate change: Needs, gaps and roles of the Convention in addressing loss and damage*, (October 2012), <http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.html>.

¹⁹⁸ Interview, 21 Jan 2016.

While UNHCR has moved forward on gender mainstreaming overall, integrating gender into the new DRR policies has advanced on a mainly individual basis. While staff working on DRR are aware of differentiated use and access of natural resources for men and women, as well as the connections between women's livelihoods and natural resource management,¹⁹⁹ the new environmentally focused reports and policies are lacking in gender inclusive language and overall gender analysis.²⁰⁰ While UNHCR's progress is to be commended, the agency should find ways to integrate these two new crosscutting issues simultaneously.

UNEP

UNEP has continued to create stronger gender mainstreaming policies, moving forward with the help of a rigorous self-review process. Internally, UNEP staff members feel strongly that there has been significant overall improvement when addressing gender considerations and the role that gender plays in UNEP's mission and mandate.²⁰¹ One staff member described it as a new level of commitment: "Overall in UNEP, the issue of gender and gender mainstreaming has been taken up at a level of seriousness over the last maybe three or four years that didn't exist before."²⁰²

After a series of evaluations on UNEP's Gender Plan of Action, the agency unrolled its Policy and Strategy for Gender Equality and the Environment for 2014-2017²⁰³. This document is a comprehensive policy statement and operational framework from which the agency has been instituting reforms targeted to better integrate gender mainstreaming into its work. It includes a business model for gender mainstreaming, a tailored strategy for every program within the agency, and an accountability framework.²⁰⁴

The agency also created a Gender and Social Safeguards Unit in 2012, intended as a headquarters base for gender mainstreaming. One of the main tasks of the office is to

¹⁹⁹ Interview, 21 Jan 2016.

²⁰⁰ See also: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR, Displacement and Disaster Risk Reduction," (2015), <http://www.unhcr.org/5665945e9.pdf>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR and Environmental Change: Protection, Migration, Adaptation," (January 2012), http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/eventos/UNHCR_and_environmental_change.pdf?view=1; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Institute for Educational Planning, *Integrating conflict and disaster risk reduction into education sector planning*, (Paris, France: International Institute for Educational Planning, 2011), http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1096/IIEP_Guidance_notes_EiE_EN.pdf; Elizabeth Ferris, *Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future*, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Georgetown University (Sanremo consultation, March 2014), <http://www.unhcr.org/53c4d6f99.pdf>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Human mobility in the context of loss and damage from climate change: Needs, gaps and roles of the Convention in addressing loss and damage*, (October 2012), <http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.html>

²⁰¹ Interviews, 14 Dec 2015a, 14 Dec 2015c, 15 Dec 2015c, 12 Jan 2016a.

²⁰² Interview, 12 Dec 2015.

²⁰³ United Nations Environment Programme, *Policy and Strategy for Gender Equality and the Environment 2014-2017*, (2013), http://www.unep.org/gender/Portals/24117/Reports/Policy_and_Strategy_for_Gender_Equality_and_the_Environment.pdf.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

ensure that all UNEP projects are reviewed for gender analysis. A new tool, the UNEP Gender Marker, launched officially in early 2016, is intended to make this process easier by providing minimum specifications for project document, analysis, implementation, and results.²⁰⁵ All projects will be reviewed and compared to the Marker's baseline as part of the routine project review process.

Staff members in the field also report that gender mainstreaming practices are mandatory. One staff member noted, "It's part and parcel of the project development. We make a specific effort to look at, and work with women's organizations, the number of women present on management and steering committees."²⁰⁶ Staff members talked about the availability of best practices for gender mainstreaming,²⁰⁷ indicating that it was not difficult to access information on integrating gender in programmatic work.

It is important to note, however, that challenges remain despite UNEP's substantial progress. The Gender and Social Safeguards office is a show of headquarters commitment to the issue, but currently only three people – only two of whom work on gender – staff it. UNEP staff members interviewed feel that the agency is doing well on integrating gender mainstreaming into policies.²⁰⁸ Multiple headquarters staff feel that there needs to be more focus on the implementation required for the translation of policies to programming.²⁰⁹ As one staff member noted,

"[The] gender work is...quite high-level... A lot of our work, doing guidelines for government, running some workshop, doing some research paper. [we have] done a lot which is very successful, but all based on assumption that document or workshop will trickle some changes in people's minds or behavior."²¹⁰

The strengthening of gender mainstreaming policies can best be associated with a strengthening of projects and daily work deliverables.

Policies are not yet successfully operationalized in all measures. The Gender Marker indicates progress in gender analysis on projects, but there was also a strong sense among staff that the responsibility for gender mainstreaming mainly falls on individuals.²¹¹ This was especially relevant to gender focal points inside various offices. While gender focal points were considered well-integrated into their individual units,²¹² the status of the gender focal point as a voluntary position allows for significant variance in levels of involvement. There is also limited capacity of support for gender focal points from headquarters. Gender focal points feel strongly that they want more training for their work, as there is currently no mandatory gender mainstreaming training.²¹³

²⁰⁵ Interview, 12 Jan 2016a.

²⁰⁶ Interview, 15 Dec 2015c.

²⁰⁷ Interview, 15 Dec 2015c.

²⁰⁸ Interviews, 14 Dec 2015a, 14 Dec 2015c, 15 Dec 2015c, 12 Jan 2016a.

²⁰⁹ Interviews, 12 Dec 2015c, 12 Jan 2016a.

²¹⁰ Interview, 12 Jan 2016a.

²¹¹ Interviews, 12 Dec 2015, 12 Dec 2015, Jan 12, 2016a.

²¹² Interviews, 14 Dec 2015a, 14 Dec 2015c.

²¹³ Interview, 12 Dec 2015.

USAID

USAID has continued to strengthen its policies related to gender mainstreaming. Additionally, the first operational principle in the USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015 is “Promote Gender Equality and Female Empowerment.”²¹⁴ This principle is supported by specific instructions on implementation in each step of the program cycle. The Agency already had strong policies in place, and it has moved even further to put women in the narrative, including language that is innovative. USAID has made gender mainstreaming a clear priority and wants to be a leader in this issue.

The 2012 *Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy* updates the 1982 Policy Paper on Women in Development, noting that a new policy on gender equality is necessary “to reflect fundamental changes in the world and the evidence that has accumulated” since the issuance of the 1982 policy.²¹⁵ The policy is underpinned by seven guiding principles:

- Integrate gender equality and female empowerment into USAID’s work
- Pursue an inclusive approach to foster equality
- Build partnerships across a wide range of stakeholders
- Harness science, technology, and innovation to reduce gender gaps and empower women and girls
- Address the unique challenges in crisis and conflict-affected environments; Serve as a thought-leader and a learning community
- Hold ourselves accountable²¹⁶

In 2013, a new chapter in USAID’s policies and requirements, Automated Directives System (ADS) 205, was added about integrating gender equality and female empowerment in USAID’s program cycle, which elaborates on previous requirements in ADS 201, 202, and 203 on integrating gender equality and women’s empowerment in all phases of programming, budgeting, and reporting. The chapter applies to all Bureaus and Missions in Washington and in the field.²¹⁷ Staff members were clear that USAID also enforces mandatory gender mainstreaming guidelines for partner and implementing organizations through a multi-stage process in which implementing partners and USAID technical teams work to refine programming to better serve women’s needs. These steps further institutionalize the mechanisms for mainstreaming of gender-responsive programming.²¹⁸

²¹⁴United States Agency for International Development, *Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy*, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2012): 3, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 1.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 1-2.

²¹⁷ United States Agency for International Development, “ADS Chapter 205: Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” Bureau for Planning, Policy and Learning (July 2013): 3, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/205.pdf>.

²¹⁸ Interviews, 11 Dec 2015a, 12 Jan 2016b, 15 Jan 2016.

USAID has implemented programming to build long-term resilience in Haiti, specifically focusing on urban DRR, disaster preparedness, and support to the government for stockpiling emergency supplies. Women are included in local community intervention teams to improve community participation in disaster preparedness efforts and to diversify perspectives to create better results.²¹⁹ USAID appears to have a greater ability than other major organizations to ensure that their implementing partners include gender explicitly in project design and implementation. Implementing partners participate in an extended discussion with USAID technical experts, who help to refine program design and ensure that each program is gender-responsive.²²⁰

USAID staff members noted that since the issuance of the 2012 policy, gender is taken more seriously in their roles and in interactions with colleagues, and that there has been an increased focus on gender in humanitarian assistance and DRR programming. Staff members feel positively about the stronger emphasis placed on incorporating women's needs and capabilities, though there is a need for more resources specifically tied to gender analysis and gendered response within specific sectors. USAID staff seem confident in the institutional mechanisms in place to ensure that the design and implementation of programming is gender mainstreamed; while staff members in the other organizations discussed in this report often find that the responsibility for mainstreaming rests with individuals or specific teams, USAID staff seem confident in the system of technical advisors and program design and monitoring to ensure that programming is gender-responsive.²²¹

²¹⁹ Interview, 15 Jan 2016.

²²⁰ Interview, 15 Jan 2016.

²²¹ Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 12 Jan 2016b, 15 Jan 2016, 30 Jan 2016.

Conclusion

VIII. Conclusion

The response to the Haiti earthquake and long-term DRR assistance provided by OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID provide valuable insight into the nexus of gender, DRR, and humanitarian assistance. This is a key intersection to understand in order to organize effective and inclusive responses to future disasters, and to build more resilient communities that can better withstand catastrophic natural disasters and prevent potential crises.

Humanitarian response and DRR have undergone real and significant changes between 2010 and 2015. The advancement of women's inclusion and support for a gender-responsive lens in global discourse has started to shift institutional attitudes toward seeing gender-responsive programming as essential to life-saving rather than as an optional add-on. The humanitarian response and DRR organizations examined in this study have created frameworks and accountability mechanisms to ensure that program design, implementation, and evaluation are gender-responsive. Gender-responsive approaches appear to be mainstreamed more effectively in recovery and development work than in emergency response, though fully integrating gender considerations into both emergency response and long-term DRR is still a significant challenge. When funding is short and resources must be distributed to different disasters around the world, gender mainstreaming can be very difficult and often neglected. Institutional top-down change can also take time to influence all offices and all staff members; interviews with staff revealed organizational cultures that seek to incorporate women's voices, but which have been inefficient in clarifying the distinction between gender, gender mainstreaming, and gender-based violence (GBV), as well as the role of gender advisors and gender focal points. The operationalization of guidelines and plans has been slow, inconsistent, and with mixed results. Serious challenges remain to meaningful gender mainstreaming, but, at the same time, these organizations have taken real steps to address gender inequality through policy and programming.

These four organizations offer interesting insights into how policy informs response, and how institutional culture can shift, even within the span of five years. The change in these organizations has been catalyzed by a shift in global discourse about the importance of including women's voices, needs, and capabilities in programming. This broader conversation has informed both top-down policy shifts and bottom-up changes in staff roles and responsibilities. Institutional requirements and policies create the framework for gender analysis and accountability, but it is individual staff members and offices that actively work to include women's needs, abilities, and perspectives into programming on a daily basis.

Each of the organizations discussed in this study provided different services and were guided by different sets of guidelines and policies. While OCHA's inclusion of gender was

relatively strong in its construction of Flash Appeals in the wake of the earthquake, its dependence on partner organizations for implementation and data limited its ability to ensure that its resources were distributed in a gender-responsive manner. Since 2010, OCHA has strengthened its policies related to gender, and has created more specific requirements and expectations for its staff related to gender. UNHCR has moved forward significantly on their gender mainstreaming policies, but still lack significant integration in their burgeoning DRR field. UNEP's institutional commitment to gender mainstreaming is significant, but there remain challenges in operationalizing its strong policies. USAID, using a strong gender framework, incorporated women's needs into its response, though during the emergency response phase this was largely focused on GBV-related programming. However, USAID continued to strengthen its policies and programming to focus on women's involvement in the economy and in community-based DRR strategies.

Gender and the environment are issues that the international humanitarian response community must be able to address effectively in order to respond to disasters and prevent future crises. Many people and organizations are paying attention to these issues separately, but few are specifically studying and analyzing the intersection of DRR and gender. A clear understanding of this intersection and the best practices for gender-sensitive response to disasters is crucial for all humanitarian assistance organizations, and building resilience using a gender lens is important for building strong and vital communities around the world. This study provides insight into the nexus of gender, DRR, and humanitarian response, and seeks to draw lessons from the emergency response and long-term capacity-building assistance in Haiti between 2010 and 2015.

The 2010 Haiti earthquake devastated the country and disrupted normal life, exacerbating vulnerabilities and threatening women's political, economic, and social space. Haiti is a country full of resilient communities who have responded to and recovered from the many natural disasters to which the country is subject. However, a stronger infrastructure for disaster response and recovery, and one that incorporates the perspectives of women, is crucial for long-term development and economic revitalization. Humanitarian organizations play a significant role in helping communities rebuild, and this can only be successful when all members of the community, women and men, are included.

