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Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa:
Policies for Harmonious Development

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Abstract

The paradox of efforts over the past twenty years to reinvent democracy in Africa has been that rather than dampening the fires of ethnic conflict, they have often made them more intense and in the past decade have been accompanied by the explosion of violent conflicts of autochthony, confrontations of ‘sons of the soil’, that threaten the very bases of social order and cohesion in multi-ethnic societies. This essay explains the relationship through an argument in five parts. First, I examine the social construction of African ethnicities since the imposition of European colonial rule, with particular focus on both the role of the state and the market, as well as the internal response in African societies. Second, I discuss the particular relationship between the state, colonial and post-colonial, with effective institutionalization of ‘Big Man’ politics and patronage as the essential link between ethnic communities and the state and mode of access to the resources of modernity. Third, we will see that both nationalism and ethnicity in Africa share a common origin and focus on grasping control of the state apparatus that reinforces rather than undermines the salience of the nation-state. Fourth, I argue that neo-liberal ‘reforms’ of the state and market have led to significant political, social and economic decay that can reinforce ethnic cleavages and undermine democratization in multi-party regimes, even where there have been serious efforts at constitutional reforms to contain and limit its political expression. Finally, and fifth, I look at the conflicts of autochthony that have exploded in four very different national contexts that share a common relationship to economic crisis, growing social decay and increasing inequality in supposedly democratizing nations.

Keywords: ethnicity, state, market, neo-liberalism, democracy

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1. The Social construction of African ethnicities

Rather than atavistic survivals of stagnant primordial ‘tribal’ identities and communities, African ethnicities are new not old, part of complex responses to colonial modernity. In the pre-colonial world the most striking features of African identities and communities was their fluidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with significant movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and linguistic borrowing. The boundaries of communities were frequently ambiguous and identities contextually variable. The African states encountered by European colonizers in the 19th century were largely of relatively recent historical origin and by contemporary conceptions multi-ethnic in composition, ruling with rather loose tributary relationships over linguistically and culturally diverse groups. Both ethnic political movements and territorial nationalism in Africa are of the same recent historical origins; neither is ‘natural’ and both are responses to the colonial introduction of the institutions of modernity in the state and market.

Three methodological caveats must be stressed at this point. First, the African experience of colonialism was extremely varied across the diversity of indigenous societies, the institutional and cultural variations of the colonial ‘systems’ of various European powers, the presence or absence of white settlers or immigrants from other parts of the European empires, variations in the patterns of development of production and markets, and the levels of coercion involved in the establishment and maintenance of colonial control. Studying ethnicity in Africa involves the analysis of complex causality in which no single set of factors is determinant or can be analysed in isolation from others. The role of theory in this context cannot be to define universal relationships at so high a level of abstraction that they are devoid of empirical content, but rather to provide a conceptual toolkit that can identify common factors and the relationships between them to explain not only the similarities of cases, but also their contingent and idiosyncratic differences (Tilly 1975, 15-17). Theory in such circumstances must understand complexity and
the uniqueness of each empirical experience. Indeed, from a political and policy perspective, the
idiosyncrasies of each case may be the most important thing to understand.

Second, within these varied historical experiences, we must recognize that African
societies in the colonial period were never simply passive victims of external domination, but
active participants in the process. And this active interaction, and the varied uses of colonialism
by Africans, can be traced on ideological, institutional and cultural levels in the construction of
ethnicity and nationalism (Bayart 2000). And this, of course, is the methodological and
theoretical basis of the importance of context and complex causality.

Third, assuming that the number of ethnic groups in a particular nation-state in itself
explains anything about its political or economic performance is highly problematic, to say the
least (Ranis 2010). The exercise of counting reproduces the old conventional wisdom of
‘primordialism’ that African ‘tribes’ are ancient, stable (if not stagnant) communities governed by
rigid and unchanging custom and clearly and unambiguously separated from each other. Research
on African ethnicity over the past thirty years has exploded the primordial myth. Instead, as noted
above, African ethnicities are now understood as open-ended and dynamic processes of social and
political creation rather than static categories before, during and after colonial rule. Groups
appear and disappear, change their names, adapt their cultures, fight over who is or is not a real
member of the group, and address a myriad of demands to public institutions and other ethnic
groups (Berman 1998). There is no basis in historical or contemporary evidence to believe that
the simple number of ethnic groups in any nation or any index of ‘ethno-linguistic fragmentation’
is necessarily positively or negatively correlated with economic performance or political stability.
The relationship between ethnicity, political stability and economic performance is grounded in
the specifics of context.¹ One of the key findings of the EDG program is that the single most

¹ At the turn of the 20th century the US was the most ethnically diverse of Western societies and one of the
most economically dynamic, although with high level of labour conflict involving both ‘native’ and
immigrant workers. In April 2010 Statistics Canada announced that Canada contained for the first time 200
ethnic communities, and in the context of its liberal multi-culturalism, that was regarded as a positive
important factor in the social construction and political mobilization of ethnic communities in Africa and elsewhere is their ‘recognition’ by public institutions and the forms of access to resources of the state and market it confers (Eisenberg and Kymlicka forthcoming). The categorizing and counting of ethnic groups by state institutions is not an objective recording of a stable reality, but rather in itself an active intervention into the process of ethnic social and political creation (Berman forthcoming a). As a result, the first ‘fact’ about ethnicity in Africa is that there is no universal agreement about the number of ethnic groups in most countries, their social and spatial boundaries, or their membership, because such designations are contested political acts.

To understand the impact of the colonial intrusion of state and market and the African response, I would like to introduce the concept of ‘moral economy,’ which is empirically that part of culture that legitimates the inequalities in the distribution of values that mark almost all human communities primarily through principles of redistribution and reciprocity of obligations between rulers and ruled, rich and poor in specific social contexts. The moral economy of a society establishes the framework of social trust, i.e., the stability of mutual expectations between actors that permit the structured patterns of action ensuring social production, reproduction and security. All human communities that achieve a degree of stable reproduction over time can be understood to have at least to a minimal degree a functioning moral economy, although we can make no assumptions as to the extent to which it is subjectively accepted by its members (Berman forthcoming b).

The concept of moral economy is crucial to understanding the process of hegemony, of which it is the central subject of contestation, and also the political dynamic of change from one form of social order to another (Crehan 2002; Berman forthcoming b). In pre-capitalist societies, contribution to economic growth and social development. The two most multi-cultural cities, Toronto and Vancouver, were also its most culturally and economically dynamic.
like those of pre-colonial Africa, the distribution of values, particularly the allocation of labour, resources and the social product was embedded in hierarchical social relations of authority and subordination, and of social honour and status. The legitimacy of such inequalities was based on the recognized rights of subordinate groups or classes to subsistence from the social product created by their labour, access to land and the means of production, membership and marriage within the community, and protection from the ravages of natural disaster or external attack. For acquiescence to relations of inequality by their subordinates, ruling groups had reciprocal obligations to honour these rights and redistribute their wealth to insure the survival and reproduction of the community. At the same time, in an active internal politics both superiors and subordinates constantly sought to evade, violate or renegotiate their reciprocal obligations and rights in establishing the complex mixture of force and consent that is hegemony (Scott 1985).

The politics of moral economy ranged across a wide variety of social forms in Africa from small scale societies lacking institutions beyond extended corporate lineages, where dependents ‘flourished in a big man’s shade,’ to small chiefly states and larger kingdoms where the chief’s or king’s herds and granaries provide the communities strategic reserves, and positions of authority from lineage elders to kings controlled access to land, livestock, trade and marriage. Underlying all of them were patriarchal family structures and familial metaphors of social power that infused wider political institutions, paternal and, more rarely, maternal ties of superior and subordinates, and fraternal ties of social equals. The most striking fact of these relations is that they were all personal ties or bonds between individuals in positions of power and wealth and individuals in subaltern groups, genders and generations. These relations typically took the form of patron and client, the ‘lopsided friendship’ of anthropologists, linking unequal individuals in mutual ties of loyalty and support. While such relations were often far more disorderly and coercive in practice than their idealized reconstructions might suggest, the key characteristic is that they were personal, generally face to face, ties of supposed mutual benefit between individuals of unequal rank. Positions of authority combined power, wealth and social honor in
the single individual and a leader of rank was supposed to use the material resources he accumulated to reward his network of client subjects to meet his obligations and sustain their loyalty (Berman 1998, 2004a).

Patron-client relations have been, and probably remain, the most universal and widespread of human power relations from the lineages of small agrarian communities to the highly formalized and ceremonially sanctioned orders of rank and ties of loyalty of historical empires. I emphasize them here because they are important to understanding the impact of the colonial state and market in Africa, which challenged them and shaped the internal politics of developing ethnic communities. Patron-client relations do not involve ‘policies’ in the sense of impersonal distribution of public goods or services to social classes or geographical regions, or the distributions of commodities through the impersonal exchanges of the market. The development of the collective, impersonal authority relations of the nation-state and universal allocations of resources through the market are among the most dramatic discontinuities of modernity, and both define patron-client ties as ‘corruption’ within the framework of contemporary moral economies (Berman 1998 and 2004).

The social construction of African ethnicity was and is the outcome of contributions from many hands, European and African, rather than the deliberate creation of any single individual or group and, for that reason, is always incomplete and a matter of controversy. So saying, however, the key actor in the process was the colonial state, which was acutely conscious of Africans living in ‘tribes’ and used the instruments of modern state power to define and classify them through scientific instruments like maps and censuses that assigned individuals and communities to what were believed, often erroneously, to be ancient primordial identities (Kertzer and Arel 2002). The social construction of ethnic difference was also spurred by European missionaries who produced the grammars and dictionaries that turned local dialects into the standardized written language of a whole ethnic group, who promptly began to produce texts of their own articulating their history and culture; and by professional anthropologists, mostly European, who conveyed the concept of
culture as a distinct, systematic expression of the social practices and identity of particular group. This does not mean that Europeans ‘created’ African ethnic groups to fit their preconceptions or that Africans created ‘tribes’ on their prompting, but rather that they provided cultural resources and political contexts that Africans, particularly the class of collaborators and educated intelligentsia could deploy in the internal conflicts that resulted from the unequal and divisive impact of colonial modernity (Berman 1998).

Such categorization, numbering and mapping of African peoples provided the basis for creation of administrative units to facilitate political control and institutional integration into the colonial state. Equally important, the state was the central institution, within the broader context of the intrusion of capitalist modernity, in the organization, production and distribution of social resources, shaping also the social criteria of access to those resources and the resulting social differentiation between individuals and communities. The colonial state brokered the articulation of ‘tribes’ to the capitalist market as cash-crop farmers, traders and wage laborers, not only through the imposition of taxes and coercive labour laws, but also through more positive incentives and resources channeled through networks of local African collaborators and their supporters, and the growing employment of a Western-educated intelligentsia in the state apparatus (Berman 1990). The most important consequence of the colonial political economy was the creation of horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2010) between ethnic communities in the manner and degree of their involvement in cash crop and labour markets, access to education and to higher levels of employment in public institutions; and growing internal inequalities between the local collaborators and intelligentsia and their poor clients and dependents.

At the same time, the neo-traditional ideology characteristic of colonial regimes was fearful of the effect on ‘tribal discipline’ and political control of the full-scale development of capitalist forms of property and commodity markets that would create landless peasants and rootless proletarians (Berman 1990). Instead they implemented in an often-haphazard fashion a partial, fragmented and often contradictory development of a market economy while attempting
to sustain ‘traditional’ culture and authority through their collaborators. In so doing, the colonial state also delineated the strategic contexts in which ethnicity was or was not salient and molded the choices of political actors with regards to both the ascriptive markers of ethnicity and the organizational forms in which it was expressed. This shaped, in turn, the scope of ethnic politics, its relationship with other social cleavages and the complex interaction of ethnic identities and interests.

Colonial rule rested on complex systems of collaboration with indigenous local elites linked directly to the colonial state through patron-client ties with the European field agents of the state. Colonial power incorporated and built on the power of ‘big men’ who presided over intricate networks of clientage involving reciprocal but unequal relations with ‘small boys,’ as well as power over women and children, and those held in diverse forms of dependence. Colonial power created the hierarchies of ‘decentralized despotism’ (Mamdani 1996) of headmen, chiefs and even kings, ruling through ‘native authorities’ in various forms of indirect rule involving cadres of African collaborators, whether directly appointed by the regime or holding indigenous offices incorporated into the state apparatus. European officials rewarded their loyalty through access to resources controlled by the state, including preferential access to trade and commodity production, that became key to the accumulation wealth and was controlled by local African officials in the interests of their kinsmen and extensive clientages. Linked to them were the members of the growing literate intelligentsia occupying other positions in the state and small groups of wealthy farmers, cattle owners and traders who also played patron-client politics, using their wealth to invest in social networks to build their own clientage and position themselves for access to the wider patronage networks of the state (Berry 1993). These new sources of wealth and power, however, were distributed increasingly unevenly both within and between developing communities, providing the material basis for the internal and external politics of ethnic formation.
The networks of collaboration and patronage shaped the colonial state’s involvement in the process of ethnic construction. Each local administrative unit ideally contained a single culturally and linguistically homogeneous ‘tribe’ in which people continued to live within indigenous institutions and were subject to ‘tribal discipline’ through local structures of authority. This made what the colonial state understood to be local institutions of tribe and kinship into the grassroots foundations of colonial domination, as well as means of deriving a degree of legitimacy from association with ‘tradition.’ Moreover, their knowledge of that ‘native law and custom’ largely came from the distinctly self-interested accounts of their own local collaborators and agents. The colonial state was, however, engaged in the development of ethnicities that often bore little correspondence to pre-colonial identities and communities, defining the culture and customs of tribes with a degree of clarity, consistency and rigidity that produced an increasingly sharp definition and enclosing of ethnicity and a significant expansion of the scale of ethnic communities. This shaped diverse stories of ethnic development in a process of reformulation involving both the creation of new groups and the disappearance of older ones. Colonial officials, missionaries and anthropologists combined in an ‘invention of tradition’ through efforts to define clearly bounded tribal societies and identities that would preserve social stability and facilitate political control (Ranger 1983). Africans, for their part, responded through a process of cultural imagining based on real cultural experiences and resources, created and refashioned out of both old and new elements (Ranger 1994; Berman 1998).

The impact of colonialism on African agrarian communities generated both new cleavages of class, as well as exacerbating existing internal differences of gender, generation and clienthood. These were argued out in the context of indigenous cultures over issues of ‘authenticity’ defining of the proper boundaries of the community and its culture and of recognized membership within it that allocated legitimate access to family and property. Ethnicity and class were thus intertwined products of the colonial experience, rather than negating opposites. Africans did not and do not have either class or ethnic identities, but both; and this was
reflected in the cultural politics of their communities (Berman 2004). It focused on increasing conflict between rich and poor over their reciprocal obligations, particularly of the former to redistribute their wealth so their dependents and clients could flourish (Eyoh 1996; Chabal and Daloz 1999).

The issues in dispute were so clearly related to those of ‘moral economy’ that John Lonsdale and I developed the concept of moral ethnicity to make clear the connection of ethnicity to the impact of colonial modernity. Moral ethnicity defines the discursive and political arena within which ethnic identities emerged out of renegotiation of the bounds of communal membership and authority, the social rights and obligations of moral economy, and access to land and property (Lonsdale 1994: Berman 2004a). This enclosed often fiercely contested attempts to define an ‘authentic’ culture and identity out of the hybridity and fluidity of the past while under pressure from colonial regimes to conform to the European image of an ancient and homogeneous culture, which defined who had access to wealth and power and to whom they were responsible. Patronage politics became increasingly unstable with the obligations of ‘big men’ more and more focused on distributing the resources of state and market to their clients and communities, while a growing number of excluded poor clamored to be included. The struggle of the ethnic elites to gain such resources took the form of political tribalism, mobilized communal solidarity and political organization of the community defined by moral ethnicity, first against the alien power of the colonial state and then, increasingly, against the competing interests of rival ethnicities for access to the state and its patronage resources, driven by the horizontal inequalities of the colonial political economy.

2. The stage, nationalism and the politics of patronage

The particular pattern of state-society linkages of colonial Africa – patron-client networks centered on local African agents of colonial power and largely contained within the internal and external politics of ethnic communities – defined a fragmented plurality of communities of trust,
within which individual probity, rights and responsibilities were the focus of an active political process, while between them an amoral competition for access to the material resources of the state became increasingly intense. Social trust was largely contained within ethnic communities and embedded in the personalistic ties of the patron-client networks that were opportunistically focused on access to material benefits. There was little basis for the development of impersonal systemic trust in the state as the impersonal arbiter of conflict or as an honest and disinterested distributor of public resources that supposedly characterized the development of the Western nation-state (Ekeh 1990, 2004; Berman 2004b).

Moreover, while the colonial state was the principal source of wealth and power, it was simultaneously an agency of arbitrary power and oppressive force. For both masses and elites dealing with the state was a mixture of opportunity and danger – an opportunity to gain access to the diverse resources at the disposal of state and its agents, and the danger of running afoul of its apparently arbitrary and capricious actions and its coercive taxes and punishments. The constant resort to metaphors of eating and consuming in the discourse of politics in sub-Saharan Africa, to politics as ‘eating’ or ‘devouring’ and repeated references to getting ones share of state resources or ‘slice of the cake’ vividly express the personal, material and opportunistic character of politics, and its dual character: those who aspire to eat can also be eaten in the amoral food chain of politics. The ‘politics of the belly’ originated in the institutional structures and social relations of the colonial state (Bayart 1993). To survive in such a dangerous world requires support and protection, exactly what patrons and clients are supposed to provide for each other. At the same time, the ethnic community provides security and protection against the state in a social arena in which issues of moral economy could be argued out.

The colonial legacy of African societies – bureaucratic authoritarianism, neo-traditional ideology, patron-client relations, the partial and contradictory development of capitalism, and an ethnic dialectic of assimilation, internal conflict and external competition – produced diverse local variations and provided the context for the development of African nationalism. The end of
World War Two brought the ‘second colonial occupation’ by highly stressed French and British states attempting to use the development of their colonies as part of their efforts at economic recovery and regaining legitimacy in both the metropole and the colonial dependencies (Lonsdale and Low 1976). It involved an unprecedented expansion of the colonial state’s apparatus beyond the personalized structures of patriarchal patron-client linkages into a broader and deeper intervention into indigenous societies and a huge expansion of the social and economic resources it had to distribute. It led, much to the consternation of colonial regimes, to growing political conflicts on three levels: within African communities over the unequal distribution of the benefits of ‘development’; between ethnic communities over the distribution of access to the resources of ‘development’ that brought ‘tribal’ conflicts to the fore; and between farmers and wage labourers and the state over the latter’s efforts to extend its control over markets and wages. At all three levels, protest merged into a growing, mass-based anti-colonial opposition led by the literate intelligentsia, often employees of the state itself; and challenged both the collaborating elites and the European regime (Cooper 1996).

The institutions of the colonial state and European ideologies of nationalism powerfully influenced the development of these nationalist movements. The state was not only the focus of the material opportunities of development, but also French and British conceptions of colonial development precluded any political future except that of turning colonies into nation-states. Both pan-African federation and the ‘balkanization’ into ethnic states were rejected by the imperial powers, forcing the liberation struggles to focus on the national territorial framework and the capture of the state (Davidson 1992; Young 2007, 248). African nationalism was primarily an attempt to gain state power and control its collaborative networks and sources of patronage. In Kwame Nkrumah’s celebrated dictum: “Seek ye first the political kingdom.” It was both a discourse of legitimacy for state power and an embodiment of a doctrine of popular sovereignty blending nationalist and universalist claims for the nation as a project tying demands for universal rights and self-determination to diverse ethno-nationalist themes of cultural renewal and identity.
A confusing and contradictory blend of civic and ethnic elements in hybrid and internally conflicted movements took control of states that were largely authoritarian bureaucracies with spare and unpracticed parliamentary and electoral institutions of European liberal democracies added by hastily written independence constitutions (Berman 2010).

At independence African states and nations, ethnic groups and classes, were all in flux, processes of active social construction and political contest rather than stable social entities, and they continue to be so up to the present. In the first decades of independence up to the end of the 1970s nation-building as a conscious strategy and objective was dominant in most African states by governments preoccupied with the linkage of nation unity and socio-economic development, and under pressure from international and bilateral aid organizations that focused on the paradigm of a secular industrial nation-state as the sole embodiment of modernity and development, and communicated their fear of weak ‘new nations’ in Africa being torn apart by ‘atavistic’ tribalism. Even before independence, tenuous ethnic and class coalitions had begun to unravel into competing factions struggling for control over the material rewards of state power. In several states minority, ethnically based parties challenged dominant nationalist movements (Allman 1993). At independence, competitive elections and the Africanization of the state apparatus began to make ethnicity increasingly important as the basis of political support and access to the higher levels of the state apparatus (Young 1994).

In the international environment of the Cold War, state-focused development strategies and national development plans were the order of the day. In particular, the Keynesian/social democratic moral economy of the post-war West was the hegemonic paradigm for a state-regulated capitalist national development. Ideologically, nationalism guided and promoted economic development by appeal to national rather than class or regional ethnic interests. This was expressed through a wide variety of nationalist discourses in particular countries that were all ostensibly broadly inclusive nation-building strategies. In addition to promoting economic development and fighting ‘poverty, ignorance and disease,’ nationalist ideologies focused on
education for the masses, including the propagation of a national historical epic of the great struggle for liberation from colonial oppression as a legitimating charter for the ‘nation.’ The new regimes also pursued the cultural and symbolic dimensions of a national project, from newly created flags and anthems to popular culture and sport, making heroes out of performers and national teams (Young 2007, 248-50).

However, nationalism as a development ideology and nation building through cultural engineering actually proved of only limited effectiveness. All of the nationalist ideologies of post-colonial Africa ultimately failed to reconstruct an effectively hegemonic ‘national’ moral economy attached to a legitimate, widely trusted arena of civic politics in the state. Nor did there develop a unified and self-conscious dominant class capable of pursuing a project of national development. Instead, behind the façade of ostensibly modern state institutions, the politics of the belly reigned through the pervasive spread of ethnic patronage networks to the very centre of the state apparatus, with ramifying linkages reaching from cabinet to village to produce what J-F Bayart graphically described as the ‘rhizome state’ (1993). What came to be called ‘neopatrimonialism’ was grounded in the ethnic patronage networks. At the grassroots, ethnic identity and communal membership was reinforced as the basis for access to the state and its resources. Moreover, in state after state, the political and cultural construction of the ‘nation’ turned into a cult of personality around the president or leader as the embodiment of the nation and the father of his people. Such a preoccupation with the leader undermined nationalism and reinforced the political culture of traditional personal leadership and patronage, including the taking of traditional or, at least, traditional sounding titles such as Mobutu Sese Seko or Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah.

The growth of personal rule of Africa’s big men was linked to the growing suppression of political expression and competition and an increasingly authoritarian cast to the state and ruling parties (Jackson 1982). De facto and de jure ‘one party democracies’ declared the ruling party the essential carapace of national unity, and competing parties, especially those based on particular
ethnic communities, were suppressed and their leaders incorporated into the single party led by the great national leader. Increasingly authoritarian rule eliminated the political meaning of citizenship and offered instead an implicit, tenuous moral contract of material benefits in return for political quiescence. The single party state, meanwhile, offered a ‘national’ arena within which the distribution of material resources between ethnic communities could be negotiated between the leaders of various groups, without having to resort to the public mobilization of their supporters. The politics of political tribalism and moral ethnicity thus became linked to the ability of big men holding positions in the state to obtain for their communities a significant share of the large-scale collective benefits of ‘development,’ as well as the more individual rewards apportioned to their personal clients.

The wave of military coups in Africa that began in December 1963 with Togo’s 250-man army killing the president, Sylvanus Olympio, brought to power military regimes whose significance as a distinctive political development now seems far less than at the time. In spite of their extravagant claims to be the real agents of national unity and their suppression of all ‘divisive’ political parties and organizations, military regimes have represented little change in the state-focused patronage system. Instead, the military magnates incorporated themselves into a dominant position within the patrimonial networks of patronage and appropriation of state resources. Africa’s ramshackle and meagerly equipped armies were extravagantly rearmed, claiming larger and larger portions of national budgets, and military big men were among the most enduring and profligately corrupt of its rulers.

3. Neo-liberal reform and social decay

The rise of neo-liberal hegemony in the dominant capitalist nations and international financial institutions in the 1980s brought a stunning reversal of the conception of ‘development’ with a rejection of the state-centred strategies of economic development and nation-building of the first decades of independence. Instead, the focus was radically narrowed to the market alone
and the supposedly irremediably corrupt and ‘predatory’ states of Africa were rejected as the enemy of ‘development.’ Neo-liberal doctrine cast off the legitimacy of politics and sought to remove the state’s ‘interventions’ that distorted the free play of market forces and, it was asserted, retarded growth. For country after country, access to aid and finance was conditional on the implementation of ‘reforms’ contained in Structural Adjustment Programs, uniform for each country that imposed the conditions for receiving assistance: currency devaluation, fees for basic public services like health and education, removal of price subsidies for food, elimination of budget deficits, removal of trade barriers, and privatization of public corporations and other state-owned assets. The painfully won gains of national development of the 1960s and 70s were dismissed as restraints on market-driven growth. Instead, market-driven reforms were economically and scientifically ‘correct’ in a way that tolerated no dissent. Efforts at state-led industrialization and economic diversification had to be abandoned and African countries had to concentrate on their areas of ‘comparative advantage’ in the production of cash crops, pushing them back into the structural niche of the colonial political economy. Politics could only be a corrupt intrusion into the pursuit of a scientifically determined result.

Neo-liberal structural adjustment programs, part of conscious efforts at ‘globalization’ of the capitalist system, represent the most rigorous and coercive effort to impose the self-regulating market since the early 19th century. The result, while producing periods of growth in some countries, has been a general experience of economic decline, social decay and disorder. Africa has been integrated into the global economy in segmentary fashion that also marginalized large portions the territory and population of each nation and the continent as a whole and generated a general socio-economic decline (Ferguson 2006). In 1976 the per-capita GNP of sub-Saharan Africa was 17.6% of the world average, but had dropped to 10.5% by 1999. The average GNP per capita in African states dropped by almost 10% between 1970 and 1998, while the continent’s share of global economic activity was only 1.1%, despite having 10% of world population. Rather than neo-liberal reform bringing predicted increases in foreign investment, Africa received
only 0.6% of the world total (Arrighi 2002, 17; van de Walle 2001). By the end of the 1980s, even the economic ‘miracle’ in the Cote d’Ivoire was in radical decline, while in Ghana the World Bank implemented its Program of Assistance to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), a tacit admission of the failures of market reform (Marshall 2007; Brydon and Legge 1996; Hutchful 2002). Rather than development, neo-liberalism brought what James Ferguson (2006, 48) called the ‘steepest economic inequalities seen in human history,’ with corresponding declines in literacy and life expectancy and unprecedented growth in the proportion of African populations living in absolute poverty. This was correlated with rural decline, runaway urbanization with metastasizing slums and the ‘shadow economy’ of the informal sector. The impact of adjustment has been documented in the Human Development Index of the UNDP, developed in 1990 under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen in order to counter the “preoccupation with the growth of real income per capita as a measure of the well-being of a nation” (Cleveland 2008) and in the detailed empirical studies by the UN Habitat Program (2003; Davis 2006).

The impact of structural adjustment and globalization on African states has been severe. Cuts of personnel and services ‘hollowed out’ most states, reducing their administrative capacity and limiting the effective authority of smaller and weaker states to a radius of a few miles around the capital city and other major towns. The undermining of state capacity and loss of direct developmental functions and services did not make space for markets to produce rapid growth, but led to a significant increase in corruption. Equally important was the effective loss of sovereignty to international political and economic forces, both in the loss of control over macro-economic policy to the international financial institutions and of vast tracts of territory and resources to private corporations and NGO’s. The particular African experience of globalization

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2 In the 2004 HDI for 177 countries, the highest ranked sub-Saharan African countries were South Africa (121), Gabon (124) and Namibia (125); while the lowest 23 (155-177) were all from sub-Saharan Africa. Canada and Japan were sixth and seventh, respectively (UNDP 2004).
combining integration and marginalization is found in the development of highly capitalized enclaves, particularly for natural resource extraction, with little connection to the marginalized regions around them. The growth of such enclaves with their private security of hired mercenaries represents the loss of many states of the key monopoly of legal organized force (Ferguson 2006, 39-40). In addition, the taking over of public services and development programs by a wide range of ngo’s – local, national, and transnational – gives them state-like functions to pursue their own political, economic and religious agendas.

Such undermining of the state threatened the established structures of political and economic power, and the politics of patronage. Political elites dependent on state patronage periodically clashed with the international financial institutions over the terms of adjustment programs, including the civilian Moi regime in Kenya and the military magnates in Nigeria in the early 1990s. (Ndulu and Mwega 1994, 102-17; Forrest 1995, 242-48) State deregulation and divestment did not so much free markets as extend political struggles for control of key sectors of the national economy from the state into the private sector. And this also includes political elites deploying even declining state power to gain a hold over parts of the rapidly growing international criminal economy, especially drugs and arms trafficking that has accompanied globalization (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999).

The decay of the state and resulting intensified struggle for control of resources and accumulation of wealth in circumstances of growing poverty and uncertainty for the mass of the population has increased both the horizontal and vertical inequalities between and within ethnic communities and the conflicts of moral ethnicity and political tribalism. Contracting states are incapable of creating new programs and positions or even paying the salaries of existing officials, while patrons with declining or threatened resources are unwilling and unable to sustain distributions to their clients. An increasingly materialistic and opportunistic appropriation of state resources for purely private personal gain undermines the relations of trust underpinning patronage networks with growing cynicism over the failure of big men to meet their obligations.
of reciprocity and redistribution (Chabal and Daloz 1999). From aiding their followers to a share of the ‘national cake,’ elites are seen as ‘eating’ the people and failing to protect them from the ravages of neo-liberal ‘adjustment.’ Big men are seen as agents of sorcery and witchcraft, using their occult powers to suck the life from the poor (Geschiere 1997). Where countries like Ghana and Kenya are under pressure from both indigenous elites and International Financial Institutions to develop land markets, control of rural land has become the most important source of conflict within and between ethnic communities (Lonsdale 2008; Tettey et al. 2008). While the poor placed greater demands on wealthier kin for aid and families bitterly divide over the inheritance of land and property, the broader conflict between rich and poor is expressed in acts of resistance and escape, as in the growth of parallel economies beyond the grasp of decayed states.

The erosion of state capacity and the declining legitimacy of both civil and military regimes in Africa were accompanied by a widespread increase of social violence. With the withdrawal of social services and decline of patronage networks, social disorder, crime and insecurity became an increasing feature of daily life in African societies. More disturbing was the increasingly savage nature of violence by organized groups, whether national armies and police, criminal gangs, insurgent movements or private ‘war lord’ armies. Such violence, typically characterized in the Western news media, which covers little else about Africa, as ‘senseless,’ ‘irrational,’ an ‘end in itself,’ served as the basis for the construction of African ‘difference’ and ‘darkness’ and a reversion to primordial savagery. The problem with this simplistic and inaccurate stereotype is that it obscures a complex reality and makes the relationship between the state and social violence impossible to understand. Compared to the rest of the world in the sanguinary history of the 20th century, Africa has been no more prone to violent conflicts than other regions nor have they been more lethal (Zeleza 2008). The horrific genocides of Rwanda and Darfur do not place Africa outside of ‘civilization,’ but as part of the grim global record of state-sponsored and organized slaughter that is the evil legacy of modernity (Bauman 1989), including the vicious contemporary ethnic confrontations in the Balkans and Caucasus.
occasioned by the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Moreover, most serious civil conflicts in Africa are grounded in the political and economic legacies of the colonial experience and its characteristic harsh and routine use of coercion against the subject population. Up to today, the violence of the state’s agents is an ever-present threat in any encounter with its security forces. The level of social violence in Africa has risen from an already violent historical base, whether carried out by state or non-state actors, organized groups or in interpersonal assaults, with the line between political and criminal agents increasingly porous, and all facilitated by the ready availability of small arms, especially automatic weapons, in the post-Cold War arms bazaar.

The most influential explanation of African ‘civil wars’ by Paul Collier and his colleagues, sponsored by the World Bank, depicted them as driven by greed rather than political grievances or ideology and based solely on rational calculation of the economic returns to violence by predatory insurgent groups and warlords who fought for the control over natural resources (‘conflict diamonds’), drug trafficking and ruthless exploitation of local populations (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). What is missing is any conception of the interplay of economic, social, cultural and political factors that shape the context of conflicts and the motivation and meaning of both individual actors and insurgent movements (‘grievance’). Based on rational choice models of individual actors motivated by maximization of material rewards (‘looting’), for which no empirical evidence in any African context is offered, it offers correlations rather than explanation of the violence based on dubious evidence of poorly understood and miss-characterized cases (Mkwandawire 2008, 103-19; Kaarsholm 2006, 14-19).

Here we actually confront the intersection of both common and locally idiosyncratic factors that shape each conflict and in which, as noted earlier, the latter may be the most important in particular cases. In particular, the interaction of economic factors with ethnicity and ethnic conflict operates on two key dimensions. First, on the level of structural political economy, the structural adjustment reforms exacerbate the horizontal and vertical inequalities between and within ethnic communities that constitute the material basis for both greed and grievance and
violent conflicts (Stewart 2008). However, whether such structural inequalities are translated into
different forms of conflict including the most extreme forms of violence depends on political
factors unique to each case. For example, the hollowing out of state capabilities and resources,
noted above, reduced the patronage resources available to political elites to mitigate the
inequalities between communities and for ‘big men’ to redistribute to their clientage. Moreover,
the decline of state administrative capabilities and resources led by the late 1980s to the crisis of
‘governance’ that prompted ethnically-based movements to attack weakened regimes or move out
of their shrinking orbit of effective control. On the second level, of economic behavior, ethnic
cleavages can have a significant impact on market behavior of both individuals and firms, as well
as on the behavior of banks, government services, aid programs and NGO’s assisting local
business development. The failure of trust in market exchange can have serious effects on
economic growth, but also involves the role of the state and the rule of law in providing and
maintaining the essential normative basis of exchange transactions. The impact of ethnicity on
economic behavior and its wider structural consequences is a topic that calls for much further
detailed research in different national contexts.\footnote{While studying indigenous industrial development in Ghana I was told repeatedly by both businessmen and government officials that partnerships between individuals from different ethnic groups rarely worked (Berman 2003). I also observed during numerous interviews at small manufacturing firms that the employees tended to come from the same ethnic group as the owner, if not the same extended family. The extent to which both can be found in Ghana and other countries and their wider significance for economic performance is a provocative hypothesis that requires further research.}

Given the conventional wisdom about the artificiality and fragility of African nation-
states, they have actually proved remarkably durable during the first half-century of independence,
and especially during the past quarter century of escalating violence. The internal wars of Africa
have largely focused on controlling the state within the established territorial boundaries or
gaining some degree of regional autonomy or more equitable distribution of resources within it.
In only nine cases (Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, both Congo’s, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia) have insurgents from the periphery destroyed an incumbent regime and its security forces, rather than the switch of loyalty to the new rulers that occurred under earlier coups. (Young 2007, 260) In only one instance, the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia, has the division of an existing state occurred and been internationally recognized. Indeed, the issue of ‘state collapse’, which has been a major focus of much recent political research in Africa, has, I think, been quite exaggerated. Even where there has been a dramatic recession of state authority and control over wide parts of its national territory, as in Somalia, Zaire, Sierra Leone and Liberia, their national boundaries have remained largely intact and internationally recognized. Indeed, the reconstitution of a functioning state in the portion of Somalia that was the British colony of Somaliland has thus far failed to gain international recognition.

In states weakened by globalization and neo-liberal reforms the focus of conflict has been of contested nationalisms and battles about state formation and the socio-cultural dimensions of the nation. Much of the violence has been about the reassertion of central state control. Even where the civil administration has temporarily receded in the countryside, the military and police have remained to contest insurgent movements for control of the national territory. And the criminalization of the state may actually indicate attempts at consolidation and expansion of state resources in ways similar to how wars, piracy and organized crime contributed to state building in early modern Europe (Bayart 2000; Kaarsholm 2006; Tilly 1990). The contests of nationalism suggest not only the degree to which nationhood has become powerfully rooted in the political and cultural imaginary of even small and weak African states (Kaarsholm 2006; Milliken and Krause 2002), but the increasing intertwining of nationalism and mobilized ethnicity in the complex motives underlying political violence. Indeed, rather than an artificially imposed concept by earlier efforts at ‘nation-building,’ the nation has become part of popular consciousness, a ‘taken as given’ part of social reality (Young 2007, 262). Equally important, the socio-cultural boundaries of the nation and citizenship have become increasingly ethnicized and link together the efforts at democratization and the intense civil conflicts of autochthony.
4. Democracy and disorder: African nations and the conflicts of autochthony

In 1989 of the 47 states of sub-Saharan Africa, only five possessed competitive multi-party systems, 11 were military oligarchies, 29 civilian one-party states with varying degrees of permitted competition, and two (Namibia and South Africa) white settler regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 79). The 1990s came with a wave of ‘democratization’ as popular protests and foreign pressures pressed authoritarian regimes for political reforms and multi-party elections. By the middle of the decade, sixteen countries had newly elected governments, although in 24 others incumbent regimes had successfully blocked reforms or were able to manipulate them to win an electoral mandate, often through deeply flawed elections. The decade ended with the outbreak on particularly vicious civil conflicts in several of the most important democratized states that extended into the new century. ‘Democracy’ itself appeared to be a source of social disorder.

External pressures for democratization came from the international financial institutions and major Western powers, especially the United States, alarmed at the decay of African states, their obvious loss of legitimacy with their populations and the resulting crisis of governance from efforts to implement neo-liberal reforms. They pushed for the restoration of multi-party politics, free elections and the open development of ‘civil society.’ The end of the Cold War removed any strategic reasons for the support of authoritarian regimes like that of Mobutu in Zaire. The sort of democracy promoted by the Western powers was, however, highly elitist and narrowly procedural. The intent was to provide a process to legitimate ruling groups and entrench neo-liberal reforms and the ‘free market’ as the untouchable bases of ‘democracy.’ The version of liberal democracy pressed on African states was a disciplined one in which capitalism and the ‘free market’ was sacrosanct and there was not ‘too much’ democracy attending to issues of distribution and inequality (Abrahamsen 2000).
Internal pressures, by contrast, emerged from the growing wave of popular protest between 1988 and 1992 challenging, in circumstances of increasing poverty and insecurity in patrimonial autocracies, both civilian and military. These protests were led by trade unions, students, civil servants, professional organizations and, in some instances, religious institutions. From economic grievances they quickly moved to demands for political reform and civil liberties. In eleven francophone countries reform movements led to national conferences and new constitutions, while constitutional reform also marked reforms in other countries. Common elements included legalization of political parties, constitutional separation of powers, and multiparty legislative and presidential elections. Space was also provided for the press outside of government control and a new range of civil society organizations. The reform movements were also testimony to the importance of the nation in popular consciousness and the focus on the state as its political expression (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Young 2007).

In three important cases – Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa – democratization and constitutional reform involved efforts to employ varying forms of federalism to accommodate and manage ethnic diversity. Ethiopia instituted an explicitly ethnic form of federalism, with ethnicity as the basis for the organization of states and the exercise of significant political and cultural autonomy. In a situation of great ethnic diversity of some 80 groups of widely varying sizes from several million to mere thousands, six states focused on the largest communities with recognizable territorial foci, while three others combined numerous small communities. In Nigeria, in the fourth constitutional iteration since independence, deliberate efforts were made to fragment and sublimate the identities and politicization of the three main ethnic groups into some 22 states, while 14 are ethnically heterogeneous under the control of smaller minority communities. In both instances federalism functions as a way of incorporating and rewarding ethnic elites by providing access to state institutions and resources and thereby institutionalizing ethnic patronage as the basis of politics. In states without a dominant group, elite competition among minority communities replicates the ethnic politics of centralized states; in Ethiopia the
three ethnically fragmented states have been the site of the most violent ethnic confrontations. In both Ethiopia and Nigeria the reality is actually increasing centralization of control by the federal state. In Nigeria this is linked to the ‘federal principle’ in the distribution of oil revenues to the states, which has created exceptional state dependence on the centre, as well as generating smoldering conflict with the ethnic communities of the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta (Turton 2006; Ejobowah 2008).

In South Africa the nine provinces were deliberately designed to contain no majority ethno-racial community and the system is officially described as ‘devolved union’ rather than federation, with strong central government powers. In all three states, domination of the central government by a single party has effectively increased the centralized power of the state over the federal units. Federalism, finally, can do little to deal with the internal movement of peoples and loss of territorial focus of increasingly hybrid and inter-married populations, especially in urban areas (Murray and Simeon 2008).

By the end of the 1990s, however, the tide of democratization was ebbing and many governments were receding back into ‘semi-democracies’ and a reassertion of elite control revealed serious limits of the process. Newly elected regimes were unable, under heavy international pressure, to make any departure from neo-liberal policy prescriptions, which compromised their ability to address local issues of poverty and redistribution. Moreover, the shallow and narrowly restricted ‘democracy’ implemented in most countries actually exacerbated ethnic conflicts and the political mobilization of ethnic communities. First, the competition between ethnically based patronage networks for access to state resources was intensified by open electoral competition. Despite efforts in some countries to limit the expression of ethnic conflict by banning explicitly ethnic parties and/or requiring candidates to achieve a minimal level of support in all regions of the country, militant ethnic politics has been increasing in many countries. Rather than patronage resources being discretely sorted out by bargaining among elites within a single ruling party or behind the opaque shield of a military autocracy, elites have to
compete publicly for electoral support to gain access to the state. The hegemony of neo-liberal ideology among the parties allows for little variation in ideology or program between parties and leaves little but their ethnic base for politicians to appeal to. In Ghana where ethnic cleavages had not been a predominant factor in politics, the series of increasingly successful national elections since 1992 have been marked by the emergence of ethnic bloc voting (Jockers et al. 2009). And patron–client politics works very effectively within the electoral process, as it does in so many countries outside of Africa, exchanging client votes for patron/leaders for expected redistribution of material benefits.

At the same time, the winner-take-all outcome of elections in systems without proportional representation in most states, increased smaller communities’ fear of domination by larger groups, the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth, and their ultimate exclusion from access to the state. Instead of reducing corruption, democratization allowed it to reach new heights as newly elected politicians sought ‘our turn to eat’, and the politics of the belly revealed the personal, materialistic and opportunistic character of politics and the relative unimportance of ideology, principal or policy in the circumscribed political arena. Western expectations, meanwhile, that the growth of civil society would serve as a force for social and political renewal have proven illusory. The focus on socio-cultural forms borrowed from the West – churches, professional organizations, trade unions, universities, etc. – has ignored the dense networks of indigenous institutions that surround and pervade them, features of historical experience and the social landscape that are idiosyncratically African and usually ethnically or religiously specific. Such organizations mean that civil society is neither a democratic *deus ex machina* or a movement of popular empowerment, but traversed by inequalities, and anti-democratic and authoritarian politics revealing clashing interests of ethnicity, class and gender, and deep and potentially violent conflicts (Fatton 1995).

The most intense of these conflicts have focused on the meaning of citizenship and national belonging. Citizenship has been increasingly ethnicized to mean deriving solely from
birth into one of the original ethnic communities of the nation. The socio-cultural boundaries of ethnic groups and their claims to being the native inhabitants of national territory became objects of growing conflict with regards to both political participation and access to material benefits. The issues of ‘who can vote?’ or ‘who can be a candidate where?’ show the growing fear of local populations of being outvoted by more numerous ‘strangers’; while the decentralization of development programs and the increasing involvement of NGOs’ has triggered confrontations over who could participate in projects (Cueppens and Geschiere 2005). Conflicts over ethnic definitions of citizenship bring new intensity to the politics of authenticity by combining the internal conflicts of moral ethnicity and the external confrontations of political tribalism. These have found expression in conflicts over ‘autochthony,’ of literally being ‘sons of the soil’ that began in Francophone countries and have emerged in varying, but no less violent circumstance, in countries of Anglophone Africa as well. These involve struggles over recognition of the authenticity of communal and individual membership in the nation in circumstances of economic distress and uncertainty over real material issue of access to land and work.

Conflicts of autochthony, however, involve attempts to define fixed criteria of identity and discourses of exclusion to assert group boundaries in real world circumstances of mobility, immigration, urbanization and mixed ancestry of increasingly diverse populations. They involve efforts to rehabilitate ‘authentic’ origins and a ‘re-enchantment’ if not actual invention or appropriation of ‘tradition.’ It is linked to a xenophobia and sense of victimization that defines the enemy as an interloping stranger and his innocent autochthonous victim (Marshall-Fratani 2007; Mbembe 2000). The righteous imagery of the victim amid the reality of ambiguous and contested identities, as Appadurai notes, gives the violence of the conflicts a particularly vicious quality, as the other can only be definitively eliminated by murder and atrocity (Appadurai 1999).

In the context of democratization and economic crisis, the violent conflicts that exploded in the Cote d’Ivoire in 2002 pitted ‘autochthonous’ communities in the south against ‘allogenes,’ including both foreign immigrants from Burkina Faso and Mali and internal immigrants from the
north of the country. It was both a struggle over land and of the definition of citizenship of true Ivoirians defined by ‘ivoirité’ as opposed to foreigners and strangers. Ethnicity as self-identification was linked to autochthony as the basis of national belonging. Demands for group based citizenship focused on special recognition and precedence for ‘true’ sons of the soil (Geschiere 2009, 18, 24-5). In the Ivory Coast this was expressed in a “National Operation of Identification” in 2001-2002 requiring every Ivorian to return to his or her village of origin and be identified by a committee of local notables and registered as full citizens with rights to land and to the vote (Geschiere 2009, 98-117; Marshall-Fratani 2007). It was to the participants a ‘war of who is who’ in circumstances of ambiguity and hybridity that focused on grasping control of the state and its historic role in the definition of group identities. Rather than undermining the nation-state, the conflict reinforced its vitality and importance (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 31-2, 45).

In the north east corner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, bordering on Rwanda and Burundi, the outbreak of ethnic violence in 1997-98 focused on issues of autochthony and national citizenship and the role of the state in defining both in a region of remarkable complexity of ethnic identities and communities with constantly changing names and historical claims (Cueppens and Geschiere 2005, 395). The issue was the authenticity of the citizenship of the ‘banyarwanda,’ a composite group of the banymulenge or ‘Congolese Tutsi’ who had settled in the area shortly before the territorial divisions of 1885 placed them under Belgian rule, and later Tutsi and Hutu immigrants, including Tutsi refugees from the first pogroms in Rwanda in 1959 and Hutu refugees fleeing the victorious Tutsi army at the end of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Mobutu first granted citizenship to the Banyamulenge when he depended on their support and reneged when he need support from other groups. Between 1992 and 1996 he used the citizenship issue to destabilize the democracy movement and made people of Rwandan origin the first target. When the Banyamulenge resisted, it provided the pretext for the organization of several ethnic militias in the region and the intervention of Rwanda and Uganda ostensibly to prevent another genocide (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, 70-76).
While the concept of ‘autochthony is rarely invoked in Anglophone Africa, clashes over conflicting claims to land and citizenship are becoming more frequent, and two outbreaks of efforts to exclude strangers or foreigners in early 2008 are particularly striking. In January and February, a major element of the violence following on the contested outcome of the Kenya election of December 2007, as in the outbreaks following the earlier multi-party elections of 1992 and 1997, were attacks by Kalenjin ‘warriors’ on Kikuyu farmers in the western Rift Valley. An act of blunt ethnic cleansing, later found to have been organized and paid for by senior political figures from the area, it was an attempt to by earlier migrants to the area to rid it of late-coming ‘strangers,’ with the likely actual autochthonous inhabitants, the Okiek, too small in numbers or power to be an issue. The Kikuyu were descendants of landless peasants settled on former white settler estates at the end of the colonial period, but on land the local Kalenjin believed should have once again become their own. For the British, who believed Kikuyu landlessness as a cause of the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, it was the solution to a problem (and the first development project in Kenya to be funded by the World Bank), but it turned out to create another in its stead. The Kikuyu established their claim by their productive labour and creation of wealth, the Kalenjin rejected not their citizenship but their presence in the wrong place and what they perceived as Kikuyu arrogance and dominance (Lonsdale 2008; Mueller 2008; Anderson and Lochery 2008). In multi-ethnic and multi-racial South Africa, in May 2008 violence broke out in the townships surrounding Johannesburg as black South Africans attacked immigrants and refugees, especially those from Mozambique and increasing numbers fleeing the political and social collapse in Zimbabwe. The ‘rainbow nation’ that prides itself as being a beacon of democracy and human rights revealed a powerful popular undercurrent of xenophobia among all South African racial and ethnic communities, directed in particular at the makwere-kwere of African immigrants from across the Limpopo River. Stigmatized as sources of crime and disease and stealers of jobs from real citizens, a majority of South Africans thought they were
undeserving of basic human rights, let alone those of citizenship. Xenophobia, as Jonathan Crush noted, turns out to be the underside of democratic nationalism (Crush 2000).

Underlying the conflicts of autochthony and efforts to purify the authentic group is the link of belonging and access to the new resources of wealth and power that can accompany globalization (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). For example, at the most local level, this is clear in attempts to decentralize control over development programs and local resources to indigenous communities and ‘traditional’ leaders. In the case of conflicts over development programs for local forest resources in Cameroon, Geschiere has shown the contradiction between combining neo-liberal reform and belief in the market as the solution to all problems with trust in the ‘community’ or ‘customary chiefs’ as a source of stability and local control. Instead, the result is that communities limit access to resources and income by closing themselves to ‘outsiders’ and excluding people previously accepted as part of the community (Geschiere 2009).

Finally, the claims of autochthony are inseparable from ‘recognition’ by the state that allocates access to political and economic resources. The various political dimensions of the construction of ethnic communities since the colonial period – moral ethnicity, authenticity, representation, and recognition – have not so much undermined post-colonial African states, as the older conventional wisdom held, but as reinforced them as the most important source of wealth and power, even in times of social decay and global crisis (Berman forthcoming c). Ironically, given that global development institutions, both international and bilateral, do not understand the relationship between processes of ethnic construction and colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, or that the forms of expert knowledge they apply are also political interventions into the processes they seek to ‘scientifically’ control; the result is that policies like democratization and decentralization can actually promote, unintentionally and unexpectedly, increasingly intense, divisive and violent conflicts.
5. African ethnicity and nationalism as shadow and portent

The nation-states of Africa, as those elsewhere, are continuously unfinished projects, contingent outcomes of the universalized social forces of globalized modernity and their own distinctive cultural diversity, mediated by the idiosyncrasies of the colonial experience. African nations are both reflected shadows of the development of Western nation-states, the real historical nation-states, rather than the idealized forms too often used to assess the failures of non-Western nations; and are a portent of the challenges posed to all nations by contemporary globalization and the current world crisis.

The ethnic conflicts of sub-Saharan Africa of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been as violent and vicious as those in other parts of the world, but are not unique examples of atavistic savagery. Most of the violence has been focused on defending or gaining control of the state within a nation and redolent of the earlier struggles in the construction of European nation-states, although in a strikingly different global context (Connor 1972; Bayart 2000). The movements of democratization attest to the continuing reality of African nations and nationalism both internally for citizens struggling to reconstruct the state and externally for the international community. The repeated efforts to rewrite national constitutions attest to the continuing political energy of nationalism in the popular consciousness (Berman 2009). At the same time, the disturbing connection between democratization and civil violence, increasingly expressed in the bitter conflicts of autochthony, reveals the growing ethnicization of nationalism and more narrowly bounded notions of citizenship in Africa.

While aspects of African nationalism, ethnicity and democratization may reflect at some historical distance the experience of Western states, the context in which they occur makes contemporary Africa an embodiment of the challenges increasingly facing all nation-states in the globalized world. Social and ethnic diversity and the challenges of multi-culturalism are increasingly global phenomena through the unprecedented movements of people from the southern hemisphere to the north, many of them from sub-Saharan Africa to Western Europe and
North America to escape the combination of economic decay and civil conflict. Ethnicized nationalism and conflicts over citizenship have taken on new urgency in a strikingly diverse world embracing local sons of the soil and alien others. At the same time, Western nation-states have been challenged from within by the political mobilization of minority ethnic communities submerged beneath the juggernaut of earlier nation building, while North America and other former colonies of settlement face the rising demands of suppressed and dispossessed indigenous peoples. Conflicts of autochthony and anti-immigrant politics are growing in ‘developed’ nations of Europe (Geschiere 2009), as the 2009 elections to the European Parliament strikingly demonstrated. All nations now confront the issues of the meaning of nation and identity, democratic development and accountability, citizen and communal rights, the balancing of multi-ethnic mosaics versus integrationist melting pots amid intensifying conflicts of cultures, classes and genders. In this setting, the impact of ethnicity on economic development in African states derives not from the diversity of ethnic groups but from the impact of thirty years of neo-liberal reforms on the horizontal cleavages that are the material basis of ethnic conflict and on the access of ethnic communities to the sources of wealth and power in the state and market. This shapes in turn the behavior of both individuals and institutions, public and private, in the market place. And they must do so in the context of a global crisis of capitalism that challenges the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism and brings the issues of moral economy to the world stage as well as to the domestic politics of every nation.
References


Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

アフリカにおいて民主主義を再構築しようという過去20年間の取組みが直面してきたパラドックスとは、それが民族紛争を鎮火させるよりも、むしろ悪化させてしまう事態が頻繁に起きていることにあり、特に最近の10年間は土着性に由来する暴力的紛争や「その土地は自分たちに与えられた」と称する者同士の衝突に繋がり、多民族社会の社会秩序や結末の根幹を揺るがせるような事態に発展してきている。民族多様性と民主主義の関係性はどのように変遷してきたのだろうか。

本稿では、まず、欧州諸国による植民地統治が行われるようになって以降のアフリカ諸民族の社会構成について、特に国家と市場の役割および現地社会の対応に焦点を当てながら検証した。第2に、植民地国家と独立後の国家の特殊な関係について、国家や近代化に由来するリソースへの接近と民族集団を繋ぐ重要なリンクとして、「大物（Big Man）」政治やパトリオネージの制度化があるという観点から論じた。第3に、アフリカではナショナリズムとエスニシティは同じ起源を持ち、いずれも、国民国家に顕著な特徴を切り崩すよりもむしろ強化する方向で国家機構による支配権を掌握しようとしてきた。

しかし、新自由主義的な国家・市場改革が進められるにつれ、民族的亀裂を悪化させ、多党制による民主化を困難にするような政治的的経済的荒廃がもたらされた。民族的分裂が政治化するのを抑えるため、憲法改正に真剣な努力が払われている国においても、この傾向は見られる。本稿では4つのまったく異なる国の状況下でも勃発した土着性に由来する紛争を検証した。ここからわかることは、民主化プロセスにあると見られるいずれの国民国家においても、経済危機と社会の衰退、不平等の拡大との関係が共通して観察されることである。
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