



JICA Research Institute

JICA-RI Working Paper

Impact Assessment of Infrastructure Projects on Poverty Reduction

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No. 89

March 2015

JICA Research Institute



JICA Research Institute

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Spatial vs. Social Network Effects in Risk Sharing

Takeshi Aida*

Abstract

Although substantial research has been conducted on informal consumption smoothing mechanisms within villages, or within social clusters such as family and friends, few studies have compared the effects of these spatial and social networks. Employing spatial panel econometric models, this study extends the conventional empirical test of the full risk-sharing hypothesis to incorporate spatial and social network effects, and quantifies the diffusion of income shocks in each network. Estimation results based on household survey data in Southern Sri Lanka show that consumption smoothing performs better in spatial networks than in social ones, because income shocks defuse more effectively among neighboring households. This study also shows the limitations of the conventional test when it is considered a special case of a spatial econometric model.

Keywords: risk sharing, network, distance, kinship, spatial econometrics, spillover effect

JEL classification: O12; Q12; C23

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This research was conducted as a project of the JICA Research Institute, and was supported by a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows (12J10183). I am grateful to Olugbenga Ajilore, Hidehiko Ichimura, Takahiro Ito, Kei Kajisa, Takashi Kurosaki, Tomoya Matsumoto, Hitoshi Matsushima, Alistair Munro, Toru Nakanishi, Keijiro Otsuka, Yasuyuki Sawada, Masahiro Shoji, Kazushi Takahashi, Yasuyuki Todo, Koichi Ushijima, Wataru Yamamoto, Chikako Yamauchi, and participants at the VII World Conference of the SEA, JEA 2013 Autumn Meeting, TEA 2014, 10th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, and seminars at GRIPS and Chuo University, for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to Deeptha Wijerathna and Prabhath Wickramaratne for data collection. All remaining errors are my own.

1. Introduction

Although rural households in developing countries face various types of risks, formal institutions that can mitigate these risks are often weak. Under such situations, informal consumption smoothing, that is, risk sharing, is critical. Townsend (1994) conducted the seminal work in this field by applying the full risk-sharing hypothesis (FRSH) to micro data in India. Although he rejects the FRSH, he also finds that the effects of income shocks on individual consumption are very small. Despite some cases where the FRSH cannot be rejected, many subsequent studies reach almost similar results to those of Townsend (1994) (e.g., Udry 1994; Townsend 1995; Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997; Grimard 1997; Deaton 1997; Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Kurosaki 2001). To investigate the mechanism of this “partial risk-sharing” situation, several studies have focused on types of friction in risk-sharing arrangements, such as private information (Ligon 1998) and limited commitment (Kocherlakota 1996; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002; Dubois et al. 2008; Laczó 2013), and yet others have recently compared the effects of these barriers (Kinnan 2012; Karaivanov and Townsend 2013).

This study provides an alternative approach to the risk-sharing test that incorporates spatial and social network effects, by employing a spatial panel econometric approach. These networks are important in mitigating the problems of asymmetric information and limited commitment.

Spatial networks are important because of transaction costs in risk-sharing arrangements. Given that financial systems and infrastructures are generally underdeveloped in developing countries, the issue of transaction costs is more salient in these areas (Jack and Suri 2014). In this situation, physical distance can serve as a proxy for transaction costs, because distance increases those costs associated with asymmetric information and contractual enforcement problems (Rosenzweig 1988; Townsend 1995). Murgai et al. (2002) analyze optimal risk-sharing group size under the influence of two types of transaction costs: the “association” costs of establishing

links with insurance partners, and the “extraction” costs of implementing transfers, such as monitoring and rule enforcing. They find that these transaction costs, measured by physical distance, have a negative effect on risk-sharing group formation. De Weerd (2004) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) also test the effects of physical distance on dyadic risk-sharing network formation, and find that higher costs (i.e., longer distance) prevent households from forming links. However, these studies mainly focus on group formation, and do not analyze co-movement in consumption or the effect of individual income shocks. Thus, bridging these studies and the conventional tests of the FRSH should be addressed.

Although many previous studies have focused on intra-village risk sharing, social networks also play an important role, especially under the limited commitment problem. This is because family ties and altruism facilitate income transfer among households with different realized income (Cox and Fafchamps 2008; Fafchamps 2011). For example, Grimard (1997) applies the FRSH to ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivoire and confirms a partial risk-sharing situation. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that altruism based on family ties serves to ease the commitment problem. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that households receive gifts and informal loans through networks of friends and relatives. Angelucci et al. (2012) show that resources are well shared in extended family networks, and that the positive spillover effect through the risk-sharing mechanism leads to higher human capital investment. In terms of network formation, De Weerd (2004) and Attanasio et al. (2012) find that close friends and relatives tend to form risk-pooling groups.

Although previous studies emphasized the importance of both spatial and social networks, few compared the effects of these networks based on the FRSH test. In order to fill this gap, and incorporate spatial and social network factors into an empirical model, this study employs a spatial panel econometric approach. Spatial econometrics focuses on spatial effects resulting from spatial dependence and heterogeneity (Anselin 1988; LeSage and Pace 2009). Recently, theoretical studies have been shifting to panel data analysis, and estimation methods have been

developed (e.g., Elhorst 2003, 2010, 2014; Kapoor et al. 2007; Anselin et al. 2008). By employing these models, this study is able to analyze whether there are any spatial and social network effects in risk-sharing arrangements.

One of the most important objectives of employing spatial econometric models is the estimation of direct and indirect effects. If risk-sharing mechanisms work, albeit partially, individual income shocks have spillover effects, thus affecting other households' consumption. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) and Angelucci et al. (2012) show that a cash transfer program indirectly affects ineligible households' consumption through the risk-sharing mechanism. They identify the treatment effect by comparing the outcomes of the ineligible households in the treatment and control villages. In contrast, this study quantifies the spillover effects of income shocks based on the FRSH test, providing a mechanism for identifying processes that have been treated as a black box in previous studies. By estimating direct and indirect effects, which are common approaches in spatial econometrics literature, we can quantify this external effect as well as the direct effects of individual shocks, and we can compare the effects of income shock diffusion in spatial and social networks.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the conventional empirical test of the FRSH, and the empirical strategy of this study. Section 3 describes the dataset used in this study, and Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The final section offers a summary and concluding remarks.

2. Empirical Strategy

The benchmark model is the conventional FRSH test, which is a standard model adopted in previous studies¹ (e.g., Mace 1991; Cochrane 1991; Townsend 1994; Kurosaki 1999). Suppose that an economy consists of N households ($i = 1, \dots, N$) with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility

¹ The notation used here is based on Kurosaki (1999).

function, u_i , where $u_i' > 0$ and $u_i'' < 0$. There is a finite set of states $s = \{1, \dots, S\}$, each of which occurs with probability π_{st} . In each state, households receive stochastic income y_{ist} and consume c_{ist} . The Pareto optimal resource allocation is obtained by solving the following social planner's problem:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \rho_i^t \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_{st} u_i(c_{ist}) \quad (1)$$

with the resource constraint:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N c_{ist} \leq \sum_{i=1}^N y_{ist}, \quad (2)$$

where λ_i is a Pareto weight and ρ_i is the discount factor of household i . The interior solution of this problem requires satisfying the following first order condition:

$$\lambda_i \rho_i^t u_i'(c_{ist}) = \mu_{st}, \quad \forall i, \quad (3)$$

where μ_{st} is the Lagrange multiplier divided by π_{st} . This condition means that the weighted marginal utility is equalized for all i , implying that idiosyncratic income shocks do not affect individual consumption under the FRSH.

Assuming the forms of a utility function, empirical tests of the FRSH can be derived from conditions (2) and (3). If the utility function is the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) type, individual consumption levels will co-move with the average consumption level in the economy, and idiosyncratic shocks in income should not affect consumption.² Assuming homogenous preference parameters, the empirical test equation is as follows:

² See Appendix for the results employing a CRRA utility.

$$c_{it} = \beta \bar{c}_t + \gamma y_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

where \bar{c}_t is the within-cluster average of consumption level at t , y_{it} is household i 's income at t , and η_i are individual fixed effects. In order to avoid a spurious correlation problem, these average values are calculated without household i . If the FRSH holds, individual consumption should perfectly co-move with the average income, and idiosyncratic income shock should not affect individual consumption. Therefore, we can test the FRSH by estimating this model and testing $\beta = 1$ and $\gamma = 0$. Note that the model (4) is in individual observation mode. The vector form of this model is

$$c_t = \beta \bar{c}_t + \gamma y_t + \eta + \varepsilon_t. \quad (5)$$

In order to incorporate spatial and social network factors into the empirical test model, this study employs a combined spatial lag and error model, also known as an SAC model (LeSage and Pace 2009), with household fixed effects:

$$\begin{aligned} c_t &= \beta W c_t + \gamma y_t + \eta + u_t \\ u_t &= \lambda W u_t + \varepsilon_t, \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where W is a spatial weight matrix, and η is a vector of household fixed effects. This model nests a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) when $\lambda = 0$. For estimation, this study employs a maximum likelihood approach. In order to handle the incidental parameter problem, the transformation approach proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) is used for bias correction.³

³ Because of this approach, the number of observations reduces from NT to $N(T - 1)$.

The important facet of this approach is that the conventional FRS test (5) is a special case of the spatial econometric model (6) when there is no spatial correlation in the error term ($\lambda = 0$), and the weight matrix is defined as

$$w_{ij} = 1/(N_c - 1) \text{ if } (i, j) \in c \text{ for } \forall i \neq j$$

$$w_{ij} = 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

where c is the set of risk-sharing clusters, and N_c is the number of households in the same cluster ($Wc_t = \bar{c}_t$). Thus, the conventional models implicitly assume that (1) there are no spatial correlations in the error term; (2) changes in consumption have identical effects among the members in the same cluster; and (3) there is no risk sharing across clusters. Note that this matrix is the row-standardized version of the adjacency matrix, whose element is 1 if i and j belong to the same cluster, and 0 otherwise.

Considering the conventional tests as spatial econometric models leads to another problem in the estimation. Previous studies employing conventional tests have estimated the models using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. However, under the existence of spatial dependence, OLS estimators are known to be inconsistent (e.g., Anselin 1988; Kelejian and Prucha 2002).

Taking the first difference to eliminate the individual fixed effects, the model (6) can be written as

$$\Delta c_t = W \Delta c_t \rho + \Delta y_t \gamma + \Delta \epsilon_t$$

$$= [W \Delta c_t, \Delta y_t] \begin{bmatrix} \rho \\ \gamma \end{bmatrix} + \Delta \epsilon_t.$$

Since the normal equations can be written as

$$[W \Delta c_t, \Delta y_t]' [W \Delta c_t, \Delta y_t] \begin{bmatrix} \rho \\ \gamma \end{bmatrix} = [W \Delta c_t, \Delta y_t]' \Delta c_t,$$

we get the following two equations:

$$\begin{aligned}(W\Delta c_t)'(W\Delta c_t)\rho + (W\Delta c_t)'\Delta y_t\gamma &= (W\Delta c_t)'\Delta c_t \\ \Delta y_t'W\Delta c_t\rho + \Delta y_t'\Delta y_t\gamma &= \Delta y_t'\Delta c_t.\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the OLS estimate of ρ is

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\rho} &= ((W\Delta c_t)'(W\Delta c_t))^{-1}(W\Delta c_t)'(\Delta c_t - \Delta y_t\hat{\gamma}) \\ &= ((W\Delta c_t)'(W\Delta c_t))^{-1}(W\Delta c_t)'(\rho W\Delta c_t + \Delta y_t(\gamma - \hat{\gamma}) + \Delta\epsilon_t) \\ &= \rho + ((W\Delta c_t)'(W\Delta c_t))^{-1}(W\Delta c_t)'(\Delta y_t(\gamma - \hat{\gamma}) + \Delta\epsilon_t).\end{aligned}\tag{7}$$

Since $E[(W\Delta c_t)'\Delta\epsilon] = E[\{W(I_t - \rho W)^{-1}(\Delta y_t\gamma + \Delta\epsilon)\}'\Delta\epsilon] \neq 0$, the second term of the equation (7) remains, and $\hat{\rho}$ is not consistent in general. Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\gamma} &= (\Delta y_t'\Delta y_t)^{-1}\Delta y_t'(\Delta c_t - W\Delta c_t\hat{\rho}) \\ &= (\Delta y_t'\Delta y_t)^{-1}\Delta y_t'(W\Delta c_t(\rho - \hat{\rho}) + \Delta y_t\gamma + \Delta\epsilon_t) \\ &= \gamma + (\Delta y_t'\Delta y_t)^{-1}\Delta y_t'(W\Delta c_t(\rho - \hat{\rho}) + \Delta\epsilon_t),\end{aligned}\tag{8}$$

which is also inconsistent. Therefore, an OLS estimate of the conventional FRSH model leads to biased estimates. By comparing the estimation results of the OLS and spatial econometric versions, this study can discuss the bias in the conventional tests.

In addition to the block-based weight matrix, this study uses an inverse distance matrix as another method for capturing the spatial network effect. In the case of risk sharing, it is natural to assume that transaction costs are increasing functions of the distance between households (e.g., Rosenzweig 1988; Murgai et al. 2002; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). For example, neighboring

households can easily monitor each other to mitigate the moral hazard problem, and to implement risk-sharing contracts. Thus, under the existence of transaction costs, the consumption patterns of neighboring households are more likely to co-move than those of distant households. Note that the conventional test assumes perfect co-movement of the consumption patterns of households in the same cluster, regardless of distance. Regarding the spatial correlation in unobserved factors, neighboring households tend to face the same spatially covariate shocks. In order to reflect these factors and to assign larger values to nearer households, an inverse distance matrix based on GPS data is used as a weight matrix.

Regarding social networks, this study uses an adjacency matrix based on kinship. This type of network is important because extended families might be connected altruistically, and the tie can facilitate income transfer in a risk-sharing arrangement (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Cox and Fafchamps 2008; Fafchamps 2011). Thus, households connected in terms of kinship tend to share risks, which results in co-movement of consumption. Using this matrix enables us to analyze these effects quantitatively.

In addition to estimating these models, the framework enables us to estimate direct and indirect effects. Under the existence of a risk-sharing mechanism, individual income shocks not only affect consumption of the said household, but also that of neighboring households. Note that under the spatial dependence, i.e., SAR and SAC models, the coefficient γ does not correspond to the marginal effect, because income shocks of household i diffuse to other households. Since the true data generating process is $c_{it} = (I_N - \rho W)^{-1}(\gamma y_{it} + \epsilon_t)$, the marginal effect of income shock is $\frac{\partial c_{it}}{\partial y_{it}} = (I_N - \rho W)^{-1}\gamma = S(W)$. This parameter captures the equilibrium of a feedback arising from both the left and right hand sides c_t in model (6). Thus, by estimating the direct ($= \partial c_{it} / \partial y_{it}$) and indirect effects ($= \sum_{i \neq j} \partial c_{it} / \partial y_{jt}$), this study can quantify income shock diffusion through spatial or social networks. Based on the literature of spatial econometrics (e.g., LeSage and Pace 2009), our study specifies these effects as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{M}_{direct} &= N^{-1}tr(S(W)) \\
\bar{M}_{total} &= N^{-1}t'_N(S(W))t_N \\
\bar{M}_{indirect} &= \bar{M}_{total} - \bar{M}_{direct},
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where t_N is a vector of ones. Standard errors for these effects are calculated based on LeSage and Pace (2009). Comparing these effects, this study can quantify the spatial and social externalities of income shocks.

Table 1 summarizes the expected results from each hypothesis. In the case of the FRSH with homogenous preference parameters, the coefficient on the spatial lag is 1, and that on income is 0. Thus, both direct and indirect effects are also 0. In a partial risk-sharing case, the coefficients on both spatial lag and income are positive, which results in positive direct and indirect effects. If there is no risk sharing (i.e., autarky), i 's consumption is determined only by his/her own income, implying that the coefficient on the spatial lag is 0. Thus, the indirect effect is also 0, despite the fact that the direct effect is equal to the coefficient on income.

3. Data

This study uses a dataset collected by JICA (former JBIC) as part of the research project “Impact Assessment of Infrastructure Projects on Poverty Reduction.”⁴ The study site is Walawe Left Bank (WLB), which is located in the southern part of Sri Lanka. Using Japanese ODA loans, the government started to construct the Left Bank Main Canal in 1995, and most households had received access to irrigation water by 2008. Under this project, the government invited new settlers, and provided them with homogeneous size of land for residence and agricultural cultivation (Aoyagi et al. 2014). For this, there is no need to care for the classical patron-client relationship (e.g., Scott 1979), as a variant of risk sharing.

⁴ See JBIC Institute (2007) for details of this project.

In order to assess the effects of this project, JICA conducted eight household surveys covering seven cropping seasons,⁵ collecting data that included the households' demographic information and their seasonal income and consumption. Because the consumption module of the questionnaire was modified in the last survey round, this study uses panel data from the former seven rounds. The original sample size was 858 households in the first four rounds, and 193 households in the next two rounds. Of the 193 households, both GPS and balanced panel survey data were available for 171 households after dropping missing observations. The locations of each household are shown in Figure 1. The average distance among households is 10.17 km with a standard deviation 7.35.

Figure 2 shows the kinship network among the heads of the sample households.⁶ The network density, defined as $2m/N(N - 1)$, where m is the number of edges in the network, is 0.279. Among 171 households, 49 do not have kin in the sample.

The study site is divided into five blocks according to their accessibility to irrigation: Sevanagala Irrigated, Sevanagala Rainfed, Kiriibbanwewa, Sooriyawewa, Mayurapura, and Tissapura. This study uses these blocks as clusters of risk sharing. Because the irrigation canal was originally constructed from the upstream area and gradually extended downstream, there are time lags in the irrigation access among each block. Table 2 summarizes the timing of the irrigation access in each block. Specifically, Sevanagala Irrigated, Kiriibbanwewa, and Sooriyawewa were already irrigated by the first round. Mayurapura accessed irrigation water by the sixth round, and Tissapura did so by the last round. Because of topographical constraints, irrigation access was not available in the Sevanalgara Rainfed block for the sample period.

Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The total sample size is 1026 (171 households \times 6 cropping seasons). Following previous studies, this study uses adult-equivalent consumption and income based on the age and sex weights used by Townsend

⁵ The cropping seasons in this area are divided into the dry season (April-September), *Yala*, and the rainy season (October-March), *Maha*.

⁶ In this study, the definition of kinship is father/mother, uncle/aunt, cousin, grandfather/grandmother, son/daughter, nephew/niece, grandson/granddaughter, brother/sister, and other extended relationships.

(1994). This consumption includes self-produced items, and both consumption and income levels are adjusted for the price index based on 2002 Sri Lanka Rupees.⁷ The net incomes are negative for 7.4% of the samples, because their agricultural input costs exceed the total value of production. This is typically true of farmers who started banana cultivation, which is the second most popular crop in the region after paddy, because of the large initial cost.

Table 4 shows Moran's I for the transient change in income and consumption, which is defined as the difference between the adult-equivalent income/consumption at time t and its average over six seasons.⁸ Changes in income tend to co-move according to the spatial network, that is, the block-based and inverse distance matrices, though the magnitudes are very small. Because a substantial number of households earn the largest share of their income from agriculture in the study area (Sellamuttu et al. 2014), there are some spatially covariate shocks that affect agricultural productivity, such as bad weather and crop disease (e.g., Druska and Horrace 2004). Food consumption tends to co-move both spatially and socially. In some cases, correlation in food consumption is significant even when income changes are not correlated. This implies that idiosyncratic shocks are diffused in networks because of the risk-sharing mechanism. Non-food consumption is also correlated, especially according to the inverse distance matrix. Although these casual observations support the existence of a risk-sharing mechanism, formal testing based on the FRSH models is still required.

⁷ The source is Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka ([http://www.statistics.gov.lk/price/ccpi\(old\)/ccpi_2.pdf](http://www.statistics.gov.lk/price/ccpi(old)/ccpi_2.pdf)). The price index of Maha 2000 is constructed based on the geometric average of January – March 2001 because the price index for October – December 2000 is not available.

⁸ The Moran's I statistic is a measure of spatial correlation defined as:

$$I = \frac{N}{\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij}} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} (x_i - \bar{x})(x_j - \bar{x})}{\sum_{i=1}^N (x_i - \bar{x})^2}.$$

4. Estimation Results

4.1 Baseline Results

Using the described dataset, this section estimates the conventional FRSH test, and the SAR and SAC models. This study uses three different weight matrices: (1) the block-based matrix, whose element takes 1 if i and j live in the same block; (2) the inverse distance matrix, whose elements are calculated based on GPS data; and (3) the kinship matrix, whose element takes 1 if i and j are kin. Matrices (1) and (2) capture spatial networks, and (3) captures social networks. These matrices are row-standardized for the estimation. As previously mentioned, the estimation results of the conventional test might be biased when the test is regarded as a spatial econometric model. Thus, comparing the results of the conventional test and the SAR model with the block-based matrix, which corresponds to the spatial econometric version of the conventional test, shows the degree of this bias.

Table 5 shows the estimation results when the dependent variable is food consumption. Both the conventional test and the SAR models cannot reject the FRSH because the coefficient on income is not significant. However, the co-movement of consumption is not perfect in all cases because the coefficient is significantly different from 1. The point estimate changes from the conventional test and the SAR model. The spatial lag term, which corresponds to village-level average consumption, decreases from 0.889 to 0.682, and the coefficient on income increases from 0.0199 to 0.0229. These differences result from the biases in the conventional test. Once the spatial error term is introduced (Column 5 and 6), the qualitative results change drastically. Income has a significantly positive effect on food consumption, and strongly rejects the FRSH. Furthermore, the spatial error term is significant in models with inverse distance and kinship matrices, suggesting that ignoring the spatial correlation in unobservables leads to the wrong results.

Table 6 shows the results of the same specifications when the dependent variable is non-food consumption. All of the results reject the FRSH, because the coefficient on income is

significantly different from zero. Similar to the food consumption case, the point estimate of income changes from the conventional test to the SAR with the block-based matrix. The spatial correlation in the error term is significant in Column 5. However, it is not significant in the SAC with the kinship matrix, which rather supports the SAR model.

4.2 Handling Measurement Error

One possible concern in the results of Tables 5 and 6 is measurement error in the income variable. The measurement error, which is uncorrelated with the error term, causes attenuation bias in the regression coefficient. To address this issue, using an instrument correlated with true income, but uncorrelated with the measurement error is necessary (Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997; Kinnan 2012). Based on Sellamuttu et al. (2014), this study uses the irrigation access dummy, which is constructed based on block level information (Table 2), as the excluded instrument. As previously mentioned, there is variation in the timing of irrigation access among blocks. It is possible to assume that the portion of the income change explained by improved irrigation access is not correlated with the measurement error. This study employs a two-step maximum likelihood approach (Wooldridge 2010). The first-stage model is estimated by regressing the income level on the irrigation access dummy and the individual fixed effects. The first-stage F test for the excluded instrument strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero ($F = 14.67$). Using the predicted values from this estimation, \widehat{income} , the previous specifications are re-estimated as the second stage.

Table 7 shows the two-step estimation results for food consumption. Except for the conventional test, all specifications reject the FRSH because the coefficient on income is significantly positive. Furthermore, the magnitude of coefficients is larger in the two-step estimation than in Table 5, confirming the existence of the attenuation bias. The spatial error term is significant in the SAC for the inverse distance matrix, and the likelihood ratio test also supports this finding. Thus, omitting this term can cause problems in the FRSH tests. In terms of

AIC and BIC, the SAC model with the inverse distance matrix performs the best. Thus, spatial networks, i.e., the inverse matrix, perform better than social networks.

Table 8 shows the results for non-food consumption. The coefficients on income become larger than those in Table 6, also confirming the attenuation bias, and the FRSH is rejected. The spatial lag term in the SAR with the inverse matrix is not significant, which rather supports the autarky situation. However, the SAC is superior to the SAR model in terms of both AIC/BIC, and the likelihood ratio test. Regarding the kinship weight matrix, the SAC model supports autarky, but the SAR is supported in the model selection criteria. Similar to the food consumption case, AIC and BIC support the spatial network models rather than the social network model.

4.3 Quantifying the Diffusion of Income Shocks

Using the results of the two-step estimation in Tables 7 and 8, the direct and indirect effects of an income shock can be estimated. Table 9 summarizes these effects for each specification. The last column shows the ratio of the indirect effect to the total one. For food consumption, the indirect effect is larger for the block-based and inverse matrices than for the kinship one. This implies that income shocks diffuse better in spatial networks than in social ones. Regarding non-food consumption, the indirect effect is insignificant in the SAR model with the inverse distance matrix, and in the SAC one with the kinship matrix. This is because the spatial lag term is insignificant for these specifications in Table 8. Although the contrast is less clear than in the food consumption case, spatial networks also play an important role in diffusing income shocks to smooth non-food consumption.

Because these direct and indirect effects summarize the feedback effect of an income shock, investigating each element of the feedback effect matrix $S(W) = (I_N - \beta W)^{-1}\gamma$ is also useful. Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between the spatial distance and the elements of $S(W)$ in the SAC specifications, using the inverse distance matrix for food consumption and non-food consumption, respectively. Although the results of the kernel-weighted local

polynomial regression show a very flat and small-magnitude relationship, there are peaks at approximately 7 and 24 km. These non-linear relationships imply that there is a trade-off between the scope and effectiveness of risk sharing (e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). Although spatial distance increases transaction costs, it also reduces the possibility of facing covariate shocks. Therefore, the degree of risk sharing is a mixture of these positive and negative effects.

4.4 Robustness Check

As a robustness check, the same specifications are re-estimated after dropping households with no kin from the sample. For these households, the spatial lag variable (Wc_t) is zero in the previous estimation because the entries in the corresponding row are all zero. This treatment might cause bias in the results with the kinship matrix. Table 10 shows the re-estimation results employing a two-step procedure. As shown in this table, the qualitative results are virtually unchanged, which supports the robustness of the previous findings.

5. Conclusion

By employing spatial panel econometric models, this study extends the empirical tests of the FRSH to incorporate spatial and social network effects. This approach enables us to quantify the diffusion of income shocks in both spatial and social networks, and to compare the effect of these networks. In addition, the conventional test can be regarded as a special case of a spatial econometric model, which implies an estimation bias in the conventional test.

The results after controlling for the attenuation bias of the income variable reject the FRSH in most cases. The point estimates change from the conventional test to the spatial econometric model, confirming the bias in the conventional test. The results also show the existence of the spatially correlated unobservables, which have been neglected in previous

studies. These findings strongly support the effectiveness of the spatial econometric approach to risk-sharing analysis.

The estimated direct and indirect effects show that income shocks are diffused in each network. Furthermore, the diffusion of income shocks in the spatial networks is larger than that in the social networks, especially for food consumption. This result suggests that consumption smoothing within spatial networks works better than that within social networks, implying that the reduction of transaction costs by living close together has a larger effect than facilitating transfers through the kinship network does. Note that this result does not reject the importance of risk sharing through kinship networks. One possible explanation for this result is that our study site is a newly settled area, where the density of the kinship network is weaker than that in natural villages. Rather, sharing irrigation canals enhances social capital (Aoyagi et al. 2014; Hayami 2009), which facilitates risk sharing through spatial networks.

Since risk sharing within spatial and social networks is not perfect, there is room to improve welfare by introducing formal insurance programs. In addition, spillover effects from partial risk sharing, especially through spatial networks, boost the welfare of neighboring households, as well as the targeted households.

Appendix: CRRA Specification

Another standard specification of the conventional test employs a CRRA utility function. In this case, the empirical test model is used to regress the log of consumption and income instead of these variables in level form, that is

$$\log(c_{it}) = \beta \overline{\log(c_t)} + \gamma \log(y_{it}) + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

One problem in this specification is that logarithms cannot be defined for negative values. As shown in Table 3, the reported income is negative for 7.4 percent of the samples because of large input costs in agriculture. Because the logarithm of these negative income cases cannot be defined, they are replaced with the value 1 before taking the log. In order to handle the bias arising from this treatment, a dummy variable that identifies these negative income cases is also included in the estimation.

Tables A1 and A2 show the estimation results for food and non-food consumption, respectively. The coefficient on income is significantly positive, which strongly rejects the FRSH. The spatial error term is significant when the weight is an inverse distance or kinship matrix. The spatial lag term is larger for the block-based and inverse distance matrices than for the kinship one, implying that households' consumption is better connected in spatial networks than in social ones. Both AIC and BIC also support the finding that the spatial network models, i.e., the inverse distance matrices, perform better than the social network model. Table A3 summarizes the direct and indirect effects. Similar to the CARA specifications, the indirect effect is larger for the block-based and inverse distance matrices, implying that income shocks diffuse better in spatial networks than in social ones.

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Table 1. Summary of expected results from each hypothesis

Hypothesis	Coefficient		Direct effect	Indirect effect
	Spatial lag	Income		
Full risk sharing	1	0	0	0
Partial risk sharing	+	+	+	+
No risk sharing (Autarky)	0	+	+	0

Note: In the case of autarky, the coefficient on income is identical to the direct effect.

Table 2. Irrigation accessibility in each block

Year	2001		2002		2007		Sample Size
	Maha	Yala	Maha	Yala	Maha	Yala	
Survey round	1& 2	3	4	5	6	7	(total 171)
Sevanagala Irrigated	X	X	X	X	X	X	20
Sevanagala Rainfed							8
Kiriibbanwewa	X	X	X	X	X	X	16
Sooriyawewa	X	X	X	X	X	X	31
Mayurapura				X	X	X	82
Tissapura						X	14




Figure 1. location of sample households




Figure 2. Graph of kinship network

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Unit	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Food consumption	Rs.	1026	5145.713	2611.291
Non-food consumption	Rs.	1026	3219.305	5585.483
Income	Rs.	1026	5726.269	9346.965
Negative income dummy	Binary	1026	0.0740741	0.2620191
Irrigation access dummy	Binary	1026	0.5516569	0.4975669

Note: Both consumption and income are in real terms and based on 2002 Sri Lanka Rupees. Consumption and income are in adult-equivalent scale.

Table 4. Moran's *I* of consumption and income shocks by cropping seasons

Weight Matrix	Season					
	Maha 2001	Yala 2001	Maha 2002	Yala 2002	Maha 2007	Yala 2007
Income change						
Block based	0.006 (0.019)	0.012 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.129*** (0.019)	0.029** (0.019)	0.029** (0.019)
Inverse distance	0.035* (0.028)	0.017 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.019)	0.076*** (0.028)	0.009 (0.028)	0.034* (0.028)
Kinship	-0.074 (0.071)	0.051 (0.067)	0.002 (0.049)	0.083 (0.072)	0.056 (0.070)	0.005 (0.072)
Food consumption						
Block based	0.026** (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.032** (0.019)
Inverse distance	0.023 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.029)	0.033* (0.028)	0.039* (0.028)
Kinship	0.014 (0.072)	0.050 (0.072)	-0.075 (0.072)	0.116** (0.072)	-0.053 (0.072)	0.154** (0.071)
Non-food consumption						
Block based	-0.017 (0.017)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.018)
Inverse distance	0.035* (0.026)	0.042** (0.027)	0.065*** (0.027)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.063*** (0.022)	--0.048* (0.027)
Kinship	0.037 (0.065)	0.067 (0.069)	0.021 (0.069)	-0.059 (0.071)	-0.043 (0.057)	0.119** (0.068)

Note: The standard deviations are in parenthesis. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Model estimation results for food consumption (One-step)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.889*** (0.0796)					
Spatial lag		0.682*** (0.0379)	0.654*** (0.0462)	0.312*** (0.0495)	0.880*** (0.0288)	0.545*** (0.0691)
Income	0.0199 (0.0146)	0.0229 (0.0152)	0.0258* (0.0156)	0.0297* (0.0176)	0.0184*** (0.00679)	0.0272*** (0.00809)
Spatial error					-0.774*** (0.111)	-0.306*** (0.0948)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	18295.32	15447.03	15453.45	15586.91	15423.57	15583.48
BIC	18305.18	15461.28	15467.7	15601.17	15442.58	15602.49
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is the adult-equivalent food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6. Model estimation results for non-food consumption (One-step)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.513*** (0.0980)					
Spatial lag		0.309*** (0.0494)	0.108* (0.0598)	0.151*** (0.0524)	0.866*** (0.0367)	0.0797 (0.116)
Income	0.0648* (0.0372)	0.0690* (0.0375)	0.0738* (0.0385)	0.0724* (0.0381)	0.0468*** (0.0158)	0.0728*** (0.0207)
Spatial error					-1.192*** (0.0769)	0.0905 (0.117)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	20330.69	17103.48	17112.32	17109.42	17037.8	17112.83
BIC	20340.56	17108.23	17117.07	17114.17	17047.31	17127.09
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is adult equivalent non-food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7. Model estimation results for food consumption (Two-step)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.851*** (0.0962)					
Spatial lag		0.614*** (0.0472)	0.566*** (0.0510)	0.188*** (0.0494)	0.841*** (0.0382)	0.345*** (0.101)
Income (predicted)	0.0886 (0.0951)	0.230*** (0.0833)	0.258*** (0.0830)	0.513*** (0.0749)	0.104*** (0.0403)	0.438*** (0.0723)
Spatial error					-0.753*** (0.116)	-0.187 (0.117)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	18301.53	15442.49	15448.24	15535.7	15423.49	15535.85
BIC	18311.39	15456.74	15462.49	15549.95	15442.5	15554.85
LR test for spatial error					26.744***	1.85
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is adult-equivalent food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8. Model estimation results for non-food consumption (Two-step)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.299*** (0.0943)					
Spatial lag		0.161*** (0.0419)	0.0110 (0.0384)	0.0927** (0.0451)	0.847*** (0.0434)	0.0622 (0.107)
Income (predicted)	0.533*** (0.168)	0.638*** (0.155)	0.752*** (0.151)	0.709*** (0.142)	0.140* (0.0729)	0.727*** (0.166)
Spatial error					-1.180*** (0.0803)	0.0404 (0.109)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	20332.94	17100.42	17102.55	17100.68	17044.79	17106.55
BIC	20342.81	17105.17	17107.3	17105.44	17059.04	17125.55
LR test for spatial error					61.762***	0.137
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is adult-equivalent non-food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9. Direct and indirect effect of the income variable (Two-step)

	Direct	Indirect	Total	Indirect / Total
Food consumption				
Model: SAR				
Block	0.237*** (0.0722)	0.362*** (0.111)	0.599*** (0.173)	60.43%
Inv. Dist.	0.265*** (0.0721)	0.335*** (0.0995)	0.600*** (0.158)	55.83%
Kinship	0.514*** (0.0636)	0.0839*** (0.0286)	0.598*** (0.0751)	14.03%
Model: SAC				
Inv. Dist.	0.115*** (0.0367)	0.565*** (0.191)	0.680*** (0.210)	83.09%
Kinship	0.444*** (0.0594)	0.159*** (0.0598)	0.603*** (0.0687)	26.37%
Non-food consumption				
Model: SAR				
Block	0.636*** (0.131)	0.123*** (0.0408)	0.759*** (0.148)	16.21%
Inv. Dist.	0.750*** (0.128)	0.0104 (0.0323)	0.760*** (0.125)	1.37%
Kinship	0.707*** (0.120)	0.0536* (0.0307)	0.761*** (0.133)	7.04%
Model: SAC				
Inv. Dist.	0.154** (0.0672)	0.830* (0.479)	0.984* (0.513)	84.35%
Kinship	0.725*** (0.140)	0.0406 (0.0682)	0.766*** (0.139)	5.30%

Note: Standard errors based on LeSage and Pace (2009) are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure 3. Spatial distance and income shock diffusion (food consumption)




Figure 4. Spatial distance and income shock diffusion (Non-food Consumption)

Table 10. Robustness check for the kinship matrix (Two-step)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	SAR	SAC	SAR	SAC
Weight Matrix	Kinship	Kinship	Kinship	Kinship
VARIABLES	Food	Food	Non-food	Non-food
Spatial lag	0.160*** (0.0457)	0.327*** (0.109)	0.0556* (0.0290)	0.0411 (0.103)
Income (predicted)	0.524*** (0.0808)	0.430*** (0.0800)	0.700*** (0.163)	0.709*** (0.186)
Spatial error		-0.195 (0.126)		0.0204 (0.104)
Observations	570	570	570	570
AIC	10339.56	10339.99	11508.96	11512.92
BIC	10352.6	10357.37	11513.3	11525.96
Number of households	114	114	114	114

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A1. CRRA specification for food consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.876*** (0.0697)					
Spatial lag		0.675*** (0.0365)	0.642*** (0.0431)	0.288*** (0.0484)	0.877*** (0.0282)	0.558*** (0.0615)
Income	0.0413*** (0.0155)	0.0459*** (0.0155)	0.0468*** (0.0149)	0.0552*** (0.0166)	0.0328*** (0.0102)	0.0454*** (0.0124)
Negative income dummy	0.377*** (0.135)	0.433*** (0.135)	0.445*** (0.130)	0.560*** (0.145)	0.316*** (0.0948)	0.469*** (0.113)
Spatial error					-0.806*** (0.108)	-0.351*** (0.0839)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	652.32	743.17	750.10	882.57	715.35	876.10
BIC	667.12	762.18	769.11	901.58	739.10	899.86
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is the adult-equivalent food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A2. CRRA specification for non-food consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Model	Conventional	SAR	SAR	SAR	SAC	SAC
Weight Matrix	NA	Block	Inv. Dist.	Kinship	Inv. Dist.	Kinship
Average consumption	0.806*** (0.0868)					
Spatial lag		0.560*** (0.0485)	0.457*** (0.0574)	0.233*** (0.0485)	0.810*** (0.0408)	0.500*** (0.0720)
Income	0.0830** (0.0371)	0.0955** (0.0373)	0.104*** (0.0380)	0.109*** (0.0392)	0.0880*** (0.0276)	0.0994*** (0.0317)
Negative income dummy	0.655** (0.323)	0.792** (0.328)	0.876*** (0.337)	0.952*** (0.348)	0.759*** (0.254)	0.894*** (0.287)
Spatial error					-0.825*** (0.115)	-0.329*** (0.0934)
Observations	1,026	855	855	855	855	855
AIC	2709.38	2442.66	2460.13	2490.04	2433.85	2486.30
BIC	2724.18	2461.67	2479.13	2509.04	2457.61	2510.05
Number of households	171	171	171	171	171	171

Note: The dependent variable is the adult-equivalent non-food consumption. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A3. Direct and indirect effect of the income variable (CRRA specification)

	Direct	Indirect	Total	Indirect / Total
Food consumption				
Model: SAR				
Block	0.0480*** (0.0138)	0.0950*** (0.0316)	0.143*** (0.0441)	66.43%
Inv. Dist.	0.0488*** (0.0132)	0.0843*** (0.0291)	0.133*** (0.0406)	63.38%
Kinship	0.0555*** (0.0142)	0.0152*** (0.00558)	0.0707*** (0.0188)	21.50%
Model: SAC				
Inv. Dist.	0.0370*** (0.00979)	0.245*** (0.0905)	0.282*** (0.0973)	86.88%
Kinship	0.0474*** (0.0110)	0.0363*** (0.0113)	0.0837*** (0.0205)	43.47%
Non-food consumption				
Model: SAR				
Block	0.0975*** (0.0325)	0.123** (0.0495)	0.220*** (0.0791)	55.91%
Inv. Dist.	0.105*** (0.0330)	0.0882** (0.0367)	0.193*** (0.0662)	45.70%
Kinship	0.109*** (0.0335)	0.0230** (0.00979)	0.132*** (0.0413)	17.42%
Model: SAC				
Inv. Dist.	0.0961*** (0.0256)	0.393*** (0.151)	0.489*** (0.169)	80.37%
Kinship	0.103*** (0.0278)	0.0650*** (0.0246)	0.168*** (0.0483)	38.69%

Note: Standard errors based on LeSage and Pace (2009) are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

村落内部もしくは親族・友人関係の内部における非公式の消費平準化（リスクシェアリング）については多くの研究が行われてきたが、これらの空間的・社会的ネットワークの効果を比較検証したものは少ない。本研究は空間計量経済学のモデルを完全リスクシェアリング仮説の検証に適用することにより、空間的・社会的ネットワークの効果をとり込み、それぞれのネットワークにおける所得ショックの拡散の度合いを定量化した。スリランカ南部の農村地域のデータを用いた分析の結果、空間的ネットワークの方が社会的ネットワークよりもモデルの適合度が高く、所得ショックの拡散の度合いが大きいことを示した。また、従来の検証モデルを空間計量経済学モデルの特殊ケースとして解釈し直すことにより、従来のモデル推定におけるバイアスの存在を示した。

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