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A ‘Local’ Response to Peacebuilding Efforts in Timor-Leste

Yukako Sakabe Tanaka*

Abstract

Many international agencies and donors that have implemented peacebuilding activities in a variety of countries and situations acknowledge, in theory, the importance of placing local communities at the center of peacebuilding activities. In practice, however, debate continues on how to operationalize community-centered approaches and whether they can be used successfully to promote peace. This paper thus unpacks the voice of ‘the local’ to understand the mechanisms of peacebuilding together with development. By conducting focused group discussions (FGD) in three villages in Timor-Leste and utilizing a community-based rating system for ten key areas, we found that external efforts are perceived differently with respect to location and time. The 2006 political turmoil in the capital had different impacts on local communities. External actors responded as ‘intervenors’ by dispatching an international force along with the provision of humanitarian assistance in urban areas. In rural districts, they maintained capacity-building activities, thus playing the role of ‘mentors’. Findings also show that local communities continue to suffer from poor quality water and lack of qualified teachers and are requesting further involvement from the national government. At the same time, some Timorese nationals have attempted to tackle issues of unsettled land ownership and insecurity at the community level while the formal justice and police services remain underdeveloped. In response, external actors have taken on the role of ‘facilitator’ to assist with the functionalization of a traditional customary system for conflict resolution. Thus, they contribute to the generation of hybrid forms of peace, which evolved from the interactions of different groups. The analysis underscores the challenge of assessing the external actor’s role in regard to the needs of local communities by location, sector and timing.

Keywords: peacebuilding, local, development, Focused Group Discussions, Timor-Leste

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1. Introduction

Many international organizations and donors engaged in activities related to peacebuilding have been seeking to self-assess their assistance toward weak, fragile states. Over the past few decades, the effectiveness of these activities has repeatedly been called into question. Such questions include the role of external actors and their relationships with national and local actors and beneficiaries. Member states of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), for example, have undertaken activities targeting both national governments and their citizens. Such activities were based on the consensus that building a capable state is essential in fulfilling the state's core functions of providing services to citizens (OECD 2007). These core functions include ensuring security and justice, mobilizing revenue, and enabling basic service delivery. With this view, state-building has become a central means for OECD countries to institutionalize peace, which is defined as “purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process *for negotiating the mutual demands between the state and societal groups*” (OECD DAC 2008, 13).¹ More concretely, the OECD began to assess policies in spheres of “informal and non-state service provision and security mechanisms, as well as those of the state, and pay due regard to informal and non-western forms of organisation, rule-making and conflict resolution, whether religious or communal”(OECD DAC 2008, 23).

Nevertheless, analyses of outcomes from such efforts, by incorporating voices from the ground, are ongoing (e.g., Pouliquen 2006; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012; Richmond and Pogodda 2016). This paper thus raises the following questions: have members of the community in post-conflict societies noticed improvements in the quality of life or not with the support provided by the government, international organizations and donors? And how do community members perceive the role of the international organizations and donors in this regard? By

¹ Emphasis is by the author.

conducting focused group discussion (FGD), this study investigates the perceptions of local communities to the combined efforts of external actors and the national government in promoting peace and development.

Timor-Leste is a conflict-affected country that, as its internal stability has become increasingly secure, is considered to be focusing more on development (Government of Timor-Leste 2010). The Timor-Leste case demonstrates that locals have undergone circuitous paths in transitioning away from conflict, some of which are overlooked by national and external actors who tend to describe the routes from conflict to development as direct. The independence of Timor-Leste in 2002 was achieved following a massive inflow of assistance. Overcoming the 2006 political turmoil necessitated the reintroduction of humanitarian assistance and restructuring of the police. The country's 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report praised the achievement of goals of “promot[ing] gender equality and empower[ing] women” and in detecting the incidence of malaria and tuberculosis. On the other hand, the country is at the stage of reducing malnutrition, enhancing primary school enrollment, and increasing the access to clean water sources (MoF 2015a). Further, it is noted that

while the MDGs are worthy goals, they cannot be achieved by nations that are riddled with conflict and insecurity...Timor-Leste's focus in the years immediately after the instability was therefore to cement peace by building a just and secure society, effective government institutions and strong economic foundation.

As the local communities experienced these tangled paths toward advancing peace and development, this paper endeavors to examine the interactions between the local and external actors who are involved across multiple sectors.

In Section 2, we first review ongoing debates over peacebuilding involving the local community and point out that it is useful to examine one particular case in detail for understanding the mechanisms of how local ownership is promoted in practice. Section 3 explains the methods used in this paper in order to gather community insights from three villages in Timor-Leste by conducting FGD as well utilizing a community-based rating system. Section 4 presents the main findings—the perceptions of local community members of the 15-year experiences of peacebuilding efforts—and discusses the patterns that emerged in the FGD regarding the ways that external actors interact with the local community over time. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the discussion.

2. The process of ownership transfer from the external to the local

The importance of incorporating people-centered perspectives into top-down approaches to peacebuilding has been emphasized by scholars as well as practitioners who have cast doubt on the utility of peacebuilding (Chandler 2004, 2010; Richmond 2011). Interventions by external actors can reproduce patterns of colonialism, and the effectiveness of interventions has been contentious in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and many other places, leading to ‘intervention fatigue’. In other words, externally driven peacebuilding has been questioned both in the normative and the methodological sense. Searching for an alternative approach, international actors have explored the idea of handing over tasks to the local community (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Thus, practitioners and scholars highlight the notion of hybridity—defined by Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012, 3) as “composite forms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the interaction of different groups”—in peace and development, along with the promotion of local ownership (Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2012).

The search is continuing for new approaches in applying the idea of local ownership and hybridity to operations (e.g., Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011; Mac Ginty 2015).

Because each case follows different paths, Peterson (2012) points out that scholars can investigate different types, processes, or reactions to ongoing activities from the perspective of hybridity. For instance, Richmond and Pogodda (2016, 14) utilize rich case studies to understand the forms of politics and peace that emerged from the interaction of local formation and externally led peace building processes. Given these previous works, two important issues for this paper to consider are (1) the need to identify ways of involving local communities in the process of creating peace and development; and (2) the roles that external actors can play and given specific time frames and contexts.

In the policy-making sphere, the national government is the main partner of international organizations and donors. This arrangement may help to enhance the legitimacy of the intervention. However, due to situations where external actors frequently collaborate with political factions that are likely to gain power in the upcoming regime, results are often mixed. Stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, were carried out by elevating the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), while excluding the former regime elites and the Northern Alliance, who had gained victory over the Taliban. Such decisions are often criticized on the grounds that other political factions are too often left out during the critical phase of peacebuilding, resulting in the generation of new conflicts (Höglund 2008). The dispatch of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) has traditionally relied on the consent of warring parties. Yet recent experiences in Mali and South Sudan indicate that the emerging mandates for the Protection of Civilians (POC) placed the international community in a difficult position between the rival political factions. In such situations, external actors face combinations of traditional leaders, civil society, community leaders, crime groups, warlords, and ordinary citizens as their direct counterparts during their intervention.

The next challenge of realizing hybridity is ensuring local ownership as part of international interventions. In essence, when locals face difficulties of promoting peace and development, external actors are likely to be more active, with the result that local ownership

becomes a secondary option. To increase local involvement, external actors could transform their roles into becoming supporters of local actors by placing them in the driver's seat, while external actors remain in the backseat (Nathan 2008). This is considered by some to be an ideal pathway because the local community can drive the process by themselves. Donais (2012) argues that consensus-building among locals as well as in the local-international arena, in both the means and the ends of peacebuilding, is expected. In this process, however, "too much local ownership" can be "as dangerous to the prospects for peace as too little local ownership, and may reflect little more than an abdication of responsibility on the part of external actors" (Donais 2012, 18-19).

Instead, the roles of external actors can be carefully selected based on the circumstances of local communities. Jastard and Olsson (2012) classify activities by external actors into three roles: an 'intervenor' gives direct assistance via humanitarian support and military engagement when the government fails to provide sufficient public service to the people. As locals are preparing to take responsibility, external actors could transform their role into that of a 'mentor'. The mentor can strengthen the capacity of the targeted state by dispatching advisors and experts who transfer technical skills. While the transfer of ownership is in progress, a 'facilitator' connects the local population with the government and assists by promoting cooperation among various local agencies.

As actors involved in peace and development have become aware of the importance of involving the local community, what could be explored more is how efforts to engage with local communities are perceived by the locals themselves. More concretely, this paper explores the insights of local participants on the progress and drawbacks that occur in peace and development. Secondly, the paper identifies how local community members perceive the roles of external actors when local ownership is encouraged within the peacebuilding efforts.

Timor-Leste was selected as a case study for addressing the questions above. The country has plentiful experience of peacebuilding efforts initiated by external actors and has

experienced a relatively successful transition from conflict toward development in recent years. Indeed, during the 2015 development partners meeting, Prime Minister Dr. Rui Maia de Araújo noted that the country has achieved security and peace, the economy was growing, and more jobs were available. Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that the country faced challenges and that many of its people lived in poor conditions with inadequate access to health care, education, clean water, basic infrastructure and government services (MoF 2015b). The investigation of the Timor-Leste case from the local viewpoint should provide a snapshot of progress in the country's development and how peacebuilding efforts are perceived by the people in a weak, fragile state.

Background to the Timor-Leste case

Following the UN-administered referendum in 1999 that led to the independence of Timor-Leste, the country received a massive inflow of international support for the purposes of building a new state. Immediately after the referendum, many residents were forced to flee from their homes due to violence propagated by Indonesian-backed militias. With the deployment of the International Force (INTERFET) for stabilization, the international community took on the intervenor role, dispatching the UNPKO with full mandated authority until independence in 2002. This top-down approach was criticized at a time when ‘Timorization’ was being pursued in order to transfer some powers to the Timorese (Babo-Soares 2002). Along with state-building efforts, such as developing new laws and institutions, external actors emphasized building local capacity as a priority. In fact, the international technical assistance operation struggled with the competing goals of service delivery and capacity development, while sending advisors and conducting trainings. This included the challenge of ensuring that “at least one generation of civil servants will still need to pass through a capacity development process” to offer effective

public services (Government of Timor-Leste and UNDP 2006, 9). As explained, the external actors initiated their role as the mentors.

This ‘capacity building’ challenge was revealed to be a major concern following a clash between the national police and the army in May 2006, which highlighted “the expression of deep-rooted problems inherent in fragile State institutions and a weak rule of law” (OHCHR 2006, para. 221). This political turmoil was further exacerbated by widespread violence involving gangs and martial arts groups (MAGs) across the capital, which led to 100 deaths. Timorese leaders unanimously requested that the international community take on the role of intervenor by dispatching the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) led by the Australian Defence Force. In tandem, the UN deployed UNMIT (the UN Mission in Timor-Leste), whose mandate included law enforcement during the rebuilding of police function.

The 2006 crisis gave rise to social and security problems, causing one-tenth of the population to become internally displaced persons (IDPs) in addition to setting back economic growth and development. The government noted such phenomena were “sharp reminders of our vulnerability to conflict,” adding that “trust needs to improve” (Government of Timor-Leste 2008). The donors, playing role of intervenor, provided humanitarian assistance in full. They supported a government-led coordination mechanism named the National Priorities Process (NPP) to highlight the country’s priority issues on a yearly basis. The prioritized issues ranged from “public safety and security,” “social protection and solidarity,” “addressing the needs of youth,” “employment and income generation,” “improving social service delivery,” and “clean and effective government.” Following the removal of “public safety and security” from the priority list in 2010, the government launched the Strategic Development Plan (SDP), designed to foster the country’s long-term development planning and implementation. This replaced the

National Development Plan (NDP) which was created before independence. Now the country enjoys US\$2,060 per capita GNI (as of 2016) which grew from US\$760 as of 2002.²

This paper considers two dimensions of local experiences in Timor-Leste that previous research has discussed. The first concerns local ownership in the *suco* (village). Hohe (2002) illustrated how the early UN administration formulated a sub-national government structure, which challenged existing power structures, i.e., traditional leaders at *suco* and *aldeia* (sub-village) levels.³ This externally-imposed formation of the local government confused the people and increased tensions between the *xefi de suco* (chief of the village), *xefi de aldeia* (chief of the sub-village) and new leaders. While the national government relies on this local government system to deliver services directly to people (Tanaka 2014), Hughes (2009) argues that local governance projects led by external agencies, which have given power to the *suco* structure, have left people out and shunted the existing local system aside.

The other dimension of local ownership is the traditional conflict resolution system embedded in Timorese culture. Babo-Soares (2004) shows how, apart from the formal reconciliation process among political leaders, it was natural for local leaders and community members to conduct family-to-family or people-to-people reconciliation, known locally as “*Nahe Biti*.” Such traditional reconciliation practices have been found to be effective at the village level in bringing back a stable social order, which has led to increased attention on the ‘local’ concept. Cummins and Leach (2011) examine the recent interactions between traditional and modern authorities at the *suco* level, which characterize renewed local administration. Based on previous systems inherited from the Portuguese and Indonesian occupation periods,

² World Bank Data, GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US\$).
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=TL>.

³ The Timorese traditionally have a hierarchical community structure in specific geographic areas, based on *uma kain* (extended family relationship), *aldeia*, and *suco*. Each level has legitimized leaders called *lia-na’in* who standardize social norms, which also deal with communal disputes. Social norms are formed as *lisan*, which is a body of law practiced closely with legitimized leaders and community members (see Hohe 2002; Cummins 2010).

traditional practice plays a significant role in the operation of the local administration, while some *suco* face challenges in welcoming newly emerging leaders without this traditional background.

In other words, the *suco* has become the interface of the people and the national government, which external actors identify as representing the ‘local’ in Timor-Leste. Within this field of knowledge, this paper endeavors to supplement the discussion with a local response to peacebuilding efforts by external actors. More concretely, by highlighting ‘communities’ at *suco* as ‘locals’ of Timor-Leste, this paper attempts to examine the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts for local communities as well as to identify the functions of external efforts over the last 15 years.

3. Methods

In order to explore the direct response of the local community, we conducted FGDs in three *suco* in Timor-Leste. FGD is a group interview process that enables collecting participants’ opinions on a specific topic of interest. While a survey can collect individual opinions from large samples, FGD can explore different perspectives through group interviews, so it is essentially a qualitative method to explore the study area (Kreuger & Casey 2009). More concretely, FGD is a collective activity that allows for consensus-seeking in response to the questions raised, while also emphasizing insights into people’s experiences and understandings (Morgan & Kreuger 1993; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 2013).

We carefully applied FGD to our study with several considerations. Firstly, the selection of locations was managed to ensure we had enough variation. Peterson (2012) points out that aid recipients’ engagement with international actors is unbalanced, such as in the differences between urban areas and rural areas. In order to investigate this rural-urban imbalance, we selected three interview sites, one *suco* each from the capital Dili, the western area, and the

eastern areas of the country. This geographical coverage is likely to ensure a variety of opinions of Timorese who may have different experiences toward peace and development.

Secondly, we broadly asked villagers to participate in the FGD by disseminating information about the session throughout the village with permission from the chief of *succo*. This procedure required extra arrangement to avoid the results being over-represented by particular social groups. For instance, Timor-Leste has been perceived as a male-dominated culture. As we wanted to ensure women's participation, we explained to chief of *succo* the need to encourage female participants to raise opinions during the FGDs. In two villages, we arranged invitations to females and youth in close collaboration with the chief of *succo*. At the same time, we limited FGD to participants above age 20 so that the discussion topics were relevant to their experiences.

Thirdly, working with an experienced moderator is often crucial to the success of FGD by creating a comfortable FGD environment for participants, helping them feel at ease, providing a clear explanation of the purpose of the session, and facilitating the discussion. Thus, as both local knowledge and interpersonal skills are required, the local NGO "Fundasaun Mahein (FM)" was asked to conduct the FGD sessions.⁴ The author and FM together developed the questions and the members of FM organized the sessions. Each session was conducted in Tetum, the local language used in Timor-Leste.

Lastly, we organized the questions and structure of the FGD in order to effectively encourage the participants to engage in the sessions. The group was asked to discuss the quality of life in their communities in four distinct time periods: the post-referendum period (1999–2002), the early independence period (2002–2005), the 2006 crisis period (2006–2008), and the post-2006 crisis period (2008–today). The four periods were set based on clearly defined

⁴ FM and the author conducted FGD in Santa Cruz, Dili in March 11, 2016 as a pilot project. Adjusted FGDs were then conducted in Ma'abat, Manatuto, on April 1, 2016 and in Aisirimou, Aileu on April 14, 2016. Each FGD took one day to complete the discussion. Light refreshments and lunch were offered.

chronological points in Timor's recent history. The UN-administered referendum took place in 1999, leading to the independence of Timor-Leste in May 2002. The early independence period was when the UN presence was declining and international assistance was reduced drastically from approximately US\$500 million in 2000/01 to US\$150 million in 2005/06 (Government of Timor-Leste 2006). Following the 2006 crisis, in 2008, the government reorganized its development plan, and the government declared "goodbye conflict, welcome development" in 2010, as discussed in the previous section (Government of Timor-Leste 2010).

The FGD session was composed of individual interviews followed by group discussion sessions. The interviews were intended to ask participants individually about their basic demographics as well as their perceptions of security in 1999 and 2006, the quality of life in their community, and general knowledge of aid projects. Individual interviews allowed both organizers and participants to become familiar with the issues to be discussed in group sessions.

During the group sessions, participants discussed the access and quality of ten sectors in each of the four distinct periods: health, clean water, education, business, security, housing/land, social assistance, roads/bridges, and justice/political participation. These sectors were selected based on two conditions. The first condition was that the sectors needed to be listed in the NDP and SDP, which comprehensively represents Timorese concerns. The second condition was that the sector should be closely related to people's daily concerns in the realm of peace and development.

To facilitate the discussions and to understand the degree of the assessment among the members, the group was asked to use a rating system with common scales (Kreuger & Casey 2009). The scales ranged from 1 to 5 for two parameters, 'quantity/accessibility' and 'quality'.⁵ Practically, this rating system helps the FGD process to visualize the discussion results in chronological order and allows the results to be compared (Figure 1). In addition, the group

⁵ The scale was described as 1 (not good), 2 (not very good), 3 (normal), 4 (good), 5 (very good).

members can actively participate and take responsibility in the sessions by posting stickers of the ratings for each of the ten issues as the group comes to consensus.

At the end of the discussion, the moderator asked the participants if there were any projects led by the international aid or the government. Furthermore, free discussion time was offered to allow participants to express their feelings and opinions about the results.

<Figure 1 around here: An Example of Rating>

Profile of locations and participant demographics

The population of the country was 1,183,643 in 2015, with 70% of people residing in rural areas. The socio-economic status of the population varies according to their areas of residency.⁶ For instance, the national literacy rate for the local language is 62.4%, but the rate varies from 86.7% in urban areas to 63% in rural areas. Similarly, the percentage of households who have access to improved drinking water resources is 74.7% on average across the country, with 91.5% in urban areas vs. 68.6% in rural areas. Use of improved sanitation facilities in households is 57.1% at the national average, yet 93.1% and 44.1% in urban and rural areas, respectively. Table 1 shows the variance between the three *suco* in which we conducted interviews. While the trend toward a better quality of life in Dili compared to the districts is obvious, one exception is job status. The employment rate is lower in Dili than in the districts where half of the labor force identify themselves as self-employed.

⁶ The demographic and socioeconomic indicators in this section was retrieved from the Census 2015 if not specified.

Santa Cruz *suco* is located in the capital Dili and was chosen as being representative of the characteristics of an urban area in Timor-Leste. This *suco* is well known for the Santa Cruz cemetery, the site of the massacre of 271 unarmed youth by Indonesian military soldiers in 1991. Since then, the *suco* has become accustomed to assistance from both the government and abroad. Santa Cruz has 1,222 households within 10 *aldeia*. Among its 5,195 habitants, many were relocated from 12 districts; therefore, various lifestyles and cultures co-exist. About half of the households are involved in work for the private or public sectors. Eight residents—all men—participated in the FGD, while women and youth were invited but did not attend.⁷ Seven participants have been involved in local leadership as chief of the *suco* or chief of the *aldeia*. The participants' ages ranged from 44 to 62.

Ma'abat is a *suco* located on the coast of Manatuto district, a central region of the country. 750 people reside in the village in two *aldeia* with 117 households. The majority of the population has lived in Ma'abat since birth. Forty percent of Ma'abat's population is involved in crop production and also raises animals. Twelve persons participated in the FGD—five females and seven males. Their ages ranged from 29 to 79, with an average of 52. Among them, four respondents were chief of the *suco* or chief of the *aldeia*, or held a position in the local leadership council. Two respondents were farmers. Most female respondents were heads of households.

Aisirimou is a *suco* located in Aileu district, in a mountainous terrain where the total population is 2,206 with 326 households. Seventy-nine percent of the population identified themselves as farmers, producing coffee, corn, rice, coconuts, and other fruit. Aisirimou is known as “Aileu Rai Husar” or “the country’s navel,” and was one of the bases for building FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste), the armed forces for the independence movement. Ten residents participated in the FGD: two females and eight males.

⁷ If there had been female participants in the Dili session, they may have provided a different assessment. At the same time, the discussion showed similar concerns and opinions (e.g., qualities of water and school) as the other two FGDs which did have female participants. The author takes into account that male participants do have concerns.

They ranged in age from 34 to 69 with an average age of 49. Most hold positions of local leadership and have lived in the *soco* for their whole lives.

Table 1: Socio-economic Indicators of Three *soco* and the National Average
(Census 2015/2010)

	Urban	Rural		National
Soco	Santa Cruz	Ma'abat	Aisirimou	
District	Dili	Manatuto	Aileu	
Number of aldeia	10	2	5	2,336
Population	9,702	756	2,206	1,183,643
Number of households	1,480	117	326	204,597
Literacy rate for adults in local language*	86.7%	63.4%	63%	62.4%
Net primary school enrollment**	86.9%	68.3%	77.0%	72.2%
Use of improved/safe drinking water	99.3%	92.0%	70.0%	74.7%
Use of improved sanitation facilities	84.9%	67.0%	56.4%	49.5%
Possession of automobile (2010)	40%	19.3%	20.4%	14.3%
Possession of mobile (2010)	93.4%	77.5%	70.2%	54.3%
Employment rate	43.9%	67.2%	58.9%	52.6%

Notes: *The indicators with asterisk are those sub-districts in which each *soco* is located. These are Nain Feto (Santa Cruz), Manatuto (Ma'abat), Aileu Vila (Aisirimou).

** The number of children enrolled in a primary school who belong to the age group that officially corresponds to primary schooling divided by the total population of the same age group.

Source: GDS/MoF 2010, GDS/MoF 2015.

4. Findings

Prior to FGD sessions, participants individually described security situation as follows. Most respondents of Santa Cruz discussed feeling unsafe during the 1999 and the 2006 crises, leaving

their villages outside Dili, and then coming back after the international interventions. Most respondents gave some names of the organizations providing assistance. Ma'abat Participants' impressions of security varied, except concerning the violence in 1999, where all indicated they felt 'not secure at all' or 'a little secure', as they were forced to evacuate their homes (most people returned afterward). Most participants were able to name some international organizations and NGOs that provided assistance to Timor-Leste. Aisirimou Participants' feelings of security have varied in the past, but they at least had a common sense of security after the international intervention in 1999. During the 2006 crisis, they were not forced to relocate but half of them felt "insecure." All respondents know at least one international organization or NGO providing assistance to Timor-Leste.

After collating the community-ratings across each of the ten key areas in the FGD, the overall trends in the responses in three *sucos* show general improvements in the quality of life from 1999 to today (as of March/April 2016) (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). At the same time, there were some variations between the trends in Dili and the districts. In this section, the examination of the ratings is followed by a deeper analysis of selected sectors that prompted specific explanations from the respondents related to the role of external actors. These sectors have been organized into three levels: (1) sectors in which the national government has increased its role in service delivery and the involvement of international actors has been prominent; (2) sectors where traditional norms and the international actors co-exist; and (3) sectors for which the existence of international actors was rarely discussed. This section presents the findings at each level.

<Tables 2 – 4 around here>

Table 2:

Table 3:

Table 4:

1) Overall trends based on the ratings

Prior to independence, public services and support were perceived to be better in Dili than in the districts. The rating was raised to ‘good’ for security, road/bridges, health, and water services in Santa Cruz with participants commenting on the dispatch of the international force following the referendum in August 1999. Between 2002 and 2005, urban residents found that access to services in education, business and social assistance improved with the increase in international assistance. On the other hand, villagers of Ma’abat and Aisirimou rated most sectors as ‘normal’ or below between 1999 and 2002. They noticed that external actors’ presence in this period was limited and that services had improved with the increase of the government services and international assistance since independence.

The 2006 crisis directly affected life in Dili, so the Santa Cruz residents rated health, water, education, business, security, and roads/bridges sectors lower than the previous period (2002–2005). A FGD participant reported that, “Inside the government, there was confusion, but there was a humanitarian intervention, so we had good access to water and health services in IDP camps.”

While there was a lack of respect for the official security services in Dili, the rural participants graded the rates of security higher than the rates in 2002–2005. This rating illustrates that they remained unharmed during the 2006 crisis in their day-to-day lives. A Ma’abat resident explained, “in this period we felt safe because the community policing operation was very good.” Similarly, Aisirimou residents reported that security was ‘good’, “particularly due to the community leaders who had a role of securing the people.” Although some found that the inflow of the IDPs worsened the quality of health and water, a resident noted that a fire brigade unit provided potable water in an emergency. Such evidence indicates that the districts were able to overcome some problems with government and international support. In

Ma'abat, most services maintained their levels of access and quality. A FGD participant recalled, “the crisis did not affect municipal services... the government continued to provide health care.”

In the post-2006 crisis period, all *suco* experienced an overall increase in quality of life. Some exceptions exist, however: both the quantity and quality of the water sector in Ma'abat remain “not very good,” and roads/bridges in Aisirimou were degraded to ‘bad’. Such responses show that the benefits of the development are yet fully spread across the country.

2) Increase of the presence of the national government

This subsection explains the sectors for which the residents perceived the increasing involvement of the national government in providing services while the external actors’ roles had been more prominent in the past.

Food

The availability of food was ‘not good’ across the country after the 1999 crisis: “Finding food was really difficult because we had to find it in a different district. And the international assistance was only temporary.” Ma'abat residents noted that the challenges have transformed over time in respect to the relationship with international actors. In the post-referendum period, “[we] depended entirely on the assistance from international agencies. Rice paddy fields were abandoned...[we] just waited for assistance.” Another participant said that “we had rice and potatoes only, no production at that time.” Since 2002, the situation has improved and local production commenced after the government provided facilities and equipment such as tractors. An international NGO (Childfund) also provided some temporary food support. During the 2006 crisis period, communities continued to receive support from JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency): “they provided seeds, tractors and that increased food production. And

then we were able to sell products in the market.” Recent challenges include the fact that distribution of pensions allowed members to buy imported food. This affects the conditions of the rice farmers because the price of imported rice is less expensive than their rice. Although Ma’abat residents rated the food sector as ‘good’ as of today, they were concerned that a government program in another sector could affect their income.

Health

Santa Cruz respondents were aware that the health service had initially received significant assistance from international agencies. The chief of one *suco* recalled: “In 1999, my child suffered from malnutrition. Help from an international medical aid team including JICA supported [his/her] feeding and my child recovered.” The government program started with independence, but its quality declined “due to no budget, no proper health policy, lack of facilities, nurses, and midwives.” However, as another participant mentioned, “I think the period 2002–2005 was good as we had international NGOs such as World Vision, as well as the state...and many health facilities that people could easily access.” During the crisis, they felt the access to and quality of health services deteriorated in the IDP camps.

After achieving stability, as of today, access is better because government programs have improved with the support of aid partners. Since 2009, in Ma’abat, access and quality of health service was upgraded to ‘very good’. A participant noted that “there were great changes during this period. We now have access to health clinics, reliable medical personnel and medicines.”

Water

Up to 2002, Santa Cruz residents rated the water sector as ‘good’ due to support provided by international aid agencies. However, access and quality of water was ‘not very good’ in rural areas. A Ma’abat resident commented, “we only used water from irrigation; only a few people had access to water taps.” Similarly, an Aisirimou resident noted they were only able to have water from rivers, which was dirty and even dried up during the dry season.

Further, all three *succo* ranked the quality of clean water below ‘normal’ up to today. In particular, the Ma’abat community received international support to establish a plumbing system after 2008, but they are unsure how to measure the quality. Residents requested that the government should undertake efforts to solve the problem by providing improved plumbing water with additional support from international agencies.

Roads and bridges

For 1999-2002, Santa Cruz residents rated the roads/bridges sector as ‘good’, with one respondent commenting that this was “because Indonesia left the roads in good condition.” Aileu residents rated the sector as ‘not very good’, because they consider that access via roads and bridges as well as their quality are consistently low since the authorities do no maintenance. Residents repeatedly mentioned a short-term job creation project by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which allowed community members to earn three dollars a day by conducting self-maintenance of the roads.

Santa Cruz residents noted that roads do not last more than a month before they are damaged again, saying that the facilities built during the Indonesian time were not maintained other than through dirt-sealing. Aileu residents commented that old roads are left unfixed, and that better quality repairs are needed. Therefore, the communities found that the roads require appropriate maintenance.

Education

The respondents in all three *soco* rated the education sector after the 1999 crisis was ‘not very good’ as they suffered from lack of school buildings and facilities when those were burnt.

Overall, FGD participants graded access to educational services as ‘better’, but the quality as ‘relatively low’. A female participant in Aisirimou commented that “the lack of school infrastructure and tables, chairs, and books as well as teachers are concerns even though children are now able to attend school regularly.” Even today, although the quality was rated ‘very good’, a female participant in Ma’abat stated that “[while access to school is good] we have a little difficulty because there are not enough books to distribute to all students. We need to improve the quality of education.” Likewise, Santa Cruz residents who rated education as ‘not very good’ reported that “people frequently question the quality of education in Timor-Leste... the state also questions the lack of human resources and skills in public administration.”

3) Traditional norms and the presence of international actors

This section explores the sectors in which traditional customary practices are pre-eminent, while international actors also play a functional role.

Political participation/justice

The use of local conflict resolution practices seems to vary. For the rural districts, in particular, incorporating traditional conflict methods resolution was vital. Ma’abat participants stated that “our community leaders received some training on how to resolve conflict through mediation.” Aisirimou residents also recalled that local authorities supplemented the lack of official laws and understanding of formal justice: “the solutions were through the efforts of the local authorities,

veterans, rulers, traditional leaders... from this there was justice." Today they are confident of adopting both the formal justice system and the local conflict resolution system: "Any problems can always be resolved, either by adopting the formal justice system or adopting the community's traditions to resolve them." On the other hand, Santa Cruz respondents seldom referred to the traditional conflict resolution system. As of today, they emphasize their familiarity with the formal justice system, such as how to file legal complaints with the courts.

Security

As explained previously, Santa Cruz has enjoyed a secure environment at a certain level since 1999. In Ma'abat and Aisirimou, no permanent presence of INTERFET existed, while some participants mentioned that the United Nations Police (UNPOL) was effective there. They noted that security was 'normal' and 'not very good' in Ma'abat and Aisirimou, respectively. During the 2006 crisis, security was the biggest concern for urban settlers. They felt unsafe for the first time since independence, as violence, burning, and destruction were taking place. This fear led some residents to settle in IDP camps until the end of 2008. Santa Cruz residents also considered access to roads at that time to be 'not very good' because "most of the violence in the 2006 crisis occurred in the streets... as people threw rocks and set up “‘verify points’ [road blocks on the streets manned by gangs] ...also the conflict and violence linked with MAGs occurred in neighborhoods and on the roads... so the access to the road was bad and [they] needed to find [a] safer route."

In the post-2008 period, the security in Santa Cruz improved from 'not very good' to 'good'. Residents reported that "we have better access to the security service [police]. We actually feel safer when we enjoy the protection of the law and the access to many basic services."

FGD participants discussed security since the 2006 crisis in different terms from formal security. The Aisirimou chief of the *soco* explained the collaboration between police and local authorities as follows: “We have a high level of security services through the Community Policing Council [KPK in Bahasa Indonesia] to prevent conflict and crime. Because of the KPK, we can say that Aisirimou is quite safe and secure.” A respondent explained that the village received some training support from an international NGO (Asia Foundation) to launch KPK, which is a joint forum for police and communities to engage each other in regular dialogues. KPK is also operational in Ma’abat where a village chief stated that “KPK ensures that we feel safe.”

Santa Cruz respondents recognized the improved access to security services via improved policing, yet they were concerned over various stories about political instability and the country’s insecurity that circulated in the community. Furthermore, recalling the post-referendum period, the resident noted that current situation was insecure:

My own view on security is that I felt safer in my own neighborhood at the moment prior to independence than I do right now. Previously, we didn’t have problems, but now we have self-governance and there is fighting and killing in these places.

4) Rare Presence of External Actors

International support was seldom mentioned in the following sectors by the respondents: business/employment, social assistance, and housing/land.

Business/Employment

Urban and rural areas showed contrasting trends, which correspond to the statistical data. While Ma’abat and Aisirimou villagers observed improved access and quality in the business environment over time, Santa Cruz residents felt the employment situation had worsened after the 2006 crisis. In Ma’abat, residents were concerned about the lack of opportunities for employment and no market access up to 2005. The business environment improved after the 2006 crisis when some community members received support to develop small businesses. Recently, they gained access to credit for small business offered by the Banco Nacional Comercio Timor-Leste (BNCTL). Similarly, Aisirimou residents recalled their improved access to self-employment as well as jobs in the public and private sectors from 2007. On the other hand, Santa Cruz participants noted that they only had limited access to employment and credit, and this situation continued after the 2006 crisis due to the lack of clear government policies for establishing a business environment. Since 2008, they noticed that the government has undertaken programs to boost business opportunities, yet they remain concerned with the increasing unemployment rate as well as a boost in new graduates from the secondary schools and higher education institutes, pressures that make the employment situation worse.

Social Assistance

In discussing social assistance, both Santa Cruz and Aisirimou villagers referred to the issue of pensions and support for vulnerable persons (e.g., the aged, disabled, and veterans) that the government launched after 2008. A female participant noted that “we received assistance from the government to the poor from the program called ‘Bolsa da Mae’ (Mother’s Purse).⁸ An international agency also distributed school materials to children.”

⁸ The Bolsa Mae program was launched in March 2008 by the government together with UN agencies. The program aims to enable poor households headed by women to provide cash benefits on the

They explained that access to assistance for the vulnerable improved, yet doubted its quality when it was implemented, commenting that “some people who really need assistance have not found it,” so they suggested improving the mechanisms for providing social welfare to those in need. In Santa Cruz, some noticed that “with scholarship assistance for veterans’ children, some children received it and some didn’t, despite the fact they are all veterans’ children.” It is interesting to note that Ma’abat residents stated that access to such social assistance is ‘good’, which contributes to the “harmonization of the community.”

Housing/Land Issues

In relation to housing/land, Santa Cruz and Aisirimou residents rated this ‘normal’ or ‘not very good’ throughout all of the periods due to disputes over land property, in addition to the burden of reconstructing homes after the war. Aisirimou members recalled that the land conflict stemmed from the war in 1975. One of them explained that “we fled from our home to the remote mountains, and when we returned back to the village after the war [in 1999], the landholders during the war demanded that we go away [back to the remote mountains].”

The disputes between the landowners, the land settlers, and land squatters have continued until today. One respondent noted that “the government should intervene to resolve the disputes; otherwise the number of disputes shall increase. The problem is that Timor-Leste does not have an effective law regarding land ownership.” Similarly, disputes in Santa Cruz worsened after the 2006 crisis because homes were again damaged, and villagers fled to IDP camps and churches. Urban residents noted that the government and international partners supported rebuilding and repairing houses through the program called “recovery packages,” yet “the land disputes persist as of today because there is no proper or special law regulating housing

condition of children’s school attendance. ILO. See “Bolsa Mae Programme in Timor-Leste.” <http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess>ShowWiki.action?id=1225>.

and land ownership.” In contrast, it is notable that Ma’abat residents mention the effectiveness of traditional cultural practices to resolve the land disputes in their community.

5. Discussion: The external role in supporting peace and development

The responses from the three *suco*, while sharing comparable histories of political turmoil and external support, illustrate a variety of interactions between local and external actors in enhancing peace and development. Firstly, the local Timorese community has a variety of perspectives on their experiences of the transition process from conflict to development, while they had a similar view that the standard of living is generally improving. Timor-Leste is a geographically small country, with both Aisirimou and Ma’abat *sucos* situated within 50km of Dili. While most assistance was concentrated in Dili, the districts rated the access to services as relatively low in the pre-independence period. The impact of the 2006 crisis on the capital resulted in the full support of the external actors in Dili, while the rural area was able to maintain its quality of life.

Many sectors have utilized both government and international aid programs up until the present. During the post-referendum period, external actors were mostly engaged as intervenors to deliver services to the people. Their role during the 2006 crisis was once again that of intervenors who predominantly provided security services and humanitarian assistance—specifically in Dili. In parallel, external actors increased their role as mentors after independence to support the capacity of the new state. The external actors also recognized that they could continue their role as mentors in the districts during the 2006 crisis period.

Furthermore, the response from locals revealed various patterns on how external actors changed their roles over time respective to the situation in each sector. Following the post-2006 crisis, the quality of services in water, education, roads/bridges sectors are the concerns of local communities, and access to those is improving. These sectors were mostly excluded from

development efforts, and thus greater involvement of the national government was requested by local communities.

Business/employment, land disputes, and social assistance were sectors that respondents did not find any significant direct involvement from external actors. This does not mean that they were not involved in these sectors. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) previously conducted a program to launch a basic legal system and handed it over to the national government (Lopes, 2008). However, land disputes became aggravated as a result of the 1999 and 2006 crises and institutionalization of the land system has not taken place. In the case of social assistance, the involvement of the external actors varies. While the Bolsa Mae program received help through the financial and technical support of UN agencies, the distribution of the pension to veterans and scholarships for their children is solely managed by the government and paid from the national budget, which is funded by the country's oil income (Government of Timor-Leste 2014). Participants in two *suco* referred to the unequal distribution of social assistance, and the potential increase of social conflict, pointing out that people are directly requesting the government to improve its mechanism of redistribution.

The respondents elaborated on some external actors' roles as 'facilitators' when referring to the co-existence of modern and traditional systems. They noticed the use of traditional mediation processes in resolving communal disputes, while the formal justice system was more often used in dealing with public crimes. As respondents referred to ongoing customary practice, they added that international agencies, the government and NGOs (Asia Foundation and Provedoria dos Direitos Umanos no Justica (PDHJ)) have provided training support to some *suco*.⁹

⁹ Belun/Asia Foundation (2014) notes that NGOs, churches, and international agencies such as JICA support the traditional system of social resolution, which may include imposing restrictions (*Tara Bandu*), as providing both technical assistance and financial support for planning and implementation. *Tara Bandu* has been primarily used for natural resources management but also for other dimensions of social life (e.g., Cummins 2010).

References to active KPK can be another example of a collaborative process between the local communities, the national government, and external actors. KPK at the operational level is unique to each *soco* within its own context, yet the common objectives of KPK are to monitor the security situation and address security-related problems through consultation with communities and police so as to prevent violence and maintain peace (Belo and Rajalingam 2014). The introduction of KPK to Timor-Leste was initiated by a local commander who was responsible for community policing and then was supported by an international NGO (Asia Foundation) and the New Zealand Police. In this situation, external actors play the role of facilitators who connect the government and the effective systems embedded in the people.

Nevertheless, applying such a ‘facilitator’ role in every community seems not to be optimal. Santa Cruz residents did not mention KPK nor the traditional leader’s role in local resolution but good relationships with the police and access to formal justice. Belun/Asia Foundation (2014) notes that the applicability of local systems varies across the country. As the lack of sacred places to implement traditional practices and multiple cultures within a community poses a challenge—especially in urban areas—the inclusive process of socialization to apply cultural practices is becoming more important. While this specification requires further analysis, the finding implies that Timorese have various perceptions of the security situation and prefer to incorporate both formal and local systems. External actors may therefore require the deliberate consideration of their roles to work with people on a case by case basis.

6. Conclusion

This paper examined local perceptions of responses in Timor-Leste, a country that is generally perceived as a successful case of transitioning away from conflict to development. Peacebuilding involves efforts by local, national and international actors, and scrutinizing local experiences is useful in understanding the mechanisms of the interactions between them. As one

FGD participant pointed out, “it is not just police...people actually feel safer when they can enjoy the protections of the law, when they can afford to smile and when they have access to basic services, which make us happy.” This indicates the extent that awareness of security influences development, and vice versa, while acknowledging that the quality of life is generally improving.

Local voices address the external actors’ roles as intervenors, mentors, and facilitators and consider how these roles transform over time according to the situation within different sectors. The transformation of the roles is not always linear, and international actors may take multiple roles at a time if necessary. The experience during the 2006 crisis showed how external actors again took on the important role of intervenors in emergencies while continuing the role of mentor in the districts.

Some implications for peacebuilding policy are evident. The unsettled land ownership system, the search for resolutions to local disputes, and the need to ensure security are shared concerns among the Timorese. These concerns lie in the fact that the formal services, particularly in the justice and security sectors via the government, remain underdeveloped. While institutionalization of peace is in process in the country, a grass-roots and traditional system seems to be a viable means of stabilizing the situation and resolving problems in communities. Thus, in these areas of interest, the external actors’ role as ‘facilitator’ is contributing to the emergence of hybrid forms of peace.


As the situation changes over time and by location as well as the varied challenges emerging across sectors, these situations and challenges do not allow the roles of external actors to be determined by the actors’ own uniformed assessment. The local participants clearly noticed that external actors are fulfilling roles as intervenors, mentors, and facilitators, and were able to identify specific services provided by the international actors and the national government. They also requested the improvement of some services—particularly from the national government—while they are aware that external actors are assisting programs in other sectors.

The diverse patterns of interaction and distinctive perceptions that appeared in the security and other sectors show how a unilateral approach to working at the local community would be problematic.

Leonardsson and Rudd's (2015) review of enhancing local peacebuilding can be interpreted as a means of an effective, top-down approach to peacebuilding or as a means of emancipation to promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. As discussed elsewhere, both approaches can be observed in Timor-Leste since external actors are gradually incorporating the latter approach, recognizing it as a key to building a resilient state and society. External actors are becoming more conscious that 'the local' is a significant component of peacebuilding, enabling us to scrutinize what roles would suit local needs. As this paper has clarified, one challenge to such an exercise is that the local contexts differ, as needs vary with time and location. Because peacebuilding advances through both negotiation and contestation in each specific context at the local, national, and international levels (Donais 2012), international actors could consider how to respond to various local needs by incorporating hybrid approaches.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: An Example of Rating in Focused Group Discussion (FGD) Process



Source: Author

Table 2: Result of Rating in Focused Group Discussion (FGD) Process (Santa Cruz)

	Health		Water		Food		Education		Business	
	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality
1999-2002										
(Post-Violence and Referendum)	4#	4	4#*	4	2#	2	2#*	2	2#	2
2002-2005										
(Early Independence)	4#*	4	2*	2	2*	2	4*	3	4*	3
2006-2008										
(Just After the 2006 Crisis)	2#*	2	4#	3	4#*	2	4#*	2	2	2
2008-Present										
(Life Today)	4#*	2	4#*	2	3#*	2	4#*	2	3#*	3
	Security		Housing/Land		Social Assistance		Roads/Bridges		Justice/Political Participation	
	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality	Quantity /Access	Quality
1999-2002										
(Post-Violence and Referendum)	4#	2	2#	2	2#*	2	4	4	4#	2
2002-2005										
(Early Independence)	3#*	3	2*#	2	4#*	2	4*	2	2*	2
2006-2008										
(Just After the 2006 Crisis)	2#	2	2#*	2	4#*	2	2#*	3	4#*	2
2008-Present										
(Life in Today)	4#*	3	3	3	4#*	2	4#*	2	4#*	4

Notes: Scale: 1 = Bad / None; 2 Not Very Good / Some; 3 = Average / Normal; 4 = Good; 5 = Very Good.

Variance: * Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of government development programs during this time.

Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of international aid programs at this time.

Source: FGD conducted by Fundasaun Mahein (FM) and author on March 11, 2016.

Table 3: Result of Rating in Focused Group Discussion (FGD) Process (Ma'abat)

	Health		Water		Food		Education		Business	
	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality
1999-2002 (Post-Violence & Referendum)	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
2002-2005 (Early Independence)	4*# (+1)	4 (+2)	2*# (0)	2 (0)	4*# (+2)	3 (+1)	4*# (+2)	3 (+1)	4*# (+2)	3 (+2)
2006-2008 (Just After the 2006 Crisis)	4* (0)	4 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)	4*# (0)	4 (+1)	4 (0)	4 (0)	4# (0)	4 (+1)
2008-2016 (Life Today)	5*# (+1)	4 (0)	2*# (0)	2 (0)	4(0)	4 (0)	5*# (+1)	5 (+1)	5* (+1)	4 (0)
	Security		Housing		Social Assistance		Roads/Bridges		Justice/Political Participation	
	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality
1999-2002 (Post-Violence & Referendum)	3	3	2	2	2	2	4	1	2	2
2002-2005 (Early Independence)	3*# (0)	3 (0)	3* (+1)	3 (+1)	3*# (+1)	3 (+1)	4*# (0)	1(0)	3*# (+1)	3 (+1)
2006-2008 (Just After the 2006 Crisis)	4# (+1)	4 (+1)	4 (+1)	2 (-1)	4*# (+1)	4 (+1)	4* (0)	4 (+3)	4* (+1)	4 (+1)
2008-Present (Life Today)	4*# (0)	4 (0)	5* (+1)	4 (+2)	4* (0)	4 (0)	4* (0)	4 (0)	4*# (0)	4 (0)

Notes: Scale: 1 = Bad / None; 2 Not Very Good / Some; 3 = Average / Normal; 4 = Good; 5 = Very Good.

Variance: * Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of government development programs during this time.

Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of international aid programs at this time.

Source: FGD conducted by Fundasaun Mahein (FM) on April 1, 2016.

Table 4: Result of Rating in Focused Group Discussion (FGD) Process (Aisirimou)

	Health		Water		Food		Education		Business	
	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality
1999-2002 (Post-Violence & Referendum)	3*	2*	2	1	3#	2	2	1	3	2
2002-2005 (Early Independence)	3 (+0) #	2 (+0)	3 (+1) #	2 (+0)	4 (+1) #	3 (+1)	3 (+1)	2 (+1)	4 (+1)	4 (+2)
2006-2008 (Just After the 2006 Crisis)	3 (+0)	2 (+0)	3 (+0) #	3 (+1)	3 (-1)* #	3 (+0)	4 (+1)*	3 (+1)	4 (+0)	3 (-1)
2008-2016 (Life Today)	4 (+1)* #	4 (+2)	4 (+1)* #	3 (+0)	5 (+2)* #	4 (+1)	5 (+1)* #	5 (+2)	5 (+1)	4 (+1)
	Security		Housing/Road		Social Assistance		Roads/Bridges		Justice/Political Participation	
	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality	Quantity/ Access	Quality
1999-2002 (Post-Violence & Referendum)	2#	2	2#	2	3#	2	3	3	3#	3
2002-2005 (Early Independence)	3 (+1)	2 (+0)	3 (+1)	2 (+0)	3 (+0)	3 (+1)	3 (+0) #	3 (+0)	4 (+1)	3 (+0)
2006-2008 (Just After the 2006 Crisis)	4 (+1) #	4 (+2)	3 (+0) #	2 (+0)	3 (+0) #	3 (+0)	3 (+0) #	3 (+0)	4 (+0) #	3 (+0)
2008-Present (Life Today)	5 (+1) #	4 (+0)	3 (+0)	2 (+0)	4 (+1) #*	3 (+0)	1 (-2)	2 (-1)	4 (+0)	3 (+0)

Notes: Scale: 1 = Bad / None; 2 Not Very Good / Some; 3 = Average / Normal; 4 = Good; 5 = Very Good.

Variance: * Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of government development programs during this time.

Denotes participants indicated that they were aware of international aid programs at this time.

Source: FGD conducted by Fundasaun Mahein (FM) on April 14, 2016.

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Tanaka (Sakabe), Yukako. 2014. "Higashi Timor Ni Okeru Chihousenkyo-Shinseiminshushugikoku Niyoru Chihobunkensa No Katei Toshiteno Kousatu—" [Local Elections in Timor-Leste: Decentralization in the New Democracies]. *Jisedai Ajiaa Ronshu* [Journal of Next Generation Asian Forum]. OAS, Waseda University (in Japanese)

Abstract (in Japanese)

要約

平和構築活動においては、ローカル・コミュニティを中核に据えるべきであるとする指摘に対応し、国際機関やドナーは、その方針を実行に移してきた。しかし、ローカル・コミュニティを中核とする平和構築活動とは、どのようにして実現できるのか。また、そのような活動が、本当に平和を推進したのか。現場での模索と議論は、未だに続いている。

本論文は、「ローカル」の声を取り上げ、開発とともに進む平和構築のメカニズムを理解することを目指す。著者は、東ティモールの3つの村においてフォーカス・グループ・ディスカッション（FGD）を実施。参加者は、10分野において進展状況の評価付けと意見交換を行った。その結果、外部アクターの関与のあり方について、平和構築活動が行われた場所と時期により、参加者がさまざまな認識を持っていることが明らかとなった。

特に首都ディリで発生した2006年の政治危機は、各ローカル・コミュニティに対して異なる影響を及ぼした。外部アクターは、首都部に「介入者」として国際部隊を派遣し人道援助を提供した。その一方で、地方部では「メンター」として能力構築への支援を維持した。

地方部の人々は、依然として飲料水や教師の能力には懐疑的で、質の向上に向けた政府のさらなる努力を求めていた。また、ローカル・コミュニティには、フォーマルな司法制度や警察機能が整っていないため、土地の所有権や社会治安の問題に対して、各コミュニティが独自に対処しようとしている。こうした動きに対し、外部アクターは「調整者」として、慣習として存在する伝統的な紛争解決システムを活用することを後押しするケースがみられた。

FGDの結果は、多様な集団の活動の相互作用から生まれる「ハイブリッドな平和」の形成に、外部アクターがその一端を担つたことを示した。そして、ローカル・コミュニティの多様なニーズに応えるには、場所、分野、時機といった特徴を考慮し、外部アクターが担える役割とは何かについて、外部アクター自らが見極めることの重要性を本論文は示唆している。

キーワード： 平和構築、ローカル、開発、フォーカス・グループ・ディスカッション、東ティモール



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