Development Cooperation by Emerging Countries

Humanitarian Crises and the Rise of the Rest: The Future of Humanitarianism from the Perspective of Four Latin American Emerging Countries

Oscar A. Gómez

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Abstract

This paper offers a critical perspective on the future of humanitarianism, drawing on the experience of four Latin American emerging countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Their experience in the region and beyond provides a mix of characteristics that result in a unique understanding of crisis and response. Except for Haiti, Latin America is rather well-off and is mostly outside the scope of major humanitarian emergencies. However, Latin America is still affected by high inequality, organized crime, and all types of disasters, while hosting a major population displacement in Colombia as a result of civil conflict. Thus, emerging countries of the region remain on the global humanitarian watch list. The paper explores this duality, based on over one hundred semi-structured interviews in the selected countries, complemented with direct observations and primary data analysis. Among significant findings, the paper describes a historical resistance from the region to be seen as the locus of humanitarian crisis, reflected both through capacity building and diplomacy. At least four older and more recent principles of action are identified, namely ‘non-indifference’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘horizontality’. In particular, horizontality underscores a rich diversity of South-South exchanges between line ministries and other offices in charge of specific crises that goes beyond being ‘donors’. Indeed, emerging countries explicitly challenge the traditional humanitarian establishment, so their contributions are better understood as reflecting ongoing transformations in their human development and security agendas.

Keywords: Global governance, emerging powers, crisis management, South-South cooperation, humanitarianism

* Assistant Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University(oagomez@apu.ac.jp)

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1. Introduction

The rise of ‘emerging’ countries and their impact on international cooperation has received increasing attention in the international community. Through South-South and Triangular cooperation efforts, these countries from outside the ranks of traditional donors are asserting themselves as players at regional and global levels (White 2011; Chatin 2016) and are seen as disrupters of the international system in both positive and negative ways. They can bring new resources, new ideas, and experiences that appear to be more relevant to the context of countries benefitting from cooperation. They provide an opportunity to innovate beyond the status quo of international cooperation, dominated by Western powers and their affiliated organizations, including bilateral agencies, multilateral organizations and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, they are also seen as potentially weakening ethical standards for action, compromising fragile gains in codes of conduct, and fragmenting the global aid system (Mawdsley 2012, 2014; Gulrajani and Swiss 2017). Understanding the actual impacts of emerging countries in cooperation, thus, remains a contentious issue.

The present research aims to shed light on how emerging countries’ cooperation efforts challenge existing humanitarian expectations, focusing on their response to humanitarian crises. Humanitarianism, the attempt to provide relief to distant strangers (Barnett 2011), is at the core of the moral minimum about which defenders of the present liberal world order feel threatened by the rise of emerging powers. While emerging countries’ new institutions and new rules for trade and development can in the end be accommodated, backtracking on the “...ethic of care for peoples who are either at risk of, or worse still suffering from, large-scale natural disasters and politically motivated atrocities” would mean the end of the liberal world order (Duncombe and Dunne 2018, 26). Examining how the ethical principles and practices of global humanitarianism are affected by emerging powers is thus critical in order to grasp how deeply the world is being transformed by the “rise of the rest.”
It has to be noted, however, that inside humanitarian studies no accepted framework of analysis exists that allows us to grasp the effects of emerging countries \textit{on their own terms}. There are two underlying problems: lack of consolidation and a strong Western bias. First, what actually constitutes the international humanitarian sector and/or system remains contested, and simply describing it “in terms of boundaries, identity, nature and purpose is hugely problematic” (Collinson 2016). Consequently, assessing the roles and impacts of new players becomes even more complicated as categories and interactions are invariably in flux. The literature uses humanitarian action (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Metcalfe-Hough and Willitts-King 2016) or humanitarian ‘donorship’ (e.g., Binder, Meier and Steets 2010; Smith 2011) as the main frames to look into the new actors’ behavior, but both are problematic because their essence is contested by emerging countries. In this sense, despite the blurred boundaries and diversity underlying humanitarian interactions, one essential feature of the literature and the present institutions, and the debates and diversity within them, is that it still remains dominated by Western actors and assumptions. For instance, Roepstorff (2016) reluctantly accepts “non-DAC donors” as a category of analysis, but she observes that such framing replicates existing hierarchies and suggests a uniformity among DAC and among non-DAC members that in reality does not exist. An alternative remains to be found. Therefore, a second aim of this paper is to provide elements for a new framework to understand humanitarianism based on emerging countries’ experiences. Step by step, the analysis deconstructs the existing framings, identifying assumptions that do not hold for these new actors, while advancing alternatives that better fit their experiences.

To fulfill the dual aims of understanding the rise of the rest and developing an appropriate analytical framework, the case of Latin American emerging countries is relevant in several ways. From the perspective of the future of humanitarianism, Latin America\textsuperscript{1} offers an odd combination of factors that may become the new normal in the near future. The region is

\textsuperscript{1} In this paper Latin America includes the Caribbean, although the focus is on the selected four countries.
rather well-off and—except for Haiti\(^2\)—mostly outside of the scope of major humanitarian emergencies. It is in a position to move from being a net recipient to a net supporter of humanitarian response. Regardless, Latin America is affected by high inequality, organized crime, all types of disasters and, moreover, hosts a major population displacement in Colombia as a result of civil conflict, so multiple humanitarian concerns remain. Latin America thus allows envisioning how the management of disasters, infectious diseases and forced displacement—the three types of crises covered by this research—takes place while strength and fragility co-exist. From the perspective of international cooperation, the region is recognized because of its dynamism in promoting South-South and Triangular cooperation and systematizing its efforts (Ojeda Medina 2016; Santander Campos 2016; Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) 2017). The predominance of middle-income—though highly unequal—economies in the region brings along capacities and resources that facilitate transitioning towards cooperation partnerships and acting horizontally. Whether such dynamism also impacts how humanitarian crises are dealt with offers further clues about the future of humanitarianism. Finally, from the ideational perspective, the region has been an early participant in the liberal order, to the point where it is questioned whether it is or not part of the West (e.g., Fawcett 2012; Sikkink 2014). In either case, Latin American countries have led paradigm changes on development and the environment, as with the Rio conferences and the Sustainable Development Goals, making them a referent for new world views that resonate with ‘the rest’.

\(^2\) For instance, since the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the European Commission started publishing in 2014 the INFORM reports on “risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters,” Latin American countries have never appeared among the twelve countries with the highest risk. Mexico is always included among those with the highest values in the hazard and exposure category, while Haiti has appeared among the most vulnerable—see [http://www.inform-index.org/](http://www.inform-index.org/). In the Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports produced by Development Initiatives since the year 2000, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras have occasionally appeared among the more affected countries, and only Haiti after 2010 earthquake as one of the top recipients; in the nineties Honduras and Nicaragua appeared as major recipients after 1998 Hurricane Mitch, although then the pledges were not only humanitarian. Development Initiatives reported in 2016 that Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela had been included in the list of forgotten crises produced by the European Commission, and lately El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico have also been included in the list in relation to violence-related problems.
The elements necessary for a new analytical framework to understand humanitarianism based on emerging countries’ experiences are necessarily derived from the established humanitarian narrative. These elements are identified in the next section, using as a starting point the definition of humanitarianism as life-saving support to foreign populations beset by crisis. Then, each of the three elements singled out in this definition—i.e., a crisis, action, and supporting donorship—are fleshed out through the experiences of the four selected countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. These were selected because of their efforts in cooperation and their experiences in multiple types of crises; restrictions of time and budget also prevented widening the scope to countries like Argentina, Costa Rica and Cuba, which also have rich and interesting experiences. Finally, the last section discusses the findings of the investigation, and suggests ways in which the rise of Latin American emerging countries provides alternative narratives to global humanitarianism.

The research is qualitative, based on semi-structured interviews with major stakeholders involved in humanitarian crises management and international cooperation, as well as a review of primary and secondary data in Spanish, Portuguese and English. Actors surveyed are divided into three types, namely: government offices in charge of the management of crises, international cooperation organizations, and actors supporting both crisis management and cooperation (including academia and civil society). There were three rounds of fieldwork, resulting in 108 interviews (individual and in groups) with 192 persons, covering the four selected countries, plus Washington DC., Brussels and Geneva, as well as a couple of discussions with diplomatic missions in Tokyo and follow-up conversations on the Internet.

2. A framework for studying contributions to humanitarianism by emerging countries

In order to understand the ways that emerging countries influence humanitarianism on their own terms, at least two steps are necessary: firstly, deconstructing the humanitarian literature to some
minimal core elements in order to organize the analysis and, secondly, contrasting these elements with the narratives and practices brought in by the new actors. In regard to the first step, the most basic notion of humanitarianism involves some form of life-saving assistance to foreign populations beset by crises. This definition encompasses at least three basic roles that could be played by emerging countries in the humanitarian literature: as donors providing support, as actual assistance providers, and as the crisis-affected, recipient communities.

Of these three roles, humanitarian donorship is the role that appears to be the newest and most disruptive role played by emerging countries. Emerging countries can provide fresh sources of funding for responses after crises take place, are free to choose established or alternative implementing partners, and are thus capable of changing the ways of humanitarian practice through their monetary allocations, the agendas they favor, and the organizations benefitting from their support. Understanding such roles as donors is part of the broader discussion on the rise of emerging countries, in which humanitarianism is one among several sectors through which these new players make their presence felt. This discussion presents two main biases that should be challenged: the assumption that emerging countries are new to this role, and the assumption that the vertical, donor-recipient relationship is the only way to actualize international support. The latter is particularly important in analyzing humanitarian ‘donorship’, as will be discussed below.

Another role emerging countries can play, slightly different from being merely a donor, is that of undertaking humanitarian action. This element of the humanitarian narrative was traditionally linked to a group of implementation partners different from states, who can uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Nonetheless, the direct participation of states in humanitarian action has been gradually finding a place inside humanitarian narratives, not only in the shape of humanitarian interventions but also because of the nexus with development cooperation (e.g., Barnett 2011; Hanatani, Gómez, and Kawaguchi 2018). Emerging countries are part of this challenge to traditional humanitarianism, in which
several institutions or national actors directly take part in operations in crisis-affected areas and engage in different modalities of support. Moreover, they bring along different principles that are more relevant to their experience of both receiving help and supporting other countries. Such emphasis on new principles informing emerging countries’ actions can be found as well on the literature on South-South cooperation, which usually highlights the different nature of countries’ exchanges (e.g., Calvento and Rolandi 2015). These principles are, thus, also part of the challenge to the established humanitarianism and the source of concerns about the negative impact of emerging countries, as discussed in the introduction.

Lastly, emerging countries can also be recipients of humanitarian assistance. When hit by large-scale crises, they are expected to require international support. This is perhaps the most traditional way in which non-Western countries are depicted through humanitarian narratives but, at the same time, a topic less emphasized in the literature on emerging countries. After all, the emerging countries narrative is about ‘graduation’ from assistance and leaving fragility behind. Nevertheless, emerging countries bring along a history as recipients of humanitarian aid, as well as a background of unresolved issues, which must be included in any consideration of the ways they impact humanitarianism.

How do emerging countries of Latin America fit into or challenge these categories and narratives? Through the rest of the paper, the experiences of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico will be used to answer these questions. The three humanitarian roles will be presented in the inverse order, i.e., crisis, action, and ‘donorship’, because such a sequence helps in emulating the imaginary progression behind the rise of emerging countries: from recipients to donors.

3. Latin American emerging countries as a locus of humanitarian crisis

While Latin American countries do not figure prominently in the history of humanitarianism (Barnett 2011) —either as donors or recipients—the region has experienced major crises with
significant humanitarian consequences. Some authors see the human impacts of the conquest and colonization of the continent as comprising the roots of humanitarian crisis and response in the region (e.g., Ferris and Wherry 2016). Pandemics also played an important role in the conquest of the continent (Diamond 1997). Mistreatment and displacement of indigenous populations were common, and the region became an important part of the slave trade from Africa, as well as slavery’s last bastion. Moreover, Latin America has been heavily affected by all kinds of disasters: there are, for instance, records of earthquakes affecting societies from as early as the fifteen and sixteen centuries in Mexico and Chile (Garcia Acosta 2001; Onetto Pavez 2017). Latin America has not suffered any major famines, at least since the end of the nineteenth century, although armed conflict and other forms of violence have been a constant challenge, accompanied by different forms of forced displacement.

With the creation of the Red Cross in Switzerland in 1863 and the subsequent agreements on humanitarian law in The Hague and Geneva, it follows that Latin America’s early experience has not been widely acknowledged as part of the development of humanitarianism. Moreover, the early commitment of national governments in dealing with major threats as part of the process of state building also played a role in avoiding being framed as humanitarian recipients. The case of infectious diseases is a good example. Medicine and public health were central parts of consolidating Latin American nations as early as the second half of the nineteenth century (Cueto and Palmer 2015). Governments made great efforts to both protect their populations against diseases, and to show countries in the North that the tropics were not an unhealthy threat to the world—especially in order to avoid trade barriers. Cueto and Palmer (2015) describe how, at the start of the twentieth century, Latin American medicine and science was highly regarded, and since then it has benefitted from the constant circulation of people, ideas and biological products that are locally generated, re-worked and adapted. Both capacities and government ownership contribute to challenging the dominant humanitarian narrative.
Close engagement with the United States (US) led to the creation of today’s Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in 1902 (Cueto 2006). This was followed by a prolific history of exchanges that were prominently supported by US philanthropy and official cooperation. Over a century, robust health systems were created in each country, combining local and international resources and knowledge, leading to the development of institutions that would later play important roles in cooperation. Among many examples, it is worth noting the prominent role of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) in Rio de Janeiro. Founded in 1900 and following the Pasteur Institute model, Fiocruz functions as a public science and technology agency linked to the Ministry of Health, and nowadays is considered one of world’s main public health research institutions, with the capacity to support all types of action in public health, from drug production to community support. It hosts a Center for International Relations in Health, which informs and directly contributes to the country’s international cooperation in the sector. Fiocruz has played major roles not only in confronting major health crises throughout Brazil’s history, such as yellow fever, HIV AIDS and Zika fever, but also sharing the country’s experience abroad.

Developing these capacities to cope with threats while also benefitting from international support has been usually accompanied by narratives of national ownership and pride. For instance, Cueto (2013) observes how the malaria campaign in Mexico during the Cold War was financed by US international cooperation, but domestically was presented as a local effort. This was something that the US did not oppose in order to prevent communist and anti-American actors using the projects to push their own agendas to control the country, as well as not hurting national pride. Stressing local ownership of responses against threats while benefitting from cooperation in different ways is a common situation that is still evident today in all emerging countries of the region—as described below.

In Brazil and Chile, the military regimes during the Cold War triggered international humanitarian action particularly in relation to asylum seekers and human rights abuses. In Chile,
the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) office was created in 1973 to support persons trying to exit the country after the coup d’état, and closed in 1995 after repatriation efforts were completed. In Brazil, UNHCR worked without government recognition from 1977 to 1982 and was only fully regularized in 1989 when the change in the direction of the migratory flows became evident (Fischel de Andrade and Marcolini 2002; Reiss 2011). In both countries, the return of democracy is associated with a change from being primarily the recipients of assistance to a willingness to support other crisis-affected countries.

As the only major country in the sample suffering a domestically recognized, protracted humanitarian crisis, Colombia is a special case. The escalation of the armed conflict resulted in impacts in the civil population that could not be dismissed. More than five decades of internal armed conflict have resulted in a cumulative figure of 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2018), and Colombia hosts the only national UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the region. The pressure of the crisis led to the development of contrary approaches. Initially, the government has made great diplomatic efforts to minimize damage to its reputation. Between 2002 and 2010, the government opted for a military solution to the problem. It vehemently denied the existence of a conflict inside the country and persistently confronted dissenting international agencies (Borda 2011). In those years, it was feared that humanitarian organizations would be expelled from the country because of this government pressure. Indeed, organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to adjust, avoiding conflict with the government and even tolerating the misuse of its emblem for a hostage rescue operation to avoid losing humanitarian access (Borda 2014). The succeeding government (2010-2018) changed the strategy, and accepted the existence of a crisis, which ultimately led to a negotiated end to the conflict. The government pursued parallel strategies of 1) requesting international support for peacebuilding, and 2) heralding a “history of success” narrative (Morales and Tickner 2017)—i.e., turning from a failed state in need of international security assistance to an exporter
of peace and security know-how. The strategy has so far proved successful, as demonstrated by
the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 and membership of the OECD in 2018, although
financial support for the peace agreement implementation has been limited.

On the other hand, the size of the problem has forced the Colombian government to
develop sophisticated legislation, institutions and programs to provide durable solutions that are
globally unprecedented at such a scale for internal displacement. The government is obliged by
law to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict, as well as reparations, which
nowadays is done through the Unit of Victims (UARIV). Created in 2011, the UARIV comprises
a titanic effort with a budget of more than 1 billion US dollars between 2016 and 2017 alone, and
with which more than 8 million persons have registered. Its size is beyond any international
cooperation program, although the office in charge does benefit from some international support.
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily part of the “history of success” that the government intends
to sell. An interviewee mentioned that the former head of UNHCR, Antonio Guterres, asked the
country to host a big event on displacement, but politically the government was against being
seen as a role model in dealing with internal displacement. Only technical cooperation—i.e.,
supporting local initiatives in specific projects, usually for the government—is tolerated.

Internal displacement is not unique to Colombia, but other regional emerging countries
also resist its international recognition, fearing “Colombianizing” their problems. One
interviewee denounced a case of the government discouraging a UN agency from publishing a
commissioned report on internal displacement, while at a UN agency it was mentioned that
displaced populations were covered through regular programs without using a displacement or
crisis frameworks—thus avoiding confrontation with the government. International
humanitarian organizations pushed through the regional consultations prior to the 2016 World
Humanitarian Summit to include the consequences of gang violence as part of the agenda (Cue
and Nuñez-Flores 2017), but this was strongly resisted by the governments of the region. As
Hirst (2017, 174) notes, “Understanding these realities [violence in Central America and Mexico,
governability problems in Venezuela] as a humanitarian crisis by political actors, multilateral agencies and NGOs exacerbate defensive reactions that deepen tensions and hinder the attention to the most vulnerable social sectors.” All types of violence are security issues to be dealt with domestically, even when supported by international actors. Besides, interviewees mentioned that the almost complete disappearance of internal displacement from the Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compacts on migrants and refugees was in part a consequence of emerging countries’ leadership. Resistance goes beyond the fear of replicating the Colombian experience.

Major disasters and pandemics have recently hit the region, but these are also treated outside of the humanitarian framework. The first pandemic influenza of the century—H1N1—started in Mexico, paralyzing the capital city for several days in 2009. While several forms of international support were received (World Health Organization 2011), the operation was presented mainly as a national one. Zika fever outbreaks that resulted in congenital brain abnormalities, including microcephaly, of babies of infected pregnant women were identified in Brazil and Colombia in 2015-2016. The response has attracted massive international attention and scientific support, but operations have still been largely local, government-driven, instead of an international humanitarian operation. In this case too—and not only for Latin American actors but globally—the health security approach has been dominant over the humanitarian approach, which was challenged during the Ebola emergency in Western Africa (DuBois and Wake 2015).

Colombia was affected by major floods in 2010 and 2011 that overwhelmed the existing emergency response institutions, so the government created a program called Colombia Humanitaria (Humanitarian Colombia), in order to centralize the response, rehabilitation and recovery after the disaster. On that occasion, the program leadership pondered making an international appeal but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not allow it. The response to the disaster was thus paid from local resources and the role of the UN limited to the support and execution of projects (Colombia Humanitaria, n.d.). Since then, Colombia has been vocal
against unrequested assistance—for example, making a statement regarding this during the 2017 Global Platform. Similar opinions have been shared by all the other countries in the sample. Major earthquakes took place in Chile in 2010 and Mexico 2017, as well as extensive forest fires in Chile in 2017, all of them followed by support from regional and countries with relevant expertise. Yet, again, in these cases, a civil protection framework has been the strategy of official support request and coordination, while other strategies, such as cluster coordination, are out of the picture.

In sum, emerging countries of the region have historically contested being framed as the loci of humanitarian crises by investing in capacities to deal with problems and providing their own narratives at the international level. That does not mean that international assistance is not taking place, but the logic of the exchanges is not humanitarian, as it is further argued in the next sections.

4. Latin American emerging countries and humanitarian action

Moving from being the locus of a humanitarian crisis to a contributor to humanitarian efforts has several implications, most of them arising through emerging countries’ experiences. The first and most basic aspect to be contested is whether the label “humanitarian” should be applied to their contributions. In the same way that regional powers resist humanitarian framings of their problems, they do not push the humanitarian label into their actions. On the one hand, as Aneja (2014, 5) reports, “the term humanitarianism is perceived by southern states to be a moral cover for northern states and humanitarian agencies to secure their political and organisational interests.” Humanitarian action is not a sector included in the annual reports of Ibero-American

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3 It can be seen here https://twitter.com/UNGRD/status/867887945063301120
4 It is worth noting that Brazil is an outlier in regard to disasters because it is not affected by eye-catching extreme disasters and so maintains a myth of not being affected by them—although in practice floods and landslides are a serious concern.
South-South cooperation, for instance (Ibero-American General Secretariat 2017). On the other hand, action in response to crisis is subsumed in other types of cooperation. Binder and Meier (2011, 1140) mention that non-Western donors “fund intertwined short- and long-term humanitarian and development projects without a second thought, and criticize Western donors for separating the two.” Brazil’s government has been particularly vocal in this respect so, for instance, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim noted after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti that “In our view, security, humanitarian aid, and social and economic development cannot be viewed separately” (quoted by Hermann 2011, 236). Therefore, grasping the influence of emerging countries requires scrutinizing all types of practices after crises, before classifying them as contentious types of contributions.

The main implication of presenting action as humanitarian is to guarantee that it respects some basic principles and shame those who do not follow them. In the case of governments, in particular, the examination aims to unveil the political drivers underlying new actors’ contributions and the balance between interests and values in decision-making (El Taraboursli-McCarthy, Metcalfe-Hough and Willitts-King 2016, 2). The usual standards of comparison are the widely-recognized humanitarian principles—i.e., humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence—based on the two questions that are most often asked: to what extent are the humanitarian principles upheld by new actors? And, do new actors bring new principles?

Concerning the first question, it has to be noted that at least two of these principles are hardly applicable to country governments. The principle of independence implies autonomy of humanitarian objectives from other objectives but, as suggested above, emerging countries put forward the inseparability of multiple objectives. On the other hand, neutrality implies not taking sides in conflicts but, as most violence nowadays is about non-state actors, the neutrality of governments is difficult to conceive. The other two principles are seen as more relevant for all types of actors (Schenkenberg van Mierop 2016; DuBois 2018): humanity because it stresses the
commitment to people, and impartiality because it implies that support must be guided by needs. However, the practice of impartiality is difficult to assess because its meaning changes radically depending on the scale of analysis: impartiality could be about prioritizing different populations affected by a single event, but also about deciding which crisis to support at the global level. Moreover, as DuBois also observes, concentrating on need can also derail humanitarianism because it enlarges the agenda beyond urgent response needs. Finding deviation from the humanitarian principles is thus of limited use.

Therefore, much attention is given to the second question: identifying alternative principles underlying emerging countries’ actions. For this sake, research on South-South cooperation has identified multiple candidates, which include: non-interference, non-conditionality, solidarity, horizontality, consensus, demand driven, mutual benefit, and reciprocity (Aneja 2014; Calvento y Rolandi 2015; Fukuda-Parr and Shiga 2016). These principles are generally associated with development cooperation, although the difference between types of assistance is ambiguous, as noted above. Thus, this section will concentrate on identifying the extent to which some of these principles are relevant to Latin American emerging countries involved in humanitarian action.

4.1 Contributing at home: refuge and resettlement

Latin America has a historical commitment to the protection of refugees. The region has an important tradition on political asylum dating back to the nineteenth century, and this expanded with the evolution and incorporation of international refugee laws from the mid-twentieth century (Harley 2014, 24). A major hallmark was the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted in 1984 following a massive influx of conflict-affected Guatemalans into Mexico that began in 1980. On that occasion, solidarity was a primordial principle and Mexico was committed to pragmatically supporting displaced populations; the country offered generous support but also became the fourth largest recipient of UNHCR assistance (Figueroa Fischer...
The Cartagena declaration reflected this spirit, providing an extended framework of human rights-based protection that extended beyond the definitions in international law, and became the basis for refugee support across the region. Follow-up meetings such as Cartagena+20 in Mexico and Cartagena+30 in Brazil have reaffirmed and expanded the commitments, including efforts in cities and borders of solidarity, as well as a Latin American program for resettlement—also called solidarity resettlement—among other efforts to provide durable solutions.

Solidarity towards refugees is rooted in emerging countries’ own experiences with refugees and migrants. As noted above, Chile and Brazil were notable sources of asylum seekers during the Cold War. Both countries committed to supporting refugees as a way of paying back the generosity received in those years. As Harley (2014) remarks, *reciprocity* of protection is an important feature of the regional commitment. Besides, Mexico has traditionally been a transit country, as well as the major source of international migrants between 1990 and 2005 (Butler 2017). Mexico’s migration institutions are mainly designed to support Mexicans in the US from a consular perspective, and such expertise has given way to South-South cooperation with Central American countries now that their citizens are in need of such protection (Schiavon and Cárdenas Alaminos 2014). Solidarity originating from similar histories of migration and discrimination in the US also plays a role in regional support.

It must be noted that, given the nature of displacement flows in the region, Brazil and Mexico have opted for means that circumvent traditional refugee legal status while offering additional protection opportunities. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there was a spike in the number of migrants to Brazil, which had been leading a UN mission there since 2004. By 2016, the demand for protection of the estimated 85,000 refugees (Jubilut, Muiños de Andrade and de Lima Madureira 2016) forced the Brazilian government to develop a system of humanitarian visas, so migrants could access local services and restart their lives in Brazil. Such visas have been used for Syrians as well, with more than 8,000 people receiving them since the
start of the conflict (Vera Espinoza 2018). Humanitarian visas became institutionalized in new migration legislation in 2017. Regulation reforms in Mexico have not penalized people for illegal immigration, offering windows of opportunity for regularization or transit, while also creating special measures for unaccompanied minors and stopping human trafficking. This approach transforms the humanitarian refuge issue partly into a security and partly into a developmental one: it transforms the practice of refugee protection by avoiding the issue of legal status and gives migrants the opportunity to integrate by their own means. Note that not all of the countries in the sample include refugee support as part of their humanitarian contributions, but as an independent category altogether.

Another contribution that receives attention is the work on resettlement, particularly of Brazil and Chile (Vera Espinoza 2018). Chile started with a program for Yugoslavs in the nineties, which has been openly recognized as a failure, mainly because of the lack of experience by the Chilean government with such programs. Subsequent programs with Palestinians, Colombians and Syrians have built upon past mistakes and become successful. UNHCR returned to the country in 2008, partly to support these efforts that have reached 480 persons. Brazil has mainly benefitted Colombians and Central Americans, with a total of 715 persons resettled between 2002 and July 2017 (Silva Menezes and Kostas 2017). While numbers remain small compared to those of some rich countries, two points need to be considered. One is that resettlement programs are considered to be works in progress, through which UNHCR and IOM (International Organization for Migration) are nurturing these countries so they enlarge and self-sustain the programs. In 2016, these two UN agencies created the Emerging Resettlement Countries Joint Support Mechanism to support such cases in which Brazil, Chile and Argentina are involved. This signals a long-term strategy of the UN agencies. Another consideration is that resettlement efforts by emerging countries are also used by UNHCR as a negotiation tool to

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5 From relevant interviewees, as well as Ruiz (2015).
shame rich countries when they fall short or backtrack in their contributions. So, even at its present very modest size, Latin American countries contribute toward promoting the commitments of other governments.

A new challenge is emerging with the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. The Brazilian offices of UNHCR and IOM, as well as local partners, are supporting activities at the frontier, which are already feeling the stress. Venezuelan migrant presence has also been felt in Chile. However, the core of the problem is in Colombia, which for the first time is in the position of becoming a massive refugee receiver. In 2015, over 20,000 Colombians living close to the frontier with Venezuela were forced to return to the country after the Venezuelan government decreed a state of emergency in the area because of the alleged presence of Colombian paramilitary groups. On that occasion, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD) led the relief operation, which was comprised of essential support during the first days, and arranging transportation so that returnees could reach their relatives anywhere in the country, supported by IOM. UN agencies were asked to remain outside of the operation and allowed to contribute when specific needs or skills were required. By the end of 2017, at least 700,000 Venezuelans were estimated to be in Colombia (OCHA 2017), but so far the government has no plans to give them refugee status, supporting them instead through the national social services, as well as through churches and other organizations.

4.2 Deploying action abroad

Cross-border and international support provided by Latin American emerging countries is full of contrasts. In the case of fast-onset disasters triggered by natural hazards, there is a rich history of exchanges, particularly those undertaken by the armed forces and civil protection organizations. Personnel deployment has become an iconic type of cooperation, primary a demonstration of solidarity, usually publicized by mass media and the homepages of the ministries of foreign affairs. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti was a particular emergency in which all Latin American
countries invested themselves heavily (Lucatello 2011; Sanchez Gutierrez and Gilbert 2017). Unfortunately, historical information regarding these initiatives is not systematized so records are patchy and, for instance, only a list of deployments was available for Mexico (OECD 2013). In this case, Mexico developed military capabilities to deal with domestic disaster emergencies through the National Defense Plan DN-III-E in 1965, first implemented during Hurricane Inez in 1966. This plan is still in place nowadays and its capabilities have been used to provide relief abroad over 40 times since at least 1996.

International action after disasters in the region is characterized by direct communication between technical agencies in each country. This is a vital point, stressed in Colombia, Mexico and Chile, because communication between technical offices balances the diplomatic willingness to help with the actual needs on the ground as assessed by first responders. In the case of Colombia, one interviewee suggested that the creation of UNGRD in 2011 also resulted in a change in this direction. After the earthquake in 2010 in Haiti, for instance, it was the Colombian National Red Cross Society which supported the National Army in finding ways to contribute to international relief operations; nowadays the unit coordinates international deployments, employing parallel coordination with the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the civil protection offices in affected countries. Besides, UNGRD has placed a special emphasis on international cooperation and maintains strategic plans and reports on cooperation advances, something that could not be found in any other country.

The technical basis of action does not override diplomatic objectives. Indeed, diplomatic implications play an important role in the type of assistance that is provided and accepted. On the one hand, multilateral actions, particularly working through their own coordination mechanisms such as the Cluster System, are not welcome. This is not only because

6 The acronym is in Spanish; the “III” stands for the third version of the plan, and the E is the annex in which the attention to the civil population was included. Newer versions of the plan exist, but the DN-III received popular recognition, so it is still in use.
7 Available at: https://www.gob.mx/sedena/acciones-y-programas/ayuda-humanitaria-plan-dn-iii-e
of the reputational effects of receiving humanitarian assistance but also because national responses are already usually much larger than any international contribution. Bilateral action is a different story. Solidarity and reciprocity mean that all governments, rich and poor, do not only offer support but also accept it. For instance, after the September 2017 earthquakes in Mexico, the Mexican Secretary of External Relations requested only specific support from the US, Israel and Japan. However, presidents from mainly Latin American countries started to directly and publicly offer assistance, and the government was forced to accommodate these offers. Resistance to public bilateral offers of support does not work in these cases. For instance, the Swiss embassy announced through its Twitter account that its offer of help had been declined by the government. Six hours later, after outrage on social networks and mass media, the embassy announced that its offer had now been accepted. In this sense, several efforts exist in the region to standardize responses by Ministries of Foreign Affairs, mainly through guidelines, but the 2017 experience shows this is very much work in progress.

Emergency responses are complemented with actions toward recovery and the prevention of further disasters, encompassed through disaster risk reduction (DRR). DRR support aims to address the sustainability of cooperation results, another key principle. South-South and triangular efforts by Chile and Mexico replicating experiences as recipients of Japanese assistance are notable—see Hosono (2012) and Saito (2012). These programs are implemented by local authorities, research centers and universities participating in the DRR system. Disasters are in fact included as part of the environmental sector of Ibero-American reports, not as part of a separate humanitarian sector (Ibero-American General Secretariat 2017). This embracing of the full crisis management picture matches the approach promoted by Brazil in dealing with health issues, described as ‘structuring’ cooperation, rather than traditional relief or top-down assistance (Buss and Ferreira 2017). A path-breaking, early example of such a

8 Since the eighties, PAHO has noted in the region the downside of humanitarian aid—about the topic see Gomez (2019).
structuring approach can be seen in Brazil’s outstanding role in providing access to antiretroviral
drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment (Fraundorfer 2015). While resisting international pharmaceutical
industries and providing access to drug production technologies—partly thanks to existing
Fiocruz capabilities—it offered sustainable solutions to the crisis. Indeed, the country has
suggested that sustainability is another principle of its humanitarian cooperation (Binder and
Meier 2011).

Communications between technical offices and diplomatic missions after disasters
imply that the principle of non-interference is not an issue of concern for both offering and
receiving governments, as everything is done based on mutual agreement. Yet, not all
humanitarian crises are like this, a fact that has forced emerging countries to reconsider their
stauch support for non-intervention. The case in question is Haiti—initially a UN peacekeeping
mission—which was particularly challenging for Brazil. The Brazilian Government assumed the
leadership of the mission in 2004, a reason why it was (and still is) heavily criticized (Milani,
Baran and Bras 2017). The Brazilian government defended its decision by embracing the
principle of non-indifference, as opposed to non-interference, echoing Pope John Paul II
(Hermann 2011). The approach is not purely altruistic, or disregarding of national interests but,
in theory, combines a long-term vision of what benefits the nation with the spirit of solidarity.
The mission in Haiti was also peculiar for having a marked developmental mandate, not just
peacekeeping. Even after the earthquake, the Brazilian government placed emphasis on
undertaking ‘structuring’ cooperation, i.e., long-term oriented and sustainable.

“Structuring” cooperation after the Haiti earthquake provides evidence of a final
contrast of regional support during humanitarian crises: despite strong capabilities, emerging
countries have not embarked on particular humanitarian actions against pandemics. Countries in
the sample provided donations but did not have the lauded presence of Cuban physicians after
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (Beldarrain Chaple and Mecer 2017). Besides this, no
information could be found about emergency support during the cholera outbreak in October
2010, ten months after the earthquake in Haiti, which as of December 2 of 2017 has killed 9739 persons and affected over 815,000.\(^9\) After the earthquake, the Brazilian Health Ministry set up a budget of about 70 million dollars to support a project of Tripartite Cooperation with Haiti and Cuba, and signed a memorandum of understanding as soon as March 2010 (Kastrup et al. 2017; Milani, Baran Bras 2017). According to Milani, Baran and Bras (2017), the project is “one of the biggest investments of Brazilian cooperation ever.” The project included infrastructure and capacity building, particularly on epidemiology (Meneghel et al. 2016). Still, 80% of the treatment of cholera patients in the first three months was done by Doctors without Borders (MSF, an NGO) and the Cuban doctors—the rest was covered by the local system (Biquet 2013).

Two hypotheses can be suggested as to why solidarity does not apply in the case of pandemic emergencies. Infectious diseases are the only disaster that you can bring back home, so national security may trump humanitarian action. All health ministries interviewed reported countermeasures against local cases of Ebola and cholera, with possible cases detected and treated in Brazil and Mexico, so capabilities for detection and treatment were there. Another hypothesis is that such emergency responses have been left to rich countries, Cuba or multilaterals. Ipea (2013) suggests that Brazil supported the response to cholera through the UN mission, while Milani, Baran and Bras (2017) hint that Cubans were covering these needs as part of the Tripartite Cooperation agreement.\(^10\) Indeed, a review of Latin American South-South cooperation in the health sector shows that communicable diseases are one of the areas receiving less attention from South-South cooperation in the region (PAHO and SEGIB 2017). If the glass is seen as half full, as PAHO and SEGIB perceive it to be, the situation is the result of emerging countries choosing to focus on complementing existing cooperation; if seen as half-empty, the region is free-riding on the North’s health security capabilities.

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\(^10\) The MSPP asked Fiocruz for support in the coordination of international cooperation and the work of NGOs in the country, but the institution was unable to fulfill the request (Kastrup et al. 2017, 651).
5. Latin American emerging countries as humanitarian donors?

The ‘humanitarian donors’ frame (e.g., Binder, Meier and Steets 2010; Smith 2011) is contested through regional emerging countries’ experience in at least three ways: hierarchy implications, consolidation of institutions, and size of the contributions. Regarding the first source of contestation, the rejection of the vertical relation donor-recipient is explicit in all South-South cooperation declarations. Horizontal exchanges that entail mutual benefit, or that can be reciprocated, are preferred, as described in the previous section. Regional actors are contributing to long-term pacts of mutual support, not only by doing win-win developmental projects but also by supporting refugees or dispatching rescue teams. An interviewee suggested that there has even been restraint in using tragedies to advance political goals, specifically between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, countries that have unresolved border issues but which do not use emergency support to advance their interests on that agenda. This suggests that the expected benefits are primordially humanitarian, though countries and governments do benefit from the good press following such actions, thereby achieving soft power.11

Second, horizontality in regional responses to crises further challenges the ‘donor’ label because it assumes a level of unity that is not necessarily present on the ground. On the one hand, none of the countries have developed sophisticated offices in charge of humanitarian aid as part of their foreign relations institutions, such as OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance) in the US or ECHO (Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations) in the European Union. Brazil used to have since 2004 one office tasked with the alleviation of hunger, the General Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and Fight against

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11 Two examples: one, Brazil provided amnesty to illegal migrants and used such experience to denounce the double standards of United States and the European Union, which support human rights in its discourse but treat migration as a national security issue (Reis 2011); two, reception of Syrians in Chile has been linked to leftist governments, so rightist governments have hindered refugee recognition.
Hunger (CGFome, in Portuguese). This worked in several African countries to promote Brazilian expertise in dealing with malnutrition. However, the office was closed in 2016 after the impeachment of the government and its functions have been assumed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) (Milani 2017). While Mexico exhibits great expertise in and commitment to humanitarian affairs, the area is a sub-directorate of its cooperation agency, AMEXCID. In Chile, there was no desk on humanitarian affairs in the ministry until after the earthquake in 2010—the office is still is perceived as weak, and it lies outside of the agency in charge of international cooperation, AGCID. Both Chile and Mexico cooperation agencies place more emphasis on the prevention of disasters, while emergencies receive episodic attention. In Colombia, neither disasters nor emergencies were part of the international cooperation agency (APC) portfolio, nor is there a specific unit in charge of it at the Ministry.

Indeed, in Colombia, it is the unit in charge of disasters that has an international cooperation strategy. This shows how, on the other hand, the horizontality of South-South cooperation implies interrelations across borders that are not mediated by a single institution that enforces a “donor” identity but are the result of a broader mix of interactions in which expertise and a history of exchanges are more important. For instance, the ministries of health are directly in charge of complying with the International Health Regulations, which are relevant to any pandemic response, and undertake cooperation in emergencies with a high degree of autonomy. Ministries of foreign affairs help by providing coordination, or query courses of action, but much still happens directly between line ministries and international actors. The case of refugees is slightly different, because in this case, the consular sections of the ministries of foreign affairs are not only diplomatic but also technical offices. Even in this case, however, other national and local offices lead the processes, such as the ministries of justice, labor and interior in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Local governments bear a large share of the burden and are still heavily dependent on UNHCR and civil society organizations (CSOs),—particularly those linked to the Catholic Church—for the operationalization of national commitments. Only Mexico has an
independent national office in charge of migration, the National Institute for Migration (INAMI), which has also undertaken in-house humanitarian assistance since 1990.

Reining in such a multiplicity of international exchanges is indeed one of the main tasks of the international cooperation agencies in each country. In moving from recipients to partners, they have all empowered cooperation agencies to concentrate and coordinate development cooperation that previously flowed directly among line ministries. Despite some interviewees’ skepticism, the South-South cooperation narrative suggests important advances, supported by more than two decades of work in the case of Chile and three decades in Brazil (e.g., Milani 2017). Humanitarian cooperation—as referring to developmental support after a crisis—is covered by cooperation agencies, but the security component of the emergency support seems beyond their reach and remains distributed across different offices. The “donor” label overlooks how traditional humanitarianism is not part of their agenda so far.

The final reason to contest the donor label is the size of the contributions, which still lag behind in terms of the amounts that traditional donors provide (White 2011). Numbers are difficult to come by for multiple reasons. First, not all of the countries include humanitarian assistance as part of the reports of their international cooperation agencies. Examining documents from each of the country’s international cooperation agencies, in Colombia, there are references to just over a million dollars being contributed to international humanitarian appeals between 2011 and 2015. In Chile, a fund—“Fondo Chile”—was established in 2012 in partnership with UNDP. It is partly used for humanitarian crises, but only one contribution over a million dollars was reported—in 2017. Reports on Brazilian international cooperation stopped presenting humanitarian cooperation as a sector after 2014 (Ipea 2018). Second, not all efforts can be valued in dollar terms. For example, Brazil reports quantities of food and health-related items provided without their economic value (Ipea 2018, 188-189), while Mexico also reports

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12 Information available at: https://www.apccolombia.gov.co/seccion/rendicion-de-cuentas#collapse0
deployments of experts and military personnel. Moreover, important contributions are not reported as humanitarian, particularly support provided to displaced populations; and efforts on sustainability are part of the broader development agenda. Additionally, as noted above, horizontal support implies that some exchanges taking place between line ministries are not accounted for. All that said, OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service includes some figures that, although not matching those reported by the cooperation agencies, can shed some light onto each of the sample countries contributions—see Table 1. According to these numbers, the largest contribution since 2008 by a single country of the region, Brazil’s 54.4 million dollars in 2012, pales in comparison compared to the US 3.8 billion in the same year (Development Initiatives 2013).

Table 1. Humanitarian contributions reported to OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service in US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,304,284</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,718,359</td>
<td>312,400</td>
<td>235,815</td>
<td>467,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>26,037,467</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>18,852,000</td>
<td>10,747,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>23,189,309</td>
<td>167,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,345,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>54,415,596</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>588,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,930,462</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>551,488</td>
<td>1,365,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15,490,061</td>
<td>705,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7,048,604</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3,201,751</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4,075,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,525,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>122,500</td>
<td>638,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5,100,375</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Prepared by the author from UNOCHA FTS data*
However, it is necessary to tread carefully in regard to the quantity versus quality of the region’s humanitarian assistance, because important contributions can be downplayed. Some clear exceptions are Brazil’s contributions to UNHCR, where federal expenditures in refugee protection between 2011 and 2013 amounted to 8.3 million-dollars provided to UNHCR—“the principal donor among emerging countries”—and 1.2 million to CSOs (Ipea 2017, 142-143). Mexico volunteered to host a major global event on disaster risk reduction in 2017, the Global Platform, and co-led the negotiation process of the Global Compact on Migration. Brazil and Chile created and support, among others, the international facility for the purchase of drugs (UNITAID) for tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, malaria and hepatitis C.

Besides, emerging countries are also contributing to domestic humanitarian action implemented by international organizations or NGOs with international reach. Dealing with its internal conflict, the Colombian government disburses significant amounts of money through local UN agencies. The most striking example is the local office of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which is the largest in the world; in 2016 the Colombian government contributed 43.8 million dollars to the office, more than the European Union or Japan provided (UNODC 2017). In other UN agencies relevant for the three types of humanitarian crises explored in this paper and for all countries in the sample, it was evident that local offices have, to a large extent, become government contractors, helping to provide human resources and services nationally and internationally. In Brazil, for instance, someone said that UNDP is the travel agency of ABC, since it operationalizes most of its cooperation; UN agencies also help by contracting staff for the ministries, at least in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Interestingly, in all countries, UN contractors mentioned preferring working directly for the government instead of the UN—contrary to the trend in less developed countries; this is mainly because of the stability of the posts. With this symbiosis, emerging countries are influencing global governance

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13 An interviewee mentioned that there is lobbying for a Colombian to head the agency in the near future.
(Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou 2017), although being presented as donors fails to capture such a bottom-up transformation.

As for the prospects of other national actors promoting governmental donor behavior, there is no clear answer. There is the unique case of MSF Brazil that wound up its humanitarian projects in the country in 2011 and, since 2013, the organization has been advocating for the government to become more engaged with humanitarianism (MSF 2016). The development of local humanitarian organizations is incipient, as Abdeneur and Sochaczewski (2016) suggest for Brazil. Think tanks in Brazil and Colombia denounced the local alliance of the government with UN agencies on the grounds that it hinders their own capacity to grow, since the UN agencies capture human and financial resources. Red Cross societies still seem trapped in the old model of local, usually in-kind charity, and struggle to create a culture of monetary support. Interestingly, while church-related organizations play a crucial role in providing support—particularly in relation to forced displacement—and benefit from international funding from Caritas and other organizations, they are not seen as channels to fund action abroad. Figueroa Fischer (2016) mentions missionary goals conflicting with their humanitarian intentions. Future research is necessary to shed light on why the emergence of these countries is not changing the direction of these traditional flows of humanitarian financial support.

6. Conclusion: Towards a new humanitarian normal

Latin American emerging countries offer an example of how the rise of the rest challenges existing humanitarian practices. Using three basic elements of humanitarian narratives and practices, the experience of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico reveals the nature of the challenge they pose. First of all, they resist being seen as the locus of humanitarian crises. They

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14 Oxfam had a similar agenda there, but decided to quit such approach after the political changes since 2016.
15 Colombian society was an exception, as noted above.
acknowledge and take responsibility for their problems and generate capacities to deal with them. This provides the basis not only for non-intervention but also for equal international relationships and participation (Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014). They have done so from very early in their nation-building processes, and continue to do so now when emerging and re-emerging challenges, such as disasters, pandemics and forced displacement affect them. Emerging countries continue to benefit from international support but on their own terms, mostly at a technical level, characterized by active networks beyond a single ministry and largely involving local actors—including UN offices that have become local in practice. Just as Barnett (2011, 20) does not consider the support received by the US after Katrina humanitarian response, the experience of Latin American countries further suggests that the spectrum of such framing should be drastically narrowed—see DuBois (2018).

Second, in terms of principles underlying action, Latin American emerging countries embrace a whole new set of principles that are coherent with their histories and capacities. Solidarity remains a principle common to traditional humanitarianism, reaffirming the humane side of responses to crises, but they also promote non-indifference, reciprocity, sustainability and horizontality. No matter how much non-interference is important for the region, it has not been an excuse to refrain from providing help (Coe 2015). Furthermore, this support is not seen as an isolated effort, but part of a history of mutual support. In other words, reciprocity is a vital part of their commitment. And given that dealing with crises is a long and complex process, separating support into distinct humanitarian and developmental phases is pointless; instead, providing sustainable solutions is part of the countries’ philosophy—as far as resources allow it.

Finally, Latin American countries also challenge the present focus on a humanitarian donor-recipient relationship. The principle of horizontality—supporting as equals—exposes the limitations of such an approach. Exchanges take place not between countries, but between similar offices in each state, mediated to some degree by ministries of foreign affairs, but not necessarily. This is possible thanks to similarities between the countries of the region, although
in different settings, such as Haiti, difficulties arise; still, horizontality is attempted as much as possible. In this way, impartiality and the preeminence of need have better opportunities to trump political or diplomatic distortions. Additionally, horizontality avoids the double standard of having different offices for domestic and international disasters, as it is a common feature of northern donors.

The richness of these exchanges can be overlooked through an emphasis on ‘donorship’, assuming humanitarianism must follow a linear process from recipient to donor; instead, the consolidation of a security community seems a more accurate description. In other words, the rise of the rest results in the pooling of capabilities and resources in each region that are made available to cope with local crises. The proximity of these crises, and the close contact between the countries of the region, facilitates the use of resources and smooth collaboration. Such efforts, nonetheless, may remain regional, as the lack of action during the Ebola crisis suggests, while global action continues to be sparse and contingent. It could be the case that such a lack of global projection changes as capacities and funding increase. When those are available, examples of global reach can be found: for instance, Brazil place great emphasis on African countries through the work of CGFome, and Colombian security cooperation reaches well beyond Latin America.

Support after a crisis is not about distant strangers, but about solidarity towards sisters and brothers in distress. Donini and Walker (2012) argue that humanitarian action cannot be reciprocal, but Latin American countries show that this is not the case. There is indeed great discomfort with the humanitarian label. Relevant principles for action put forward in the region seem very different from those that traditional humanitarians hold dear. The diversity of channels used for exchanges also contest the utility of seeing them as donors. Instead, security and development are common overall categories through which their contributions and tribulations, as in the absence of pandemic support, can be better understood. Therefore, ideas of human development and human security could be more relevant notions to make sense of how
the rise of the rest modifies international cooperation, while crisis-specific analyses could offer a
deeper understanding of the different dynamics of displacement, violence, pandemics, disasters
and so. The region lacks any strong humanitarian identity and so the system is in urgent need of
developing one that is closer to the local context and institutions, or else be absorbed by other
agendas with all the risks that could imply.\textsuperscript{16} If the Latin American experience is a sign of things
to come, then the rise of the rest will challenge even the most basic definitions of
humanitarianism.

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presentation was organized at the Instituto Mora, Mexico City, in February 2019 thanks to the

\textsuperscript{16} As this paper was finalized, the governments of Colombia, the US and others, were using
humanitarian assistance as an excuse for intervention and, ultimately, achieve regime change in
Venezuela. As this paper has tried to show, such behavior has no precedent in the region and provides
evidence for the possible consequences of weak humanitarian institutions.
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要約

本稿は、ブラジル・チリ・コロンビア・メキシコというラテン・アメリカの4か国の経験に依拠して、人道主義の将来についての批判的な視点を提供するものである。ラテン・アメリカ諸国は、ハイチを除けば比較的裕福な国が多いため、人道危機とはほぼ無縁であると見られがちである。しかしながら、これらの諸国は今なお深刻な不平等、組織犯罪、あらゆる形の災害の影響を受けているし、コロンビアのように多くの国内避難民を抱えている国もある。このため、ラテン・アメリカ地域の新興国は人道危機のウォッチ・リストに残ったままとなっている。本稿は、半構造化インタビューやデータ分析等に基づき、こうした経済発展と人道問題の残存という二重性を検討する。ラテン・アメリカ諸国は歴史的に人道危機が存在する国であると見られることに対して抵抗してきた。これら諸国の4つの行動原則は、「内政不干渉」「相互主義」「持続可能性」「水平性」である。特に、水平性の原則は、特定の人道危機対応を任務とする各国の省庁等のあいだの多様な南南協力を下支えしてきた。それは、「ドナー」と「被援助国」という(垂直な)関係とは異なるものであった。実際に、新興国は伝統的な人道援助の制度や理念にあからさまに挑戦するようになっているが、彼らの人道危機対応への貢献(支援)は、国内で進んでいる「人間」開発や安全保障アジェンダの変化の過程を反映したものとなっている。

キーワード：グローバルガバナンス、新興国、危機対応、南南協力、人道主義
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“Development Cooperation by Emerging Countries”

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Hisahiro Kondoh

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Jin Sato and Awidya Santikajaya